Student ID:4232193

Is American Power in Decline? In the frame of reference given by the title, power, can be defined more specifically as a

theoretical measurement of an ability to direct influence towards other entities behaviour and

courses of events in time. Power is difficult to define but Nye (2002, pp. 4-5) distinguishes that

Hard power can rest on inducements or threats whereas Soft power rests on the ability to set

the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others also coerce or co-opt. Michael

Coxs argument regarding U.S. decline and a thorough refutation by M.J. Williams discuss these

concepts of power and decline and provide a perspective right before the 2007-2008 financial

crisis and the 2008-2012 global recession. This difference in perspective today only highlights

that the U.S. retains its power to influence, but also the changing nature of power in a political

context.

Cox builds his argument on two distinct concepts, first linking relatively recent U.S

history to an empirical observation from throughout history, a notion that all empires inevitably

fall (Cox 2007,p.645). The second foundation of his argument is a chronology of current and

retrospective narratives from the end of Reagans office to that of George W. Bush at that time,

emphasizing how perspective continuously changes, (Cox 2007,p.644) states after 20 years of

having been told that the United States was on the way down, followed by a decade of being told

the opposite, we are now in the throes of yet another incipient discussion concerning Americas

long-term standing in the world. Coxs argument culminates when he links the two concepts

through drawing a parallel between Thucydides in Sicily and Bush in Iraq, that unnecessary war

led to a much weakened international position, with fewer genuine friends surrounding it, former

allies distancing themselves from it, and a seething tide of resentment being directed against it by

emboldened enemies (Lebow 2003, cited in Cox 2007,p.650). Instead, it didnt only recover, the

U.S. emerged out of a crisis far better off than its closest competitors. Coxs mistake is explained

more than decades earlier by Nyes (1990,p.171) conclusion that: Loose historical analogies and

falsely deterministic political theories are worse than merely academic; they may distract

Americans from the true issues confronting them. The problem for U.S. power after the Cold

War will less be the new challengers for hegemony than the new challenges of transnational

interdependence.

M.J. Williams pens a direct rebuttal on Coxs argument just a month after in the same

journal, arguing that the realist laws fail to provide a sufficient platform from which its possible

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Student ID:4232193

to comprehend current events and derive effective policies in the post-Cold War era. First,

Williams strongly points out, Realism is based on observations made in a world pre-globalisation

and as such it has limited ability to understand our world today (Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006).

This is significantly undermines Coxs interpretation of the implications of the end of the Cold

War and the fall of the USSR where he stated, In a matter of two years, the world system had

finally been united and the world economy rendered whole for the first time since

1947(2007,p.648), but does not consider globalisation at all, going on to say in reality the United

States by the beginning of the twenty-first century had all the features of a modern empire,

including,, a global culture and economy(2007,p.648). In essence this implies Cox assumed

that this economic boom was something that was exclusive to Americas new empire in a

unipolar world. Williams (2007,p.946) states, Realism presupposes that a great power can

essentially control its destiny and exert control over other states. This simple statement

undermines the frame and assumptions of Coxs main argument. However, this admission that at

the same time disagrees with Williams (2007,p.950) stating America is still the indispensable

nation, and if it can recapture the essence of Americas founding principles, it will remain so for

the foreseeable future later in his work. The statement implies that Williams admits to

interdependence but that it can still retain a place as a world leader. Williams continues attacking

Cox but (2007,p.947) states Although the erosion of U.S. economic power is linked to growing

international interdependence, this interdependence is also stimulus for growth in the U.S., but

in the same paragraph continues Meanwhile, the U.S. can reject international rule changes with

which it disagrees, such as the Kyoto Protocols that were dismissed because they would damage

the competitiveness of U.S. companies. Again, this alludes to the idea that the U.S. can

somehow pick and choose what constraints are placed on it while other nations must follow.

Williams then makes valid points on why Europe and China have big problems, then concludes

his argument (2007,p.950) that America would have a greater rather than lesser role in the

future.

Although Cox briefly mentions China, the U.S. economys competitiveness and admits

the U.S is still significantly unmatched in hard power, the bulk of his argument relies on drawing

parallels to historical observations of decline. Cox argued less for how power would change but

more towards the realist expectation of a gradual loss of power that would eventually manifest in

a serious competitor, the fact that the 2008 crisis affected most nations clearly shows how power

is diffused in many complex ways in the current international system rather than manifesting in

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polarities giving rise to major nations. Williams clearly overwhelms Coxs realist arguments, and

strongly frames Americas influence in the worlds future through more responsible foreign

policy. And clearly there has been progress made towards this, especially restraint towards war in

Syria. The U.S. is undeniably the most economically successful nation currently in absolute

terms, and has recovered from the recession faster than its competitors. However, the U.S. must

learn to apply liberalism instead of realism in foreign policy, something it still repeats up to this

day. A very recent example is the case of Chinas AIIB, the fact that the U.S. is concerned about

a competitor creating an international institution that falls into what could be called a liberal

development is hardly a soft power approach. The entry of allies such as the U.K. and Germany

is also yet another signal that although the U.S. is still pursuing hard power rather than soft

power foreign policy.

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