Review: [Untitled] Author(s): Noel Carroll Reviewed Work(s): The Imaginary Signifier

8/14/2019 Review: [Untitled] Author(s): Noel Carroll Reviewed Work(s): The Imaginary Signifier

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Review: [untitled]

Author(s): Noel CarrollReviewed work(s):The Imaginary Signifier by Christian Metz

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Winter, 1984), pp. 211-216Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/429996

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212understood n their literary,not their philosophical,sense), and a desire to study cinema's effects uponspectators rather than baldly focussing upon thestructureof the cinematic sign in isolation from thecontextof reception.

The essays that compose the book are: "TheImaginary Signifier," "Story/Discourse," "TheFiction Film and its Spectator," and "Meta-phor/Metonymy,or the ImaginaryReferent." Thelast of these is an extended correction of certainterminological confusions of psycho-semiologicaljargon concerning the notions of metaphor, met-onymy, paradigm, syntagm, displacement andcondensation. This essay is of primaryinterest topractitionersof the second semiology and, for thatreason, I will not dwell on it. The other essays,however, are of more general interestto nonalignedreaders concerned with film and aesthetics. Theseessays attempt o mobilize psychoanalysisto explainwhy people go to films and how people are able toassimilatethe rules and conventionsof cinema.The lead essay, "The Imaginary Signifier,"from which the volume derives its title, proposestoanswer the preceding questions by maintaining hatcinema has its roots in certain unconscious phe-nomena, notably: imaginary identification, voy-eurism, fetishism and disavowal. That is, in somecases, Metz explains our interest in cinema bysuggesting that the medium can afford, in somemeasure, whatever presumable pleasures and com-pelling force that these psychic phenomenaprovidethe unconscious, while, in other cases, Metz canargue that we are able to comprehendvarious cin-ematic practices in virtue of their having thesepsychic processes, structures and syndromes aspsychic prototypes. In other words, we understandvarious cinematic structures and phenomena be-cause we have already encountered similar pheno-mena in the course of our psychicdevelopment.Though the point of "The ImaginarySignifier"is quite simple, the essay is difficult to read. Onereasonfor this is that the essay doesn't really start oset out its central argument until it is nearly halffinished. The piece opens with meanderingrumin-ations about cinephilia, and a laborious statementof Metz's specific semiotic and psychoanalytical-legiances; one plows through over thirty pages be-fore gleaningan idea of where we're headed.Metz contrasts his deployment of psychoanalysisto other possible approaches. For example, a psy-choanalytic film scholar might analyze the person-ality of a filmmaker through his works, or mightattempt to derive a typology of directorial syn-dromes. Or, one might apply psychoanalysis toindividual films, conceived of as textual systems.Metz rejects the former methods because they areconcerned with authors ratherthan cinema, and hedeparts from the latter because he wishes to analyze

REVIEWScinema as such, i.e., the nature of cinema apartfrom the uniquecharacteristicsof individualtextualsystems. Metz's approach is to isolate the filmspecific feature of cinematic representation,and,then, to see what psychoanalysis can reveal aboutcinema by keeping in central view film's specificcharacteristics.That is, Metz wants to unearththepsychic significance of the essential featureof cin-ema in such a way thatsome of our questionsaboutwhy people go to films and about how we under-stand films will be answered.(N.B.: thoughin otheressays Metz denies that he is an essentialist, hecertainly comes off as one in "The ImaginarySignifier.")Metz's candidate for the essential feature of cin-ematic representation s derived by a contrastwiththeater. The essential, differentiating feature thatcommands Metz's attention is that in cinema whathe calls the signifier involves a uniqueplay betweenpresence and absence. That is, the cinematic signi-fier, or representation, s present to the spectator,e.g., an image of a locomotive, but what it is a signof, the locomotive itself, is absent, i.e., it is not inthe screening room. This is thoughtto contrastwiththeater where a characteror prop is representedbysomething that is actually present to the audience,e.g., a living actoror a chair.Having identified in the play of presence andabsence the unique feature of cinematic representa-tion, Metz looks to psychoanalysis in order to re-view what it has to tell us about the play of presenceand absence, especially in terms of our relationsorpotential relations to visual arrays where those aremarked by the play of presence and absence. Metzfinds the theme of presence and absence in fourtypes of psychic phenomena: imaginaryidentifica-tion, voyeurism, disavowal, and fetishism. Heproceeds to attempt to illuminate cinematic expe-rience by reference to these phenemonaconceivedof as prototypesof cinematicexperience.The first psychic analog Metz finds for the cin-ematic experience of presence and absence isimaginary identification. According to Lacanianpsychoanalysis,one of the momentouspoints in ourpsychosexualdevelopment is the MirrorStage. Pur-portedly at aroundeighteen months of age the childacquires a powerful sense of identity by encounter-ing its own image in a mirror.It derives its sense ofidentity, that is, by identifyingwith its own reflec-tion, an experience occasioned by feelings of per-ceptual mastery. Cinematic representation,accord-ing to Metz, is somewhatanalogousto this seminalexperience since what is reflected on screen and inthe mirrprare not literally in the source of thereflection. What can this analogybe used to explainabout cinema? First, presumably, the encounter ofsimilar dynamics of presence and absence triggerthe sense of perceptualmastery, therebyaccounting


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Reviewsfor some of the pleasure we derive from cinema.Second, the invocationof the MirrorStage explainswhy, accordingto Metz, film viewers identify withthe camera.This, in turn,explains why we so easilyaccept cinematic conventions such as camerapans.But actually the engendering of identification ex-plains much more for Metz. For he believes thatallcommunicationrequires identificationof some sortfor the communication to be intelligible (p. 46).Thus by triggering identification with the camerathroughthe play of presence and absence, a filmsecures a necessary condition for appearingintelli-gible. The identificationhere is imaginary, namedafter a faculty for identificationcalled the Imagi-nary, which is supposedly acquired at the MirrorStage. Insofaras cinematic representationactivatesthis faculty, it is animaginary ignifier.Along with the pleasures of perceptual mastery,the cinematic play of presence and absence alsoaffords voyeuristic pleasure. According to Metz,cinema recapitulates he theme of presence and ab-sence in voyeurism insofar as the film spectator isabsent from the fictional world displayed by thefilm. That is, in contradistinction o theatre, wherethe actor is aware of the presence of the audience,the film spectatoris not present to the film actor.Metz adds to this that film viewing, like voyeurism,is experiencedin an essentially solitary way where-as theater s a far more communalexperience.The psychic phenomena of disavowal is alsocorrelated to the cinematic play of presence andabsence. "Disavowal" refers to the supposed in-fantile coming to termswith castration.A male bothbelieves but doesn't believe that females have pe-nises-that they both are and are not castrated.Thiscapacity for believing something is present whileknowing it is really absent underwritesthe cine-matic experiencefor Metz. This is how we can reactas though GregoryPeck is before us while knowinghe is not. Disavowal is the mechanismwhich makesthis possible thereby enabling us to comprehendcinema'smost basicconvention.Connected to disavowal is fetishism. In place ofthe female's absent penis, the fetishist finds anobject-a foot, for instance-that stands for it. Infilm, the absence of the literal source of the imageis emotionally compensatedfor by technique. Thisdisplacement s not only mobilizedby cinephilesbutby all filmgoers insofar as they esteem the well-madenessof a movie.Though "The ImaginarySignifier" is constantlyand uncriticallycited by film theorists, it is a highlyproblematicwork. Metz's method is hardly clear.Having identified film's essential feature, hesearches for the occurence of similar themes-ofpresenceandabsence-amongst psychicphenomena.But what principlesof selection lead him to exactlythe four (rather heterogeneous) phenomena he ar-

rives at? Are there only these four correlations?Inanswer to this, Metz may say thathe never claimedexhaustiveness. But apartfrom this slight issue, themanner of how Metz moves from the essence ofcinema to his prototypes is murky. There is nouniform, consistent principle stated which enablesus to reason smoothly from the essence of film toMetz's favored psychological phenomena. The no-tion of the play of presence and absence is notapplied univocally throughout the essay. In thetreatment of voyeurism, for example, the relevantabsent element is the spectatorwho is not partytothe world of the film and who watches our GregoryPecks unobserved. But in Metz's other analyseswhat is significantly absent is the source of thefilm's imagery-our Gergory Pecks and our loco-motives. Indeed, using concepts as vague as "pre-sence" and "absence," with little or no attentionfor what is presentor absent in each case, allows forcorrelations that seem no more than sleights-of-hand.However, the lack of an explicitly stated, con-sistent method is the least of Metz's problems.Greaterdifficulties arise with Metz's essentialism.First, one wonderswhy Metz isolates the essence offilm solely by a contrast with theater. Aren't thecharacters of novels as absent to the reader inMetz's sense as King Kong is to the film viewer?But, more importantly, is Metz's account of thedifferentialplay of presence and absence in cinemaand theater correct? I think not. For if we arespeaking of fiction-fiction films and fictionaldramas-then, ontologically, Shylock is no morepresentto the theaterspectatorthan Fred C. Dobbsis present to the film viewer. Neither Shylock orFred C. Dobbs can be hit by a critical tomato. Norcan I pick up Hamlet's sword, though I can pick upa theatricalprop.Once we areconsideringthe realmof fiction, it makes no sense to speak of the differ-ences between cinema and theaterin terms of whatis absent to the spectator.In both film anddramaticfiction, the character s absent from the continuumof our world in the same way. There is no reasontothink that the distinction between theater and filmcan be drawn in the way that Metz desires, espe-cially when we recall that what Metz has in mindare fictions. The presence and absence issue thatMetz raises has no relevance where what is beingcommunicated is first and foremost fictional. Ad-mittedly, Metz's analysis of the play of presenceand absence has some connection to the most typ-ical ways (barring, for instance, cartoons in filmand puppetsin theater)of producing mages in filmsand theater. But this contingentfact about the waythese fictional images are caused to be is of noontological moment. Nor is it clear why these fea-tures of the productionof fictional images shouldhave any psychological repercussions, particularly

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REVIEWSwhen what the audience in both theater and film isprimarily oncernedwithare fictional worlds.Furtherdifficulties beset Metz's analyses of theinteractionsbetween film and his supposedpsychicprototypes. Even if we ignore the question ofwhether the initial Lacanian account of imaginaryidentificationhas a secure scientific basis, we stillhave more than enough to trouble us with Metz'scharacterizationof it in regardto film. Why, onewonders, if there is a faculty of the imaginary,would it be triggeredby film? An encounter with afilm is so different, phenomenologically, from anencounterwith a mirror.It is true that in our culturethe mirroris a metaphorfor visual representationssuch as painting, drama and cinema. Indeed, it isundoubtedly his metaphoricassociationthat attract-ed film scholars to Lacanianpsychoanalysis in thefirst place, since talk of mirror dentificationcouldbe segued with the conceit that somehow film is avisual process like mirroring.But this, lamentably,only shows that much contemporary ilm theory isprecariouslybased on metaphors.It does not showhow something as radically different from mymirrorimage of myself as a film can serve as theefficient cause that mobilizes my supposed facultyof theImaginary.Nor does Metz appear to be on target when hedescribes our relation to the camera in terms ofidentification. When I look at a film image I onlyfocus on partof it, usually upon what is representedin the foreground.Yet if I truly identified with thecamera, I supposethat I would experience the entirevisual arrayof the projection as co-extensive withmy vision. Of course, one might drop the idea thatone always identifies with the camera. But Metzcan't for his theory of communicationpresupposesthat all communicationrequires some kind of iden-tification, and he argues that camera identificationis the most plausible candidate when it comes tofilm. It is this commitment o the necessity of iden-tification in communication that leads Metz to ex-plain film reception in terms of imaginary identi-fication. But I think it is outlandishto suppose thatevery comunication, in order to be intelligible,requiressome subtending process of identification.When a railroadconductor instructs the passengeracross the aisle to get off at the third stop, I under-standhis remarks, I find them intelligible, without,in any meaningful sense of the word, identifyingwitheithertheconductoror my fellow passenger.Metz's account of voyeurism in cinema is asconfused as his acocunt of imaginary dentification.Undoubtedlyvoyeurism can be made a live issue inthe context of specific films. But Metz sees it inoperation in all films. Why? Because the filmspectator is not in the presence of the film per-former, which suggests that the film spectator isviewing unobserved.Not only does this reverse the

way in which Metz usually discusses the play ofpresence and absence; it also seems downrightwrong. Metz asks us to thinkof the film actoras ifhe were unaware that he is the object of an onto-logicallyabsentaudience-this incontradistinctionothe stage actor who is conscious of the presenceof abreathingaudience in frontof him and who is com-plicit in their act of watching. The true circum-stances of voyeurism, for Metz, requiresa victimwho does not know he is being watched. The filmactor purportedlyapproximatesthis state but thestage actor does not. But does this make any sense?Surely every film actor in typical films is playingforan audience-quite knowingly, I mightadd. Filmactors are in no way like the unwary apartmentdwellers who accidentally eave theircurtainsopen.Film actors are just as complicit as stage actors intheir exhibition of themselves for popular con-sumption. Also Metz's claim that cinema viewingis solitary and theater viewing is communal isparochial. Perhaps ilm viewing in first-run inemasin Paris is privatized,but no one who views filmswith ghetto audiences, or, for that matter, withteenageaudiences,can doubtthat the screeningisn'tanopportunityor communalparticipation.Nor is Metz's characterizationof film fetishismvery persuasive. There may in fact be film fetish-ists, but I wonder if all film viewing involvesfetishism. A fetishist putatively fastens upon oneobject in orderto deny the absenceof anotherobjectwhose presence he has a stake in. But what is therelevantabsentobject in the case of cinematicrep-resentation. According to Metz what is absent iswhateverhad been filmed-the desert, for example,in Lawrence of Arabia. But it is implausible toattributeto spectatorsa desire for the actual pres-ence, in the screening room, of the objects andpersons they see represented on film. Not onlywould Metz be hard put to find a viewer whoconfessed to characteristicallywanting to be amidstthe fictionalworld of films-with DirtyHarry'sbul-lets actuallywhizzing by him;but also such a desirewould frustrate he very purposeof representation.As Aristotleand ArthurDanto have argued,we areinterested n representations f things in a way thatwe would not be interestedin the things they rep-resent-in still lifes of dead fish rather hanin deadfish-because representationsacilitatecognitiveandemotive responses that the thing in nature doesn't.But this function of representationwould be im-plausible if what viewers of films of topplingbuildings really wanted was all that mayhem intheirscreeningroom.In connection with film fetishism, Metz says thatit is the process of disavowal that enables the filmviewer to believe that the objects that cause theimage are presentdespite the fact thatthe spectatorknows that they are not. Some such process as

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Reviewsdisavowal might be operativeif it were appropriateto say that in some sense film viewers character-istically believed while simultaneouslydisbelievingthat locomotives and Gregory Peck were in thescreeningroom. But Metz has suppliedno reasontopostulate this contradictory state of spectators.Specifically he has not shown that spectators n anyway believe that the objects and persons shown infilm arereallybeforethem.In his second essay, "Story and Discourse (ANote on Two Kinds of Voyeurism)," Metz relies ona distinction that has caused a great deal of con-fusion in contemporary ilm theory. Following thelinguist E. Benveniste, Metz distinguishesbetween"story" and "discourse." "Jones went to the gro-cery store" falls into the categoryof story;"I assertthat Jones went to the grocery store" is an instanceof discourse. In "story," the speaker s not referredto; in semiotic jargon this is expressed by sayingthat all traces of enunciation(the productionof theutteranceby the speaker, in this case, by me) areobliterated. Examples of the story are said to pre-sent themselves as "transparent,"as if they weretold by no one. In discourse, on the otherhand, theauthor is referredto within the utterance, therebyacknowledgingthe fact of enunciation-in "I assertthat Jones . . .," I acknowledge that I produce theutterance. What does this have to do with film?Supposedly the traditional film presents itself asstory, as if it were reality narrating itself. Thepotential for ideology in this has, in turn, beenseized upon by numerous contemporaryfilm the-orists following Metz. But how viable is the conceptof story'? t is of little use in categorizing literature,for example. Novels very often mix both story anddiscourse in theirexposition, as do historicalworks.Turningto traditional ilms, they always have creditsequences. Would not this place them in the cate-gory of discourse'?Also, many traditional filmshave narrators-e.g., I Remember Mama. DOA,How Green Was My Valley, Double Indemnity,etc.Are suchworks to be considerednonstandard-tradi-tional films thatarediscourserather hanstory'?Butcertainly these are standardfilms. Moreover, thesupposed effect of examples of story-that theyappear to be without authors, that they seem tonarrate hemselves-is improbable. We always at-tribute an authoror groupof authorsto a narrative,filmed or otherwise. If we even encountered a nar-rative that appeared o have no teller we would beas shocked as if we saw a stone floating in the sky.Indeed, what would it take for an intelligible storyto appearas though t had no narrator'?In "The Fiction Film and its Spectator," Metzembarkson a lengthy examinationof the analogiesanddisanalogiesbetween film, daydream,and nightdream. The analogy between film and night dreamhas been with us at least since the twenties. Some of

215the grounds which Metz cites for this analogy in-clude that both phenomena involve: a darkenedroom, diminished mobility, involuntary receptionand, purportedly, lowered wakefulness. However,Metz also notes strong disanalogies between filmand night dream:the film spectatoralmost alwaysknows thathe is at the movies, whereasthe dreamerdoes not usually know he is dreaming; ilm percep-tion is real-there actually s an externalreflectiononthe screen-whereas dreamperception s not real inthis sense; film narrativesare more rational thandream narratives; ilm is less viable as a source ofhalluncinatory wish-fulfillment than one's owndreams.On the other hand, the bruntof these disanalo-gies can be lessened somewhat if we analogize filmnot to night dreams but to daydreams. The day-dreamer s aware thathe is daydreaming ust as thefilmgoer is aware of watching a movie. The nar-rativeof the daydream s more subject to secondaryrevision than is thatof the night dream, resulting insomethingthat is less gappy anddiscontinuous, andmore rationalthan the night dream. This would, ofcourse, suggest that the daydream,like film, is lesseffective than the night dream in affording halluci-natorywish-fulfillment.The film viewing process, though not identicalwith the process of daydreaming, is closer to thedaydreamthan the night dream. Yet film, the day-dream, andthe nightdreamall supposedly resembleeach other because each putatively involves dimin-ished wakefulness. Film, then, is seen to blendelements of night dream and daydream. But ourperceptionof a film is, as already mentioned, real.This leads Metz to conclude that partof the uniquepower of film is that it mixes real perception, day-dream elements, and night dream (p. 141). Thisaccounts, in some measure, for the specific joyinvolved in cinema, that of "receiving from theexternal world images that are usually internal

. ...? (p. 136). Thus, Metz offers us yet anotherreasonwhy we go to films.The major considerationthat Metz offers for theanalogy between film and night dream is that bothinvolve lowered wakefulness. But I see no reasonfor believing thatfilm involves diminishedwakeful-ness. Metz notes that when one has had little sleep,there is dangerof dozing duringa film (p. 107). Sowhat? The problem of lowered wakefulness herecan't be attributed o the film but to the fact thattheviewer is already fatigued. If he fell asleep whileeating his soup or reading a newspaperwould wesay thatsoup and newspapersmix elements of nightdream'?Of coursenot.How does Metz know that films diminish wake-fulness'? He has not even attempted such simpleempirical corroborationas measuring heartbeats,breathing,etc. Does Metz think that film involves


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216lowered wakefulness because when we're at themovies we usually ignore what's happeningin ourenvironmental surroundings.That's called payingattention, not lowered wakefulness. Does Metz be-lieve that his wakefulness is lowered when he isriveted to a semiotics lecture and is unheeding ofthose who leave the room or shuffle papers?If not,then why would he suppose ordinaryviewers, dis-playingthe same sort of raptattention,are in a stateof lowered wakefulness when they are attentivelyfocussed on their movies? Metz's claims about thelowered wakefulness of film viewing sound falseand are completely unsubstantiated.To the extentthat the assertion that cinematic representationpos-sesses elements of night dream depends on thehypothesisof lowered wakefulness, Metz's thesis isaltogetherwithoutproof.Metz claims that film contains elements of day-dream. Thus, when we see a film we are gratifiedby encountering the externalization of somethinggenerally internal. Insofar as the film/daydreamconnection depends on the notion of diminishedwakefulness, it must confront the preceding argu-ment. But Metz, of course, has otheranalogies thanlowered wakefulness to supportthe film/daydreamconnection. Some of these are not very compel-ling-the filmgoer is awarehe is filmgoing and thedaydreamers awareof daydreaming-but, then, ofcourse, the beer drinker s aware he is beer drink-ing, and so on. Indeed, Metz's major analogiesbetween film anddaydreamingall seem ratherweakbecause they are not straightforward nalogies butanalogies relative to the weaknesses of the nightdream/film analogies, i.e., film narrativeis morelike daydreamnarrative hannight dream narrative.But how directly analogous are film narrativesanddaydreamnarratives?Enough to make them worthcomparing?However, even if we accept Metz's analogiesbetween daydreamand film, one must ask whetherthese analogies will be adequate for supportingMetz's major claim, that what is gratifying aboutfilm is that it presents us with the type of visualexperience that we recognize as primarily nternal.Daydreaming s a talent that is acquired. Not eve-ryone does it. Children apparentlylearn to do itthrough play and through stories. Gradually, theylearnto internalizetheir games with dolls and theirstories, often picturestories (which, in our culture,would include movies). Daydreamingappearsto bethe internalizationof externalized forms of repre-sentationsuch as play and narrative, ncluding nar-rativefilm and narrativeTV. What is strangeaboutcontemporaryfilm theorists who want to explainhow we understand inematicconventionsby meansof the structures of daydreaming is that, in allprobability, the narrative devices of daydreaming,in manycases, derive frompervasivecultural orms

216lowered wakefulness because when we're at themovies we usually ignore what's happeningin ourenvironmental surroundings.That's called payingattention, not lowered wakefulness. Does Metz be-lieve that his wakefulness is lowered when he isriveted to a semiotics lecture and is unheeding ofthose who leave the room or shuffle papers?If not,then why would he suppose ordinaryviewers, dis-playingthe same sort of raptattention,are in a stateof lowered wakefulness when they are attentivelyfocussed on their movies? Metz's claims about thelowered wakefulness of film viewing sound falseand are completely unsubstantiated.To the extentthat the assertion that cinematic representationpos-sesses elements of night dream depends on thehypothesisof lowered wakefulness, Metz's thesis isaltogetherwithoutproof.Metz claims that film contains elements of day-dream. Thus, when we see a film we are gratifiedby encountering the externalization of somethinggenerally internal. Insofar as the film/daydreamconnection depends on the notion of diminishedwakefulness, it must confront the preceding argu-ment. But Metz, of course, has otheranalogies thanlowered wakefulness to supportthe film/daydreamconnection. Some of these are not very compel-ling-the filmgoer is awarehe is filmgoing and thedaydreamers awareof daydreaming-but, then, ofcourse, the beer drinker s aware he is beer drink-ing, and so on. Indeed, Metz's major analogiesbetween film anddaydreamingall seem ratherweakbecause they are not straightforward nalogies butanalogies relative to the weaknesses of the nightdream/film analogies, i.e., film narrativeis morelike daydreamnarrative hannight dream narrative.But how directly analogous are film narrativesanddaydreamnarratives?Enough to make them worthcomparing?However, even if we accept Metz's analogiesbetween daydreamand film, one must ask whetherthese analogies will be adequate for supportingMetz's major claim, that what is gratifying aboutfilm is that it presents us with the type of visualexperience that we recognize as primarily nternal.Daydreaming s a talent that is acquired. Not eve-ryone does it. Children apparentlylearn to do itthrough play and through stories. Gradually, theylearnto internalizetheir games with dolls and theirstories, often picturestories (which, in our culture,would include movies). Daydreamingappearsto bethe internalizationof externalized forms of repre-sentationsuch as play and narrative, ncluding nar-rativefilm and narrativeTV. What is strangeaboutcontemporaryfilm theorists who want to explainhow we understand inematicconventionsby meansof the structures of daydreaming is that, in allprobability, the narrative devices of daydreaming,in manycases, derive frompervasivecultural orms

REVIEWSEVIEWSof narrative uch as film. Thus, when we encounterfilms we are not encountering something that isgenerally internal,but ratherstructuresof represen-tation that are found both internallyand externallyand whoseprovenance s, in fact, external.

Apart from questions of detail, one may alsodoubt the theoreticaladvisabilityof Metz's overallstrategy in "The Fiction Film and its Spectator."Metz proposesto tell us about the natureof film byanalogizing it to the mind. This places Metz in thetradition of film theorists which begins with H.Munsterberg, who, unlike Metz, primarilyanalo-gized film to rationalmental processes rather thanto irrationalones. But one must ask whether thisapproach-employing either rational or irrationalanalogs-is very useful since, in fact, we know solittle about the natureof the mind and its processes.For an analogy to be informative we should knowmore about the item that is meant to do the illumin-ating than we do about the item that is supposedtobe illuminated, e.g., we should know more aboutdreams than we know about films. But I'm notconvinced that this condition is met by film/mindanalogies. Indeed, I suspect that we probablyknowmore about the workings of film than we do aboutthe workings of the mind. I do not deny that spe-cific films, like Le Chien Andalou, can attempttomime the mind's operation n such a way that it isappropriatefor a film critic to call attention toanalogies with thought (especially in terms of howthoughtis conceived or misconceivedby the film inquestion). But as a theoreticalproject I think thatfilm/mind analogies have little to tell us given thepresent state of knowledge of the mind, both in itsrationaland its irrationalaspects. How much do wegain by being told that films are like daydreamswhen we understand so little about daydreams?Perhaps ilm scholars would be betteroff restrictingtheir attentionto films and film history ratherthaninvestingin Metz'sdaydreams.

NOELCARROLLWesleyanUniversity

SHAPIRO,GARY and ALAN SICA, eds. Hermeneutics:Questions and Prospects. The University ofMassachusettsPress, 1984, 310 pp., $24.00.Shapiro and Sica's Hermeneutics:Questions andProspects is one of the spateof recent books on thesubject of hermeneutics,a field which is currently

and increasingly enjoying a new popularity inAnglo-American philosophy and literary theory.

of narrative uch as film. Thus, when we encounterfilms we are not encountering something that isgenerally internal,but ratherstructuresof represen-tation that are found both internallyand externallyand whoseprovenance s, in fact, external.Apart from questions of detail, one may alsodoubt the theoreticaladvisabilityof Metz's overallstrategy in "The Fiction Film and its Spectator."Metz proposesto tell us about the natureof film byanalogizing it to the mind. This places Metz in thetradition of film theorists which begins with H.Munsterberg, who, unlike Metz, primarilyanalo-gized film to rationalmental processes rather thanto irrationalones. But one must ask whether thisapproach-employing either rational or irrationalanalogs-is very useful since, in fact, we know solittle about the natureof the mind and its processes.For an analogy to be informative we should know

more about the item that is meant to do the illumin-ating than we do about the item that is supposedtobe illuminated, e.g., we should know more aboutdreams than we know about films. But I'm notconvinced that this condition is met by film/mindanalogies. Indeed, I suspect that we probablyknowmore about the workings of film than we do aboutthe workings of the mind. I do not deny that spe-cific films, like Le Chien Andalou, can attempttomime the mind's operation n such a way that it isappropriatefor a film critic to call attention toanalogies with thought (especially in terms of howthoughtis conceived or misconceivedby the film inquestion). But as a theoreticalproject I think thatfilm/mind analogies have little to tell us given thepresent state of knowledge of the mind, both in itsrationaland its irrationalaspects. How much do wegain by being told that films are like daydreamswhen we understand so little about daydreams?Perhaps ilm scholars would be betteroff restrictingtheir attentionto films and film history ratherthaninvestingin Metz'sdaydreams.NOELCARROLL

WesleyanUniversity

SHAPIRO,GARY and ALAN SICA, eds. Hermeneutics:Questions and Prospects. The University ofMassachusettsPress, 1984, 310 pp., $24.00.Shapiro and Sica's Hermeneutics:Questions andProspects is one of the spateof recent books on thesubject of hermeneutics,a field which is currently

and increasingly enjoying a new popularity inAnglo-American philosophy and literary theory.

Documents

Review: [Untitled] Author(s): Noel Carroll Reviewed Work(s): The Imaginary Signifier