RIGHTS Accused

7/27/2019 RIGHTS Accused

1/32

BILL OF RIGHTS: Rights of an Accused

RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED

Before Criminal Prosecution: (before arraignment)

Right to due process (Sec. 14(1))

Custodial rights (Sec. 12)

Right to be informed of his rights

Right to remain silent

Right to counsel

Right to bail (Sec. 13)

Right to speedy disposition of his case (Sec. 16)

Right of free access to the courts

During Criminal Prosecution: (after arraignment up to promulgation of judgment) Right to presumption of innocence (Sec. 14(2))

Right to be heard by himself and counsel (Sec. 14(2))

Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him (Sec.

14(2))

Right to have speedy, impartial and public trial (Sec. 14(2))

Right to confrontation (Sec. 14(2))

Right to have compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses and

production of evidence on his behalf (Sec. 14(2))

Right against self-incrimination (Sec. 17)

Right against double jeopardy (Sec. 21)

9.Right against ex-post facto law and bill of attainder (Sec. 22)

After Conviction:

Right against excessive fines and cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment (Sec.

19)

SECTION 12Custodial Rights

Sec. 12: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be

informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own

choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights

cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2009/12/bill-of-rights-rights-of-accused.htmlhttp://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2009/12/bill-of-rights-rights-of-accused.html


2/32

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be

used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are

prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible inevidence.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation

to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

- To put the accused on equal footing with the State

"in custody" - includes deprivation or mere restriction on physical liberty

Custodial Investigation investigation conducted by law enforcer immediately afterarrest

The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine all evidence (the fruit) derived from anillegal search (the poisonous tree) must be suppressed, whether it was obtained directlythrough the illegal search itself, or indirectly using information obtained in the illegal

search

But For Test or taint doctrine; the evidence would not have come to light but for the

illegal action of the police

WHEN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BEGINS:

1. Restrictive View - limited to in-custody interrogations as when the accused has

been arrested and brought to the custody of the police for questioning

2. Expanded View contemplates two situations: (1) general inquiry as toidentification, circumstances of a crime without focus on any particular suspect;

and (2) suspicion is focused on a particular person and questions are asked from

him to elicit admissions or information

**Under the expanded view, general inquiry as to identification, like in a police line-up,

is not considered part of custodial investigation hence the accused may be identified by

a witness in a police line-up even if made not in the presence of counsel

NOT PART OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION:

Police line-up, or during process of identification Spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary

manner (spur-of-the-moment statements) res gestae

o SPUR OF THE MOMENT

means to do something on impulse, without any forward planning.This could be due to fear, or as such, another emotion. The

majority of people confuse this with 'spare of the moment', which

in itself is an incorrect statement.


3/32

To do something Off the Cuff, or a at moments notice. Linked to

spontaneity, or spontaneous people.

SPONTANEITY - the quality of being spontaneous andcoming from natural feelings without constraint.

OFF THE CUFF - spontaneous; done without any planning or

rehearsing

Volunteered statements

Extrajudicial admission to the prosecutor or a private person

Investigation made by a citizen or private security officer

Miranda Doctrine: Rights Under Custodial Investigation

Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed 2d 694

Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow, but,

briefly stated, it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory orinculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it

demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against

self-incrimination. By custodial investigation, we mean questioning initiated by lawenforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of

his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be

employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of

their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the followingmeasures are required: Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has

the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence

against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained orappointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is

made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner

and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking,there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any

manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The

mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on

his own does not deprive him of hte right to refrain from answering any further inquiriesuntil he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.

Extrajudicial Confessions to Mayor and Media Admissible

People vs. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997

Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confessionbefore the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational

supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law


4/32

enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the

Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to

any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. Nopolice authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who

spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor

did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talkedwith the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled

confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the

constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneousstatement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary

manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the

Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The

rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by thestate as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely

and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor

was correctly admitted by the trial court.

Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions

were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any otherinvestigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to

news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in

evidence.

Q: COA auditor investigated certain anomalies in the accounts of a government

agency. He questioned X, a public employee therein, without benefit of counsel. Are

Xs statements admissible?

A: Yes. A COA auditor is not a law enforcer.

Q: Miguel, an AFP major, arrested B and questioned him without benefit of

counsel. Admissible?

A: Yes. An AFP member is not a law enforcer.

Q: H, a police officer, and husband of W, saw the latter cheating on him with her

paramour. The paramour was able to escape while W was detained by H and then

questioned. Later, H filed a case for adultery against W and used her statement as

evidence. Admissible?

A: Yes. Even if H is a police officer, the time when he questioned W, his wife, he wasnot acting in his official capacity as a police officer but in his personal capacity as her

husband.

Q: X, the accused in a case for rape, was asked to provide the police investigating

team with samples of his DNA. He did so without assistance of counsel. Admissible?

A: Yes. The act of providing samples for identification is a mere mechanical act, not

covered by the right against self-incrimination.

Q: If in the above case, X was also made to sign booking sheets and police reports,


5/32

also without counsel. Admissible?

A: No. Handwriting is not a mere mechanical act.

RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

- Refers not only to testimonial confessions but also to acts- but does not apply to acts that are merely mechanical (does not require use of

intelligence) or to general questions (e.g. What is your name? Right to remain silent?Grabe ha ^_^)

MECHANICAL ACTS:

Paraffin test

DNA test

Examination of physical body

Fingerprinting

Being asked to step on a footprint to compare foot size

NOT MECHANICAL:

Handwriting

Initials on marked money

Signing of inventory receipts in search warrant (see People vs. Go)

Reenactment

RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT AND COMPETENT COUNSEL

- absolute, even if accused himself is a lawyer

Independent - counsel is not hampered with any conflicts of interest

Competent - counsel who is vigilant in protecting the rights of accused

Accused must be apprised of his rights under custodial investigation

People vs. Obrero, G.R. No. 122142, May 17, 2000

Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusiveevidence showing the declarants consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such

confession will be sustained.

xxx

But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that

accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the


6/32

Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States from

which Art. III, 12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept

into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of theatmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel.

Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in custodialinterrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right

to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against

him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, alawyer will be appointed to represent him.

Mere Perfunctory Reading of Miranda Warnings not Enough

There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant

without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so,

whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind

of giving of warnings, in several decisions[16] of this Court, has been found to be merelyceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Especially

in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator thataccused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only

finished the fourth grade of the elementary school.

xxx

Independent Counsel

Moreover, Art. III, 12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial

interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by

Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an"independent counsel" as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station

commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant.

NOTA BENE:

The right to counsel attaches upon investigation, that is, when the investigation

officer starts to ask question to elicit information or confession or admission. In

case of waiver of rights, the same must be done in writing and in the presence ofcounsel.

A legal officer of a city cannot qualify as independent counsel. As to who has

burden of proving the voluntariness of the confession and that the constitutional

safeguards have been complied with, the prosecution has the burden of proof.

If admission is made before a private person, then it is admissible even if done

without assistance of counsel.


7/32

SECTION 13

Right to Bail

Sec. 13: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidenceof guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance

as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

- Available whether or not the case has already been filed for as long as the person hasbeen denied his liberty or otherwise deprived thereof

- A mode to ensure the attendance of the accused at his trial

2 KINDS OF BAIL:

Bail Bond

> Cash money, not check> Property real property, not personal property (because value depreciates); annotatedin the title

> Surety similar to insurance

Recognizance

GENERAL RULE: Available to all persons, not exclusively to those already formally charged of a crime.

Any person who is under detention and custody and deprived of his liberty may avail himself of this right.

EXCEPTIONS:

Reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, and death when evidence of guilt is strong Military men facing charges before court martial

Recidivists, habitual delinquents, quasi-recidivists, person who violated his probation or parole,

even if penalty is less than six years

Extradition or deportation proceedings

Contempts in legislative inquiry

RIGHTS INCLUDED:

1. Right to a hearing, which may be summary and does not have to be separate and

distinct from the trial itself

2. Prosecution has right to present evidence if this is denied, the grant of bail isvoid

WHEN A MATTER OF RIGHT:

MTC - before and after conviction (less than 6 years imprisonment)

RTC - before conviction, below reclusion perpetua and even if evidence of guilt is

strong


8/32

Minority - even if reclusion perpetua or death and evidence of guilt is strong; a

privileged mitigating circumstance (lower by two degrees, the highest penalty that

can be imposed is only reclusion temporal) Reclusion Perpetua or higher if evidence of guilt is not strong

NOTA BENE:

If the accused is convicted and penalty of more than 6 years imprisonment is

imposed, the trial court should cancel the bail, if he has been provisionally

released. It becomes discretionary only upon the court whether to grant the

accused provisional liberty on the same bail bond.

When the charge is punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, hearing for grant

of bail is mandatory to comply with due process of law. The prosecution should

also be allowed to present evidence.

WHEN A MATTER OF DISCRETON: RTC - after conviction, below reclusion perpetua but more than 6 years

imprisonment

Reclusion Perpetua or death - before conviction

Minority - after conviction for more than 6 years imprisonment

CA - accused was charged with murder but was convicted with homicide, which

conviction was appealed to the CA; the trial court should deny bail but the CA has

discretion whether to let the accused out on provisional liberty

WHEN BAIL SHALL BE DENIED: MTC - recidivist, habitual delinquent, quasi-recidivist, violated parole or

probation

RTC - charged with reclusion perpetua and evidence of guilt is strong, even if

convicted of lesser penalty; or after conviction for offense punishable by death or

reclusion perpetua

Habeas Corpus vis--vis Bail; When Bail may be Cancelled

Mendoza vs. CFI, G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973

Habeas Corpus: When it is available

Habeas corpus could be invoked by petitioner if he were able to show the illegality of his

detention. There is aptness and accuracy in the characterization of the writ of habeascorpus as the writ of liberty. Rightfully it is latitudinarian in scope. It is wide-ranging and

all embracing in its reach. It can dig deep into the facts to assure that there be no


9/32

toleration of illegal restraint. Detention must be for a cause recognized by law. The writ

imposes on the judiciary the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether a deprivation of

physical freedom is warranted. This it has to discharge without loss of time. The partywho is keeping a person in custody has to produce him in court as soon as possible. What

is more, he must justify the action taken. Only if it can be demonstrated that there has

been no violation of one's right to liberty will he be absolved from responsibility. Unlessthere be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease.

Remedy of Habeas Corpus not available when there is Warrant of Arrest

The above formulation of what is settled law finds no application to the present situation.

Petitioner's deprivation of liberty is in accordance with a warrant of arrest properly issued

after a determination by the judge in compliance with the constitutional provisionrequiring the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses

produced. No allegation to the contrary may be entertained. It cannot be denied that

petitioner's co-accused, Nelso Unal, Hermogenes Lumanglas and Leopoldo Trinidad, had

previously come to this court to challenge the filing of one information where there werethree victims. Accordingly, this Court, in Unal v. People, required three separate

amended informations. There was no question, however, as to the legality of the warrantsof arrest previously issued, not only in the case of the parties in such petition, but

likewise of petitioner. Habeas corpus, under the circumstances, would not therefore lie."

Bail, concept, rationale

Even if it be granted that petitioner may not be released on a habeas corpus proceeding, is

he, however, entitled to bail? Precisely that is the remedy by which, notwithstanding theabsence of any flaw in one's confinement, provisional liberty may still be had. Such a

remedy, as a matter of fact, was granted him in accordance with an order of the municipal

court of Mulanay. Thereafter, however, the bail was revoked by the Court of FirstInstance in the order now challenged. Such actuation he would now condemn as a grave

abuse of discretion. In the landmark decision of Chief Justice Concepcion, People v.

Hernandez, the right to bail was rightfully stress as an aspect of the protection accordedindividual freedom which, in his eloquent language," is too basic, too transcendental and

vital in a republican state, like ours, ...." To be more matter of fact about it, there is this

excerpt from de la Camara v. Enage "Before conviction, every person is bailable except if

charged with capital offense when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows fromthe presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to

the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be

proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in theobservance and not in the breach. It is not beyond the realm of probability, however,

ftlinethat a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would

just simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail isintended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of

Cooley, a mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the

attendance of the accused for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in

denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong,


10/32

as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a

death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too

great to be resisted."

Can bail be cancelled without violating the right to bail?

The precise question however, is whether once the provisional liberty has been thus

obtained, it could be terminated by the cancellation of the bail. In the answer filed on

behalf of respondent Court, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza did stress the absence ofauthority on the part of special counselor Antonio R. Robles who was not authorized to

intervene in this case on behalf of the state but did so, his failure to object being the basis

of the bail granted by the municipal court of Mulanay, Quezon. Such an allegation was

denied by petitioner. We are not called upon to rule definitely on this aspect asindependently thereof, there are two other basic objections. One was that petitioner, when

the bail was granted, was still at large. The municipal court, therefore, could not have

granted bail in accordance with our ruling in Feliciano v. Pasicolan. Thus: "'The

constitutional mandate that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except thosecharged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, is subject to the limitation

that the person applying for bail should be in custody of the law, or otherwise deprived ofhis liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous as

to grant bail to one who is free.'" Secondly, and what is worse, the prosecution was never

given a chance to present its evidence. The authoritative doctrine in People v. San Diegois thus squarely in point: "Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody

for a capital offense be resolved in summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial,

the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the

evidence that it may desire to introduce before the Court should resolve the motion forbail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution

should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due

process, and order of the Court granting bail should be considered void."

Extradition Proceedings: Due Process and Right to Bail

Govt. of the USA vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002

FACTS:

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested theextradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest

should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez

to post bail for his provisional liberty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before issuance of

warrant of arrest

Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings


11/32

RULING:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.

First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by

facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the other.

With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent

criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading

prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting theirmethods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.

Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon

extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in thesuppression of crime.[30] It is the only regular system that has been devised to return

fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipaland international law.

xxx

Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an

expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an

isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chancesof suppressing crime in our own country.

2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and

that both accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process. More pointedly,our duly authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty signifies our

confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights

of the person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that the

accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basicrights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would

not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.

3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are notcriminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at

fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.

An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call


12/32

into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin

with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or

innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the statewhere he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to

determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.

x x x x x x x x x

There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminalproceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings

involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of

evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent

standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requiresproof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited

upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case

where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition

proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has thefinal discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby

the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case andthe demands of the nations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to

extradite.

Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain

the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Such determination

during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which aperson charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best

claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter

into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose ofextradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request

complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition

Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumptionthat its implementation will serve the national interest.

Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with therequesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a

bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure would discourage

other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty thathinges on reciprocity.

Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations

under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting


13/32

country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied.

In other words, [t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the

law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the properwarrant, and the other government is under obligation to make the surrender.

Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused,

should it be found proper.

5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie

presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothing short

of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested

state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.

The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be

extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if

only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts ofherein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his

indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learningthat the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are

bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as

well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and

the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity,

from fleeing a second time?

Due Process

Is an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest?It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word

immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered

nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sendingnotices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving

them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a

hearing can no longer be considered immediate. The law could not have intended the

word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgencyand swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.

By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not asimportant as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an

exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the

filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the courtis expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to

make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.

xxx


14/32

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not

require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects

against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shallbe inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable

cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or

affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularlydescribing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself

requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and thewitnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused

before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

x x x

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely furtherexamine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the act of

respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at

this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If theaccused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima

facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from

presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to

negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of aprima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial

of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of

extraditions.

That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not

sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. Ifa different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite --

would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.

Right to Bail

Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings

We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the

constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the

Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violationof Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because

extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in


15/32

favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter

he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It

follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition,where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired evenwhen the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract from the

rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must

be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds applicationonly to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly

connected with invasion. Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on

bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned

offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extraditionproceedings that are not criminal in nature.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United

States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extraditionproceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is

charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him,not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the

judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well

as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant

of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life,

liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to everysituation calling for its application.

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after apotential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be

applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1)

that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the

community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstancesincluding, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting

state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived

essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden

of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphaticforcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial,

responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its

barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not

normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of


16/32

this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and bilateral

interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short,

while this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizesthe limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.

Bail is a Matter of Discretion on the part of Appellate Court

Obosa vs. CA, G.R. No. 144350, Jan. 16, 1997

FACTS:

Obosa was charged with two counts of murder for the ambush and slaying of formerSecretary of Interior and Local Governments Jaime Ferrer and his driver Jesus Calderon.

However, he was only convicted of two counts of homicide by the trial court. Obosa

applied for bail with the trial court. While this is pending, he appealed the case to the CA,which found strong evidence of guilt. Meanwhile, the trial court approved Obosas bail

bond, prompting the prosecution to request the CA to cancel the bail bond approved by

the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused is entitled to right to bail pending appeal as a

matter of right

RULING:

The Purpose of Bail

In the case of De la Camara vs. Enage, we analyzed the purpose of bail and why it should

be denied to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong:

"x x x Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses

when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption ofinnocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom

as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond

reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the

breach. It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with acrime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce

and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an

intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a 'mode short of confinementwhich would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused' for the

subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged

with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong. as the likelihood is, rather thanawait the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present

threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted."

(Underscoring supplied).

The aforequoted rationale applies with equal force to an appellant who, though convicted

of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was


17/32

nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense. Such appellant can hardly be

unmindful of the fact that, in the ordinary course of things, there is a substantial

likelihood of his conviction (and the corresponding penalty) being affirmed on appeal, orworse, the not insignificant possibility and infinitely more unpleasant prospect of instead

being found guilty of the capital offense originally charged. In such an instance, the

appellant cannot but be sorely tempted to flee.

Appeal in a Criminal Case Opens the Whole Case for Review, including Penalty

In Quemuel vs. CA, et al., this Court held that the appeal in a criminal case opens the

whole case for review and this includes the penalty, which may be increased. Thus, on

appeal, as the entire case is submitted for review, even factual questions may once more

be weighed and evaluated. That being the situation, the possibility of conviction upon theoriginal charge is ever present. Likewise, if the prosecution had previously demonstrated

that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as it had done so in this case, such

determination subsists even on appeal, despite conviction for a lesser offense, since such

determination is for the purpose of resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does nothave any bearing on whether petitioner will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the

charge.

Bail is a Matter of Discretion on Appeal

We have previously held that, while the accused, after conviction, may upon application

be bailed at the discretion of the court, that discretion particularly with respect to

extending the bail should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution and only for

strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding the majesty of the law and theadministration of justice.

SECTION 14

Right to Due Process, to be Presumed Innocent, Speedy Trial

Sec. 14: (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, andshall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and

to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his

behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused providedthat he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

DUE PROCESS

- procedural, not substantive

- procedure established by law for the prosecution of offenses must be followed


18/32

STEPS:

1. Preliminary examination by judge to determine probable cause for issuance ofwarrant of arrest

2. Arrest and interrogation by authorities

3. Preliminary investigation by the prosecutor to determine probable cause forpurposes of filing information

4. Filing of information in court

5. Arraignment6. Preliminary conference

7. Pre-trial conference

8. Presentation of evidence by prosecution

9. Presentation of evidence by defense10. Rebuttal

11. Offer of evidence

12. Decision

13. Promulgation of judgment

NOTA BENE: The absence of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of a

criminal information, nor does it otherwise render it defective, neither does it affect thejurisdiction of the court over the case.

Extradition Proceedings: No Notice and Hearing during Evaluation Stage

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000

FACTS:

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of ForeignAffairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private

respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.

On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge

of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents,

Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of theofficial extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to

comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but

the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US ExtraditionTreaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the

United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent has right to notice and hearing

RULING:


19/32

Rationale of Extradition Treaty; Summary Proceeding

It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to

arrest the dramatic rise of international and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug

trafficking. Extradition treaties provide the assurance that the punishment of these crimeswill not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties

should be the unbending commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not be

coddled by any signatory state.

It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will

minimize if not prevent the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and

expedite their trial. The submission of the private respondent, that as a probableextraditee under the RP-US Extradition Treaty he should be furnished a copy of the US

government request for his extradition and its supporting documents even while they are

still under evaluation by petitioner Secretary of Justice, does not meet this desideratum.

The fear of the petitioner Secretary of Justice that the demanded notice is equivalent to anotice to flee must be deeply rooted on the experience of the executive branch of our

government. As it comes from the branch of our government in charge of the faithfulexecution of our laws, it deserves the careful consideration of this Court. In addition, it

cannot be gainsaid that private respondents demand for advance notice can delay the

summary process of executive evaluation of the extradition request and its accompanyingpapers. The foresight of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes did not miss this danger. In 1911,

he held:

"It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious niceties ofa criminal trial at common law. But it is a waste of time . . . if there is presented, even in

somewhat untechnical form according to our ideas, such reasonable ground to suppose

him guilty as to make it proper that he should be tried, good faith to the demandinggovernment requires his surrender." (emphasis supplied)

We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow time to stand still on his

prosecution. Justice is best served when done without delay.

Extradition Proceeding is Sui Generis; Not Criminal

An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will callinto operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin

with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or

innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the statewhere he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to

determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee

especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held by theUS Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:

"An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional

safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from


20/32

extradition pursuant to a valid treaty."

There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding.An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a

full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an

extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. Interms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond

reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited "upon

showing of the existence of a prima facie case." Finally, unlike in a criminal case wherejudgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our

courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to

extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of

State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands ofthe nation's foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.

As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an

extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due processsafeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the

procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with adetermination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the

private interest that has been affected by governmental action." The concept of due

process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for thesame kind of procedure."

Constitutional Right to Due Process vis-a-vis States Obligation to Treaty

Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation

stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and the

degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to theinterests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of Justice. In Angara

v. Electoral Commission, we held that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes

and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicialdepartments of the government." Under our constitutional scheme, executive power is

vested in the President of the Philippines. Executive power includes, among others, the

power to contract or guarantee foreign loans and the power to enter into treaties or

international agreements. The task of safeguarding that these treaties are duly honoreddevolves upon the executive department which has the competence and authority to so

act in the international arena. It is traditionally held that the President has power and even

supremacy over the countrys foreign relations. The executive department is aptlyaccorded deference on matters of foreign relations considering the Presidents most

comprehensive and most confidential information about the international scene of which

he is regularly briefed by our diplomatic and consular officials. His access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data is also unlimited. The deference we give to the

executive department is dictated by the principle of separation of powers. This principle

is one of the cornerstones of our democratic government. It cannot be eroded without

endangering our government.


21/32

The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to

do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered by ourgovernment. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws

involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest

purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whoseactivities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest

of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to

crimes, especially transnational crimes.

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not

ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length

and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires adetermination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated

otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are

at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an

individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." We have explained why anextraditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition

process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treatyaffords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the

petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for

his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition.The extraditee's right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the

extradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent

escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the

basis of the request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extraditionproceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the

government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater

power over matters involving our foreign relations. Needless to state, this balance ofinterests is not a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted as the extradition

process moves from the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution

stage depending on factors that will come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporaryhold on private respondent's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right

to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to

resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no denial of due process

as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

Burden of proof lies on his accusers to prove him guilty

Equiponderance of Evidence (Equipoise Doctrine) when preponderance of evidence

is at equipoise, court will find for the defendant; when the scale stand at an equipoise and

there is nothing in evidence to incline it either way, the court shall rule against the partywho has the burden of proof


22/32

Proof beyond reasonable doubt not to be equated with absolute certainty; moral

certainty, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind

Prosecution has Burden of Proof

People vs. Austria, G.R. No. L-55109, April 8, 1991

It is axiomatic that conviction should be made on the basis of a strong, clear and

compelling evidence (People v. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107 [1986]. Thus, "if the inculpatory

facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which isconsistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then

the evidence does not fulfill the tests of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a

conviction" (People v. Ale, 145 SCRA 64 [1986]; People v. Modesto, 25 SCRA 36[1968]).

To overcome the presumption of innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed.Thus, in People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 60 [1971], this Court held:

Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt; the

prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyondreasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need for the most careful scrutiny of the

testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is

offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive ata conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under

such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that

every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof againsthim must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway

judgment.

Presumption of Innocence vs. Presumption of Regularity of Performance of Official Duty

People vs. Briones, G.R. No. 113498, Jan. 16, 1997

The foregoing circumstances militate against affirming appellant's conviction. For the

same reason, we can not stamp with approval the trial court's undue reliance with the

presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. While SPO1 Alilio is presumed to

have regularly performed his official duty, this presumption alone cannot by itselfsupport a judgment of conviction. Indeed, under our Constitution, an accused, no matter

how despicable the crime for which he may have been charged, still enjoys the

presumption of innocence. And this presumption prevails over the presumption ofregularity of the performance of official duty. Nor can it be overcome by just an ordinary

proof to the contrary for to convict an accused, no less and nothing more than proof

beyond reasonable doubt is necessary. In this case, the threshold issue is whether or not


23/32

the guilt of the appellant has been established by this required quantum of proof? We rule

in the negative. Accordingly, we reverse his conviction based on reasonable doubt.

Equipoise Doctrine

Corpuz vs. People, G.R. No. 74259, Feb. 14, 1991

The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the

parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence

should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. Theevidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner

with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the

accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to theprejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be

affirmed.

RIGHT TO BE HEARD

Right to be present at the trial

accused has an absolute right to be personally present during the entire

proceedings from arraignment to sentence, if he so desires

limited only to trial court proceedings and only to the actual trial therein, not to

appellate proceedings or proceedings subsequent to the entry of final judgment,

looking only to the execution of the sentence

GENERAL RULE: Accused may waive his right to be present during trial.

EXCEPTIONS: (Presence of Accused is Mandatory)

Arraignment and plea presence of lawyer is also indispensable

during trial, for identification

during the promulgation of sentence, unless for a light offense wherein the accused may appear by

counsel or a representative

NOTA BENE:

If the judgment is one of acquittal, the accused need not be present.

If the judgment is conviction but for a light offense, the accused need not bepresent.

If the judgment is conviction and the offense is grave, the presence of the accused

is mandatory.

If trial in absentia and judgment is rendered, it will be promulgated even without

presence of accused but he will be furnished with copies sent to his last known

address.


24/32

If appeal, presence of the accused is not necessary. It is the duty of the appellate

court to appoint counsel, whose presence is indispensable.

Right to counsel

if the accused appears without an attorney, he must be informed by the court ofsuch right before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires to have the aid

of counsel

if he cant afford one, a counsel de officio shall be appointed for him

the indispensable aid of counsel continues even at the stage of appeal

not waivable

the right to be represented by counsel is ABSOLUTE, but the option of the

accused to hire one of his own choice is LIMITED

Right to an impartial judge

a judge who had conducted the preliminary investigation and made a finding ofprobable cause is not disqualified from trying the case, in the absence of evidence

of partiality

Right of confrontation

available only during trial, not during preliminary investigation

REASON: so defendant may make objection to the witness or so witness may

identify him

right to cross-examine

if the defense counsel deferred cross-examination of the prosecution witness and

then this witness dies, accused cannot anymore ask the witness directexamination to be expunged from the records since the denial of the right to

confrontation is through no fault of plaintiff

EXCEPTIONS:

1. Dying Declaration

2. Trial in absentia - REQUISITES: (1) accused has been arraigned; (2) accused hasbeen duly notified of the date of trial; (3) failure of the accused to appear is

unjustified

3. Depositions - witness is dead, insane or otherwise cannot be found, with due

diligence, in the Philippines

Right to compulsory processes

2 KINDS OF SUBPOENA:1. Ad testificandum - to compel a witness to attend and testify

2. Duces Tecum - to compel a person having under his control documents or papers

relevant to the case to bring such items to court during trial


25/32

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION

presence of accused is indispensable during arraignment and promulgation of

judgment of conviction

after arraignment, only formal amendments to the Information may be granted bycourt

not waivable

description, not designation of the offense, controls

all the attending aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the

Information and proved during trial; EXCEPT: for purposes of proving moral

damages only, then it is allowed to be proved even if not alleged

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

- available in every criminal prosecution

Speedy - there is no fixed criterion in our statues to determine with precision the time

for speedy trial. As soon as after indictment as the prosecution can with reasonablediligence prepare for it. It means a trial free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive

delays. But justice and fairness, not speed, are the objectives

NOTA BENE: If the accused is acquitted on ground of denial of his right to speedy trial,

it is a judgment on the merits and therefore, first jeopardy attaches.

Impartial - cold neutrality of an impartial judge; absence of bias or prejudice

Public - open to the free observation of all

- EXCEPT: evidence to be adduced at the trial is of such character as to be offensive todecency and public morals

SECTION 16

Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

Sec. 16: All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-

judicial, or administrative bodies.

**Covers all phases of any judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings,

including custodial and preliminary investigation of an accused. Speedy is a relative term

and must be a flexible concept. The circumstances of each case must be weighedcarefully to find out whether there has been a speedy disposition


26/32

Inordinate Delay in Preliminary Investigation Violative, Exception to the Rule

Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72335-39, March 21, 1988

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by theTanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to

due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conductof preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation

prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the

procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only

under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guaranteeof "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in

the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's

constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable orjustifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not

impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in

the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruellingscrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary

investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the

first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be

emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner werefor his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by

Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual

issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay ofalmost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges

relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while

presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify theperiod of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.

It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigationshould not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation

does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but the absence of a preliminary

investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue

delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now,man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained tohold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the

information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the

petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and

10503 should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on

the other issues raised by petitioner.

Delay in Preliminary Investigation, Not Violative


27/32

Santiago vs. Garchitorena, G.R. No. L-109266, Dec. 2, 1993

Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated byreason of the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. According to her,

while the offense was allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the

information was filed only on May 9, 1991 and the amended informations on December8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In

Tatad, there indeed was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of the legal and factual issues involved therein.

In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled

because of the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the originalinformation came to the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in

the January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the

investigatory process was set in motion. The investigation was first assigned to Special

Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation wasre-assigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by

a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for the filing of the chargeson March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the hierarchy of review, normal

for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the Ombudsman in March

1991.

We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal

Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained

why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing ofthe information against her in those petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like

the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.

SECTION 17

Right Against Self-Incrimination

Sec. 17: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Available both before or during criminal prosecution

Accused is competent to testify in his behalf, but he is entitled to the right not to

testify as a witness against himself. He cannot be compelled to incriminatehimself; that is, to say or do anything that can be used against himself

Accused can invoke this right from the beginning; however in case of witness, he

can invoke this right only when the questions start to become incriminating

RATIONALE:

1. Public policy


28/32

2. Humanity

GENERAL RULE: The accused cannot be compelled to testify against his co-accused under the theory thatthe act of one is the act of all.

EXCEPTIONS:

If he is discharged as a state witness

After he is convicted or acquitted

By trying him separately instead of jointly with his other co-accused

SECTION 19

Right Against Excessive Fines and Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment

Sec. 19: (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.

Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the

Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion

perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detaineeor the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by

law.

Excessive fines flagrantly disproportionate to the offense no matter what circumstancesthe offense was committed

Cruel and unusual punishment in its form; duration or amount; in flagrantdisproportion between the offense and the punishment

SECTION 21

Right Against Double Jeopardy

Sec. 21: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished

by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution

for the same act.

Double Jeopardy two perils or dangers of being tried and punished

2 KINDS:1.Same Offense (First sentence of Sec. 21)

REQUISITES:


29/32

First jeopardy

A valid complaint and information

A court of competent jurisdiction

Arraignment and valid plea

First jeopardy has been terminated

Second jeopardy for the same offense includes an attempt or frustration of thesame offense or it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other

Terminated either by conviction, acquittal or dismissal upon the merit without

consent of the accused

CONVICTION: a judgment declaring the accused guilty of the offense charged and

imposing upon him the penalty provided by law; accused may appeal and this is not

double jeopardy

ACQUITTAL: a termination of the case based upon the merits of the issue; prosecution

cannot appeal anymoreDISMISSAL: a termination of the case other than upon the merits thereof; first jeopardy

only attaches if dismissal without consent of accused

NOTA BENE:

Consent means approval, acquiescence, conformity, agreement, etc. Mere silence

of the accused should not be construed as consent.

Even if the motion to dismiss was filed by the accused, the dismissal is equivalent

to acquittal if it is grounded on (1) insufficiency of evidence (demurrer to

evidence after prosecution has rested its case); (2) denial of the right to speedytrial

Supervening Facts when the second offense was not in existence when the firstoffense was charged and tried, then another information may be filed or thepresent information may be amended (substantial)

2.Act Punished by a Law and Ordinance (Second sentence of Sec. 21)

this will only apply if the accused has been either convicted or acquitted

if the case was only dismissed not upon the merits, the prosecution may re-file

Provisional Dismissal

People vs. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003

Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with


30/32

the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after

issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses

punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shallbecome permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been

revived.

Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Courtof Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first

paragraph thereof, namely:

1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for aprovisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused

move for a provisional dismissal of the case;

2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;

3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the

case.

The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar

in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of theexpress consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him

from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double

jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.

Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall

become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been

revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shallbecome permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public

prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been

revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless heis served with a copy of the order of dismissal.

Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a

positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its

meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisionaldismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to

express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction

or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failureto object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent.

A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent tosuch provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express

consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the

new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the

express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The


31/32

case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of

the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or

refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.

The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the

Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offensenecessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation.

However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original

witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or mayhave died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a

new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a

new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from

the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for thesame offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the

original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal

liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The

accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all,the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not

mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the court indispensing that justice.

In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of thefirst paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal

Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any

motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. xxx

xxx

Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not presentwhen Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set

forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.

SECTION 22

No Ex Post Facto Law or Bill of Attainder

Sec. 22: No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

Ex post facto law one that punishes an act which was not punishable when committed;or aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when committed; or changes the laws on

evidence so that lesser evidence is needed for conviction than when the act was done

Bill of Attainder a law which inflicts punishment without benefit of judicial trial


32/32

ELEMENTS OF EX POST FACTO LAW:

1. Penal2. Retroactive

3. Disadvantageous to the accused

4. Must take from the accused any right that was regarded, at the time of theadoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty and which

he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him

ELEMENTS OF BILL OF ATTAINDER:1. There is a law

2. The law imposes a penal burden on a specified individual or an easily

ascertainable members of a group3. The penal burden is imposed directly by the law without judicial trial

Documents

RIGHTS Accused