Aquino Vs Morato

 FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.  

ISSUE : WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid

 HELD : The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character. it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land.

Tañada vs. Tuvera

FACTS:

Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its enforcement.

RULING:

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT VS. COMELEC, MAY 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1Facts: On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these – and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA;

(5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9)ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14)AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list.Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Another letter of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency of the subject request.Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales’ requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WON’T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", with the following sub-heading:"Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented."On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter to the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales’ earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionallyguaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying … the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724

under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request.Issues: (1)Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and (2) Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution todisclose to the public the names of said nominees.Held: The petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly denied insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days fromnotice hereofNote:The petitioner requested the COMELEC to publish the individual nominees of all the party-list groups in order that they will be guided on whatparty-list group shall be supported by them. The COMELEC held that under the Party-list Act, such list of nominees is confidential and should not bepublished.Held: The COMELEC should publish the list of nominees of all the party-list groups. This is in accordance with the right to information on matters of public concern which shall be accorded to every citizen

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. No. 16977, April 20, 2006The Facts: In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine

National Police (PNP). On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued E.O. 464, “ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. – (a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential

or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:1. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; 2. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; 1. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; 2. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and 3. Such other officers as may be determined by the President. I S S U E S: 1. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and H E L D: E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right to information on matters of public concern. There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen. To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials throughthe various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:

It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.Baldoza vs. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14FACTS: In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas,charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.Respondent, in answer to the complaint,stated that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records; that although court records are among public documents open to inspection not only by the parties directly involved but also by other persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. court has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal. Under the circumstances, to allow an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the right to free access, might do more harm than good to the citizenry of Taal. Disorder and chaos might result defeating the very essence of their request. The undersigned is just as interested as Mr. Baldoza in the welfare of the community and the preservation of our democratic principles. The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A.

Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and (cooperation among officers in the same municipality. This motion was denied by the Investigating Judge, but after formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of respondent.Ruling: WHEREFORE, the case against respondent is hereby dismissed.information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. The publication is made subject to the consequences of the law.Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his control and supervision. it has not been shown thatthe rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable.The access to public records predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significancethe Court finds that the respondent has not committed any abuse of authority. there is no showing of abuse of authority on the part of the respondent.The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of the respondent under certain conditions and under his control and supervision.Complainant admitted that he was aware of the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent when he went to his office to view his docket books for the purpose mentioned in his communication

Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383FACTS: Petitioner was the editor of the Manila Post, who sought the inspection of real estates sold to aliens and registered with the RD. He was denied to do so which prompted him to file a petition for mandamus.HELD: Except when it is clear that the purpose of the inspection is unlawful, it is not the duty of the registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, purposes, and objects of the person seeking to inspect the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before the public gaze.Gonzales vs. Narvasa 337 SCRA 733

FACTS: Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for information with respect to the names of executive officials holding multiple positions, copies of their appointments, and a list of recipients of luxury vehicles previously seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to the Office of the President. Petitioner filed this petition to compel the Executive Secretary to answer his letter.Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the caseHELD: It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the petitioner. The letter deals with matters of public concern, appointments to public offices and utilization of public property. The Executive Secretary is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of appointment papers.

Case Digest on Gonzales v. Narvasa Right to Information

FACTS:  Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for information with respect to the names of executive officials holding multiple positions, copies of their appointments, and a list of recipients of luxury vehicles previously seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to the Office of the President.  Petitioner filed this petition to compel the Executive Secretary to answer his letter.

HELD:  It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the petitioner.  The letter deals with matters of public concern, appointments to public offices and utilization of public property.  The Executive Secretary is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of appointment papers

Gonzales vs. Narvasa,G.R. NO. 140835, August 14, 2000Facts: On November 26, 1998, by virtue of Executive Order (EO) No. 43,President Joseph Estrada created the Philippine Commission on Constitutional Reform(PCCR), in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions tothe 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same. Under Section 7 of EO 43, the amount of P3,000,000 is appropriated for its operational expenses to besourced from the funds of the Office of the President. Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, inhis capacity as a taxpayer and a citizen, assailed the constitutionality of the creation of PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.Petitioner asked the court to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisersand assistants from acting as such. Petitioner also sought to enjoin the Commission on Audit (COA) from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidentialconsultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner anchored his petition

on two grounds:(1)he contended that PCCR is a public office which only the legislature can create by wayof law;and (2) he asserted that by creating the PCCR, the President is intervening in aprocess from which he is totally excluded by the Constitution, which is the amendmentof the fundamental charter.Issue: Whether petitioner has a legal standing to question the constitutionality of EO 43in his capacity as a citizen and as a taxpayer?

Ruling :NO.The Court ruled that petitioner failed to establish hislocus standi so as toenable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen and as a taxpayer. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suff

ered someactual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal

conduct of the government.The injury must be fairly traceable to the

challenged action and is likely to be redressedby a favorable action. In the

case at bar, petitioner has not shown that he has sustainedor is in danger

of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR.Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even indirect, injury. Only

Congress, not petitioner,can claim any injury in this case since, since

according to the latter, the President hasencroached upon the legislative

power to create a public office and to proposeamendments to the Charter

by forming the PCCR. A taxpayer is deemed to have standing to raise

a constitutional issue when it is shownthat public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or theConstitution. A taxpayer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise byCongress of its taxing or spending power. In the instant case, it is apparent that there isno exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The appropriation of P3,000.000 for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact,there was no appropriation at all because in its strict sense, appropriation has beendefined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitutionthat money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers tothe act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum tobe used in the payment of debts or dues from the State to its creditors.The funds usedfor the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in theexercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Section 25 (5) of  Article VI of the Constitution. While the court retains the power to decide whether or notit will allow a taxpayer’s suit, petitioner failed to show that he is a real party in interest – that he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he is entitled to the avails of the suit.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATONIn re: ATTY. EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governorsunanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent

from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay hismembership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of hisconstitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining hisstatus as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the correspondingdues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization towhich he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty andproperty guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the aboveprovisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter isnot among the justiciable cases triable by the Courtbut is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."Issues: Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues?Held: It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he ishereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.Ratio Decidendi: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he isnot already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-definedb u t u n o r g a n i z e d a n d i n c o h e s i v e g r o u p o f w h i c h e v e r y l a w y e r i s a r e a d y a m e m b e r. B a r integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or notattend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as hechooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. TheSupreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving

the profession in this fashionbe shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers. Moreover,there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court, under its constitutional power and duty topromulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of thePhilippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution), from requiring members of aprivileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeedimposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives andpurposes of integration. Also, it clear that under the police power of the State, and under thenecessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation andinquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penaltydesignedto enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is notvoid as unreasonable or arbitrary. NOTE: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringethe constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon wasstricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.

Tarnate vs. Noriel, 100 SCRA 93The crux of the matter in this proceeding for certiorari with preliminary injunction is whether or not probationary employees are entitled to vote in the election of officers and board members of a labor union. Respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel

1 at first ruled that they could not, apparently relying on the applicable provision of the Labor Code, which reads thus: "Any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, with at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee for purposes of membership in any labor union., 2 When, however, a motion for reconsideration was filed, he granted it and allowed the votes to be counted. Hence this suit for certiorari.In the election of union officers on October 23, 1977, there were two strong contenders, petitioner Arthur Ternate and respondent Lucerio Fajardo. Petitioner received 308 votes and respondent 285 votes. Forty (40) ballots cast by employees who classified as second helpers were challenged. Theywere included in the list of qualified voters upon the motion of the Fajardo faction and over the opposition of the Ternate group. It was imposed as a condition that the challenged ballots would be segregated and would be counted only after passing upon the question of membership of the such second helpers. The Ternate group finally agreed to allow them to participate in the election. On October 27, 1977, after the decision, the Fajardo group moved to have the challenged votes opened. The Med-Arbiter granted the prayer. Respondent Director Noriel in the order now challenged in this petition, as noted earlier, decided otherwise in a motion for reconsideration.The Solicitor General 3 when asked to comment, after stressing the constitutional right to form associations, a corollary of which in the case of labor is the right to self-organization, pointed to Article 3 of the New Labor Code in sustaining the power of respondent Director to issue the assailed order.Thus: "These constitutional mandates are recognized in Article 3 of the New Labor Code. Further, Article 244 thereof is of the same tenor: ... — All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including religious, medical or educational institutions operating for profit, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargain.

4 Reference to the constitutional right to freedom of association is not without relevance. The more decisive question, however, is the force and effect of the Labor Code provision as to when a probationary employee could in the language thereof "be considered a regular employee for purposes of membership in any labor union."The answer arrived at by this Court after due consideration of all factors bearing on such issue, is that the condition thus imposed in the Labor Code requiring "at least one year of service" calls for application. Petitioner, therefore, must prevail.1. The reliance of petitioner on the applicable Labor Code provision is not in vain. It is definite and clear. At least one year of service is required for an employee to enjoy the benefits "of membership in any labor union." There is no ambiguity. Its validity has not been challenged. It, therefore, calls for application in the precise terms it was enacted. As was pointed out in Gonzaga Court of Appeals: 5 "It has been repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently been to that effect. 6 There is thus no statutory support for the challenged order of respondent Noriel.2. In reaching such a conclusion, this Court is not unaware of the implication for freedom of association. 7 There is plausibility on its face to the contention of the Solicitor General that to bar the probationary employees from voting for union officials would run counter to such constitutional right. Nor should it be forgotten that in U.E. Automotive Employees and Workers Union vs. Noriel, 8

it was stressed that "freedom of association is explicitly ordained; it is not merely derivative, peripheral or penumbral, as is the case in the United States. It can trace its origin to the Malolos Constitution. 9 A more realistic appraisal, however, of the labor situation would serve to clarify matters. (The right to join a labor union remains undisputed. In the meanwhile however, for purposes of electing the union officers, assuming it would be chosen as the sole bargaining unit in the negotiation for a collective bargaining contract, the right of probationary employees could be thus restricted as provided for in the Labor Code. The justification lies in the fact that management could, by the simple device of appointing probationary employees in the labor union expected to prevail in the choice of the sole collective bargaining agent, attain the result that would serve best its interests, not necessarily that of labor). It must have been such a purpose that inspired a provision on this character. At any rate, there being no attack on its validity, it must be given full force and effect.3. The delay in the decision of this case is due to the fact that the required number of votes for this conclusion could not be obtained until the last deliberation. Precisely to some of its members the argument based on freedom of association weighed heavily. At any rate, before the next election takes place, matters hopefully have been clarified by this decision.WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the election of petitioner Arthur Ternate is upheld. The restraining order issued on November 27, 1978 is lifted.

Villar vs. Inciong, April 20,l983Facts:Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, a duly registeredlabor organization which, was the existing bargaining agent of the employees inprivate respondent Amigo Manufacturing, Inc. (Company). The Company and theAmigo Employees Union-PAFLU had a CBA governing their labor relations, which agreement was then about to expire on February 28, 1977. Within the last 60 daysof the CBA, upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees in the company,including the petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR) filed a petition forc e r t i f i c a t i o n e l e c t i o n w i t h M O L E . T h e p e t i t i o n w a s o p p o s e d b y t h e P h i l i p p i n e Association of

Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) with whom the Amigo Employees Unionwas at that time affiliated. The same employees who had signed the petition filedby FUR signed a joint resolution disaffiliating from PAFLU. Petitioner Dolores Villar,representing herself to be the authorized representative of the Amigo EmployeesU n i o n , f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n e l e c t i o n i n t h e C o m p a n y . T h e A m i g o EmployeesUnion-PAFLU intervened and moved for the dismissal of the petition forc e r t i f i c a t i o n e l e c t i o n f i l e d b y D o l o r e s V i l l a r , o n t h e g r o u n d , a m o n g o t h e r s t h a t D o l o r e s V i l l a r h a d n o l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y t o s i g n t h e p e t i t i o n s i n c e s h e w a s n o t a n officer of the union nor is there factual or legal basis for her claim that she was theauthorized representative of the local union. Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition filedb y V i l l a r , w h i c h d i s m i s s a l i s s t i l l p e n d i n g a p p e a l b e f o r e B L R . A m i g o E m p l o y e e s Union-PAFLU called a special meeting of its general membership. A Resolution wast h e r e b y u n a n i m o u s l y a p p r o v e d w h i c h c a l l e d f o r t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n b y t h e P A F L U n a t i o n a l p r e s i d e n t , o f a l l o f t h e p e t i t i o n e r s a n d o n e F e l i p e M a n l a p a o , f o r continuously maligning the union spreading false propaganda that the union officerswere merely appointees of the management; and for causing divisiveness in the u n i o n . P A F L Uf o r m e d a T r i a l C o m m i t t e e t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e l o c a l u n i o n ' s c h a r g e s against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty. PAFLU and the Company concluded an e w C B A w h i c h a l s o r e i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e s a m e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e e x i s t i n g C B A , including the union security clause. PAFLU President rendered a decision finding thepetitioners guilty of the charges. PAFLU demanded the Company to terminate theemployment of the petitioners pursuant to the security clause of the CBA. Acting

onP A F L U ' s d e m a n d , t h e C o m p a n y i n f o r m e d P A F L U t h a t i t w i l l f i r s t s e c u r e t h e necessary clearances to terminate petitioners. PAFLU requested the Company top u t p e t i t i o n e r s u n d e r p r e v e n t i v e s u s p e n s i o n p e n d i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r s a i d c l e a r a n c e s t o t e r m i n a t e th e p e t i t i o n e r s . T h e C o m p a n y f i l e d t h e r e q u e s t f o r c l e a r a n c e t o t e r m i n a t e t h e p e t i t i o n e r s b e f o r e D O LE w h i c h w a s g r a n t e d. D O L E Secretary Inciong denied the appeal, hence, this petition for review.Issue: WON DOLE Secretary erred in affirming the grant of clearance of terminationof petitioners.Ruling:It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It isimplicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution. But the Courthas laid down the ruling that a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restrictionof the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.In the case at bench, the Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU enteredinto a CBA with a union security clause which is a reiteration of the old CBA. Thequoted stipulation for closed-shop is clear and unequivocal.Petitioners’ theory thatt h e i r e x p u l s i o n w a s n o t v a l i d u p o n t h e g r o u n d s i s u n t e n a b l e . P A F L U h a d t h e authority to investigatepetitioners on the charges filed by their co-employees in thelocal union and after finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU is clear under the constitution of t h e P A F L U t o w h i c h t h e l o c a l u n i o n w a s a f f i l i a t e d . A n d p u r s u a n t t o t h e s e c u r i t y c l a u s e o f t h e n e w C B A , r e i t e r a t i n g t h e s a m e c l a u s e i n t h e o l d C B A , P A F L U w a s justified in applying said security clause. Recognized and salutary is the principlethat when a

labor union affiliates with a mother union, it becomes bound by thelaws and regulations of the parent organization. It is undisputable that oppositorswere members of the Amigo Employees Union at the time that said union affiliatedw i t h P A F L U ; h e n c e, o p p o s i t o r s a r e b o u n d b y t h e l a w s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s o f P A F L U . Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that matter, is the right of self -p r e s e r v a t i o n . W h e n m e m b e r s o f a l a b o r u n i o n s e e k t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n a n d destruction of the very union to which they belong; they thereby forfeit their rightst o r e m a i n a s m e m b e r s o f t h e u n i o n w h i c h t h e y s e e k t o d e s t r o y . P r u d e n c e a n d equity, as well as the dictates of law and justice, therefore, compelling mandate theadoption by the labor union of such corrective and remedial measures, in keepingwith its laws and regulations, for its preservation and continued existence; lestbyits folly and inaction, the labor union crumble and fall.Decision appealed from is affirmed

People vs. Ferrer, 56 SCRA 793 (Read the dissenting opinion of Justice FERNANDO in both cases)Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines(CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.)Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membershiptherein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association. Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. (2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person. Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIPwith KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished.Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization.Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congresswere done. The court further stressesthat whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

Inherent Power of imminent Domain

THE CITY OF ILOILO VS. JUDGE LEGASPI, RTC 22, ILOILO CITY, 444 SCRA 269FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Iloilo on March 7, 2001 enacted regulation ordinance granting umbrella authority to thenMayor Mansueto A. Malabor to institute expropriation proceedings on Lot No. 935, registered in the name of Manuela Yusay, located at barangay

Sto. Niño Norte, Arevalo, Iloilo City.On March 14, 2001, Mayor Malabor wrote Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del Rosario, administration of the estate, making formal offer to purchase theproperty for the purpose of converting the same as an on-site relocation for the poor and landless resident of the city. With apparent refusal to sell theproperty, the city represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treñas filed an expropriation case based on the Power of State on Eminent Domain. Upon the strictcompliance to the governing rules on expropriation, the city of Iloilo argued that it is entitled to an immediate issuance of a writ of possession.ISSUES:1. When does a court order become final and executory? 2. What is the legal basis of the Local Government Unit to exercise power ofeminent domain? 3. What are the requisites in issuance of Writ of Possession?RULING:A. Time-honored and of constant observance is the principle that noorder dictated in open court had no juridical existence before it is set in writing,signed, promulgated and served on the parties. Since the order orally pronounced in court had no juridical existence yet, the period within which to file a motion for reconsideration cannot be reckoned therefrom, but from the time the same was received in writing. Petitioner had fifteen (15) daysfrom its receipt of the written order within which to file a motion for reconsideration.B. Petitioner has the irrefutable right to exercise its power of eminent domain. It being a local government unit, the basis for its exercise is grantedunder Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160, to wit:Sec. 19 Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power ofeminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to theprovisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.C. For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint and the requiredprovisional deposit. Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 provides that the local government unit may take immediate possession of the property upon thefiling of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on

its current tax declaration. As long as the expropriation proceedings have been commenced and the deposit has been made, the local government unitcannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ of possession.Petition is hereby GRANTED

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE GINGOYON, 478 SCRA 474Facts: In 2003, the Supreme Court held in AGAN VS. PIATCO, 402 SCRA 612 that the CONCESSION AGREEMENT FOR THE BUILD OPERATE TRANSFER ARRANGEMENT OF THE NINOY AQUINO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PASSENGER TERMINAL II between the Philippine Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) as well as the amendments thereto is void for being contrary to law and public policy. On Motion for Reconsideration (420 SCRA 420), the Supreme Court held that: “This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over the said facility, IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE SAID STRUCTURES. THE COMPENSATION MUST BE JUST AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND EQUITY FOR THE GOVERNMENT CAN NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICH ITSELF AT THE EXPENSE OF PIATCO AND ITS INVESTORS.”On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Pasay City seeking a writ of possession authorizing to take immediate possession and control over NAIA 3 facilities and deposited the amount of P3.0B in cash with Land Bank of the Philippines representing the assessed value of the terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes.On the same day, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the government to “take or enter upon the possession of the NAIA 3 facilities”. It held that it is the ministerial duty of the government to issue writ of possession upon deposit of the assessed value of the property subject of expropriation.

However, on January 4, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued another Order supplementing the December 21, 2004 Order. It pointed out that the earlier orders to the amount to be deposited by the government was based on Section 2, Rule 67 when what should be applicable is RA 8974 and therefore ordered that the amount of US$62,343,175.77 be released to PIATCO instead of the amount in the December 21, 2004 Order.On January 7, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued another Order directing the appointment of three (3) Commissioners to determine just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex.Both Orders were questioned by the government as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.ISSUES: 1. What law is applicable in this expropriation case: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or RA 8974? 2. If RA 8974 will be used, may the court used the provision of Rule 67 on the 3 commissioners to determine just compensation.HELD: 1. Application of Rule 67 would violate the AGAN Doctrine which provides that “for the government to take over the said NAIA 3 facility, IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE SAID STRUCTURES”. If Section 2, Rule 67 will be applied, PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving the just compensation even if the government takes over the NAIA 3 facility. It is sufficient that the government deposits the amount equal to the assessed value of the facilities. It would violate the proscription in the AGAN Decision that the government must pay first the just compensation before taking over the facilities.So when shall Rule 67 be used in expropriation cases and when shall RA 8974 be used?In all “National government projects” or “national infrastructure projects”, like those covered by the “Build-Operate-Transfer”, RA 8974 shall be followed. The rest, Rule 67 shall apply.Differences between the two laws on expropriation:a. Under Rule 67, the government “merely deposits” the assessed value of the property subject of expropriation and can have a writ of possession over the same while under RA 8974, the scheme of immediate payment (100%) shall be followed.

b. Under Rule 67, there can be writ of possession even if the owner of the property has not received a single centavo while under RA 8974, as in this case, Writ of Possession may not be issued in favor of the government UNTIL ACTUAL RECEIPT by PIATCO of the preferred value of just compensation.Upon issuance of the writ in favor of the government, however, it could already exercise acts of ownership over the NAIA 3 facilities.The just compensation to be paid by the government shall be determined within 60 days from the finality of the decision based on Section 4, RA 8974.2. Rule 67 on the appointment of three (3) commissioners to determine just compensation may be used since RA 8974 does not provide for such procedure.Just Compensation; Amount to be deposited in court before a Writ of Possession may be issued by the court in favor of the government; When to apply Rule 67 and when to apply RA No. 8974; Who owns the interest of the initial amount deposited for the purpose of issuing writ of possession.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 172410, April 14, 2008THE FACTS: On 29 December 2000, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), filed with the RTC a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against landowners whose properties would be affected by the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 869-M-2000 and raffled to Branch 85, Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corporation (HTRDC) was one of the affected landowners.On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the affected properties, in the total amount of P28,406,700.00, with the Land Bank of the Philippines, South Harbor Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized government depository. TRB maintained that since it had already complied with the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974

in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the RTC.The RTC issued, on 19 March 2002, an Order for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession.On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying that the respondent or its duly authorized representative be allowed to withdraw the amount of P22,968,000.00, out of TRB’s advance deposit of P28,406,700.00 with LBP-South Harbor, including the interest which accrued thereon. Thereafter, the RTC allowed the release of the principal amount together with the interest to the respondent but on Motion for Reconsideration of the TRB, it disallowed the withdrawal of the interest reasoning out that the said issue will be included in the second stage of expropriation, that is, the determination of just compensation.The private respondent elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals which ruled that the respondent is entitled to the interest by way of accession.Hence, this petition of the government before the Supreme Court.I S S U E: Who has the right over the interest of the amount deposited representing the zonal value of the property sought to be expropriated? The expropriator or the landowner?HELD: The petition is without merit.The TRB claims that there are two stages in expropriation proceedings, the determination of the authority to exercise eminent domain and the determination of just compensation. The TRB argues that it is only during the second stage when the court will appoint commissioners and determine claims for entitlement to interest, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco and National Power Corporation v. Angas.The TRB further points out that the expropriation account with LBP-South Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC, but of DPWH. Thus, the said

expropriation account includes the compensation for the other landowners named defendants in Civil Case No. 869-M-2000, and does not exclusively belong to respondent.The said argument is without merit because it failed to distinguish between the expropriation procedures under Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speak of different procedures, with the former specifically governingexpropriation proceedings for national government infrastructure projects. Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon, we held: There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.x x x xRule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances

when the national government expropriates property “for national government infrastructure projects.” Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the expropriation of properties intended for a national government infrastructure project. Therefore, the RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in Republic Act No. 8974, by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the properties sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Republic. The controversy, though, arises not from the amount of the deposit, but as to the ownership of the interest that had since accrued on the deposited amount. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the interest earned by the deposited amount in the expropriation account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue of accession, hinges on the determination of who actually owns the deposited amount, since, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, the right of accession is conferred by ownership of the principal property:Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.The principal property in the case at bar is part of the deposited amount in the expropriation account of DPWH which pertains particularly to HTRDC. Such amount, determined to be P22,968,000.00 of the P28,406,700.00 total deposit, was already ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or its authorized representative. The Court of Appeals further recognized that the deposit of the amount was already deemed a constructive delivery thereof to HTRDC:When the [herein petitioner] TRB deposited the money as advance payment for the expropriated property with an authorized government depositary bank for purposes of obtaining a writ of possession, it is deemed to be a “constructive delivery” of the amount corresponding to the 100% zonal

valuation of the expropriated property. Since [HTRDC] is entitled thereto and indisputably the owner of the principal amount deposited by [herein petitioner] TRB, conversely, the interest yield, as accession, in a bank deposit should likewise pertain to the owner of the money deposited.Since the Court of Appeals found that the HTRDC is the owner of the deposited amount, then the latter should also be entitled to the interest which

accrued thereon.

The deposit was made in order to comply with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, which requires nothing less than the immediate payment of 100% of the value of the property, based on the current zonal valuation of the BIR, to the property owner. Thus, going back to our ruling in Republic v. Gingoyon: It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases involving national government infrastructure projects. The critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery which gives legal effect to the act is the actual intention to deliver on the part of the party making such delivery. The intention of the TRB in depositing such amount through DPWH was clearly to comply with the requirement of immediate payment in Republic Act No. 8974, so that it could already secure a writ of possession over the properties subject of the expropriation and commence implementation of the project. In fact, TRB did not object to HTRDC’s Motion to Withdraw Deposit with the RTC, for as long as HTRDC shows (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that respondent is the absolute owner thereof. A close scrutiny of TRB’s arguments would further reveal that it does not directly challenge the Court of Appeals’ determinative pronouncement that the interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account accrues to HTRDC by virtue of accession. TRB only asserts that HTRDC is “entitled only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated property, nothing more and nothing less.” We agree in TRB’s statement since it is exactly how the amount of the immediate payment shall be determined in accordance with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, i.e., an amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the expropriated properties. However, TRB already complied therewith by depositing the required amount in the expropriation account of DPWH with LBP-South Harbor. By depositing the said amount, TRB is already considered to have paid the same to HTRDC, and HTRDC became the owner thereof. The amount earned interest after the deposit; hence, the interest should pertain to the owner of the principal who is already determined as HTRDC. The interest is paid by LBP-South Harbor on the deposit, and the TRB cannot claim that it paid an amount more than what it is required to do so by law.

Since the respondent is the owner of P22,968,000.00, it is entitled by right of accession to the interest that had accrued to the said amount only.We are not persuaded by TRB’s citation of National Power Corporation v. Angas and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, in support of its argument that the issue on interest is merely part and parcel of the determination of just compensation which should be determined in the second stage of the proceedings only. We find that neither case is applicable herein.The issue in Angas is whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the applicable law isArticle 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate, or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal rate at 12% per annum. We ruled in Angas that since the kind of interest involved therein is interest by way of damages for delay in the payment thereof, and not as earnings from loans or forbearances of money, Article 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing the 6% interest shall apply. In Wycoco, on the other hand, we clarified that interests in the form of damages cannot be applied where there is prompt and valid payment of just compensation. The case at bar, however, does not involve interest as damages for delay in payment of just compensation. It concerns interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account.Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency of the government pays just compensation twice: (1) immediately upon the filing of the complaint, where the amount to be paid is 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR (initial payment); and (2) when the decision of the court in the determination of just compensation becomes final and executory, where the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court (finalpayment) As a final note, TRB does not object to HTRDC’s withdrawal of the amount of P22,968,000.00 from the expropriation account, provided that it is able to show (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner thereof. The said conditions do not put in

abeyance the constructive delivery of the said amount to HTRDC pending the latter’s compliance therewith. Article 1187 of the Civil Code provides that the “effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation.” Hence, when HTRDC complied with the given conditions, as determined by the RTC in its Orderdated 21 April 2003, the effects of the constructive delivery retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the amount in the expropriation account of DPWH.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 441 SCRA 637FACTS: Private respondents Eastern Plywood Corporation and Benigno Lim as officer of the corporation, had an “AND/OR” joint account withCommercial Bank and Trust Co (CBTC), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands. Lim withdraw funds from suchaccount and used it to open a joint checking account (an “AND” account) with Mariano Velasco. When Velasco died in 1977, said joint checkingaccount had P662,522.87. By virtue of an Indemnity Undertaking executed by Lim and as President and General Manager of Eastern withdrew onehalf of this amount and deposited it to one of the accounts of Eastern with CBTC. Eastern obtained a loan of P73,000.00 from CBTC which was not secured. However, Eastern and CBTC executed a Holdout Agreement providingthat the loan was secured by the “Holdout of the C/A No. 2310-001-42” referring to the joint checking account of Velasco and Lim. Meanwhile, a judicial settlement of the estate of Velasco ordered the withdrawal of the balance of the account of Velasco and Lim. Asserting that the Holdout Agreement provides for the security of the loan obtained by Eastern and that it is the duty of CBTC to debit the account ofrespondents to set off the amount of P73,000 covered by the promissory note, BPI filed the instant petition for recovery. Private respondents Easternand Lim, however, assert that the amount deposited in the joint account of Velasco and Lim came from Eastern and therefore rightfully belong toEastern and/or Lim. Since the Holdout Agreement covers the loan of P73,000, then petitioner can only hold that amount against the joint checkingaccount and must return the rest.

ISSUE: Whether BPI can demand the payment of the loan despite the existence of the Holdout Agreement and whether BPI is still liable to theprivate respondents on the account subject of the withdrawal by the heirs of Velasco. RULING: Yes, for both issues. Regarding the first, the Holdout Agreement conferred on CBTC the power, not the duty, to set off the loan from theaccount subject of the Agreement. When BPI demanded payment of the loan from Eastern, it exercised its right to collect payment based on thepromissory note, and disregarded its option under the Holdout Agreement. Therefore, its demand was in the correct order. Regarding the second issue, BPI was the debtor and Eastern was the creditor with respect to the joint checking account. Therefore, BPI was obligedto return the amount of the said account only to the creditor. When it allowed the withdrawal of the balance of the account by the heirs of Velasco, itmade the payment to the wrong party. The law provides that payment made by the debtor to the wrong party does not extinguish its obligation to thecreditor who is without fault or negligence. Therefore, BPI was still liable to the true creditor, Eastern.

GABATIN VS. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, 444 SCRA 176What is the basis of the just compensation for expropriation proceedings in connection with the agrarian reform program of the government.Held: The taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program of the government partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceedings. As such, in computing the just compensation, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking, not at the time of the rendition of the judgment, which should be taken into consideration

Hacienda Luisita vs. Presidential Agrarrian Reform Council, GR no. 171101, April 24, 2012I. THE FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI andAFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands inHacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim andwhich the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle,give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or[choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked tomanifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printednames.”The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.II. THE ISSUES: (1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case? (2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional? (3) Can’t the Court orderthat DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac

Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP? (4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes ofdetermining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP? (5) Has the 10-year period prohibitionon the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through theSDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties,whether they have fully paid for the lands or not? (6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualifiedFWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?III. THE RULIN: [The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the optiongranted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Courtthereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain asstockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, thedoctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies thathave the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must berespected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of thePARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stockdistribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at theearliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic sinceSDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor ofthe constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify theresolution of the issue of constitutionality.]3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land andnot 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent theDAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held byTadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads,irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in thedecrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting thearea that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of theagricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation andenforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualifiedFWB will be awarded.On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted toindustrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation

(LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARCresolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.

4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since thisis the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subjectof the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Suchapproval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that thedate of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI isentitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, saidcases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminaryand is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a specialagrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedlya judicial function.]5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualifiedFWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of theemancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to thequalified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP orCLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell orconvey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands willjust be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should bereconsidered.[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as thesequalified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the shareof the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLIstockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share ofthe common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDPapproved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.

NPC vs. Jocson, February 25, 1992Facts: The NPC filed for the acquisition of a right-of-way easementover portions of the parcels of land described in the complaints forits Negros-Panay Interconnection Project, particularly the Bacolod- Tomonton Transmission Line. Provisional values were fixed on thebasis of the market value and the daily opportunity profit petitionermay derive. Respondents sought a re-evaluation. Judge increasedvalue without hearing and directing the defendants to manifestwithin twenty-four (24) hours whether or not they are accepting and withdrawing the amounts, representing the provisional values,deposited by the plaintiff for each of them as "final and fullsatisfaction of the value of their respective property (sic); " Judgedeclared the provisional values as the final values and directing therelease of the amounts deposited, in full satisfaction thereof, to thedefendants even if not all of them made the manifestation; andsuspended the issuance of the writ of possession until after thesuspending the amounts shall have been released to and receivedby defendants.Issue: WON Judge Jocson committed grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction. YES.

? Municipality of Biñan vs. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, et al: thereare two (2) stages in every action of expropriation: The firstis concerned with the determination of the authority of theplaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and thepropriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involvedin the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of theaction, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has alawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,upon the payment of justcompensation to be determined asof the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leavesnothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too,would an order of condemnation be a final one, forthereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedingsbefore the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of theright of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall befiled or heard." The second phase of the eminent domainactionis concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not morethan three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the justcompensation on the basis of the evidence before, andfindings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It wouldfinally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leavenothing more to be done by the Court regarding theissue. . . .? However, upon the filing of the complaint or at any timethereafter, the petitioner has the right to take or enter uponthe possession of the property involved upon compliancewith P.D. No. 42 which requires the petitioner, after duenotice to the defendant, to deposit with the PhilippineNational Bank in its main office or any of its branches oragencies, "an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation." This assessed valueis that indicated in the tax declaration.? P.D. No. 42 repealed the "provisions of Rule 67 of the Rulesof Court and of any other existing law contrary to orinconsistent" with it. Accordingly, it repealed Section 2 of Rule 67

insofar as the determination of the provisionalvalue, the form of payment and the agency with which thedeposit shall be made, are concerned. Said section reads infull as follows: Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositingvalue with National or Provisional Treasurer. — Upon thefiling of the complaint or at any time thereafter the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real or personal property involved if he deposits with theNational or Provincial Treasurer its value, as provisionallyand promptly ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings, to be held by such treasurersubject to the orders and final disposition of the court. Suchdeposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a depository of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the National or Provincial Treasurer, as the case may be, in the amount directed by the court to be deposited. After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved.

? It will be noted that under the aforequoted section, the courthas the discretion to determine the provisional value whichmust be deposited by the plaintiff to enable it "to take orenter upon the possession of the property." Notice to theparties is not indispensable. In interpreting a similarprovision of Act No. 1592, this Court, in the 1915 case of Manila Railroad Company, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 45 held: The statute directs that, at the very outset, "whencondemnation proceedings are brought by any railwaycorporation" the amount of the deposit is to be"provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by thecourt." It is very clear that it was not the intention of the legislator that before the order fixing the amount of thedeposit could lawfully be entered the court should finallyand definitely determine who are the true owners of theland; and after doing so, give them a hearing as to its value,and assess the true value of the land accordingly. In effect,that would amount to a denial of the right of possession of the lands involved until the conclusion of the proceedings,when there would no need for the filing of the deposit. Of course, there is nothing in the statute which denies the rightof the judge to hear all persons claiming an interest in theland, and courts should ordinarily give all such persons anopportunity to be heard if that be practicable, and will causeno delay in the prompt and provisional ascertainment of thevalue of the land. But the scope and extent of the inquiry isleft wholly in the discretion of the court, and a failure tohear the owners and claimants of the land, who may or maynot be known at the time of the entry of the order, in nowise effects the validity of the order. . . .? P.D. No. 42, however, effectively removes the discretion of the court in determining the provisional value. What is to bedeposited is an amount equivalent to the assessed value fortaxation purpose. No hearing is required for that purpose.All that is needed is notice to the owner of the propertysought to be condemned.? Clearly, therefore, respondent Judge either deliberatelydisregarded P.D. No. 42 or was totally unaware of itsexistence and the cases applying the same.? In any event, petitioner deposited the provisional value fixedby the court. As a matter of right, it was entitled to beplaced in possession of the property involved in thecomplaints at once,

pursuant to both Section 2 of Rule 67and P.D. No. 42. Respondent Court had the correspondingduty to order the sheriff or any other proper officer toforthwith place the petitioner in such possession. Instead of complying with the clear mandate of the law, respondent Judge chose to ignore and overlook it. Moreover, uponseparate motions for reconsideration filed by the defendantsin Civil Cases Nos. 5938 and 5939, he issued a new Orderincreasing the provisional values of the properties involvedtherein. No hearing was held on the motions. As a matter of fact, as the records show, the motion for reconsiderationfiled by defendants Jesus Gonzaga, et al. in Civil Case No.5938 is dated 11 July 1990 while the Order granting bothmotions was issued the next day, 12 July 1990. The motionfor reconsideration in Civil Case No. 5938 does not evencontain a notice of hearing. It is then a mere scrap of paper;it presents no question which merits the attention andconsideration of the court. It is not even a mere motion for itdoes not comply with the rules, more particularly Sections 4and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; the Clerk of Court thenhad no right to receive it. 50? There was, moreover, a much stronger reason why therespondent Court should not have issued the 12 July 1990Order increasing the provisional values of the Gonzaga lotsin Civil Cases Nos. 5938 and 5939. After having fixed theseprovisional values, albeit erroneously, and upon deposit bypetitioner of the said amounts, respondent Judge lost, aswas held in Manila Railroad Company vs. Paredes, "plenarycontrol over the order fixing the amount of the deposit, andhas no power to annul, amend or modify it in matters of substance pending the course of the condemnationproceedings." The reason for this is that a contrary rulingwould defeat the very purpose of the law which is to providea speedy and summary procedure whereby the peaceablepossession of the property subject of the expropriationproceedings "may be secured without the delays incident toprolonged and vexatious litigation touching the ownershipand value of such lands, which should not be permitted todelay the progress of the work."? Compounding the above error and the capriciousness withwhich it was committed is respondent Judge's refusal toplace the petitioner in possession of the property or issuethe writ of

possession despite the fact that the latter hadlikewise deposited the additional amount called for by the12 July 1990 Order. Instead, respondent Judge issued the 16 July 1990 Order directing the defendants to state in writingwithin twenty-four (24) hours whether or not they wouldaccept and withdraw the amounts deposited by thepetitioner for each of them " as final and full satisfaction of the value of their respective property (sic) affected by theexpropriation" and stating at the same time that the writ willbe issued after such manifestation and acceptance andreceipt of the amounts. The above Order has absolutely nolegal basis even as it also unjustly, oppressively and capriciously compels the petitioner to accept the respondent Judge's determination of the provisional value as the justcompensation after the defendants shall have manifestedtheir conformity thereto. He thus subordinated his own judgment to that of the defendants' because he made thelatter the final authority to determine such justcompensation. This Court ruled in Export Processing ZoneAuthority vs. Dulay, et al. 52 that the determination of justcompensation in eminent domain cases is a judicialfunction; accordingly, We declared as unconstitutional andvoid, for being, inter alia, impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives which tends to render the Court inutilein a matter which, under the Constitution, is reserved to itfor final determination, the method of ascertaining justcompensationprescribed in P.D. Nos. 76 464, 794 and 1533,to wit: the market value as declared by the owner oradministrator or such market value as determined by theassessor, whichever is lower in the first three (3) decrees,and the value declared by the owner or administrator oranyone having legal interest in the property or the value asdetermined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever is lower, prior to the recommendationor decision of the appropriate Government office to acquirethe property, in the last mentioned decree. If the legislatureor the executive department cannot even impose upon thecourt how just compensation should be determined, it wouldbe far more objectionable and impermissible for respondent Judge to grant the defendants in an eminent domain casesuch power and authority.

? Without perhaps intending it to be so, there is not only aclear case of abdication of judicial prerogative, but also acomplete disregard by respondent Judge of the provisions of Rule 67 as to the procedure to be followed after thepetitioner has deposited the provisional value of theproperty. It must be recalled that three (3) sets of defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Section 3,Rule 67 of the Rules of Court; Section 4 of the same ruleprovides that the court must rule on them and in the eventthat it overrules the motions or, when any party fails topresent a defense as required in Section 3, it should enteran order of condemnation declaring that the petitioner has alawful right to take the property sought to be condemned.? As may be gleaned from the 25 June 1990 Order, therespondent Judge found that the petitioner has that rightand that "there will be a (sic) paramount public interest tobe served by the expropriation of the defendants'properties." Accordingly, considering that the partiessubmitted neither a compromise agreement as to the justcompensation nor a stipulation to dispense withtheappointment of commissioners and to leave thedetermination of just compensation to the court on the basisof certain criteria, respondent Judge was duty bound to setin motion Section 5 of Rule 67; said section directs the courtto appoint not more than three (3) competent anddisinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain andreport to it regarding the just compensation for the propertysought to be taken. Such commissioners shall perform theirduties in the manner provided for in Section 6; upon thefiling of their report, the court may, after a period of ten (10)days which it must grant to the parties in order that thelatter may file their objections to such report, and afterhearing pursuant to Section 8, accept and render judgmentin accordance therewith or, for cause shown, recommit thesame to the commissioners for further report of facts. Thecourt may also set aside the report and appoint newcommissioners, or it may accept the report in part andreject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the petitioner the propertyessential to the exercise of its right of condemnation, and tothe defendant just compensation for the property so taken.

? Not satisfied with the foregoing violations of law andinsisting upon his own procedure, respondent Judgedeclared in his Order of 18 July 1990 that the provisionalamounts he fixed, later increased with respect to theproperties of the Gonzagas, shall be considered as the fullpayment of the value of the properties after the defendantsin Civil Cases Nos. 5938, 5939, 5940, 5942 and 5943 shallhave filed their manifestations; he also ruled that the writ of possession will be issued only after the latter shall havereceived the said amounts. This Order and the recordsbefore this Court do not disclose that the defendants in CivilCases Nos. 5941 and 5944 filed any manifestation; yet, inthe Order, respondent Judge whimsically and arbitrarilyconsidered the so-called provisional values fixed therein as the final values. By such Order, the case was in factterminated and the writ of execution then became a mereincident of an execution of a judgment. The right of thepetitioner to take or enter into possession of the propertyupon the filing of the complaint granted by Section 2 of Rule67 and P.D. No. 42 was totally negated despite compliancewith the deposit requirement under the latter law.? City Government of Toledo City vs. Fernandos, et al: doesnot apply to the instant petition because at the pre-trialconference held therein, the petitioner submitted to thediscretion of the court as to the correct valuation, privaterespondents stated that they have no objections and are inconformity with the price of P30.00 per square meter asreasonable compensation for their land and the CityAssessor informed the court of the current market andappraisal values of the properties in the area and the factorsto be considered in the determination of such. The partiespresented their documentary exhibits. In effect, therefore,the parties themselves agreed to submit to a judicialdetermination on the matter of just

compensation and that judgment be

rendered based thereon. In the instant case,no pre-trial was conducted; the proceedings were still atthat state where the provisional value was yet to bedetermined; and the parties made no agreement on just compensation.

Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, Aug. 3, 1990NATURE: Petition to review Commission on Audit decisionFACTS: - Petitioners, Spouses Ansaldo, owned two parcels of land which were taken by thegovernment and used to widen what is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue in 1947.However, it was only in 1973 or 26 years later that the spouses claimed for compensation. The Secretary of Justice in due course rendered an opinion that justcompensation be paid in accordance with PD No. 76. This decree provided that basisfor the payment should be the current and fair market value as declared by the owner or such value as determined by the assessor, whichever was lower. (It shouldbe noted however that at the time the decision was made by the SC, this provisionon payment was already declared unconstitutional in 1988 in the Export Processingvs Dulay case where said mode was said to be an impermissible encroachment onthe judicial prerogative to resolve the compensation issue in an appropriateproceeding of eminent domain)- Pursuant to the opinionof the Justice Secretary, the auditor of the Bureau of PublicHighways recommended to the auditor General that payment be made on the basisof the current and fair market value and not on the fair market value at the time theproperty was in fact expropriated. The Commission on Auditdeclined the saidrecommendation and instead ruled that the amount of compensation should bed e t e r m i n e d a s o f t h e t i m eo f t a k i n g o f t h e p a r c e l s o f l a n d . T h e m o t i o n f o r reconsideration filed by the spouses Arsaldo was denied.- Hence this appeal to theSupreme Court.ISSUE: WON the fixing of compensation should be at the time of the taking of the property

HELD: Yes. Normally, of course, where the institution of an expropriation action precedesthe taking of the property subject thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of thetime of the filing of the complaint. This is so provided by the Rules of Court, theassumption of possession by the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on itsdeposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the property asprovisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings. Thereare instances, however, where the expropriating agency takes over the propertyprior to the expropriation suit, as in this case although, to repeat, the case at bar isquite extraordinary in that possessionwas taken by the expropriator more than 40y e a r s p r i o r t o s u i t . I n t h e s e i n s t a n c e s , t h i s C o u r t h a s r u l e d t h a t t h e j u s t compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.- The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara,16 is that"x x (W)here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnationproceedings,the value thereof may be enchanced by the public purpose for which it istaken;the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated itsvalue thereby;or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of theproperty from the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what heactually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyondhisloss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his propertyat the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paidcan be truly just; i.e., 'just not only to the individual whose property istaken,but to the public, which is to pay for it.'"- Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos' property mustbe ascertained as of theyear 1947, when it was actually taken, and not at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which, by the way, still has to be done. It is as of that time thatthe real measure of their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shallearn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected, conformably with otherprinciples laid down by case law.Disposition:Petition DENIED

Mun. of Makati vs. CA, Oct. 1, 1990Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was depositedin PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.TheRTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review.Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution. Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance

appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be

validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.

BERKENKOTTER, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, December 14, 1992 Cruz, J.Facts: 1. On June 18, 1982, Vicente Viray, then President of Apolinario Apacible School of Fisheries, a government institution in Nasugbu, Batangas, sent the petitioner a written offer to buy the property of the latter with an area of 10,640 square meters for its 5-year expansion program;2. That the petitioner expressed willingness to sell at P50.00 per square meter in its reply;3. Viray then requested the Office of the Provincial Assessor of the Province of Batangas to appraise the land and the latter fixed its market value at P32.00 per square meter;4. Viray then wrote the petitioner and expressed willingness to buy the latter's property at P32.00 per square meter. The petitioner, however, stuck to its original valuation. Later on, it said that its property had in fact appreciated to as much as P100.00 per square meter;5. On October 28, 1983, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for the expropriation of the petitioner's property and invoked the assessment made by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of the Provincial Assessor of Batangas in the amount of P32.00. The government likewise sought immediate possession of the property upon deposit of 10% of the total assessment in accordance with PD 48;6. Berkenkotter originally questioned the purpose of the expropriation but later abandoned this objection and concentrated only on what it called the "underappraisal" of the subject land;7. The RTC then appointed a panel of commissioners in accordance with Rule 67, ection 5, of the Rules of Court, to determine the just compensation to be paid for the land;

8. On September 23, 1985, the panel of commissioners submitted its report to the trial court and pegged the market value at P85.00 per square meter;9. The Republic of the Philippines objected and pointed to three (3) contracts of sale executed by the petitioner in 1985 whereby it sold three (3) tracts of land similar in topography and adjacent to the property in question for the unit price of only P19.18 per square meter;10. The court directed the commissioners to convene anew and to receive additional evidence. However, in its second report dated April 1, 1987, the panel reiterated its original recommendation of P85.00/sq. m. or a total of P904,400.00 for the entire area sought to be expropriated. The trial court acting on this recommendation rendered judgment requiring the Republic to pay the petitioner the amount of P904,400.00 for the entire area sought to be expropriated;11. The government appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION and declaring that the fair market value which should be the basis in computing the amount to be paid by the government to the petitioner shall be P19.18, the market value according set by the petitioner if we follow the three (3) deeds of sale it executed in favor of three (3) different individuals;12. The petitioner was therefore constrained to file this instant petition claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that P19.18 per square meter should be the basis of the computation for the just compensation of its property because:a. Viray even offered the amount of P32.00 per squaremeter as the fair market value;b. that P32.00 per square meter was the appraised value made by the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Batangas; andc. the complaint itself prays that the market value be pegged at P32.00 per square meter.Issue: WHAT SHOULD BE THE BASIS IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE JUST COMPENSATION: P32.00/SQ. M. IN ACCORANCE WITH THE APPRAISAL OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR; P100.00/SQ.M. AS CLAIMED BY THE OWNER; P85.00/SQ. M. AS

RECOMMENDED BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED BY THE COURT TO EVALUATE THE SAME, OR P19.18 PER SQUARE METER WHICH WAS THE SELLING PRICE IN AN ADJACENT LOT SOLD BY THE PETITIONER TO THREE PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.Held. The basis in the computation of just compensation shall be P19.18 per square meter or the price which the petitioner sold its other lots to other individuals.This is so because there is no showing that the petitioner had any special reason for granting each of the individual vendees the extraordinary discount amounting to as much as 75% of its claimed real value of the land. To all appearances, they were ordinary buyers who bought the land for their own private purposes only and not for the public purpose invoked by the government.The petitioner's claim that the value as appearing in the deeds of sale in the three other parcels is not a reliable index of just compensation "because owners usually undervalue the selling price of the property to lower the expenses they would have to pay for capital gains tax and documentary stamps tax" is practically an admission that it did not indicate the actual consideration in the three transactions where it was made toappear that the price per square meter was only P19.18. If this was the purpose of the petitioner when it executed the 3 deeds of sale, then IT IS

SURELY HOIST NOW BY ITS OWN PETARD. AND RIGHTLY SO, FOR IT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM ITS OWN DECEPTION AND CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY SHOULD BE ASSESSED AT THE HIGHER RATE IT CLANDESTINELY AGREED UPON WITH THE BUYERS.The Court is disappointed that the petitioner should demand a higher price from the republic, which needs the land for a public purpose, when it was willing to accept less from the three individual buyers who had only their private interests to serve.The fact that the petitioner sold the 3 other parcels of land at P19.18 per square meter which are admittedly of the same topography as that subject of

this case, it impliedly admitted that the price for the latter should be the same as the former. This rule of consistency is best expressed in the familiar saying, surely not unknown to the petitioner, THAT WHAT IS SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE IS ALSO SAUCE FOR THE GANDER.Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the proerty sought to be expropriated (Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 378). The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. he compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker.To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the property, to which should be added the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation.The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by the parties willing but not compelled to enter into a contract of sale.Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value are: 1. cost of acquisition; 2. the current value of like proerties; 3. its actual or potential uses; 4. particular case of lands; 5. their size, shape, location; and 6. the tax declarations thereon.Finally, note that as held in the case of Republic vs. Santos, 141 SCRA 30, the market value as recommended by the board of commissioners appointed by the court were at best only ADVISORY AND PERSUASIVE AND BY NO MEANS FINAL OR BINDING

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 87335, February 12, 1989 Expropriation: Gancayco, J.Facts: 1. On February 20, 1979, the Rep. of the Philippines initiated an expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets, among them Cristina de Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus, and some other fifteen defendants in Civil Case No. 7001-P;2. In June, 1979, the Republic of the Philippines prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be expropriated on the ground that it had already deposited with the PNB 10% of the amount of compensation stated in the complaint; that on June 14, 1979, the Lower Court issued a

writ of possession authorizing the Republic to enter into the properties condemned and created a committee to determine just compensation;3. On July 16, 1979, De Knecht went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition directed against the June 14, 1979 order of the lower court;4. On October 30, 1980, the Supreme Court rendered its decision granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition and directing that the Order of therespondent Judge dated June 14, 1979 be SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil CaseNo. 7001-P 5. On August 8, 1981, the defendants in Civil Case No. 7001- moved for the dismissal of said case since the decision of the Supreme Court is already final;6. On September 2, 1983, the Republic moved for the dismissal of the case due to the enactment of BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. On the same date, the Court dismissed the case. The defendants moved for a reconsideration which the Court denied;7. De Knecht appealed the Order dismissing the case to the Court of Appeals who on December 28, 1988 issued its decision setting aside the Order appealed from and dismissing the expropriation proceedings before the lower court on the ground that the choice of the above-mentioned streets as the line through which the EDSA should be extended is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval;8. The Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court.Issue: Whether or not the legislature could still pass a law expropriating the lots of the private respondents despite the existence of a final decision ofthe Supreme Court which held that choice of their lot to be used as an extension of EDSA is arbitrary?Held: It is true that there is already a final decision of the Supreme Court to the effect that the choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. However, it is equally true that the Constitution and our laws may expropriate private properties after the payment of just compensation. When on February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the

same purpose, IT APPEARS THAT THE SAME WAS BASED ON SUPERVENING EVENTS THAT OCCURRED after the decision of the SC in De Knecht vs. Bautista in 1980. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension has disappeared because of the fact that the residents of the area have been relocated and duly compensated and only DE KNECHT now is left while her property is only about 5% of thearea to be expropriated. The Republic could continue it expropriation proceedings considering the supervening events after the decision was rendered.BP Bilang 340 THEREFORE EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDED THE AFORESAID FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT. X x x THE COURT AGREES IN THE WISDOM AND NECESSITY OF ENACTING BP 340. THUS THE ANTERIOR DECISION OF THIS COURT MUST YIELD TO THIS SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE FIAT.Cruz, J., concurringSupervening events have changed the factual basis of the SC's decision to justify the subsequent enactment of the statute. If we are sustaining the legislation, it is not because we concede that the lawmakers can nullify the findings of the Court in the exercise of its discretion. It is simply because we ourselves have found that under the changed situation, the present expropriation is no longer arbitrary.I MUST ADD THAT THIS DECISION IS NOT A REVERSAL OF THE ORIGINAL DE KNECHT CASE, WHICH WAS DECIDED UNDER A DIFFERENT SET OF FACTS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 87335, February 12, 1989