Right-wing nationalism in Russia

maria nozhenko Fiia BRiEFing PaPER 135 • September 2013

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

135

a By-PRoduct oF ElEctoRal comPEtition

oR a Political agEnda FoR thE FutuRE?

• DebatesonnationalismacquiredagreatdealofsignificanceinRussiainthesummerof2013,withtheactivitiesofright-wingnationalistsincreasingduringthisperiodtoo.

• ModernRussiannationalismhasitsrootsinanti-immigrantsentiments,mainlyasaconsequenceoffailednation-statebuildinginthepost-Sovietperiod.

• Most right-wingorganisationsaremarginalised,withmembershipandsupport relatively low.Buttheanti-immigrantideaswhichtheseorganisationspropagatecurrentlyenjoyhighlevelsofsupportinRussiansociety.

• Overthepasteightyears, theactivitiesofright-wingnationalistshavebeen largely limitedto‘thestreets’,duetothelackofopportunitiesopentonationalistpartiestoparticipateinelectoralprocesses.

• The prospects for Russia’s right-wing nationalist organisations will depend on the regime’sapproach to ‘illegal’ immigration, but also on the state’s overall policy towards right-wingnationalism.Threescenariosareseentobepossibleatthisjuncture:‘marginalisednationalists’,‘undergroundnationalists’,and‘incorporatednationalists’.

Right-wing nationalism in Russia

FIIA Briefing Paper 135

September 2013

a By-PRoduct oF ElEctoRal comPEtition oR a Political agEnda FoR thE FutuRE?

The EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia research programme

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

maria nozhenko

Head of the Centre for European Studies – EU Centre

European University at St. Petersburg

thE Finnish institutE oF intERnational aFFaiRs 3

Introduction

Duringthesummerof2013,thenationalismdebateinRussiagainedenormoussignificance.Thereareanumberofreasonsforthis,butfourstandoutasbeingparticularlyrelevant,including:theraceriotsinPugachev;AlekseiNavalny’sparticipationintheMoscowmayoralelection;thestate’seffortstocom-bat‘illegal’immigration;andtheso-called‘Russianclean-ups’(russkie zachistki)involvingextremistnationalists.1

ThefirstoftheaboverelatestoPugachev,asmallRussiantownintheSamararegionwithapopula-tionofaround41,000.RaceriotsflareduponJuly7,followingthedeathofalocalcitizenduringafightwith an ethnic Chechen, with protestors subse-quentlydemandingtheexpulsionofallimmigrantsfrom the North Caucasus. During the course ofseveraldays,mostadults inthetowntooktothestreets,brandishingplacardsinscribedwithbothanti-Caucasusandnationalisticslogans.

Right-wingnationalistorganisationswerequicktotrytocapitaliseonthisincident,instantlylabellingPugacheva‘Russianriot’.Oneprominentleaderofthe St. Petersburgnationalists,Nikolai Bondarik,attempted to travel toPugachev in order to leadevents,butwasdulyarrestedbypoliceanddetainedfortwoweeks.TheincidentinPugachevisbynomeansanisolatedone,andisthefourthtimesince2005 that thekillingof a localby ‘strangers’hasresultedinraceriots,withnationalistsloganscon-spicuousineachcase.OnAugust9,2013,policeinSt.Petersburgdisperseda‘publicgatheringagainstethniccrime’(narodny skhod protiv etnicheskoi prestupnosti)organisedbynationalistsinresponsetothemurderofalocalman(thesuspectsinthiscasewereUzbeks),withparticipantsclaimingthatthiseventwasacontinuationofwhatwasstartedinPugachev.

TheMoscowmayoral election that took place onSeptember 8 is a second factor underlying theheightenedsignificanceofthenationalismdebateinthesummerof2013.Themainchallengerinthis

1 ThewordzachistkahasamilitaryconnotationintheRussian

language.Itismainlyusedtodescribeasetofactionsaimed

ateliminatingterroristsorcriminalsfromacertaingeo-

graphicalarea,eitherbyarrestorliquidation.

election, Aleksei Navalny, is not only an opposi-tionleader,ananti-corruptionactivistandafierceopponentofthePutinregime,butalsoanationalistwho,inthepast,hasparticipatedintheso-called‘RussianMarch’–anannualprocessionthattakesplaceinseveralRussiancitiesandwhichtypicallyinvolves a range of nationalist groups, includingextremists.Navalny’s electoral campaign for thepostofMoscowmayoremphasised, amongotherthings, the fight against illegal immigration andincludedaproposaltoestablishavisaregimewiththe former Soviet Central Asian republics.Thesedemands are now popular among right-wingnationalists.

Athirdfactorbehindtheincreasedsignificanceofnationalisminthesummerof2013relatestotheoffi-cialresponsetotheproblemofillegalimmigrationinRussia.EarlyAugustsawtargetedpoliceraidsinmanyRussiancitiesaimedatlocatinganddetainingillegalmigrants.TheformalpretextfortheseraidswasanincidentthatoccurredinaMoscowmarketwhere a police officerwas injured attempting toarrestarapesuspect.ThelatterwasfromDagestanandwasallegedlyassistedbymembersofthelocalDagestanicommunity.

DespitethefactthatDagestanisapartoftheRus-sian Federation (North Caucasus), meaning thatDagestanislivingandworkinginMoscowareinnoway‘illegal’, theauthoritiesreactedby intensify-ingtheireffortsincombattingillegalimmigration,notablyinmarketplacesinRussia’scapital.Hun-dredsofpeoplewerearrestedinMoscowandthecountry’sfirstillegalmigrantcampwasestablishedinthecity.TheseraidswerethenreplicatedinotherRussiancities.

Thefourthandfinalreasonfortheincreasedsalienceofthedebateonnationalisminthesummerof2013concernstheworryingoccurrenceofanumberofso-called‘Russianclean-ups’.TheseincidentsbeganattheendofJuly2013whenright-wingnationalistsinSt.Petersburg,sometimesarmedwithbaseballbatsandotherweapons,descendedonmarketstallsoperated by non-ethnic Russians, demanding toseeworkpermits.Ifmetwithrefusal,theywouldthenproceedtodamagegoodsanddisruptbusiness.Theseactsoflawlessnesswereoftenjustifiedonthegroundsthatthoseinvolvedwere‘helpingthelawenforcementagenciesdotheirjob’and,asaresult,thepolicewouldoftendetainmarketworkersand

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ignorethenationalists.But,astheseactsbecamemoreregular,thepolicetookactionandarrestedaround20organisers, although these ‘clean-ups’havesinceoccurredinotherRussiancities.

Inshort,thedebateonnationalismandtheactivi-ties of right-wing nationalistsmanaged tomaketheirwaytothetopofthepoliticalagendainRussiainthesummerof2013.Thecentralelementofthisdebateisthefightagainstillegalimmigration,whichhasnowbecomeamainprogrammaticcomponentforsomeofRussia’slargestright-wingnationalists.Consequently,thistopicisextremelysensitiveforamajorityofRussians,withsomepublicopinionpollssuggestingthatupto74%ofrespondentsbelievethat the arrival of a largenumberof immigrantsisbadforthecountryandjustoverhalf(53%)ofrespondents showing support for strengtheningexistingmigrationlaws.2

However,thereactionofboththepublicandtheauthoritiesshowsthatthereisoftenlittledistinc-tionmadebetween‘immigrants’whoareforeignnationalsand‘internalmigrants’fromRussia’seth-nicrepublics,notablytheNorthCaucasus.TheraceriotsinPugachevandthereactionoftheauthori-tiestotheaforementionedincidentintheMoscowmarketareevidenceofthefactthatevenRussiancitizensareconsidered‘aliens’and‘illegal’inmanypartsofthecountry.

Thispaperarguesthatonecannotsaywithanycer-taintythat therecentupsurge inanti-immigrantattitudesinRussiaisjustatemporary‘by-product’of the present election cycle that gave this issueextrarelevanceinthesummerof2013,orwhetheritisanaspectofalonger-termpoliticalagendaonthepartofboth theregimeandright-wingnational-ists.Assuch,therealthreatofRussiannationalismremainsopentodebate.

Why is Russian nationalism anti-immigrant?

Intermsofunderstandingtheriseofanti-immigrantattitudesincontemporaryRussia,onemayidentifya group of main contributory factors, including

2 ‘Dobro pozhalovat’’ – ili ‘postoronnim vkhod

vospreshchen’?,availableat:http://wciom.ru/index.

php?id=459&uid=%20114341(accessed1September2013).

failedattemptsatnation-statebuildinginthepost-Sovietperiod,thePutinregime’sattitudetowardsright-wingnationalism,aswellaspublicdistrustofthepoliceandlawenforcementagencies.

Russia as a failed nation state

ContemporaryRussiaisanexampleofafailednationstate,asopposedtoafailedstate.Themainexpla-nationforthisdevelopmentincludesthelegacyofSovietfederalismaswellasthelackofpoliticalwillonthepartofpoliticalelitestocreateacivicnationinpost-SovietRussia.Formuchofthe1990s,Rus-siawasanasymmetricfederation,where‘national’or‘ethnicrepublics’(currently21outofRussia’s83federalunits)enjoyedaspeciallegalstatusandsowieldedgreaterpowervis-à-visother,non-ethnicterritorialunits.Thissituationwaslargelyaconse-quenceoftheSovietsystemofethno-federalism,inwhichonlythoseethno-territorialunitshadrightstoalimitedautonomy.3

In addition, the conflicts occurring in the early1990sbetweendifferentpowercentres, includingRussianandSovietpresidents(1990-1991)andlaterbetween the Russian president and the Russianparliament(1992-1993),alsoplayedacrucialroleintheemergenceofasymmetricalfederalism.Duringtheseconflicts,eachpowercentretriedtogainthesupportof theethnicrepublicsbygrantingthemnewrights.Moreover,asthespecialstatusoftheseethnicrepublicswasjustifiedintermsofthe‘righttoself-determination’,thebasisforproto-nationsin the formofethnic republicsbecamerooted inRussia.

Asaresult,theideaoftheRussiannationasaunitedpoliticalcommunitywasmarginalisedintheearlypost-Sovietperiod.However,severaldifferentrep-resentationsofa“we-community”werenonethe-lessforming,includingnotonlythosecommunitieswithintheethnicrepublicsalreadymentioned,but

3 TheRussianSovietFederatedSocialistRepublic(RSFSR)was

dividedintoautonomousrepublics,autonomousoblastsand

districts(okrugs),krais,oblasts,andrepublicancities(Mos-

cowandLeningrad).Allautonomies(republics,oblastsand

okrugs)wereformedaccordingtotheethnicprinciple,while

kraisandoblastswereadministrativeterritoriesgoverned

fromthecentre.Almostallautonomieshadreferencestothe

‘main’ethnicgroupintheirtitles.

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alsothecommunityofothers,mainlyethnicRus-siansintheremainingregions.Inaddition,manyethnicRussiansdidnothaveaclearideaof‘nation’similartothatwhichexistedintheethnicrepub-lics.Accordingtopublicopinionpollsatthattime,almosthalfofallrespondentsfeltfrustratedatthecollapseoftheSovietUnionandconsideredthem-selvespartofthe‘Sovietpeople’,butnotpartoftheRussiannation.4

Nevertheless, some attempts at building a civicnation inRussiaweremade in the 1990s, inpar-ticularbyRussia’sfirstpresident,BorisYeltsin,intheperiod1994-1998.Yeltsin, inhisfirstaddresstotheRussianFederalAssemblyinFebruary1994,notedthattheideaofacivicnationalreadyexistedintheRussianConstitutionandsorepresentativesofthepoliticalelitestartedtousetheterm‘Russiancitizens’(rossiiyane)5.AspecialcompetitionwasevenorganisedbythestatenewspaperRossiiskaya gazeta inviting the general public to suggest thebasisforanewRussian‘nationalidea’.Thesecondhalfofthe1990salsosawseveralattemptsbyoffi-cialsandoppositionpoliticianstofillthisperceivedvoid.

However,inthe1990s,theseattemptsatelaboratinganationalideaforthecountrywerelargelyunsuc-cessfulandsothestagewassetforYeltsin’ssucces-sor,VladimirPutin,whenheassumedthepostofpresidentin2000.Infact,Putinstartedfromthepremisethattherewasnoneedtolookforanewnationalideabecauseonealreadyexisted,andthatthebasis fornationalconsolidation,accordingtoPutin, lay in theachievementsof theSovietperi-od.6ThereturnoftheoldSovietnationalanthem,albeitwith somechanges, and thecelebrationofthe60thanniversaryoftheUSSR’svictoryinWWIIaptlyillustratethiswayofthinking.Yet,inthemid-2000s, itbecameevidentthatRussiawasmovingfurtherawayfromtheideaofcivicnation-building

4 Gorshkov,K.M.,TikhonovaE.N.(eds)(2005)Rossiiskaya

identichnost v usloviiakh transformatsii: opyt sotsiologich-

eskogo analiza,Moscow,78-79.

5 Rossiyaneisatermwhichreferstothecivicidentityofpeo-

pleasopposedtorusskie(“Russians”),whichreferstotheir

ethnicidentity.

6 SeePutin’sfirstpresidentialaddresstotheRussianFederal

Assemblyin2000.

andwasinsteadpromotingtheRussiannationonthebasisofOrthodoxculturealone.7

The regime’s attitude towards nationalism

Theattitudesof thePutinregimetowardsradicalorextremeformsofnationalismarecontradictory.Fromoneperspective,manyright-wingnational-istsnowhaveaccesstostate-ownedmediaoutletsand have established platforms for transmittingtheirideas.Moreover,somehaveevenbeenincor-poratedintotheRussianhighereducationsystem.8Theregimehasalsopromotedsomenationaliststoseniorpostsingovernmentinstitutions.Forexam-ple,DmitryRogozin,afigureactiveinnationalistorganisationsandparties, isnowadeputyprimeministerinthefederalgovernment.

But from another perspective, the Putin regimehasdeliberatelylimitedtheopportunitystructurefortheformationofnewnationalistpoliticalpar-ties,andbymid-2013onlythreewereregisteredbytheMinistryofJustice–‘Motherland’(Rodina),‘theRussianPeople’sUnion’(Rossiiskii Obshchen-arodny Soyuz) and ‘the Great Fatherland Party’(Partiya Velikoe Otechestvo). Other nationalistmovementsattemptingtogainlegalstatusaspoliti-calpartieshavesofarbeendeniedregistration.

Thesamekindofambiguitycanalsobeseeninotherareas.Forexample,theregimeseemsinterestedinbuildingitsideologyonthebasisofRussianOrtho-doxy,which is also akeyprogrammatic elementformanynationalistorganisations.Thenewstateholidayestablishedin2005(theNationalUnityDay)fallson4Novemberandcoincideswiththefeastdayof theRussianOrthodox iconOurLadyofKazan.Initially, this holiday was intended tomark theliberationofMoscowin1612attheendofthe‘TimeofTroubles’,butinrecentyearsincreasingvaluehasbeenattached to the religiouscomponentof this

7 Thekeyelementof‘Orthodoxculture’isOrthodoxmorality,

whichincludesanti-LGBTandanti-atheisticattitudes,andis

basedontraditionalsocialnorms.TheinfusionofOrthodoxy

intotheRussianideaofnationisnotnew,butwasofficially

supportedduringnation-buildinginthelateRussianEmpire.

8 Umland,A.(2013):NewExtremeRight-WingIntellectu-

alCirclesinRussia:TheAnti-OrangeCommittee,theIsborsk

ClubandtheFlorianGeyerClub,in:Russian Analytical Di-

gest,No.135/,5August.

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holiday.The2012trialofmembersofthePussyRiotpunkgroup,togetherwithregularappearancesbythepresident,primeministerandotherofficialsinOrthodoxchurchesaresignsnotonlyofamergingoftheRussianOrthodoxChurchandtheregime,butalsooftheattemptatforminganationalideaonthebasisofRussianOrthodoxculture.

However,therearealsoindicationsthattheregimeiskeentokeepnationalistinitiatives‘frombelow’undercontrol,andthisisparticularlyevidentwiththepreviouslymentionedNationalUnityDayholi-day.Since2005,nationalistRussianMarcheshavebecomean integralpartof thisholiday,andon4November2012theytookplacein46cities,attract-ing12,000(accordingtopoliceestimates)to32,000(according to theorganizers)participants.But inmostcases thesemarchesarenotgranted formalpermissionbytheauthoritiesandthepoliceoftenarrestthoseinattendance.

Ultimately,theapproachtakenbytheauthoritiestotheissueofnationalismisambiguous,butalsocautious.Eventhoughtheslogan‘RussiaforRus-sians’hasagreatdealofsupportamongthepopu-lace,Putinhaspubliclycondemnedthisattitude.In2009,heremarkedthat“thosewhosay‘RussiaforRussians’areeitherdishonestpeoplewhodonotunderstandwhattheyaresayingandarejustplainidiots,ortheyareprovocateurs”.9Thisisdespitethefactthatopinionpollsatthattimeindicatedthattheslogan‘RussiaforRussians’hadthesupportofaround54%ofcitizens.

Distrust in the law enforcement agencies

Themajority of Russian citizens view the policeand lawenforcementagencies inanegative light.According to polls conducted in 2013, 55% ofrespondents agreed that thepolice areunable toprotect them and their families from criminals,and56%ofrespondentssaidtheydidnottrustthepolice.10Atthesametime,a2012opinionpollfoundthat71%ofrespondentsweresurethatimmigrants

9 Tsitaty iz Vladimira Putina,availableat:http://www.v-v-

putin.ru/citations.html(accessed1September2013).

10 Indeks doveriya politsii,availableat:http://www.levada.

ru/04-03-2013/indeks-doveriya-politsii(accessed1Sep-

tember2013).

contributed to risingcrime.11Thus,amajorityofRussiancitizensviewimmigrantsasathreatanddonotbelievethattheauthoritiesareabletoguaranteetheirsafety.Inthesecircumstances,itisnosurprisethatRussiansconsideracaponimmigration(sup-portforthismoveincreasedfrom45%in2002to70%in2012)andextraditingillegalimmigrants(thiswassupportedby64%ofrespondentsin2012)aseffectivemeasurestoincreasetheirpersonalsafety.12

Infact,popularsupportfortheideaof‘RussiaforRussians’ as well as support for anti-immigrantattitudes among themajority ofRussian citizenslooksquitelogicalwhenviewedagainsttheback-drop of the prevailing socio-political context incontemporaryRussia.InasituationwhereordinaryRussiansdistrustthepoliceandintheabsenceofseriousalternativestotheethno-culturalversionof ‘nation’, it is almost impossible toexpect thatthedivisionbetween‘we’and‘others’canbesus-tainedthroughothercriteria.Thisalsoexplainsthefactthatitisnotonlyimmigrants,namelycitizensofotherstates,thatareconsidered‘strangers’and‘illegal’byRussians,butalsomanyRussiancitizensorthosenativesofRussia’sethnicrepublics,inpar-ticularthosefromtheNorthCaucasus.

Right-wing nationalists and their political activity

In thepost-Sovietperiod, right-wingnationalistorganisationshavelargelyfailedtoattractanykindofmasssupport.Asaresult,thebulkoftheiractiv-ityisknownonlytohumanrightsactivistsandthepolice,ratherthantothewiderpublic.Nevertheless,someorganisationshavemanagedtogainpublicity.

Inthe1990s,mostnationalistorganisationsfailedtogainanyelectoralsuccessofnote.Thiswasdespitethe relatively largenumberofnationalist organi-sations,occasionalpoliticalvisibility, ideologicaldiversityandtherelativelynon-restrictiveattitudeonthepartoftheauthorities.Oneexplanationfortheelectoralfailureofright-wingnationalistswastheir inability to coordinate their efforts duringthepre-electionperiod inordertoenhancetheir

11 Obshchestvennoemnenie–2012,availableat:http://www.

levada.ru/books/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-2012(accessed1

September2013).

12 Ibid.

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prospects of success. In addition, since the endof the 1990s, right-wing extremists have foundthemselves increasinglyunderpressure fromtheauthoritiesandhavetypicallyfounditimpossibletoregistertheirorganisationaspoliticalparties,thuspreventingthemfromcompetinginelections.

Inthe2000s,thenumberofright-wingorganisa-tionsinRussiacontinuedtogrow.However,theirsupport,asarule,wasinsignificant.Ofthesixlarg-estright-wingorganisationswhichexistedinRussiainthemid-2000s,onlyonewasnew–theMovementagainst Illegal Immigration, orDPNI (Dvizhenie Protiv Nelegalnoi Immigratsii)–withtheotherfiveestablishedinthe1990s.Amongthoseorganisationscreatedinthe2000s,somewereclearlyextremistinnature(forexample,theNationalSocialistSociety;Format18),withsomeutilisingtheissueofillegalimmigrationasthebasisfortheirideology.Themostwell-knownoftheseorganisationswastheabove-mentionedDPNI,createdin2002andbannedunderanti-extremismlegislationin2011.Initially,DPNIsuggestedthatitwashelpingtheauthoritiescombatillegalimmigration,buttheradicalmeasuresusedbyDPNImemberseventuallyledtoitsofficialban.

Overall,therelationsbetweentheregimeandright-wingorganisationsarefluid,not leastbecauseofthelackofconsolidationontherightwingofthepoliticalspectrum.SomenationalistorganisationssupportPutin,andsotendtoavoidpressurefromtheauthorities.Initiativesonthepartofnational-istintellectuals,suchastheIzborskClub,aregoodexamples. However, there are also nationalistorganisationsthatareinoppositiontotheregime,notably theNational Bolshevik Party (NBP).NBPmembers,itshouldbenoted,helpedestablishthecivilmovement‘Strategy31’toprotectfreedomofassemblyinRussia.

Theactivitiesof thoseorganisationswhichdonotsupporttheregimeare,inmanycases,suspendedbytheauthorities.Thisistypicallyachievedthroughtwomainmechanisms.Thefirstistorecognisetheiractivitiesas‘extremist’accordingtoanti-extremismlegislation,thesecondtorestrictaccesstothepoliti-calsystembyotherlegalmeans.Thefirstmechanismisusedtosuspendtheactivitiesofthoseextremistnationalistorganisationswhicharenotonlylegiti-matelycriticisedbyhumanrightsgroups,butalsohavecriminallinkstoo.However,thissamemecha-nismisalsoappliedtothoseorganisationswhichare

obviouslyopponentsoftheregime.Forexample,theaforementionedNBPhaditsactivitiessuspendedin2005byacourtdecisionandtwoyearslateritwasbannedaltogetherasanextremistorganisation.ThesecondmechanismisusedtopreventtheemergenceofpoliticalpartiesnotunderthecontroloftheKrem-lin.Ittypicallyinvolvesdenyingnationalistorgani-sationsregistrationaspoliticalpartiesorcancellingexistingregistrationduetoafailuretomeetsomeformalcriteriaoutlinedintheLawonParties.

In view of the lack of opportunities to expressthemselvesintheelectoralarena,theonlywayfornationaliststobecomevisibletothewiderpublicis to organise street events.However, any ‘massaction’ orchestrated by organisations or move-mentswhicharenotinsomewayconnectedtotheregimearemoreoftenpreventedbytheauthorities.Insum,opportunitiestoexpresspoliticalviewsinpublic, includingnationalism,arestrictlylimitedincontemporaryRussia.Nevertheless,anumberofnationalistorganisationshavemanagedtoorganisepublicevents,althoughmosttendtobedispersedbythepolice.Inrecentyears,themostactivepar-ticipantsintheseeventshavebeenrepresentativesoftheformerNBP,unitedwithintheOtherRussia(Drugaya Rossiya)organisation.

Inrecentyears,extremistnationalistgroupshavetried tomaximise their limited opportunities togain public visibility, including participation intheabove-mentionedRussianMarches,butalsoinothermassactions.Assuch,thepeakofright-wingnationalistactivitywasobservedduringtheproteststhat followed the December 2011 parliamentaryelectionandtheMarch2012presidentialelection.Notonlywererepresentativesofextremistnation-alist organisations present in these protests, buttheywerealsoincludedintheso-calledoppositionCoordinationCouncilwhichwasformedinOctober2012fromelementsofthisprotestmovement.But,as some experts have noted, the participation ofnationalistsintheproteststhatfollowedtheDecem-ber2011/March2012electionsdeclinedtowardstheendof2012.13

13 Gosduma ukazala pravoradikalam novye tseli: Ksenofobi-

ya i radikal’niy natsionalizm i protivodeistvie im v Rossii v

pervoi polovine 2013 goda,availableat:http://www.sova-

center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2013/07/d27507/

(accessed1September2013).

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Theeventsof thesummerof2013providedright-wingnationalistswithanewopportunitytoraisetheirpublicvisibility,andasaresultmanyextremistnationalistgroupshavecapitalisedontheevents.Inconsiderationoftheconditionscurrentlyprevail-inginRussia,thepopulation’ssympathywilllikelygotothoseabletosuggestandimplementeffectivemeasures to combat illegal immigration and, insomecases, evenextremenationalistsmay scorepoliticalpoints.

Conclusion: three scenarios for the future

Inmyopinion,therearethreescenariosthatcapturethefuturepossibilitiesopentoright-wingnational-istsinRussia.Eachofthesescenariosdependsontheapproachoftheregimetowardsthequestionofimmigration,aswellastheapproachofthenation-aliststhemselves.

‘Marginalised nationalists’

If theauthoritiespersist in theirattempt tocurbillegalimmigration,givelegalstatustoimmigrantcamps and establish them in most of Russia’sregions,butatthesametimecontinuetoprevent‘Russian clean-ups’ from occurring and denynationalistpoliticalpartiesregistration,thenRus-siannationalistswilllikelyseetheirpositionfurthermarginalised.Thiskindof political agenda couldresult in the regime ‘privatising’ the anti-illegalimmigrantdiscourse,withtheauthoritiespresent-ingthemselvesastheonlylegitimatedefenderofthepublic’sinterestsinthissphere.

Assuch,thoseactorswhotrytoemphasiseimmi-grationasanissueandasanimportantpartoftheirpoliticalprogrammemaylosepotentialpublicsup-portandcouldbeforcedtolookfornewideas.Ifthisscenariotranspires,thenanypoliticianororganisa-tionespousingnationalistideas,eitherinoppositiontotheregimeorotherwise,willbeoflittleinterestto the authorities: theywill simplybeviewed ascompetitorstryingtoincreasetheirownpopularityattheKremlin’sexpense.

Yet,realisingthisscenariowilldemandsignificantinvestmentandfinancial resources,which in thepresent economic climate, arevery limited.Ulti-mately,anyhugestateexpenditureinthisareamaybecounter-productiveanddecreasethepopularity

of the regime. Moreover, this scenario impliesincreasing policy coordination betweendifferentstate institutions, suchas thepolice, theFederalMigrationService,socialdepartments,andsoforth,whichiscomplicatedandfraughtwithdifficulty.Inthisrespect,thisscenarioisseenasunlikely.

‘Underground nationalists’

If thepresentstate-ledfightagainst illegal immi-gration is part of the regime’splan todisarm itspoliticalopponentsatatimeofanimportantelec-tioncampaign(theMoscowmayoralelection,butalsotheotherregionalelectionsinSeptember2013),thenwemayseeahardeningofficiallinetowardsright-wingnationalistorganisationsinthefuture.Theimportantelementinthisscenarioistheperse-cutionofextremistnationalistsbytheregimewithinthebroadercontextofwidespreadanti-immigrantattitudesamongordinaryRussians.Inotherwords,theregimewillnotperseverewithitsfightagainstillegal immigration,but at the same time, itwillnotgiveanyopportunitytootherpoliticalactorstobecome‘defenders’ofthepubliconthisissue.

However,thisscenariocouldalsoleadtoincreasingoppositiononthepartof right-wingnationaliststowardstheregime.Extremistnationalistorganisa-tionswilllikelyswitchtoan‘undergroundmode’andwillactivelyparticipateineventsorganisedbyotherelementsoftheregimeopposition,usingthemasanopportunitytoenhancetheirpublicvisibility.Thisscenariomayofferashort-termadvantagetotheregime,butitcouldbedangerousinthelongtermifanti-immigrantattitudescontinuetogainsupport in Russian society. Despite the dangers,however,thisscenarioisseenaslikelyinviewofthepresentpoliticalandsocialcontext.

‘Incorporated nationalists’

Athirdscenariomayseetheregimetrytominimiseitsowncostsby incorporatinga largenumberofright-wingnationalistorganisationsintothepoliti-calsystem.Butforthistohappenafurthereasingofregistrationrequirementsforpoliticalpartieswillbeneeded.Theinfluxofalargenumberofsmall,right-wingpartiesintothepartyandelectoralsystemwillservetofurtherfragmentthisendofthepoliticalspectrumandgenerateconflictamongthesenewparties.

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Theadvantageisthatthisscenariowouldallowtheregimetoavoidwastingvaluableresourcesinmeet-ingtheanti-immigrantdemandsofRussiansociety.Inthisscenario,theelectoratewillhaveachancetovoteforthechampionsofimmigrant-freeRus-sia,butthesesmallpartieswillonlyabsorbpopulardissatisfactionwithoutchangingthepoliticalandsocialreality.Theauthoritiescouldjettisoncostlystate-runprogrammesaimedatcombatingillegalimmigrationsimplybyallowingthereturnofthisissuetothenationalistpoliticalagenda.

Inthisscenario,themajorityofright-wingnation-alistswouldprobablymakeadealwiththeregimeandwouldtrytoadapttotheformalframeworkofthepoliticalsystem.Itisunlikelythatanynation-alistorganisationwouldrepeatthesuccessoftheHungarianJobbikpartyoreventheRussianpartyMotherland(Rodina)intheparliamentaryelectionofDecember2003.14However, thisapproachhasitsdangers.Theregistrationofnationalistpartiesmayleadtotheformationofcoalitionsratherthanthesmall,controllablepartiesenvisaged.However,althoughthisscenariomayprovedangerousfortheregimeinthemid-tolong-termperspective,frommypointofview,itdoesseemlikely.

Given thepossibility thatall three scenariosmaycome to pass, the prognosis is difficult, and it isimpossible to say with any degree of certaintywhetherthepresentsalienceofnationalismisjustaby-productofelectoralcompetitionorevidenceofalarger,politicalagendaonthepartofboththeregimeandextremenationalists.Ultimately, theunpredictabilityof theregimeand theability (ornot)ofright-wingnationaliststousetheopportu-nitiesnowopentothem,makeunderstandingthethreatposedbyRussianright-wingnationalismadifficultandchallengingtask.

14 Jobbik became the third biggest faction in theHungarian

parliamentfollowingthe2010parliamentaryelection.

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