Reviews – Etudes critiques – Buchbesprechungen

Reviews Etudes critiques - Buchbesprechungen

From Language to Context. And Back.’ Reference and attitudes. Corazza’s book explores the new semantic territories op-

ened up by the Direct Reference Theory. The first half deals exclusively with context- sensitive referring expressions - demonstratives (“this”, “that”) and indexicals (“I”, “now”, “here”, “today”, “yesterday”). In the second part, along with the recent Crim- min’s 1990 Talk About Belief, Richard’s 1990 Propositional Attitudes and RCcanati’s 1993 Direct Reference - not to mention articles by Schiffer and others - it proposes a map of belief attribution framed in a new approach to propositional attitudes: triadism. The latter emerged after the Direct Reference Theory cast serious doubts on the useful- ness of the Fregean paradigm with respect to indexicals. According to triadism, propositional attitudes terms are not two-place predicates - linking the attributee and a proposition - but rather three-place predicates, linking the attributee, a singular proposition and modes of presentation of the components of the latter. The book offers a different perspective on what is now becoming the philosopher of language’s new play- ground. Corazza’s contribution is interesting and adds valuable material to the ongoing debate concerning both context-sensitive expressions and propositional attitudes.

Riference, contexte et attitudes is divided into five chapters. The first one sets the stage - introducing both the Fregean and the Russellian approaches to demonstratives and indexicals. Problems raised for Fregeanism by these expressions are clearly ex- plained. Corazza’s discussion of indexicals leads to his theory of indexicality. I will come back to it later on. In Chapter 2, he develops his own view on demonstratives. The discussion brings fresh air into what was becoming a two players game, the first one being the 1977 Kaplan - arguing that demonstration was decisive and intentions inert - and the 1989 Kaplan - arguing that intentions were decisive and demonstrations inert. Proper names are largely left aside; the author assumes a Kripkean analysis in the first chapters and, in the last chapters, a more Perry-type view, using the notion of a mental file. Chapter 3 regroups different topics, including the use of indexicals and demonstratives in fiction (here the author relies heavily on Evans’s 1982 Vurieties of Reference) and, more importantly, the problem of the cognitive value of demonstratives. The last two chapters, the high point of the book, address problems raised by indexicals and

’ Corazza, Eros, Refbrence, contexte et attitudes, Paris, Vrin-Bellarmin, 1995.

Dialectica Vol. 52, No 3 (1998)

256 Reviews - Etudes critiques - Buchbesprechungen

demonstratives in connection with belief reports. Corazza proposes there his own version of triadism. The latter has two characteristic features. First, it relies on Castafieda’s quasi-indicators, remarkably well introduced in Chapter 4. Second, while most triadists use sophisticated but controversial psychological entities to fill the third argument Co- razza, who sides with Richard in that respect, trusts language, capitalizes on sentences and invokes a rather uncontroversial acceptance relation between a speaker and a sentence. The bulk of Chapter 5 is a defense of that perspective. His suggestion is a major contribution to triadism, and an interesting alternative to Perry’s, Crimmin’s, Schiffer’s and RCcanati’s more psychological views.

Old-fashioned philosophers of language, those worried about triadism and its rather free way of connecting sentences to the propositions they express, will like much in this book. The author is always very careful to link each item in an expressed proposition to a linguistic term. While RCcanati and Perry/Crimmins very loosely connect a sentence occuring in a belief report with the proposition it expresses, Corazza’s use of quasi-indicators allows him to knit both closely together. Let me introduce the author’s more specific suggestions and make some critical comments on the book’s main contentions.

Keferring terms. Corazza’s proposal concerning indexicals can be put in the following way. Indexicals do not express Fregean senses but (constant) matrices one can con- sider as their linguistic meaning (CRA, p. 32), each indexical expression being tied to a different matrix. That takes care of the idea that indexicals have a meaning as a type. The matrix of an uttered indexical is to be filled in the context of utterance, and matrices tied to different indexical expressions (”today” and “tomorrow” for example) can be filled by the same material. The thought expressed by an indexical utterance is to be identified with the filled matrix, not with the matrix or linguistic meaning. The content of the indexical’s matrix in a context, part of the thought, is said to fix its referent. The latter is part of the singular proposition, as distinct from the thought; the singular proposition plays the roles of both truth bearer and object of belief. In my understanding, the singular proposition is not part of the thought. We have a two-stage process, the indexical sentence in a context expresses first a thought, the latter then determines a singular proposition. The matrix-filler is defined in two ways. At first, Corazza writes that the matrix is a function taking a context as argument and giving a sense as a value (CRA, p. 20). LJnfortunately, a matrix is then underdescribed since linguistic meaning as role is defined the same way (CRA, p. 20), that is, as a function taking a context as argument and giving a referent as a value. We need to know what the second argument of each function is, and they have to differ if the functions are to yield different values. Unfortu- nately, the author is mute on this point. Later on (CRA, p. 35), he seems to adopt a different perspective and argues that sense is not an abstract, functionally defined entity, and is not even conceptual: it is, the author hesitates here, an “act of perception” or a “perceptual mode of presentation”, acting as a mode of presentation of the referent. In the case of “I”, “here” and “now”, a nonrepresentational, kinesthesic perception is relevant. For example, in “Today is Wednesday” uttered on Wednesday, and “Yesterday was Wednesday” uttered on Thursday, the different matrices are filled in by the same material and the two utterances express the same thought. Moreover, the indexicals refer to the same object, hence the two utterances expresses the same singular proposition. This model is easily generalized to all indexicals.

There is a tension in Corazza’s view, and one is strongly tempted to stick to functionally defined senses, and drop the psychological picture. One may find it hard to figure

Reviews - Etudes critiques - Buchbesprechungen 257

out what perception of a whole day or oneself could be. Moreover, once we have such perceptions, there is not much we can do with them since they are highly subjective, non sharable entities. Is the end product really a thought ? Maybe. However, a thought is standardly a logical, fully conceptual entity capable of solving cognitive problems raised in semantics. Thoughts ought to be conceptual if they are to solve cognitive problems; the latter involve contradiction, logical implication, and so on. It is difficult to see how perceptions could do the job; they are famous for eluding the strong cognitive relations that concern us. In addition, one may wonder how such a psychological, object-dependent entity - after all, if I have a perception, even kinesthesic, of myself it plausibly depends upon myself - can determine the referent of the indexical. It seems to me to be the reverse, the referent - the object - fixes the content -the psychological representa- tion. In any case, determining a referent is the role of referent-fixing semantic entities, and perceptions, at first sight, are not semantic. I, therefore, remain sceptical here, and do not see the benefit of introducing perception in the analysis of indexicality. The pros- pect of functionally defined senses seems much better. However, unless new details are added, it is difficult to see how all the machinery is to work.

According to Corazza, demonstratives are semantically distinguished from indexicals by the fact that the use of the former presupposes an act of perception. Since they are based on perception, they, unlike indexicals, may lack a referent. This is familiar enough. What is less often recognized is the distinction he makes between two types of referents: the semantic referent of the demonstrative, determined by the demonstration, and its pragmatic referent, determined by a referring intention. In the ideal case, the latter is identical with the former, but discrepancy can occur and plausible belief attribution in a context can make a hearer select the pragmatic referent as relevant, and drop the semantic referent altogether. Take the now famous Kaplan example of designating a picture of Spiro Agnew while intending to refer to a picture of Carnap and believing that one is referring to a picture of Carnap. Here, the semantic referent is Agnew’s picture, while the speaker’s referent is Carnap’s picture, the latter one being the plausible referent in the context. Connecting the first one with the designating gesture belongs to semantics, and connecting the second one with an intention fits with a very standard view of pragmatics. The way the author puts it is so clear and simple that it should become philosophical commonsense. A hearer may have trouble identifying the speaker’s intentions. But I take that to be a problem common to all cases of speaker’s intention identification, and not to be a specific argument against Corazza. As a consequence, pragmatic use of demonstratives, in so far as it depends upon intentions rather than perception is not perceptually based.

Identifying the referring intention of a speaker who uses a demonstrative may be difficult; bare demonstratives lack informative content. However, they are very often used in conjunction with a sortal predicate, like “flower” in “this flower”. Philosophers have never fully examined these expressions and Corazza takes a first stab at doing so. He observes that a used demonstrative always designates an object even when the speaker intends to refer to a different one. Suppose that I intend to designate a picture on a wall which has in fact been removed. I will nonetheless refer to something, namely a wall. The sortal predicate adds information to allow one to assess the plausibility of the expressed proposition. It helps to identify a relevant object, one satisfying the sortal predicate used. He also pays attention to complex demonstratives like “this flower” or “that car” and raises an interesting problem relative to semantic differences between the propositions expressed by utterances of “This flower is red” and “This is a red flower”.


These two utterances appear to have the same truth conditions even if they express different singular propositions. On the whole, this chapter significantly adds to the avail- able material on demonstratives, and is a perfect starting point for in depth research into these expressions.

My disagreements with Corazza are, I think, based on his reliance on the Fregean requirement of a non linguistic intermediate between a term and an object, call it the Non 1 inguistic Mediator Requirement. In the absence of Sinn, he exploits functionally defined senses and the Husserlian tradition. His senses are still ill-defined. I sympathize with this tradition; but blending it with a very specific area of semantics is a task requir- ing a lot of work if it is to be fair and fruitful for both. Moreover, I do not see the relev- ance of any nonlinguistic mediator in the explanation of the semantic behavior of indexicals or demonstratives.

Invoking perception, or a contextually defined sense in connection with indexicals and demonstratives to account for their semantics seems to me to require more justifica- tions that one usually find in the literature. When I use “I,” I need no perception (kinesthesic or other) of myself, no information about myself or particular way of thinking about myself, and no contextually built in item. In virtue of my linguistic knowledge I know that my utterance of “I”, because its linguistic meaning is “the speaker of the utterance,” or something similar, will have me as its referent, whoever I am. No cognitive fix - whether through a sense or by acquaintance or through a mode of presentation of myself - is really called for. It is in fact a virtue of “I” that we can safely use it to refer to ourselves without any information about who we are, any epistemic contact with, or mode of presentation of, an object happening to be us. To utter a first-person sentence, I just have to believe that I will refer to myself and express a true proposition. Indeed, I do not even have to have a belief relation to the proposition I expressed using an I-sentence.

What about demonstratives ? Standardly, the demonstrative’s semantic value is said to be too weak to determine an object and, usually, a helper is then called in to do so - both an intention and a gesture are alternatively invoked. I think that that is all there is to say about the semantics of demonstratives. Corazza’s view about the semantic referent of a demonstrative - using a relation between a demonstrative a gesture and an object - leads to the same conclusion, since it does not introduce perception. Arguing that the use of demonstratives is based on perception does not add anything to our knowledge of demonstratives. It just draws attention to a causal, nonsemantic link, between a term and circumstances of use. In addition, contrary to his contention, the possibility of a failure of reference does not depend on perception. All referring terms - even those not grounded on perception - may lack a referent except “I,” “here” and “now”. These last terms may not lack a referent because their referent in a context is always a feature of the context of utterance identical with a parameter defining the utterance in that context.

I also think that use of demonstratives does not require perception of the object to which one refers. Take the following example z. I am in my office. One student was sup- posed to show up at 2 o’clock and another at 3 o’clock. It is now 2:30 and the first student has not yet arrived. Suddenly, someone knocks at my door. I say “He is late or early.” I intend to refer to the person who knocked at the door, whoever he is. But I have no perceptual relation with that person, and cannot tell which singular proposition I ex-

* I owe this example to John Perry.


pressed. I cannot even say if it is the one containing the first student or the second. I am not acquainted with, nor do I have a mode of presentation of, that object. You would have little ground to say that my utterance is based on the perception of that object and that I believe the singular proposition I expressed. No cognitive fix on the object to which I referred need play a role in my utterance. When I made the utterance I knew the meaning of the words used and believed that whoever I was referring to was late or early. I also believed I expressed a true proposition. This knowledge and these beliefs prove necessary and sufficient to back my utterance. Is my use purely semantic or pragmatic ? Corazza would argue that it is pragmatic. Because the intention connected to my utterance would be the one connected to a demonstration, I tend to believe that it is semantic.

Belief reports. The last two chapters deserve high praise. Chapter 4 is an excellent critical introduction to Castaiieda’s quasi-indicators, used in Chapter 5 to articulate a version of triadism. Surprisingly, these chapters are, by and large, independent of the material introduced earlier on indexicals and demonstratives. In fact, the author’s triadism coheres with almost any view on indexicals and demonstratives which takes these terms to express singular propositions.

Corazza clearly sees that the syntax and the semantics of quasi-indicators Casta-eda gave can be isolated, and keeps the syntax while providing a different semantics. While Cas- taiieda argued that quasi-indicators were referentially opaque. C o r m takes them to be referentially transparent. Sentences containing quasi-indicators have a double duty: to introduce a singular proposition and an acceptance relation toward a sentence. Hence, litig- ious psychological entities are deemed irrelevant. Since any theory of indexicals worth its salt involves singular propositions and sentences, the result is that the semantics of belief reports does not require controversial new items like ideas and notions. A rather simple relation is enough. This relation is loosely defined under the label Transpositional Principle: “If the reporter was in the attributee’s context, in order to express what the attributee believes, desires, doubts, and so on, the reporter would utter the sentence the acceptance of which he attributes to the attributee” (p. 161). Basically, the idea is to put yourself in the attributee’s shoes. Corazza adds that accepting a sentence implies believing what the latter expresses in a context. Staying close to the lexicon, insofar as the quasi-indicator sentences introduce all the relevant material, this saves us from unarticulated components (Perry/Crimmins) or pragmatic principles (RCcanati); relying on nonindexical lexical items, the report is context insensitive and semantically conveys all the relevant information in every context, that is, the singular proposition, the acceptance relation and the accepted sentence, as well.

I have some reservations concerning Corazza’s.descriptions of his own suggestion. I think that he underrates its originality. Contrary to what he concludes, one is not commited to the view that all propositional attitude reports require three arguments - only those containing quasi-indicators do. More importantly, because the two crucial components, the singular proposition and the acceptance relation (with its arguments), are carried by the embedded sentence containing the quasi-indicator, one is not committed, contrary to what Corazza assumes, to the view that propositional attitudes terms are triadic - they are dyadic, linking an agent and a sentence, the latter having a double duty - nor to the view that they are context sensitive (Richard). That does not mean that attitudes are not triadic, however. Finally, in contrast with the versions of triadisms on the market, Corazza’s view does not turn beliefs, reported by the propositional attitude sentences, into heterogenous entities containing both the singular proposition and mental entities. Corazza never con- tends that the whole is a belief.


L,et us look at an example. Take Iara’s utterance of “Estou feliz.”, a Portuguese sentence meaning exactly what the English sentence “I am happy” means. In Corazza’s theory, reporting what she expressed, I would use a sentence like “Iara believes that she* is happy”. The latter expresses the proposition given by “Be1 (Iara, < # , F >, ACC [Iara, “I am happy”])”, containing both the singular proposition < , >, which includes her and the property of being happy, and the sentence she would accept. I could report, in French, what she expressed by using “Iara croit qu’elle* est heureuse.”, expressing the proposition given by “Croit (Iara, < # , F>, Acc [Iara, “Je suis heureuse”])”. In this perspective, the object contained in the singular proposition is given by the quasi-indicator through the sentence’s subject, and it is safely bound to the relevant mental state thanks to the acceptance relation - so, there is no risk of matching the right state with the wrong object.

Reference to the language of the quoted sentence seems to be required. But this is not so - the language just has to be, by definition, the language of the speaker. To achieve his aims, the author has to introduce quotation marks, making some belief reports metalinguistic, and dependent upon the possibility of having a language which is also its own metalanguage. At first sight I see nothing wrong here. One could quarrel by saying that attitudes are then dependent upon metalinguistic devices. One would be wrong: it is quasi-indicator sentences that are so dependent. Finally, as a direct consequence of Corazza’s view, the author of Names, a book about proper names published under the title Naming without the author knowing anything about this, may unknow- ingly attribute to himself what is connected to his utterance of “I am famous” by using “The author of Naming believes that he* is famous”. He has the right object and the right state, but does not recognize that object and does not know that he is talking about himself. Corazza cannot avoid this consequence. On the other hand, as long as the author holds in his mind the thought, the mental content as opposed to the singular proposition, I do not see its offensive nature. That brings us back to the main point. Whatever we think about the semantics of quasi-indicators Corazza gives, are we willing t o concede to Casta-eda his point that some pronouns have a semantic behavior we have ignored until now ? And are we willing, like Corazza, to have a look at belief reports that takes them into account ? I think that Corazza’s triadism gives quasi-indicators a new life.

Belief reports are widely held to .... report beliefs. On Corazza’s view, this is not quite truc. They report first a singular proposition, the latter expressible by different sentences, and hence not fine-grained enough to qualify as a belief. Now, instead of adding and structuring new components in order to get a sophisticated entity fit to satisfy some plausible demands on beliefs, he relies on an acceptance relation to a sentence. The latter is not any sort of belief component, but is only used to specify the material enabling one to identify a thought understood as a mental component. This consequence re- minds one that in Castaiieda’s Theory, quasi-indicator sentences represent uses of indexical sentences by a speaker. In no way do they report a content. Corazza’s semantics of indexicals implies one of Castaiieda’s contentions. In some respect, this amounts to avoiding the task of adressing problems raised by beliefs expressed by indexical sentences and takes us back to a basic question raised by indexicals: what is a belief expressed hy an indexical sentence? As we know, the singular proposition will not fill the bill. Are helief reports fit to represent them then? Maybe Corazza is right here. In a sense, belief reports containing quasi-indicators concern acceptance of a relevant sentence, and the \ingular proposition an occurrence of the latter expressed in a context. Quasi-indicator


sentences merely, so to speak, “show” how the attributee connects to the singular proposition. Corazza’s reply is that insofar as some terms in the sentence are indexicals, they give a matrix fillable in the relevant way. I agree, and his thoughts do just fine. He could also take a weaker stand and invoke only an unfilled matrix - showing how the attributee thinks about himself, but not the details of the mental states of that person. Maybe this is the best we can ask of belief reports where indexical sentences are concerned, and that seems to be good enough.

The book is well organized and, for the most part, easy to read. A little more work on the writing could have helped to avoid repetitions and made clearer some points that are couched in a uselessly complicated language. Chapter 4, in my view, should be widely read, especially by beginners. It provides material supporting a view on belief reports which differs from those one find in the literature. And a fruitful one, as Corazza convincingly proves in the following chapter.

Richard Vallee Universidade Federal da Paraiba

Dialectica Vol. 52, No 3 (1998)

Documents

Reviews – Etudes critiques – Buchbesprechungen