REVIEW REPORT ON MONITORING THE INTERNAL DIALOGUE ON …fer.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Review... · Review Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo1 July 24, 2017

FONDACIJA ZA OTVORENO DRUŠTVO, SRBIJA OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION, SERBIA

REVIEW REPORT ONMONITORING THE INTERNAL

DIALOGUE ON KOSOVOJuly 24, 2017 – January 17, 2019

Belgrade, January 17, 2019

Review Report on Monitoring the Internal

Dialogue on Kosovo1

July 24, 2017. - January 17, 2019.

1 In this report the term “Kosovo” is used both as a general and technical term, primarily because its use is common in today’s domestic and international literature and the public. But the use of this, as well as other appropriate terms, that is, for this part of Serbia, is one of the most illustrative examples of a general “ethnification” of public and political life and language. Both Serbs and Albanians have their own separate and often mutually exclusive narrative dominated by special “key words”, especially as regards the names of cities, villages, streets, etc. The name “Kosovo and Metohija” has been in use for a very long time in terms of constitution and linguistics. “Kosovo and Metohija” is a designation used in the first constitution after the Second World War. However, the second part – “Metohija” was later dropped, and reintroduced into the constitutional terminology in 1990 by the constitutions of Serbia and the FRY. The designation “Kosovo and Metohija” is now considered a synonym for the “Serbian viewpoint”. The name “Kosovo” is of Turkish-Albanian origin and marks the district of Kosovo which, before the Balkan wars of 1912, included the territories of Sandžak, Gornje Polimlje, Kosovo and Metohija, northern Macedonia to Veles and eastern Macedonia to Bregalnica. The name was associated with the idea of Greater Albania. Today, Albanians do not say “Kosovo” but “Kosova”. “Kosova” is synonymous with the Albanian standpoint regarding the status of Kosovo; it is synonymous for Albanian domination over this territory and the people who live there.

Contents

SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................................ 5

NOTE .......................................................................................................................................................................... 7

CONTEXT ................................................................................................................................................................... 9

PART I: (NON) ACHIEVEMENT OF THE PROCLAIMED GOALS OF THE INTERNAL DIALOGUE ........17

PART II: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR SERBIA – KOSOVO RELATIONS ....................................................23

1. DELIMITATION BETWEEN SERBS AND ALBANIANS ........................................................................25

2. THE STATUS QUO POLICY AND „FROZEN CONFLICT“ .....................................................................43

3. NORMALIZATION OF SERBIA – KOSOVO RELATIONS – A PATH TOWARD POSSIBLE SOLUTION ............................................................................................47

4. RECOMMENDATIONS TO UNBLOCK THE DIALOGUE .......................................................................51

5. APPENDICES ..................................................................................................................................................575.1. Appendix I: Forum for Ethnic Relation Reports on Monitoring

the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo ....................................................................................................................575.2. Appendix II: A Chronology of the History of the Serb-Albanian Conflicts

and Cooperation ........................................................................................................................................................585.3. Appendix III: A Chronology of the Internal Dialogue .........................................................................59

5

SUMMARY

The Review Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo is the seventh in a series of reports prepared by a team of experts from the Forum for Ethnic Relations in the period between July 24, 2017 and January 17, 2019, within the framework of the project “Monitoring and Reporting on the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo”, supported by the Open Society Foundation.

It is not possible to make a comprehensive assessment of the scope of the internal dialogue and to assess whether the internal dialogue has been used effectively, primarily by its initiator, Serbian President, because President Vučić has not yet acted on the announcement he had made to create a political platform and action plan on dialogue with Kosovo, and the Brussels dialogue has stalled.

The internal dialogue responded to the set goals only partially, and it especially failed to meet one of its key objectives: reaching a broad social consensus on the issue of Kosovo.

In the institutionalized dialogue, which was governed by the Serbian authorities, the issue of normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia and its connection with Serbia’s EU integration was suppressed and neglected. The public of Serbia was placed before a false image that status quo and delimitation are preferred options. Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo was neglected in the internal dialogue, even though the findings of public opinion polls showed that this option was more preferred than ethnic delimitation.

All this, with intensified propaganda and political activities of Serbian authorities had some side results of the internal dialogue, such as: strengthening ethnic nationalism in Serbia’s public, aggravating ideological and political divisions, and bringing security issues to the forefront. The biggest challenge for Serbia and attempts by its authorities to impose the policy of ethnic delimitation and swap of territories, due to failure to reach a social consensus.

It is important that the internal dialogue and Brussels dialogue have raised the issue of status of Kosovo and Serb community in Kosovo and the issue of borders, which lie at the core of the crisis – in the circumstances where the effective control over the territories predominantly inhabited by Serbs is de facto and partly de jure shifted in favor of Kosovo’s government.

The analysis also indicates complete absence of democratic framework in Serbia to address the issue of Kosovo. One argument in favor to this conclusion is that this policy was not formulated or carried out through legal institutions, nor was the public informed or invited in this serious venture. This finding is forewarning because the historical experience teaches that when there is no democratic framework, rule of law, functional institutions and influential public, the management of inter-ethnic relations can easily slip into the domain of ideological, political and armed conflicts.

This brings the entire purpose of the initiative and of the internal dialogue into question. There are many reasons for that: firstly, the initiator of the dialogue, as well as the Working Group or the Government, did not create the conditions for successful development of this dialogue, and they especially they did not support the freedom of dialogue and debates based on arguments; the atmosphere of propagandistic and ill-intentioned political confrontations was prevailing in the media as well as the public; the existing political conflicts over other issues such as the exercise of

6 Review Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo

power and the deep division and disagreements over the past, present and future of Serbia have been transferred on the issue of Kosovo. All this, and the crisis of dialogue indicate that Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo is at a crossroads.

7

NOTE

Between July 24, 2017 and January 17, 2019, the Forum for Ethnic Relations (hereinafter: Forum) published a series of six and this - seventh Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue (Attachment: Reports by the Forum for Ethnic Relations on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue) as the result of the project “Monitoring and Reporting on the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo”, supported by the Open Society Foundation.

Members of the expert team of the Forum for the preparation of the Review Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo (hereinafter: Review Report) are: Dr Dušan Janjić, Head of Expert Team and experts: Izabela Kisić, Milivoje Mihajlović, Fayez Risheg, Dr Siniša Vuković and Verka Jovanović, young researcher.

The Review Report includes the results of the analysis of the internal dialogue and Brussels dialogue on Kosovo.

The internal dialogue consisted of two sets of activities: the institutionalized dialogue consisting of twenty-nine (29) round tables, public debates organized by the Working Group for Support to the Managing of the Internal Dialogue set up by the Serbian Government (hereinafter: Working Group) (Attachment: Chronology of the internal dialogue), and numerous activities of opposition political parties, civil society organizations etc. From the very beginning, this part of the internal dialogue was more vibrant (it included a large number of actors, the most diverse initiatives were launched and many proposals were put forward).

The monitoring included collection, classification and analysis of data on the internal dialogue collected in various ways from reports and contributions in electronic and other media about events organized by the Government of the Republic of Serbia on behalf of the initiator of the dialogue (Serbian president), i.e. the Working Group; from events organized by civil society organizations, professional and other associations2 through direct monitoring of individual events (conferences, round tables, public debates, etc.) by the Forum’s contributors, when these events were not covered by the media but were of great importance for the project; through a research of public attitudes and value judgment on the internal dialogue, as well as on Serbian-Albanian relations and dialogue on the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo with the support of the European Union (hereinafter: Brussels dialogue).

The plan was to make a comprehensive assessment of the content and scope of the internal dialogue, and to assess whether the internal dialogue has been used effectively. However, at the time of writing this report, that is not possible due to the following two reasons:

1. Aleksandar Vučić, the initiator of the internal dialogue, has not yet acted on the announcement he had made to create a political platform for the dialogue with Kosovo, and on August 9, 2018, he announced publically: “I am in favor of delimitation with Albanians”. To date, the public is listening to new announcements and new reports without having seen any legitimate

2 NINA Media provided the material (press clipping) based on the methodology and key words agreed with the expert team of the Forum for Ethnic Relations.


document as proof. But the promised development and political platform are still missing. At the same time, the “Declaration of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia on the Current Situation in Kosovo and Metohija Following the Unilateral and Violent Actions of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Prishtina”, adopted by the Serbian Parliament on July 31, 2011 in order to start the Brussels dialogue and negotiations with the EU on Serbia’s accession, which concern the negotiating framework (Chapter 35), and

2. The Brussels dialogue is stagnating and it is impossible to verify whether Serbian President Vučić had accepted any of the proposals from the internal dialogue. Serbian authorities’ course of action towards Kosovo remains unknown, which points to a number of problems, non-transparency and clandestine operations to name some. This type of political modus operandi is supported by the EU facilitators, and EC politicians and bureaucrats are obviously “relying on powerful local leaders, because they will sign whatever needs signing”. They do not take into account the public support.3

The Review Report points to the basic determinants and scope of the internal dialogue, to the situation and interaction between the internal dialogue and the dialogue in Brussels, in the period from 24 July 2017 to 17 January 2019. It also points to the activities of key actors as well as to key proposals and their contribution to the progress of the dialogue and the improvement of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.

Associates of the Forum in the entire process of monitoring and reporting on the internal dialogue were as follows: Dr Dušan Janjić (project leader and leading expert), experts - Jelena Aleksić, Ankica Dobrin, Stefan Goranović, Verka Jovanović, Izabela Kisić, Predrag Milidrag, Milivoje Mihajlović, Fayez Risheg, Dr Vladan Rusić, Ivan Spirić, Eva Vukašinović, Dr Siniša Vuković, regional reporters - Tatjana Lazarević, Ljiljana Stojanović, Fatmir Rexhepi.

3 Guest N1: Public in disarray, no one knows what is Serbia’s policy for Kosovo, N1, Belgrade, 06 June 2018, 18:39 (http://rs.n1info.com/a394299/Vesti/Gosti-N1-Javnost-sludjena-ne-zna-sta-je-politika-za-Kosovo.html)

9

CONTEXT

The year 2018 was marked by political and security confrontations and propaganda wars4both concerning Kosovo and in Kosovo. General public, Serbian and Kosovo authorities, and international actors are now facing a choice: to continue the dialogue on normalization or to live in a state of (un) safety.

The Serbian-Albanian relations are marked by a long history of “parallel life” on “common territory”. Through history these relations shifted back and forth from conflicts to cooperation. In certain periods, the Serbian-Albanian relations were marked by open political as well as armed (military-police and guerrilla) conflicts, with characteristics indicating an ethnic conflict. (Attachment: Chronology of Serbian - Albanian Conflicts and Cooperation).

In recent history, the issue of status came at the core of the crisis in Kosovo, which is why its resolution is one of the essential elements of the consolidation and peace-building. It is also tightly related with the state-building process of both Serbia and Kosovo, as an answer to the status issue. Significant changes have occurred regarding the control over the territory of Kosovo. Today, Serbia does not have effective military and police control over the territory and life in Kosovo, and Kosovo is in the phase of completion of sovereignty of its institutions and building international legal personality, first of all in regional cooperation, in world monetary and financial institutions, sports and other organizations. Kosovo is committed to becoming a member of the EU.

In fact, public declaration and participation in the EU integration process is one of the few if not the only shared interest of Serbia and Kosovo. It is also a powerful tool for solving a number of issues within the normalization process. But, evidently, it is not sufficient, as there is no substantial progress in the normalization of relations, which would strengthen the commitment to the EU integrations.

The life of Albanians and Serbs is one of neighbors, which is why their dialogue is older than the Brussels dialogue, which began in 2011. Prior to this, the dialogue did not stop even during the military-police repression and armed conflicts, from 1997 to 1999, or during the period of persecution and violence against of Serbs in 2004.

In the spring of 2008, Kosovo declared independence. Serbia decided to challenge it before the International Court of Justice, and all processes at home came to a halt until the Court delivered a decision that, in its opinion, the declaration of Kosovo independence did not violate the international law. All contacts that existed, however weak, were carried out through international liaison offices, but even that required creative diplomacy.

The unilateral proclamation of independence of the Republic of Kosovo was followed by a period of stagnation in relations and the freezing of communication between the authorities of Kosovo and Serbia. Now, the process of normalization has begun, which should hopefully facilitate regulation of Serbia-Kosovo relations and resolution of the status issue. This journey started with the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 in March 2011.5

4 The term “security” includes both the broader context of human safety as well as a series of frivolous incidents and violent actions all the way to the political terrorist act of murder of Oliver Ivanović.

5 The Resolution defined the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, under the auspices of the European Union (Brussels dialogue) as follows: „the process of dialogue in itself would be a factor for peace, security and stability


In order to include Serbia in the Brussels dialogue, on July 31, 2011 the National Assembly of Serbia adopted the “Declaration of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia on the Current Situation in Kosovo and Metohija Following the Unilateral and Violent Actions of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Prishtina”, by which it determined the priorities (paragraph 6) i.e. “the action framework for state bodies and other public factors in the defense of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia”.6

Two decisive steps were made on April 19, 2013 with the signing of the Agreement on Principles, and on May 22, when a plan for its implementation was agreed. The significance of this agreement is that it represents the first sign that the parties have agreed to look ahead into the future in order to reduce hostilities. While there is a relatively high degree of agreement on the nature of the Agreement on Principles, this does not apply to the assessments of its implementation and the contribution of the “other side” to implement what was agreed. There is a pronounced disagreement regarding the fulfillment of a part of the agreement concerning the Community / Association of Municipalities with Serb majority (ZSO).7

After the signing of the Agreement on Principles it was evident that it had covered most of the objectives of the dialogue from the UN General Assembly resolution 64/298, but also that it included more than that.

The goal of the Brussels dialogue is to achieve significant progress towards “normal” relations, i.e. normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. Normalization itself is seen as a milestone. By achieving “full normalization”, which, in Serbia’s case, should be achieved through negotiations on EU membership, and in Kosovo’s case through the implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), the ultimate goal will be reached. The ultimate goal is the same for Serbia and Kosovo – a common European future.

The importance of the Brussels dialogue is reflected in the fact that it included the authorities and the public and produced the first results in facilitating the lives of people.

The Negotiating Framework for Serbia’s EU accession, which contains the mechanism and rules for Serbia’s EU membership negotiations, provides that “full normalization” is a conditio sine qua non8

in the region, and that dialogue would be to promote cooperation, achieve progress on the path to the European Union and improve the lives of the people“ (Rezolucija GS UN 64/298 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/298).

6 That framework consists of: • Defence of legitimate interests of Serbia and „people on KiM“, until the adoption of a compromise solution of

the issue, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244; • Continuation of dialogue between the Serbian government and Prishtina aimed at finding solutions to specific

problems of citizens and finding a permanent compromise solution; • Serbian requests the international missions to allow no unilateral activities carried out by the provisional

institutions in Prishtina threatening peace, stability, possibility of reaching compromise solution and changing of the existing situation on the ground“;

• Government of the Republic of Serbia to adopt concrete measures aimed at maintenance of all state activities of the Republic of Serbia in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija;

• Government of the Republic of Serbia to make its utmost efforts in all circumstances that may arise, to protect the lives and property, rights and liberties of the citizens in the province, and especially the Serbian and other violence endangered population“;

• Government of the Republic of Serbia to adopt a concrete and comprehensive measures plan to be taken in case of deterioration of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija etc. (Declaration of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia on the Current Situation in Kosovo and Metohija Following the Unilateral and Violent Actions of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Prishtina„Official Gazette of RS, no. 44, Belgrade 31 July 2011).

7 Dušan Janjić, “Normalization Challenges: Analysis of the Negotiation Process and the Implementation of the Brussels Agreement”, Policy Paper, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade 2015.

8 Paragraph 23 of the Negotiating Framework states: “The issue of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo will be addressed under Chapter 35: “Other issues” as a specific item”. Also, “Serbia’s continued

Review Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo 11

for the accession of Serbia to the EU, as well as that Serbia and Kosovo must sign a legally binding agreement on a comprehensive normalization of relations before Serbia becomes a member of the EU.9This attitude also determines the nature of the agreements to be reached during the Brussels dialogue. So, this concerns political documents that produce binding legal consequences. At the end of the negotiation process, under Chapter 35, a legally binding umbrella agreement is envisaged that will also legally verify all agreements.

This dialogue started with the process called a “technical dialogue” on issues that were already discussed before in order to build some confidence by reaching agreements on easy things. Among those, it chose energy, telecommunications, some justice-related issues, border controls, freedom of movement etc. (See: Appendix Chronology of technical dialogue).

Results were mixed, but it produced first actual agreements between the two sides on several issues where agreement was possible. This included recognition of diplomas, important for Southern Serbia where many Albanians attended school in Kosovo and were not eligible for employment in the public sector unless their diplomas were recognized. It also included an agreement to copy land registry books that were removed from Kosovo when Yugoslav/Serbian authorities were withdrawing from Kosovo. This was good for both sides, as it allowed the Kosovo authorities to sort out many ownership issues, including Serbian claims to ownership. So these were a clear win-win. The agreement on “integrated border management” handled an issue that was considered settled by both sides, but from completely opposed positions. In the end, it resulted in regulating the border traffic. At the time, that was a major achievement. Discussion on customs stamp issue was basically a non-issue, as the customs stamp in question was already accepted by Serbia within the CEFTA framework, but the fact of discussions allowed Belgrade to accept it again without too much public backlash. Discussions on energy and telecommunications, as before, led nowhere. The agreement on freedom of movement, on the other hand, was an unqualified success as it finally allowed the citizens of Kosovo to travel through Serbia unimpeded. So the process created some technical successes that had direct impact on quality of life. This, coupled with the simultaneous decision to restart dialogue, was given as reasons not to continue with recognitions of Kosovo until the two sides sort out their differences. This did not help move the political process, but actually returned the situation to where it was before the ICJ process – Serbia continued to dispute actions taken by Kosovo authorities as illegitimate, and lack of recognitions stalled almost every international process related to Kosovo. But it did produce tangible results, and it created a general atmosphere in which it was normal for delegations from Kosovo and Serbia to meet and discuss just about any topic.

High Representative Ashton convened the prime ministers of Kosovo and Serbia to Brussels, and in April of 2013 they reached the First Framework Agreement10. This was the first actual, political breakthrough ever in the process, and should be recognized as such. The agreement laid out much of what was to be discussed on some outstanding difficult issues, and set out the framework for the single most contentious issues of the later decade – the Association of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo.

The agreement also put the administration of justice and police firmly within the Kosovo legal framework, bringing about a significant change in attitude and clearly establishing at least general Kosovo jurisdiction over the four municipalities in the north of Kosovo. It also provided for elections in the north of Kosovo under Kosovo jurisdiction, which were held amidst riots and general disturbances, and had to be repeated, but which in the end succeeded.

engagement, in line with the Stabilization and Association process conditionality, towards a visible and sustainable improvement in relations with Kosovo”.

9 http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/pristupni_pregovori/pregovaracki_okvir.pdf10 http://www.kim.gov.rs/lat/p03.php


Incorporation of police and justice was more than a technical agreement. It was a political commitment to elimination of what is known as “the parallel structures”, the single most visible sign of Serbia’s continued presence in Kosovo. Political symbolism of this can hardly be overstated – for many years Kosovo Serbs clung to the idea that Serbia is still present in Kosovo, and that, once the meddlesome foreigners are gone, it will return. In the meantime, there is no need to fear because there is police to protect them, schools to educate children, and courts to pass justice. Serbia’s role in the elimination of those most basic “parallel structures” was recognized as a major step forward in normalization of relations and was “rewarded” as well. This was confirmed by the EU’s decision to move on with Serbia’s accession, by adopting the Negotiating Framework for accession negotiations with Serbia.

More than two years later, the EU adopted a Common Position on Chapter 3511. The entire document is a catalogue of agreements reached in the two processes since 2011, asking Serbia to continue implementation of each in turn, with more or less specifics. But there is absolutely no notion of any new areas that the dialogue could engage on.

Be that as it may, there are still two main ways in which the process of normalization can move on – continue as until now, building from the bottom up, or reversing the course and reaching an overall agreement first, sorting out the details later.

The internal dialogue and the Brussels dialogue on Kosovo involved an effort to facilitate the adjustment of the Serbian government policy and public discourse on the issue of Kosovo independence, and bring normalization of Serbia – Kosovo relations in order to further Serbia’s EU integrations. Since 2013 the Serbian officials have been treating the issue of Kosovo as a necessary step that must be taken to allow Serbia, and later Kosovo, EU membership. They insisted on the opportunities offered by this process, hoping it could avoid accepting Kosovo’s independence.12

A key step in the Brussels dialogue was an agreement on the continuation of the dialogue between interested and involved parties (Serbia, Kosovo, the EU and the United States) and its elevation to the highest level by the inclusion of Prime Ministers of Serbia and Kosovo Ivica Dačić and Hashim Thaçi, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton.

The course of the Brussels dialogue was so far good. There were 23 agreements 13reached at the political and technical level and three agreements14 within the political dialogue. However, the analysis of the agreements’ implementation and application indicators shows very modest results which do not guarantee favorable outcome. The period of progress (in the dialogue) was followed by an eruption of political and security challenges.

Announcement of the “new phase” of the dialogue in July 2017, in which the negotiations should accelerate and strengthen the implementation of the agreed, when Serbian officials began to mention the obligation established under the EU negotiating framework for Chapter 35 on the negotiation and adoption of a final comprehensive agreement that is legally binding, has opened a

11 AD 12/15 30 November 2015 CONF – RS112 Bodo Weber & Agron Bajrami (2018) The original framework of the political dialogue, Democratization Policy

Council – DPC, Group for Legal and Political Studies and Kosovo Foundation for Open Society – KFOS, Berlin-Prishtina, may 2018, 7, 8.

13 Most of these agreements deal with issues that are important for the lives of citizens, aimed at dissolving Serb parallel structures in Kosovo, extending the rule of law across the country, and consolidating Kosovo’s international subjectivity. However, their implementation was not satisfactory, primarily because of the very nature of the agreement, as well as because of the unwillingness of the parties, especially Serbia, to respect the agreements reached.

14 The first agreement on comprehensive normalization of relations, April 19, 2013 and the Agreement on Judiciary, February 9, 2015, which is currently being implemented, as well as the Agreement on ZSO, August 25, 2015, which was not implemented (Kosovo Dialogue - Serbia: Challenges and Further steps, KIPRID, Transparency INtrenational Kosova, March 2018).


new season of conflicts and solicitation of the most diverse solutions, such as “border delimitation between Serbs and Albanians”, not only in Kosovo but across the Balkans, “divisions”, and “exchange of territories”.

While 2017 could be seen as a year of hope and belief that “the momentum for reaching a historical agreement” between Serbia and Kosovo, 2018 could be described as a year of political – propaganda clashes and security issues.

Up until the beginning of 2018 it had seemed that presidents Vučić and Thaçi were close to reaching an agreement. But when it was announced that the agreement could involve territorial exchange, in the region where the most severe conflicts since the World War II took place, it revived old fears among Serbian and Kosovo citizens, and was met with resistance by the most influential circles in the international community.15

Occasional political and security incidents took the Kosovo crisis to a new, higher level and established a “new reality”.16

Political speeches and a visit by the Serbian president to northern Kosovo on 9 September 2018 played an important role in this. President Vučić portrayed his political activities in northern Kosovo as part of his struggle for Serbs and peace.17A special emphasis was placed on the visit to Gazivode artificial lake – an important resource for both the Serbs and Albanians18according to Vučić, who also added that no one thinks that Albanians should be left without this water resource.19This sent a message that these resources, territory and property cannot be taken away from Serbia”.20On that occasion, Aleksandar Vučić told the Serbs south of Ibar that there is no reason for concern since no agreement is anywhere in sight, but if anything changes and his proposals are accepted, Serbs will enjoy more rights than today and their lives will be incomparably better. We are not close to any solution because there is no support for that from the international community, primarily the most powerful EU members. He also announced that Serbia will continue to finance institutions and needs of Kosovo Serbs in the amount up to EUR 50 million.21Hashim Thaçi reciprocated by also visiting Gazivode Lake.

This process has entered a new phase when Kosovo government passed a decision to introduce 10% customs tariffs, and later, on 21 November 2018, introduced 100% customs tariffs on all goods from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economically speaking, these are unusual measures, but are actually a common place in political confrontations. These measures are just another link in the long chain of political and propaganda confrontations between Belgrade and Prishtina, which came to the fore in early 2015 on the issue of ownership over Trepca mines and establishment of the Community of Serb Municipalities. Additionally, new measures have been announced aimed at defending Kosovo’s

15 http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/414253/Vucic-za-Blumberg-Resenje-problema-izmedu-Srba-i-Albanaca-promenice-region

16 https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/29128387.html17 I am going to Kosovo to fight for Serbs and peace, Večernje novosti, Belgrade, 08 October 2018.18 Speaking about Gazivode Lake, President Vučić said that this shows all the problems that Serbia is facing, adding

that he believes that different views about the lake and the difficult political struggle will stay in the past and that an agreement will be reached that will last for the next 100 years. Gazivode are important for Albanians because most of Metohija gets water from there, as well as Prishtina. It is significant for the Serbs, because without Gazivode there is no life for people in Zubin Potok and Ibarski Kolašin. On that occasion, Vučić mentioned misunderstandings with the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO): “Are they stealing EUR 8 million worth of electricity from us or our people are not paying, as they say? Vučić said and reminded that Serbia invested in the renovation of the dam almost RSD 128 million and that it RSD 12 million remains to be paid. (Vučić: Dogovor nije blizu, FoNet, 08.09.2018 16:13; http://www.fonet.rs)

19 ibid20 Milovan Drecun, No one can take away Serbia’s property, “Kurir”, Belgrade, 09 October 201821 “We want an economically stronger Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, we want Serbia to help more” (EUR 10 million

for a hospital in Mitrovica, Večerne novosti, Belgrade, 10 October 2018).


vital interests.22It was argued that it is necessary to stop Serbia’s operations that hinder free trade and jeopardize Kosovo’s vital national interests.23 Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj stated that measures will stay in force until “Serbia stops undermining” Kosovo’s sovereignty.24

In the opinion of the Serbian president, this move by the Kosovo government can produce four possible outcomes: first, “to exert the strongest pressure so far”, leading to “unconditional capitulation” of Belgrade and full recognition of Kosovo independence; second, “an attempt towards complete trade ban” which would “prevent people in northern Kosovo from having access to goods from Serbia”, that is, to quietly and secretly carry out the fastest ethnic cleansing and expel Serbs from Kosovo, both north and south of Ibar river; third, pressure on the international community and institutions in order to ensure visa liberalization for Kosovo, and “to show at the same time that they are able to produce destabilization”; fourth, provoking “conflicts and complete destabilization of the region for the sake of interests of others or their own interests”, because Prishtina “cannot fulfill their goals peacefully and through dialogue in the way they want it”.25

Concerning customs tariffs on Serbian goods, the EU firmly “requested their withdrawal”. In case of “violation of the spirit and principles of the Agreement on stabilization and association between the EU and Kosovo”, the Agreement provides for the mechanisms to be used to resolve open issues between the EU and Kosovo. “This includes bilateral contacts and placing the issue on the agenda of common bodies, such as the Stabilization and Association Council.

The introduction of tariffs showed there was room for reciprocal penalties. If Serbia does not recognize food certification issued by Kosovo, Kosovo can do the same. These measures will certainly be more devastating for Serbia. The same applies to license plates, personal documents, bank registration, transport certificates, veterinary certificates, phyto-certificate, etc. Of course, Serbia will be able to manage and survive these measures because it is bigger, richer and in a better position in almost every way. But, such a development can aggravate the lives of people in both countries. The reaction by the authorities and the media in Serbia after the introduction of the customs tariffs further aggravated the atmosphere already marked by distrust and mobilization aimed to “further complicate” the lives of Kosovo citizens, both Serbs and Albanians26 including the announcement of a possible “armed strike” in northern Kosovo.27 It was announced that on 14 December 2018 Kosovo Assembly

22 Customs tariffs on Serbian goods 100%, FoNet News Agency, 21 November 2018 ([email protected]).23 “Serbia and Russia are refusing to recognize our sovereignty and are blocking our accession to the UN. By violating

the Brussels agreement on the normalization of relations, Serbia is working to block our path to the EU, as well as in many international organizations, including our efforts to join Interpol, which panders to organized crime and hinders the implementation of the international law” (Ramush Haradinaj, Kososvo’s prime minister: We will not accept Serbia’s violation of our sovereignty, “The Washington Post”, Washington DC, November, 28, 2018).

24 ibid.25 FoNet News Agency, 21. November 2018. ([email protected])26 A part of Serbia’s policy that contributes to this is lobbying for the withdrawal of recognition of Kosovo by other

states and blocking Kosovo’s membership in international organizations (UNESCO, and most recently Interpol). Serbian authorities explain such activities as improving Serbia’s negotiating position. In reality, this leads to a “frozen conflict” and is a departure from the policy of normalization of relations. In the case of Kosovo’s membership in Interpol, two issues were crucial - the issue of the status and the issue of security. The issue of the status prompts the vote “against”, while the issue of security, including arguments given by Serbia, such as strong organized crime, the presence of terrorist threats and endangerment of the Serb minority’s deficiency prompts the vote “in favor”. Priority was given to the issue of the status over the improvement of security. It can therefore be concluded that “the crime has won” and those “fearing to find themselves on the wanted list” (Analysts: Too much triumphalism in Serbia, elections are approaching, N1 info, http://rs.n1info.com/a437565/Vesti/Analiticari-Previse-trijumfalizma):

27 The influence of the use of security issues in political and propaganda purposes on the public is also reflected in public opinion polls. In June 2018, Faktor Plus agency found that 36 percent of the respondents would support the use of military force in northern Kosovo, while 16% would support the use of force in the entire Kosovo territory. 25 percent support diplomatic ways in defending Kosovo Serbs, while 16 percent of respondents would negotiate “at all costs”. These facts make it possible to conclude that there is an extremely high degree of “militarization” of


will pass a law a thus finalize the legal framework for the transformation of KSF into Kosovo armed forces. On that occasion, the President of Serbia stated that Prishtina’s moves are irresponsible, very irresponsible, and will lead to a perilous situation: “They are doing this to expel the Serbian people from Kosovo and Metohija and take over the north of Kosovo. I said at the beginning and I repeat it today - our hands will not be tied, because we are put in in a tight corner, we have no choice ... What are we supposed to do? To fight to spread the truth, to plead with everyone not to jeopardize the safety of Serbs in Kosovo, the international community, KFOR ... Is that enough. We will see that”.28

The EC claims that they are working with Prishtina to “resolve the issue of customs” in order to move things towards achieving a comprehensive solution for relations between Belgrade and Prishtina. At the same time, the US authorities call on Kosovo to abolish the customs tariffs with a clear warning that such a decision is jeopardizing the dialogue and good relationship with the United States.29

The economic cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo started after 2013 with the initiation of the process of normalization and the Berlin process. This positive trend was best utilized by business communities and companies in Serbia and Kosovo and the region. The two sides, whether government institutions, agencies or companies agreed on numerous procedures and documents that had not been harmonized to date. In that way the economic cooperation that already existed was restored to the legal framework, and new cooperation has been encouraged. Therefore, the introduction of customs tariffs by the Kosovo government from 10% to 100% is extremely risky because it calls into question one of the most visible achievements of the current normalization process30 as well as the very purpose of the further dialogue.31In order to show the omnipotence of political voluntarism, these measures punished those who believed in the possibility of cooperation, and the biggest losers are the

the Serbian public (Faktor plus: Third in favor of the use of force in Kosovo, Danas, Belgrade, 9-10 June 2018, 43; Two thirds of Serbs weep for Kosovo, Politika, Belgrade, June 9, 2018.

28 https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2018&mm=12&dd=03&nav_category=11&nav_id=147740329 According to TV Klan Kosova, US State Department sent a letter with the following eight points: 1. “Tariffs

are introduced without consultation with the United States”. 2. “We are deeply disappointed that after President Trump’s letter to President Thaçi, not only that the Kosovo Government failed to send a positive response, but the volume of products to which the tariffs are applied has been increased.” 3. “We demand the immediate suspension of tariffs. The same tariffs can be re-established if the agreement with Serbia fails. “4. “US support for Kosovo is not unconditional. Kosovo is currently risking endangering the success of the dialogue. “5. “If tariffs are not immediately suspended, the US will suspend security assistance, that is, support for the KSF.” 6.” Success and achievement of the agreement are not related to the role of Ms. Mogherini and the EU. The agreement is a strategic interest of the United States, so it is unacceptable to challenge this strategic goal with irresponsible actions by the Kosovo leaders. “7. “If the agreement fails because of Kosovo, the burden of responsibility and consequences will be borne solely by Kosovo and the individuals responsible for this failure. “8.” With its irresponsible behavior, Kosovo is seriously endangering its friendship with the United States. “ (https://kossev.info/klan-kosova-stejt-department-uslovljava-kosovo-svojom-podrskom-za-kbs-ako-ne-ukinu-takse..

30 Kosovo imports amounted to to EUR 3 billion in 2017, which shows that it is a clearly import-oriented economy; the total export was EUR 378 million. Of these total imports, imports from Serbia are 14.47%, and 12.75% of its total exports are to Serbia, which is a rather balanced situation percentagewise. Serbia’s exports amounted to EUR 15 billion of which EUR 420 million to Kosovo, which makes 3% of Serbia’s total exports. When comparing data for 2017 and 2016, there is an increase in exports from both sides. Serbia’s exports to Kosovo were 9.5% higher in 2017 and Kosovo’s exports to Serbia were higher by 27.5%, which shows a stable growth considering the starting point of the normalization process. In the first 9 months of 2018, Serbia recorded 8.5% export growth to Kosovo, while Kosovo’s exports to Serbia were higher by 15.4%. Of the total Serbian exports to Kosovo, 58% are goods, material for further processing, 35-36% are final products and 5% are machines. Therefore, there is a significant connection between the markets of Serbia and Kosovo measured by the placement of final products as well as raw materials from Serbia for further processing and creation of added value in Kosovo.

31 This weakness in the Kosovo government policy was used directly by the President of Serbia on December 15, 2018, when he stated the following: “What is there to discuss until measures are withdrawn?”. By this he introduced another “red line”, in addition to the CSM from March 2018, for participation in the Brussels Dialogue. In addition, he challenged the Assembly’s resolution on the dialogue with Belgrade which, according to him,


participants in economic cooperation. However, due to the interdependence of the two economies, this unilateral blow to one of the most important achievements of the normalization process will have consequences on the re-assessment of Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo. If all the lessons from this latest clash are learned, then certain neglected interests of Kosovo and Serbia, such as the need for sustainable development could be achieved. However, if the present situation marked by obstacles and hindering from both sides persists for a long time, it will bring down the fragile mutual confidence of the parties and set negative trends in motion.

In all likelihood, these measures were introduced with the intention to strengthen Prishtina’s position before the forthcoming negotiations. Therefore, these tariffs will not be canceled “overnight”. “The tariffs will be abolished when Kosovo gets something in return. When analyzing the essence of these measures, they are introduced to show that Kosovo is a state and that Kosovo can strike back“.32

* * *

The year 2018 could be marked as a year of uncertainty and growing crisis in relations between political actors on the issue of Kosovo, relations with Kosovo Albanians, as well as Serbia’s EU integration. This year started with a still unsolved murder of one of the most prominent leaders of Kosovo Serbs Oliver Ivanović on January 16, and continued with ill-intentioned usage of security incidents, military and police for the purposes of marketing and propaganda and for “the strengthening of negotiating positions”; the international community and the region grew skeptical regarding the real intentions of the negotiators and fear of losing control over political and security conflicts. At the same time, the Brussels dialogue has stalled. This indicates the absence of a democratic framework and consensus on this issue, and the strengthening of authoritarianism and militarization of politics, primarily in Serbia and Kosovo but also in a wider context. General public, Serbian and Kosovo authorities, and international actors are now facing a choice: to continue the dialogue on normalization or to live in a state of (un) safety.

In December 2018 the relations between Serbia and Kosovo have reached a point from which they could take two opposite directions: first, the relations can stay inside the political framework and in 2019 it would be possible to restore dialogue; second, the crises could disperse over a series of conflicts, local armed conflicts and terrorism. It remains to be seen which of these two courses will be adopted, but that mainly depends on local leaders, the public, and the involved international actors.

Freeze-frame or slow-motion film techniques could be summoned to describe the present dynamics of the Brussels dialogue – a dying patient (dialogue) and a group of disorientated doctors (local politicians, European and other bureaucrats, diplomats) arguing whether to resuscitate. The image goes off and on into slow-motion solely to allow the patient to take one breath. The (clinical) picture does not bode well for the patient. This dialogue never actually stopped, the problem is the noninclusive manner in which it is carried out. Presently, the Brussels dialogue entails occasional meetings between politicians, exchanges over Tweeter and other media etc., and mobilization of masses for something that is not normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. It is a discussion between leaders threatening to become a discussion for leaders only, because there is a new reality, which states that Kosovo government, including the emerging Kosovo army, is capable to effectively control the entire territory of Kosovo.

has set three “very important conditions” as follows: “that any agreement must lead to the recognition of the Republic of Kosovo; determining immutability of the borders of the Republic of Kosovo; territorial integrity must be retained on a unitary principle, meaning that no parts of it can be a part of a federation... They said - we want everything and at all costs, and we are ready for dialogue. What are we to discuss based on such a document?” President Vućić asked. (B92 Info bulletin, 15.12.2018 (b92-info-txt).

32 https://www.danas.rs/politika/dusan-janjic-uvodjenjem-taksi-kosovo-ojacalo-pregovaracku-poziciju/

17

PART I: (NON) ACHIEVEMENT OF THE PROCLAIMED GOALS OF THE INTERNAL DIALOGUE

The internal dialogue was started at the initiative by the President of the Republic of Serbia.33 But it was conducted and completed as informal personal consultations by Aleksandar Vučić. The dialogue ended de facto primarily by the “freezing of activities” of the Working Group.34

From the day of assassination of Oliver Ivanović on January 16, 2018, there is a notable instability of the political and security framework of the internal dialogue, including the crisis of March 26, 2018, when Marko Đurić, director of the Office of the Serbian Government, was arrested in Kosovska Mitrovica with excessive use of force by the Kosovo Police Service (KPS); numerous incidents (ethnically-motivated attacks on Serbs, encouragement of hate speech and over-emphasizing the importance of violence and possible armed conflict by media, politicians, individual members of governments, and especially Serbian media); tensions emerging due to the visit of Aleksandar Vučić and Hashim Thaçi to Gazivode Lake, in the north Kosovo). These events triggered the energy of destabilization and increased the risk of failing to peacefully manage the relations between the Serbs and Albanians or Serbia and Kosovo. Since then, the political and security marketing activities of the authorities have been intensified, and the ethno-nationalist narrative has become intensified in the public discourse. In such circumstances, the Working Group interrupted the institutionalized internal dialogue, which led to its collapse in the public.

The Initiative for the Internal Dialogue set the following goals: achieving broad social consensus, demythologizing the Kosovo issue, achieving a solution that is sustainable in the future, which the initiator refers to as “the final solution”, peaceful solution of problems, achievement of the key interests of the Serbian community and opening of the way towards the EU. The analysis indicates that none of these goals have been fully met (“Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo”).35

33 Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić initiated the internal dialogue on Kosovo with the text “Why Do We Need an Internal Dialogue on Kosovo”, published in daily Blic on July 24, 2017. Despite the fact that he announced on several occasions during the presidential campaign, then again in his inaugural speech and in an interview for Sputnik on July 2, 2017 that he will initiate internal dialogue on Kosovo and constitutional changes, the First Report treats Vučić’s text in Blic as the initiative. There are two reasons for this: firstly, in that text, the reasons and goals of the internal dialogue are clarified and, secondly, this text has triggered reactions which de facto started the internal dialogue.

34 An official summary or a similar document that would be available to the public or at least participants in the dialogue was never prepared. No state body has been informed on results of the dialogue to date.

35 Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25 May, 2018.


One of the visible consequences of the internal dialogue is an increased interest of the public in Serbia and Kosovo, as well as the region, in resolution of the Kosovo issue. Also, the majority of actors are homogenized in their ethno-nationalist approach to this issue. This is largely the result of institutionalized dialogue and propaganda - marketing and political activities of the Serbian authorities. This homogenization has increased the risk of failing to achieve the key goal of the initiative – reaching an overall consensus.36 Instead, it produced political clashes and conflicts.

There are two criteria for this grouping: First and foremost, differences in ideology and politics. One subgroup constitutes the parties of a strong ethno-nationalist and right-wing orientation, while the other subgroup consists of followers of liberal-democratic ideology and politics; second, (dis)agreement on the future of Serbia, or (non) acceptance of Serbia’s membership in the EU, including differences in relation to Russia and the West (EU and USA). Considering the ambivalent message contained in the initial text of the initiator of the dialogue, the attitudes of the citizens, and the attitudes raised during the internal dialogue, a conclusion can be drawn that the content of that text is a faithful expression of the mood of a large number of Serbian citizens, and that in such circumstances it is unrealistic to expect the achievement of a wide social consensus on the issue of Kosovo.

It is also evident that there is a lack of political will of the initiators and the Serbian authorities to check and improve the policy of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo through the internal dialogue, which is a commitment undertaken during the election campaign through the acceptance of the obligations under the Brussels agreement.

There are arguments to support the following conclusions: first, the dialogue collapsed because there was no clear strategy behind the initiative that would promote genuine dialogue and encourage the creation of a social consensus on Kosovo; second, the initiative was just a blanket for putting forward plan “B” or redirecting normalization toward a “final solution” which implies full recognition of Kosovo by Serbia with appropriate “territorial compensation”.37

During the internal dialogue, many of the previously known solutions were repeated, but the creativity to adapt those solutions to reality was missing. Also, there was no effort to argue more comprehensively and elaborate on the proposed solutions.

There are very few solutions that are actually grounded in reality. The absence of inclusiveness and tolerance, disregard for the interests and integrity of the other (Albanian) side are prevailing.

Instead of the proclaimed demythologization, there was an intensified mythologization of the Kosovo issue38, which was reduced to the question of control of the territory. This is evidenced by the statement of the Serbian President of Serbia of June 30, 2018, that Serbia “no longer has one inch of the land in Kosovo”.39

The internal dialogue took place under controlled conditions. A propaganda campaign by numerous political actors was unceasing (from members of political parties of the ruling coalition and parts of the opposition, certain civil society organizations and public figures, experts, especially analysts and media close to the government and those with “pro-Russian orientation”), against individuals and organizations attacked, labeled and disqualified as “national traitors”, “members of foreign agencies” and the like.40 The reason behind these attacks was criticism against the state

36 First Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, p. 18, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25 December 2017, available at http://fer.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Izveštaj-final-web.pdf

37 For now, it seems that behind this concept there was no elaborated strategy, no sufficient support was provided and, in terms of tactics and the application of this political idea, there was no sufficient capacity (knowledge, skills and human resources).

38 Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25 May 2018, p. 939 Vučić: Even one meter of Kosovo is a gain, because now we have nothing, Blic, 30 June 2018. (https://www.blic.rs/

vesti/politika/)40 Sam President Vučić also mentioned activities of the agencies, which he also mentioned to the Patriarch of the

Serbian Orthodox Church, implicating activities of different agencies operating inside the SPC. The message to


policy on Kosovo, the positions held by the president of Serbia and certain members of the Serbian government, and the internal dialogue itself.41 There were no attempts to reconcile the attitudes of those who hold that any agreement with the Kosovo Albanians is “treason” and those who insisted on “the necessity of agreement and compromise”.42

The ruling coalition and government authorities have seized a monopoly on advocating a “compromise” but also on labeling others. The public should have the impression that Serbia is surrounded by enemies and is powerless to solve the problem of Kosovo for its own benefit. In this media confusion, the word “dialogue” is completely lost.43

Although the achievement of a broad social consensus nowhere in sight, representatives of the government keep announcing and postponing holding a debate in the Parliament and referendum on Kosovo for the moment “when we have a defined proposal produced through a compromise”.44

In addition to individual public acceptance of the commitment to a peaceful solution, army, military force, military-police activities were mentioned, explicitly or implicitly, as a factor in negotiations regarding the final solution to the status of Kosovo.45 Increased public mentioning of the subject of equipping and raising the combat readiness of the Serbian Armed Forces, enhanced public manifestation of the capabilities of the police and gendarmerie in facing the risk of terrorism, the fact that Serbia’s combat readiness was twice raised, along with the advocacy of authoritarian rule and the militarization of society, memories of recent armed conflicts and a sense of vulnerability were revived among the citizens of Serbia, especially among the Serbs in Kosovo, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. All this creates a fertile ground for the strengthening of the activities of extreme political groups who advocate armed conflict as a viable solution.

In such circumstances, the statements by Presidents Vučić and Thaçi, such as those given after the meeting in Brussels on 24 June 2018, that “it was agreed that all problems are to be resolved in peace, with respect and guarantee of the security and safety of citizens”,46 are short-lived and unconvincing. The reason for this is that their talks and public arguments are always neglecting the fact that there is a connection between the European integration of Serbia and the resolution of the status of Kosovo. Neither the authorities nor the opposition have done anything to clearly demonstrate to the citizens of Serbia the interdependence between the normalization of Serbia-Kosovo relations and the internal dialogue with the progress of Serbia’s EU integrations.47 The “European future” has disappeared from the public speech of the leading political actors and citizens were not offered any convincing alternative.

The initiator of internal dialogue proclaimed that “compromise” is his goal, adding that “this means not losing what we must not lose, and if you want to define it in this way, to lose only

all who oppose Vučić’s possible proposal for Kosovo is this: If Father Sava was declared CIA agent, if Teodosije is subjected to attacks – imagine what can media make up about you...

41 Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25 May 2018, p. 742 Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25 May 2018, p. 843 “All government media claimed that Serbia is weak, that the mighty West is siding with the Albanians, that they

are preparing a “Storm” for the north Kosovo... Media preparation of the “Solution for Kosovo” includes raising tensions throughout the region. Relations with Montenegro are exacerbated - the cause is overly banal (the presence of a Montenegrin officer - a military diplomat in Zagreb, at a celebration marking an anniversary of the operation “Storm”).

44 Gojković: The Parliament will discuss KiM when we have solution proposal, Tanjug, 07 September, 2018. According to President Aleksandar Vučić “Whatever we do, we have to go to a referendum. Whatever we do, there

will be a referendum. Regardless of the kind of constitutional change we imagine, we must hold a referendum” (Vučić: Whatever we do in Kosovo, we must hold a referendum), N1, 08 July 2018. http://rs.n1info.com/a402339/Vesti/Vučić-o-Kosovu.html)

45 Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25 May, 2018, p. 1046 https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/dijalog-Vučić-taci/29316154.html47 Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25 May, 2018, p. 12


what we have to”. This is actually a question of interest that should be determined and achieved through the continuation of the Brussels dialogue. This attitude became the mantra of the Serbian authorities, although they never made any effort to explain it more clearly. This creates at least two possibilities: the first one, which is more probable, to maintain a wide spectrum of opportunities for influencing the public in order to delay returning the policy on Kosovo into the framework defined by the constitution and law i.e. institutions such as the National Assembly and the Government of Serbia. This is also includes postponing a visible progress in the Brussels dialogue, in order to reduce the possible negative effects on the current government. In fact, by renouncing proactive action, the government of Serbia is opting to maintain the status quo; second, the authorities are not in a position to decide on this issue on their own, and are forced to constantly calculate, adjust, and therefore act in a non-transparent manner.

However, the fact is that in defining the “benefits” for Serbs and Serbia as the necessary part of the compromise, the results of the internal dialogue can be of considerable benefit and should be taken into account in the continuation of the dialogue on relations between Kosovo and Serbia. First of all, these are important elements for defining:

a) Interests of Serbia:• “Full normalization”, i.e. progress in the normalization of relations between Serbia and

Kosovo, and progress in the economic, social and institutional reforms;• Removing the obstacles which existing open issues in relations with Kosovo create on the

Serbia’s road towards the EU;• Building a “security package” containing complex security measures, including security of

the Serbian community;• Protection and improvement of the economic interests of Serbia and business entities from

Serbia in Kosovo: protection of proprietary rights of companies from Serbia, as well as the Serbian state itself, while respecting the principle of succession of property of the former Yugoslavia, while observing the specific circumstances of the Kosovo status which has not been resolved yet; protection of the rights of companies and employees in case they were privatized;

• Settling all accounts related to all mutual claims existing today;• Creating a strategy for strengthening the sustainable development of the north Kosovo,

municipalities with Serb majority and members of the Serbian community, andb) Interests of the Serbian community in Kosovo:

• Support to Kosovo Serbs to stay in Kosovo through the improvement of their living standards, rights that they enjoy or should enjoy, according to law and international law, preventing conflicts and mass evictions, encouraging peace in the region and creating a favorable ground for cooperation with Kosovo Albanians;

• Support to strengthening the capacity of members of the Serbian community to manage the process of integration into the legal and institutional framework of Kosovo;

• Realization of the Community of Serb Municipalities (hereinafter: ZSO), to the extent and with the competencies that would enable effective and sustainable coordination of the joint appearance of municipalities with Serb majority in the exercise of their rights, in particular the rights to comprehensive and sustainable development;

• Upgrading the solutions from the Appendix IV of the Ahtisaari Comprehensive Plan on political representation and the rights of members of the Serbian community, which should be developed into a system of self-government of the Serbian community, including the rights enjoyed by the Albanian community in central Serbia, developing mechanisms for the protection of cultural heritage, guaranteeing the autonomy of the SPC.48

48 Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25 May, 2018, pp. 14-15


Most of the goals set by the Initiative for internal dialogue were not achieved and there are many reasons that affected such outcome: firstly, the initiator of the dialogue, as well as the Working Group or the Government, did not create the conditions for successful development of this dialogue, and they especially they did not support the freedom of dialogue and debates based on arguments; the atmosphere of propagandistic and ill-intentioned political confrontations was prevailing in the media as well as the public; the existing political conflicts over other issues such as the exercise of power and the deep division and disagreements over the past, present and future of Serbia have been transferred on the issue of Kosovo. The dialogue has collapsed and the goal of “a broader involvement of actors with the desire to achieve consensus” was not achieved.

U The dialogue did not address the needs of the society, only the political interests of domestic and foreign actors. The institutionalized dialogue governed by the Serbian government suppressed the issue of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The public is under the impression that the support is given to those who want Serbia to step out of the Brussels Dialogue. And so the government and the public of Serbia are placed before a false image that status quo and delimitation are preferred options.49 Security issues have come to the forefront, and Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo is now at a crossroads. However, when taking into account the need for development, normalization and security, as well as the obligations undertaken in the Brussels dialogue and in the negotiations on Serbia’s accession to the EU, it is necessary to try to return “to what is at hand”, and that is normalization.50

“Reasonable politics knows its course, and in the event of failure it implements a second, third or fourth idea or strategy that it had prepared in advance, and by which it must act in a way that serves its interests,” Janjić said, adding that the statement made by the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić at the session of the Main Board of his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), on September 24, 2018, that for five years, Serbia has been trying to return the issue of Kosovo back to the negotiating table, but that at the moment that policy “had failed”,51 is actually a preparation for possible elections, where Kosovo will be used as “just another backdrop”. That way, the public will be prepared to accept the transfer of responsibility to Others. In itself, this is a “strong statement” but even as such it does not suggest that the Brussels negotiating process will be abandoned, nor does it suggest that the current policy will be changed (which would certainly be useful). There was no official policy, the public was not informed on what this policy actually advocates, negotiations with Prishtina were stalled, and part of the policy towards the Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church was a failure. Failure is reflected in the fact that this policy has resulted in turning a large number of citizens against the policy of the Serbian government.52

It is especially interesting how the public attitude of the Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić towards the idea of delimitation has changed. In fact, he pounced on opposition leaders, NGOs and

49 One segment in preparing the public for the concept of delimitation was the following statement made by the Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić: “The idea of delimitation in Kosovo and Metohija proposed by the Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is the only one, for the time being”, adding that he is concerned “by the lack of a proposals for a solution that could be acceptable for both sides” (Dačić: I am concerned with the lack of proposals for a solution to the Kosovo problem, Source: Beta; http://www.beta.rs, 09/19/2013 12:59 PM).

50 Dušan Janjić, The internal dialogue is over and the goal has not been reached (SOURCE: BETA FRIDAY 25 MAY 2018.|23:52 (WWW.B92.NET/INFO/VESTI/INDEX.PHP?YYYY=2018&MM=05&DD=25&NAV_CATEGORY=640&NAV_ID=1397002).

51 “My policy by which Serbia could keep a lot of things in Kosovo and Metohija has been defeated, this policy did not win because Serbs prefer to cry over something that has long been lost (instead of getting something in return)...All we could have gained has slipped through our hands because of the reactions in Serbia, which condemned my every attempt to implement the Kosovo policy,” Vučić said.

52 https://beta.rs/vesti/politika-kosovo/97739-janjic-vuciceva-izjava-da-je-kosovska-politika-dozivela-neuspeh-priprema-za-prenosenje-odgovornosti


dignitaries of the SPC, putting them all in the same “political basket”. They were accused of being “traitors”, members of “foreign agencies”, etc. It is absurd that the President of Serbia attacked those who responded to his invitation to participate in the internal dialogue on Kosovo.53 This can also be interpreted as dissatisfaction because they did not accept his idea. However, he himself has just called for a widespread discussion on this option. This reaction by the president could suggest that his own initiative is dishonest. It is possible that the president is attacking himself, that is, his previous policy of participation in the Brussels dialogue and the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, and wants to eliminate the debate, as well as the political response to the results of the previous policy.

“There is nothing good about Kosovo that we can get and offer to the people. Just trouble and hardship. And everything that is difficult, everything that is troubling, I will go before my people and give my proposal. I will not hide at all, and people will make a decision about their future ... The people should say whether they want one or the other or something else. I will not hide behind anything or anyone.” But, the Serbian president has not yet decided what to offer to citizens, and that the decision will be made on the referendum after a compromise solution is reached – a solution that is not at the expense of citizens. However, another “but” ensued: “But we are still far from such a solution”.54 Apart from many “buts” one thing is clear - the president of Serbia believes that he is in a position to reach an agreement before the agreement, outside the eyes of the public and even outside the legal institutions. The referendum will not be called in order for a decision to be made, but in order to confirm the decision made by the Serbian president. As such, the referendum would actually represent a verification of the president’s power and it will not represent a decision-making mechanism on an important national and state issue concerning relations with Kosovo.

* * *

This leads to a conclusion that the internal dialogue responded to the set goals only partially, and that it especially failed to meet one of the key objectives: reaching a broad social consensus. This brings the entire purpose of the initiative and of the internal dialogue into question.

The initiator and the Serbian authorities are showing strong absence of the political will to improve the policy of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo through the internal dialogue.

The analysis shows that practically none of the goals have been achieved. To a large extent, the result of the institutionalized dialogue, propaganda, and political activities of the Serbian authorities is the homogenization of the ethno-nationalist approach. Most solutions were made without acknowledging reality. Also, the absence of inclusiveness and tolerance is prevailing including disregard for the interests and integrity of the other side (Kosovo).

Instead of the proclaimed demythologization, the Kosovo myth was intensified and reduced to the question of the control of the territory.

The dialogue did not include the discussion on the needs of the society, only the political interests of domestic and foreign actors.

In the institutionalized dialogue, which was governed by the Serbian authorities, the issue of normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia was suppressed and neglected, and the idea of stepping out from the Brussels dialogue was advocated in the public by government representatives and the media close to the government.

The collateral result was that the government and the Serbian public were placed before a false image that political status quo and delimitation along ethnic lines are preferred options.

53 Gordana Suša “The authorities are accusing and threatening”, FoNet, 16 August 2018.54 Beta http://rs.n1info.com/a399460/Vesti/Vucic-Necu-da-se-krijem-iza-naroda-sa-predlogom-za-Kosovo.html

23

PART II: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR SERBIA – KOSOVO RELATIONS

Research into the state of relations between Serbia and Kosovo and options for managing these relations, as part of seeking resolution for the issue of northern Kosovo55, has shown that Serbia and other actors have applied the following policies:

• Status quo – maintaining the “frozen conflict“ situation arising from dual sovereignty in northern Kosovo.

• Division – territorial delimitation and division along the ethnic lines (in the case of northern Kosovo and Mitrovica, along the Ibar River). Practice over the last two decades has shown that this was an inadequate and coerced solution. It did not bring peace and stability.

• The exchange of the territories – subcategory of Division, which implies the exchange of predominantly Albanian municipalities of Preševo and Bujanovac in central Serbia for Zubin Potok, Leposavić, Zvečan and north Mitrovica in Kosovo. This option is unlikely to take place in the current security and political circumstances.

• Integration of northern Kosovo within Serbia – through ethnic cantonization and regionalization, was an idea contained in many projects during the nineties of last century. It was also advocated by the Belgrade negotiation team during the talks in 2006 and 2007, but was never implemented. Although some elements of this concept (establishment of the Serb-majority municipalities and protected zones around the Serbian Orthodox monasteries and cultural and historical monuments) are contained in the “Ahtisaari Plan”, it is unlikely that it will be implemented in the near future.

In the period from 2001 to 2012 the policies of the Serbian government oscillated in practice. There was „Plan A“ which advocated for reintegration of Kosovo, which actually meant maintaining „frozen conflict“, and potential „Plan B“ which implied division of Kosovo. These policies were not discussed in a public forum but steps in those directions were taken in the field.

There are sufficient indicators to warn that it would wise to wait and see further developments in the policy of Aleksandar Vučić and SNS towards Kosovo. Since they have undertaken numerous maneuvers and made public announcements about turning to new policies, a reliable assessment is necessary of whether they have actually managed to escape the ill fate of Serbian ethno-nationalist politics.

55 “The perspective of northern Kosovo in the process of normalization of relations between Belgrade and Prishtina” “Forum, Policy Paper, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 1/2103, April 2013.


Integration within Kosovo – implementation of Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement (CSP) or the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo. Integration of north into the Kosovo’s institutional framework has been the strategy of Kosovo’s authorities since unilateral declaration of its independence. That was the main strategy agreed by the International community (US and prevailing numbers of the EU member states).56 The stumbling block for Serbian political leadership and Kosovo Serbs regarding the acceptance of CSP is that CSP is related with the acceptance of reality and international recognition of Kosovo’s independence. For Serbian political leadership, the reason for rejection of CSP is a fear of the removal from political scene and loss of power, and for Kosovo Serbs, a strong perception that it would mean lower living standards.

There are different models of “transitional solution”, which stipulate some temporary modalities of integration of northern Kosovo and Kosovo’s institutions, as follows:

• Regional autonomy - without prejudice to the status of Kosovo, but also without compromising the status quo

• Different forms of “transitional solution”- transitional administration guided by the principles of minority self – government based on the right to self – organization and self – administration, including regional autonomy.

• “Special status” or interim government - Serbian legislation remains, to be progressively aligned with Kosovo’s legislation.

• “Transitional administration under international supervision” - integration by introducing Kosovo’s legislation as an objective under the supervision of the International Community), as it was done in Eastern Slavonia with the Erdut Agreement, as an experience of interim solution which created conditions for peaceful integration and mutual recognition of Serbia and Croatia.

Interim solutions imply an agreement on normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, which would confirm the agreed interim solution, rather than a prior agreement on Kosovo’s status.57

By means of analysis of the internal dialogue and application of the Brussels dialogue, including policy proposals governing relations between Serbia and Kosovo, it was determined that the number of available options has been reduced to the following:

1. Delimitation between Serbs and Albanians,2. Status quo policy or “frozen conflict”3. Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo

This implies that in five years (from 2013 to the end of 2018) the situation has changed significantly, while the possibilities for achieving the options of the Integration of northern Kosovo into Serbia and in particular for implementation of transitional solutions are narrowed, if not eliminated all together, due to the policies of Serbia and Kosovo towards the implementation of Brussels Agreements.

This Report will analyze the main determinants of each of the advocated options for the development of the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, followed by arguments for and against given options, the possibilities these options provide and the risks they carry.

56 Implementing the strategy of Kosovo’s integration, despite the non-acceptance of Serbs from northern Kosovo and Serbia, the Government of Kosovo passed a decision in 2010 on the establishment of the Office for Integration of North Kosovo, headed by Ilber Hysa. The Government of Kosovo, with the assistance of the International Civilian Office (ICO), adopted an ambitious plan to hold Kosovo elections within a year in northern Kosovo, but this attempt produced no results. That is why the Quint group, ICO and the Kosovo government sought new ways to achieve the same strategy. In 2012, a new “office” was opened, called Temporary Administrative Office for North Mitrovica (AKSM). However, “Ahtisaari Plan” did not envisage any such special administrative office for the northern part of Mitrovica, but a “Joint Committee” for a divided city within the two municipalities. During 2011, the public of Serbia and Kosovo discussed the so-called Ahtisaari Plus proposal. Although such a plan was not presented in a form of a document, these initiatives and discussions have influenced the increase of the potential for using the provisions of the Ahtisaari Plan in future resolutions for northern Kosovo.

57 Ibid, pp. 4, 5

25

1. DELIMITATION BETWEEN SERBS AND ALBANIANS

By advocating the delimitation between Serbs and Albanians, the internal dialogue and relations between Serbia and Kosovo have gained a new momentum. It also renewed the interest in border changes and the exercise of effective authority over the territory. This, together with the issue of recognition of Kosovo, is the core of the Kosovo crisis.

There is a notable confusion in terms of terminology and substance in the discussions on this issue. It is also symptomatic that the very proponents of this policy did not make an effort to clearly define the terms they use, such as “delimitation between Serbs and Albanians”, “division of Kosovo”, “territorial exchange”, “change of borders in the Balkans”, “correction of the Kosovo – Serbia border”. Often, various contents were covered by the same terms, or different terms which are not synonymous were used to cover the same content. There was also no effort to substantiate the above claims or the advocated policies.

The confusion was also increased by the failure to present to the public any document that would indicate the principle based on which new borders between Serbs and Albanians will be drawn (the right of the people to self-determination or acceptance of the de facto secession), how (through which mechanisms and procedures), and exact locations.

This has allowed placing the debate within the framework of ideology and political propaganda. However, it also prevented the discussion from being led by the “for” and “against” argumentation for the concept of delimitation58, and failed to encourage actors to stand behind or against this idea. This has introduced a new basis for ideological and political divisions in the public and political life in Serbia, and created a new obstacle for reaching consensus on Kosovo.

Ethnic delimitation is not a new idea. As already indicated, living in “parallel ethnic worlds” and de facto ethnic - territorial delimitation has been a reality in Kosovo for a long time. There is nothing new about this policy - it is only an attempt to finalize ethnic delimitation. The idea to finalize delimitation by minimizing the presence of the “Others” is also not new. It has been developed over a long period of time by many authorities in Serbia and Kosovo, and outside legal and legitimate institutional channels. The international community has been assisting it all the time, through its representatives in Kosovo. What is new is that it has been discussed and / or negotiated by the highest representatives of Serbia and Kosovo (President Aleksandar Vučić and Hashim Thaçi), with strong assistance by the Prime Minister of Albania (Edi Rama); This idea was supported and improved by many (local and foreign politicians, diplomats, intelligence operatives, civil society activists, experts, journalists, lobbyists and others). It was, sporadically “thrown in” during the internal dialogue at meetings organized by the Working Group i.e. the Serbian government, which tried to present it as the only “compromise solution”.59

58 This is a partial explanation of the behavior of the Serbian president - the initiators of the internal dialogue and the Working Group who publically ignored the recommendations, requests and requests to organize a discussion on arguments for and against the policy of demarcation along ethnic lines. This recommendation was persistently repeated in all monitoring reports published by the Forum for Ethnic Relations.

59 After the internal dialogue and persistent commitment to the idea of demarcation between Serbs and Albanians, Serbian deputy Prime Minister Dačić “revealed to the public” of Serbia, that is the idea of President Aleksandar Vučić,


During the internal dialogue, Aleksandar Vučić left the advocacy of this idea to others. There were assumptions, speculations and even individual testimonies of his support of this option in the past.60 But, Vučić did not reveal his support of delimitation before his political appearances on July 25, 2018, and August 9, 2018.61 He delivered one message that was especially notable in the public: “You do not want ethnic boundaries and delimitation with Albanians - tell that to the people”.62

At the beginning of August 2018, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić said that “the solution is necessary as soon as possible, because “we need a lasting peace between the Serbs and Albanians and a solution that will bring some kind of security for our citizens”.63 “We want a country with defined borders, a country we know, a country we guard”... “Having a territory that is not defined, where it is not known what belongs to whom - that is always a source of potential conflicts and problems,” Vučić said.64

The idea of delimitation had its “world premiere” at the Forum in the Alpbach on August 25, 2018. Presidents Vučić and Thaçi told the world public that the comprehensive agreement on the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Prishtina will be a “peace agreement”. The presence of a large number of journalists made it possible for the news on the idea of the delimitation between Serbs and Albanians to reach most of the Western media. This has served both leaders as evidence for the public at home that this idea was supported by the West.

However, only a month later Aleksandar Vučić showed certain distance towards the idea of delimitation. At the session of the main board of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), he said: “This policy of mine to enable Serbia to keep as much as it can in Kosovo obviously did not find support in Serbia, because Serbs like to lose everything, they like to wail over their own destiny”.65 During a visit to northern Kosovo (September 9, 2018), Vučić diversified this topic not by delivering clear and direct statements, but rather by hiding it behind the vague and unclear concepts of “compromise”, “peace” and “stability”. Besides, he pointed that when peace and long-term stability are achieved, Serbia can then “devote itself to the economic progress of the country”, and that the resolution of Kosovo’s issue will remove the “aggravating factors that are burdening our heads and shoulders”. He added that this would bring more foreign investments and that it could also improve the present poor demographic picture of Serbia. According to Vučić: “It is a question of optimism of the entire nation and faith in a different future.”

and the only idea that could be acceptable for both sides. According to Ivica Dačić, the idea of division should only be the subject of talks, as well as “that Serbia’s actions have influenced foreign actors such as the USA, Russia, Italy, France and the EU to change their minds and support the search for a peaceful solution for Kosovo and Metohija “(Dačić: I am concerned about the lack of proposals for the Kosovo problem, Beta; http://www.beta.rs, 19 September 2018 12:59).

60 Fourth Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, February 16 - March 15, 2018, Forum for Ethnic Relations and Open Society Foundation, Belgrade, March 30, 2018, p. 37

61 “I am advocating demarcation with Albanians. Having a territory that is not defined, where it is not known what belongs to whom - that is always a source of potential conflicts and problems. Whether we will succeed or not – that’s another thing”, Vučić said. http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/Podela-Kosova-korekcija-granice-ili-razgranicenje.html; “You do not want demarcation with Albanians (in Kosovo)? No problem, tell the people to get ready to defend Vranje in 40 years. Don’t you think our people are already moving out? I will provide all the information in my statement,” Vučić said. The Serbian president said this in response to the question of how his views on the open letter by the Bishop Teodosije of Raška – Prizren Eparchy, who said that division of the territory, will lead to the emigration of Serbs from the southern province and destruction of cultural heritage. July 25 2018.http://mondo.rs/a1120893/Info/Srbija/Vučić-o-razgranicenju-s-Kosovom.html

62 Vučić: You do not wish demarcation? And in several decades we will have to defend Vranje, Danas, Fonet, 25 July 2018. (https://www.danas.rs/politika/Vučić-necete-razgranicenje-a-za-nekoliko-decenija-cemo-braniti-vranje/)

63 Vučić: Albanians and Serbs should declare whether we need peace, Source Beta, 07.08.2018 12:37, http://www.beta.rs

64 Kosovo Headline: Vučić: We want clearly defined borders, not an interim solution (Source: Tanjug, 09 August 2018 22:45, http://www.tanjug.rs)

65 Radio Free Europe, 24 September 2018, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/29507371.html


During a visit to Lešak and Zvečan (there are speculations that these parts of north Kosovo could be “exchanged” and “integrated into Serbia”), President Vučić said: “You are in the same boat as us; we share a common destiny, it’s the way it has always been and always will be. Long live Serbia!”, and “The hour has come - there are between five and six percent of Serbs in Kosovo. Whatever we have… land, property ... if there is a chance to keep anything, we have to do it any way we can. It’s our job to come gather, to stand up to others, to fight, to be strong and guard what we have”.66

An attempt to avoid advocating the idea of delimitation was seen in Aleksandar Vučić’s reply to the question asked by Reuters journalist on whether there is a possibility to put back the agreement on delimitation back the table. “Nothing official is at the table so it cannot be discussed”67… “We are primarily negotiating the implementation of the Brussels Agreement, we have an action plan, and a plan on how Serbs and Albanians should live together in the future and how to overcome all the difficulties that Belgrade and Prishtina are facing”.68

It is important to point out that the Serbian President Vučić did not use any of the many opportunities that he had to present convincing arguments for his claims. For example, the relation between poor demographic trends and unresolved issue of Kosovo. He also did not indicate which institutions, procedures, financial and other means would be used to finalize an extremely complex concept of delimitation along ethnic lines, especially when territorial engineering is involved, as advocated by the Serbian leadership. There was also no indication of whether this concept could take place within the framework of EU integration policy and “military neutrality” outside from the “European future” framework and close to the “Euro-Asia” and/or Russia, or perhaps as part of Serbia’s NATO accession. Instead of attempting to win the public over, during 2017 and 2018, Vučić promised on several occasions that the public (“people”) of Serbia should be get acquainted with the content of his idea. The fact that he did not make good on that promise did not prevent him from giving assessments such as: “Those who speak against the idea of delimitation do not know what this term means”.69

During the internal dialogue, Government ministers Ivica Dačić and Aleksandar Vulin have been advocating publicly and persistently the idea of delimitation, i.e. the division of Kosovo and the drawing up of new borders.70

August of 2017 was marked by the proposals for the delimitation between Serbs and Albanians. Deputy Prime minister and minister of foreign affairs Ivica Dačić made a significant contributed to this. Dačić has been a political negotiator in the Brussels dialogue since 2012, and he signed the First Agreement. Given that the views contained in this agreement are contrary to the idea of delineation, the question arises as to what the real policy of the Serbian authorities is, given that there was no reaction from the government on the proposals presented by Ivica Dačić. According to Dačić, the delimitation between Serbs and Albanians is a “permanent solution” based on a

66 B92 Info bilten, 13.09.2018 ([email protected])67 B92 portal, 13 September 2018, https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php68 B92 portal, 13 September 2018, https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.69 Vučić: Against demarcation are those who do not know what that means, Insajder, 25 August 2018. (https://insajder.

net/sr/sajt/vazno/11997/) 70 A more detailed description of these views can be found in: First Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on

Kosovo, 24 July - 1 October 2017, Forum for Ethnic Relations and Open Society Foundation, Belgrade, 25 December 2017, p. 29 – 31; Second Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, 1 November 2017 - 15 January 2018, Forum for Ethnic Relations and Open Society Foundation, Belgrade, 25 January 2018, p. 35 -38; Third Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, 16 January - 15 February 2018, Forum for Ethnic Relations and Open Society Foundation, Belgrade, 28 February 2018, p. 37 - 43; Fourth Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, February 16 - March 15, 2018, Forum for Ethnic Relations and Open Society Foundation, Belgrade, March 30, 2018, p. 37 - 40; Fifth Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, March 16 - May 20, 2018, Forum for Ethnic Relations and Open Society Foundation, Belgrade, May 25, 2018, p. 49 - 51.


compromise between the historical and ethnic law. Dačić believes that delimitation is the only solution “by which Serbia and Serbs will get something”. He also believes that “it is the only realistic proposal because both Serbs and Albanians accept it”. This means that Kosovo will be divided territorially so that Serbian churches and monasteries get a status like those at Ahtos in Greece and that northern Kosovo will be exchanged for the Preševo Valley. Lastly, Dačić claims that “if there is a possibility to make a lasting agreement on the place where Serbs live, than that place will never be a part of the independent Kosovo.”71 To those who oppose delimitation, Minister Ivica Dačić said that an integral Kosovo is only possible as an independent state, and that there is no territorial connection that would allow all Serb-populated areas to remain in Serbia.72

Ivica Dačić believes that his proposal of “delimitation between what is Serbian and Albanian, which means the normalization of relations, the securing of the Serbian Orthodox heritage by creating autonomous monastic communities according to the Athos model in Greece, the Community of Serb Municipalities in the South, and the financial compensation for the usurped property”,73 is in fact a compromise. Even amidst the latest exacerbation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia in November 2018, he continues – “Serbia will not support violent change of borders” and that for the time being “there is no agreement”, adding that “hypocrites are all those who have worked on breaking Serbia’s border and now remembering that borders are unchangeable.” Asked about the announcements from Prishtina that they will seek the demarcation of the border with Serbia, Dačić said that “there is no border but only an administrative line”, that “Kosovo is a fiction in a realistic international political public” and that the EU document on visa liberalization for Kosovo citizens states that it “concerns a territory”.74

Each time he used the opportunity to state his proposal, Dačić made no attempt to provide assumptions, let alone arguments on what his proposal sees as being in the interest of the Albanians. In fact, this “failure to acknowledge” the other side makes this proposal a type of one-sided wishful thinking. Therefore, this proposal is placed outside the domain of what is achievable.

Minister of Defense of the Republic of Serbia Vulin, speaking at a roundtable organized by the Working Group, stated the following: “The assumption that the frozen conflict in Kosovo is wrong and unsustainable is absolutely correct. We are responsible for both ourselves and the future of our children. That is precisely why we have to go a step further and say that this frozen conflict is not the only frozen conflict that the Serb people have, and that the conflict with the Albanian nation on the territory of Kosovo is not the only conflict and Albanians are not the only nation with whom we have issues to discuss concerning the situation of our people and the future... The issue of Kosovo cannot be resolved without solving the national question of Serbs in the Balkans. We have to accept the fact that after two centuries of persistent, stubborn, hard fighting, sometimes successful and sometimes less successful, the Serbian people did not solve their national question. ... So now, when we look at the situation of our people, when we look at where and how our people live, we must start with the assumption that resolving just one part of the Serbian national question will not free our children of the burden of solving this problem, just as the relationship with the Albanians will not be resolved only in the territory of Kosovo. ... There are no and there will be no fundamental differences between the policies of Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and the territory we call Kosovo, when it comes to Serbia and the attitude towards the Serbs and their interests, regardless of where the issue is coming from. The essential question that we are trying to answer here is how stop the “Greater Albania”. Therefore, when we

71 TV Palma Plus, I bi dan, 15 August 2017.72 We will never give up the north, Večernje novosti, 04.09.2018.73 Lana Geršović, Interview: Ivica Dačić, head of the Serbian diplomacy and leader of SPS, We are expecting very

hard discussions on Kosovo, Večernje novosti, Belgrade, 7 Januray 2018, pp. 2, 3.74 https://www.danas.rs/politika/Vučić-i-taci-usamljeni-u-pokusaju-korekcije-granice).


hear statements about Albania spreading all the way up to the city of Niš it is a message of a clear policy that has never been condemned by a single political representative of the Albanian people in all the countries that I have mentioned. We must take these messages seriously, and that is why the process of stopping the establishment of ‘Greater Albania’ must begin right in the territory of Kosovo. A permanent and secure delimitation between Serbs and Albanians must be established in the territory of Kosovo, but the process of delimitation delimitation and the political process cannot end until all is fulfilled, agreed and completed.”

According to Aleksandar Vulin, Serbia cannot afford the transfer of space, either political or economic, and cannot to allow the creation of ‘Great Albania’ on its borders, and cannot let others determine its borders: “Hence, we must admit that we are not negotiating and not discussing and seeking solutions with Prishtina. We are seeking the solution, at least for now, with Tirana. The Albanian factor in the Balkans is not random, it is not fragmented or spread over several countries. It is unique, determined, with very clear ideas and directions.”75

In the autumn 2018, the Prime Minister of Serbia Ana Brnabić joined those who advocated delimitation when, speaking at a meeting with civil society organizations, she stated that division of Kosovo is the best solution. This was supposed to suggest that this represents a coherent policy of the government and the president of Serbia.

There are no publicly available data, document or anything similar that would suggest that a consent was achieved or that it was decided that Serbia will abandon the policy of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo within the process of Serbia’s EU integrations. However, since there are no indications of the abandonment of this policy by its proponents, and that there are only sporadic announcements from the president Vučić that all political platforms will be introduced to the National Assembly and / or that a new referendum on Kosovo will be held, it is possible to conclude that there are ongoing “preparations in the field” and that the verification of the delimitation policy is left for later (after extraordinary parliamentary elections in Serbia and Kosovo, during or after the elections for the EU institutions).

The current attitude of the proponents of delimitation from the top of the Serbian government towards the public and the National Assembly suggests that there is no democratic framework in Serbia for resolving issues such as the issue of relations with Kosovo. This is warning by itself, and indicates that lessons from the recent history of Serbia and the former Yugoslavia were not learned. This lesson reads: In the absence of a democratic framework, inter-ethnic relations easily break into conflicts, putting forward non-institutional imposition of a “new reality”. In 1999, 2004 and even 2008 this reality was not in line with the proclaimed Serbian government’s policy to fight for the interests of Serbs from Kosovo and Serbia.

The idea of delimitation was supported by a group of experts from Belgrade,76 who developed a model of economic and demographic benefits of the normalization of Belgrade-Prishtina relations, which supports the idea that the best compromise is the “exchange of territory” or the “adequate application of the Brussels Agreement” or “normalization with delimitation”. According to this

75 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=le0Th4vkm_E; http://www.mod.gov.rs/lat/12152/ministar-vulin-resavanjepitanja-kosova-i-metohije-ne-moze-da-se-resi-bez-

resavanja-nacionalnog-pitanja-srba-na-balkanu-12152; https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/29023321.html, Slobodna evropa, 6 February 2018; http://www.rts.rs/page/ stories/sr/story/9/politika/3029559/adresa-za-resenje-sukoba--tirana-a-ne-Prishtina.html,

RTS, Tanjug, 6 February 2018; http://rs.n1info.com/a362492/Vesti/Vesti/Unutrasnji-dijalog-I-haski-osudjenik-predlaze-resenja.html, TV N1, 6

February 2018.76 “The economic, demographic and social implications of possible scenarios of normalization of relations between

Belgrade and Prishtina” (authors: Miladin Kovačević, Dušan Gavrilović, Dragan Popović, Milena B. Stevović, Ljiljana Sekulić and Katarina Stančić, commissioned by the Open Society Foundation).


study, the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Prishtina would lead to economic growth of Serbia, higher employment and a better standard of living for citizens.77

The Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies (CEAS) from Belgrade, one of the few non-governmental organizations designated as a pro-Euro-Atlantic, supported this idea and suggested that negotiations on the correction of the administrative line between Serbia and Kosovo should be organized under the auspices of the “West”. This correction would go along the current four municipalities in northern Kosovo (North Mitrovica, Zvečan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić) inhabited mainly by the Serbian population. The correction would be followed by the adoption of a comprehensive agreement on the normalization of relations. CEAS suggests that this can be done in a wider format in the presence of Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, where the border disputes existing between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, as well as other countries would be resolved, along with other open issues stemming from the disintegration of the SFRY and the wars of the nineties, and above all the issue of missing persons and continuation of regional cooperation in the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. Also, Serbia would undertake not hinder Kosovo’s involvement in all political international structures; CEAS feels that the Kremlin would not object to such an agreement; Serbia could offer the establishment of a Community of Albanian Municipalities in the south of Serbia.78According to the proponent’s statement, “This proposal is not a proposal for delimitation along the ethnic lines and does not include the three municipalities in the south of Serbia, but only four in the north of Kosovo. It takes into account the new regional circumstances, such as the fact that Albania and Montenegro have joined NATO, and Macedonia is on the right track, making unfounded the former fears about the correction of Serbia and Kosovo’s administrative lines causing a domino effect in the Balkans.”79

The only influential politician from the region, who openly advocates the division of Kosovo, is the former president of Republika Srpska and current Serb member of the BiH presidency Milorad Dodik, who believes that Republika Srpska and northern Kosovo should join Serbia80. „Serbs have to draft a plan that would also include short-term and long-term goals of our people. First off, that would entail reintegration of the four municipalities in the northern Kosovo,” Dodik said.81

77 Despite being an attempt to initiate discussion on the arguments for and against demarcation, this did not happen because of the already described attitude of the government toward this discussion and the weakness of the study itself. For example, the problem with this study is the initial data. Namely, it is based on assumptions and estimates, one of which is that Serbia would exchange Preševo with 29,600 inhabitants, of which 91% Albanians for the four municipalities in northern Kosovo with the majority Serb population (Zvečan, Zubin Potok, Leposavić and the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica), where there are about 42,021 inhabitants. The study also states that demographic gains in the case of Serbia would amount to 12,000 inhabitants, territorial gain of 1,000 square kilometers, the annual expenditures for the Office for Kosovo would decrease from 47 million to nine million and the difference in GDP would be in favor of Serbia at the level of EUR 52,9 million annually. Also, there are no reliable data on Kosovo’s economic trends as well as lack of insight into Kosovo’s economic potential. Information on the extent and consequences of the privatization carried out in Kosovo is missing, and the fact that KPA took over the management of all non-privatized companies in Sever, including Trepça, are also ignored.

78 https://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/politika/2981516-pismo-nevladinih-organizacija-je-povrsno-i-kontroverzno-miliceva-ostro-napala-one-koji-su-pisali-mogerinijevoj

79 The study also includes a proposal to stop Milorad Dodik, president of Republika Srpska (BiH entity), with the possible support of the Kremlin, in his attempt to abuse the correction of the administrative line in order to achieve his dangerous political plans. Ever since we went public with the contours of this idea, more people from the country and abroad wondered who gave us this idea, than what kind of arguments we have. As in the previous ten years of the existence of CEAS, the views, ideas and suggestions are only those of CEAS, guided by our value-based principles and our motto – progress, dedication, influence. (“West side story”, Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies - CEAS, Belgrade, June 2018, p.3,4).

80 21 November 2017. https://www.dw.com/sr/dodik-mapa-i-flomaster/a-41461505 81 3 August 2018, Blichttps://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/dodik-ako-kosovo-ude-u-un-i-rs-trazi-stolicu/hzs55rd


Significant cooperation and coordination has been achieved between the presidents of Serbia and Kosovo in advocating the delimitation between the Serbs and Albanians. But, evidently, a full consensus has not been reached. This is evidenced by the fact that in April 2018 the president of Kosovo, Hasim Thaçi started retreating but not completely excluding himself from this game. Thaçi is trying to find a way to interpret “delimitation” as “border correction”.82 Thaçi is trying to include integration of Preševo Valley with Kosovo under the idea of “border correction”. This was supported by representatives of the local authorities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medveđa.83 Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić84 and Prime Minister Ana Brnabić85 replied to this Thaçi’s “offer” by saying that Serbia will not transfer Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa in exchange for four municipalities in northern Kosovo. In view of their earlier statement in favor of delimitation, it is not clear whether this is really a departure from that concept or an attempt to secure better position for negotiations.

Thaçi’s statements during the many months of debate were oscillating: first, he said that there is no discussion on any kind of division, then he began to advocate delimitation in exchange for full recognition and ultimately he spoke of “border correction”.86 “Some say that Serbia should recognize Kosovo unconditionally and within these borders. I want the same. But do you think that we will be able to persuade Serbia to do something like that soon? Unfortunately no”, Thaçi said and proposed “the option of border correction with Serbia” ... “I argued that with an agreement on peaceful correction of the border with Serbia, Kosovo would be granted recognition by Serbia and the merger of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa to Kosovo. I expected rational counter-arguments, but to date, I have only heard a lot of noise and even hatred. Kosovo is a very small country to produce so much hatred that divides our society ... border correction between Kosovo and Serbia, two independent states that will recognize one another will be an integral a part of the delimitation of the 430 km long border,” Thaçi said,87 adding that “Serbia is seeking the division of Kosovo and that will not be successful. That’s unacceptable”.88

“I am against the division of Kosovo, the exchange of territories, status quo, making Republika Srpska in Kosovo, but I am for peaceful delimitation and the establishment of 400 kilometers long border between Kosovo and Serbia,” Thaçi said.89 He advocates for the merging of the municipalities of

82 Thaçi: We will have border correction with Serbia, Mondo.rs, 31 July 2018. (http://mondo.rs/a1122236/Info/Srbija/Hasim-Taci-o-podeli-Kosova.html)

I am against the division of Kosovo, the exchange of territories, status quo, making Republika Srpska in Kosovo, but I am for peace full demarcation and the establishment of 400 kilometers long border between Kosovo and Serbia“, Thaçi said (Thaçi: I am against division, I am for peaceful demarcation of the border, N1, 13 August 2018. (http://rs.n1info.com/a411313/Vesti/Taci-Nisam-za-podelu-vec-za-mirnu-demarkaciju-granice.html).

83 „Preševo municipality president Sqiprim Arifi stated that “the people of Preševo valley welcome the idea of joining Kosovo, but they are also skeptical of whether such a solution is possible“. Albanian representatives from the Municipal Assembly of Bujanovac, Presevo and Medveđa on a joint session held on 14 July in Bujanovac adopted a decree authorizing “the president, prime minister and the negotiating team for Kosovo to represent their interests during negotiations with Serbia in Brussels“. All Albanian politicians from Preševo and Bujanovac are in favor of joining Kosovo, Beta, 06 September 2018; All Albanian politicians from Presevo and Bujanovac are in favor of joining Kosovo, Beta, 06 September 2018; Fonet, Aug. 15, 2018)

84 https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/, 19. jun 2018.85 Večernje novosti, 19. septembar 2018.86 He argued that he would not sign an agreement with Serbia unless it implies a reciprocal recognition. Kosovo

President explained his plan for “border correction” by Kosovo’s attempt to “return the gift it received from Ranković in 1959”. This concerns parts of the territory of the municipalities of Leposavić and Zubin Potok, which the Serbian Government has transferred to the southern province. Returning “Ranković’s Gift” to Kosovo Albanians should mean “returning the gift to the enemy” because Aleksandar Ranković, as Yugoslav head of police after the Second World War was accused for having a firm stand toward Albanians.

87 FoNet News Agency, 2018-09-17 ([email protected])88 Thaçi: Border correction YES, exchange NO (Source: TANJUG, 01 August 2018 19:07, http://www.tanjug.rs),89 Thaci: I do not support division but a peaceful demarcation of the border, N1, 13 August 2018. (http://rs.n1info.

com/a411313/Vesti/Taci-Nisam-za-podelu-vec-za-mirnu-demarkaciju-granice.html)


Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa into Kosovo.90 Another option being mentioned is that Thaçi intends to transfer parts of Leposavic municipality together with Lešak, as well as a part of the territory of the municipality of Zubin Potok91 by means of a legally binding agreement on normalization of relations with Serbia. On the one hand, the arrival of Kosovo President to Lake Gazivode (at the beginning of September 2018) may be a message that there is no longer a division of Kosovo and that the final marking of the territory has begun, but on the other hand, it can be understood in the following way: If we do not war we must somehow continue the dialogue. It is precisely on this ambiguousness that Thaçi survives, even though his presidential and negotiating positions are questionable in Brussels.92

An indicator that Thaci has not given up the concept of territorial exchange is the statement made on January 10, 2019 by Blerim Shala, advisor to Kosovo President Hashim Thaci, who said that the idea of border correction between Kosovo and Serbia should be reexamined as part of the final peace agreement between the two countries. “Serbia wants territory in exchange for recognition”.93

Belgrade and Tirana have been working for a long time to establish stronger ties between the two countries, and this is presented in Belgrade as promotion of Serbian - Albanian relations. A key statement made by Rama that pointed out that there are some disagreements between Belgrade and Tirana about changing the borders is: “Albania and Kosovo will have a common foreign policy, not just common embassies and diplomatic missions. Why not even one president as a symbol of national unity and a common national security policy?”94

Albanian Prime Minister Rama believes the border issue issue is only a matter of days, the issue of common history, but it is the task of the state of Kosovo and its authorities to develop a platform for the dialogue.95

Unlike the media in central Serbia and Kosovo, the world’s media were cautious about the idea of delimitation and decided to analyze this concept.96

Territorial engineering has been confirmed to be a part of advocacy for delimitation between Serbs and Albanians. That suggests acknowledgement of the confirmed fact that space / territory are relevant for the very determination of the nation.97 Occupying a single, compact, national

90 This was said at the round table „What does border correction between Kosovo and Serbia mean?“ held in September 2018 and organized by Kosovo Democratic Institute

91 https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/koha-ditore-taci-hoce-da-vrati-srbiji-delove-teritorija-zubinog-potoka-i-leposavica/h9l8vxp, 22 September 2018.

92 Blic, 1 October 2018.93 Shala: Territory in exchange for agreement, 10 January 2019. (FoNet)94 Rama said that Kosovo and Albania are two formally separated administrative realities, but that they are a part

of a common historical narratives, a united national sentiment and inseparable political interest. He announced intensive cooperation between Prishtina and Tirana in all areas, as well as establishment of a common system of education. He also said that Kosovo and Albania will have a common system of customs and common trade and economic market thanks to successful process of regional integration https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2018&mm=02&dd=18&nav_category=640&nav_id=1360212 18 February B92).

95 Fonet, 14 September 2018.96 The Economist, 18 September 2018 in a text titled „Failed plans for the exchange of territories between Serbia and

Kosovo“ starts with quote by an unnamed diplomat from Prishtina: “All idiots with maps and guns are getting excited“, adding „Serbs and Albanians are astonished by their leaders who recently discussed the exchange of territories inhabited by tens of thousands of people“. Washington Post ( 20 September 2018.) in a text titled „ Kosovo and Serbia are discussing border corrections. A terrible idea“, claiming that it is a threat to “set up an ominous precedent for a leader with separatist aspirations“. Paris “Mond“ published two texts on a possible exchange of territories between Belgrade and Prishtina, as well as a map of Kosovo and its own interpretation as to how the correction of borders would look like, adding that “ethnic mosaic, key infrastructure and cultural heritage an obstacle for border redefinition project“.

97 The modern state (its apparatuses - army, school, bureaucracy, prisons, etc.) materializes a spatial matrix whose boundaries represent the framework of acceptance and strengthening of the power. The state sets limits. This ultimately comes down to exceeding the boundaries. This is otherwise possible only by crossing the border. It was the Imperialism that had started, and modern globalism that strengthened the importance of crossing the border.


territory is one of the elements of manifestation of the nation’s existence. But the territory, especially parts containing natural resources for the overall material and economic development, held much greater significance for communities in the past (the genus, the tribe, the people) compared to today. However, national territory and full control over land and resources within the territory are still important, but can also be considered as constraints to development of national economies and development. 98

As historically evidenced, even by the history of Serbia and Balkans, placing too much focus on the territory is an expression of the powerful influence of geopolitics.99 The practice of Nazi geopolitics took this notion the furthest, as the state science behind the Third Reich and later, with the help of ethnic nationalism, racism and military campaigns for “living space” (“Lebensraum”) and space in general (“Raumfrage”). During the World War II many have suffered the tragic consequences of this practice as part of the “final solution”, which why advocating this type of concept and policy causes concern today. The proponents of delimitation are neglecting the potency of this element in the collective memory of the Serbian people. Also, strong insisting of delimitation proponents on the idea of the “final solution” as concerns the relations between Kosovo and Serbia, that is, the solution that will rid future generations of this problem, has reinforced the conviction that geopolitics is employed to trivialize the sphere of reforms and democracy.100

The basic, starting-points for advocating delimitation along ethnic lines are:• It is not possible to live with the “other” but it is possible to coexist in “parallel” and “clearly

ethnically determined” universe;• Multiculturalism is generally unsustainable, especially in the Balkans and in Kosovo;• The experience in the relationship between Serbs and Albanians shows the model of

domination and / or “parallel life”;• The supreme ideal is the creation of a national state that will bring together one nation

(ethnicity) and round up (ethnic) territory, i.e. the realization of ethnic homogeneity;101

• Territorially complete and recognized Kosovo is only possible as an independent state. However, territorial compensations are necessary given that there is no territorial connection to allow all parts inhabited by Serbs to remain in Serbia, and this calls for the integration of northern Kosovo into Serbia;102

Arguments “in favor” of delimitation:• It represents an easy solution to many issues in relations between Serbia and Kosovo;• Confirming the principle that Kosovo is “a unique case”103;

A country with easily crossable borders is the ideal of a modern society, and a closed state is the ideal of the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century

98 See more in: Dušan Janjić, Some elements of the theoretical determination of the nation and relations between the nation and the state, Faculty of Law, Belgrade, April 1986, p. 50.

99 Geopolitics is a “a science of the dependence of political affairs upon characteristics of the soil” that seeks to provide “weapon for political action and guidance for political life”, as defined in 1928 by Karl Hausfoer in “Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik”

100 Sava Janjić, Abbot at Visoki Dečani Serbian Orthodox Monastery also points to this element: “Delimitation is merely a hypocritical euphemism for the ethnic-territorial division of Serbia, such as the “final solution” was the name for the elimination of the Jews in Nazi Germany. The terms ‘border correction’, ‘delimitation’ and the like are all used with the same purpose to conceal the essential intent (Olja Bećković, “Oligarchy turns democracy into dictatorship, NIN”, Belgrade, November 22, 2108, p. 12) .

101 Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25 May, 2018. p. 13102 We will give up the north, Večernje Novosti, 04 September 2018.103 Dr. Arian Starova, Policy Paper on the future of Serbia-Kosovo relations, Working Paper, Center for Applied

European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 4 - 6.


• Reducing interethnic tensions and enabling sustainable relations between the Serbs and the Albanians until the full reconciliation104;

• Opening the of the road to EU for Kosovo and Serbia;• Peaceful exchange of territories and normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo

could have appeasing effects on Bosnia and Herzegovina (to enable recognition of Kosovo by Bosnia and Herzegovina, strengthening economic cooperation, etc.)105;

• Serbia could become a leader in the process of EU integration and an important link in regional cooperation and integration of the Western Balkans region into the EU;

• A dialogue on the Euro-Atlantic integration of Serbia will be promoted and Serbia’s path to NATO opened.

Based on the action - reaction principle, the advocacy of the delimitation between Serbs and Albanians has prompted the grouping of those who disagree with the delimitation policy. This grouping encompassed the actors across the entire political spectrum (ethno-nationals, liberal - democrats, social democrats and leftist as well as proponents of multiculturalism); pro-EU, Euro - skeptics and pro-Russian oriented political and social actors; actors from different public spheres (political parties and movements, civil society organization from non-governmental organizations to SPC, experts and creators of public opinion).

The “Human Rights House” Belgrade organized an initiative to send a letter to Federica Mogherini, intermediary in the dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina, demanding that she oppose the principle of division of Kosovo or the exchange of territories based on ethnic principle.106 The signatories of this letter point to the potential risks of delimitation with reference to the following argument: the experience in the Balkans shows that the establishment of the principle of “ethnic ownership over the territory” has pushed the region on several occasions into bloody conflicts.107

The SPC and a number of Serbs from Kosovo have opted against delimitation and division, pointing out that by dividing, exchanging territories, or by “delimitation between Serbs and Albanians”, most Serbs in Kosovo would be left “at the mercy of Albanians”, that there is a great danger that Serbs south of Ibar would be subjected to terror and forced to exodus.108 In addition, the Bishop Teodosije, who is the Bishop of the Eparchy of Raška and Prizren, also pointed out that important issues are being neglected, such as: the freedom of return of displaced persons, the resolution of the fate of missing persons, the rights of their family members, the protection of property rights, the provision of adequate health and education, religious and human rights, which must be guaranteed by law and by any agreement reached.109

104 Ibid.105 Alida Vracić, Serbia Kosovo relations and security in Southeastern Europe. SWOT Analysis, Working Paper,

Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 3, 4.

Author’s analys is also points to possible weaknesses and risks for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the event of implementation of thissolution: the possibility of internal destabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the strengthening of the advocacy of secession of Republika Srpska.

106 The letter was signed by more than forty civil society organizations from Serbia and Kosovo107 As alternatives to delimitation, the signatories of the letter indicate: creating the best possible living conditions for

all inhabitants of Kosovo (including the freedom of movement, business and international cooperation), ensuring that the crimes of the past are never repeated (including resolving the issue of missing persons as the primary task for both countries); creating conditions for the development of legal and democratic government systems in Kosovo and Serbia (NGO: Mogherini to announce her stand on the division, “Danas”, Belgrade, August 8, 2018, 4).

108 Fonet, 19 August 2018.109 Bishop Teodosije calls for a transparent continuation of the dialogue, “which should be returned to the framework

that will serve the stability in the region and the European continent and in accordance with all relevant international charters and standards, among which the UN Resolution 1244 is particularly important”; supports the stand


A large number of international experts with experience in the Balkans have expressed their disagreement on delimitation and signed an appeal demanding the rejection of proposals on delimitation and “border correction” as a solution to the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. In their letter they said: “We ask the EU, its members and the United States to review - including through their legislative bodies - their position on the return of ethnification of communities and borders”.110

Based on the findings of a public opinion survey in Serbia, it can be concluded that despite the strong political and propaganda activities by the authorities and the Serbian president, the public of Serbia is not ready to support the delimitation between Serbs and Albanians, nor the territorial engineering in the regulation of relations between the Serbs and Albanians or Serbia and Kosovo: According to IPSOS research carried out in December 2017, 14% of citizens support the idea of delimitation and / or division of Kosovo, and in August 2017, this idea was supported by 21% of respondents; according to Demostat research in the autumn of 2018, 13% of respondents supported “delimitation with the exchange of parts of Kosovo and Serbia”. As much as 61% of respondents expressed disagreement with options involving exchange of the Preševo valley for northern Kosovo, and only 16% agreed. It is also indicative that 66% of respondents disagree with the recognition of Kosovo’s independence in exchange for Republika Srpska becoming part of Serbia.111 A survey by CeSID showed that 44 percent of Serbian citizens are against the idea of delimitation.112 All these data indicate that there is no broad social consensus in Serbia about delimitation, division or exchange of territories; this solution would almost certainly include recognition of independence of a part of Kosovo, so the support by the citizens of Serbia would also decline.

There is no consensus either in Kosovo or Kosovo society. President Hashim Thaçi has no support for his ideas in the ruling coalition judging by the explicit position of the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj, that the idea of division of Kosovo does not have his consent or support, emphasizing that to him the division of Kosovo “means war”, “I say this without any hesitation and it is very risky to talk about division”.113

Kosovo parliamentary opposition parties sent a letter to Federica Mogherini against the division of Kosovo or the exchange of territory. In the letter they said that they do not support such ideas and that no agreement, based on such ideas, will be supported. 114 The letter was signed by the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, the Self-Determination Movement, the Social Democratic Party and the Alternative.

A public survey by the Democratic Institute of Kosovo showed that more than three quarters (77.6%) of Kosovo citizens oppose the idea of exchanging territory with Serbia.115

that Kosovo should remain a part of Serbia, “with its 1,500 Orthodox monasteries, churches, endowments and monuments of Serbian culture” (Bishop Teodosije: The division of Kosovo leads to the emigration of Serbs, the destruction of heritage ..., RTS, July 25, 2018).

The president of the European Movement in Kosovo, Rada Trajković, warns that the division of Kosovo would mean “destabilization of the region and certainly destabilization of Serbia”, “legalization of ethnic cleansing” carried out over Serbs and “retaining the northern Kosovo as a place of happiness where gangs have absolute power” (RTV Mir, Leposavić , August 20, 2018).

110 Among 51 signatories are Balkan experts and former diplomats such as Florian Bieber, Wolfgang Ischinger, Adriatik Kelmendi, Jasmin Mujanović, Veton Surroi, Tobi Vogel and Bodo Weber. (Fonet, August 31, 2018)

111 Public Omnibus Survey, CATI. Demostat. Survey – publishing centre, autumn 2018112 https : / /www.glasamerike.net/a/br iselski-dija log-k l ini%C4%8Dki-mrtav-amerika-odobrava-

razgrani%C4%8Denje/4612018.html113 Arifi: If border correction is at the table, the war is inevitable, Tanjug, 27 July 2018.114 September 2018: http://radiomitrovicasever.com/2018/09/13/29029/13115 Beta, 28 September 2018.


The international public also reacted to the idea of delimitation. The French daily Le Monde said “the exchange of territory based on purely ethnic criteria is worrying” and “in a debate about a possible change of the boundaries between the two sides, ethics and pragmatism are mutually colliding”116.

Former Prime Minister of Sweden and High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Carl Bildt views the division as a “recipe for geopolitical instability” and “the opening of Pandora’s box”.117 Carl Bildt’s warnings that divisions will cause a “domino effect” or chaos in the Balkans, because it would open a debate on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina and would pose a great danger in Macedonia and Montenegro. These warnings were heard in Serbia, Kosovo and the region, but also in Washington and Brussels.

In arguing their position “against”, the critics of delimitation point out the following:118

• The delimitation does not guarantee immediate normalization of relations between the two societies; it rather triggers a long process that would be an obstacle for the continuation of reforms.119 Also, changing the territorial framework, and thus the number of the population, economic and other indicators involved in the EU accession negotiations, would actually require a review of the established negotiation framework. Given that the EU does not have this type of experience, it is uncertain how and when the process of integration of Serbia and Kosovo into the EU would continue;

• This solution could not have a significant impact on the already established reality of ownership over economic and other infrastructure, but would dramatize the issue of economic cooperation and energy security of Serbia and Kosovo;120 Delimitation along the ethnic lines is an idea that is contrary to the EU values 121 and efforts to build Kosovo and Serbia as an ethnically homogeneous society will shift these societies in the direction that is difficult to foresee, but which certainly bears pronounced risks to the narrowing of human rights, the rule of law and democracy;122

• The experience of people from Serbia and the former Yugoslavia from the 90s of the last century, is the experience of armed conflicts, genocide, about two hundred thousand dead

116 A special curiosity of the piece published in Le Mond is a published map of delimitation, which, in well-informed circles, is a work by a French intelligence agency( https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/mond-razmena-teritorija-beograda-i-pristine-je-problematicno-resenje/)

117 Carl Bildt, Further Balkanizing the Balkans is a recipe for disaster, August 9, 2018 at 11:57 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/amphtml/news/global-opinions/).

118 In the processing of this topic, a significant assistance to the Forum’s experts were the working papers and author contributions to the international conference “Three scenarios for Kosovo and Security in South-East Europe”, organized by the Center for Applied European Studies (CPES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies on the Balkans (CISBalk), Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, held on December 3, 2018.

119 Vessela Tcherneva, The Serbia – Kosovo Relations: Three Scenarios, Working Paper, Centre for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 2.

120 Despite the fact that based on the example of the Gazivode Lake it might be possible to have some borderline corrections (on the basis of the cadastre or property ownership in the municipality of Tutin and Novi Pazar, which were flooded during the construction of this artificial lake) that alone does not solve the ownership issue, nor it can exclude Kosovo from the right to water supply. Any possible exchange of part of the territory of Preševo and the introduction of the new state - Kosovo on the Corridor 10 would jeopardize the freedom, speed and price of the movement of people and goods on this corridor, and the damage would significantly outweigh the benefits of such a solution (Edward Joseph, September 2018).

121 Nikolaos Tzifakis, The resolution of the Kosovo question: A SWOT analysis from a Greek, Working Paper, Centre for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 4.

122 Vessela Tcherneva, The Serbia – Kosovo Relations: Three Scenarios, Working Paper, Centre for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 2.


people and over a million refugees as a result of the implementation of the policy of ethnic delimitation.123 This inescapably brings out the questions to which the proponents of the delimitation have not provided answers, such as: what will happen with the population of another ethnicity found in the exchanged territory or outside its “border”, or what will happen to Serbs living south of the Ibar River (the fact is that most of Kosovo Serbs and Serbian monasteries and other religious buildings are not in northern Kosovo) and what will happen to the Albanians living north of the Ibar river? The practice so far shows that it is certain that the delimitation along ethnic lines and territorial engineering increase humanitarian and security risks and require establishing conditions which will prevent chaos in the transfer of population.124 One case from the recent past, when such conditions were supposedly secured was the military-police operation “Storm” carried out by Croatia. The victims of this “human migration” and the public of Serbia, including politicians who advocate delimitation, see this operation today as persecution, genocide and violations of the principles of humanity; 125

• Proper delimitation, as viewed by the public international law, implies the full recognition of Kosovo by Serbia.126 This requires a fundamental turn in the Serbian government policy, amendments to the constitution of Serbia, agreeing not to hinder Kosovo’s membership in international organizations, as well as suspending all actions pertaining to withdrawal of the already issued recognitions of Kosovo’s independence by third countries. Advocates of delimitation have also failed to mention this and it is unrealistic to assume that they can drum up public support for that.

• Mutual recognition of Serbia and Kosovo is not enough for Kosovo to become a full member of the international community, even if all countries that do not recognize Kosovo change their decision. It is especially important to note this cannot be expected from China or Russia unless it is “compensated” by the emergence of many new states from their sphere of influence, including recognizing that Crimea is part of Russia;127

• Proponents of delimitation do not even comment on the principle based on which Kosovo will be recognized. If this pertains to the Kosovo’s right to self-determination or legalization of the de facto secession, “chain reactions” could ensue, i.e. honoring the right to self-determination of Catalonia, Scotland, and Corsica. A precedent would be established for the Crimea, South Ossetia, Abkhazia 128, Cyprus129 inspiring ethnic culturalism of communities that have a territorial concentration (for example, the issue of ethnic Hungarians in Bačka or the issue of Bosniaks in Sandžak);130

• Changing the borders with Kosovo would have serious implications for countries in the region, primarily those with significant number of ethnic minorities. This is primarily related to Serbia whose one of the characteristics is the territorial concentration of national minorities in the border regions.131 Experience shows that divisions by ethnic principle increase the risk of an outbreak of ethnically motivated violence, especially if it is accompanied by a weakening of the legal and socio-economic position of minority communities that are forced to improve

123 LSV against border changes, Fonet, 12 August 2018.124 David Philips, Balkan Insight125 Balkan expert Daniel Serwer, author text for the portal Peacefare.net126 Blerim Shala, advisor to the Kosovo president, Fonet, 28. September 2018. 127 David Philips, Balkan Insight128 ibid.129 Nikolaos Tzifakis, The resolution of the Kosovo question: A SWOT analysis from a Greek, Working Paper, Centre

for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 5.

130 https://www.danas.rs/politika/jeremic-razgranicenje-fakticki-znaci-nezavisnost-kosova; 131 B92, 2 September 2018,


their status through active resistance to existing institutions132. The division could restore inter-ethnic conflicts in Kosovo or destabilize fragile multi-ethnic states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro133 and Macedonia.134

• Delimitation along the ethnic lines would not only change the territorial framework, but it would lead Kosovo and Serbia towards the new phase of building a mono-ethnic society, which would then lead to a complete dominance of ethno-nationalism in all segments of social life. In the case of Kosovo, the ethno-nationalist homogenization could bring two results - parallel lives of two states of one nation or a single state union, which the proponents of delimitation from the Serbian authorities refer to as “Greater Albania”;135

• A precedent would be created on the basis of which Republika Srpska, with Serb majority and occupying 49% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, could declare independence, and make a request for unification with Serbia, and a reciprocal move could ensue from Bosnian Croats.136 This would signify a historical loss of the international community which stood behind the Dayton peace agreement and the final victory of those who waged wars and were condemned or are being tried for war crimes and genocides. Most likely it would be the collapse of one of the most sustainable post-conflict interventions, and a great loss of credibility for multilateral institutions - the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the EU and the United States in particular, as it would confirm their inability to complete the “unfinished business” in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.137

The review above confirms that the number and credibility of the “against” argument outweighs the number and credibility of the “in favor” of delimitation arguments.138 However, the answer to the key question of whether the exchange of territory would lead to the restoration of old and opening up new conflicts, or such an agreement would lead to a sustainable solution,139 cannot be resolved without a test in practice. Individual guarantees or assurances by the proponents of delimitation that no conflicts will occur do not have the power of a decisive argument. This imposes a first-order priority to achieve consent of all interested actors, including the internal democratic consensus in Serbia on the issue of Kosovo. The facts show that the attempts to impose delimitation as a “compromise solution” so far have failed and that for now this necessary condition has not been met.

This can be interpreted as the absence of a properly designed strategy, as a political improvisation that has failed to reduce the opposition by the international community to violent change of borders.140

132 Sambanis, N. and Schulhofer - Wohl, J., 2009. What’s in a line? Is partition a solution to civil war? International Security, 34(2), pp. 82-118.

133 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2018&mm=11&dd=13&nav_category=167&nav_id=1469081134 Montenegrin President Milo Đukanović assessed that new negotiation between “the presidents of Serbia and

Kosovo are especially unnerving” and that instability has been increased by the deterioration of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb, which could encourage the supporters of “Greater Serbia” (David Philips, Insight). Also, Montenegrin Foreign Minister Srđan Darmanović emphasized the concern about a possible solution that would involve the exchange of territories, noting that such a sensitive solution should be accompanied by clear guarantees that will ensure stability of the entire Balkans(https://www.glasamerike.net/a/darmanovic-odnosi-stabilnog-partnerstva-sa-sad/4587059.html); Balkan expert Daniel Serwer, author text for the portal Peacefare.net.

135 Balkan expert Daniel Serwer, author text for the portal Peacefare.net136 Daniel Serwer, author text for the portal Peacefare.net137 European Stability Initiative, 28 August 2018.138 Dr. Sandro Knezović, Serbia –Kosovo Relations and Secrity in South – Estern Europe. A View from Croatia.

SWOT Analysis, Working Paper, Centre for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 3 - 5.

139 Guardian on Kosovo: Could land swap between Serbia and Kosovo lead to conflict Kossev.info, 23 August 2018 (https://kossev.info/gardijan-o-kosovu-razmenom-teritorija-do-novih-sukoba)

140 Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25 May, 2018. p. 13


At the same time, it is possible to assume that there was a constant campaign actually at play, aimed at creating an image of the degree of support for delimitation, both domestically and internationally. In addition, there is no dispute that this is a kind of decision-delaying tactics in anticipation of “favorable circumstances”. In that case, it was about buying time and creating an alibi for any subsequent abandonment of the delimitation policy and marginalization of maximalist demands. But in total, so far the advocacy of delimitation and creation of narratives of “conspiracy” and “unification around leadership” were catering to the ethno-nationalist actors. At the level of political propaganda, these tactics may have brought short-term political benefits by increasing support for the next elections or by consolidating the powers of the existing authorities on both sides.

Advocating the delimitation policy implies the elementary responsibility of the proponents to provide arguments for their opinions and suffer consequences of the realization of this policy in practice. Proponents of this policy did not fulfill the initial minimum, which was to first clarify to themselves personally the policy they advocate. Those who think clearly speak clearly. The present rhetoric of the majority of proponents of delimitation is not clear and abounds with ignorance or disregard for the basic standards for the use of certain concepts. This can be illustrated by the numerous statements analyzed by the Forum experts in all monitoring reports, including this one.

The issue of border141 is open and has invoked the evil and good spirits in the internal dialogue and the dialogue on relations between Serbia and Kosovo with the support of the EU. There was an evident need to discuss this issue. But in order for the debate to be effective, it is necessary to maintain certain principles such as: publicity, freedom of expression and information, and the like. Respecting the standards in the use of key categories reduces the possibility of misusing the public debate and makes it easier to reach a compromise on the issues being discussed. The following are the basic meanings of the key categories for the discussion on delimitation, recommended to increase the responsibility in public address:

“Delimitation along ethnic lines” may be linked to but not the same as the definition of “territorial delimitation” in terms of determining territorial lines.142 Delimitation between Serbs and Albanians, which has been advocated in internal dialogue, is not the same as the delimitation between Serbia and Kosovo. Delimitation along ethnic lines is a political-security concept of managing ethnic conflicts and establishing boundaries between ethnic groups. In this concept, enclave is a type of delimitation, for example. It does not mean much, besides guaranteeing the right to self-management or having a type of autonomy or giving a guarantee to citizens that no one could harm them physically.

“State border delimitation” is the process of determining state borders. It essentially determines the space in which various functions will be performed (economic, such as production, trade, and fiscal, such as collection of taxes and customs; a space in which institutions and various political and legal processes will be organized – constitution, law, administrative bodies, elections and representations; other activities include - education, culture, sport, etc.), which represents the basic meaning of the control and use of territory. In that sense, territory is an integral part of any given state.143 The rule is that this is done by means of agreements, and in practice, the most frequent peace treaties are most often between concerning neighboring countries, and there are examples of multilateral international agreements, decisions of international congresses, joint

141 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago, Auckland, London, Madrid, Manila, Paris, Rome, Seoul, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, 1993, Volume I, A to G, pg. 914

142 Milan Vukajlija, Leksikon stranih reči i izraza, “Prosveta”, Belgrade, 1966, 206.143 Legislative apportionment, in: The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 7, Micropaedia, Chicago, Auckland,

London, Madrid, Manila, Paris, Rome, Seoul, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, 1995, 247.


declarations of recognition. Borders may be established by a court or arbitral award; by a decision of an international body and by an internal act of the state in the case of independence of a part of a state territory or its disintegration into several new states.144 Based on the principle of effectiveness, the existing (factual) situation is taken as the starting point. The basic rule is the one agreed by the interested parties to represent the basic rule or the most important criterion of delimitation. It may be ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation of the majority population. But, it can also be agreed to use the principle of Uti possidetis (as you possess).145

“Determination of the boundary line” is the activity of marking and tracing the lines of separation, or the activity of marking state borders.146 It is a process in which the “delimitation” is the first phase and entails determining the position of the border line and points through which the border line passes. This is done by means of an international conference or in direct negotiations between foreign diplomats and other high representatives of the governments concerned. This is described in detail in a contract or an annex with a clear marking of the geographical features such as reliefs, settlements and the like; “Demarcation” is the second phase in which the boundary is accurately determined and marked (the boundary markings are placed at each break of the straight line and at certain distances on the right line).147

“Division of territory” means an arrangement on the division of a particular territory, and one of the criteria may be ethnic, racial or religious differences, but also natural obstacles, or ore and other natural wealth etc.

“Swap or exchange of territories”148 is the exchange (taking and giving) of a whole or parts of the territory and is the result of an agreement or imposition. In discussions on relations between Serbia and Kosovo this meant that Serbia would take northern Kosovo, and Prishtina would take Preševo, part of Bujanovac, part of Medveđa and Sijarinska Banja. In order for this to be discussed at all, Kosovo must be a recognized independent state, which is not. That means - I will give you something of mine for something that is not yours. It is extremely important to understand that this is a complex, long-term and difficult work: “But, you know, there are many details that need to be worked out, such as the exact territories in question, how to mark the border, how to include citizens, what other measures to take to ensure the safety of minorities, etc. So, I think it is a very complicated problem, and such an arrangement will not be easy to reach and it will take a lot of time for that,“ said Robert Cooper. According to him, “as long as there is agreement on all sides there should not be problems.”149

144 More on this: Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples”, European Journal of International Law, 3 EJIL (1992) 178.

145 A similar solution was accepted, under the influence of external forces, in the delimitation between republics of the former SFR Yugoslavia, by introducing a guiding principle that the border would go along the former administrative border between the former member republics. A similar rule was also established during the dissolution of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. (Boris Krivokapić, International Public Law, Third Edition, Faculty of Law and Business, Institute for Comparative Law, Belgrade, 2017, 714 - 717).

146 Larousse du XXe Siecle, Librairie Larousse, Paris, Tome Deuxieme, 1920, pg.752.147 Boris Krivokapić, International Public Law, Third Edition, Faculty of Law and Business, Institute for Comparative

Law, Belgrade, 2017, 730 – 734.148 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, prepared by William Little, H.W. Fowler and J.

Coulson, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, Third Edition, Volume II, N – Z, 1950, pp. 2097, 2098.149 According to Cooper, this also applies to Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, Cooper says: “First of all we would

have a small geographical problem because there is quite a distance between the Republika Srpska and Serbia, so I do not know exactly how to solve that. But I think that all issues should be considered individually because not all of them are the same, not everyone must do the same”. (Former mediator in the dialogue: Belgrade and Prishtina agreement should be accepted with border change, 3 October 2018 (beta.rs/vesti/politika-vesti-srbija/98271-bivsi-posrednik-u-dijalogu-treba -give-agreement-beograd-and-pristine-is-change-boundaries)


The EC and the EU were not specific on this issue because there were no concrete solutions in public.150 In the second half of 2018, certain members of the EC and the EU started giving their general preliminary statements. Judging by the previous EU policy and most statements made by the EU representatives, delimitation along ethnic lines cannot be supported (more on this will be given further in the Review Report). The EU can support border corrections only if: there are credible guarantees that there will be no armed conflict, which cannot be guaranteed, especially by Kosovo, since the Kosovo Prime Minister himself stated that this solution meant war; there are credible guarantees that there will be no “spillover effect” on the rest of the region where issues of delimitation and exchange of territories can also be raised. Such guarantees neither the Serbian nor Kosovo authorities are in a position to give; it remains to be seen whether, if this solution is applied, the EU would be willing to isolate this case as a precedent. This, however, requires that the solution is voted on in assemblies and in referendums in Serbia and Kosovo. With the apparent lack of broad consensus, this is highly unlikely (and also depending on the formulation of the referendum question), even if the five EU member states that do not recognize Kosovo’s independence due to their own internal problems, provide their consent to the EU to “approve” an agreement that would include recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Serbia. It follows that a successful outcome of the dialogue on the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia, and the negotiation on a comprehensive agreement that would provide for a peaceful and democratic future of Serbia and Kosovo and their successful mutual cooperation, is not possible if the parties, including the EU and the US, abandon the initial, original framework of the dialogue, as rightly pointed out by Weber and Bajrami.151 O This framework implies “status neutral solutions” and “full normalization”, that is, a framework which does not condition the integration of Serbia into the EU by Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence, but by the acceptance of the reality of Kosovo’s independence (which will be discussed in the Review Report containing recommendations for the continuation of the dialogue). This seemingly small difference is actually very significant. The attempt to ignore it has led to the issue of determining the boundaries (the territorial framework for exercising authority by Kosovo and Serbia) being translated into the mantra: Territory for recognition!

* * *

The internal dialogue and Brussels dialogue have raised the issue of the status of Kosovo and the status of Serb community in Kosovo, which is the issue at the core of the crisis – in the circumstances where the issue of effective control over the territories predominantly inhabited by Serbs and the northern Kosovo is de facto and to a great extent de jure resolved in favor of the Kosovo government.

Serbia’s leadership is faced with the necessity of recognizing independence and territorial integrity of Kosovo, so the advocates of territory exchange want to have an excuse for the US and the European Union, something along the lines – you have tried to solve the problem without us and that did not work out! This should demonstrate the potency of the authorities in Serbia where issues of history, identity and territory are at stake.152

150 EC spokesman Carlos Martin said on August 10, 2018 that the parties are working on drafting and agreeing on the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Normalization of Relations and that the parties should define a common position (Politika daily, Belgrade, August 11, 2018, 6). This common proposal has not been prepared yet.

151 Bodo Weber & Agron Bajrami (2018) The original framework of the political dialogue, Democratization Policy Council – DPC, Group for Legal and Political Studies and Kosovo Foundation for Open Society – KFOS, Berlin-Prishtina, may 2018, 7, 8.

152 Unlike this “virtual benefit” for Serbia, Kosovo’s benefits are clear: achieving the goals of the struggle for independence, full membership in international organizations and a clean path to EU membership, including the ability of Kosovo citizens to address the European Court of Human Rights

(https://www.politico.eu/article/a-balkan-border-change-the-west-eu-should-welcome-kosovo-serbia-land-swap)


The key question is whether the old idea of ethnic delimitation can respond to the new challenge of balancing the energy and dynamics of ethnic nationalism with the reality of a weakened nation- state, the strengthening of globalism and integrations, including EU integration. In fact, advocates of ethnic delimitation are attempting to complete the processes that started with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Priority is given to ethnic-nationalism (chauvinism) over reforms. This makes it difficult for the societies of Kosovo and Serbia to turn to the present and the future and it is meant to discourage the ideas of inter-ethnic and inter-state cooperation and regional integration.

Those advocating for delimitation have prompted a number of dilemmas which have not been addressed. One of them is whether the Serbian authorities are renouncing the current policies. In addition, exaggerated expectations such as that of the Kosovo’s president to get Preševo without giving any part of the Kosovo territory or expectations of the Serbian president to finally solve this historical problem by recognizing Kosovo’s independence, and not give something that is now part of Central Serbia (the so-called Preševo Valley) for a part of the present Kosovo territory. According to their public statements, both presidents are ready to take but not to give. Regardless of whether it is rational or useful to them, territorial exchanges based on ethnicity could not provide adequate protection to citizens, and that is the essence of what they should do to ensure security if they wish to see their countries in the EU. Also, it is an open question whether this solution is sustainable, in the medium and long term, or it leads to violence.

The key problem of the advocates of delimitation along ethnic lines and territorial exchange is that no consensus has been reached in Serbia or in Kosovo.

The fact remains that during the internal dialogue the issue of state border was opened, which is also one of the topics discussed under the Brussels Dialogue. However, the opening of that issue does not compel the acceptance of the policy of territorial exchange and delimitation along ethnic lines. Suppressing the debate on the issue of delimitation or recognition of Kosovo’s independence with territorial compensation is not the way to go, under such circumstances. Instead, there should be a free and comprehensive debate, resulting in a confirmation of the (non) existence of consent or political and social consensus. For the time being, clearly no debate could be qualified as free, versatile, and argumented debate.

The analysis of messages and the social and political status of the advocates of delimitation along ethnic lines, including a correlation of this type of advocacy with the existing constitutional, legally and politically declared commitment to the democracy of EU integrations, indicate complete absence of a democratic framework to address the issue of Kosovo. One argument in favor of this conclusion is that this policy was not defined or carried out through legal institutions, nor was the public informed or invited in this serious venture. Ignoring the need to build a democratic framework points to an authoritarian attempt to manage and steer the conflicts of interest existing on Kosovo issue, but also other issues of related to Serbia’s future development. This finding is forewarning because the historical experience teaches that when there is no democratic framework and functional institutions, the management of interethnic relations can easily slip into the domain of ideological, political and armed conflicts!

43

2. THE STATUS QUO POLICY AND „FROZEN CONFLICT“

Maintaining the status quo was largely seen as the most desirable option for regulating the relations between Serbia and Kosovo by most participants in the internal dialogue, whereas “frozen conflict” had much less support.153 This is apparently also acceptable to some of the most important international actors like Russia and China.154

The president of Serbia and his associates insisted that the choice is between a “frozen conflict” and delimitation, adding with the explanation that the “frozen conflict” will not be a part in his political platform.155 This does not mean that the president and the authorities of Serbia renounce the status quo game or renounce making attempts to “freeze” the relations between Serbia and Kosovo. After all, since mid-2015 until today, the policy of the Serbian authorities is a policy of delaying the changes in relations between Serbia and Kosovo, with occasional attempts to discredit the agreements reached. This is collectively referred to as maintaining the status quo.

In reality, a choice between status quo and delimitation is not a choice between two solutions. Status quo is a phase in search for a solution, while delimitation is one of the possible solutions.

Proponents of the policy of maintaining the status quo point to the following arguments “in favor”: • It does not exclude or impede the conducting of dialogue on Kosovo;• It allows more time to search for solutions and avoid ‘hard conflicts’;• Preserving the current state of interethnic relations in Serbia, including possible conflicts in Sandžak;• Preservation of the “Ahtisaari’s mechanism” for the protection of national minorities /

communities in Kosovo;• Reducing the risk of mass migration of Serbs from Kosovo to Serbia;• It does not pose threat to the interethnic relations in neighboring countries, and is probably

not a threat to Serbia – Kosovo relations;• Political elites can place more focus on social and economic problems;• Delaying the solution or recognition of Kosovo’s independence is a way of transferring

responsibility for a political decision to another actor, which can prolong the authority of the one implementing the status quo policy;

• Articles 114 and 182 of the Constitution of Serbia, which define Kosovo as an integral and indivisible part of Serbia, remain untouched. This will defer potential internal political conflicts over Kosovo;

• Postponing the resolution of Kosovo’s status can preserve stability in the region;156

153 Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25 May, 2018. p. 13.154 Radovan Vukadinović, Introductory remarks on (possible) solution to Serbia – Kosovo Issue, Working Paper,

Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 1.

155 Vučić: Serbia has two options for resolving the Kosovo issue, Blic, 31 March 2018. 156 Nikolaos Tzifakis,The resolution of the Kosovo question: A SWOT analysis from a Greek Perspective, Working

Paper, Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 1 - 2.


• It provides time and possibilities to establish favorable circumstances and make an assessment of what has been achieved and plan a different approach to the issue of relations between Serbia and Kosovo (this is most often expressed as “It’s not all over yet” or “It’s Possible to Return Kosovo”);157

• Overtime more favorable circumstances for the interests of Serbia and the Serbs could occur, as emphasized by proponents of this approach. Most of them believe that overtime, the EU and the US will progressively lose influence and the power and influence of Russia and China will grow.158

The critics of this policy have the following arguments “against” the political status quo:• Kosovo crisis is an example of a spiral crisis with exaggerated dynamics in which actors have

completely opposing goals, which why it is vibrant and changeable. Therefore, status quo is a short-term state and is established after turbulent changes which imposed a “new reality” or status quo at the new level;

• This is not a solution but a delay in reaching a solution, by which the most important (“ultimate”) interests of the stakeholders are not met;159

• Apart from “buying time”, it does offer any other possibility;• The situation adds to frustration among citizens;160

• An increase in ethnic nationalist rhetoric;161

• Less rights for the Serb community in Kosovo and a “quiet” exodus of the Serbs;• Disruption in the existing political relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo;• The North of Kosovo remains unintegrated or integrated only on paper, and thus remains an

environment for the strengthening of organized crime and its spill-over into Serbia and the region;

• Maintaining potential for future armed conflicts with severe consequences for the region;• Maintaining the status quo is a complex, difficult and costly job to maintain the status quo,

especially in the context of weak economies, poor rule of law, high levels of corruption, strong political polarization162;

• For imperfect countries, such as Serbia and especially Kosovo, it is almost impossible to control all the factors of such a state; the situation could suddenly collapse;163

• In the long run, a space for activities of external actors will open;• There is no guarantee for expectations such as “the strengthening of Russia and China” that

could improve the position of Serbia and the Serbian community in Kosovo and influence the change in the attitude of the Albanian community in Kosovo about living in Serbia;164

157 Second Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue, p. 23, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade 25. January (http://fer.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Izveštaj-II-final-PRESS.pdf)

158 First Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, p. 33., Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25. December 2017.

159 Arian Starova, Policy Paper on the future of Serbia – Kosovo relations, Working Paper, Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 1 - 2.

160 Besfort T. Rrecaj, Finalizing an overdue process: Kosovo – Serbia relations crucial for a long term peace in the Balkans, Working Paper, Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 8.

161 ibid, 7.162 ibid, 3, 4.163 Vessela Tchrneva, The Serbia – Kosovo Relations: Three Scenarios, Working Paper, Center for Applied European

Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018,8.

164 Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25 May, 2018. p.14


• It will produce immediate negative effects on the already implemented measures under the agreements reached in the Brussels Dialogue;

• The unresolved issue will continue to exist as an obstacle to the full progress of Serbia and Kosovo, and the constant threat of conflict escalation would have an impact on the entire region;

• Kosovo remains one of the most important issues in Serbia and will continue to influence debates on other important topics;

• Unresolved Kosovo issue facilitates external influences,• It postpones the continuation of Serbia’s EU165 integration process and influences key reforms

in Serbia regarding the rule of law, internal processes and overall democratization of society.

Despite many weaknesses of the status quo policy, in the case of Serbia-Kosovo relations, this is a dominant stand by the political and other elites of Serbia and Kosovo.

“Frozen conflict“ is primarily a state of affairs, both as the desired result of politics or as a collateral effect of different policies. It is most often defined as “locking-down” a particular problem and putting it under control (deep freeze). This is opting not to resolve problems, primarily due to inability to resolve it in the interest of only one of the actors. It is mostly established by means of a civil war or rebellion. It can also be the result of an agreement on fixing the sphere of interest. This has happened after the Second World War.166 We can observe this state of “frozen conflict” in the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, involving Nagorno-Karabakh (since 1994), the conflict of military and paramilitary forces in Moldova, involving Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic/Transnistria (since 1992), Georgia, involving South Ossetia and Abkhazia (since 2008), Cyprus and Turkey (since 1974). “Frozen conflict” implies a certain degree of institutionalization of the conflict, reducing it to an everyday occurrence. This renders negotiations unnecessary, as no compromise offers a solution that would improve the relative benefits of the parties involved.167

The basic argument used by the proponents of the “frozen conflict” is that “frozen” is better than open conflict, especially armed conflicts.

The basic arguments against the “frozen conflict” are:• Frozen conflict carries risks of limiting the human and minority rights or “silent” emigration

of the Serb population from Kosovo;• “Frozen conflict” can be seen as a state of affairs in northern Kosovo from 2000, that is, from

the signing of the Kumanovo Agreement until the beginning of the process of integration of Serbs in Kosovo institutions in 2013. Hence, any attempt to reinstate this state would mean a step back to state before the start of the Brussels Dialogue. It would also require cancelling all the consequences arising from the application of the Brussels Dialogue. At the same time, the possibility of Serbia actually implementing this process and the ensuing consequences on Serbia’s EU integration have not been considered;

• The frozen conflict in Kosovo, especially in northern Kosovo, creates a breeding ground for criminal activities and is a serious threat to everyday life and security of citizens.168

165 Besfort T. Rrecaj, Finalizing an overdue process: Kosovo – Serbia relations crucial for a long term peace in the Balkans, Working Paper, Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 4; Sandro Knezović, SWOT Analysis Serbia – Kosovo Relations and Security in Southeastern Europe. A View from Croatia, Working Paper, Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 1, 2.;

166 Stefani Weiss, Frozen Conflicts – Kant reloaded, Spotlight Europe, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008 / 1, Berlin, September 2008.

167 Similar examples can be found in relations between India and Pakistan regarding the Cashmere region, as well as relations between China and Taiwan.

168 Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25 May, 2018. p. 14


• Frozen conflicts are always on the verge of turning into open wars, they are a source of a constant low-intensity conflict, they permanently open the possibility of intervention by great powers and their mutual disagreements at the expense of those whose fate they are deciding, they hinder economic development, they encourage permanent ethnic-national mobilization; they do not contribute to the efforts to develop democracy and the rule of law, and further corruption and clientelism, and

• Countries that are parties to frozen conflicts are significantly impaired in terms of entering the EU and NATO.

47

3. NORMALIZATION OF SERBIA – KOSOVO RELATIONS – A PATH TOWARD POSSIBLE SOLUTION

During the internal dialogue, but also in the public discourse in Serbia in 2017 and 2018, the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo was mentioned sporadically. From time to time, some members of the Serbian Government would deliver a statement169 to remind themselves and the public that Serbia “will insist on the implementation of the Brussels agreement and the establishment of the ZSO”170 and that “Serbia’s strategic goal is to join the EU, which holds peace as its core value.”171

It is noticeable that the Serbian government did not use the internal dialogue to inform the public, let alone win the public over in understanding the link and interaction between the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo with the integration of Serbia into the EU. The subject of the commitments undertaken by signing the Brussels agreements was examined exclusively from the perspective of Kosovo’s failure to meet its obligations, and the establishment of ZSO was designated as the “red line”, which was not insisted upon too much.

At the same time, the Brussels dialogue receded to occasional meetings between Presidents Vučić and Thaçi. In June 2018172, the Serbian president announced “defining a common basis for the future legally binding agreement on the overall normalization of Belgrade-Prishtina relations”. There is no information about the progress in this operation, and the meeting where this topic was to be discussed was planned for September 7, 2018, in Brussels, but it was not held because President Vučić decided not to talk to Hashim Thaçi, but instead to visit Kosovo in the following days.173 The public was fed a speculation that a plan for border change is a part of the “common ground”. This suggested the creation of a type of “hybrid normalization with delimitation between Serbs and Albanians”. This mission impossible had a collateral effect of further suppression of main topics from the public, which should concern agreements on a comprehensive normalization of relations.

The attitudes of the EU representatives were largely harmonized and they verbally supported the full normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.174

169 Kisić: Prime Minister supports division of Kosovo, Danas, 07 September 2018. 170 http://rs.n1info.com/a423605/Vesti/Govor-Brnabic-u-UN.html 28 September 2018.171 „It is neither an economy nor a trade, nor a larger market. It is peace ... We want and need to be a part of the EU in

order to have a sustainable peace, and with it stability and prosperity in the Balkans, a restless region of the world that was also known as the “powder keg of Europe,” she said in a speech to the UN (http://rs.n1info.com/a423605/Vesti/Govor-Brnabic-u-UN.html 28 September 2018).

172 http://rs.n1info.com/a398848/Vesti/Vučić-o-Briselskom-dijalogu.html 24. Jun 2018.173 Meeting between Vučić and Mogherini ended in Brussels, RTS, 07 September 2018. 174 Tako High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, who is the main

facilitator of the negotiations in Brussels, and her team did not openly elaborate on the demarcation. Johannes Hahn said he would support any solution as long as it contributes to a greater stability in the region and German Chancellor Angela Merkel has categorically rejected the idea of a further change of borders in the Balkans (Merkel: No Balkan border changes, Kossev, August 13, 2018 (https://kossev.info/merkel-granice-na-balkanu-nopromenjive/)


Despite being suppressed, the policy of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is still a solution supported by the largest number of citizens, according to opinion polls.175 In addition, the proclaimed goals of the Serbian President’s initiative for interior dialogue correspond to the goals of normalization and the Brussels dialogue. Subsequent research and / or further course of relations between Serbia and Kosovo will provide more arguments for assessing the fact that the Serbian government did not support this option. This scenario would be the preferred choice of the countries across the region, from Greece to the Western Balkans.176

Normalization of relations is not realized by means of just one agreement, because any agreement can be broken if there is no real will on both sides to transfer their interdependence and cooperation to all spheres of political and socio-economic life. When it comes to normalization, it is important to emphasize that it is a long-term process, which could be set off by temporary arrangements and solutions, to be supplemented and improved in future. Such an approach would generate the need for more fundamental and lasting cooperation in finding mutually acceptable solutions for all new challenges.

The proponents of continuation of the Brussels dialogue and full normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo pointed to the following arguments “in favor”:

• It is a sustainable and peaceful solution; Dialogue, negotiations, as a way of solving the problem requires waiving the use of force;177

• The reality in Kosovo is respected;• There will be no new instability in Serbia if the solution does not include full recognition of

Kosovo by Serbia;• It would not produce higher interethnic tensions in Kosovo; • The present EU Negotiating Framework for Serbia will not be jeopardized;• A possible abandoning of the normalization process would produce a number of serious

economic and social consequences for Serbia 178 and Kosovo;• Serbia can confirm that it did not “sell” Kosovo, which reduces the space for political

extremism;• Help in meeting the need for higher living standard;• It helps to achieve many essential interests of the Serbian community, including maintaining

and improving the position of Serbs by creating ZSO as well as maintaining and improving the status of the SPC.

• It allows Serbia to free itself from strong obstacles to its stability, development and security due to establishing relations with Kosovo and in relation to Kosovo with third countries;

175 Full normalization of relations confirmed by a legally binding agreement is supported by 46% of respondents and demarcation and exchange, as already indicated, by 14%. If we add that 5% of the respondents supported the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, provided that Serbia becomes a member of the EU, the support is even higher (Public Omnibus Research CATI - Demostat, Belgrade, Autumn 2018, page 16)

176 Nikolaos Tzifakis, The resolution of the Kosovo question: A SWOT analysis from a Greek Perspective, Working Paper, Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 10, 11.

177 Arian Starova, Policy Paper on the future of Serbia – Kosovo relations, Working Paper, Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 4.

178 Marko Čadež, President of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, said: “Such a scenario would lead to the collapse of our economy, hyperinflation, infrastructure devastation, general criminalization of society, high unemployment, low standards, mass impoverishment, collapse of health, education, welfare” (“Failure to resolve the issue of Kosovo will take Serbia far back” – Biz, B92, 13 August 2018). (https://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php?yyyy=2018&mm=08&dd=13&nav_id=1430518).


• Normalization of relations is in line with the values and norms of the EU, especially the acceptance of ethnic and other diversity, reconciliation and transitional justice;179

• Achieving the agreement on full normalization is an important condition for Serbia’s EU integration, which surpasses all interests of those who wish see isolate Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo and in Serbia;

• The EU would “save face” which could be relevant for the EU’s foreign policy;• Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo offers a way to lower the potentials

for interethnic conflicts and provides a high level of protection for Serbs in Kosovo, north and south of the Ibar, because it creates a framework for decentralization of power, strengthening the rule of law, especially in northern Kosovo, and effective functioning of the ZSO;

• Normalization of relations creates favorable conditions for resolving the issue of Kosovo because it does not presume the full recognition of Kosovo’s unilaterally declared independence by Serbia, but creates an opportunity to open up the perspective of recognition or recognition of the reality of Kosovo’s existence as an independent state or the recognition of Kosovo statehood under the principle of uti possidetis juris.180 This, in turn, allows balancing the territorial status quo as the initial basis for determining and marking the border / administrative line between Serbia and Kosovo;181

• Normalization would enable KFOR to physically present NATO soldiers as well as to reduce the costs of their engagement;182

• Higher regional security.

The critics of the normalization policy point out the following arguments “against”:• In the case of “reduced recognition”, the “ultimate goal” of Kosovo Albanians remains

unfulfilled, which is full recognition by Serbia;• Normalization is a long-term process that requires a lot of engagement, energy and investment;

it is also a complex process involving reforms, reconciliation, which can leave both sides frustrated due to “unfinished business” and facilitate the penetration of actors whose interests are threatened by the progress in the process of normalization;183

• Dissatisfaction on both sides due to “unfinished business”;• Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is a road to the EU, and membership

in the EU is not a preferred option;

179 Nikolaos Tzifakis, The resolution of the Kosovo question: A SWOT analysis from a Greek Perspective, Working Paper, Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 10, 11.

180 Nikolaos Tzifakis, The resolution of the Kosovo question: A SWOT analysis from a Greek Perspective, Working Paper, Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 10, 11; Prikaz monitoringa unutrašnjeg dijaloga o Kosovu, Forum za etničke odnose, Beograd, 25.05.2018, 15-16

181 Vessela Tchereneva, The Serbia – Kosovo Resolutions: Three Scenarios, Working Paper, Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 10, 11; Prikaz monitoringa unutrašnjeg dijaloga o Kosovu, Forum za etničke odnose, Beograd, 25.05.2018., 6,7

182 There is a high degree of agreement between most local actors that it is necessary for KFOR to remain in Kosovo. The cooperation between Belgrade and KFOR can strengthen the already intensifying cooperation between NATO and Serbia, which will limit the ties with Russia in weapons trade and training.

183 Sandro Knezović, Swot Analysis Serbia – Kosovo Relations and Security in South – Eastern Europe. A View from Croatia, Working Paper, Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018,5,6.


• There are no clear criteria for the progress in the normalization process nor criteria for assessing whether “full normalization” has been achieved;184

• Extending the period for reaching the agreement, and especially ineffective implementation of the agreed, can inspire radicalization of ethnic-nationalism and anti-EU policies; in the present international security environment, opposition to the normalization process increases the threat of terrorism.185

• Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo should begin with the normalization of relations between Serbs and Albanians. This process should be patiently planned and managed. In order to ease the flow of the dialogue and normalization, Belgrade and Prishtina should, with the support of the EU, and the US, establish criteria for visible and sustainable progress in their relations. It’s a kind of “table” that cross-references all the “bench marks” from all the interrelated issues in the Brussels dialogue and all chapters, and in particular Chapters 35.

• Conditioning the approval of Serbia’s EU integrations with the recognition of Kosovo.

The analysis suggests prevalence of arguments in support of normalization, which is a preferred option compared with the policies of delimitation between Serbs and Albanians and the status quo.

184 Besfort T. Rrecaj, Finalizing an overdue process: Kosovo – Serbia relations crucial for a long term peace in the Balkans, Working Paper, Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 6 – 10.

185 Arian Starova, Policy Paper on the future of Serbia – Kosovo relations, Working Paper, Center for Applied European Studies (CAES) and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk) of the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, October 2018, 4.

51

4. RECOMMENDATIONS TO UNBLOCK THE DIALOGUE

The issue of Kosovo marked the political scene in Serbia in 2018. A number of questions from our questionnaire related to this issue show that citizens feel that a denouement is at hand, they just don’t know what it is.186

From the perspective of the direct participants in the dialogue, in particular the EU representatives, there is insufficient engagement by the parties in the implementation of the agreed, and currently a consultation period is in progress before the official final phase of the dialogue takes place.187From the public’s perspective, the Brussels dialogue is in crisis, at a “critical stage”188and should be revived. This requires resolving a number of political, economic and security problems that arose during the crisis of dialogue, especially the latest political, economic and security developments related to the process of forming Kosovo Army, the Kosovo government’s decision to introduce “tariffs” (100%) on goods from Serbia and use such circumstances to unilaterally resolve some of the unfulfilled obligations from the Brussels dialogue (such as license plates /vehicle registration, arranging border-crossings, different types of certificates, declarations, permits etc.), activation of police forces and prosecutors in maintaining the rule of law (collecting data in the investigation of the murder of Oliver Ivanović as well as other crimes). As the process moves on it will lead to a “new reality” that would, according to Kosovo officials, be in Kosovo’s favor. There is no doubt that this moves Serbia and Kosovo away from reaching an agreement, deepens distrust and produces a number of economic and security problems that were not on the agenda of the Brussels Agreement. But it does not necessarily lead to the end of the dialogue.

The crisis in Serbia - Kosovo relations and the Brussels dialogue imposes the need to renew the dialogue. But that requires answering the previous question: How and where to next?

There are at least two choices:First, to keep the entire issue in the political arena. In order to achieve this, since the capacities

of the parties (Kosovo and Serbian authorities) are insufficient, assistance must be provided to both parties and the EC. Support is already provided by the President and State Department of the United States.189The need for assistance was evident from the first meeting - the presentation of the Kosovo team and the political platform for a new format of negotiations, on January 8, 2018. This was a legitimate move by Kosovo, which marked the end of the “dream of the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini”, a dream that prevailed during the second half of 2018, in which Vučić and Thaçi could form a common platform. At this moment there is no common

186 This is the finding of the public opinion polls carried out in cooperation with the “Factor Plus” agency and daily Politika on December 17-26, on a sample of 1,250 respondents. According to this survey, most citizens are convinced that Belgrade will not agree that Kosovo gets a chair in the UN, and the percentage of those who think that Serbia should be a member of the EU has dropped from 38 to 34 percent in a year.

187 Edita Tahiri, Thaçi and Vučić block the dialogue, Vreme, Belgrade, 22 November 2018, 20.188 Marija, Stojanović, Belgrade still hopes the West will make a concession, Danas, Belgrade, 6 June 2018189 This also applies to the question of removing the trade barriers imposed by customs tariffs, but also to encouraging

the leading negotiators to complete what they have started, as already mentioned in this report.


platform: “Kosovo has its own, and Serbia…nobody knows”.190 The weakened EC rating as a facilitator was evident during the meeting in Brussels, when representatives of Kosovo refused to accept the request by Federica Mogherini and withdraw the 100% customs tariffs before the beginning of the dialogue. That is not surprising because, previously, the European Commissioner did not show persistence in supporting the notion that formation of the ZSO is a “red line”.191 This only confirmed that there is little chance that the dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade could successfully continue with the existing EC delegation. However, Kosovo delegation made big step in January with its appearance in Brussels. They declared their intention “not to do anything”. Since then the ball has been in Serbia’s court.

In order to fill the vacuum in the dialogue, it is necessary to come up with an exit strategy from this ethnic adventure. It is important to realize that Serbia and Kosovo cannot resolve the current crisis unilaterally. The reality is that Kosovo cannot get recognition of its statehood from Serbia from this crisis, but also that Serbia cannot do much for the Serbian community in Kosovo, even in northern Kosovo, in terms of economy and security terms, if it does not cooperate with the Kosovo authorities.192

Diplomatic efforts are necessary to prevent the situation from escalating, and the Brussels dialogue must be reset. The driving role in this could be given the Troika to determine the state of affairs. The present EC or EU team is not sufficient for this mission, and it cannot be under the auspices of the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council, primarily because of the conflict of interests of permanent members of the UN Security Council.

For that reason, a possibility of forming a type of “Troika” should be considered, consisting of representatives of the EU (preferably Germany), the United States and NATO. This “Troika” should go on a fact-finding mission, maintain communication with representatives of the authorities of Serbia and Kosovo, encourage discussion about the possibilities of resolving specific controversial issues etc. The usual mechanism by which the EU supports the dialogue should continue to work on renewing the dialogue, although it is not realistic to expect that the final phase of the dialogue will take place before the EU and the EC elections.

The engagement of the “Troika” would be limited to two to three months. This would enable the elections in Serbiaand the EU, and most likely in Kosovo. The elections signify that the dispute is within the political framework and that it will not be resolved on barricades or one-sided measures by the parties.

The second choice is to do nothing and to change nothing. This will most probably lead to the dissolution of the crisis into a series of conflicts, from local armed conflicts to terrorist activities. Namely, the crisis will deepen further because both sides will try to create a new reality on the ground and they will try to re-draw the borders on the basis of these realities. That is why the US Ambassador to Prishtina Philip Kosnett warned: «If the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo does not improve, it will turn for the worse. There is really no possibility to maintain a status quo».193

As long as it remains within the framework of politics, Prishtina’s acts and Belgrade’s responses can be seen as a preparation for extraordinary parliamentary elections, and will most likely last

190 Janjić: Prishtina outsmarted everyone, the end of Mogherini’s dream, and Belgrade must hold elections, N1, Beograd (http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a450394/Janjic-Pristina-nadmudrila-ostale-kraj-sna-Mogerini-a-Beograd-mora-na-izbore.html)

191 Persistent claims from the Brussels that this is not a matter of blocking the process, and that EC is working with Prishtina on resolving the issue of tariffs do not change anything, and only confirm that the EC rating is threatened on this issue..

192 Janjić: How to revive the Brussels “half-dead horse” (https://www.danas.rs/politika/janjic-kako-oziveti-briselskog-polumrtvog-konja)

193 B92 Info bilten, December 28, 2019 ([email protected])


until the spring of 2019. However, this crisis has the potential to get out of control and turn into security incidents and conflicts and drive Serbia and Kosovo towards isolation. If this continues, Serbia (and Kosovo) will become closed societies existing “outside of history”.194

Belgrade must carry out democratic and parliamentary verification of the political platform. At this point, even if there is any kind of political platform, it has not been confirmed in the public and in the constitutionally and legally defined institutions and procedures. One way to introduce it into the legal and legitimate frameworks of the current functioning of the Serbian president is through extraordinary parliamentary elections. This does not in itself challenge the Brussels dialogue, as the EU is having elections on May 24, 2019. This only confirms that the dialogue will not be significantly more intensive and that its completion cannot be expected before the end of 2019.

The leadership of Serbia should finally and unequivocally stand for the “European future”, and therefore for the dedication to participate in the Brussels dialogue. This means taking a stand on the position of Serbia not only in view of the current circumstances and daily political interests, but in view of the present and the future, given the interests of the next generations as well as the reality of a possible resolution of the Kosovo issue.195 Based on the previous analysis, it is assumed that this means taking a stand for the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo with the integration of Serbia.

Resetting the Brussels dialogue should imply a new format of the dialogue, with the inclusion of topics imposed during the analyzed period: the issue of recognition of Kosovo by Serbia, the issue of determining state borders / administrative lines. 196 Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić spoke about the need for a new format, pointing out that in 2019 Serbia will intensively work on the issue of Kosovo, “probably in a different format”. In addition, he pointed out that it would be beneficial to involve other large countries, such as Russia and China, along with the United States, as it would provide broad international guarantees for what has been agreed. “This would mean full international legitimacy for everything agreed upon in Kosovo, and above all, it would ensure that the agreement lasts a long time, which is also in Serbia’s interest as well”.197

As concerns the recognition of the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo by Serbia, there are two possible available solutions supported by the EU and US from the beginning of the process:

• First, formal and full recognition of the Republic of Kosovo by the Republic of Serbia198, and

194 Analysts: Too much triumphalism in Serbia, elections are approaching, N1 info (http://rs.n1info.com/a437565/Vesti/Analiticari-Previse-trijumfalizma):

195 Opinions of the Forum for Ethnic Relations: Normalization is the way to solution, Policy Paper, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 2/2018, July 2018, 9-11.

196 “Determining” and “adapting” should be used in a comprehensive agreement (in the formulation: “determining / adapting”), which should contain clear principles and procedures for establishing a line of territorial delimitation that would respect international legal standards (the opinion of the Banditer Committee should be accepted because of the principles it establishes but cannot be a direct source because the Committee refused to take a stand on the issue of borders between Serbia and Kosovo. That way it would leave aside the dispute over the attitudes towards the Committee’s opinion as well as decisions of the governments of Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia and other countries that have recognized Kosovo within its external borders, which the Committee defined as the borders of the FRY and Serbia and Montenegro.

197 “U 2019. o Kosovu verovatno u drugačijem formatu”, TANJUG, Wednesday, 26.12. 2018 (https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2018&mm=12&dd=26&nav_category=640&nav_id=1486637)

198 The argument in favor of the first solution is that it is a solution for a clear resolution of the dispute. This model is based on full recognition on the basis of international public law and the exchange of ambassador’s. This would mean that Serbia is suspending all activities to deny full recognition of Kosovo and to facilitate Kosovo’s membership in the UN. At the same time, clear messages from Serbia and Kosovo should make it easier for Serbs from Kosovo to accept Kosovo as their own state.


• Second, a narrow form of recognition in line with the 1972 Basic Treaty between West and East Germany (the Two Germanys).199

The difference with regard to the full recognition is that Serbia and Kosovo would not exchange ambassadors but permanent representatives 200 or liaison officers, but with increased capacities for carrying out diplomatic and consular activities. Full responsibility for the fulfillment of this requirement will move from the EU to Serbia. Therefore, Serbia could endorse this framework by explicit and legally binding acceptance of the reality of Kosovo’s independence, which imposes an obligation on Serbia not to hinder Kosovo’s full membership in the international community, which means restraining from the activities aimed at preventing this process. If there is no political consensus in Serbia on this issue, like there isn’t one today, there is a risk that such a solution, if accepted by the government, will not be supported in the referendum for amending the Serbian Constitution. There is also a real risk of deeper political conflicts, further destabilization of Serbia, and refusal of EU membership unless Kosovo’s independence is recognized. This could also bring deterioration of the situation in both Kosovo and the Western Balkans region. These risks will be significantly reduced in case of accepting the solution embedded in the already adopted negotiating framework for Chapter 35, which obliges all parties, including EU as the facilitator, to a “status neutral” solution. It requires clarification of the relation between “full normalization” of Serbia-Kosovo relations and recognition of Kosovo’s international legal subjectivity. If we follow the letter and the spirit of this framework which draws inspiration from the model of “Two Germanys”, this recognition is possible, but not a necessary condition for Serbia’s EU integration.

Not closing the perspective of the international public recognition of Kosovo’s independence would facilitate the determination of borders and the territorial framework of Kosovo and Serbia. This issue could be resolved as part of the comprehensive agreement, as a matter of marking or adapting (demarcation) of the current border / administrative line, as indicated in the Brussels Agreement in relation to the freedom of movement. Such a solution would not be a precedent for the EU, given that Croatia became the EU and NATO member while having interim or conditionally determined border with Montenegro. And the time of reaching the agreement on Prevlaka, Montenegro was a federal unit and not an internationally recognized state, and a tacit political agreement was reached with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia not to open border issues, and the EU was satisfied that a dispute was initiated with Slovenia involving international arbitration.

This “narrow recognition” carries a risk of different misinterpretations by Serbia and Kosovo as well as among Serbs in Kosovo. Also, there is a potential risk that amendments to the Constitution may involve application of non-compliant interpretations. This risk can be mitigated by an active EU position. The main challenge for the EU is to extend the state of non-recognition of Kosovo by EU member states and verification of solutions by the UN Security Council.

The future direction of the dialogue greatly depends on Prishtina and Belgrade, and the countries of the Western Balkans and, of course, the so-called Great powers. Although the historical experience teaches that the existence of “a single voice” coming from Brussels and Washington is a condition for resolving problems in Europe, such a voice has not been heard. One of the reasons is that, on the one hand, with the US President Donald Tramp, the US administration

199 Bodo Weber and Agron Bajrami (2018) How to recognize Reality? The issue of Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo, Democratization Policy Council - DPC, Berlin), Group for Legal and Political Studies – GLPS and Kosovo Foundation for Open Society - KFOS, Berlin – Prishtina June 2018, 13

200 Bodo Weber and Agron Bajrami (2018) How to recognize Reality? The issue of Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo, Democratization Policy Council - DPC, Berlin), Group for Legal and Political Studies – GLPS and Kosovo Foundation for Open Society - KFOS, Berlin – Prishtina June 2018, 10.


adopted a new “flexible” approach, allowing Belgrade and Prishtina the opportunity to reach “the best possible agreement”.201 This attitude served the political and propaganda machinery of the Serbian authorities to create an atmosphere in the public that the US supports the correction of Kosovo borders if the two sides agree on it.202 However, we did not see that reaction in Kosovo.203 On the other hand, the EU, particularly Germany, remained consistent with the principle of territorial integrity.204

201 The top US official to launch this thesis was Trump’s Security Adviser John Bolton, who said that “the US does not exclude territorial corrections.” He said that US policy is such that if the two sides can work with one another and reach an agreement, the United States will not reject the correction of the territory. “We will not interfere, and I do not think anyone in Europe will try to prevent it if two sides in the dispute reach a mutually satisfactory solution” (Tanjug, September 17, 2018).

202 First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Serbia Ivica Dačić, who advocates division, welcomed these statements as evidence that there is a shift in the US position in finding a lasting solution for Kosovo, and that the possibility for continuing the dialogue is opening, with the assessment that the United States are open to all talks, including the issue of delimitation. “They don’t have a preference now and are not suggesting a solution, but they are inviting the possibility of a mutually acceptable solution in the direct dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina,” Dačić said.

203 Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj said after his visit to the United States that citizens of Kosovo should not worry about exchanging territories or border corrections, because that will not happen. Haradinaj said US officials believe Kosovo should stay within the current borders.

204 After a telephone discussion with US President Trump concerning relations between Serbia and Kosovo, Angela Merkel said, “We support all negotiations that will lead us to the solution of this issue. But at the same time, we say that territorial integrity, as it stands today, also an important value. I also emphasized this during my recent talks with the prime ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. We must be careful and not allow the moves made on one territory to produce results in another territory,“ Merkel said. German Chancellor Angela Merkel pointed out that the EU has a strong interest in the stability of the Western Balkans and that territorial integrity is an important starting point for the region, so Merkel rejected the idea of a further change of borders in the Balkans (Merkel: Borders in the Balkans are immutable, Kossev, August 13, 2018 (https://kossev.info/merkel-granice-na-balkanu-news/news/) ) She added: “The fact is that the territorial integrity of the Western Balkans countries is firmly established and unchangeable,” Merkel said. Also, most parliamentary parties in Germany oppose the correction of borders in Kosovo (Danas, August 30, https://www.danas.rs/politika/nemacki-poslanici-za-dw-o-razgranicenju).

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5. APPENDICES

5.1. Appendix I: Forum for Ethnic Relation Reports on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo

Forum for Ethnic Relations: Reports on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on KosovoReport Monitoring period covered by the ReportFirst Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo205 July 24, 2017 – October 31, 2017.Second Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo206 November 1, 2017 – January 15, 2018Third Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo207 January 16, 2018 – February 15, 2018Fourth Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo208 February 16, 2018 – March 15, 2018Fifth Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo209 March 16, 2018 – May 20, 2018Review of Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo210 July 24, 2017 – May 20, 2018Review Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo211 July 24, 2017 – January 17, 2019

205206207208209210211

205 First Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 25. December 2017, available at: http://fer.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Izveštaj-final-web.pdf

206 Second Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, January 25, 2018, available at: http://fer.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Izveštaj-II-final-PRESS.pdf

207 Third Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 28. februar 2018, available at: http://fer.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Izveštaj-III-final.pdf

208 Fourth Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 30. mart 2018., available at: http://fer.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Četvrti-izveštaj-o-monitoringu-unutrašnjeg-dijaloga-o-Kosovu-16.-februar-15.mart-2018..pdf

209 Fifth Report on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, available at: http://fer.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Peti-izvestaj-o-monitoringu-unutrasnjeg-dijaloga-o-Kosovu.pdf

210 Review of Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, May 25, 2018, available at: http://fer.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Zavrsni-prikaz-monitoringa-unutrasnjeg-dijaloga-o-Kosovu.pdf

211 Overview of the Reports on Monitoring the Internal Dialogue on Kosovo , Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, December 10, 2018, available at: http://fer.org.rs/


5.2. Appendix II: A Chronology of the History of the Serb-Albanian Conflicts and Cooperation

Phase; Sub-phase Timeline CharacteristicsPhase I 1918-1941/45 Mutual domination and violencePhase II 1945-1966 Armed violence and administrative restrictions on the rights of

the Albanian communityPhase III 1968-1981 Strengthening the Kosovo’s autonomy; Albanian national affirmationPhase IV 1981-1999 Conflicts over the status of Kosovo- Sub-phase I 1981-1985 Strengthening the Albanian National Movement- Sub-phase II 1986-1989 Political conflicts over the status of Kosovo and Albanian community- Sub-phase III 1989-1997 Suspension of autonomy; parallel societies of Serbs and Albanians- Sub-phase IV 1998-1999 Armed conflict (war)Phase V 1999 – 2005 The international (UN) military-civilian presence in Kosovo and

Systemic discrimination against ethnic Serbs- Sub-phase I May 1999 – end

1999The end of war; establishment of the (UN) military-civilian presence; return of ethnic Albanian refugees and exodus of Serbs

- Sub-phase II 2000 - 2002 Building international institutions and Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in Kosovo – “standards before status“

- Sub-phase III 2003 – 17 / 19 mart 2004

Transition of the UN mission to the “Kosovo state-building“ mission and escalation of ethnic Albanian extremism – “standards before status“

- Sub-phase IV March 2004 – 2008

Restoration and strengthening international institutions and Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in Kosovo and beginning the process of determining the future status of Kosovo - standards and status (attempts by the UN SC, UNMIK and the Government of Belgrade, to solve the problem through decentralization; role of Michael Shepherd; Conference in Vienna, January - March 2008; Proposal for a comprehensive solution by Mahti Ahtisaari)

Phase VI 2008 – 2017 Unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence and finding a peaceful solution

- Sub-phase I February 17, 2008 –2011.

Disputes over recognition of Kosovo’s independence(Unilateral declaration of independence of the Republic of Kosovo – “Declaration on independence of Kosovo”(February 17, 2008); Non-recognition of proclaimed Kosovo’s independence by the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (February 18, 2008) and political demonstrations in Belgrade - “Kosovo is the heart of Serbia!”(February 21, 2008); Reconstruction of the “international presence” – UNMIK-ICO transition, EULEX-establishment and KFOR-transformation; June 29, 2010. According to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the declaration of Kosovo’s independence was in accordance with general international law).

- Sub-phase II March 2011. – April 2013.

Back to the negotiation table (UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298, March 2011, determined the path for the EU-facilitated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo; “Technical dialogue” - March 8/9 - July 2012; Beginning the “political dialogue”, July 8, 2012 to April 2013, or the “first phase” of Brussels dialogue).

April 2013. - 2018

Dialogue for normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, or The “second phase” of Brussels dialogue(The First Agreement of principles governing normalization of relations Belgrade and Prishtina, initialed in April 2013; Beginning the negotiations on Serbia’s EU membership and ratification of the Negotiating framework - guidelines and principles for the accession negotiations with Serbia, including Chapter 35 - Other issues/Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, December 17, 2013)


5.3. Appendix III: A Chronology of the Internal Dialogue

Beginning of the internal dialogue July 24, 2017The number of round tables organized under the framework of the “institutionalized” internal dialogue

29212

End of the internal dialogue May 11, 2018213

212213

212 “According to Dušan Kozarev, Deputy Director at the Office for Kosovo and Metohija, twenty six (26) roundtables were organized between October 31, 2017 and March 27, 2018, and according to Nikola Selaković, Secretary General of the Presidency, fifteen (15) roundtables were organized. According to the FER’s expert team observation, there were twenty-nine (29) roundtables. (Another five roundtables under the framework of the internal dialogue, “N1, March 28, 2018, http://rs.n1info.com/a375166/Vesti/ Jos-pet-round-tables-in-the-internal dialogue.html).

213 The 29th roundtable was organized by the Working Group tasked with supporting the internal dialogue on Kosovo and the Serbian National Forum (SNF) on May 11, 2018

FONDACIJA ZA OTVORENO DRUŠTVO, SRBIJA OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION, SERBIA

REVIEW REPORT ONMONITORING THE INTERNAL

DIALOGUE ON KOSOVOJuly 24, 2017 – January 17, 2019

Belgrade, January 17, 2019

Documents

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