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The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text

Author(s): Paul RicurSource: New Literary History, Vol. 5, No. 1, What Is Literature? (Autumn, 1973), pp. 91-117Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/468410 .

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The Model oftheText: MeaningfulActionConsidered s a TextPaulRicoeur

MY AIM IN THIS PAPER will be to test n hypothesis. assumethattheprimaryenseof theword"hermeneutics"oncernsthe rulesrequiredfor he nterpretationfthe written ocu-mentsof our culture. In assuming hisstarting oint am remainingfaithfulotheconcept fAuslegung s it was statedbyWilhelmDilthey;whereasVerstehen understanding, omprehension)relieson the rec-ognition fwhat a foreign ubjectmeansor intendson the basis ofallkindsofsigns nwhichpsychicife xpressestselfLebensiiusserungen),Auslegung interpretation,xegesis) mplies omethingmorespecific: tcovers nly limited ategory fsigns, hosewhich re fixedbywriting,includingall the sortsof documents nd monumentswhich entail afixation imilar o writing.Now myhypothesiss this: if thereare specific roblemswhich areraised by the interpretationf textsbecause theyare texts and notspoken anguage,and if theseproblems re the ones which constitutehermeneuticss such, thenthe social sciencesmay be said to be her-meneutical I) inasmuchas theirobject displays ome of the featuresconstitutivef a textas text, nd (2) inasmuchas theirmethodologydevelopsthe same kind of procedures s thoseof Auslegungor text-interpretation.Hence thetwoquestions o whichmypaperwill be devoted: (i) Towhatextentmaywe consider henotionoftext s a goodparadigmfortheso-calledobjectof thesocial sciences? (2) To whatextentmayweusethemethodologyftext-interpretations a paradigmfor nterpreta-tionin general n the fieldof the social sciences?

I. The Paradigm ofTextIn orderto justify he distinction etweenspokenand writtenan-guage I want to introduce preliminaryoncept, hat of discourse. t

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92 NEW LITERARY HISTORYis as discourse hat anguage is either pokenorwritten.Now, what isdiscourse?We shall notseekthe answerfrom he logicians,not even from heexponents f linguistic nalysis, ut from helinguists hemselves. is-course is the counterpart f what linguists all language systems rlinguistic odes. Discourse is language-event r linguistic sage. Thispair of correlative erms-system/event,ode/message-has played abasic role in linguisticsince it was introduced y Ferdinandde Saus-sure and LouisHjelmslev.The firstpokeof anguage langue)-speech(parole), thesecondofschema-usage. We can also add competence-performancen Chomsky's anguage. It is necessary o draw all theepistemological onsequencesof such a duality,namely, hat the lin-guistics fdiscoursehas differentulesfrom he inguisticsf language.It is the Frenchlinguist mile Benv6nistewho has gonefurthest iththisdistinction. or him,these wolinguisticsre not constructedponthesame units. If thesign (phonological r lexical) is the basic unit oflanguage,thesentence s the basic unit of discourse. hereforet is thelinguistics f the sentencewhich supportthe theory f speech as anevent. I will retain our raits rom his inguisticsfthesentencewhichwillhelpme in a littlewhile to elaboratethe hermeneutic f theeventand of discourse.First trait: Discourse s alwaysrealizedtemporallynd in a present,whereas helanguage ystems virtual nd outsideoftime. Emile Ben-v6niste alls this he"instance f discourse."Second trait:Whereas anguage acks a subject-in the sense hat thequestion Who isspeaking?"does notapplyat its evel-discourse refersto its peaker ymeans of a complex etof ndicators uchas thepersonalpronouns.We willsaythatthe "instance fdiscourse" s self-referential.Third trait: Whereasthesigns n languagerefer nlyto other ignswithin he same system,nd whereas anguagethereforeacks a worldjust as it lacks temporalitynd subjectivity, iscourse s always aboutsomething. t refers o a world which t claimsto describe, o express,or to represent.t is in discourse hatthesymbolic unction flanguageis actualized.Fourthtrait:Whereas anguage s only he condition or ommunica-tion,forwhich tprovides hecodes, t is in discourse hat all messagesare exchanged. In this ense,discourse lone has not onlya world,butan other-anotherperson, n interlocutoro whom t is addressed.These fourtraits akentogether onstitutepeech as an event. It isremarkable hat these four traits ppear only in the movement f ef-fectuation rom anguageto discourse.Everyapologyfor peechas an


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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 93event, herefore,ssignificantf, nd only f, tmakesvisible heeffectua-tionby which our linguistic ompetence ctualizesitself n perform-ance. But the same apologybecomes abusive as soon as this event-character s extendedfromeffectuation, here it is valid, to under-standing.What is it to understand discourse?Let us see how differentlyhesefourtraits re actualized in spokenand writtenanguage:

(I) Discourse, s we said, exists nlyas a temporal nd presentn-stance.This first rait s realized differentlyn livingspeech and inwriting.n living peech,the nstance f discourse as the character fa fleeting vent,an eventthat appears and disappears.That is whythere s a problemof fixation, f inscription.What we want to fix swhatdisappears. f,byextension,we can saythatone fixesanguage-inscriptionf thealphabet, exical inscription,yntactical nscription-it is forthe sake of thatwhichalone has to be fixed,discourse.Onlydiscourse s to be fixed,because discoursedisappears.The atemporalsystem either ppearsnordisappears; t doesnot happen. Here is theplace to recall themyth n Plato's Phaedo. Writingwas givento mento "cometotherescue" ofthe"weakness fdiscourse," weaknesswhichwas thatof the event. The giftof thegrammata-of that "external"thing, f those"externalmarks,"of thatmaterializinglienation-wasjustthatofa "remedy"brought o ourmemory. he EgyptiankingofThebes could well respond o thegod Theuth thatwritingwas a falseremedy n thatit replacedtruereminiscence y materialconservationand real wisdomby the semblanceof knowing.This inscription,nspiteof itsperils,s discourse's estination.What doeswriting ix?Nottheeventofspeaking, utthe "said" ofspeakingwherewe understandby the said that intentional xteriorizationonstitutive f the aim ofdiscoursethanks to which the sagen-the saying-wants to becomeAus-sage-the enunciation, he enunciated. In short,what we write,what we inscribe,s thenoema of thespeaking. It is themeaningofthespeechevent,not theeventas event.What doeswriting ix?If it is notthespeechevent, t is speech tselfin so far s it s said. Butwhat s said?Here I would like to proposethathermeneutics as to appeal notonly to linguistics linguistics f discoursevs. linguistics f language)as it does above, but also to the theory f thespeech act such as wefind t in Austinand Searle. The act of speaking, ccordingto theseauthors, s constituted y a hierarchy f subordinate cts which aredistributedn three evels: (I) the levelof thelocutionary r proposi-tionalact, the act of saying; (2) the level of the illocutionaryct or


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94 NEWLITERARYISTORYforce, hat which we do in saying; and (3) the level of theperlocu-tionary ct, thatwhichwe do bysaying.When I tellyou to close thedoor,forexample,"Close the door!" is the act ofspeaking. ButwhenI tellyou this withthe forceof an orderand not of a request, his sthe llocutionaryct. Finally, can stirup certain ffects,ikefear,bythe factthat giveyou an order.These effectsmakemydiscourse ctlikea stimulus roducing ertainresults. his is theperlocutionaryct.What is the implication f these distinctionsorour problemof theintentionalxteriorizationywhichthe event urpassestselfnmeaningand lends itself o material fixation? he locutionary ct exteriorizesitself n thesentence. The sentence an be identified nd reidentifiedas beingthesame sentence.A sentencebecomesan enunciation Aus-sage) and thus s transferredoothers s being uch and such a sentencewithsuch and such a meaning. But the illocutionaryct can also beexteriorizedn grammaticalparadigms (indicative, imperative, ndsubjunctivemodes,and otherprocedures xpressivef the llocutionaryforce) which permit ts identificationnd reidentification.ertainly,in spokendiscourse, he illocutionary orce eans upon mimicry ndgestural lementsnd uponthenonarticulatedspects fdiscourse,whatwe call prosody. n thissense,the llocutionaryorce s lesscompletelyinscribedn grammar han s thepropositionalmeaning. In every ase,its nscriptionn a syntacticrticulations itself atheredup in specificparadigmswhich nprinciplemakepossible ixatiod ywriting.Withouta doubtwe mustconcede thatthe perlocutionaryct is the least in-scribableaspect of discourseand that by preferencet characterizesspoken anguage. But theperlocutionaryction s preciselywhat is theleastdiscursiven discourse. t is thediscourse s stimulus. t acts,notby myinterlocutor'secognitionfmy intention, ut energetically,ydirect nfluence pon the emotions nd theaffective ispositions. husthe propositional ct, the illocutionary orce,and the perlocutionaryaction are apt, in a decreasing rder,forthe intentionalxteriorizationwhichmakes nscriptionn writing ossible.Thereforetis necessaryounderstandbythemeaning fthespeech-act, orbythe noemaofthesaying, otonlythesentence,n the narrowsense ofthepropositionalct,but also the llocutionaryorce nd eventheperlocutionaryction n themeasurethatthesethree spects f thespeech-act re codified, athered ntoparadigmswhere,consequently,theycan be identified nd reidentifieds havingthe same meaning.Therefore am heregiving heword "meaning"a very argeaccepta-tionwhich covers ll theaspects nd levelsofthe ntentionalxterioriza-tion whichmakes the inscriptionf discoursepossible.


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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 95The destiny f the threeothertraitsof discourse n passingfromdiscourse ntowriting ermits s to makemoreprecisethemeaningofthis elevation fsaying o whatis said.(2) In discourse,we said-and thiswas the second differentialraitof discoursen relation o language--the entencedesignatestsspeakerbydiverse ndicators fsubjectivitynd personality.n spokendiscourse,this reference y discourse o thespeaking ubject presents characterofimmediacy hatwe can explain n thefollowingway.The subjectiveintention fthespeaking ubject nd themeaningofthediscourse ver-lap each other n such a way that it is the same thingto understand

what thespeakermeans and whathis discoursemeans.The ambiguityof the French expressionvouloirdire,the German meinen,and theEnglishto mean attests o thisoverlapping. t is almostthe same thingto ask "What do you mean?" and "What does that mean?" Withwritten iscourse, he author's ntention nd the meaningof the textcease to coincide. This dissociation f the verbalmeaningof the textand the mental intention s what is reallyat stakein the inscriptionofdiscourse.Not thatwe can conceiveofa textwithout n author;thetiebetween hespeaker nd thediscourse s notabolished, utdistendedand complicated.The dissociation f themeaningand the intentionsstillan adventure f the reference fdiscourse o the speaking ubject.But thetext'scareerescapesthe finite orizonof its author.What thetextsaysnow mattersmore than what the authormeantto say, andeveryexegesisunfolds ts procedureswithin the circumference f ameaningthathas broken tsmoorings o thepsychologyf its author.UsingPlato'sexpression gain,written iscourse annotbe "rescued"byall the processes y which spokendiscourse upportstself n ordertobe undertood-intonation,delivery,mimicry, estures. In this sense,the inscriptionn "externalmarks,"which first ppeared to alienatediscourse,marksthe actual spiritualityf discourse.Henceforth, nlythe meaning"rescues" the meaning,without he contribution f thephysical nd psychological resence ftheauthor. But to say that themeaningrescuesthe meaning s to say thatonly interpretations the"remedy"fortheweakness fdiscoursewhich tsauthorcan no longer'"save.5"(3) The event s surpassed ythemeaning third ime. Discourse,we said, is what refers o theworld,to a world. In spokendiscoursethismeans thatwhat the dialogue ultimately efersto, s the situationcommonto the interlocutors. his situation n a way surrounds hedialogue, and its landmarkscan all be shown by a gesture,or bypointing finger,r designatedn an ostensivemannerbythediscourse


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96 NEW LITERARY HISTORYitself hroughthe oblique reference f those otherindicatorswhichare the demonstratives,he adverbsof timeand place, and the tenseof the verb. In oral discourse,we are saying,reference s ostensive.What happensto it in written iscourse?Are we saying hatthe textno longerhas a reference? his would be to confoundreference nddemonstration, orldand situation.Discoursecannotfail to be aboutsomething. n sayingthis, am separatingmyself romany ideologyof an absolutetext. Only a fewsophisticatedexts atisfyhis deal ofa textwithout eference. hey are textswhere theplayof thesignifierbreaksaway from hesignified.But this new form s valuable onlyasan exception nd cannotgive the keyto all other textswhichin onemanner or another peakabout theworld. But what,then, s the sub-ject oftextswhennothing an be shown? Far from aying hatthetextis then without world, willnowsaywithout aradoxthatonlymanhas a worldand not just a situation. n the same manner that thetextfrees ts meaningfrom the tutelageof the mental intention,tfrees ts reference rom he limitsof ostensive eference.For us, theworld is the ensembleof referencespened up by the texts.Thus wespeak about the "world" of Greece,not to designate ny morewhatwere the situationsfor those who lived them,but to designatethenonsituational eferences hichoutlive the effacement f the firstndwhichhenceforth re offered s possiblemodes of being,as symbolicdimensions f ourbeing-in-the-world.or me,this s the referentfallliterature; o longer heUmwelt f theostensive eferencesfdialogue,butthe Weltprojectedbythe nonostensive eferencesfevery ext hatwe have read, understood, nd loved. To understand text s at thesame timeto lightup our own situation, r, ifyouwill,to interpolateamongthepredicates f our situation ll thesignificationshichmakea Weltof ourUmwelt. It is this nlargingftheUmwelt nto heWorldwhichpermits s to speakof the referencespenedup by the text-itwould be better osaythat hereferencespenup theworld. Here againthespiritualityf discoursemanifeststself hroughwriting, hichfreesus from hevisibilitynd limitation fsituations yopeningup a worldforus, that s,new dimensions f our being-in-the-world.In thissense,Heideggerrightly ays-in his analysis f verstehennBeing and Time-that what we understand irstn a discourse s notanother erson, utaiproject, hat s,theoutlineof a newbeing-in-the-world. Only writing,n freeingtself,not onlyfrom ts author,butfrom he narrowness f thedialogicalsituation, evealsthisdestinationofdiscourse s projecting world.In thustying eference o the projectionof a world, t is not only


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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 97Heideggerwhomwe rediscover,ut Wilhelm von Humbolt,for whomthegreat ustificationf language s to establish herelation fman tothe world. If we suppressthis referentialunction, nly an absurdgameoferrant ignifiersemains.(4) But it isperhapswith hefourth rait hat heaccomplishmentfdiscourse n writings mostexemplary.Only discourse,not language,is addressed o someone.This is thefoundation f communication. utit is one thingfor discourse o be addressed o an interlocutorquallypresent n the discourse ituation, nd anotherto be addressed, s isthecase in virtually verypiece ofwriting, o whoeverknowshow toread. The narrowness f the dialogical relationexplodes. Instead ofbeingaddressed ust to you, the secondperson,what is writtens ad-dressedto the audience that itselfcreates. This, again, marks thespiritualityf writing, he counterpart f its materiality nd of thealienationwhich t mposesupon discourse.The vis-a-vis f the writtenis just whoeverknows how to read. The copresenceof subjects n adialogue ceases to be the model forevery"understanding." he rela-tion writing-readingeases to be a particular case of the relationspeaking-hearing.But at the same time,discourse s revealed as dis-course in the universalityf its address. In escapingthe momentarycharacter ftheevent-the bounds ivedbytheauthor nd thenarrow-ness of ostensive eference-discourse scapes the limitsof beingfaceto face. It is no longer visible uditor. An unknown,nvisible eaderhas becometheunprivilegedddresseeof the discourse.To whatextentmaywe saythattheobjectofthesocial sciences on-forms o the paradigmofthe text? Max Weber defines hisobject assinnhaft rientiertes erhalten, s "meaningfully rientedbehavior."To what extentmaywe replacethepredicate meaningfullyriented"by what I would like to call readability-characterserivedfromthepreceding heory f the text? Let us tryto applyour fourcriteria fwhat a text s to the conceptofmeaningful ction.

a. The Fixation fActionMeaningful ction s an object for cienceonlyunderthe conditionof a kindofobjectification hich s equivalentto thefixation'f a dis-coursebywriting. his traitpresupposes simpleway of beingmean-ingfulwhich s similar o the dialogical situation s regards anguage.Meaningful ctionmaybe graspedand understoodwithin he processofinteraction, hich s quite similarto theprocessof interlocutionn


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98 NEW LITERARY HISTORYthe fieldof discourse. It is at this trategicevel thattheso-calledphi-losophy of actions operates among post-Wittgensteinianhinkers.G. E. M. Anscombe n Intention,A. I. Melden in Free Action,andRichard Taylor in Action and Purpose requireno otherconceptualframework ortheirtheory f action than the one which is at workin ordinary anguage. Science is another"language game" based onquite differentemanticrules. It is one thing o speakof actions,pur-poses,motives, gents nd their gency, nd it issomethinglse tospeakofmovements s happening, f mentalevents if there re any), or ofphysicalor mental causes. The dualityof linguisticgames, that ofordinaryanguage and thatof thebehavioraland the social sciences,is inseparable. As is known,themain discrepancy etweenboth lan-guage gamesconcerns he rreducibilityfmotive, onceived s "reasonfor,"to cause interpretedn Humean terms as an antecedenteventlogicallydistinct rom, nd contingentlyinked o, tsconsequent.Butisittruethat a scientificpproachmustnecessarilyxclude the characterof meaningfulnessnd that ordinary anguage alone preservest? Istherenot a scientificanguagefor whichaction would be both"objec-tive"and "meaningful"?

The comparison etween nterlocutionnd interactionmay help usat this tageofouranalysis. In the samewaythat nterlocutions over-come in writing, nteraction s overcome n numeroussituations nwhichwe treataction as a fixedtext. These situations re overlookedin a theory faction forwhich thediscourse f action s itself partofthe situationof transactionwhich flowsfrom one agent to another,exactlyas spoken language is caught in the processof interlocution,or, if we mayuse the term,of translocution. his is whythe under-standing f actionat theprescientificevel is only"knowledgewithoutobservation," r as G. E. M. Anscombesays, "practical knowledge"in thesenseof "knowinghow" as opposedto "knowing hat." But thisunderstandings not yetan interpretationn the strong ense whichdeserves o be called scientificnterpretation.My claim is thataction tself, ctionas meaningful,maybecomeanobject of science,without osingits character of meaningfulness, yvirtueof a kindof objectificationimilarto the fixationwhichoccursin writing.By thisobjectification,ctionis no longera transaction owhich the discourseof actionwould stillbelong. It constitutes de-lineatedpatternwhichhas to be interpretedccording o its nnercon-nections.This objectificationrsmadepossible ysome nner raits f theactionwhich are similarto thestructure f the speech act and whichmake


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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 99"doing" a kind of utterance. In the same way fixation y writingsmade possibleby a dialectic of intentional xteriorizationnherent nthespeech-act tself, similardialecticwithin heprocess f transactionprepares he detachment f the meaningof the actionfrom he eventoftheaction.

First, n actionhas the tructure fa locutionaryct. It has a proposi-tional contentwhich can be identified nd reidentified. his "proposi-tional" structure f the action has been clearlyand demonstrativelyexpoundedby AntonyKenny n Action,Emotion and Will. The verbsof action constitute specific omplexof predicateswhich are similarto relations nd which, ikerelations, re irreducible o all thekindsofpredicateswhichmayfollow hecopula "is." The classof actionpredi-cates n itsturn s irreducible o therelations nd constitutes specificsetofpredicates.Amongother raits,heverbs faction llow a pluralityof "arguments" apable of complementinghe verb,rangingfromnoargument Plato taught) to an indeterminate umberof arguments(BrutuskilledCaesar, in theCuria, on the Ides of March,with a ...,with the help of. . . .). This variable polydicity f the predicativestructure f action-sentencess typicalof the propositional tructureof action. Anothertrait which is important or the transposition fthe concept of fixationfrom the sphere of discourseto the sphereof action concerns he ontological tatusof the "complements" f theverbsof action.Whereas relationshold betweenterms quallyexisting(or nonexisting), ertainverbsof action have a topical subjectwhichis identified s existing nd to which the sentencerefers,nd comple-mentsofwhichdo not exist. Such is the case withthe "mentalacts"(to believe, o think, o will,to imagine, tc.).

AntonyKennydescribes ome othertraits f thepropositionaltruc-tureof actions derivedfromthe descriptionf the functioningf theverb of action. For example,the distinction etween tates, ctivities,and otherperformancesan be statedaccordingto the behaviorofthetensesof the verbsof actionwhich fixsomespecific emporal raits fthe action itself.The distinction etweentheformal nd the materialobject of an action (let us say thedifference etween henotionof allinflammable hings nd this etterwhich I am now burning)belongsto the logic of action as mirrored n the grammarof the verbs ofaction. Such, roughly escribed,s thepropositionalontent f actionwhichgivesa basis to a dialecticofeventand meaning imilar o thatofthespeech-act. shouldliketo speakhereofthenoematic tructureofaction. It is thenoematic tructure hichmaybe fixed nd detachedfrom heprocess f interactionnd become an objectto interpret.


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I00 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

Moreover,thisnoema has not onlya propositionalontent, ut alsopresents illocutionary" raitsverysimilar to those of the completespeech act. The differentlasses of performativects of discoursede-scribedbyAustin t theend of How to do ThingswithWordsmaybetaken as paradigmsnotonlyfor hespeechactsthemselves,ut fortheactionswhichfulfillhecorrespondingpeechacts.A typologyfaction,followinghe model of llocutionarycts, s thereforeossible.Not onlya typology,uta criteriology,nasmuch s each type mplies ules,moreprecisely constitutiveules"which, ccording oSearle in Speech-Acts,allow the constructionf "ideal models" similarto the ideal typesofMax Weber. For example,to understandwhat a promise s, we haveto understandwhat the "essential ondition" s accordingto which agivenaction"countsas" a promise. his "essential ondition"ofSearleis not far fromwhatHusserlcalled Sinngehalt,whichcoversboththe"matter" (propositional ontent) and the "quality" (the illocutionaryforce).We maynowsaythat an action, ikea speechact,maybe identifiednot only accordingto itspropositionalontent, ut also accordingtoits illocutionary orce. Both constitute ts "sense-content."Like thespeechact,theaction-eventifwe maycointhis nalogicalexpression)develops similardialecticbetween tstemporal tatus s an appearingand disappearingvent, nd its ogical status s havingsuch and suchidentifiablemeaningor "sense-content."But if the "sense-content"swhatmakespossible he"inscription" ftheaction-event, hat makesit real? In otherwords,what correspondso writing n the fieldofaction?Let us return o the paradigmof the speech-act.What is fixedbywriting,we said, is thenoema of the speaking, he saying s said. Towhat extentmaywe saythatwhatis done is inscribed?Certainmeta-phorsmay be helpful t thispoint.We say that such and such eventleft tsmarkon its time. We speak ofmarking vents. Are therenot"marks" on time,thekind of thingwhich calls fora reading,ratherthanfora hearing?But what is meantby thismetaphor f the "im-printedmark"? The threeothercriteriaof the text will help us tomakethe natureof thisfixationmoreprecise.

b. The Autonomizationf ActionIn the samewaythat a text s detached from tsauthor, n action sdetachedfrom ts agent and developsconsequencesof its own. Thisautonomization f human action constitutes he social dimensionof


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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 101action. An action is a social phenomenonnotonlybecause it is donebyseveralagents n such a way that the role of each of themcannotbe distinguishedrom he role of theothers, ut also because our deedsescapeus and have effects hichwe did not ntend. One of themean-ingsof the notion of "inscription"ppearshere. The kind of distancewhich we foundbetween the intention f the speakerand the verbalmeaningof a textoccurs also betweenthe agent and his action. Itis this distancewhichmakes the ascription f responsibility specificproblem.We do notask,"Who smiled?" "Who raisedhishand?" Thedoer is present o his doingin thesame way the speaker s present ohis speech.With simpleactions ikethosewhich requireno previousaction in orderto be done, themeaning (noema) and the intention(noesis) coincide or overlap. Withcomplexactions omesegments reso remote rom he nitial imple egments, hich can be said to expresstheintention f thedoer,that theascription f these ctions or action-segments onstitutes problem s difficulto solveas that ofauthorshipin somecasesof iteraryriticism. he assignationfan authorbecomesa mediate nferencewell-known o thehistorianwho tries o isolatetheroleof an historical haracter n the courseof events.

We just used the expression the courseof events." Could we notsaythatwhatwe? all the courseofevents laystheroleof the materialthingwhich "rescues"the vanishingdiscoursewhen it is written?Aswe said in a metaphoricalway,some actions are eventswhichimprinttheirmarkon their ime. But on what did they mprint heirmark?Is it not in something patial thatdiscourse s inscribed?How couldan eventbe printed n something emporal? Social time, however, snotonly somethingwhichflees. It is also the place of durableeffects,of persisting atterns.An actionleaves a "trace,"itmakes ts "mark"when it contributes o the emergence f such patternswhich becomethe documents f human action.Anothermetaphormayhelpus to delineatethisphenomenon f thesocial "imprint": themetaphor fthe "record"or of the"registration."JohnFeinberg,n Action and Responsibility,ntroduces hismetaphorin anothercontext, hat of responsibility,n order to show how anactionmaybe submitted oblame. Only actions,he says,which can be"registered"for furthernotice, placed as an entryon somebody's"record,"can be blamed. And when thereare no formal"records"(like those which are kept by institutionsike employment ffices,schools,banks,and the police), there s stillan informal nalogue oftheseformalrecordswhichwe call reputationnd which constitutesbasis forblaming. I would like to applythis nteresting etaphorofa record and reporting o somethingother than the quasi-judicial


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102 NEW LITERARY HISTORYsituations f blaming, harging, rediting r punishing.Could we notsay thathistorys itself he recordof human action? History s thisquasi-"thing"on which human action eaves a "trace," puts tsmark.Hence the possibility f "archives." Before the archiveswhich areintentionally ritten ownbythememorialists,here s thiscontinuousprocessof "recording"human actionwhich s historytself s thesumof "marks,"the fateofwhichescapesthe control findividual actors.Henceforthhistorymay appear as an autonomousentity, s a playwithplayerswho do notknow the plot.This hypostasisfhistorymaybe denounced as a fallacy,but thisfallacy s well entrenchedn theprocessby which human action becomes social action when writtendown in thearchives fhistory. hanks to this edimentationn socialtime, human deeds become "institutions,"n the sense that theirmeaningno longercoincideswiththe logical intentions f the actors.The meaningmaybe "de-psychologized"o thepointwhere he innhaft(meaningfulness) esides n the work tself. n theterms f P. Winch,in The Idea of Social Science, the object of the social sciences s a"rule-governedehavior." But thisrule is notsuperimposed; t is themeaning as articulating rom withinthese sedimentedor institutedworks. Such is the kind of "objectivity"which proceedsfrom the"social fixation" fmeaningful ehavior.

c. Relevanceand ImportanceAccording o our third riterion f whata text s,we could say thata meaningfulction s an actionthe mportance fwhichgoes"beyond"itsrelevance o its nitial ituation.This new trait s very imilar o theway in which a text breaksthe ties of discourse o all the ostensivereferences. hanks to thisemancipation romthe situational ontext,discourse an developnonostensiveeferences hichwe calleda "world,"in thesense in which we speakoftheGreek"world,"not in the cos-mologicalsense of theword,but as an ontologicaldimension.What would correspondn the fieldof action to the nonostensivereferencesf a text?We juxtaposed, n introducing hepresent nalysis, he importanceof an action to its relevance as regardsthe situationto which itwanted to respond. An importantaction, we could say, developsmeaningswhichcan be actualized or fulfilledn situations therthantheone in whichthisaction occurred.To say thesame thing n dif-ferentwords,themeaningof an important ventexceeds,overcomes,


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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 103transcends he socialconditions f tsproduction nd maybe reenactedin new social contexts. ts importances its durablerelevanceand, insomecases, tsomnitemporal elevance.This thirdtraithas important mplications or the relationbetweenculturalphenomena nd their ocial conditions. s itnot a fundamentaltraitof the greatworksof cultureto overcome he conditions ftheirsocial production,n thesameway a textdevelopsnew references ndconstitutes ew "worlds"? It is in this sense thatHegel spoke, n thePhilosophyof Right,of the institutionsin the largest ense of theword) which "actualize" freedom s a second nature n accordancewithfreedom.This "realm of actual freedom" s constituted y thedeedsand works apable ofreceiving elevance n new historical itua-tions. If this s true,thisway of overcoming ne's own conditions fproductions thekeyto thepuzzlingproblems aisedbyMarxismi on-cerning he statusof the "superstructures."he autonomyof super-structuress regards heirrelation o theirown infrastructuresas itsparadigm n the nonostensive eferences f a text. A work does notonlymirror ts time,but it opens up a world which it bears withinitself.

d. Human Action s an "Open Work"Finally, accordingto our fourthcriterion f the text as text,themeaningof human action is also somethingwhich is addressedto anindefiniteange of possible"readers." The judges are not contempo-raries, ut,as Hegel said,historytself.WeltgeschichtestWeltgericht.Thatmeansthat, ikea text, uman action s an openwork, hemeaningofwhich s "in suspense." It is because it "opens up" new references

and receivesfreshrelevancefrom them that human deeds are alsowaitingfor fresh nterpretationshichdecide theirmeaning. All sig-nificant ventsand deeds are, in this way, opened to this kind ofpractical nterpretationhroughpresent raxis. Human action,too, isopened to anybodywho can read. In thesame way thatthemeaningofan event s thesenseofitsforthcomingnterpretations,he interpre-tationby contemporaries as no particularprivilegen thisprocess.This dialectic betweenthe workand its interpretationsill be thetopicof themethodologyf interpretationhatwe shall now consider.II. The Paradigm fText-Interpretation

I want now to show the fruitfulnessf thisanalogyof the text atthe levelofmethodology.


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I 04 NEW LITERARY HISTORYThe main implication f our paradigm, s concerns hemethodsofthesocial sciences, s that t offers fresh pproachto thequestionofthe relationbetweenerkldren explanation) and verstehen under-standing, omprehension).As is well known,Diltheydefined hisre-lation as a dichotomy. For him, any model of explanation s bor-rowedfrom differentegion fknowledge, hatofthe natural cienceswith their inductive logic. Henceforththe autonomy of the so-called Geisteswissenschaftens preservedonly by the recognition fthe irreducible actor of understanding foreign sychic ife on thebasis of thesigns n which this ife s immediatelyxteriorized.But if

verstehens separatedfromerkliireny this ogical gap, how can thesocial sciences be scientific t all? Diltheykept wrestlingwith thisparadox. He discoveredmore and more clearly,mainlyafterhavingread Husserl'sLogicadtInvestigations,hattheGeisteswissenschaftenresciences nasmuch s theexpressionsf ifeundergo kindofobjectifica-tion,whichmakespossible scientificpproach omewhat imilar o thatof thenaturalsciences, n spiteof the logical gap betweenNatur andGeist, factual knowledgeand knowledgeby signs. In thisway themediation offered y theseobjectificationsppeared to be more im-portant,for a scientific urpose,than the immediatemeaningfulnessof the expressionsf lifeforeveryday ransactions.My own investigationtartswith this last perplexityn Dilthey'sthought.And myhypothesiss that thekind ofobjectificationmpliedin thestatus fdiscourse s textprovides better nswer otheproblemraisedbyDilthey.This answerrelies n the dialecticalcharacter f therelationbetweenerkliirennd verstehen s it is displayed n reading.Our task herefore ill be to showto what extent heparadigmof read-ing,which is the counterpart f the paradigmof writing, rovidesasolutionforthemethodological aradox ofsocial sciences.The dialectic involved in reading expresses he originality f therelationbetweenwriting nd readingand its irreducibilityo the dia-logical situationbased on the immediatereciprocityetween peakingand hearing. here sa dialecticbetween xplainingnd comprehendingbecause the writing-readingituationdevelops a problemof its ownwhich s notmerely n extension fthespeaking-hearingituation on-stitutivef dialogue.It is heretherefore hat our hermeneutics most criticalof theRo-manticist radition n hermeneutics, hich tookthedialogicalsituationas thestandardfor hehermeneuticalperation ppliedto thetext.Mycontentions that t is this peration, n thecontrary, hichreveals hemeaningofwhat is alreadyhermeneuticaln dialogicalunderstanding.


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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 105Then, ifthedialogicalrelationdoes notprovideus withtheparadigmofreadingwe have to build it as an originalparadigm, s a paradigmofitsown.This paradigmdraws its main features rom the statusof the textitself s characterized y (I) the fixation f themeaning, 2) its dis-sociation from hemental intention f the author, 3) the displayofnonostensive eferences,nd (4) the universalrangeof its addressees.These fourtraits akentogetheronstitutehe "objectivity" fthe text.Fromthis"objectivity" erives possibilityf explaining,which s notderivedin any way from anotherfield,that of natural events,butwhich is congenialto this kind of objectivity. herefore hereis notransfer rom ne region freality o another, rom hesphere ffacts,let us say,to thesphereofsigns. It is within he same sphereof signsthattheprocessofobjectificationakesplace and givesriseto explana-toryprocedures.And it is within his phereof signsthatexplanationand comprehensionre confronted.I propose hatwe consider hisdialectic n two different ays: (I) asproceeding romcomprehensiono explanation, nd (2) as proceedingfromexplanationto comprehension. he exchange and reciprocitybetweenbothprocedureswillprovideus with a good approximationfthedialecticalcharacterof the relation.At the end of each halfof thisdemonstration shalltry o indicatebrieflyhepossible xtension f the paradigmof readingto the wholesphereofthehumansciences.

a. FromUnderstandingoExplanationThis first ialectic--orrather hisfirst igure f a unique dialectic-maybe convenientlyntroducedby our contention hatto understanda text s notto rejointheauthor.The disjunction fthemeaning ndthe intention reatesan absolutely riginal ituationwhich engendersthe dialectic of erkliirennd verstehen. f the objective meaning issomething therthan the subjective ntention f the author, t maybe construed n variousways.The problems f theright nderstandingcan no longerbe solvedby a simplereturn o the alleged intention fthe author.This construction ecessarily akesthe formof a process. As E. D.Hirsch says,there are no rules formaking good guesses. But there


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106 NEW LITERARY HISTORYare methods orvalidatingguesses.1 his dialecticbetweenguessing ndvalidating onstitutesne figure fourdialecticbetween omprehensionand explanation.In this dialecticboth terms re decisive. Guessing corresponds owhat Schleiermacher alled the "divinatory,"validation to what hecalled the "grammatical." My contributiono the theory f thisdia-lectic will be to link tmoretightlyo thetheory fthetextand text-reading.Whydo we need an artofguessing?Whydo we have to "construe"themeaning?

Not only-as I tried to say a fewyears ago-because language ismetaphorical nd becausethddoublemeaningofmetaphoricalanguagerequires n artofdecipheringwhichtendsto unfold he several ayersofmeaning.The case ofmetaphors onlya particular ase for generaltheory f hermeneutics. n moregeneral terms, text has to be con-struedbecause it is not a meresequence of sentences, ll on an equalfooting nd separately nderstandable. A text s a whole, a totality.The relationbetweenwhole and parts-as in a work of art or in ananimal-requires a specifickind of "judgment"forwhichKant gavethe theoryn theThird Critique. Concretely,he whole appears as ahierarchyftopics, rprimarynd subordinate opics.The reconstruc-tionof the text as a whole necessarily as a circularcharacter,n thesense thatthepresuppositionf a certainkind of whole is impliedintherecognition f the parts. And, reciprocally,t is in construing hedetails hatwe construe hewhole.There snonecessitynd no evidenceconcerningwhatis importantnd what is unimportant, hat is essen-tial and what s unessential. he judgment f importances a guess.To put the difficultyn otherterms, f a text s a whole, it is oncemore an individual ikean animal or a workof art. As an individualit can onlybe reachedby a processof narrowinghescope ofgenericconceptsconcerning he literary enre,the class of textto whichthistextbelongs, he structuresf different inds which intersect n thistext. The localization nd theindividualizationf thisunique textarestillguesses.Still anotherway of expressing he same enigmais that as an in-dividual thetextmaybe reached fromdifferentides. Like a cube,ora volumein space, thetextpresents "relief." Its differentopicsareI Validity n Interpretation New Haven, 1967): "The act of understandings atfirst genial (or a mistaken) guess, and there are no methodsformakingguesses,no rulesforgeneratingnsights.The methodicalactivity f interpretationommenceswhen we begin to test and criticize our guesses" (p. 203). And further: "A mutesymbolismmaybe construed n severalways."


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THEMODEL F THE TEXT 107not at thesame altitude.Therefore he reconstructionf the wholehasa perspectivistspect imilar o thatofperception. t is always possibleto relatethe same sentence n different aysto this or thatsentenceconsidered s the cornerstonef the text. A specific ind of onesided-ness is impliedin the act of reading.This onesidedness onfirmshe"guess" characterof interpretation.For all thesereasons here s a problem finterpretationot so muchbecause of the incommunicabilityf the psychic experienceof theauthor,but because of the verynature of the verbal intention f thetext.This intention s something therthan thesum of the individualmeaningsof the individualsentences. A text is more than a linearsuccession fsentences. t is a cumulative, olistic rocess.This specificstructure f the text cannot be derivedfromthat of the sentence.Therefore hekindof "plurivocity"whichbelongsto textsas texts ssomething ther hanthepolysemyfindividualwords n ordinaryan-guage and the ambiguity f individualsentences.This plurivocitystypical fthetext onsidered s a whole,opento severalreadings nd toseveralconstructions.As concerns heprocedures fvalidation ywhichwe test urguesses,I agreewithHirschthattheyare closerto a logic ofprobabilityhanto a logic of empiricalverification. o showthat an interpretationsmoreprobable n the lightof what is known s something therthanshowingthat a conclusion is true. In this sense, validation is notverification. alidation is an argumentative isciplinecomparable tothe uridicalprocedures f legal interpretation.t is a logic of uncer-taintyand of qualitativeprobability. n this sensewe may give anacceptable sense to the oppositionbetweenGeisteswissenschaftenndNaturwissenschaftenithoutconceding nything o theallegeddogmaof the ineffabilityf the individual. The method of conveyanceofindices,typicalof the logicof subjective robability,ivesa firm asisfor a science of the individualdeserving hename of science. A textis a quasi-individual, nd the validationof an interpretationppliedto it maybe said,withcomplete egitimacy,o give a scientific nowl-edge of the text.Such is the balance between hegeniusofguessing nd thescientificcharacterof validation which constituteshe moderncomplement fthe dialecticbetweenverstehennd erkliiren.At the same time,we are preparedto give an acceptable meaningto the famousconceptof a hermeneutic ircle. Guess and validationare in a sensecircularly elatedas subjective nd objective approachesto the text. But thiscircle s not a vicious circularity. t would be a


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I O8 NEW LITERARY HISTORYcage if wewereunabletoescapethekindof"self-confirmability"hich,according o Hirsch (pp. 165 ff.),threatens hisrelation etweenguessand validation.To theprocedures f validation lso belong proceduresof nvalidation imilar o the criteria ffalsifiabilitymphasizedbyKarlPopper n hisLogic of Discovery.The roleof falsifications playedhereby the conflictbetweencompeting nterpretations. n interpretationmustnotonlybe probable,butmoreprobablethananother.There arecriteriaof relative uperiority hich may easilybe derived fromthelogic ofsubjective robability.In conclusion, f it is truethatthere s alwaysmore than one wayofconstruing text, t is not truethatall interpretationsre equal andmaybe assimilated oso-called"rulesofthumb" (Hirsch,p. 203). Thetext s a limitedfieldofpossible onstructions.he logicof validationallows us tomove between he twolimits fdogmatism nd skepticism.It is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation,oconfrontnterpretations,o arbitratebetweenthem,and to seek foran agreement, ven ifthisagreement emainsbeyondour reach.To whatextent s thisdialecticbetween uessingnd validating ara-digmaticfor thewhole fieldof the social sciences?That themeaningofhumanactions, fhistorical vents, nd of socialphenomenamaybeconstrued n severaldifferent ays s well knownby all expertsn thesocial sciences.What is less known nd understoods that hismethodo-logicalperplexitys founded n the nature f theobject tselfnd,more-over,that t does not condemnthe scientist o oscillatebetweendog-matism and skepticism.As the logic of text-interpretationuggests,there s a specific lurivocityelonging o themeaningof humanaction.Human action, oo, s a limitedfieldofpossible onstructions.A traitof humanactionwhichhas not been emphasized n thepre-ceding analysismay provide an interestingink between the specificplurivocityf thetextand theanalogical plurivocityfhuman action.This trait oncerns herelation etween hepurposive nd the motiva-tional dimensions f action. As manyphilosophersn thenewfieldofactiontheory ave shown, hepurposive haracter f an action s fullyrecognizedwhenthe answer to thequestionwhat? s explained n theterms f an answer to the questionwhy? I understandwhat you in-tendedto do, ifyou are able to explainto me whyyou did such andsuch an action. Now, what kinds of answer to the questionwhy?makesense? Only thoseanswerswhichafford motiveunderstood sa reasonfor... and notas a cause. And what s a reasonfor... whichis not a cause? It is, in the terms f G. E. M. Anscombeand A. I.Melden, an expression, r a phrase,which allows us to considertheaction as thisor that. If you tellme thatyou did thisor that because


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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT IO9of jealousy or in a spirit f revenge,you are askingme to put youraction in the lightof thiscategory f feelings r dispositions.By thesame token,you claim to make sense withyouraction. You claim tomake it understandable ortheothers nd foryourself. his attemptsparticularly elpfulwhen applied to what G. E. M. Anscombe callsthe desirability-characterfwanting.Wantsand beliefs ave theprop-ertynot onlyofbeingforceswhichmake people act in such and suchways,but ofmaking ense,byvirtue ftheapparentgood which s thecorrelate of theirdesirability-character.may have to answer thequestion, s whatdo youwant this? On thebasisof thesedesirability-characters nd of the apparentgoodswhichcorrespond o them, t ispossibleto argue about the meaningof an action, to argue for oragainstthisor that nterpretation.n thisway theaccountof motivesalreadyforeshadows logic of argumentation rocedures. Could wenot say that what can be (and mustbe) construedn human actionis the motivationalbasis of this action, i.e., the set of desirability-characterswhichmayexplain t? And couldwe notsaythattheprocessof arguing inked to the explanationof action by its motivesunfoldsa kindofplurivocity hichmakesaction similar o a text?

What seems to make legitimate his extensionfromguessingthemeaningof a textto guessing hemeaningof an action is thatin ar-guingaboutthemeaning fan action putmywantsand mybeliefs ta distance nd submit hem oa concrete ialectic f confrontation ithoppositepointsofview. This way of puttingmyaction at a distancein orderto makesense ofmyownmotives aves theway forthe kindofdistancingwhichoccurswithwhatwe called the social inscriptionfhumanactionand to whichwe appliedthemetaphor f the "record."The same actionswhich may be put into "records" and henceforth"recorded"may also be explained n different ays accordingto theplurivocityfthearguments pplied to theirmotivational ackground.If we arecorrectn extendingo actiontheconceptof"guess"whichwe tookas a synonym orverstehen, e may also extendto the fieldof actionthe conceptof "validation" in whichwe saw an equivalentof erkliiren. ere, too, themoderntheory f action providesus withan intermediaryink between the procedures of literarycriticismand thoseof thesocial sciences. Some thinkers ave triedto elucidatetheway nwhichwe impute ctions oagents n the ight fthe uridicalproceduresby which a judge or a tribunalvalidatesa decisioncon-cerning contract r a crime. In a famous rticle, The Ascription fResponsibilitynd Rights" (Proceedingsofthe Aristotelianociety, 9[1948-49], I71-94), H. L. A. Hart showsin a veryconvincingway


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I 10 NEW LITERARY HISTORYthat uridicalreasoning oesnot at all consist n applying eneral awsto particular ases,but each time n construing niquelyreferringe-cisions.These decisionsterminate carefulrefutation f the excusesand defenseswhich could "defeat" the claim or the accusation. Insayingthat human actionsare fundamentallydefeasible" and thatjuridical reasoning s an argumentative rocesswhich comes to gripswith the different aysof "defeating" claimor an accusation,Harthas paved thewayfor generaltheory f validation n which uridicalreasoningwould be thefundamentalinkbetweenvalidation n literarycriticism nd validation n the social sciences.The intermediaryunc-tion of juridical reasoning learly hows that the proceduresof vali-dationhave a polemical haracter. n front f thecourt, heplurivocitycommon to texts nd to actions s exhibited n the formof a conflictof interpretations,nd the final nterpretationppears as a verdict towhich t is possible omake appeal. Like legal utterances, ll interpre-tations n thefieldof literary riticismnd in thesocial sciencesmaybe challenged, nd thequestion What can defeat claim?" is commonto all argumentativeituations.Onlyin thetribunals there momentwhentheprocedures f appeal are exhausted.But it is so onlybecausethe decisionofthe judge is implemented ytheforceofpublicpower.Neither n literary riticism or in the social sciences s there uch alastword. Or, ifthere s any,we call that violence.

b. FromExplanation oUnderstandingThe same dialectic betweencomprehensionnd understandingmay

receive a new meaning f taken n the reverseway,fromexplanationto understanding.This new Gestaltof the dialecticproceedsfrom henatureof the referentialunction f the text.This referentialunction,as we said, exceeds the mere ostensivedesignationof the situationcommon to bothspeakerand hearerin the dialogical situation.Thisabstraction rom hesurrounding orldgivesriseto twoopposite tti-tudes. As readers,we may eitherremain n a stateof suspense s re-gards anykindof referred-toorld,or we may actualize thepotentialnonostensive eferences f the text in a new situation,that of thereader. In thefirst ase,we treatthetextas a worldless ntity;n thesecond,we createa new ostensive eference hanks o thekindof "exe-cution" which the art of reading mplies.These two possibilitiesreequally entailedby the act of reading,conceivedas theirdialecticalinterplay.


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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT III

The firstway of reading s exemplified odayby thedifferenttruc-tural schoolsof literary riticism. heir approach is not onlypossible,but legitimate. It proceedsfromthe suspension, he epoche, of theostensive eference. o read in thiswaymeansto prolong hissuspen-sionof theostensive eferenceo theworldand to transfer neself ntothe"place" wherethetext tands,within he"enclosure"ofthisworld-lessplace. According o thischoice,thetextno longerhas an outside,it has onlyan inside. Once more,theveryconstitutionf the textastextand of thesystem f texts s literatureustifies his conversion fthe literary hingsntoa closedsystem fsigns, nalogousto the kindof closed systemwhich phonologydiscoveredat the root of all dis-course, nd whichde Saussurecalled "la langue." Literature,ccordingto thisworkinghypothesis,ecomesan analogonof "la langue."On thebasis of thisabstraction, new kind of explanatoryttitudemaybe extended o theliterary bject,which,contraryo theexpecta-tionof Dilthey, s no longerborrowedfromthe naturalsciences, .e.,froman area of knowledge lien to language itself.The oppositionbetweenNatur and Geist is no longeroperativehere. If some modelis borrowed,t comesfrom he same field, rom hesemiological ield.It is henceforthossible o treat exts ccording o the elementaryuleswhichlinguisticsuccessfullyppliedto theelementaryystemsfsignsthatunderliethe use of language.We have learnedfromthe Genevaschool, the Prague school, and the Danish school that it is alwayspossible o abstract ystems rom rocesses nd to relatethese ystems-whether honological,exical,or syntactical-to unitswhicharemerelydefinedby the oppositionwith otherunitsof the same system.Thisinterplay f merelydistinctive ntitieswithinfinite etsof such unitsdefines he notion of structuren linguistics.It is this structuralmodel which is now applied to texts, .e., tosequencesof signs ongerthan the sentence,which is the last kind ofunit that inguistics akes nto account.Id hisAnthropologietructurale, laude L6vi-Strauss ormulateshisworkinghypothesisn thefollowingway in regardto one category ftexts, hatof myths: "Like every inguistic ntity, he myth s madeup of constitutive nits. These constitutivenits mplythepresenceofthose which generallyoccur in the structures f language, namelyphonemes,morphemes, nd semantemes.Each formdiffersrom theone which precedes it by a higher degree of complexity.For thisreason we will call the elements,which properly elongto the myth(and whichare themostcomplexofall): largeconstitutivenits" (p.233). Bymeans ofthisworking ypothesis,helarge units,whichare


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I 12 NEW LITERARY HISTORYat least the same size as the sentence and which,put together, ormthenarrative roper o themyth, an be treated ccording o the samerulesas the smallest nitsknowns o linguistics. t is in order to insiston this ikeness hatClaude Levi-Strauss peaksof mythemes,ust aswe speakof phonemes,morphemes,nd semantemes.But in ordertoremainwithinthe limitsof the analogybetweenmythemes nd thelower-level nits,the analysisof textswill have to perform he samesortof abstraction s thatpracticedby the phonologist. o him, thephoneme s not a concrete ound, n an absolute ense,with tsacousticquality. It is not, to speak like de Saussure, a "substance" but a"form,"that s to say,an interplayf relations.Similarly, mythemeis notone of thesentences f a myth, ut an oppositive alue attachedto several individual sentencesforming, n Levi-Strauss' terms, a"bundleofrelations." "It is only n theform f a combination f suchbundles that the constitutive nits acquire a meaning-function"p.234). What is here called a meaning-functions not at all what themythmeans, tsphilosophical r existentialontent r intuition, utthearrangement,he disposition f mythemes-in short,the structure fthemyth.

We can indeedsay thatwe have explaineda myth, utnot thatwehave interpretedt. We can, bymeansof structuralnalysis, ringoutthe logic of it through he operationswhichrelate the bundles of re-lationsamongthemselves. his logic constitutesthe structuralaw ofthemythunderconsideration"(p. 241). This law is preeminentlynobjectof readingand not at all of speaking,n the senseof a recitingwherethepowerofthemythwould be reenacted n a particular itua-tion. Here the text is only a text,thanksto the suspensionof itsmeaningfor us, to the postponement f all actualizationby presentspeech.I wantnow to show n whatway "explanation" erkliiren)requires"understanding"verstehen)and brings orthn a newway theinnerdialecticwhichconstitutesinterpretation"s a whole. As a matter ffact,nobody topswitha conception fmythsnd narrativess formalas this lgebraofconstitutivenits.This can be shown n differentays.First, ven nthe mostformalized resentationfmyths yLvi-Strauss,the unitshe calls "mythemes" re still expressed s sentenceswhichbear meaningand reference.Can anyonesay that theirmeaningassuch sneutralizedwhenthey nter ntothe"bundleofrelations"whichalone is taken into account by the "logic" of the myth? Even thisbundleof relations,n itsturn,mustbe written n the formof a sen-tence. Finally,thekindof language game which the whole system f


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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 113oppositions nd combinations mbodieswould lack anykind ofsignifi-cance if the oppositions hemselves, hich,accordingto Levi-Strauss,themyth endstomediate,werenotmeaningful ppositions oncerningbirthand death, blindness nd lucidity, exuality nd truth. Besidethese existential onflicts here would be no contradictions o over-come, no logical function f the mythas an attempt o solve thesecontradictions. tructural nalysisdoes not exclude,but presupposes,theoppositehypothesisoncerninghemyth,.e., that thas a meaningas a narrative forigins.Structural nalysismerely epresseshisfunc-tion. But it cannotsuppresst. The mythwould not even function sa logical operator f the propositions hich it combinesdid not pointtowardboundarysituations. Structural nalysis, ar fromgetting idofthis radical questioning, estorest at a level of higherradicality.If this s true, ouldwe notsaythat hefunction fstructuralnalysisis to lead froma surface-semantics,hat of the narratedmyth, o adepth-semantics,hat of the boundarysituationswhichconstitute heultimate referent" f themyth?I fully elieve hat fsuch werenot thefunction fstructuralnalysis,itwould be reduced to a sterile ame,a divisive lgebra,and even themythwould be bereft f the functionwhich LUvi-Strauss imself s-signsto it, that of makingmen aware of certainoppositions nd oftending oward theirprogressivemediation.To eliminate his referenceto the aporias of existence round which mythicthoughtgravitateswould be to reducea theory fmyth o thenecrology fthemeaning-lessdiscourses f mankind. If, on thecontrary, e consider tructuralanalysisas a stage-and a necessary ne--betweena naive interpre-tation and a critical nterpretation,etween a surface-interpretationand a depth-interpretation,hen t would be possibleto locate expla-nationand understandingt two differenttagesof a unique herme-neutic arc. It is this depth-semantics hich constituteshe genuineobject of understandingnd whichrequires specific ffinityetweenthereaderand thekind ofthings he text s about.But we must not be misledby thisnotionof personalaffinity.hedepth-semanticsf thetext s notwhattheauthor ntended o say,butwhatthetext s about, .e., the nonostensiveeferencef thetext. Andthe nonostensive eference f the text is the kind of world openedup bythedepth-semanticsf thetext.Thereforewhat we want to understand s not somethinghiddenbehindthe text,but something isclosed n front f it. What has to beunderstood s not the initialsituation of discourse,but what pointstoward a possibleworld. Understanding as lessthan ever to do with


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I14 NEW ITERARYISTORYtheauthor and his situation. t wants to grasptheworld-propositionsopenedup bythereference f thetext.To understand text s to fol-low itsmovement rom enseto reference, romwhat it saysto whatit talksabout. In thisprocess he mediating oleplayedby structuralanalysis onstitutesoth the ustificationf thisobjective pproachandtherectificationfthesubjective pproach.We are definitelyreventedfrom dentifyingnderstanding ithsome kindofintuitive rasping ftheintention nderlyinghetext.What we have said about the depth-semanticswhichstructural nalysisyields nvitesus rather o think fthesenseof thetext as an injunction tartingrom hetext,as a newwayof ooking t things, s an injunction o thinkn a certainmanner.Such is the reference orneby depth-semantics.he textspeaksofa possibleworldand of a possibleway oforientatingneselfwithin t.The dimensions fthisworldare properlypened up by,disclosedby,thetext. Disclosure s the equivalentfor writtenanguageof ostensivereference orspoken anguage.If, therefore, e preserve helanguageof Romanticist ermeneutics,whenit speaksofovercoming hedistance, fmaking"one's own," ofappropriating hatwas distant, ther,foreign,t will be at the priceofan importantorrective. hat which we makeourown-Aneignungin German-that which we appropriate,s not a foreign xperience,but the powerof disclosing world whichconstituteshe reference fthetext.This linkbetween disclosure nd appropriations, to mymind,thecornerstone f a hermeneuticwhich would claim both to overcomethe shortcomingsf historicismnd to remainfaithful o the originalintention f Schleiermacher's ermeneutics. o understand n authorbetter han he could understandhimself s to displaythe power ofdisclosure mplied n his discoursebeyondthe limited horizon of hisown existentialituation. he process fdistancing,fatemporalization,to which we connected the phase of Erkliirung,s the fundamentalpresuppositionorthisenlarging fthehorizonof thetext.This second figure, r Gestalt, f the dialectic betweenexplanationand comprehension as a strongparadigmatic haracterwhich holdsfor the wholefieldof thehuman sciences. I want to emphasize hreepoints.First, hestructuralmodel,taken s a paradigm orexplanation,maybe extendedbeyondtextual entities o all social phenomenabecauseit is not limited n its applicationto linguistic igns,but appliesto allkindsofsignswhich are analogousto linguistic igns.The intermediarylink between the model of the textand social phenomenais consti-


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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT I 15tutedbythenotionof semiological ystems.A linguistic ystem, romthe pointof view of semiology,s only a specieswithinthe semioticgenre,although hisspecieshas the privilege f beinga paradigmforthe other peciesof the genre.We can say thereforehat a structuralmodel ofexplanation an be generalized s faras all social phenomenawhichmay be said to have a semiological haracter, .e., as far as itis possible odefine hetypical elations fa semiological ystemt theirlevel: thegeneralrelationbetween ode and message,relations mongthe specificunitsof the code, the relation betweensignifiernd sig-nified,the typical relation within and among social messages; thestructure f communication s an exchangeofmessages, tc. Inasmuchas thesemiologicalmodelholds,the semiotic r symbolic unction,.e.,thefunction f substitutingignsforthings nd of representinghingsby themeans ofsigns, ppearsto be morethana mereeffectn sociallife. It is itsveryfoundation.We shouldhave to say,according o thisgeneralizedfunction f the semiotic,not onlythatthe symbolic unc-tion is social, but thatsocial reality s fundamentally ymbolic.If we follow his uggestion,henthekind ofexplanation mpliedbythe structuralmodel appears to be quite differentromthe classicalcausal model, especially f causation is interpretedn Humean termsas a regular equence of antecedents nd consequentswith no innerlogical connection etween hem. Structural ystemsmplyrelations fa quite differentind,correlativeather hansequentialor consecutive.If this is true, the classical debate about motivesand causes whichhas plaguedthetheory faction these astdecades loses ts mportance.If the searchfor correlations ithin emiotic ystemss themain taskofexplanation, henwe have to reformulateheproblem fmotivationin social groups n new terms. But it is not the aim of thispaper todevelopthis mplication.The second paradigmaticfactor n our previousconceptof text-interpretation roceedsfromthe role we assignedto depth-semanticsbetween structural nalysisand appropriation.This mediatingfunc-tion of depth-semantics ust not be overlooked, ince the appropria-tion's osing tspsychological nd subjectivecharacter nd receivinggenuineepistemological unction ependson it.Is there omethingimilar o the depth-semanticsf a text n socialphenomena? I should tend to say that the search for correlationswithin and between social phenomena treated as semiotic entitieswould lose importance nd interestfitwould notyieldsomethingikea depth-semantics.n the same way that linguisticgames are formsof life, ccording o thefamousaphorism fWittgenstein,ocial struc-


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116 NEW LITERARY HISTORYturesare also attempts o cope with existentialperplexities, umanpredicaments,nd deep-rootedonflicts. n this ense,these tructures,too,have a referentialimension.They pointtowardaporiasof socialexistence, hesame aporiasaroundwhichmythical hought ravitates.And thisanalogical function f reference evelopstraitsverysimilarto whatwe called thenonostensive eferencef a text, .e., thedisplayof a Weltwhich is no longeran Umwelt,the projection f a worldwhich smorethana situation.May we notsaythat n social science,too, we proceedfrom naive interpretationo critical nterpretations,from urface-interpretationso depth-interpretationshrough tructuralanalysis? But it is depth-interpretationhich givesmeaningto thewholeprocess.This last remark eads us to our thirdand last point. If we followthe paradigmof the dialectic betweenexplanation nd understandingto itsend, we mustsay that the meaningful atternswhich a depth-interpretation ants to graspcannotbe understoodwithout kindofpersonal commitment imilar to that of the reader who grasps thedepth-semanticsf thetext and makes t his "own." Everybody nowsthe objectionswhich an extension f the conceptof appropriationothe social sciences s exposedto. Does it not make legitimate he in-trusionof personal prejudices, or subjectivebias into the field ofscientificnquiry?Does it not introduce ll theparadoxesof the her-meneuticalcircle into the social sciences? In otherwords,does nottheparadigmof disclosure lus appropriation estroy hevery onceptof social science?The way in whichwe introduced hispair of termswithinthe frameworkf text-interpretationrovidesus not onlywitha paradigmaticproblem,but with a paradigmatic olution.

This solution s not to deny the role of personalcommitmentnunderstanding uman phenomena,but to qualify t. As themodel oftext-interpretationhows, understanding as nothingto do with animmediategraspingof a foreignpsychic ife or with an emotionalidentificationwith a mental intention. Understanding s entirelymediated by the whole of explanatory rocedureswhich precede itand accompany t. The counterpart f thispersonal appropriationsnot somethingwhich can be felt, t is the dynamicmeaningreleasedby the explanationwhichwe identified arlier with the reference fthetext, .e., itspowerofdisclosing world.The paradigmaticcharacterof text-interpretationustbe applieddown to thisultimate mplication.This means that the conditions fan authentic ppropriation,s theyweredisplayedn relation o texts,are themselves aradigmatic. hereforewe are not allowed to exclude


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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT 'I7thefinalact ofpersonalcommitment rom hewholeof objectiveandexplanatory rocedureswhichmediate t.This qualification f the notionof personalcommitment oes noteliminate he "hermeneutic ircle."This circleremains n insuperablestructure f knowledgewhen it is applied to human things,but thisqualification reventst frombecoming vicious circle.Ultimately, he correlation etweenexplanation nd understanding,betweenunderstandingnd explanation,s the "hermeneutic ircle."

UNIVERSITY OF PARIS

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