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TheRise&FalloftheLiberalInternationalOrder

JohnJ.MearsheimerUniversityofChicago

PaperPreparedforPresentationatNotreDameInternationalSecurity

Center

September11,2018

Pleasedonotquotefromthispiecewithoutthepermissionoftheauthor,asitisnotthefinalversion.

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TheRise&FalloftheLiberalInternationalOrderI.IntroductionItiswidelybelievedthattheUnitedStatesledthewayinbuildingaliberalinternationalorderintheaftermathofWorldWarII,whichhashadremarkablestayingpowerovertime.Indeed,itgrewmarkedlymoreinfluentialaftertheColdWarendedin1989andtheSovietUnioncollapsedin1991.Westernelitesseethisorderasahugelypositiveforceforpromotingpeaceandprosperityaroundtheglobe.Thetectonicplatesthatunderpintheliberalinternationalorderareshifting,however,anditisunderseriousthreat,maybeevenfallingapart.Majorchangetotheexistingorderappearstobeinevitable.Infact,whenPresidentDonaldTrumpranfortheWhiteHousein2016,heemphasizedhiscontemptfortheliberalworldorder.Sincetakingoffice,hehaspursuedpoliciesthatseemdesignedtotearitdown.Itwouldbeamistake,however,tothinkthattheliberalinternationalorderisintroubletodaysimplybecausePresidentTrumphasitinhisgunsights.Therearemorefundamentalproblemsatplay,whichaccountforwhyhehasbeenabletochallengeanorderthatenjoysalmostuniversalsupportamongtheforeignelitesintheWest.Theaimofthisarticleistodeterminewhatthoseproblemsareandwhatthefutureholdsfortheliberalworldorder.Iofferthreemainarguments.First,givenhowinterconnectedstatesareinthemodernworld,itisessentialtohaveaninternationalorderorwhatIcallboundedorderstohelpstatesinteractwitheachotherinefficientandtimelyways.Thekeyquestion,however,iswhatkindsoforderarepossibleandwheniseachlikelytoemerge?Second,thereareimportantdifferencesbetweentheAmerican-ledColdWarorderandtheensuingpost-ColdWarorder.TheUS-ledorderduringtheColdWarwasneitherinternationalnorliberal.ItwasaboundedorderthatwaslimitedmainlytotheWestandwasbuiltonarealistfoundation.Thepost-ColdWarorder,ontheotherhand,isinternationalandliberal,whichisnottosayithasbeenfullyrealizedineverynookandcrannyoftheplanet.Third,thatliberalinternationalordercontainstheseedsofitsowndestruction,whichisonereasonitisindeeptroubletodayandcannotberepaired.Thereisanadditionalreasonthatorderisdoomed:China’sriseandtheresurrectionofRussianpowerislikelytoleadtoarealistinternationalorderprincipallyconcernedwithmanagingtheworldeconomy,aswellasAmerican-ledandChinese-ledboundedordersthataremainlyconcernedwithsecurityissues.Tounderstandwhatishappeningtotheliberalinternationalorderandwhereitisheaded,itisessentialtoaddresssixquestions.First,whatisaliberalinternationalorder?Whatareitsdistinguishingcharacteristics?Second,whataretheotherkindsofinternationalorders,andwhatexplainswhenyougetaliberalinternationalorderinsteadofthealternatives?Third,whatroledoordersplayininternationalpolitics?Whyaretheyimportant?Fourth,whatisthehistoryoftheliberalworldorder?Whendiditgetstarted

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andwhathasbeenitstrajectoryovertime?Fifth,whyisthatliberalorderunderthreattoday?Sixth,whatisitsfuture?II.DefiningtheLiberalInternationalOrderThebestwaytograsptheessenceofaliberalinternationalorderistodefineeachwordinthatterm.Anorderisaclusterofinternationalinstitutionsthathelpgoverntheinteractionsamongthememberstates.1Institutionsareeffectivelyrulesthatstatesthemselvesdeviseandagreetofollow,becausetheybelievethatobeyingthoserulesisintheirinterest.Therulesprescribeacceptablekindsofbehaviorandproscribeunacceptableformsofbehavior.2Thegreatpowerswritethoserules,andunsurprisingly,theywritethemtosuittheirowninterests.Nevertheless,thoserulesusuallyworktothebenefitofthelesspowerfulstatesinthesystem.Butwhentherulesdonotaccordwiththevitalinterestsofthedominantstates,theyeitherignorethemortrytorewritethem.Anordercanincludedifferentkindsofinstitutions,toincludesecurityinstitutionslikeNATO,SEATO,ortheWarsawPact,aswellaseconomicinstitutionsliketheIMF,NAFTA,theOECD,andtheWorldBank.Itcanalsoincludeinstitutionsdealingwiththeenvironment,liketheParisClimateAgreement,andmoremultifacetedinstitutionsliketheEuropeanUnion,theLeagueofNations,andtheUnitedNations.Orderdoesnotmeanpeaceorstabilityinmylexicon.Inotherwords,itisnottheoppositeofdisorderasthattermissometimesusedtoconveychaosandconflict.Nevertheless,itiswidelybelievedintheWestthatawell-establishedliberalworldorderwillfacilitatepeace.Norisorderawordthatsimplyreflectsthebalanceofpowerinaparticularregionoramongthegreatpowers.Theinternationalorderandtheglobalbalanceofpoweraredistinctentities,althoughtheyarerelated,asdiscussedbelow.Foranordertobeinternational,itmustincludeatleastalloftheworld’sgreatpowers.Ideally,aninternationalorderwouldbeevenmoreinclusiveandcontainvirtuallyeverycountryinthesystem.Incontrast,boundedordersarecomprisedofasetofinstitutionsthathavelimitedmembership.Theydonotincludeallofthegreatpowersandtheyareusuallyregionalinscope.Theysometimesdonotincludeagreatpower,butusuallydo.Itispossibletohaveboundedandinternationalordersoperatingatthesametime,aswillbecomeclearinthesubsequentdiscussion.

1Thisdefinitionisofaninternationalorderisconsistentwithhowotherscholarsdefinetheterm.See,forexample,HalBrands,AmericanGrandStrategyandtheLiberalOrder:Continuity,Change,andOptionsfortheFuture(SantaMonica,CA:RANDCorporation,2016),p.2;G.JohnIkenberry,AfterVictory:Institutions,StrategicRestraint,andtheRebuildingofOrderafterMajorWars(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2001),pp.23,45.

2Formyviewsoninternationalinstitutions,seeJohnJ.Mearsheimer,TheFalsePromiseofInternationalInstitutions,InternationalSecurity,Vol.19,No.3(Winter1994/1995),pp.5-49.

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Foranordertobeliberal,theremustbeadominantstateinthesystemthatisaliberaldemocracy,andhashugeinfluencewithinthekeyinstitutionsthatcomprisetheorder.Theremustalsobeasubstantialnumberofotherliberaldemocraciesinthesystemandalargelyopenworldeconomy.Theultimategoaloftheseliberaldemocracies,especiallytheleadingone,istospreaddemocracyallovertheplanet,whilepromotingincreasedeconomicintercourseamongcountries,andbuildingincreasinglyeffectiveinternationalinstitutions.Inessencetheaimistocreatearobustworldorderthatiscomprisedexclusivelyofliberaldemocraciesthataredeeplyengagedeconomicallywitheachother.Theunderlyingassumption,ofcourse,isthatsuchanorderwillbelargelyfreeofwarandgenerateprosperityforallofitsmemberstates.3III.AlternativeInternationalOrdersOfcourse,notallinternationalordersareliberal.Itmakesgoodsense,therefore,todescribethealternativeordersandexplainthecircumstancesunderwhicheachtypeislikelytoappear.Atthemostgenerallevel,therearethreekindsofinternationalorders:agnostic,ideological(toincludeliberal),andrealist.Whichofthesethreeorderstakesholddependsonthedistributionofpoweramongthegreatpowersandthepoliticalideologyofthedominantstate.Ifthesystemiseitherbipolarormultipolar,theinternationalorderwillberealist.Thereasonissimple:iftherearetwoormoregreatpowersintheworld,theyhavelittlechoicebuttoactaccordingtorealistdictatesandengageinsecuritycompetitionwitheachother,whichmeanstherewouldbelittlehopeofbuildingaliberalinternationalorder.Ideologicalconsiderations,afterall,wouldbesubordinatedtosecurityconsiderations.Thatwouldbetrueevenifallthegreatpowerswereliberalstates.Furthermore,anyboundedorderdominatedbyagreatpowerineitherabipolarormultipolarworldwouldberealistatitscore,asthatgreatpowerwouldbemainlymotivatedbytheimperativesofsecuritycompetition,whichwouldbereflectedintherulesitwroteforthatboundedorder.Iftheworldisunipolar,theinternationalordercannotberealist,becausethereisonlyonegreatpowerinthesystem,andthusbydefinitiontherecannotbesecuritycompetitionamonggreatpowers,whichistheessentialunderpinningofanyrealistworldorder.Inunipolarity,theinternationalorderwouldbeeitheragnosticorideological,dependingonthepoliticalideologyofthesolepole.Ifthelonegreatpowerhasauniversalisticideology–onewhichassumesthatitscorevaluesanditspoliticalsystemshouldbeexportedtoothercountries–theendresultwouldbeanideologicalworldorder.Thesolepole,inotherwords,wouldtrytospreaditsideologyfarandwideandremaketheworldinitsownimage.Itiswellpositionedtopursuethatmission,becauseitdoesnothavetocompetewithrivalgreatpowers,asthere

3JohnJ.Mearsheimer,TheGreatDelusion:LiberalDreamsandInternationalRealities(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,2018).

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arenone.Liberalism,ofcourse,hasapowerfuluniversalisticstrandbakedintoit.Thatuniversalismstemsfromliberalism’semphasisontheimportanceofindividualrights.Theliberalstory,whichisindividualisticatitscore,maintainsthateverypersonhasasetofinalienableornaturalrights.Ineffect,thatmeansliberalsaredeeplyconcernedabouttherightsofallpeopleintheworld.Communismisanotherexampleofauniversalisticideologythatislikelytocausestatestoattempttotransformtheworld.Indeed,Marxismsharessomesimilaritieswithliberalism.AsJohnGrayputsit:“Bothwereenlightenedideologiesthatlookforwardtouniversalcivilization.”4Classanalysisisthedrivingforcebehindtheuniversalismincommunism.Marxandhisfollowersmaintainthatsocialclassestranscendnationalgroupsandstateborders.Mostimportantly,theyarguethatcapitalistexploitationhashelpedfosterapowerfulbondamongtheworkingclassesindifferentcountries.Hence,iftheSovietUnionhadwontheColdWarandhadthekindofenthusiasmforcommunismin1989thattheUnitedStateshadforliberaldemocracy,Sovietleaderssurelywouldhavetriedtobuildacommunistworldorder.Iftheunipoledoesnothaveauniversalisticideology,andthusisnotcommittedtoimposingitsownpoliticalvaluesandgoverningsystemonothercountries,theinternationalorderwouldbeagnostic.Thedominantpowerwouldstilltargetregimesthatchallengeditsauthorityandwouldstillbedeeplyinvolvedinmanagingtheinstitutionsthatcomprisetheinternationalorderaswellasshapingtheworldeconomytosuititsowninterests.Butitwouldnotbecommittedtodoingregimechangeonaglobalscale.Itisalsopossiblethatagreatpowerwithauniversalisticideologymightfailinitsattempttoremaketheworldinitsownimageandabandonthatenterprise,inwhichcasetheorderwouldbecomeagnostic.IfChina,withitspresentpoliticalsystem,weretobecomeaunipolein2050,theinternationalsystemwouldbeagnostic,asChinaisnotconsumedwithauniversalisticideology.IV.WhyOrdersAreNecessaryTherearetworeasonswhyorders–betheyboundedorinternational–areindispensableinthecontemporaryinternationalsystem.Forstarters,theyareessentialformanaginginter-staterelationsinahighlyinterdependentworld.Thereisanenormousamountofeconomicintercourseamongcountries,whichcallsforinstitutionsandrulesthatcanregulatethoseinteractionsandmakethemworksmoothly.Butthatinterdependenceisnotrestrictedtoeconomicaffairs;italsoincludesenvironmentalandhealthissues.Pollutioninonecountry,forexample,invariablyaffectstheenvironmentinneighboringcountries,whiletheeffectsofglobalwarmingareuniversalandcanonlybedealtwiththroughmultilateralmeasures.Moreover,deadlydiseasesdonotneedpassportstocrossinternationalboundaries,asthelethalinfluenzapandemicof1918-1920madeclear.

4JohnGray,BlackMass:ApocalypticReligionandtheDeathofUtopia(NewYork:Farrar,StrausandGiroux,2007),p.30.

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Statesareoftentimesinterconnectedinthemilitaryrealmaswell,especiallywithalliances.Topresentanadversarywithaformidabledeterrentpostureortofighteffectivelyifdeterrencebreaksdown,alliesbenefitgreatlyfromhavingclearrulesthatstipulatenotonlyhoweachmember’smilitarywilloperate,butalsohowtheywillcoordinatewitheachother.Theneedforcoordinationismagnifiedbythefactthatmodernmilitariespossessavastofarrayweapons,notallofwhicharecompatiblewiththeirallies’weaponry.ThinkaboutthewidevarietyofweaponsinthemilitariesthatcomprisedNATOandtheWarsawPact,nottomentionthedifficultyofcoordinatingthemovementsofthevariousfightingforcesinsidethosealliances.ItisunsurprisingthatbothsuperpowersmaintainedheavilyinstitutionalizedmilitaryalliancesinEuropeduringtheColdWar.Itisimportanttoemphasizethattheinstitutionsthatcompriseanorderdonothavetheabilitytocoercepowerfulstatestoobeytherulesifthosestatesbelievethatdoingsoisnotintheirnationalinterest.Thus,itmakeslittlesensetoarguethateitheraboundedoraninternationalorderisanactualformofgovernance,becausethatterminologyimpliesthereisasovereigngoverningauthoritywithpowersofenforcement,whichisnotthecase,certainlywithregardtothegreatpowers.Still,thereisnoquestionthattherules,whicharetheessenceofanyinstitution,helpmanagethebehaviorofstates,andthatgreatpowersobeytherulesmostofthetime.Thebottomlineisthatinaworldofmulti-facetedinterdependence,youneedasystemofrulestolowertransactioncostsandhelpcarryoutthemultitudeofinteractionsthattakeplaceamongstates.5AdmiralHarryHarris,theformercommanderofU.S.militaryforcesinthePacific,capturesthispointwhenhereferstotoday’sliberalinternationalorderasthe“GlobalOperatingSystem.”6Theinstitutionsthatcompriseanorderserveasecondpurpose:theyhelpthegreatpowerstoshapethebehavioroftheweakerstatesinwaysthatsuitthegreatpowers’interests.7Specifically,themostpowerfulstatesdesigninstitutionstoconstraintheactionsoflesspowerfulstatesandthenputsignificantpressureonthemtojointhoseinstitutionsandobeytherulesnomatterwhat.Agoodexampleofthisphenomenonisthesuperpowers’effortsduringtheColdWartobuildanon-proliferationregime.Towardthatend,theSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatesdevisedtheNPT(1968),whicheffectivelymadeitillegalforanymemberstatethatdidnothavenuclearweaponstoacquirethem.Naturally,theleadershipinMoscowandWashingtonwenttogreatlengthstogeteverystateintheworldtojointheNPT.The

5RobertO.Keohane,AfterHegemony:CooperationandDiscordintheWorldPoliticalEconomy(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1984)

6StatementofAdmiralHarryB.Harris,Jr.,CommanderofU.SPacificCommand,beforetheArmedServicesCommitteeoftheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives,April26,2017,p.1.

7LloydGruber,RulingtheWorld:PowerPoliticsandtheRiseofSupranationalInstitutions(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2000).

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superpowerswerealsothemaindrivingforcebehindtheformationoftheNuclearSuppliersGroup(1974),whichaimedtoplacesignificantlimitsonthesaleofnuclearmaterialsandtechnologiestocountriesthatdidnotpossessnuclearweapons,butmightattempttoacquirethem.Finally,onecandiscriminateamongordersonthebasisofwhethertheyhaveasignificantimpactonthemostimportantareasofstateactivity,whicharethoseconcerningwealthgenerationandsecurity.Thefocushereisnotonhoweffectiveparticularordersareatachievingspecificoutcomes,butinsteadonwhethertheyhaveawide-rangingimpactonthememberstates’behaviorintheeconomicandmilitaryrealms.Afull-scaleorderiscomprisedofinstitutionsthathaveasignificantinfluenceinbothofthoserealms,whileapartialorderhasamarkedimpactoneithertheeconomicorsecurityspheres,butnotboth.Asparseorderhaslimitedinfluenceinbothofthosecriticalrealms.V.TheColdWarOrdersTherootsofthecontemporaryliberalinternationalordercanbetracedbacktotheColdWar.Theglobaldistributionofpowerbetween1945and1989wasbipolar,whichledtotheformationofthreeprincipalpoliticalorders.TherewasanoverarchinginternationalorderthatwaslargelycreatedandmaintainedbytheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStates,thetwomostpowerfulstatestoemergefromWorldWarII.Therewerealsotwoboundedorders,onelargelyconfinedtotheWestanddominatedbyWashington,theothercomprisedmainlyoftheworld’scommunistcountriesanddominatedbyMoscow.Alloftheseorderswerebuiltonarealistfoundation.TheinternationalorderthatexistedduringtheColdWarwasnotliberal,becausethesuperpowersthatwereprincipallyresponsibleforcreatingitweredeeplyengagedinanintensesecuritycompetitionfromthestartofthatconflicttoitsfinish.Thus,balance-of-powerpoliticsshapedthatorderinprofoundways.Ofcourse,theSovietUnionwasnotaliberaldemocracy,andindeedMoscowandWashingtonweremortalideologicalenemies.Butevenifbothcountrieshadbeenliberaldemocracies,theinternationalorderwouldstillhavebeenrealist.Itwasalsoasparseworldorder,asitdidnothaveamarkedinfluenceonthebehaviorofstatesineithertheeconomicorsecurityrealms.BecausetherewasnotmucheconomicintercoursebetweentheWestandthecommunistworldduringtheColdWar,therewaslittleneedtobuildformidableinstitutionstohelpmanageeconomicdealingsbetweentherivalblocs.Thesecuritysideofthestorywassomewhatmorecomplicated,however.GiventhattheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStateswereadversariesthatcompetedwitheachotherforpower,theyconcentratedonbuildingformidableboundedorderstowagethatstruggle.Inotherwords,themainsecurityinstitutionsthateachsuperpowercreatedwerenotinternationalinscope.ThinkNATOandtheWarsawPact,whichwerethecoresecurityinstitutionsintheWesternandcommunistorders,respectively.Nevertheless,theSovietsandtheAmericanssometimeshadgoodreasonstocooperatewitheachotheronsecuritymattersanddeviseinternationalinstitutionsthatcouldserve

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eachside’sinterests.DuringthesecondhalfoftheColdWar,theyworkedtogethertoproducearmscontrolagreementsthatweredesignedto:checknuclearproliferation;andputsomelimitsontheirownarmsrace.Intheprocess,MoscowandWashingtonhelpedstrengthentheColdWarinternationalorder,althoughitstillremainedasparseorder.Bothsuperpowerswereopposedtofurtherproliferationassoonastheyacquiredthebomb.AlthoughtheUnitedStatestestedthefirstatomicweaponin1945andtheSovietssoonfollowedsuitin1949,itwasnotuntilthemid-1970sthatthoserivalsputinplaceasetofinstitutionsthatcouldseriouslyslowdownthespreadofnuclearweapons.8ThefirstsmallstepforwardwasthecreationoftheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyin1957.Itsprimarymissionistopromotethecivilianuseofnuclearenergywhileapplyingsafeguardsthatensurestatesreceivingnuclearmaterialsandtechnologiesforpeacefulpurposesdonotusethemtobuildabomb.ButthekeyinstitutionsthesuperpowersdevisedtocurbproliferationaretheNPT(1968)andtheNSG(1974),whichmarkedlysloweddownthespreadofnuclearweaponsinthelatterpartoftheColdWar.TheAmericansandtheSovietsalsobeganpursuinganarmscontrolagreementinthelate1960sthatwouldputsomelimitsontheirstrategicnucleararsenals.Theresultwasthe1972SALTITreaty,whichcappedthenumberofstrategicnuclearweaponseachsidecoulddeploy(althoughatveryhighlevels)andalsoseverelyrestrictedthedevelopmentofanti-ballisticmissile(ABM)systems.MoscowandWashingtonsignedtheSALTIITreatyin1979,whichputfurtherlimitsoneachside’sstrategicnucleararsenals;butneithersideratifiedit.Thesuperpowersworkedonafollow-onagreementcalledSTARTIduringthe1980s,butitwasnotputintoeffectuntilaftertheColdWarended.Theothersignificantarmscontrolagreementwasthe1988INFTreaty,whicheliminatedallshort-rangeandintermediaterangemissilesfromtheSovietandU.S.inventories.ThesuperpowersnegotiatedahostofotherlesssignificantsecurityagreementsandtreatiesthatwerealsopartoftheColdWarinternationalorder.TheyincludetheAntarcticTreatySystem(1959),thePartialTestBanTreaty(1963),theMoscow-WashingtonHotLine(1963),theOuterSpaceTreaty(1967),theSeabedArmsControlTreaty(1971),theU.S.-SovietIncidentsatSeaAgreement(1972),theConferenceonSecurityandCooperationinEurope(1973),theBiologicalWeaponsConvention(1975);andtheHelsinkiAccords(1975).Thereweresomeagreements,liketheUNConventiononLawoftheSea,whichwassignedin1982,butnotputintoeffectuntil1994,fiveyearsaftertheColdWarended.

TheUNwasthemostvisibleinstitutionintheColdWarinternationalorder,butithadlittleinfluenceonthebehaviorofcountriesaroundtheworld,muchlessthesuperpowers’actions.Inadditiontothissparseinternationalorder,eachsuperpowerbuiltaboundedorderthatwasfull-scaleandrealist.TheSoviet-ledcommunistorder,whichwasbuiltprimarilytowagetheColdWar,includedinstitutionsthatdealtwitheconomic,militaryandideological8ElizaGheorghe,“ProliferationandtheLogicoftheNuclearMarketplace,”UnpublishedManuscript,YaleUniversity,March12,2018.

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matters.Comeconwasestablishedin1949mainlytofacilitatetradebetweentheSovietUnionandthecommuniststatesinEasternEuropean.TheWarsawPactwasamilitaryalliancefoundedin1955tocounterNATOinthewakeofitsdecisiontomakeWestGermanyamember.Italsoservedanotherpurpose:tohelptheSovietskeeptheirEasternEuropeanalliesinline.Finally,MoscowcreatedCominformin1947asasuccessortoComintern.Bothweredesignedtocoordinatetheeffortsofcommunistpartiesaroundtheworld,mainlyforthepurposeofallowingtheSovietstopurveytheirpolicyviewstotheirideologicalbrethren.Cominformwasdissolvedin1956.

TheboundedWesternorderwasdominatedbytheUnitedStates,whichshapedittosuititsowninterests.ItencompassedahostofeconomicinstitutionsliketheIMF(1945),theWorldBank(1945),GATT(1947),CoCom(1950),andtheEuropeanCommunity(1957),aswellasNATOonthesecurityfront.AlthoughliberaldemocraticAmericadominatedthisboundedorder,whichalsoincludedanumberofotherliberaldemocracies,itwasarealistorderatitscore.ItsprincipalmissionwastocreateapowerfulWestthatcouldcontainandultimatelydefeattheSovietUnionanditsallies.9Thisisnottodenythatgeneratingprosperitywasanimportantendinitselfforthisboundedorder.NoristodenythattheUnitedStateswascommittedtoeconomicopennessandceterisparibuspreferreddealingwithdemocraciestoauthoritarianstates.Butbuildinginstitutionsandencouragingtradeandinvestmentwereconsistentwitharealistagenda,andpromotingdemocracy,howeverdesirableagoal,alwaystookabackseatwhenitconflictedwiththedictatesofbalance-of-powerpolitics.VI.TheLiberalInternationalOrderAftertheColdWarendedandtheSovietUnioncollapsed,theUnitedStateswasbyfarthemostpowerfulcountryintheworld.The“unipolarmoment”hadarrived.10Moreover,thedeeplyrootedandfull-scaleWesternorderthatAmericanpolicymakershadcreatedtodealwiththeSovietthreatremainedfirmlyintact,whileitsrivalcommunistorderquicklyfellapart.ComecondissolvedinJune1991,theWarsawPactinJuly1991,andtheSovietUnionitselfinDecember1991.Unsurprisingly,PresidentGeorgeH.W.Bushandhisadvisors9TherationaleforfoundingtheEuropeanCommunity(EC),theforerunneroftheEU,showstherealistrootsoftheWesternorder.AlthoughmanybelievethateconomicfactorswerethemainreasonforcreatingtheEC,infact,strategiccalculationsinvolvingtheSovietthreat,weretheprincipaldrivingforce.SeeSebastianRosato,EuropeUnited:PowerPoliticsandtheMakingoftheEuropeanCommunity(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2011).

10MostforeignpolicyanalystsandscholarsbelievetheinternationalsystemhasbeenunipolarsincetheColdWarended,andtheUnitedStatesisthesolepole.Theotherstatesareeithermajororminorpowers,butnotgreatpowers.SeeNunoP.Monteiro,TheoryofUnipolarPolitics(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2014).Incontrast,Ibelievetheworldhasbeenmultipolar,asChinaandRussiaarealsogreatpowers.JohnJ.Mearsheimer,TheTragedyofGreatPowerPolitics,updateded.(NewYork:Norton,2014).Thereisnoquestion,however,thattheUnitedStatesisfarmorepowerfulthanthoseothertwogreatpowers.Indeed,itistheonlysuperpoweramongthethree,makingthisaclear-cutcaseofunbalancedmultipolarity.Thus,thereislittledaylightbetweenmyviewoftheglobalbalanceofpowerandthosewhoseeunipolarity.Giventhisfact,coupledwithhowthepopularlexiconhasevolved,Iusethetermunipolarity,notunbalancedmultipolarity,todescribethearchitectureofthesystemsince1989.

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decidedtotaketherealistWesternorderandspreaditacrosstheplanet,transformingitintheprocessintoaliberalinternationalorder.ThisendeavorenjoyedtheenthusiasticsupportoftheliberaldemocraciesinWesternEuropeandEastAsia,althoughtherewasneveranydoubtthattheUnitedStateswouldbeinthedriver’sseat.AsBushputitin1990,“thereisnosubstituteforAmericanleadership.”11OrasPresidentClintonandhisSecretaryofState,MadeleineAlbright,likedtosay,theUnitedStatesis“theindispensablenation.”12ThoseinstitutionsthathadbeenthekeyelementsoftheColdWarinternationalorder–theUNandthevariousarmscontrolagreements–wouldbeintegratedintowhatBushcalledthe“newworldorder.”HefirstlaidouthisvisionbeforeajointsessionofCongressonSeptember11,1990.Thepresident,whohadjustreturnedfromafruitfulmeetingwithSovietPresidentMikhailGorbachev,wasactuallyaddressingCongressabouthowtheUnitedStateswoulddealwithIraq’sconquestofKuwaitonemonthearlier:

Clearly,nolongercanadictatorcountonEast-WestconfrontationtostymieconcertedUnitedNationsactionagainstaggression.Anewpartnershipofnationshasbegun.Westandtodayatauniqueandextraordinarymoment.ThecrisisinthePersianGulf,asgraveasitis,alsooffersarareopportunitytomovetowardanhistoricperiodofcooperation.Outofthesetroubledtimes…anewworldordercanemerge:anewera–freerfromthethreatofterror,strongerinthepursuitofjustice,andmoresecureinthequestforpeace.Anerainwhichthenationsoftheworld,EastandWest,NorthandSouth,canprosperandliveinharmony.Ahundredgenerationshavesearchedforthiselusivepathtopeace,whileathousandwarsragedacrossthespanofhumanendeavor.Todaythatnewworldisstrugglingtobeborn,aworldquitedifferentfromtheonewe'veknown.Aworldwheretheruleoflawsupplantstheruleofthejungle.Aworldinwhichnationsrecognizethesharedresponsibilityforfreedomandjustice.Aworldwherethestrongrespecttherightsoftheweak.ThisisthevisionthatIsharedwithPresidentGorbachevinHelsinki.HeandotherleadersfromEurope,theGulf,andaroundtheworldunderstandthathowwemanagethiscrisistodaycouldshapethefutureforgenerationstocome.13

BushandhissuccessorsintheWhiteHousewerebentonpursuingaremarkablyambitioustask:creatinganewinternationalorderthatwasfundamentallydifferentfromtheWesternorderthatexistedduringtheColdWar.14Inshort,theyweredeterminedtotransformaboundedandrealistorderintoaninternationalandliberalone.Moreover,theyaimedto11PresidentGeorgeH.W.Bush,AddressBeforeaJointSessionoftheCongressonthePersianGulfCrisisandtheFederalBudgetDeficit,September11,1990,http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18820.

12AlbrightmadethisstatementonNBC’sTodayshowonFebruary19,1998.

13Bush,September11,1990speech.

14WhenBillClintonbecamepresidentin1993,hemaintainedthathispredecessor’sconceptofanewworldorderwasnotambitiousenough.SeeDavidC.Hendrickson,“TheRecoveryofInternationalism,”ForeignAffairs,Vol.75,No.5(September/October1994),pp.26-43.*

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makesurethatitwasafull-scaleinternationalorder,like[?]theWesternorderthatwouldbeitsfoundation.Creatingaliberalinternationalorderinvolvedthreemaintasks.First,itwasessentialtoexpandthemembershipintheinstitutionsthatcomprisedtheWesternorder,aswellascreatenewinstitutionswherenecessary.Inotherwords,itwasessentialtocreateawebofinternationalinstitutionswithuniversalmembership.Second,itwasimperativetointegratecountriesallaroundtheworldintotheopeneconomicorderthattheUnitedStatesanditsalliesbuiltduringtheColdWar,andindeedmakethatorderevenmoreopen.Thatgoal,ofcourse,dovetailedwiththefirstgoal,sincemanyinternationalinstitutionsdealwitheconomicaffairs.Third,itwascrucialtovigorouslypromoteliberaldemocracyaroundtheworld,amissionthatwasfrequentlyshortchangedwhentheUnitedStateswascompetingforpowerwiththeSovietUnion.Thesethreetasks,ofcourse,aredirectlytiedtotheprincipalliberaltheoriesofpeace:liberalinstitutionalism,economicinterdependencetheory,anddemocraticpeacetheory.Thus,inthemindsofitsarchitects,constructingarobustandsustainableliberalinternationalorderwassynonymouswithcreatingapeacefulworld.Thisdeep-seatedbeliefgavetheUnitedStatesanditsalliesapowerfulincentivetoworkovertimetocreatethatneworder.IntegratingChinaandRussiaintoitwasespeciallyimportantforitssuccess,becausetheywerethetwomostpowerfulstatesinthesystembesidestheUnitedStates.Theaimwastoembedtheminasmanyinstitutionsaspossible,fullyintegratethemintotheopeninternationaleconomy,andhelpturnthemintoliberaldemocracies.NATOexpansionintoEasternEuropeisagoodexampleoftheUnitedStatesanditsalliesworkingtoturntheboundedWesternorderintoaliberalinternationalorder.OnemightthinkthatmovingNATOeastwardwaspartofaclassicdeterrencestrategyaimedatcontainingapotentiallyaggressiveRussia.15Butitwasnot,astheWest’sstrategywasbasedmainlyonliberalprinciples.TheaimwastointegratethecountriesofEasternEurope–andpossiblyRussiaaswell–intothe“securitycommunity”thathaddevelopedinWesternEuropeduringtheColdWar.ItschiefarchitectsdidnotthinkMoscowwasathreattoinvadeitsneighborsthatneededtobecontained,orthatRussianleaderswouldseeNATOenlargementasthreatening.16

15ThisisanargumentthatsomeanalystsmadeaftertheUkrainecrisisbrokeoutinFebruary2014.StephenSestanovich,forexample,claimsthat“today’saggressiveRussianpolicywasinplace”intheearly1990sand“powercalculationsundergirded”AmericanpolicytowardRussia–toincludeNATOexpansion–fromthatpointforward.StephenSestanovich,“HowtheWestHasWon,”ForeignAffairs,Vol.93,No.6(November/December2014),pp.171,173.NATOenlargement,fromthisperspective,isarealistpolicy.Theavailableevidence,however,contradictsthisinterpretationofevents.Russiawasinnopositiontotaketheoffensiveinthe1990s,andalthoughitseconomyandmilitaryimprovedsomewhatafter2000,hardlyanyoneintheWestsawitasaseriousthreattoinvadeitsneighbors–especiallyUkraine–beforetheFebruary22crisis.Infact,Russiahadhardlyanylarge-scalecombatunitsonornearitswesternborder,andnoseriousRussianpolicymakerorpundittalkedaboutconqueringterritoryinEasternEurope.Thus,itisunsurprisingthatU.S.leadersrarelyinvokedthethreatofRussianaggressiontojustifyNATOexpansion.

16Ikenberry,AfterVictory,pp.235-39,245-46,270-73.

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ThisliberalapproachtoNATOexpansionisreflectedinhowtheClintonadministrationsoldthatpolicy.Forexample,DeputySecretaryofStateStrobeTalbottarguedin1995thatembeddingthecountriesofEasternEuropeinNATO–aswellastheEuropeanUnion–wasthekeytoproducingstabilityinthatpotentiallyvolatileregion.“EnlargementofNATOwouldbeaforcefortheruleoflawbothwithinEurope’snewdemocraciesandamongthem.”Moreover,itwould“promoteandconsolidatedemocraticandfreemarketvalues,”whichwouldfurthercontributetopeace.17HowtheUnitedStateshasdealtwithaChinainthepost-ColdWaryearsisbasedonessentiallythatsameliberallogic.Forexample,Clinton’sSecretaryofState,MadeleineAlbright,maintainedthatthekeytosustainingpeacefulrelationswitharisingChinaistoengagewithit,nottrytocontainitthewaytheUnitedStatesdealtwiththeSovietUnionduringtheColdWar.EngagementwouldleadtoChina’sactivemembershipinsomeoftheworld’smajorinstitutionsandalsohelpintegrateitintotheAmerican-ledeconomicorder,whichwouldinexorablyhelpturnChinaintoaliberaldemocracy.Chinawouldthenbea“responsiblestakeholder”intheinternationalsystem,highlymotivatedtomaintainpeacefulrelationswithothercountries.18TheBushDoctrine,whichwasdevelopedoverthecourseof2002andusedtojustifytheMarch2003invasionofIraq,isathirdexampleoftheUnitedStatesseekingtobuildaliberalinternationalorder.InthewakeofSeptember11,theBushadministrationconcludedthatwinningtheso-called“globalwaronterror”notonlyrequireddefeatingalQaeda,butalsoconfrontingcountrieslikeIran,Iraq,andSyria.Thekeyoperatingassumptionwasthattheregimesintheseso-called“roguestates”werecloselytiedtoterroristorganizationslikealQaeda,werebentonacquiringnuclearweapons,andmightevengivethemtoterrorists.19Thebestwaytodealwithproliferationandterrorism,the17StrobeTalbott,“WhyNATOShouldGrow,”NewYorkReviewofBooks,August10,1995.Talbott’sviewsonNATOexpansionwerewidelysharedintheupperechelonsoftheClintonadministration.SeeSecretaryofStateWarrenChristopher,“ReinforcingNATO’sStrengthintheWestandDeepeningCooperationwiththeEast,”OpeningStatementattheNorthAtlanticCouncilMinisterialMeeting,Noordwijk,Netherlands,May30,1995;SecretaryofStateMadeleineAlbright,“APresidentialTributetoGeraldFord,”FordMuseumAuditorium,GrandRapids,Michigan,April17,1997;SecretaryofStateMadeleineAlbright,CommencementAddress,HarvardUniversity,June5,1997.

18SecretaryofStateMadeleineAlbright,“AmericanPrincipleandPurposeinEastAsia,”1997ForrestalLecture,U.S.NavalAcademy,Annapolis,Maryland,April15,1997.AlsoseeSecretaryofStateWarrenChristopher,“AmericaandtheAsia-PacificFuture,”AddresstotheAsiaSociety,NewYorkCity,May27,1994;“ANationalSecurityStrategyofEngagementandEnlargement,”TheWhiteHouse,February1995,pp.28-29;“ANationalSecurityStrategyforaNewCentury,”WhiteHouse,October1998,pp.41-47.DeputySecretaryofStateRobertZoellickfirstintroducedtheterm“responsiblestakeholder”in2005.Zoellick,“WhitherChina?FromMembershiptoResponsibility,”remarkstotheNationalCommitteeonU.S.-ChinaRelations,NewYorkCity,September21,2005.

19PresidentBushsaidshortlybeforetheinvasionofIraqinMarch2003that“thegreatestdangerinthewaronterror[is]outlawregimesarmingwithweaponsofmassdestruction.”PresidentGeorgeW.Bush,SpeechatAEI’sAnnualDinner,February28,2003.OntheBushDoctrinesee,TheNationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStates,(Washington,DC:TheWhiteHouse,September17,2002)

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Bushadministrationreasoned,wastoturnallthecountriesintheGreaterMiddleEastintoliberaldemocracies,whichwouldtransformthatregionintoagiantzoneofpeace,takingthosetwinproblemsoffthetable.20“Theworldhasaclearinterestinthespreadofdemocraticvalues,”PresidentBushsaid,“becausestableandfreenationsdonotbreedtheideologiesofmurder.Theyencouragethepeacefulpursuitofabetterlife.”21Itappearedtomanyobserversintheearly1990sthattheUnitedStateswaswellsituatedtoconstructaliberalinternationalorder.IthadabundantexperiencebuildingandrunningtheWesternorderduringtheColdWar,anditwasalsoremarkablypowerfulcomparedtoitspotentialrivals.ChinawasthenintheearlystagesofitsriseandRussiawasinastateofcompletedisarray,whichremainedthecasethroughoutthe1990s.Thishugepoweradvantagemeantthattheunipolecouldlargelyignorerealistdictatesandactaccordingtoliberalprinciples,whichwasimpossibleduringtheColdWar.Furthermore,thispoweradvantagecouldbeusedtocoaxorcoerceotherstatesintofollowingWashington’sedicts.Ifnecessary,therewasalwaysthepossibilitytheUnitedStateswoulduseforcetogetitsway.Finally,theUnitedStatesanditsallieshadabundantlegitimacyintheyearsimmediatelyaftertheColdWarended.Notonlydidtheywinthatprotractedconflict,butalsotheredidnotseemtobeaviablealternativetoliberaldemocracy,whichlookedliketheoptimalpoliticalorderfortheforeseeablefuture.Itwaswidelybelievedatthetimethateventuallyalmosteverycountryintheworldwouldbecomealiberaldemocracy,whichledFrancisFukuyamatoconcludethatthismightbe“theendofhistory.”22Inessence,itlookedliketheUnitedStateshadthewindatitsbackandwasfreetopursueliberalhegemony,aforeignpolicythatcalledforbuildingaworldorderbasedonliberalprinciples.23Duringthe1990sandtheearly2000s,theUnitedStatesanditsclosealliesappearedtobewellontheirwaytofashioningafull-scaleliberalinternationalorder.Thereweresomeproblemsforsure,butgenerallyspeakingtheemergingorderwasworkingwell.Fewpeopleexpectedthatitwouldbeginunravelingafewyearsintothenewmillennium,butthatiswhathappened.20OnemightthinkthatNATOexpansion;AmericaneffortstoturnChinaintoaliberaldemocracy;andtheBushDoctrineareactuallyevidenceofuntetheredrealism,whichwasmadepossiblebythecomingofunipolarity.Butthisconclusionwouldbewrong.ItisclearfromthediscourseinpolicycirclesandwithintheforeignpolicyestablishmentthatthesepoliciesandothersweremotivatedbyliberaltheoriesandthattheUnitedStatesanditsalliesintheWestwerefirmlycommittedtobuildingaliberalworldorderthatwouldtranscendbalance-of-powerpolitics.Almostallrealists,itisworthnoting,opposedNATOexpansion,theIraqWar,andtheBushDoctrine.Moreover,theyfavoredemphasizingcontainmentoverengagementindealingwithChina.IftheUnitedStateshadbeenguidedbyrealistlogicintheaftermathoftheColdWar,itwouldhavesoughttocreateanagnosticinternationalorderandpursuedthepoliciespushedbyrealists.

21Bush,SpeechatAEI’sAnnualDinner.

22FrancisFukuyama,“TheEndofHistory?,”NationalInterest,No.16(Summer1989),pp.3–18.

23Mearsheimer,TheGreatDelusion.

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VII.TheGoldenYearsTheUnitedStatesanditsalliesdidagoodjobofintegratingChinaandRussiaintotheworld’skeyeconomicinstitutionsinthedecadeorsoaftertheColdWarended.RussiajoinedtheIMFandtheWorldBankinJune1992,althoughitdidnotjointheWTOuntilAugust2012.ChinahadbeenamemberoftheIMFandtheWorldBanksinceApril1980,whenittookTaiwan’splaceinthoseinstitutions.ChinajoinedtheWTOinDecember2001.AlthoughtherewasaminorcrisisoverTaiwanin1997,Sino-Americanrelationswereotherwisegoodthroughoutthe1990sandearly2000s.Engagementappearedtobeworking.RelationsbetweenMoscowandWashingtonalsofaredwellduringthisperiod.ThestoryinEuropewaspositiveaswell.TheMaastrichtTreaty(1992)wasamajorstepforwardinpromotingEuropeanintegration,andthenin1999theeuromadeitsdebut,whichwaswidelyseenasevidencethattheEUhadabrightfuture.Furthermore,therewerehardlyanyproblemswiththeearlywavesofEUandNATOexpansionintoEasternEurope,althoughtheRussiansmadetheiroppositionclear.FinallybothCzechoslovakiaandtheSovietUnionbrokeapartpeacefully.Yugoslaviadidnot,however,leadingtowarsoverBosniaandKosovo,whichtheUnitedStatesanditsNATOallieswereslowtoshutdown.ButacoldpeacewasfinallyimposedontheBalkansin1999.ThestorywasmoremixedintheGreaterMiddleEast,buteventhereitappearedthattheregionwasslowlybutsteadilybeingincorporatedintotheliberalinternationalorder.IsraelandthePLOsignedtheOsloAccordsinSeptember1993,givinghopethatthetwosidesmightfindapeacefulsolutiontotheirconflictbytheendofthedecade.TheUnitedStates,operatingwithaUNSecurityCouncilmandate,ledabroadcoalitionofalliestoastunningmilitaryvictoryoverIraqinearly1991–liberatingKuwait,seriouslyweakeningIraq’smilitary,andexposingitssecretnuclearweaponsprogram,whichwasthenshutdown.Nevertheless,SaddamHusseinremainedinpower.Afghanistanalsoremainedatroublespot,mainlybecausetheTalibanallowedalQaedatooperatethere,whichledto9/11.Theeventsofthatday,however,promptedtheUnitedStatestoinvadeAfghanistaninOctober2001andtoppletheTalibanfrompower,puttinginitsplaceapro-Westernregime.TheninMarch2003,theAmericanmilitaryconqueredIraqandtoppledSaddamfrompower.Itappearedbythesummerof2003thattheBushDoctrine,whichaimedtospreaddemocracyacrosstheGreaterMiddleEast,wasgoingtoworkasintended.DemocracywasclearlyonthemarchinthewakeoftheColdWar,seeminglyconfirmingFukuyama’sclaimthattherewasnoviablealternativetoit.AccordingtoFreedomHouse,34percentofthecountriesintheworldweredemocraciesin1986.Thatnumberjumpedto41percentby1996andthen47percentby2006.24Despiteoccasionalturmoilinparticularregions,theinternationaleconomywashummingalonginthe1990sandearly2000s.Plus,therewasgrowinginterestinprosecutinghumanrightsviolators,leadingaprominentscholartowriteabooktitledTheJusticeCascade:HowHumanRights

24ArchPuddingtonandTylerRoylance,“PopulistsandAutocrats:TheDualThreattoGlobalDemocracy,”inFreedomintheWorld,2017(Washington,DC:FreedomHouse,2017),p.4.

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ProsecutionsAreChangingWorldPolitics.25Ontheproliferationfront,SouthAfricaabandoneditsnuclearweaponsprogramin1989,whileBelarus,Kazakhstan,andUkrainegaveupthenucleararsenalstheyinheritedfromtheSovietUnion.NorthKorea,whichwasonitswaytodevelopingnuclearweaponsintheearly1990s,agreedtoterminateitsprogramin1994.TheUnitedStatesanditsalliesdidfacesomesetbacksinthecourseofthe1990s.IndiaandPakistantestednuclearweaponsin1998,andtheUnitedStatessuffereddefeatsinHaiti(1994-95)andSomalia(1993),nottomentionthattheClintonadministrationreactedmuchtooslowlytotheRwandangenocidein1994.ItalsofailedtoshutdowndeadlywarsinCongoandSudan,whilealQaedagrewmoredangerousintheconfinesofAfghanistan.Still,onecouldmakeastrongcasethatenormousprogresshadbeenmadeinashorttimeinspreadingtheliberalinternationalorderacrosstheglobeandthattheUnitedStatesanditsallieswouldeventuallybeabletointegratetroubledcountriesinAfricaandelsewhereintotheneworderandmakefurtherstridesinrollingbackproliferation.VIII.TheLiberalWorldOrderGoesSouthMidwaythroughthefirstdecadeofthe2000s,seriouscracksbegantoappearintheliberalinternationalorder,whichhavewidenedsincethen.ConsiderwhathashappenedintheGreaterMiddleEast.By2005,itwasapparentthattheIraqwarwasturningintoadisaster,andtheUnitedStateshadnostrategyforstoppingthefighting,muchlessturningIraqintoaliberaldemocracy.Atthesametime,thesituationinAfghanistanbegantodeteriorateastheTalibancamebackfromthedeadandbegantochallengetheAmerican-installedgovernmentinKabul.TheTalibanhasgrownstrongerwithtimeandtheAfghanistanwarisnowthelongestwarinUShistory,andthereisstillnoendinsight.TheUnitedStatesanditsalliesalsopursuedregimechangeinLibyaandSyria,whichendeduphelpingtoprecipitatedeadlycivilwarsinbothcountries.Furthermore,intheprocessofhelpingtowreckIraqandSyria,theBushandObamaadministrationsplayedacentralroleincreatingISIS,whichtheUnitedStateswenttowaragainstin2014.TheOsloPeaceProcess,whichonceseemedsopromising,hasfailedcompletelyandthereisvirtuallynohopeofsettlingtheIsraeli-Palestinianconflictintheforeseeablefuture.Indeed,Israel,withhelpfromWashington,hasturneditselfintoanapartheidstate.TheUnitedStatesisalsocontributingtotheongoingmurderandmayheminYemen,anditgaveitsconsentwhenademocraticallyelectedgovernmentwasoverthrowninEgyptin2013.FarfromincorporatingtheGreaterMiddleEastintotheliberalinternationalorder,theUnitedStatesanditsallieshaveplayedakeyroleinspreadingilliberaldisorderinthatregion.

25KathrynSikkink,TheJusticeCascade:HowHumanRightsProsecutionsAreChangingWorldPolitics(NewYork:Norton,2011).AlsoseeSarahB.Snyder,FromSelmatoMoscow:HowHumanRightsActivistsTransformedU.S.ForeignPolicy(NY:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2018).

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Europe,whichappearedtobethebrighteststarintheliberalinternationalgalaxyduringthe1990s,isinserioustroubletoday.TheEUsufferedamajorsetbackin2005whenFrenchandDutchvotersrejectedtheproposedTreatyforEstablishingaConstitutionforEurope.EvenmoredamagingwastheEurozonecrisis,whichbeganinlate2009andlingersontoday.Notonlyhasitexposedthefragilityoftheeuro,butithasalsocreatedintenseanimositybetweenGermanyandGreece.26Tomakemattersworse,BritaindecidedinJune2016toexittheEU,whilexenophobicrightwingpartiesaregrowingmorepowerfulallacrossEurope.Indeed,fundamentallyilliberalviewsarecommonplaceamongleadersinEasternEurope.AsaJanuary2018articleintheNewYorkTimesputit:“TheCzechpresidenthascalledMuslimimmigrantscriminals.TheheadofPoland’sgoverningpartyhassaidrefugeesareriddledwithdisease.TheleaderofHungaryhasdescribedmigrantsaspoison…[and]Austria’snewfar-rightinteriorministersuggestedconcentratingmigrantsinasylumcenters–withallitsobviousandodiousechoesofWorldWarII.”27

Finally,thereisacivilwarraginginEasternUkrainethatinvolvesRussia,whichseizedCrimeafromUkraineinMarch2014,causingaseriousdeteriorationinrelationsbetweenRussiaandtheWest.BothsideshavesignificantlyincreasedtheirforcelevelsinEasternEuropeandroutinelyrunmilitaryexercisesthatescalatetensionsbetweenthem.Thiscrisis,whichwaslargelytheresultofEUandNATOexpansion,coupledwiththeWest’seffortstopromotedemocracyincountrieslikeGeorgiaandUkraine,andmaybeevenRussiaitself,showsnosignsofendinganytimesoon.28Giventhisstateofaffairs,MoscowhaspowerfulincentivestosowdiscordintheWestandweakeninstitutionsliketheEUandNATO.Crackshavealsoopenedupinthetrans-Atlanticrelationship,especiallywithDonaldTrump’sarrivalintheWhiteHouse.Hetendstobecontemptuousofalmostalltheinstitutionsthatcomprisetheliberalinternationalorder,andthatincludesboththeEUandNATO,whichhefamouslysaidwas“obsolete”duringthe2016campaign.InalettersenttoEuropeanleadersshortlyafterTrumpassumedoffice,aleadingEUpolicymakersaidthatthenewpresidentposedaseriousthreattotheEU’sfuture.29Afewmonthslater,GermanChancellorAngelaMerkelwhoisadeeplycommittedAtlanticist,warnedthatEurope

26ClaudiaSternberg,KiraGartzou-Katsouyanni,andKalypsoNicolaidis,TheGreco-GermanAffairintheEuroCrisis:MutualRecognitionLost?(London:PalgraveMacmillan,2018).

27PatrickKingsley,“Trump’sImmigrationRemarksOutrageMany,butOthersQuietlyAgree,”NewYorkTimes,January12,2018.

28JohnJ.Mearsheimer,“WhytheUkraineCrisisIstheWest’sFault,”ForeignAffairs,Vol.93,No.5(September/October2014),pp.77–89;JohnJ.Mearsheimer,“Moscow’sChoice,”ForeignAffairs,Vol.93,No.6(November/December2014),pp.175–78.

29JamesKanter,“TrumpThreatensEurope’sStability,ATopLeaderWarns,”NewYorkTimes,January31,2017.

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cannotdependontheUnitedStateslikeitoncedidandthusEuropeans“reallymusttakeourfateintoourownhands.”30The2008globalfinancialcrisisnotonlydidenormousdamagetopeoples’lives,butitalsocalledintoquestionthecompetenceoftheeliteswhomanagetheliberalinternationalorder.31InadditiontothedeteriorationinrelationsbetweenRussiaandtheWest,thereareworryingsignsofpotentialconflictwithChina,whichisdeterminedtochangethestatusquoregarding:theEastChinaSea,theSouthChinaSea,Taiwan,anditsborderwithIndia.Unsurprisingly,theUnitedStatesisnowmoreinterestedincontainingratherthanengagingChina.Infact,theTrumpadministrationhasrecentlysaidthatitwasamistaketoadmitChinaintotheWTO,asitsprotectionistpoliciesmakeitclearthatBeijingisunwillingtoplaybythatinstitution’srules.32Finally,thenumberofliberaldemocracieshasbeendecliningoverthepastdecade,reversingatrendthatoncelookedunstoppable.Relatedly,softauthoritarianismappearstobeanattractivealternativetoliberaldemocracy,adevelopmentthatwasalmostunthinkableintheearly1990s.Andsomeleaderstodayextolthevirtuesofilliberaldemocracy,whileothersruncountriesthatarecommittedtopoliticalsystemsbasedondeeplyheldreligiousbeliefs.Ofcourse,liberaldemocracyhaslostsomeofitsappealinrecentyears,especiallybecausetheAmericanpoliticalsystemoftenlooksdysfunctional.EvenseriousscholarsworrythesedaysaboutthefutureofAmericandemocracy.33Insum,theliberalinternationalorderisundersiege.IX.WhatWentWrongTheearlysuccessesatbuildingaliberalinternationalordernotwithstanding,itcontainedtheseedsofitsowndestruction.Evenifthepolicymakersatthehelmhadbeenwiserstewardsofthatorder,theystillcouldnothavelengtheneditshalf-lifeinanymeaningfulway.Itwasdoomedtofailbecauseitcontainedsixfatalflawsthatundermineditseffectiveness.3430HenryFarrell,“ThankstoTrump,GermanySaysItCan’tRelyontheUnitedStates.WhatDoesThatMean?”WashingtonPost,May28,2017.

31JohnLanchester,“AftertheFall,”LondonReviewofBooks,Vol.40,No.13(July5,2018),pp.3-18;AdamTooze,Crashed:HowaDecadeofFinancialCrisesChangedtheWorld(NewYork:Viking,2018).*

32ShawnDonnan,“USSaysChinaWTOMembershipWasaMistake,”FinancialTimes,January19,2018.

33WilliamA.Galston,Anti-Pluralism:ThePopulistThreattoLiberalDemocracy(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,2018);StevenLevitskyandDanielZiblatt,HowDemocraciesDie(NewYork:Crown,2018);CassR.Sunstein,ed.,CanItHappenHere?AuthoritarianisminAmerica(NewYork:DeyStreetBooks,2018).

34Anyideologicalinternationalorder–beitbasedonliberalism,communism,oranyotheruniversalideology–isdestinedtohaveashortlife,mainlybecauseofthedifficultiesofremakingtheworldinthehegemon’simage,asdescribedbelow.Anagnosticinternationalorder–theotherpossiblekindoforderinunipolarity–canhavesignificantstayingpoweroverthelonghaul,becausethelonepolegenerallyacceptstheheterogeneitythatisinherentinpoliticalandsociallifeintheinternationalsystemanddoesnotattempttomicro-managethedoingsofeverycountryontheplanet.

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Thesinglemostimportantorderofbusinessforbuildingaliberalinternationalorderwastospreadliberaldemocracyfarandwide,whichwasinitiallyseentobeaneminentlydoabletask.Butthefirstthreeoftheorder’sfatalflawsworkedtogethernotonlytodoomthatmission,butalsotoweakentheorderintheprocess.First,theorderwasbuiltonthefalseassumptionthatpoliticshadevolvedtothepointbythelatetwentiethcenturythattherewasnoviablealternativetoliberaldemocracy.Itwasnotjustsuperiortoeveryotherkindofpoliticalsystem,sotheargumentwent,butthatfactoflifewaswidelyrecognized.Thus,itwouldberelativelyeasytocreatealiberalinternationalorder,becausespreadingliberaldemocracyaroundtheworldwouldmeetlittleresistance.Indeed,mostpeoplewouldwelcometheideaoflivinginaWestern-styledemocracy,asappearedtobethecaseinEasternEuropeafterthecollapseofcommunism.Thisassumptionwasmistaken,however.35Thereneverhasbeenandneverwillbeanythingapproximatinguniversalagreementonwhatconstitutestheidealpoliticalsystem.Onecanarguethatliberaldemocracyisthebestformofgovernment(andIwould),butotherswillinvariablyfavoradifferentpoliticalsystem.Itisworthrememberingthatduringthe1930s,manypeopleinEuropepreferredcommunismandfascismtoliberaldemocracy.Onemightagree,butsaythatliberaldemocracyultimatelytriumphedoverthosetwoisms.Whilethatistrue,whathappenedinthe1930sshowsthatliberaldemocracyisnotthenaturalorderofthingsanditisnotunusualforelitesandtheirpublicstooptforalternativepoliticalsystems.Thus,itshouldnotbesurprisingthatilliberaldemocracieshaveemergedinEasternEurope,whileChinaandRussiahaveembracedauthoritarianrule,NorthKoreaisadictatorship,IranisanIslamicrepublic,andIsraelisaJewishstate.Norshoulditbesurprisingthattherehasneverbeenatimewhenmorethanfiftypercentofthecountriesintheworldwereliberaldemocracies.36Thisdiversityofopinionaboutwhatconstitutesthebestgoverningsystemmeansthatitgoingtobeextremelydifficulttocreate(andmaintain)aworldinwhichallthemajorpowersareliberaldemocracies,andwellneighimpossibletofashiononeinwhichalmostalltheminorpowersaswellareliberaldemocracies.Itisimpossible,however,tocreatealiberalinternationalorderwithoutatleastaccomplishingthefirstofthesetwotasks.Thus,spreadingliberalismisnotjustgoingtobeahardsell,itisalsogoingtomeetfierceresistancefromcountriesthatpreferanalternativepoliticalregime.Second,buildingaliberalinternationalorderinvariablyleadstowarsagainstminorpowersthataimtoturnthemintoliberaldemocracies.Therearesignificantlimitsonhowmuchsocialengineeringofthissortgreatpowerscanevenattempttodoinbipolarityormultipolarity,mainlybecausetheyaremainlyfocusedoncompetingwitheachotherforinfluenceandpower.Spreadingliberaldemocracyisofsecondaryifnottertiary35LarryDiamond,MarcF.Plattner,andChristopherWalker,eds.,AuthoritarianismGoesGlobal:TheChallengetoDemocracy(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2016).

36PuddingtonandRoylance,“PopulistsandAutocrats,”p.4.*

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importance.Butinunipolarity,thesolepoleisfreetogooncrusadestomaketheworldmoredemocratic,simplybecausetherearenorivalgreatpowerstoworryabout.Thus,itisunsurprisingthattheUnitedStateshasfoughtsevenwarsintheyearssincetheColdWarendedandhasbeenatwarfortwooutofeverythreeyearsoverthatperiod.37Thosewars,however,invariablyfailtoachievetheirobjective,erodingpublicsupportfortheorderandcastingdoubtonthecompetenceofitsleaders.TheUnitedStateshasfocusedmostofitseffortssince9/11atbuildingdemocracyintheGreaterMiddleEast.Butthepolicyhasledtooneabjectfailureafteranother.ThinkAfghanistan,Egypt,Iraq,Libya,andSyria.38Thereareavarietyofreasonsforthisdismalrecord.39Large-scalesocialengineeringinanysocietyisdifficult,butespeciallyinaforeigncountrythathasjusthaditspoliticalleadershiptoppledfrompowerandisinturmoil.Furthermore,nationalismisaremarkablypowerfulforceallovertheworld,whichmeansthatminorpowersarenotgoingtowantagreatpowertellingthemwhatkindofpoliticalsystemisbestforthem.Thatreactionislikelytoleadtofierceresistanceagainstthesolepolewithinthetargetstate.Finally,aspreviouslynoted,noteverycountryisenamoredwithliberaldemocracy,andinthosecases,socialengineeringwillbeevenharder.Third,thecrusadermentalitythatunderpinsbuildingaliberalinternationalorderalsoleadstothepoisoningofrelationsbetweentheunipoleandanymajorpowersinthesystemthatarenotliberaldemocracies.Whilethedominantstatewillbestronglyinclinedtomakewaronminorpowerstoachieveregimechange,itwillrarelyeverattackmajorpowersforthatpurpose.Thecostswouldbetoogreatandthelikelihoodofsuccesswouldbeespeciallylow.Thus,Americanpolicymakersinthepost-ColdWarperiodhaveneverseriouslyconsideredinvadingChinaorRussia,eventhoughtheUnitedStatesisfarmorepowerfulthaneitherofthosecountries.Nevertheless,WashingtonhasbeenseriouslycommittedtoturningbothChinaandRussiaintoliberaldemocraciesandabsorbingthemintotheUS-dominatedliberalworldorder.Americanleadershavenotonlymadetheirintentionsclear,buttheyhavealsousedNGOsandvarioussubtlestrategiestopushBeijingandMoscowtowardliberaldemocracy.In

37JohnIkenberrymaintainsthatfortheUnitedStatestosustainaliberalinternationalorder,itmustpursuearestrainedforeignpolicy.“Themorethatpowerpeeksoutfrombehindtheseinstitutions,”hewrites,“themorethatpowerwillprovokereactionandresistance.”IkenberrybelievesthisisnotaproblemforAmerica,however,becauseithasa“uniqueabilitytoengageinstrategicrestraint.”Ikenberry,AfterVictory,pp.270-71.Butheiswrong;liberalhegemonsliketheUnitedStatesarehighlyaggressiveandhaveespeciallyambitiousagendas.38TheUnitedStatesinvadedAfghanistanin2001andIraqin2003totoppletheTalibanandSaddamHusseinrespectively.ItemployedU.S.airpowerin2011tohelpremoveColonelMuammarGaddafifrompowerinLibya.TheUnitedStatesdidnotuseitsownmilitaryforcestopursueregimechangeinEgyptandSyria.Startingin2011,ithelpedarmandtrainSyrianrebelgroupsbentonremovingBasharal-Assadfrompower.WashingtonintervenedinEgyptianpoliticsin2013tohelpfacilitatetheoverthrowofPresidentMohamedMorsi,ademocraticallyelectedleader,whowasreplacedbyamilitarydictator,GeneralAbdelFattahel-Sisi.

39Mearsheimer,TheGreatDelusion,chaps.5-6.

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effect,theaimispeacefulregimechange.Predictably,ChinaandRussiahaveresistedtheunipole’seffortsatregimechangeforthesamereasonsthatminorpowershavecontestedUSeffortstoshapetheirdomesticpolitics,andindeed,forthesamereasonsthatAmericansrecoilattheideaofRussia–oranyotherstateforthatmatter–interferingintheircountry’spolitics.Inaworldinwhichnationalismisthemostpowerfulpoliticalideology,self-determinationorsovereigntymattershugelyforallcountries.Moreover,ChinaandRussiahaveresistedfullabsorptionintotheliberalworldorderforrealistreasons,asthatwouldallowtheUnitedStatestodominatetheinternationalsystemeconomically,militarily,andpolitically.Inparticular,neitherBeijingnorMoscowwantsAmericanmilitaryforcesintheirneighborhood,muchlessontheirborders.Thus,itishardlysurprisingthatChinatalksaboutpushingtheUSmilitaryoutoftheWesternPacificandRussiahaslongbeendeeplyopposedtoEUandNATOexpansionintoEasternEurope,whicheventuallyledtotheUkrainecrisisin2014.ThatongoingconflicthasnotonlypoisonedrelationsbetweenMoscowandWashington,butithasincentivizedRussiatofindwaystoweakenboththeEUandNATO.Inshort,bothnationalistandrealistcalculationshavecausedthetwomajorpowersinunipolaritytocontestAmericaneffortstospreadtheliberalinternationalorder.Fourth,buildingarobustliberalinternationalordercausesseriouspoliticaltroublesinsidetheliberaldemocraciesthemselves,becauseitleadstopoliciesthatflyinthefaceofnationalism,whichisatrulyformidableadversary.Thoseproblemsonthehomefront,whichcomeintwoforms,eventuallyhaveablowbackeffectontheorderitself.Tobeginwith,liberalstatesendupdelegatingmoreandmoreauthoritytotheinternationalinstitutionsthatcomprisetheorder,whichisfrequentlyseenasevidencethattheyaresurrenderingsovereignty.Onecanargueaboutwhetherthoseliberalcountriesareactuallygivingupsovereignty,butthereisnoquestiontheyaredelegatingtheauthoritytomakeimportantdecisionstothoseinstitutions,whichislikelytocauseseriouspoliticaltroubleinamodernnation-state.40Afterall,nationalismisapoliticalideologythatprivilegesself-determinationandsovereignty,andthusislikelytocomeintoconflictwithinternationalinstitutionsthatmakepolicies,whichdecidedlyaffecttheirmemberstates.41“Thecumulativeeffectofsuchexpansionsofinternationalauthority,”JeffColganand

40ItisoftensaidthatEUmemberstatessurrendersomeoftheirsovereigntytothatinstitution.Forexample,seeRosato,EuropeUnited,p.30.Idisagree.FollowinginthefootstepsofJeanBodin,MariyaGrinbergandCarlSchmitt,Idefinesovereigntyasthesupremeauthoritytomakedecisionsforapoliticalorganization.Ibelievethatsovereignscandelegatetheauthoritytomakecertaindecisionstointernationalinstitutionswithoutsurrenderingsupremeauthority,whichistheessenceofsovereignty.ThisprocessdescribeswhathastranspiredintheEU.Sovereignscanalsotakebacktheauthoritytheyhavedelegated.Moreover,Idonotthinksovereigntyisdivisible.JeanBodin,OnSovereignty,trans.anded.JulianH.Franklin(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992);MariyaGrinberg,“IndivisibleSovereignty:TheDelegationofAuthorityandReversibility,”unpublishedpaper,July2018;CarlSchmitt,PoliticalTheology:FourChaptersontheConceptofSovereignty(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress).

41RobertJackson,Sovereignty:EvolutionofanIdea(Malden,MA:PolityPress,2007),chap.4.

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RobertKeohanewrite,“istoexcessivelylimitsovereigntyandgivepeoplethesensethatforeignforcesarecontrollingtheirlives.”42Theintensityofthisproblemwilldependonhowmuchinfluencetherelevantinstitutionwieldsoveritsmemberstates.Ofcourse,theinstitutionsthatcomprisealiberalorderareinvariablydesignedtohaveasignificanteffectontheirmembers’behavior,raisingconcernaboutademocraticdeficitamongtheirpeople.TherewasclearevidenceofthisphenomenonatplayintheBrexitvote.GiventhehugeimpacttheEUhasonitsmembers’policies,itisnotsurprisingthatoneoftheprincipalreasonsamajorityofBritishcitizensvotedforBrexitisbecausetheyfelttheircountryhadsurrenderedtoomuchauthoritytoBrusselsanditwastimetoreassertBritishsovereignty.Inparticular,therewasawidespreadfeelingthatBritainhadlostcontrolofitseconomicpolicy,andthissituationwasunderminingdemocraticaccountability.43EUbureaucratsinBrussels,whowerenotelectedbyBritons,wereseenbythemtobethekeyarchitectsofBritisheconomicpolicy,andotherpoliciesaswell.Thus,theauthorsofanimportantstudyonBrexitwrite:“Regainingsovereignty–takingbackcontrol–wasamajorthemeinthe2016election.”44AsimilarlogichelpsexplainwhyDonaldTrumpwasabletocapturetheWhiteHouserunningonaplatformthatemphasized“AmericaFirst”andskeweredalmostallthekeyinstitutionsthatcomprisetheliberalinternationalorder,includingtheEU.BritainandtheUnitedStates,ofcourse,arenotjustanytwostates.Theyareparadigmaticliberaldemocracies,oneofwhichislargelyresponsibleforcreatingtheliberalworldorder.Furthermore,theliberalinternationalorderleadstopoliciesthatclashwithnationalidentity,whichremainsaremarkablypowerfulforceincountriesallaroundtheworld,includingtheUnitedStatesandWesternEurope.Atitscore,liberalismisanindividualisticideologythatplacesgreatweightontheconceptofinalienablerights.Thisbeliefthateveryindividualontheplanethasthesamesetofbasicrightsiswhatunderpinstheuniversalisticdimensionofliberalism.Thisuniversalisticortransnationalperspectivestandsinmarkedcontrasttotheprofoundparticularismofnationalism,whichisbuiltonthebeliefthattheworldisorganizedarounddiscretenationsthathavetheirownculture,andarebestservedbyhavingtheirownstatesotheycansurviveinthefaceofthreatsfromthe“other.”45

42JeffD.ColganandRobertO.Keohane,“TheLiberalOrderIsRigged:FixItNoworWatchItWhither,”ForeignAffairs,Vol.96,No.3(May/June2017),p.42.43HaroldD.Clarke,MatthewGoodwin,andPaulWhiteley,Brexit:WhyBritainVotedtoLeavetheEuropeanUnion(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2017),pp.69-72,86,111-15,141,166-70,173.44Clarkeetal.,Brexit,p.141.

45Liberalismalsohasanimportantparticularistdimensiontoit,whichismoreinlinewithnationalismandwhichshoulddiscourageliberalstatesfromtryingtoremaketheworldintheirownimage.Specifically,liberalismplacesahighpremiumontolerance,mainlybecauseitisbasedontheassumptionthatitisimpossibletoreachuniversalagreementaboutfirstprinciples.Mearsheimer,TheGreatDelusion,pp.53-54.Thus,onemightexpectliberalstatestoacceptthefactthattheworldispopulatedbynon-liberalstatesandnottrytocreateaworldpopulatedsolelybyliberaldemocracies.Whenitcomestointernationalpolitics,

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Givenliberalism’semphasisonindividualswithequalrights,coupledwiththefactthatittendstodownplayifnotignorenationalidentity,itisunsurprisingthattheliberalinternationalorderemphasizesthatcountriesshouldaxiomaticallyacceptrefugeesseekingshelter,andthatthereshouldbefewobstaclestoindividualsmovingfreelyfromonestatetoanother.TheparadigmaticexampleofthispolicyistheEU’sSchengenaccords,whichhavelargelyeliminatedbordersamongmostofthatinstitution’smemberstates.Furthermore,untilrecently,theEUhasbeendeeplycommitted,atleastinprinciple,toopeningitsdoorstorefugeesfleeingtroublespots.Inaworldwherenationalidentitymattersgreatly,mixingdifferentpeoplestogether,whichiswhatinvariablyhappenswhenthereareopenbordersandbroadmindedrefugeepolicies,isaprescriptionfortrouble.Itseemsclear,forexample,thatimmigrationwasthemainreasonBritishvoterssupportedBrexit.TheyespeciallydislikedthefactthattheEU’spolicyofopenbordersallowedpeoplefromEasternEuropetoeasilymigratetoBritain.46Britainishardlyanexceptioninthisregard,asanti-immigrantsentimentiswidespreadinEuropeandfuelshostilitytowardtheEU.47TherefugeesfromtheGreaterMiddleEastwhohavefloodedintoEuropeinrecentyearshavecertainlynotbeenaccordedthekindofwelcomeonewouldexpectfromstatesthatareattheheartoftheliberalinternationalorder.Indeed,therehasbeenenormousresistancetoacceptingthoserefugees,especiallyinEasternEurope,butalsoinGermany,whereChancellorAngelMerkelhurtherselfpoliticallybyinitiallywelcomingtherefugees.ThistroubleoveropenbordersandrefugeesnotonlycallsintoquestiontheEU’scommitmenttoliberalvalues,butitalsoopenedupriftsamongthememberstates,whichhaveshakenthefoundationofthatvenerableinstitution.Fifth,thetremendousgrowthineconomicintercoursethathascomewiththeestablishmentoftheliberalinternationalorderhasledtoeconomicaswellaspoliticaltroubles,whichareunderminingthatorder.Thecontemporaryinternationaleconomyishighlyintegratedandremarkablydynamic.Changeoccursatwarpspeedandmajordevelopmentsinonecountryinvariablyhavesignificanteffectsinothercountries.Thereisnoquestionthatthiswide-opensystemgeneratesimpressivegrowthonaglobalscale,butitalsocreatesseriousproblemsthatgovernmentsareill-equippedtofix,atleastiftheyplayaccordingtotherulesoftheliberalworldorder.Thebestwaytounderstandthis

however,theuniversalisticstrandofliberalismtendstotrumptheparticularisticstrand,whichmeansliberalstatestendtobeintoleranttowardotherkindsofpoliticalsystems.

46Clarkeetal,Brexit,pp.11,23,53,59,70,102-03,109,113,122-24,166-70,173,205,207-08.AlthoughimmigrationandopenbordersaretreatedseparatelyfromsovereigntyinBrexit,thoseissuesarecloselylinked.Afterall,BritainisbentonexitingtheEUsothatitcanregainauthorityoveritsborders,whichisnowlargelyinthehandsoftheEU.47Clarkeetal.,Brexit,pp.222-29.

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phenomenonistocomparetoday’shyper-globalizationwiththeglobalizationthatobtainedundertheBrettonWoodssystemfrom1944untilthelate1980s.48TheBrettonWoodssystemwasdesignedtofacilitateanopeninternationaleconomy,butonlyuptoapoint.Therewere,forexample,significantlimitsoncapitalflowsacrossstateboundariesandalthoughGATTwasdesignedtofacilitateinternationaltrade,governmentshadconsiderablemaneuverroomtoadoptprotectionistpolicieswhenitwasintheirinterest.Ineffect,governmentswereabletopursuepoliciesthatnotonlyfacilitatedprosperity,butalsoprotectedtheircitizensfromthevagariesofthemarket.JohnRuggiefamouslyreferstothisrelationshipbetweenmarketsandgovernmentsas“embeddedliberalism.”49TheBrettonWoodssystemworkedwellformorethanfourdecades.Thehyper-globalizationthatbeganinthelate1980sandacceleratedaftertheColdWareffectivelyoverturnedtheBrettonWoodssystem.TheneworderwasdesignedtogreatlyreduceregulationofglobalmarketsbyremovingcontrolsoncapitalflowsandreplacingGATTwiththeWTO.Thisnewtradeorganization,whichbeganoperatingin1995,wasintendedtoopenupmarketsallovertheworldandmakeitespeciallydifficultforgovernmentstopursueprotectionistpolicies.“Anyobstacletofreetrade,”asDaniRodriknotes,wasseen“asanabominationtoberemoved;caveatsbedamned.”50Inessence,almostanykindofgovernmentinterferenceintheworkingsoftheworldeconomywasconsideredharmfultotheliberalinternationalorder.ToquoteRodrikagain,“Thestatewentfrombeingthehandmaidenofeconomicgrowthtotheprincipalobstacleblockingit.”51Hyper-globalizationmayhaveledtoimpressivegrowthatthegloballevel,butitalsocausedmajorproblemsthattheliberalinternationalorderisincapableoffixing.Specifically,manyjobsinparticularsectorsofacountry’seconomydisappearquickly,throwinglargenumbersofpeopleoutofwork.Itisoftendifficultfortheunemployed,manyofwhomareunskilledworkerswithlittlemobility,tofindwell-payingjobs,oranyjobatall.Andeveniftheyfindagoodjob,thereisalwaysthepossibilitytheywillloseit,givenallthecreativedestructionthatcomeswithhyper-globalization.Evenpeoplewho48ThesubsequentdiscussionofBrettonWoodsandhyper-globalization–orwhatissometimescalledneo-liberalism–drawsheavilyonDaniRodrik,TheGlobalizationParadox:DemocracyandtheFutureoftheWorldEconomy(NewYork:W.W.Norton,2011).AlsoseeBarryEichengreen,GlobalizingCapital:AHistoryoftheInternationalMonetarySystem,2nded.(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2008);DaniRodrik,HasGlobalizationGoneTooFar?(Washington,DC:InstituteforInternationalEconomics,March1997);DaniRodrik,OneEconomics,ManyRecipes:Globalization,Institutions,andEconomicGrowth(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,PrincetonUniversityPress,2017);JosephE.Stiglitz,GlobalizationandItsDiscontentsRevisited(NewYork:Norton,2017).

49JohnG.Ruggie,“InternationalRegimes,Transactions,andChange:EmbeddedLiberalisminthePostwarEconomicOrder,in“InternationalRegimes,”ed.StephenD.Krasner,specialissue,InternationalOrganization,Vol.36,No.2(Spring1982),pp.379-415.

50Rodrik,GlobalizationParadox,p.77.

51Rodrik,GlobalizationParadox,p.163.

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haveneverlosttheirjobsworrythattheytoomighteventuallybeunemployed.Inbrief,thedynamisminherentintheworldeconomynotonlythreatensjobs,butalsofostersanacutesenseofuncertaintyaboutthefutureamongpeopleallaroundtheworld.

Furthermore,hyper-globalizationhashelpedproducestaggeringeconomicinequalityalmosteverywhere,whichshowsfewsignsofabating.52Indeed,itappearstheproblemislikelytogetworsewithtime.53UndertheBrettonWoodssystem,governmentswereprimedtodealwithproblemsofthissort,andthuswouldhavebeenwellpositionedtodeviseredistributivetaxpolicies,trainingprogramsforworkers,andgenerouswelfarebenefits.Butintheliberalinternationalorder,thesolutiontoalmosteveryproblemistoletthemarketdealwithit,notgovernments,whichareconsideredtobemoreofaliabilitythananassetformakingtheglobaleconomyworksmoothly.Totheextentthatrulesareneededtofacilitateitssmoothworking,bettertorelyoninternationalinstitutionsthangovernments.Markets,ofcoursecannotfixtheseproblems;indeed,theycausedtheminthefirstplaceandarelikelytomakethemworseintheabsenceofgovernmentpoliciesthatcanprotecttheircitizenry.Asonewouldexpect,thesefesteringproblemshaveledtowidespreaddissatisfactionwithhyper-globalizationandgrowingsentimentforgovernment’stoadoptprotectionisteconomicpolicies,whichwouldworktounderminetheliberalinternationalorder.DonaldTrump,ofcourse,capitalizedonthishostilitytothepresentsysteminthe2016presidentialcampaignandnotonlyrailedagainstinternationalinstitutionsliketheWTO,butalsomadethecaseforpursuingprotectionisteconomicpolicies.HeemphasizedtheimportanceofprotectingAmericanworkersaboveallelse.InboththeRepublicanprimariesandthegeneralelection,hedefeatedopponentswhodefendedtheliberalinternationalorderandarguedagainstprotectionism.Unsurprisingly,TrumphasmovedinadecidedlyprotectionistdirectionsincemovingintotheWhiteHouse.Ultimately,whenmarketsclashwiththedeep-seatedinterestsofnation-states,ashashappenedwithhyper-globalization,thelatterwillultimatelyprevail,whichworkstounderminetheliberalinternationalorder.Therearetwoothersignificanteconomicproblemsthatplaguetheliberalworldorder.Theeaseandspeedwithwhichcapitalflowsacrossborders,coupledwiththeemphasisthatorderplacesongovernmentderegulation,islikelytoleadtomajorcrisesinparticularcountriesorregions,orevenengulftheentireworld.“Periodsofhighinternationalcapitalmobility,”CarmenReinhartandKennethRogoffwrite,“haverepeatedlyproducedinternationalbankingcrises.”54Unsurprisingly,therehavebeenanumberofmajorcrises

52LucasChanceletal.,WorldInequalityReport,2018(Paris:WorldInequalityLab,December2017).Seehttps://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-full-report-english.pdf

53WalterScheidel,TheGreatLeveler:ViolenceandtheHistoryofInequalityfromtheStoneAgetotheTwenty-FirstCentury(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2017).

54CarmenM.ReinhartandKennethS.Rogoff,ThisTimeisDifferent:EightCenturiesofFinancialFolly(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2011),p.155.

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sincehyper-globalizationbegantakingrootinthelate1980s.ThemostconsequentialweretheAsianfinancialcrisisof1997-1998,whichcamedangerouslyclosetospreadingacrosstheentireglobe,andthe2007-2008FinancialCrisis,whichwasthemostsevereworldwideeconomiccrisissincetheGreatDepressionofthe1930s.Giventhecontinuingmobilityofcapital,thereisgoodreasontothinkmorecrisesofthissortwilloccur,whichwillfurtherweakenthelegitimacyofthepresentorder,andmightevenbringitcrashingdown.Theotherproblemfacingtheliberalworldorderconcernstheeuro.55Whenthatcurrencywasestablishedin1999,itrepresentedagiantstepforwardinpromotingmonetaryunion,buttherewasneitherfiscalnorpoliticaluniontohelpunderpintheeuro.Criticspredictedthattheeurowouldbeplaguedbysignificantproblemsovertimewithoutfiscalandpoliticalunion.56Manyadvocatesrecognizedtheproblem,butthoughtthatmonetaryunionwouldeventuallyleadtouniononallthreefronts,thuseliminatingtheproblem.Thatdidnothappen,however,andtheeuroencountereditsfirstmajorcrisisin2009,whichlednotjusttoeconomicproblems,butpoliticalproblemsaswell.Thecrisisandtheensuingattemptstosolveithavebroughthard-edgednationalistsentimenttothesurfaceinEurope.TheEUhadgreatdifficultydealingwithEurozonecrisis,buttheproblemswereeventuallydealtwithbymassivebailoutsfrominstitutionsliketheECB,althoughnotbeforesignificantpoliticaldamagewasdonetotheEU.Tooze:USroleisenormous.Moreimportantly,therehasbeennosignificantmovementtowardfiscalandpoliticalunion,whichmeansthatthefixistemporaryandtherearelikelytobemorecrisesintheyearsahead.Sixth,incorporatingChinaintotheliberalinternationalorder,whichhasbeenahighpriorityforWesternelitessincetheColdWarended,hashelpeditgrowintoaneconomicpowerhousewithsignificantmilitarycapability.Ineffect,Chinahasbecomeagreatpower,thusunderminingunipolarity,whichisessentialformaintainingaliberalworldorder.ThisproblemiscompoundedbytheresurrectionofRussianpower,whichhasalsobeenaidedbyitsintegrationintotheexistingorder.WiththeriseofChinaandRussia’scomeback,thesystemismovingawayfromunipolarityandtowardmultipolarity,whichdoomstheliberalinternationalorder.57Ofcourse,neitherChinanorRussiaisaliberaldemocracyanyway.

55JosephE.Stiglitz,TheEuro:HowaCommonCurrencyThreatenstheFutureofEurope(NewYork:Norton,2016).

56RudigerDornbusch,“EuroFantasies:CommonCurrencyasPanacea,”ForeignAffairs,Vol.75,No.5(September/October1996);MartinFeldstein,“EMUandInternationalConflict,”ForeignAffairs,Vol.96,No.6(November/December1997);JosefJoffe,“TheEuro:TheEngineThatCouldn’t,”NewYorkReviewofBooks,Vol.44,No.19(December4,1997)PaulKrugman,“TheEuro:BewareofWhatYouWishFor,”Fortune,December1998.*

57OnemightthinkthattheriseofChinaandthedeclineofAmericanpoweristheprincipalcauseoftheliberalinternationalorder’sdemise.Inotherwords,whentheUnitedStateswastheclearlydominantpower,thesystemworkedfine,becauseWashingtonhadthewherewithaltomakeitwork.Butasitspowerwaned,theliberalorderbegantofallapart.Thisvariantofhegemonicstabilitytheoryisnotmyargument.Indeed,

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Thebottomlineisthattheliberalinternationalorder,despiteitsearlysuccesses,hadavarietyofflawsbuiltintoitthateventuallyunderminedit.X.WhereAreWeHeaded?Onemightacknowledgethattheliberalinternationalorderisbroken,butarguethatitispossibletolearnfrompastmistakesandfixtheunderlyingproblems.Thereisnoviablewaytorescuethatorder,however,asitisfatallyflawedatitsroots.Thekeyfactorthatwillshapetheneworderisthecomingofmultipolarity(China,Russia,andtheUnitedStates),whichwillleadtothecreationofarealistinternationalorderandtwoboundedrealistorders.ThoseneworderswillbearsomeresemblancetothethreeordersthatdominatedtheglobeduringtheColdWar,butwilldifferfromtheminsomeimportantways.Thefactthattheemerginginternationalorderwillberealistatitscoremeansthatspreadingliberaldemocracyfarandwidewillnolongerbeitscoremission.ChinaandRussiawillsurelyhavelittleinterestinpromotingapoliticalsystemthatisatoddswiththeirowngoverningsystemandsosimilartotheAmericanone.Infact,theyarelikelytobeopposedtodemocracypromotionaltogether.AndeveniftheUnitedStatesweretoremaindeeplyattachedtothatmission,itstillwouldhavetotakeabackseattobalance-of-powercalculations,whichwilllargelyshaperelationsamongthethreegreatpowers.Therearetwokeyfeaturesoftheemergingmultipolarsystemthatwillshapetheordersthatgoalongwithit.First,therewillbeanintensesecuritycompetitionbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStatesthatwillbethecentralfeatureofinternationalpoliticsoverthecourseofthetwenty-firstcentury.ThatrivalrywillleadtothecreationofaboundedorderledbyChinaandanotheroneledbytheUnitedStates.Militaryallianceswillbeatthecoreofthosetwoboundedorders,whicharenowbeginningtoformandwhichwillbearmarkedresemblancetotheSoviet-ledcommunistorderandUS-ledWesternorderthatwerecentraltointernationalpoliticsduringtheColdWar.Second,unliketheColdWar,thereislikelytobesignificanteconomicintercourseamongthethreegreatpowersandtheirallies.Inotherwords,thereislittlereasontothinkthatthehighlevelsofeconomicinterdependencethatnowexistintheworldeconomyaregoingtodiminishovertimeinanymeaningfulway.ThissituationwillbestrikinglydifferentfromtheColdWar,wheretherewaslittleeconomicactivitybetweenEastandWest.ThefutureismorelikelytoresemblethesituationinEuropebeforeWorldWarI(andevenWorldWarII),wheretherewasanintensesecuritycompetitionbetweentheTripleAlliance(Austria-Hungary,Germany,Italy)andtheTripleEntente(GreatBritain,France,

thetroublebeganwhentheUnitedStateswasattheheightofitspowerintheearly1990s.AllthateconomicandmilitarymightallowedAmericanpolicymakerstocreatealiberalinternationalorderthatcontaineddeepflawsandwasfatedtofail.Thisisnottodeny,ofcourse,thatoneflawwasthatithelpedChinarise,whicheventuallycontributedtotheorder’sdemise.Inshort,theliberalinternationalorderdidnotfailbecausetheUnitedStateslostpower,butinsteadbecauseitwasdefectiveatbirth.

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Russia),yetahugeamountofeconomicinteractionamongthosesixcountriesandwithinEuropemoregenerally.Thefactthattheworldeconomyislikelytoremainhighlyintegrated–despitethepresenceofsecuritycompetitionamongthegreatpowers–hasimportantimplicationsfortheshapeoftheinternationalorderundermultipolarityaswellasfortheChina-dominatedandUS-dominatedboundedorders.UnliketheColdWar,wheretheinternationalorderwasnotconcernedwitheconomicissuesinanymeaningfulway,theemerginginternationalorderwillplayapivotalroleinmanagingtheworldeconomy–justastheliberalworldorderhasdonethroughoutthepost-ColdWarperiod.Therewillbesomeimportantchangesintheexistingorder,however,mainlyduetoChina’srise.Beijingwillseektore-writetherulesinthecurrenteconomicinstitutionstogiveitmoreinfluence,anditwillalsocreatenewinstitutionsthatitdominates.58Inshort,asChinacontinuestogrow,itwillwielditspowertoreshapethepresentinternationalordertoitsadvantage.Inadditiontoitsroleinhelpingtomanagetheworldeconomy,theinternationalorderwillalsobeconcernedwithaparticularclusterofsecurityissues,aswasthecaseduringtheColdWar.Again,thefocuswillbeprincipallyonarmscontrolagreements.Theexistingtreatiesandagreementsdealingwithproliferationarelikelytoremaininplace,butBeijing,Moscow,andWashingtonwillhavetonegotiatenewtreatieslimitingtheirarsenals,asthesuperpowersdidduringtheColdWar.Nevertheless,theinternationalorderwillnotdealwithcoresecuritymatters,whichwillbehandledinsidetheAmerican-ledandChinese-ledboundedorders.Allofthisistosaythattheemerginginternationalorderwillbeapartialone,butnotasparseoneliketheColdWarorder.Thetwoboundedordersthatarelikelytoemergeinmultipolaritywillpayrelativelylittleattentiontomanagingeconomicinteractionsamongtheirmemberstates,mainlybecausethattaskwillbehandledlargelybythekeyeconomicinstitutionsintheinternationalorder.ThefocusinsteadwithinboththeBeijing-ledandWashington-ledboundedorderswillbeonsecurityissues.Thus,thosetwoorderswillbepartialones,whichstandsinsharpcontrasttothefull-scaleboundedordersoftheColdWarera,whichweredeeplyconcernedwithbotheconomicandsecurityissues.WhataboutRussia?Itisagreatpowerforsure,whichiswhytheemergingworldismultipolar,notbipolar.Butitwillbetheweakestofthethreegreatpowersfortheforeseeablefuture,unlesseithertheAmericanorChineseeconomiesencountermajorlong-termproblems.ThekeyquestionregardingRussiais:whichsidewillittakeinthegrowingSino-Americanantagonism?AlthoughRussiaisnowalignedwithChina,itislikelytoswitchsidesovertimeandallywiththeUnitedStatesagainstarisingChina,simplybecauseChinaisthegreaterthreattoRussia.ShouldMoscowandWashingtonforgecloserrelationsbecauseoftheirmutualfearofChina,RussiawillbelooselyintegratedintotheUS-ledboundedorder.ShouldMoscowcontinuetohavefriendlyrelationswithBeijing

58OliverStuenkel,Post-WesternWorld:HowEmergingPowersAreRemakingGlobalOrder(Malden,MA:PolityPress,2016),chaps.4-5.

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becauseitfearstheUnitedStatesmorethanChina,RussiawillbelooselyintegratedintotheChina-ledboundedorder.ItispossiblethatRussiawilltrynottoalignitselfwitheithersideandcreateaboundedorderofitsown.Ifthathappened,itwouldbeapartialorder,butnowherenearasconsequentialastheboundedordersdominatedbyBeijingandWashington.ThebottomlinemovingforwardisthattherewillbeamuchmoreformidableinternationalorderthanexistedduringtheColdWaranditwillbeprimarilyconcernedwithhelpingtomanagetheworldeconomy.Butitwillalsopayconsiderableattentiontofosteringandmaintainingarmscontrolagreements,especiallyamongthegreatpowers.Therewillalsobetwoboundedordersdealingmainlywithsecurityconcerns.Rivalmilitaryallianceswillbeattheheartofthosetwoorders,whichwillpaylittleattentiontoeconomicmatters,whichwasnotthecasewiththeAmerican-ledandSoviet-ledordersduringtheColdWar.XI.AFinalThoughtThereisasmallchanceChinawillnotcontinueitsimpressiveriseandRussiawillbadlyfalterinthedecadesahead,whiletheUnitedStatesgrowsincreasinglypowerful.Shouldthathappen,theinternationalsystemwouldmovebacktounipolarityfrommultipolarity.Thispossibleshiftintheglobaldistributionofpowerraisestheobviousquestion:whatwouldtheinternationalorderlooklike,giventhatthesolepolewouldbealiberaldemocracy?WouldtheUnitedStatestryonceagaintoestablishaliberalinternationalorder,asitinthewakeoftheColdWar?WhilethereisnoquestionthatAmericanpolicymakerswouldbetemptedtotryagaintocreateanotherliberalinternationalorder,thatisunlikelytohappen.Themainreasonisthatithasbeentriedonceandfailedatsignificantcost.Indeed,itfailedwhenitlookedatfirstlikealltheingredientsforsuccesswereinplace.Afterall,theplanwastotakethefull-scaleUS-ledorderthathadbeensosuccessfulduringtheColdWarandspreaditacrosstheglobe.Buttherewillbenosimilarmodeltoinspiregreatexpectationsifunipolarityreturns,becausetheUS-ledorderagainstChinawillberestrictedlargelytomilitarymatters.Regardless,itevenprovedimpossibletotransformtheboundedrealistordertheUnitedStatesbuiltduringtheColdWarintoasustainableliberalinternationalorder.Intheeventunipolarityreturns,theUnitedStateswouldlikelyleadanagnosticinternationalorder.Americanpolicymakerswouldsurelyplayacentralroleinrunningtheinstitutionsthatcomprisethatorder,aswellasmanagingtheinternationaleconomy–hopefullyavoidingthepitfallsofhyper-globalization.ButinalllikelihoodtheUnitedStateswouldnottrytolaunchanothercrusadeaimedatturningeverycountryontheplanetintoaliberaldemocracy.Ofcourse,thisisthepathAmericanleadersshouldhavepursuedaftertheColdWarended,butatthatmomentintimetheythoughtitwouldbepossibletopursueamuchmoreambitiousagendaandcreatealiberalinternationalorderdominatedbyWashington.Theyfailedtorecognize,however,thatsuchanundertakingwasdestinedtofail.Hopefully,futureUSleaderswillnotrepeatthatmistakeifunipolaritycomesagain.