Revisons Ammendments

7/28/2019 Revisons Ammendments

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The Constitution of the Philippines (Art XVI I

Amendments)

GONZALES VS. COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967]

Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, withpreliminary injunction.The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, theSenate and the House of Representatives passed thefollowing resolutions:1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing thatSection 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, beamended so as to increase the membership of the House of

Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in thepresent Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportionedamong the several provinces as nearly as may be accordingto the number of their respective inhabitants, although eachprovince shall have, at least, one (1) member;2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendmentsto said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2)elective delegates from each representative district, to be"elected in the general elections to be held on the secondTuesday of November, 1971;" and3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of thesame Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senatorsand members of the House of Representatives to becomedelegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention,without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approvalby the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No.4913, providing that the amendments tothe Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions

No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at

the general elections which shall be held on November 14,1967.

Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as aconstituent assembly, violates the Constitution.

Held: Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2)cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writstherein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement asto costs. It is so ordered.

As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot beassailed collaterally. It may not be contested except directly,by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of hisacts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a defacto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be anindirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of ade facto officer, if within the competence of his office, arevalid, insofar as the public is concerned.

"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ whichcan be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the

integral or constituent units thereof."

Article XV of the Constitution provides:. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may proposeamendments to this Constitution or call a contention for thatpurpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes

cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted tothe people for their ratification.


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From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knowsthat R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seatsas legislators, even if they should run for and assume thefunctions of delegates to the Convention.


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IM BONG VERSUS COMELECRELATED LAWS: Resolution No 2 (1967) Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates fromeach representative district who shall be elected in November,1970.RA 4919 implementation of Resolution No 2Resolution 4 (1969) amended Resolution 2: ConCon shallbe composed of 320 delegates proportioned among existingrepresentative districts according to the population. Providedthat each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates.RA 6132 Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implementedRes No. 2 & 4.Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resignedwhen they file their candidacySec 2: apportionment of delegatesSec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for anypublic office in the election or from assuming any appointiveoffice/position until the final adjournment of the ConCon.Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groupsfrom giving support/representing a delegate to the convention.

FACTS : This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing thevalidity of RA 6132.

Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entirelawImbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE: Whether the Congress has a right to call for ConConand whether the parameters set by such a call isconstitutional.

HOLDING : The Congress has the authority to call for a

Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly.

Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitionersare deemed as constitutional.

RATIO :Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art12 of ConstitutionConstitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:

o Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, hasfull authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and thesevotes were attained by Res 2 and 4

Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Res 4and is enough that the basis employed for suchapportions is reasonable. Macias case relied byGonsales is not reasonable for that case granted morerepresentatives to provinces with less population and

vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters toqualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, thisdisqualification is only temporary. This is a safetymechanism to prevent political figures from controllingelections and to allow them to devote more time to theConcon.Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral

process and also to assure candidates equalopportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties.This provision does not create discrimination towardsany particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.


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TOLENTINO VERSUS COMELEC

Fac t s : Shortly after her succession to the Presidency inJanuary 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominatedthen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator Guingona)as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9February 2001. Following Senator Guingonas confirmation,the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution 84certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate.Resolution 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy througha special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution84 further provided that the Senatorial candidate garneringthe 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for theunexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,which ends on 30 June 2004. On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all theprovinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issuedResolution 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates asthe elected Senators. Resolution 01-005 also provided thatthe first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6)years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve theunexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T.

Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President. RalphRecto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan) ranked12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution 01-005. On 20 June2001, Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters andtaxpayers, filed the petition for prohibition, impleading onlyCOMELEC as respondent. Tolentino and Mojica sought toenjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidatefor Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as thewinner in the special election for a single three-year term seat.

Accordingly, Tolentino and Mojica prayed for the nullificationof Resolution 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to

such effect. Tolentino and Mojica contend that COMELECissued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) itfailed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in thespecial election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) itfailed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under thespecial or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed tospecify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seekingelection under the special or regular senatorial elections aspurportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of theseomissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for thesenatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections withoutdistinction such that there were no two separate Senateelections held simultaneously but just a single election for

thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojicasought the issuance of a temporary restraining order duringthe pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restrainingorder, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment onthe petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and Mojica'sstanding to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and votersbecause they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursedpublic funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injurybecause of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.

I s s u e : Whether Tolentino and Mojica have standing tolitigate.

Held : Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal andsubstantial interest in a case such that the party has sustainedor will sustain direct injury because of the challengedgovernmental act. The requirement of standing, whichnecessarily sharpens the presentation of issues, relates to

the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual


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cases or controversies. Thus, generally, a party will beallowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he haspersonally suffered some actual or threatened injury becauseof the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) theinjury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) theinjury is likely to be redressed by a favourable action. Appliedstrictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar thepresent petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters, thevalidity of the special election on 14 May 2001, Tolentino andMojica assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance.This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equalmeasure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, whovoted in that election. Neither have Tolentino and Mojicaalleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court shouldgive due course to the petition because in the special electionheld on 14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x extracted and

spent in violation of specific constitutional protections againstabuses of legislative power or that there [was] misapplicationof such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was]deflected to any improper purpose. On the other hand, theCourt has relaxed the requirement on standing and exercisedour discretion to give due course to voters suits involving theright of suffrage. The Court has the discretion to takecognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not afew cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locusstandi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft anissue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, whenthe issues raised are of paramount importance to the public,the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. TheCourt accords the same treatment to Tolentino and Mojica inthe present case in their capacity as voters since they raiseimportant issues involving their right of suffrage, consideringthat the issue raised in the petition is likely to arise again.


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OCCENA VERSUS COMELECFac t s : The challenge in these two prohibition proceedingsagainst the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutionsproposing constitutional amendments, goes further thanmerely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. SamuelOccena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of thePhilippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 ConstitutionalConvention that framed the present Constitution, are suing astaxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions isthe assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamentallaw, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

I s s u e : Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in forceand effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and thepresent petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.

Held : It is much too late in the day to deny the force andapplicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portionof Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitionsfor prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification,this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It thenconcluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is nofurther judicial obstacle to the new Constitution beingconsidered in force and effect." Such a statement served auseful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that asof 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into forceand effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Courtand with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what theSupreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but mustalso be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple asthat. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function

of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect.

As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Blackand Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well aslegitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullifythe acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what wasdone cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. Themere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is themeaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then,this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. Thelatest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely twoweeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of thepresent Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.


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SANIDAD VERSUS COM ELEC

Fac t s :

On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issuedPresidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") toresolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, theinterim assembly, its replacement, the powers of suchreplacement, the period of its existence, the length of theperiod for the exercise by the President of his present powers.20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issuedanother related decree, Presidential Decree 1031 , amendingthe previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring theprovisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens

Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite

of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree991.On the same date of 22 September 1976, the Presidentissued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to hesubmitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clausesthat the people's continued opposition to the convening of theinterim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such

body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,providing for a new interim legislative body, which will besubmitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusivesupervision and control of the October 1976 NationalReferendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C.Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commencedL-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking toenjoin the Commission on Elections from holding andconducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to

declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to theConstitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as itdirects the Commission on Elections to supervise, control,hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President toexercise the constituent power to propose amendments to thenew Constitution.

As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976,another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction,docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, adelegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting thatthe power to propose amendments to, or revision of theConstitution during the transition period is expressly conferred

on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVIIof the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition withPreliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M.Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketedas L-44714, to restrain the implementation of PresidentialDecrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.

I s s u e : Whether the President may call upon a referendum

for the amendment of the Constitution.Held : Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on

Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revisionof, this Constitution may be proposed by the National

Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assemblymay, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call aconstitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all itsMembers, submit the question of calling such a convention tothe electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that


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"Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall bevalid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in aplebiscite which shall be held not later than three months aafter the approval of such amendment or revision." In thepresent period of transition, the interim National Assemblyinstituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with thatamending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisionsreads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by theinterim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all itsMembers, propose amendments to this Constitution. Suchamendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with

Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periodscontemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., periodof normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, theamending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1)regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all

its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by avote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Conventionmay be submitted to the electorate in an election voted uponby a majority vote of all the members of the National

Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may beproposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interimNational Assembly upon special call by the interim PrimeMinister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had alreadysettled that the incumbent President is vested with thatprerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convenethe interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Conventionintended to leave to the President the determination of thetime when he shall initially convene the interim National

Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peaceand order in the country. When the Delegates to theConstitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions,they were aware of the fact that under the same, theincumbent President was given the discretion as to when hecould convene the interim National Assembly. The President's

decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. Inthe plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratificationof the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people votedagainst the convening of the interim National Assembly. In thereferendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold theconvening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in thereferendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initiallyconvened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, whowere deemed automatically members of the interim National

Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendumof January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. Insensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state

undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, thatbody is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is notlegislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, itis exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by thefundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power isprovided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for theregular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the TransitoryProvisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarilyit is the business of the legislating body to legislate for thenation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of theConstitution is not legislative in character. In political science adistinction is made between constitutional content of anorganic character and that of a legislative character. Thedistinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such beingthe case, approval of the President of any proposedamendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the Presidentto approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.


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DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC

Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action(PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend theconstitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, throughPeoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of thepeople to exercise the power to directly propose amendmentsto the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued anorder directing the publication of the petition and of the noticeof hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At thehearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol angKonstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin

petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by theCOMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago,

Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court againstCOMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the severalarguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutionalprovision onpeoples initiative to amend the constitution canonly be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. Nosuch law has been passed; (2) the peoples initiative is limited

to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it isoutside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Courtgranted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues :(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regardingthe conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is

valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisionson the conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials wouldconstitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory,thus, without implementing legislation the same cannotoperate. Although the Constitution has recognized or grantedthe right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does notprovide for its implementation.The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 whichprescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative onamendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been anestablished rule that what has been delegated, cannot bedelegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). Thedelegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the

latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations toimplement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative.The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision,as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such asthe synchronization of elections, the constitutional guaranteeof equal access to opportunities for public service, andprohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done byinitiative. However, considering the Courts decision in theabove Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is arevision or amendment has become academic.


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LAMBINO V S. COMELEC [G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct2006]

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gatheringsignatures for an initiative petition to change the1987 constitution; they filed a petition with the COMELEC tohold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the supportof 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987constitution bymodifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 andby adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the presentbicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral-parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked theSantiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to

implement the initiative petitions.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiativepetition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through apeoples initiative; (2)Whether or Not this Court should revisitits ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,inadequate or wanting in essential iterms and conditions toimplement the initiative clause on proposals to amend

the Constitution; (3) Whether or Not the COMELEC committedgrave abuse of discretion in denying due course to theLambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to complywith the basic requirements for conducting a peoplesinitiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not graveabuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by thePeopleThe petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature andeffect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading whichrenders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through InitiativesThe framers of the constitution intended a clear distinctionbetween amendment and revision, it is intended that thethird mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution maypropose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of thelegislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore aconstitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not NecessaryEven assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change theresult because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to bea valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution beforecomplying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

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Revisons Ammendments