Rio Conflict Assessment Finalforhill[v.final]

8/2/2019 Rio Conflict Assessment Finalforhill[v.final]

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Marcella Marucci 2010

by Regina Joseph and Marcella Marucci

FAVELAS ON

FIRE:

BRAZILS


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Conflict Assessment Regina Joseph and Marcella Marucci

Favelas on Fire: Rios Urban War

2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Organized crime gangs in Rio de Janeiros favela slums have terrorized residents and underscored the states loss of control

since 1979. The battle for control between gangs and law enforcement created open urban warfare in Rio for the last three

decades.

Neglected since their creation as illegal settlements, favelas have been both site and source of this violent conflict. But now,

with the deadlines of the 2014 FIFA World Cup event and the 2016 Summer Olympics looming, Brazil and Rio de Janeiro have

an urgent need to finally address this complex problem and get it under control. Initial attempts at intervention have mostly

taken aim at directly suppressing the favela drug gangs, but the correlated factors of corruption, social and income

inequality require far more attention in order to achieve a sustainable peace.

This conflict assessment, prepared for the governments of Rio de Janeiro State and Brazil, consists of two phases: this report

constitutes the first phase, which employs the U.Ks Department for International Developments (DfID) Strategic Conflict

Assessment (SCA) framework. This desk study analyzes the structures, actors and dynamics of the conflict and identifies

responses, concluding with recommendations requiring city and state cooperation. The second phase involves a workshop-

oriented in-country assessment influenced by the principles of Participatory Action Research (PAR). Workshops include all

relevant stakeholders in order to effectively implement the recommendations of the first phase. The ideas of Mary

Andersons Do No Harm approach1

guide the creation of this entire assessment, in that we view identified facets behind

conflict as also critical factors for peace.

PHASE ONE: DESK STUDY

1. CONFLICT OVERVIEW

1Mary Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999)


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Topographically, the city of Rio de Janeiro is an intricate puzzle of mountains, beaches and bays, and rainforests that

surround a dense city of over 6 million inhabitants.2

Vast hillsides of shacks that comprise the more than 900 favelas that

weave through Rios high-density urban landscape house more than a sixth of the citys people.3

The disparity between the

wealth of Rios middle and upper class denizens and the abject poverty of favela-dwellers has not only contributed to Brazils

high GINI index coefficient of income equality (55.0 in 2009 and comparable to such locales as Haiti at 59.5 and South Africa

at 57.8)4, it also serves as a principal driver behind the citys violent conflict.

Drug trafficking and arms running in the service of Colombian cocaine cartels and neighboring crime factions in Bolivia, Peru

andParaguay helped propel the creation of Rios own gangs in 1979, which in turn have been responsible for the explosion

of violence in Rio from the 1980s until now. The gangs got their start in Rios penitentiary system, where they shared cells

with political prisoners incarcerated by the military dictatorship at the time, and learned from them the jargon, skills (bomb-

making, tunnel system building) and command systems of radicalized movements.

Rios gangs operate a linked criminal network between members still in prison and members on the outside, with jailed

leaders typically communicating to their free cohort through smuggled mobile phones. On the outside, the gangs act as

virtual owners of their favelas, controlling not only the lives of the residents, but also basic services they require and that the

government has neglected to providecooking oil/fuel; utilities; medicine; transport; and security,5

all for a profit at higher-

than-market rates. Thus a complex interdependence exists between favela residents and the organized crime gangs.

Drug gangs, however, are not the only instigators of violent conflict in Rio. By the late 1990s, armed militias formed by

favela-dwelling active and ex-policemen and firemen turned vigilante against the drug gangs and usurped the racketeering

of the gang cells they vanquished. Militias now control 41.5% of the slums, against 40% now in the hands of the largest

2Based on 2008 IGBE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografica e Estatistica) census statistics (accessed 1 March 2011);

http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/presidencia/noticias/noticia_visualiza.php?id_noticia=1435&id_pagina=13

Ibid.4United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2009 (accessed 1 March 2011);

http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/161.html5

Ibid.


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drug gang, the Comando Vermelho.6

Thus most favela dwellers lives are dictated, not by the state or rule of law, but by

violent groups at war with each other who exploit and extort the destitute neighborhoods over which they claim dominion.7

After historic neglect, the government is nowattempting to stabilize Rios security through a program best characterized as

a massive firepower response followed by community policing efforts. The method of pacification involvesfavela-by-favela

secure-and-hold counterinsurgency strategies in which SWAT teams invade then establish a semi-permanent presence in a

cleansedfavela. Pacifications are bloody and victims include scores of innocent bystanders.

While inaccurate reporting methods and the potential for corruption require careful assessment of reliability, homicide rates

in Rio have dropped since pacifications began three years ago (the first quarter of 2010 saw 2566 homicides, a 20% drop

compared to the same quarter in 2009).8

But it is too early to estimate whether this decrease constitutes a trend.

2.CONFLICT ANALYSIS

2.1 STRUCTURES

2.1(a) SECURITYSecurity constitutes the most visible element of Rios conflict. To eradicate organized crime gangs, the state deploys a

plethora of civil and military special police forces, accompanied by military-grade firepower. In particular, the intentionally

recognizable special operations battalions trained in counter-insurgency warfare known as the BOPE can be seen

throughout favelas that have been pacified.Favela dwellers, however, often complain of menacing behavior and extortion

at the hands of security forces.

Rio Governor Sergio Cabrals installation of urban Pacification Police Units (known as UPP forces), poses a stronger potential

peace dividend. The UPP forces semi-permanently integrate into the favela community and assist in daycare, teach skills

6Luiz Agosto Gollo, Vigilante Groups Trump Drug Gangs and Become Rios New Authority, 11 November 2009 (accessed 1

March 2011): http://www.brazzil.com/home-mainmenu-1/200-january-2009/10295-vigilante-groups-in-brazil-trump-drug-

gangs-and-become-rios-new-authority.html

7Carlos Amorim, interview by Regina Joseph, 13 April 2011, New York, email interview.

8ISP (Institute of Public Security) Reportagem, 5

thAugust 2010 (accessed 1 March 2011);

http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/Conteudo.asp?ident=216


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(like sports, athletic training, music) and seek social opportunities to engender trust and make favela life better. This is

where the greatest opportunity to create change in favelas may lie changing the public perception of the police from

corrupt and violent abusers to fellow community members.9

Corruption and abuse are pervasive: a 2010 anti-corruption sting operation known as Operation Guillotine10

revealed police

collaboration at the highest level with gangs and militias. Over 50 law-enforcement officialsincluding Allan Turnowski,

Rios police chiefwere caught aiding the groups law enforcement sought to stop.

While these visible structures require directional change, the least visible component of security, namely that of Brazils

prison systems, remains in equally dire need of reform. Prisonsovercrowded, filthy and violentare the cauldrons of

Brazils organized crime problem. Without an overhaul of the prison system, the structure of security in Brazil cannot be

successful.

2.1(b) POLITICAL

Political structures address the problem of urban warfare, but they also directly sustain the problem. Successive

governments derogated the establishment of basic public services to the poor, allowing favelas to grow and fester through

neglect.

Former President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva sought to address this with the creation of the 4-year US$350 billion

infrastructure investment programs PAC (2007) and PAC2 (2010, Programa de Acelerao do Crescimento or Growth

Acceleration Programs). PAC is supposed to address urban housing, sewage, electricity and more.11

However, widespread

corruption in Lulas and current president Dilma Rousseffs governments lead critics to scoff at PAC as unachievable publicity

9Anonymous. Drug Violence Drops in Rio as New Policing Techniques Introduced,Latin America News Dispatch Online, 20

May, 2010 (accessed 1 March 2011): http://latindispatch.com/2010/05/20/drug-violence-drops-in-rio-de-janeiro-as-new-

policing-techniques-introduced/

10Cecilia Ritto,Operao Guilhotina estanca vazadouro nos gabinetes da cpula da segurana pblica no Rio, Veja Online,

11 February 2011: http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/brasil/operacao-guilhotina-estanca-vazadouro-nos-gabinetes-da-cupula-

da-seguranca

11Brazil Online, PAC,http://www.brasil.gov.br/pac/investimentos/


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stunts. However, Bolsa Familia, Lulas conditional cash transfer program that lifted 20 million people out of poverty has been

successful, so elements of PAC2, if managed effectively, may still be viable.

The toughest political challenge to surmount lies in the fact that organized crime has become embedded into state

institutions. Drug gangs fund political campaigns, deploy members into police forces and customs agencies, and can thus

effectively render the state powerless to act.

2.1 (c)ECONOMIC

As Brazil emerges as an economic power, the impact of its urban wars and organized crime may potentially

destabilize the increasing growth trend. Currently Brazil offers a very attractive foreign direct investment

opportunityChina has been actively pouring billions of dollars into Brazil, which has in turn served as the

capital used to create investment programs like PAC. But if security continues to elude the Brazilian government,

the current upward trajectory may yet stall, which is why the tests of World Cup 2014 and the 2016 Olympics are

eyed so nervously by internal analysts. According to President of Cisco Brazil Rodrigo Abreu: Brazils high crime

rate has acted as an obstacle to the creation of a virtuous circle in which security brings investment, which in turn

brings resources that can be used to continue improving security.12 That investment also brings jobs, a factor in

changing the underlying structures that maintain favela life.

2.1(d) SOCIAL

Social and cultural forces can serve as both peace capacities as well as conflict sources. Institutions like religious

organizations often serve as mediators and charity providers within favelas; however, churches and officials have also

12Ibid.


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become participants in the conflict by protecting gang members and in some cases, even running guns and drugs on their

behalf.13

But even the power of devotion, a critical social binder in Brazil, cannot override the central social structure that maintains

the status quo of favela misery: the prosperity gap. For the poor, that gap creates resentment that has been reinforced by

the legacy of slavery, centuries of racism and a class hierarchy that still favors whites of European ancestry above all others.

The wealthy close themselves off into bunkered oases and reduce their contact with the majority of Rios population.

Researchers of Rios urban violence say such resentment serves as a source of the culture of hypermasculinity that

glamorizes guns and power, leading the most vulnerable into lives of crime.14

Myriad NGOs and community groups have sought to minimize the violence by creating programs that offer an alternative

path for young people excluded from participation in wider Brazilian society via education and employment. Many of these

focus particularly on programs for women, as they serve not only as the primary breadwinning forces within favelas, but

also as a factor in the cycle of violence: Abra Zaluar of NUPEV Violence Research Center, in observing the highest number of

deaths among men under the age of 30 in her study on favela violence, says the chances of dying between the ages of 15

and 30 is directly linked to the mother's schooling. Based on this observation, Zaluar insists the group in most need of the

states attention constitutes the poor, female slum residents that have spent little or no time in school.15

13Anonymous, MS: pastores esto envolvidos em trfico de armas, Jornal Globo Online, 11 March 2010 (accessed 1 March

2011): http://jornalnacional.globo.com/Telejornais/JN/0,,MUL1526040-10406,00-

MS+PASTORES+ESTAO+ENVOLVIDOS+EM+TRAFICO+DE+ARMAS.html

14Interview with Alba Zaluar, Director of Violence Studies of Nupev-Uerj, by Antonio Gois, June 2009 (accessed online 1

March 2011): http://www.ims.uerj.br/nupevi/artigos_midia/Hiperm.pdf

15Luiz Agosto Gollo, Vigilante Groups Trump Drug Gangs and Become Rios New Authority, 11 November 2009 (accessed 1

March 2011): http://www.brazzil.com/home-mainmenu-1/200-january-2009/10295-vigilante-groups-in-brazil-trump-drug-

gangs-and-become-rios-new-authority.html


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Certain social needs must be urgently addressed. Rio has yet to implement a public health policy to deal with the addiction

problems now rife in favelas; without this, eradication of drug gangs from favela life can never really be complete.


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2.2ACTORS

ACTORS INTERESTS RELATIONS PEACE

AGENDAS

INCENTIVES

Brazilian Govt security; stability; growth corrupted; crime

embedded; critic/public

skepticism

need to unify cities and public;

engender trust; establish domestic

stability

economic stability; global

prestige and power

Rio Govt

Police

Drug Gangs

Militias

Favela

Residents

security; stability; growth corrupted; crime


skepticism

UPP; unify favela & asfalto residents;

engender trust & quality of life

economic stability; global

prestige; structural cohesion

public order; reduce

organized crime; prestige

corrupted; crime


skepticism

UPP; unify favela & asfalto residents;

engender trust & quality of life

increased budgets; public

respect

profit; power; area

control; employment

violence; resident

dependence; security

gang exit = longer lives; better

community relations

survival

gang eradication; profit;

power; employment

violence; corruption;

resident dependence;

security

peaceful coexistence; better

community relations

avoidance of prison; public

respect; peaceful

neighborhoods

peace; stability; services;

equality; employment

violence; gang

dependence; mistrust;

sense of neglect

cooperation in improvement

programs; favela structural

improvement

peace; employment;

education; better living

conditions; stability

Intl OlympicComm. (IOC)

Intl Football

Federation

(FIFA)

Security

Consultants

Bad Neighbors

Co./Bo./Para.

profitable 2016 SummerOlympics; stability

profitable 2014 World

Cup; stability

profit; prestigious client

base

profit; domestic stabilityin own states

good relations; concernover stability

successful Olympics helps to establishpeace and economic growth

good public relations; growthof Olympic brand & profit

good relations; concern

over stability

successful World Cup helps to

establish peace and economic growth

good public relations; growth

of FIFA brand & profit

Brazilian interest &

skepticism; consultant

interest

consultancy success dependent on

ability to establish peace and security

good public relations; growth

of consultancy tactics & profit

complex diplomaticrelations; resource

dependencies

greater peace & stability for all iforganized crime brought under

control

economic stability; increasedprestige & power; better

relations

NGOs

Religious

Organizations

progressive change;

economic stability

some very community-

involved, others less so

aid programs not as successful as

community-building (esp. arts)

increase peace and stability

and use as models for other

countries

increase numbers of the

faithful; bind community

positive=charity &

community build;

negative=gang support

creating peace as a devotional work

of faith

extend devotional

communities


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2.3 DYNAMICS

2.3(a) LONG TERM TRENDS OF CONFLICT AND SCENARIOS

Social programs from the Lula administration from 2003-2010 have yielded a 6% reduction in crime and early attempts at

pacification appear to be generating decreases in favela violence. But only 13 of Rios nearly 1000 favelas constitute as

pacified. Furthermore, until Rocinha, the largest favela in Rio, is effectively pacified for a sustained period, state

representatives cant truly claim success with such measures.

Since Operation Guillotine in late 2010 removed several top law enforcement officials for corruption, the Rio civil police force

must quickly rebuild and reform to stanch the corrosive effect of abuse of power. But rebuilding and simultaneously

mounting the largest single organized crime counter-insurgency plan in historyand completing both successfully and

sustainably by 2014starts to look like over-reaching.

Even in a scenario where Rio is able to accomplish these twinned tasks, larger trends lurk ominously:

1.) Assuming a best-case scenario where violence does not mar either the World Cup or the Olympics, what happens after

the events are over?

2.) Should state investments (such as those in oil and agriculture) not yield the revenues required for continuation of core

infrastructure development programs beyond those required immediately to fulfill sporting event obligations, their removal

would put recent individual economic gains from Bolsa Familia at risk. Unless state and national governments devise a long-

term funding strategy now for Rio infrastructure, regardless of the World Cup and the Olympics and while Brazilian cash-

flow remains positive and liquid, economic wild cards can disrupt efforts aimed at overall social improvementnecessary

steps in quelling violence long-term.


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3.) Rio is experiencing new cataclysmic storm patterns, possibly due to climate change from Amazon clear-cutting. Hillside

structures like favelas face the worst threat from storms, since their flimsy constructions tend to be swept away by

mudslides and soil erosions. An infrastructural replacement plan for the favelas cannot be put off much longer.

2.3(b)TRIGGERS FOR INCREASED VIOLENCE

Pacifications trigger violence between law enforcement and gangs, so when Rio commences tackling its larger and more

dangerous favelas, violence may be triggered on a much bigger scale. The World Cup and the Olympics may certainly serve

as further potential violence triggers as drug gangs may use these events for retaliation and display. Long-term, Brazil must

consider long overdue prison reforms that may also serve as further triggers for instability and conflict. In any aspect of

reform the necessary upheaval involved could pose a real threat to peace and stability in the cities.

2.3(c) CAPACITIES FOR MANAGING CONFLICT

Several facets serve as both sources of conflict as well as sources of peaceamong them, police forces like the UPP;

reformed militia members who forego racketeering and exploitation of their communities; and uncorrupt political officials

who refuse to seek gain or employ jeito (shortcuts) when opportunities to take advantage appear. Until now, managing

conflict has primarily taken the form of matching firepower with firepower; however, managing conflict may be more

sustainably maintained through building shared identity. The prosperity gap and racism reinforce the class hierarchy

between favela residents and wealthy urbanites. However, Brazilians share common identity traits, such as a love of music,

sports, arts and patrimonial pride. By targeting identity-related issues, a build-up of trust may smooth future pacifications.

3. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RESPONSES

3.1 ROLE OF THE IOC and FIFA


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In his visit to Rio in 2010, President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Jacques Rogge emphasized that the

success of the Olympic Games lies in all the parties coming together and offered his organizations assistance to realizing

this goal.16

Although construction of some Olympic venues is already well underway, other proposed areas for the Games have little

infrastructure and will require much more construction and fundingConcerns surrounding the 2016 Olympic Games extend

to the World Cup, which occurs even sooner in 2014. Government lack of transparency in allocation of funds and budget

overages threaten to derail progress; Brazils Federal Accounting Authoritystates that severalof Brazils World Cup projects

face poor planning, and exploding costs,17

which may negatively impact more vital social improvements.

3.2ARMS, DRUG CONTROL and SECURITY

The Tri-Border Area (TBA) between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay is a hot spot for the flow of weapons and drugs.. The

Brazilian Federal Police currently maintain surveillance over the TBA, but heavily forested and poorly defined boundaries

make controlling the more than 1000 kilometer border extremely difficult. Illicit operations along the TBA continue to go

unnoticed.

In Rio, the U.S. Consulates Public Affairs Office has worked with Brazilian police agencies to assist in pacification efforts. It

also invited two U.S. security specialists to lead social development resolutions, including assessing effective dialogue

between police officers and youths and sharing knowledge on community policing and peacekeeping training from different

regions in the US, including New York City.18

The Brazilian government has also sought outside consultants like Rudolph

Giuliani to advise on security.

16Ibid.

17Tribunal das Contas da Unio - Plennary Judgement 742/2009. AC-0742-14/09-P. http://contas.tcu.gov.br 2009 (accessed

on 22 April 2011).18Anonymous. U.S. Security Specialists Exchange Shared Knowledge with Rio de Janeiro Police OfficersConsulate General

of the United States, Rio de Janeiro, 15 April 2011. http://riodejaneiro.usconsulate.gov/ev-041-5-2011.html(accessed 20

April 2011).
http://riodejaneiro.usconsulate.gov/ev-041-5-2011.htmlhttp://riodejaneiro.usconsulate.gov/ev-041-5-2011.htmlhttp://riodejaneiro.usconsulate.gov/ev-041-5-2011.html


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3.3 FOREIGN AID AND NGOs

Some organizations stand out as having an impact on both policy and social consciousness:

The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), active in Rio, plays a crucial role in supporting efforts towards

human safety by reducing the demand for small arms and strengthening arms transfer controls.19

Thanks to movements like

IANSA, the disarmament campaign in Brazil resulted in the collection of more than half a million weapons between 2003 and

2009,20

and on September 28, 2010, the Brazilian Minister of Justice signed an agreement with IANSA member Viva Rio,

establishing the disarmament campaign as a permanent state policy.21

The Luta Pela Paz (Fight for Peace) project in the Complexo da Mare favela in northern Rio is perhaps the most visible

example of a successful international (Anglo-Irish founded) effort addressing urban violence.22

Luta Pela Paz uses boxing and

martial arts combined with education and personal development to help youth in conflict-laden societies realize their

potential.23

Most recently, a meeting organized by Luta Pela Paz and the British Consulate in Rio brought together

authorities involved in the organization of cultural projects for the London 2012 and Rio 2016 Olympic Games to reinforce

the social legacy for favela youth after the Games are overfor the first time, the three spheres of Brazilian government

(Municipal, State and Federal) were present in showing interest in such an organization.

24

4. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

4.1 FEDERAL, STATE AND MUNICIPAL INITIATIVES

19Anonymous. About Us,IANSA Online. http://www.iansa.org/aboutus (accessed 22 April 2011).20

Anonymous. Brazil government announces permanent disarmament campaign.IANSA Online.

http://www.iansa.org/update/item/2010/10/brazil-government-announces-permanent-disarmament-campaign (accessed

22 April 2011).21

Ibid.22

Shyne, James. Interview by Marcella Marucci, 18 April 2011, New York, NY. Email interview.23Anonymous. About Us.Fight For Peace Online. http://www.fightforpeace.net/default.asp?contentID=2&lang=1

(accessed 20 April 2011).24

Ibid.
http://www.iansa.org/aboutushttp://www.iansa.org/update/item/2010/10/brazil-government-announces-permanent-disarmament-campaignhttp://www.iansa.org/update/item/2010/10/brazil-government-announces-permanent-disarmament-campaignhttp://www.fightforpeace.net/default.asp?contentID=2&lang=1http://www.fightforpeace.net/default.asp?contentID=2&lang=1http://www.fightforpeace.net/default.asp?contentID=2&lang=1http://www.fightforpeace.net/default.asp?contentID=2&lang=1http://www.iansa.org/update/item/2010/10/brazil-government-announces-permanent-disarmament-campaignhttp://www.iansa.org/update/item/2010/10/brazil-government-announces-permanent-disarmament-campaignhttp://www.iansa.org/aboutus


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In December 2003, the Brazilian Congress passed the Disarmament Statuteits first national gun law which imposed

restrictions on the use of firearms and laid out newly established crimes and penalties for small arms possession.25

In July

2004, the Brazilian Federal Government launched the Disarmament Campaigna gun buyback programwith extremely

positive results.26

Then in August 2007, the Brazils Ministry of Justice implemented the Program of Public Security and

Citizenship (PRONASCI) to focus on at-risk youth and the high rates of violence in major Brazilian cities.27

PRONASCIs innovative campaign targets citizen involvement and includes: modernizing police forces and the penitentiary

system; training security professionals; eradicating police corruption; fighting criminality; promoting womens human rights;

and keeping young adults away from criminality by offering them government-led options.28

The PRONASCI programs and the disarmament statute compound the gains that have been created by PAC, PAC2, Bolsa

Familia, and the UPP community policing forces. These elements taken togetherstarting with the UPP in particularmake

it possible for people in occupied favelas to play a role and have a voice in the control of violence.

4.2 LOCAL NGOs and COMMUNITY PROGRAMS

Many non-governmental organizations have formed in response to Rios growing violence. Viva Rio, the oldest and the

largest NGO created by favela residents, has developed a wide range of successful activities and strategies including Viva

Favela, a community news project that serves as both a virtual bridge between favela residents and the outside world and a

resource for intra-favela news.29

25 UN Website. Response of Brazil to the Secretary General's Request for Views on the Interrelation Between Armed violence

and Development, as Per Section 2 of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 63/23. (accessed 22 April 2011):

http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/SALW/Docs/AV-MemberStatesViews/Brazil-E.pdf26

Ibid.27

Ibid.28

UN Website. Response of Brazil to the Secretary General's Request for Views on the Interrelation Between Armed violence

and Development, as Per Section 2 of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 63/23. (accessed 22 April 2011):

http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/SALW/Docs/AV-MemberStatesViews/Brazil-E.pdf29

Viva Rio Online (accessed 20 April 2011);http://www.vivario.org.br/
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4.3(a) MUSIC, ART, and SPORT-BASED PROGRAMS

Brazilians identify strongly with their cultural heritage of the arts and athletics; some of the most successful peace

capacitors are music, art and sport programs. Grupo Cultural AfroReggae, a music and drumming collective, created by a

former Comando Vermelho member, uses music workshops to resist drug gangs across hundreds of Rios favelas;30

artists

have harnessed the collective power of favela residents to transform their hillside communities into massive artworks,

painting sweeping images directly onto shacks that create effects that can be seen from miles away; and youth programs in

soccer and volleyball have been central in creating safe places to play, as well as providing aspirational opportunities for the

gifted.

5. METHODOLOGY

By adopting DfIDs SCA framework our aim is to harmonize Brazils and Rios action plan with potential responses from all

stakeholders.

Our intensive desk study involved in-field experts (See Annex I) who helped broaden the understanding of the situation on

the ground. Given the acute sensitivity of the findings and the wide-range of actors, implementing a Do No Harm approach

requires in-country research and workshops with local and international development organizations, economists, scholars,

government actors and favela residents to exchange ideas and establish a basis for continued strategic planning; this will be

the next phase of our research.

Our approach requires flexibility: we encourage shared analysis among government actors (in particular security sector

actors like the police and prison system officials). That flexibility also requires the information sharing and participation to

extend to the various conflict actors, including drug gang members, militia members, and favela residents. The complexity of

Rios conflict requires dynamic profiling an aspect emphasized by the SCAframeworks focus on the nexus where change

30Neate, Patrick and Damian Platt. Culture is Our Weapon: Making Music and Changing Lives in Rio de Janeiro (New York:

Penguin, 2010); 1-72.
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intersects with root causes of violence.31

Rios 500-year legacy of colonialism, military dictatorships, and elite oligarchic

capitalism have entrenched behaviors, resentments, and aspirations that seem static and cant be easily undone; however,

the nature of the conflicts violence morphs daily. But the conflicts instability poses a direct challenge to Brazils current

economic ascendance. Brazil and Rio cannot afford to allow the tenuous security condition to threaten future investment,

development and growth. The he framework employs a strong political economy lens in which to view the relations

between actors; its multidisciplinary approach allows a range of ideas from various sectors to influence a sustainable plan of

action.32

To date, Brazil and Rios response to the conflict consists of a law enforcement-based response in which massive

firepower is used to counter firepower of conflict actors. This approach, while effective to some extent by slightly reducing

the overall level of violence, causes harm by inflicting collateral damage, killing innocent civilians and increasing fear and

resentment. We propose a sustainable plan of action that mitigates the harmful effects of current strategy by creating

direct dialogue between antagonistic actors to establish trust.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS

6.1A PUBLIC AWARENESS CAMPAIGN: ARRIVAL CITIES NO MORE

Much of Rios conflict rests on negative perceptions of the poor and the favelas themselves. Income inequality, racism and

unequal land distribution combined with state neglect have stigmatized favelas and residents, effectively containing them as

borderline elements of society. We recommend turning this view on its head by essentially rebranding favelas as launching

pads for the rural poor in their transition to urban life a theme expounded upon by Doug Saunders,33

the author of Arrival

City. Favelas, seen as arrival cities, determine the success of rapidly urbanizing metropolises; by changing the perception

of favelas and unifying them within the larger urban social fabric of Rio, the dialogue between wealthy and poor may be re-

energized.

6.2 PRELIMINARY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

31Department for International Development (2002) Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes (London: DfID) p. 7

32Ibid, p. 8

33Saunders, Doug, interview by Tom Ashbrook. "Global Migration and Arrival Cities." On Point. NPR. March 23, 2011.
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Short-Term:

Expand efforts to expand UPP and UPP social programs to all urban areas within Rio Expand law enforcement/anti-corruption stings Begin Rio-based public relations program highlighting favelas as vital arrival c ity components of Rios society to

restore dignity to favela residents. Require all NGOs and aid agencies to assist in the effort to establish a unified Rio

identity.

o Key focus: sanitation and anti-corruption Increase government support for sports, music, and arts-based programs in the favelas Continue to work with international actors, NGOs and aid agencies to collaborate on violence reduction

Long-Term:

Overhaul and reform the prison system: prison construction must include cell phone transmission blockingmechanisms

State-wide anti-corruption programs: must investigate embedded relationships between organized crime activityand politicians

Education reform: must include the creation of adequate schools and facilities for favela youth

Public health and housing reform for the poor: continue addressing favela sanitation and safe public housing Implement a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) team to observe ongoing conflict dynamics and stakeholder

progress

PHASE TWO: IN-COUNTRY ASSESSMENT

7.FIELD WORK AND PARTICIPATORY ACTION RESEARCH

The in-country phase of our assessment will include additional research in the form of interviews and workshops. We

propose individual workshops for each stakeholding group, concluding with a final workshop where all actors meet to
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debrief on their individual workshops. We use Participatory Action Research (PAR) principles to guide a more collaborative

response. PAR requires conflict actors to be directly involved in the process of peace-building, so that adoption of sustainable

policies potentially increases.34

To that end, one of the workshops that we require as part of the methodology consists of an

interaction exercise to take place on Rios beaches. Historically, the beaches of Rio have been a neutral, class -free space in

which all members of Rios society congregate. Our recommendation requires state government officials, gang members,

favela residents, and law enforcement officers to participate together in trust-building culturally-oriented exercises including

soccer games, volleyball games and musical performances.

8.CONCLUDING REMARKS

Brazil and Rio must amplify their current counter-insurgency-based response to the conflict by combining a public awareness

campaign to unify Rio with reform of the security sector, pubic services and education. Income inequality remains the

principle driver behind Rios urban conflict and therefore must be the states long-term ultimate goal. Certain elements of

current practice, like the UPP, constitute a step in the right direction; but they must be significantly reinforced through

extension to larger areas of the city and coupled with active policies of redistributing social equality over the next decade.

With the opportunity to project its soft power and substantiate Brazils emergence as a global leader, the city and nation

face tremendous short-term pressure to fulfill the responsibilities they have fought so hard to get. Should Rio and Brazil fail

at getting the security situation under control, not only are lives of its citizens at stake, but so is the more visible issue of

Brazils standing as a competent and reliable actor in world affairs.

34Stiefel, Matthias. "Participatory Action Research as a Tool for Peacebuilding: The WSP Experience." In Peace-Building: A

Field Guide, by L. Reychler & T. Paffenholz, 573. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., (2001), p. 266.
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Annex I

Interviewees:

Carlos Amorim

Carlos Amorim is a Rio native and resident and is considered the world's most prolific expert on Brazilian organized crime. He

is a documentary director, print and broadcast investigative journalist, and the author of a critically-lauded trilogy on

organized crime, including Assalto ao Poder (Assault on Power); CV-PCC: A Irmandade de Crime (CV-PC: The Brotherhood of

Crime); and Comando Vermelho: A Historia Secreta dor Crime Organizdo (Red Command: The Secret History of Organized

Crime). Amorim spent 20 years working for Globo, Brazil's largest media conglomerate, in a variety of executive production

roles and is also the founding editor of Brazilian newspaper Jornal de Manchete.

Marcio Kahn

Marcio Kahn is a Rio native and resident. Kahn is a senior engineer at Petrobras as well as a founding shareholder in Casa de

Carinho, a daycare center located in the Santa Marta favela. As a member of the Mangueira samba club, Kahn is also

involved in social and cultural events in that favela community. He is Regina Joseph's first cousin.

James Shyne
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James Shyne is a PhD candidate in international economics at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. He is currently working

on a multiple-essay dissertation examining public policy and human security in Brazil and was a William J. Fulbright Fellow in

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 2009.

Email: [email protected]

Cel. (Brazil) +55.21.9689.3908

Cel. (USA) +1.617.320.8377

Interview transcripts available on request.
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Rio Conflict Assessment Finalforhill[v.final]