Review of the Barème mechanism...- ECON Analysis - Review of the Barème mechanism ~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 5 indicator supplied by National Societies. The IFRC should consider

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Review of the Barème mechanism

ECON-Report no. 2005-012, Project no. 44280 Restricted ISSN: 0803-5113, ISBN 82-7645-xxx-x PSW, LLU, 1. July 2005

ECON Analysis P.O.Box 5, 0051 Oslo, Norway. Phone: + 47 45 40 50 00, Fax: + 47 22 42 00 40, http://www.econ.no

Review of the Barème mechanism

Commissioned by The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

- ECON Analysis - Review of the Barème mechanism

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Table of Contents: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....................................................................................3

1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................10 1.1 The assignment ..................................................................................10 1.2 Background for the review ................................................................11 1.3 ECON’s approach ..............................................................................11 1.4 Consultation .......................................................................................12 1.5 Authors...............................................................................................13

2 EXPERIENCE IN OTHER ORGANISATIONS.........................................14 2.1 International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) .......................15 2.2 World Council of Churches (WCC) ..................................................17 2.3 World Organization of the Scout Movement (WOSM).....................19 2.4 WWF..................................................................................................22 2.5 IUCN – the World Conservation Union ............................................25

3 THE CURRENT BARÈME MECHANISM ...............................................29 3.1 Brief description of the current Barème mechanism .........................29 3.2 Financial resources of the National Society ......................................30 3.2.1 Improving the current figures ........................................................32 3.2.2 Other measurements for determining National Societies’ ability to pay 34 3.2.3 Other approaches ...........................................................................38 3.3 UN quota............................................................................................39 3.3.1 Frequency of calculation................................................................40 3.3.2 Gross National Income (GNI) as base ...........................................40 3.4 IFRC six-year experience factor ........................................................42 3.5 Maximum contribution ......................................................................43 3.6 Minimum contribution.......................................................................45 3.7 Change limit / phase-in ......................................................................45

4 RECOMMENDED APPROACHES............................................................47 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................47 Scenario 1 (50/50 UN quota/N.S. income)...................................................50 4.1.1 Same relative weights for UN quota and N.S. income – but improve the reliability of N.S. income figures.............................................50 4.1.2 Drop experience factor...................................................................51 4.1.3 Two ceilings...................................................................................51 4.1.4 Groups based on World Bank per-capita income groups ..............52 4.1.5 phase-in ..........................................................................................53 4.2 Scenario 2 (choice of 100% UN quota or 50/50 UN Quota/N.S. income).........................................................................................................54 4.3 Scenario 3 (100% UN quota).............................................................56 4.4 Scenario 4 (GNI x HDI).....................................................................56

APPENDIX 1: QUOTAS UNDER 4 SCENARIOS (2 VARIANTS) ..................58 Two ceilings .................................................................................................58 One ceiling ...................................................................................................76

ANNEX 2: INCREASES/DECREASES UNDER SCENARIO 1........................93


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Executive Summary

Abstract The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) requested ECON Analysis to evaluate the mechanism by which the IFRC divides the cost of financing its “Core” budget among members and to suggest ways to make this mechanism more equitable, transparent and responsive to changing circumstances. The study draws on the experiences of other membership organisations.

Background The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) divides the cost of financing its “Core” budget among member National Societies according to a scale of contributions known as the “barème”. A common criticism of the current structure of the barème is that it relies heavily on only a few National Societies. For example, three National Societies pay almost 50% of the budget. Another common criticism is that many National Societies that may be able to pay more are not doing so because the present system may not adequately assess their current ability to pay.

Problem statement The IFRC asked ECON Analysis to

evaluate the barème and suggest ways to make it more equitable, transparent and responsive to the actual financial circumstances of National Societies.

It should be noted that the investigation’s scope does not include the size of the budget financed by the barème, nor what activities the barème should fund.

Consultation ECON reviewed the barème and the equivalent mechanisms of other organisations, including those of the International Organisation for Standardisation, the World Council of Churches, the World Organisation of the Scout Movement, the WWF, the World Conservation Union – IUCN, and the United Nations. ECON consulted with representatives of these organisations, as well as relevant IFRC Secretariat staff and representatives of 14 National


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Societies, including the 10 members of the Secretary General’s Funding Focus Group.

Review of the current barème Since 1976 the barème has consisted of the following factors (with the following weights since 1992):

• The financial resources of the National Society (weighted 40%)

• The relevant country’s UN quota (40%)

• An “experience factor”, consisting of the National Society’s average contribution over the past 6 years (20%)

There are also a number of adjustment rules, the most important of which state that no member shall pay more than 25% of the total, and no member’s quota shall change by more than 10% per year (raised to 12% for 2005). There is also a minimum payment of CHF 1000 for those National Societies whose quota would imply a payment less than this amount.

Financial resources of the National Society National Society income considered under the present formula is essentially unrestricted income. This is based on the assumption that unrestricted income represents the pool from which National Societies pay their barème quotas. The fact that a number of National Societies’ governments pay their quotas for them (in what are essentially earmarked donations) seems to undermine the rationale for this definition of countable income. However, the number of National Societies whose governments pay their barème it is not known.

The percentage of the total budget that unrestricted income represents appears to vary widely among National Societies, from as little as 2% to almost 100% in some cases. This contributes to a number of apparent anomalies. For example, the countable resources of the Hungarian Red Cross are larger than those of the Swiss Red Cross, and the countable resources of the Icelandic Red Cross are larger than those of the Canadian Red Cross.

A wider definition of income, such as total income, may be a better indicator of actual ability to pay. However, ECON would recommend a closer look at the finances of a selection of National Societies before making such a switch, with the aim of eventually introducing a replacement indicator (e.g., total income) in a second phase. Such a review, which has been beyond the scope of the present study, would require obtaining data from National Societies beyond that normally available to the Secretariat. Unfortunately, only an eventual change in this indicator is likely to lead to significant quota increase for some of those National Societies that “may be able” to pay more. In the meantime, changes to some other barème features, noted below, will have this affect for at least some National Societies.

There are also currently problems with validity of data. Only about half of National Societies calculate and submit income figures annually as required. However, this problem is likely to remain even if the barème uses a different


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indicator supplied by National Societies. The IFRC should consider a package of measures to deal with this problem, including audits, stricter penalties, and targeted training on calculation methods, e.g., conducted as regional seminars. Such seminars could also provide opportunities for the Secretariat to gain a greater understanding of National Societies’ accounts, and thus help it determine an eventual replacement indicator for National Society income.

UN quota The UN quota is an indicator representing national income. National income can be a proxy for the potential funding pool available to a National Society. An advantage of using an aspirational indicator such as national income is that it does not “punish” National Societies that are particularly good at raising funds (i.e., by taxing their income), while providing an incentive for others to do better. It also reduces dependence on (un-audited) data that must be supplied by National Societies.

Complete reliance on an aspirational indicator probably would be difficult in practice, especially for new National Societies, those undergoing significant reform and those facing a high level of competition for donations in their home markets. However, ECON would advise IFRC to maintain some measure of the potential funding pool in the formula as a counter to National Society income. At a minimum, ECON would recommend not lowering the relative weight of national income (e.g., as represented by the UN quota) vis-à-vis that of National Society income. (It should be noted that there is no objective way to determine the weight of factors; any weighting will necessarily involve political compromise.)

The UN quota, which is already used in the barème, appears to be a reasonable, off-the-shelf indicator of available national income, especially because it adjusts income (GNI) for debt and poverty. Because such adjustments cannot be completely objective, the UN quota system is potentially even more valuable: since it combines continual review with political discussion and compromise, this means the same calculations and compromises do not have to be re-worked in other fora. ECON recommends that the IFRC continue to use the UN quota as a measurement of national income in the barème formula.


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UN quota: main features

• The UN quota is based on gross national income (GNI, formerly called GNP) at market exchange rates.

• The “experience factor” (to use the IFRC term) is effectively about 75%, since the formula uses GNI figures for the previous six years and weights the most current year 25%.

• Significant deductions are made for external debt and low per-capita income, lowering the amount of income counted for most developing countries.

• There is an overall maximum assessment of 22%, another ceiling of 0.01% for Least Developed Countries, and a minimum assessment of 0.001%.

• A scheme that limited the percentage increase of quotas was phased out in 2000. • There is a mitigation process for ad hoc quota adjustments for countries

undergoing severe financial difficulties.

Six-year “experience factor” Given the very large “experience factor” already built into the UN quota (see box), the IFRC experience factor is largely redundant with respect to this part of the formula. It is arguably less relevant for the part of the quota represented by National Society income, since this is the factor most directly related to a National Society’s current ability to pay. ECON would advise IFRC to eliminate this component of the barème formula.

Ceiling All ceilings are a deviation from the principle of the ability to pay. However, they can provide a number of advantages to the organisation in practice. For example, ceilings can mitigate the effect of one or more of the largest members stopping payment. (The relatively low 9% ceiling imstituted by the ISO reportedly is specifically for this purpose.) Ceilings also help limit the informal influence of the largest members, especially important in an organisation run on the basis of each member having an equal vote.

There are no objective ways of determining what a ceiling should be; all ceilings are negotiated political compromises in practice. Nevertheless, there are some factors that could be used as guidelines. One of these is the precedent of other international organisations. For example, based on precedent, there could be a case for lowering the quota for the ceiling at least to 22%, given that the Federation’s current level of 25% was made with reference to the UN ceiling current at the time.

A practical guideline could be to choose a limit based on the extent to which others are willing or able to fill the gap that would be left in the event of non-payment by the largest member. To determine this level based on historical experience, the IFRC could look at the ratio of additional “direct” (voluntary) income to the total of barème and additional voluntary contributions received by the Federation during the first few years of the recent budget crisis.1

1 ECON’s rough calculation indicates this ratio is around 15%, suggesting a ceiling no greater than this level.


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It should be noted that several international organisations have more than one ceiling. ECON recommends that the IFRC consider a “regular” ceiling that would apply to all members, as well as a higher “special” ceiling that could be negotiated with the largest member, as well as with other members willing to pay more. The advantage of this would be to lower the required quota increases for other members.

Floor Currently the minimum payment for a National Society is CHF 1,000. The main complaint we have heard about this limit is that it does not begin to cover the marginal cost of membership. In particular, we have heard recommendations that the minimum membership fee should at least cover the travel costs that are commonly reimbursed to such members, estimated by the Secretariat to be about CHF 2,500.

ECON has no particular recommendation regarding the minimum contribution, other than to point out that

• even CHF 2,500 is not likely to cover the marginal cost of membership.

• the current system is based on ability to pay and not on marginal costs or services received.

• the extra money gained by the Secretariat from raising the floor to CHF 2,500 is likely to be only around CHF 50,000, which is a relatively small sum compared to the budget covered by the barème – though could be significant for some National Societies.

• There does not seem to be much recent precedent for raising the floor in the international organisations we have looked at; and the trend at the UN is significantly in the opposite direction.

Change limit While some international organisations maintain limits on annual changes in quotas, the UN has phased out this feature because it found it led to too many distortions.

Changes in the relative financial positions of National Societies and of home countries lead to changes in “theoretical” quotas, i.e., the amounts payable according to strict adherence to the formula without taking the 10% change limit into account. The change limit has caused significant differences for some National Societies between the “theoretical” quota and the actual (“proposed”) quota.

The change limit already means that changes in financial circumstances take a long time to work their way through the present system. If the change limit were maintained at the present level, it would similarly take a long time for any changes to the calculation method to be reflected in proposed quotas. ECON thus advises the IFRC to significantly raise or eliminate the change limit, at least during the period of adjustment to a new formula. ECON would advise the IFRC


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to phase in changes between the old and new quotas over 2-4 years, e.g., introducing 50-25% of the changes for each member annually.

Recommended scenario ECON described and modelled four reform scenarios. The main features of ECON’s recommended approach (Scenario 1) are as follows:

• Drop the 6-year “experience factor” (currently has a weight of 20%).

• Continue to use a combination of UN quota and National Society income with the same relative weights they possess under the current formula (resulting in new weightings of 50% each after elimination of the “experience factor”).

• Improve the reliability of the data for calculating National Society income, based on a two pronged approach:

o Institute targeted audits, stricter penalties, and targeted training in calculation methods.

o Investigate use of a wider definition of countable income (notably total income) to eventually replace unrestricted income in a second phase. Such an investigation ideally should include a review of a selection of National Societies’ accounts. Audits and regional training seminars under the previous point could be used to gain insight into such accounts and appropriate replacement indicators.

• Institute two ceilings: a “normal” ceiling for all, and a “special” ceiling for the largest member. For our calculations we used 9% and 15%, respectively. The first is based on the precedent of the ISO, and the second is based on our rough calculation of the extent to which other National Societies appeared to be willing to fill the gap left by the American Red Cross. However, it should be emphasised that setting a ceiling is a political rather than an objective process. These figures are only provided for illustration purposes, and at most should be taken as reference points for discussion.

• Distribute the resulting quota reductions of the US, German and Japanese National Societies (about 15.4% total) among those located in countries in “High” income-per-capita countries, according to pre-set World Bank groups. (A problem with grouping countries is that dividing lines between groups usually must be arbitrary. There is thus an advantage to using groups that have been decided elsewhere.)

Invite others to join the “high” group on a voluntary basis, with a strong recommendation for those National Societies located in countries whose UN quotas are higher than 1%. (Quotas calculated under Scenario 1 assume that the National Societies of China, Mexico and Russia choose to join the “High” group.)

• Freeze new quotas during a phase-in period, during which 25% of the change between the old and new quotas is introduced annually for each


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National Society over four years, (or alternatively 50% for each over two years).

• Eliminate or significantly raise the change limit for subsequent years.

The main advantages of Scenario 1 are that it is familiar; decreases reliance on the top three National Societies (by lower the ceiling); limits uptake of quota shares shed by the top three to those mostly likely to be able to afford it; and makes the barème more responsive to changing relative circumstances (by eliminating the “experience factor” and change limit).

A disadvantage is that a number of National Societies will end up with large changes in their proposed quotas. However, many of these National Societies would also face large changes simply by implementation of the “theoretical” quota under the present formula, i.e., by elimination of the 10% change limit.

Another disadvantage is that this scenario may not increase the quotas of a number of National Societies that could pay more. In many cases this is probably due to (temporary) maintenance of the current definition of countable National Society income. It should be noted that the scenario calls for investigating the introduction of a wider definition of National Society income. The eventual use of total income, for example, would probably lead to a greater redistribution of quotas. Given the lack of data on total income of National Societies, however, it is not currently possible to determine the extent of such eventual changes. This is one of the reasons ECON recommends that the IFRC carefully investigate (at least a selection of) National Society accounts before changing the definition of countable National Society income.

Other scenarios The other scenarios may be briefly described as follows:

Scenario 2: Same as Scenario 1, but National Societies are given a choice to use either their home country’s UN quota, or 50% UN quota / 50% National Society income. Only those National Societies that provided audited accounts and are not in the “High” group would be allowed to take the 50/50 option. The quota “gap” (only about 2.6%) left by those choosing to take the 50/50 option would be absorbed by National Societies in the “High” group.

Scenario 3: Same as Scenario 1, but only UN quotas are used. Exceptions would be handled on a case-by-case basis by a commission analogous to the UN’s Committee on Contributions.

Scenario 4: Same as Scenario 3, but UN quotas are replaced by figures for GNI discounted by the human development index (HDI). The main problems with this scenario are that the HDI is still somewhat experimental, and figures for HDI (and even widely acceptable figures for GNI) are not available for a number of IFRC members’ countries.


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1 Introduction 1.1 The assignment The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) requested ECON Analysis to evaluate the mechanism by which it apportions dues among its member National Societies and to suggest ways to improve this mechanism (the “barème”) in order to make it more equitable, transparent and dynamic, i.e., more responsive to the changing financial circumstances of National Societies.2

The Barème finances a major part of the “Core” budget managed by the IFRC’s Geneva headquarters. The Constitution of the IFRC requires that each member Society shall pay an annual contribution in accordance with a scale established by the Finance Commission and approved by the General Assembly. The Finance Commission, within its functions, is required to “review periodically the formula for fixing the financial participation of member Societies and every two years to establish the annual scale of contributions of member Societies for submission to the Assembly for approval” (Constitution, article 15). In practice, this is done on an annual basis.

Since 1976 the contribution of each member Society has been based on a formula that consists of the following factors (with the following weights since 1992):

• The financial resources of the National Society (weighted 40%)

• The relevant country’s UN quota (40%)

• The National Society’s average contribution over the past 6 years (20%)

In addition, there are a number of adjustment rules, the most important of which are that no member shall pay more than 25% of the total and no member’s quota shall change by more than 10% per year.

2 It should be noted that the scope of this investigation does not include the size of the budget financed by the

barème, nor what activities and functions the barème should fund.


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1.2 Background for the review A common criticism of the current mechanism is that it relies on only a few National Societies for a very large percentage of the total budget that is financed by this mechanism, e.g., 3 National Societies pay almost 50% of the total. As has been demonstrated over the past few years, this is a risky feature of the system, since non-payment of dues by one or more top contributors can lead to a budget crisis.

The current review of the Barème mechanism is motivated in large part by the non-payment of dues since 2000 by the largest contributor, the American Red Cross, which in recent years otherwise accounted for 25% of the total budget financed by the barème.

Additionally, another large contributor, the German Red Cross, has communicated its strong desire to pay a smaller portion of the budget as well. The implication is that any eventual decrease in the statutory quota of the American Red Cross may have to be picked up primarily by those countries outside the top contributors.

Another common criticism of the present mechanism we heard was that many National Societies outside the top 3 that probably could afford to pay more are not currently doing so because the present system may not adequately assess their ability to pay.

More generally, there is some concern that if National Societies don’t support whatever formula is adopted, or cannot afford payment under it, a trend toward more widespread non-payment may develop.

1.3 ECON’s approach Keeping the above main criticisms in mind, practical suggestions for change therefore ideally should find ways to assign quotas among members that, relative to the current system,

1. apportion less of the total to the current top contributors, and

2. provide a better basis than the current one for equitably assessing how much each National Society should pay.

While changes to the barème ultimately will involve political decisions, it will be helpful to base such decisions on a solid analysis of options, including proposed solutions that can be defended on the basis of logic, equity, simplicity and precedent. The purpose of this study is to provide such an analysis and set of proposals.

This paper approaches this task in the following way:

• Chapter 2 reviews mechanisms used in a number of other international organisations;

• Chapter 3 reviews and critiques the Federation’s current Barème mechanism;


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• Chapter 4 presents several alternative reform scenarios.

1.4 Consultation In preparing this report, ECON consulted with the following:

National Societies that are members of the Funding Focus Group Barges Al Barges, Kuwaiti Red Crescent

Antoni Bruel i Carreras, Head of International, Spanish Red Cross

Hiroshi Higashiura, Director of External Relations, Japanese Red Cross

Anders Ladekarl, Head of International, Danish Red Cross

Brian Majewski, Senior Director, Intl. Policy & Relations American Red Cross

Larry Mills, Finance Director, Canadian Red Cross

Yong-Hoon Rheem, Head of International, Korean Red Cross

Ms. Sana’a Darwish Al Kitibiy, Secretary General, UAE Red Crescent

Prof. Dr. Manfred Willms, German Red Cross, Member of Finance Commission

Sir Nicholas Young, Chief Executive, British Red Cross

Other National Societies Tom Buruku, Chairman, Uganda Red Cross

Changjiang Guo, Secretary General, Red Cross Society of China

Ariel Kestens, Director General, Argentine Red Cross

Mrs. Geri Lau, Secretary General, Singapore Red Cross Society

IFRC Governance William R. Usher, Chairman of Finance Commission and Member of IFRC Governing Board

IFRC Secretariat Markku Niskala, Secretary General

Richard Blewitt, Director, Movement Coordination

Luc De Wever, Head of Cabinet, OSG

Micheal Davis, Head, Finance Department

Martin Faller, Team Leader, NSFS Division


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Stephen Ingles, Director, Support Services

Susan Johnson, Director, NSFS Division

Michel Kihm, Finance Officer, Financial Services Unit

Ken Phillips, Head, OD Department

Mathew Varghese, Head, Evaluation Department

Other international Organisations Beatrice Frey, Head of the Bureau of the Secretary General, International Organisation for Standardization (ISO)

Nan Braunschweiger, Membership Income Co-ordinator, World Council of Churches (WCC)

Mireille Duchoud, Director, Administration, Finance & Personnel Unit, World Organization of the Scout Movement (WOSM)

Jon Cederoth, WWF

Regula Haller, Membership Co-ordinator, World Conservation Union (IUCN)

Ari Gaitanis, Office of the Secretary General, United Nations (UN)

David Small, Legal Affairs, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

John Donaldson, Chief of Division of General Legal Affairs, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

1.5 Authors This report was prepared by ECON Analysis, a consultancy firm based in Oslo, Norway. The principal authors were:

Philip Swanson, Partner, Paris office ([email protected])

Leiv Lunde, Partner, Oslo office ([email protected])


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2 Experience in other organisations

ECON reviewed the experience for apportioning expenses among members in several other international organisations. The goal of this exercise was to compare the IFRC’s mechanism with practice elsewhere, as well as find possible innovative solutions and precedents for use by the IFRC.

The review was limited to organisations that were thought have some similarities with the IFRC, either in terms of having a large humanitarian/volunteer component in their mission, or in having members that are essentially NGOs but with varying degrees of closeness to their national governments.

Organisations reviewed were the following:

• International Organisation for Standardization (ISO)

• World Council of Churches (WCC)

• World Organization of the Scout Movement (WOSM)

• WWF

• World Conservation Union (IUCN)

ECON reviewed a number of other organisations initially but rejected them from further consideration after determining that their financing models were likely to be too different from that of the IFRC to provide any meaningful lessons for the latter.3

The review of each organisation looks at the assessment formula used and penalties/incentives for payment and correct reporting of information on which the assessment is based. It also provides a brief commentary on the relevance of the model for the IFRC.

3 For example, sporting associations such as the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) receive

most of their money from tournaments and sponsorships, so that the real issue for them is not finding ways to determine members’ contributions but methodologies for sharing commercial proceeds with members.


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2.1 International Organisation for Standardization (ISO)

The International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) develops technical and other standards with the goal of enhancing international trade. Created in 1947 and currently based in Geneva, its members are the national bodies "most representative of standardization” in their countries. Some of these are government agencies, while others are NGOs. Only one such body from each country is accepted for membership.

The mechanism Approximately 60-65% of ISO’s budget comes from its members, while the balance is derived from sales of ISO standards documents. ISO members are assigned quotas (”subscriptions”) in proportion to the economic importance of their home countries. The formula has the following components:

• GNP 50%

• Exports (FOB) 25%

• Imports (CIF) 25%

The portion of the budget from members is divided into a number of units, and the value of one unit is determined each year by the ISO Council.

Using the formula above, a hypothetical percentage of the total number of units is determined for each full member. A revised version of this percentage is then determined by making several adjustments.

One of the adjustments is to assign some of the total units to “Correspondent” members and “Subscriber” members. These membership categories offer reduced benefits for countries that do not yet possess fully developed standards bodies. Each Corresponding member is assessed 2 units, while each Subscriber member pays for ½ unit.

In addition, a floor of 5 units has been established for each full member.

The most important adjustment relates to the rule that no member should pay more than 9% of the total number of units. According to discussions with a representative of the ISO,4 this rule has been in effect almost since the beginning of the organisation, with the express purpose of preventing the ISO from being too dependent on any one member. Currently, five members (US, UK, Japan, Germany and France) are affected by this limit, implying that 45% of the budget is split evenly between these five members.

Number of units has no relationship to formal influence in the organisation, i.e., each member has one vote regardless of the number of budgetary units it pays.

4 Conversation with Beatrice Frey, Head of the Bureau of the Secretary General, 10 December 2004. (Tel. 41-

22 741 0224, [email protected])


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Penalties/incentives for payment and correct reporting Each member has until the end of ISO’s fiscal year (which is also the calendar year) to pay its membership dues. If a full member has not paid by this time, it is “suspended” by the treasurer until it has paid its membership bill. The treasurer is apparently authorised to do this without having to seek approval from other governance bodies within the organisation.

A suspended member loses its rights to participate in the organisation and stops receiving documentation.

If a full member goes three years without paying, it is automatically dropped. If it wishes to be reinstated, it must go through the admissions process like any potential new member. Correspondent and Subscriber members are automatically dropped at the end of the first year of non-payment.

Although the non-payment rules are rather rigid, as long as a member has communicated with the treasurer and worked out a payment schedule before the end of the year, it is not usually suspended in practice.

Commentary / possible relevance to Barème

R.C. context has no equivalent to level of commercial interest The method of assessing membership fees in ISO is similar to that used in a number of other organisations with a commercial orientation: quotas are based on a country’s share in total relevant commerce. In the case of ISO, trade flows are taken as a proxy for the importance to each member of developing and maintaining international standards.5 However, it is difficult to see that there is an equivalent concept to commercial importance/interest in the case of IFRC members.

While one could perhaps measure involvement in international relief projects, this could send perverse incentives by effectively taxing members for their contributions to such efforts. It may also encourage them to work bilaterally outside the IFRC system. This may not necessarily be a bad thing, since it could be left up to individual National Societies to determine whether it is more cost-effective for them to provide their own logistics or to rely upon the services of the IFRC. Historically, however, the IFRC barème has been based not on services received but on ability to pay. A fee-for-service approach probably would require a change in strategic approach for the IFRC with implications beyond the barème. It would also require research into the costs of its various services.

Budget of members not taken into account Another observation is that, although not all ISO bodies are governmental organisations, no account is taken of the budget of these organisations.

5 Another example of measuring a member’s commercial importance and/or interest in a subject is the use of

capacity tonne-kilometers available on a member state’s scheduled air services in the calculation of dues to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). See http://www.icao.int/icao/en/res/a21_33.htm


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Low ceiling The setting of a relatively low ceiling for the purpose of avoiding dependence on any one member would seem to have some relevance for IFRC. Regarding the particular level, the ISO’s choice of 9%, like the level of all ceilings, was decided politically.

2.2 World Council of Churches (WCC) The World Council of Churches (WCC) is a Geneva-based membership organisation of 342 Christian church bodies in over 120 countries. Members have varying degrees of closeness to their governments, e.g., some are completely independent of government while others are state churches or receive some state funding or special tax status.

The mechanism Until 2003 the WCC relied on voluntary dues from member churches, while providing few guidelines on the amount each member should pay. Nevertheless, to aid financial planning, members were asked to indicate in advance how much they intended to contribute and were encouraged to send at least as much as the year before. There was also a minimum suggested annual contribution of 1,000 CHF.

A membership contribution campaign raised the number of paying member churches from 50% in 1998 to 71% by 2003, but only succeeded in raising total contributions from about CHF 6 million to CHF 6.4 million.6 This prompted the Central Committee to adopt a new calculation structure for suggested membership dues based on a method that is “fair, transparent and objectively determined for all members”. The new system was introduced from 1 January 2004.

The new system is based on the number of members in each member church. Similar to the situation in the IFRC, churches determine and submit this data themselves and the data is not audited by the Secretariat.

The Secretariat has developed a table that indicates the suggested “full contribution” according to number of members in a particular church body. For example, the full contribution for a church with a membership between 25,000 – 39,000 members is CHF 2,500. The formula behind the table is based on CHF 0.10 per member.

However, only churches in the “richest country” (which in practice has been the United States) pay the “full contribution”. All other churches pay an amount that is discounted by the income per capita of the country. For example, a church located in a country that has a per-capita income half that of the US would pay half the amount per person (CHF 0.5 instead of CHF 0.10) of a church located in the United States.

6 Interview with Nan Braunschweiger, WCC Membership Income Coordinator, 9 December 2004 (Tel 41-22

791 6177, e-mail: [email protected]). See also WCC Membership Contribution Campaign (http://www.wcc-coe.org/membership/index.html).


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Penalties/Incentives for payment and correct reporting According to the WWC, the main incentive for a church not to undercount its members is that the number of members also determines the number of delegates a church may send to the WCC General Assembly, which is held every seven years. Number of delegates to the General Assembly in turn determines the number of votes at this meeting.

There are currently no sanctions for underpaying the new quota, since the amount is still only a suggestion. However, conversion to a mandatory system may be discussed and approved at the next General Assembly, along with the introduction of sanctions.

Currently, churches that have paid no membership dues at all for a year are not eligible to receive travel subsidies to attend meetings, including, but apparently not limited to, the General Assembly. This primarily affects poorer churches. Any churches that have not paid any dues by the midway point between General Assemblies (i.e., three and a half years since the last General Assembly) will be asked to explain. This may lead to the particular church being declared ”non-active”, which means they may not be invited to any more meetings.


Number of members The formula used by the WCC to calculate contributions effectively takes into account both size of the organisation (represented by number of members) and some measure of national wealth (the use of income per capita to discount the contribution per individual member).

The main difficulty of using such a method for the IFRC may be that membership reportedly is defined differently in different RC National Societies. However, this also appears to be the case for churches. The WCC Secretariat asks churches to specify the basis of calculating membership, i.e., whether the figure provided is based on number of “baptized members”, “adult members”, “Communicant members”, or “Other”. However, all members are counted the same.

Even if number of members were not connected to number of votes in the WCC, member organizations may still have an incentive not to under-report membership, since there is presumably some prestige related to a large – and growing – number of members. Whereas some National Societies may be hesitant to report income, they may have more of an incentive to report numbers of members.

While the concept of membership is probably more fundamental to churches than it is to RC National Societies – and is apparently more important for some RC National Societies than others – that may only be the case because currently there is little emphasis by IFRC on this figure as a “success indicator” for the health of National Societies. It should be noted that “Adult membership” was used by the League of Red Cross Societies up to 1976 as one of the factors for calculating R.C. National Society contributions (see next chapter).


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Purchasing power parity One comment on the specific methodology of the WCC is that it uses income-per-capita figures based on purchasing power parity (PPP) instead of exchange rates. Because PPP figures adjust for local costs – which in developing countries can be lower than in developed countries – the effect is often to inflate the resources of poorer countries. While PPP figures are designed to provide a good indicator of purchasing power within the relevant country, they are probably less appropriate for determining how much an organisation in that country can afford to send abroad, e.g., as membership fees paid in foreign currency.

2.3 World Organization of the Scout Movement (WOSM)

The World Organization of the Scout Movement (WOSM) is the main international association of male-only and mixed-sex national scouting associations. The Geneva-based WOSM has about 150 National Scout Associations that are Member Organisations. Members differ in degree of financial and political relationship with their governments.

The mechanism WOSM finances about half of its total budget through membership fees, while the rest comes primarily from a charitable foundation.7

Similar to the system for the World Council of Churches, WOSM bases its dues assessment on a “basic fee” per individual scout in each Member Organisation: Only scouts in the “richest country” (in practice the United States) pay the full “basic fee”. The fee per scout in all other countries is discounted with reference to the income per capita in the relevant country. In 2002 the “basic fee” per scout in the “richest country” was a little over CHF 1.00, while the average fee per scout for the organisation as a whole was about CHF 0.10.

All types of scouts are counted equally, i.e., cub scouts are counted the same as boy scouts. Professional staff are also included in the total, but not committee members or non-professional staff.

Member Organisations are also divided into four categories, based on the classification system developed by the World Bank (based on income per capita).

WOSM category World Bank category on which based

A “Low income economies”

B “Lower middle income economies”

C “Upper middle income economies”

D “High income economies”

7 This section is based on an interview with Mireille Duchoud, Director, Administration, Finance & Personnel

Unit, WOSM (tel 41-22 705 1010, e-mail: [email protected]).


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The main reason for division into categories is to establish different systems of adjustments to the basic formula. The most important of these have to do with ceilings. Effectively there are two ceilings: The first applies to all countries and limits the amount payable by any one Member Organisation to 35% of the total budget. At present no Member Organisation hits this limit; the closest is the US organisation, which pays approximately 30% of the total.

The second ceiling applies only to Member Organisations in Categories A and B (i.e., those from countries with the lowest per-capita income) and limits the amount they must pay to the lower of either

• 5% of the total annual fees due from all Member Organisations, or

• an annual fee corresponding to 1 million members.

These additional limits came about due to pressure from several very large scouting organisations in populous developing countries, including notably Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand.

There is a flat fee of CHF 300 for Member Organisations in countries with a GNP per capita of less than US$ 350, an amount apparently corresponding to half the maximum income per capita of a country in the lowest income group. This effectively creates a sub-group of Category A.

There is also a flat fee of CHF 200 for “Accredited” National Scout Organisations, apparently a provisional form of membership.

Member Organisations are asked to provide information on number of members every year. This information is not audited by WOSM. However, only the membership figure for the year preceding a World Conference (held every three years) is used for determining the calculation of membership fees for the proceeding three years. (WOSM has a triennial budget.) Although the number of members used during the calculation period – and thus the percentage of the total budget paid by each organisation – does not change over the three-year period, the “basic fee” per scout may be changed each year.

There is no limit to the annual percentage change allowed for a Member Organisation’s annual fee between two triennial budget periods.

The actual budget of Member organisations is not taken into account in any way in assessing fees.

WOSM also has a number of regional offices that are funded in a similar manner from the Member Organisations in their relevant regions.

Penalties/Incentives for payment and correct reporting If a member does not pay its dues within one year, the case goes to the World Scout Committee, which usually declares a ”partial suspension”. A partial suspension implies that a Member Organisation no longer receives documentation, invitations to meetings, and no longer is able to send scouts to participate in regional or world events organised by WOSM, e.g., scout “jamborees”. If the Member Organisation still has not paid after one year of


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partial suspension, it receives a full suspension, and all communication with the organisation is cut. According to WOSM, more than 90% of fees due for a given fiscal year have, on average, been paid during the same year since the current system was introduced in 1996.

In practice, as long as a Member Organisation works out a payment schedule with the Secretariat, it does not receive a suspension or partial suspension. The Secretariat noted that the finance department was proactive in this regard and tried to keep good contact with members in order to avoid surprises.

The Secretariat also maintains an informal fund sponsored by richer associations to pay for part or all of the membership dues of some of the poorer members that request help. In practice the Secretariat co-ordinates bilateral arrangements that hook up donors and recipients.

Unlike in the WCC, size of contribution is not linked to formal influence in the organisation, for example through number of votes. Presumably, most organisations are motivated not to undercount members for prestige reasons. Nevertheless, the WOSM Secretariat has noticed that some Member Organisations habitually report a downturn in membership for the year prior to a World Conference, i.e., the year used for dues calculations. It has also noticed that a few Member Organisations even report figures to the Secretariat that are lower than those they report publicly, e.g., on websites. Since the Secretariat does not have the authority to audit or otherwise check figures, there is little it can do other than ask a Member Organisation to explain the discrepancy.

While the concept of membership appears to be straightforward and rather standardised across national scouting associations, the Secretariat notes that at least one Member Organisation has tried to justify discrepancies between publicly reported figures and those reported to the Secretariat by explaining that some participants in its programmes are not “full, dues-paying scouts” and therefore should not be counted as such for financial purposes.

A few members have not reported membership figures for many years. In such cases the Secretariat uses the latest figures available. There are no penalties for not reporting.


Multiple ceilings Although the WOSM ceilings were developed in the context of membership and aimed in part at members in populous, low-income countries, the use of multiple ceilings could provide an interesting precedent for the IFRC.

Use of bands/categories that have been determined elsewhere The use of bands or categories to divide members into groups to which different rules/fee levels apply can be problematic because of the difficulty of where to draw lines between groups. Since the placement of such lines has to be arbitrary, and since placement on one side or the other can have important financial implications for members near a border, there is potential for disputes regarding the definition of such categories. If bands are used, it can therefore be a good idea


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to use those that have already been defined elsewhere. Perhaps the best known is the set of bands developed by the World Bank for dividing countries into groups based on income per capita, i.e., the one WOSM has chosen to use. The WOSM Secretariat notes that use of World Bank bands takes the pressure off the Secretariat to defend and adjust a customised system and gives the Secretariat a “solid argument” when members do complain. The World Bank bands can be seen as similar to the UN quota system in this regard.

Manipulation of reported figures Although membership figures are more straightforward and probably less easily manipulated than budget figures, it is clear that some member organisations have still been tempted to report lower figures. Empowering the Secretariat to conduct audits may help. Another lesson from WOSM could be to base fees on figures (membership or income) over an average of several years in order to decrease the incentive to lower figures during certain years.

At the end of the day, however, it would seem that there might always be problems relying on statistics from certain members, whether for finances or membership. This may be due to accounting differences, lack of skills in collecting/preparing required statistics, genuine misunderstandings, or even deliberate attempts to deceive or take advantage of vagaries in the rules. This would seem to argue for greater reliance on figures that are publicly available and thus do not need to be supplied by member organisations.

Clearinghouse function for bilateral support for membership payment WOSM’s use of a fund or informal clearing-house system for bilateral support on membership dues could be an interesting idea for the Secretariat to consider.

Purchasing power parity It should be noted that, unlike WCC, WOSM does not use income per capita figures that have been adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). As stated earlier, PPP figures are probably not a good indicator of ability to pay membership fees in foreign currency because they are primarily designed to show purchasing power within a country.

2.4 WWF The WWF (formerly World Wildlife Fund) is a Genva-based organisation undertaking various projects with the goal of “halting the accelerating destruction of our natural world”.

WWF has offices in 29 countries. There are basically two types of offices: those that are able to raise their own sources of funding, and those that depend on financing from headquarters.


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The offices with independent sources of finance are usually franchisees that are licensed to use the WWF panda logo. They are NGOs with little or no relationship to the governments of the countries in which they are located.8

Annual dues paid by member offices account for approximately 60% of the total budget handled by WWF’s Geneva headquarters.

WWF projects may be undertaken by franchisees alone, jointly with WWF headquarters, or directly by or co-ordinated by headquarters.

The mechanism WWF recently revised its membership dues mechanism. The new system will come into effect for fiscal year 2006 (beginning mid-2005). Unfortunately, the Secretariat was reluctant to provide documentation or precise details on how the new system is to work. However, a general description follows.9

The only component used in the new dues calculation is ”total donated income” (TDI) of each member office. TDI equals gross income with the following deductions:

• income received from the WWF Network (i.e., from other offices, routed through Geneva),

• earned income from interest and dividends, and net ”trading” income, e.g., from sales of WWF toys and gifts.

The number of allowed deductions has been significantly reduced compared to the previous system. In particular, national offices are no longer able to exclude restricted/earmarked funding, including grants from governments. According to the Secretariat, this has led to a significant increase in the total pool of funds available to be included in the calculation of dues.

Another major change is that annual reports submitted by national offices must be audited.

The dues have several components:

• All offices pay the same percentage of their “total donated income” (TDI) to fund the WWF ”Core” budget, which goes to pay salaries and overheads in the Geneva office.

• All offices also pay a percentage of their TDI to the ”Network services” and ”Programme funding” budgets, which are used to fund projects organised by various national offices or the Geneva office.

8 Nevertheless, governments and government aid agencies account for approximately 22% of WWF income.

Donations from individuals account for about 50% of the total, while the balance comes from corporations (3%), trusts and foundations, royalties and other. These percentages apparently include both donations given directly to headquarters as well as indirectly via WWF member offices.

9 Phone interview with Jon Cederoth, 10 December 2004 (tel: 41-22 364 9258). Part of the reluctance to divulge financial information apparently is related to a pending lawsuit with the World Wrestling Federation over the use of the accronym ”WWF”.


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The percentage of TDI paid by each office to this part of the budget depends on the income-based category of the office. There are three income-based categories: Offices with TDIs below CHF 5 million, those with TDIs between CHF 5 and 15 million, and those with TDIs above CHF 15 million.

• There is another category of fees called the ”Programme office levy”, which appears to be a subset of the ”Programme Funding” budget and is used for funding headquarters overhead costs for projects funded by this budget. The size of this budget is apparently arbitrarily set at 10% of the ”Programme funding” budget. Only offices in OECD countries are required to pay this budget component. A single rate is used for all concerned offices.

A ceiling of 20% applies only to certain parts of the budget: Network services and the Programme office levy. Currently this ceiling affects the contributions of two offices. There are currently negotiations with these offices to raise this cap to 25%.

Penalties/Incentives for payment and correct reporting Financial information submitted by offices must be audited.

The penalty system for non-payment is not known.

Commentary / possible relevance to Barème It is difficult to comment in very much detail on the WWF system because it has not yet been introduced, and we do not have many details on how it is to function. Nevertheless, based on the information we do have, it is possible to make a few observations.

Total income instead of unrestricted income Use of an income figure that does not allow deduction of restricted/earmarked funding could provide an interesting model for the IFRC. An apparent major disadvantage to limiting barème calculations to certain types of funds is that National Societies appear to have a great deal of discretion to define such categories in practice (e.g., unrestricted or earmarked), as well as an incentive to organize their finances and fundraising efforts so that a large percentage of funds are counted a certain way.

Requiring members to include all income or “total donated income” would probably make it more difficult to seal off large amounts of resources from being counted in determining barème quotas.

A practical consideration, however, is that there are already a large number of National Societies that do not regularly report even the limited amount of financial information currently requested by the Secretariat. It therefore is unclear that these members could be expected to provide more complete financial information, especially if it involved revealing incomes that are effectively much larger than what their currently reported unrestricted budget would imply.


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On the other hand, it is possible that part of the problem in some cases is the effort currently required to separate earmarked and un-earmarked income, whereas more complete, raw information actually could be easier for some National Societies to supply. This comment was made to us, but given the limited time available, we are unable to provide an opinion on the extent to which this may be the case.

Audits Related to the above, the WWF’s new requirement for offices to have their accounts audited appears to be a reasonable move for IFRC to consider. Although audits may impose additional costs on some National Societies, it is arguably something that a well-run National Society should be doing anyway. Another possibility could be to impose audits only on National Societies whose potential contribution is likely to be significant to the IFRC, e.g., those located in a country with a GNI above a particular threshold and/or a ratio of unrestricted income to GNI below another threshold.

Different formulae for funding different parts of the budget The division of the budget into components that are funded by member offices according to different methods could be seen as the equivalent of a situation under which the IFRC develops a separate barème mechanism for N.S. contributions to the Operations budget and perhaps even another to fund the part of the Core budget that reportedly is used for overheads for some Operations projects. Such a system could be worth investigating, though it is too early to tell whether it has been successful for the WWF. (It should be noted that investigation of divisions in the budget are outside the terms of reference of the current project.)

Use of bands/groups Use of higher percentages for calculating dues for offices with higher incomes is somewhat analogous to a progressive income tax. The problem is that the bands used by WWF based on office income may be seen to have arbitrary borders, especially by offices that fall just above the cut-off line for a lower band. In this sense, WWF’s category, “offices in OECD countries”, is easier to defend, since it refers to a well-recognized group defined outside WWF.

2.5 IUCN – the World Conservation Union IUCN – the World Conservation Union10 is a Gland, Switzerland-based union of some 77 governments, 114 government agencies and over 800 NGOs facilitating a “green web” of partnership that has generated a number of environmental conventions and global standards. It was founded in 1948. In 1999 it was accorded Observer status at the United Nations.

10 Founded on 5 October 1948 as the International Union for the Protection of Nature (IUPN), the organization changed its name to the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) in 1956. In 1990 it was shortened to IUCN -The World Conservation Union.


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The mechanism The IUCN has a yearly budget of about CHF 90 million. About 10% of this (its “core budget”) is financed through membership dues. Much of the rest comes from framework agreements with major countries to sponsor specific projects.

State members are divided into 11 groups (Group 0 through Group 10) according to their UN quota, and all state members within a particular group pay the same fee. (Those in the lowest group pay CHF 2,143, while those in the highest pay CHF 12,426.)

According to the Secretariat, the borders between groups were apparently decided arbitrarily in 1987, and the composition of groups has not been changed since. This has caused complaints by some members that have moved up or down the UN scale since then.

The Secretariat could not find documentation for the basis of the original fee calculation. The fees for each group have been raised each year by the same percentage, recently tied to the Swiss CPI.

Two separate but similar scales are used for government agencies, depending on whether an agency’s parent government is already a member.

There is a separate scale for NGOs containing nine dues groups, based on the operating expenditure of the organisation (see box for definition). Members are required to provide audited accounts. As in the case for state organisations, the original formula behind the calculation of the fee for each category seems to have been forgotten, although it appears to have been based on a levy of about 0.005% of operating expenditures.

Box 2.1 IUCN definition of “operating expenditure” for NGOs

“those expenses arising in the course of ordinary activities of the organisation and which are considered to be recurrent annual expenditures. Operating expenditures do not include one-time investments and/or major project expenditures such as donor-funded projects. Applicant and/or member organisations are requested to provide appropriate financial information so that the IUCN Secretariat may determine the dues group of an NGO or INGO.” Source: Membership Dues for 2006 to 2008 (Congress Paper CGR/3/2004/17)


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Table 2.1 IUCN membership fees for NGOs and INGOs

Dues Group Operating expenditures (US$) 2005 dues (CHF) 1 Up to 100 k 404 2 100 k to 500 k 647 3 500 k to 1 million 1,213 4 1 – 2 million 2,428 5 2 – 4 million 4,854 6 4 – 6 million 8,089 7 6 – 8 million 11,325 8 8 – 10 million 14,561 9 Over 10 million 19,415 Source: Membership Dues for 2006 to 2008 (Congress Paper CGR/3/2004/17)

In practice, very few NGOs are in the highest dues groups. The largest percentage of NGO members (67%) is in Group 1, while the five highest dues groups together account for only 3.8% of NGO members. Part of the reason for this is that a number of large NGOs have left the organisation over the past 5-10 years. The Secretariat indicated that one of the reasons was probably the high dues fees for the largest NGOs. Prior to 1987, dues had been voluntary donations at the discretion of the NGO. The Secretariat said it planned to review the dues structure for NGO members.

There is also a fourth category of members called “Affiliates”, which pay a flat fee of CHF 2,428. Affiliates have rights that are similar to those of members, except that they are not allowed to vote. (In any case, voting weight is not related to size of membership fee.) This category seems to have been a back-door way of attracting or maintaining large states and NGOs that otherwise would not want to pay the relatively large fees of their upper-level dues groups. As can be seen, the fee for an Affiliate is the same as that for an NGO in dues group 4, i.e., one with operating expenditures of between US$ 1 – 2 million. Effectively this seems to operate as a ceiling.

Penalties/Incentives for payment and correct reporting Accounts by NGOs must be audited.

If a member is a year behind in its membership dues it is suspended by the Secretariat, meaning it loses its voting rights. After two years, a World Congress can decide to rescind membership. The Secretariat notes that, in practice the IUCN has been reluctant to exclude state members, in part because it does not want to isolate states on which it counts on for support at the UN. It appears to have taken a tougher line with NGOs, while offering the backdoor solution of Affiliate membership to the larger ones.

Commentary / possible relevance to Barème IUCN experience seems to point to the pitfalls engendered by creating payment groups with arbitrary boundaries, i.e., complaints by members on the high side of boundaries.


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Moreover, it is difficult to see the value-added of using groups in the IUCN dues system. Considerable transparency – and presumably more acceptance from members – probably could be gained by using a straightforward formula, e.g., the formula that presumably was behind the original calculation of dues for each group back in 1987.


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3 The current Barème mechanism

This chapter reviews the current barème mechanism. After briefly describing the system, it comments on its individual components, drawing on the experience and practice of other international organisations.

3.1 Brief description of the current Barème mechanism

The current formula for determining the Scale of Contributions dates from 1992, although the formula has consisted of the same factors (with different weights) since 1976:

• The financial resources of the National Society (currently 40%)

• The relevant country’s quota to the United Nations (40%)

• An “experience factor” based on the National Society’s quota over the previous 6 years (20%)

There is a “ceiling” or maximum quota that any National Society is required to pay. Since 1996 this has been set at 25% of the total portion of the budget funded by the barème mechanism. Responsibility for funding the portion of the budget affected by the ceiling is redistributed on a pro-rata basis to National Societies not affected by the ceiling. Currently the ceiling affects only the American Red Cross, which otherwise would pay a percentage of the budget closer to 30%.

There is also a “floor” or minimum quota, which was set at CHF 1,000 in 2003.

There is a limit on the amount that the percentage quota of each National Society is allowed to increase, set at 10% for 2004. (For example, if a particular National Society is assessed a quota of 1% one year, its quota may not be more than 1.1% the following year.) Similar to the rules for the ceiling, funding for the portion of the budget affected by this change limit is redistributed on a pro-rata basis to National Societies not already affected by the floor or ceiling. In 2004, for example, increases or decreases in quotas for approximately half of all National Societies appear to have been limited through this mechanism.


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3.2 Financial resources of the National Society

Currently, 40% of a National Society’s contribution is determined by its un-restricted income (see box for definition). Although the definition of countable income appears to be reasonably precise, we have heard questions as to whether un-restricted income is actually a reliable indicator of ability to pay.

Some (if not many) National Societies reportedly have their governments pay their IFRC barème. This effectively makes the barème payment an earmarked expense, begging the question of whether it makes sense to assume that the pool available to National Societies to pay their dues is really limited to un-restricted income in practice.

A finding in our discussions with other membership organisations is that members sometimes “game” the system if they have an incentive to do so. In the case of the IFRC there would seem to be at least an incentive for National Societies to raise mostly “restricted” funds – or to ensure that most funds are classified as such. However, without investigation into the accounts of National Societies, it would be difficult to say whether this is happening in practice.

Box 3.1 Revenue to be declared for Federation statutory contributions

• Membership fees • Revenue from investments • Revenue from Fund-raising campaigns (cash income, not including in-kind or

contributions received for emergency relief.) • Governmental and other subsidies (“all unrestricted income received from

governments and public bodies to meet current expenditures. Earmarked and or restricted grants and capital grants are to be excluded”)

• Other unrestricted revenue

Source: based on Declaration for Federation Statutory Contributions


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Certainly there seems to be little relationship between countable income and figures for expenditure, as shown for the selection of National Societies below.11

Table 3.1 Countable resources as % of reported expenditures

Source: N.S. Profiles on IFRC website for expenditures, Secretariat for resources

11 Data for expenditures comes from the National Society profiles on the IFRC website

(http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/profile/). The profiles provide figures for only one year for each N.S. ECON took the first 10 societies (alphabetically) from each IFRC region that reported figures for 2001. The countable income figures (for 31.12.2000) were supplied by the Secretariat. Note that if one assumed a common percentage of total expenditures (or total income) as countable resources, e.g., 25%, this would have the same effect as simply using total income or total expenditures. This is because all of these figures would be translated into an index and thus have the same relative values when compared to the equivalent figures for other National Societies.

New financialresources

Date last New financial Expenditures as % ofQuestionnaire resource expenditures

received (million CHF) (million CHF) (%)

Albania 31.12.99 0,264 1,980 13Algeria 31.12.99 0,280 17,000 2Andora 31.12.99 0,299 1,150 26Argentina 30.06.99 10,449 5,900 177Armenia 31.12.00 0,615 1,050 59Australia 30.06.00 16,092 247,600 6Bangladesh 31.12.00 0,877 2,300 38Barbados 31.12.00 0,145 0,363 40Belarus 31.12.00 0,192 0,216 89Botswana 31.12.99 0,255 0,441 58Cameroon 30.06.99 0,175 0,268 65Canada 31.03.00 10,849 237,000 5Croatia 31.12.94 0,273 1,600 17Czech Republic 31.12.00 0,094 5,100 2Fiji 31.12.00 0,080 0,875 9Gabon 31.12.98 0,032 0,058 55Gambia 31.12.92 0,006 0,192 3India 31.03.98 1,129 8,200 14Jordan 31.12.98 0,090 2,130 4Kiribati 31.12.96 0,008 0,027 31Qatar 31.12.00 0,871 2,600 33United States 30.06.00 841,561 4100,000 21


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The current system also produces numerous apparent anomalies, e.g.,

• Countable resources of the Hungarian R.C are greater than those of the Swiss R.C.

• Countable resources of the Icelandic R.C. are greater than those of the Canadian R.C.

• Countable resources of the Romanian R.C. are greater than those of the Chinese R.C.

There is no check or audit by the Secretariat of figures provided by National Societies. Moreover, according to the recent self-assessment exercise completed by National Societies under the Monitoring and Evaluation department, 31% of National Societies do not have arrangements for an external audit of their accounts.12

A very large number of National Societies have not submitted any statements of countable income for many years; and about half did not submit statements for the calculation of the 2004 quota. The Secretariat must make estimates for these National Societies, which it does by adding 10% to the figure used for the previous year – even in cases where the previous year’s figure was estimated the same way. This would seem to further decrease the reliability of the figures.

3.2.1 Improving the current figures If the IFRC decides to keep the current system, it should, at a minimum, institute measures to make the figures for countable income more reliable.

One recommended course of action is to require audited accounts. This should not be a problem for the approximately 60% of National Societies that already have their accounts audited on a regular basis. For the others, such a requirement arguably would also help improve governance. (It should be noted that an external audit is recommended by Section 2.3.e in “Characteristics of a well-functioning National Society”.)

Nevertheless, an external audit may place a financial burden on some National Societies. In such cases, the Secretariat or group of “donor” National Societies may wish to set up a special fund to offer temporary financial assistance during a transition period.

One way to reduce the cost of auditing could be to focus it on the issues most relevant to calculation of the barème, and/or only require audits in the most significant cases, e.g., only for those National Societies in countries with a GNI or a UN quota above a particular threshold (e.g., USD 50 billion or 0.1) and/or a ratio of unrestricted income to GNI below a particular threshold (e.g., 0.25)

Recommendation: If the IFRC decides to keep some measure of National Society income as part of the barème calculation, it should require the

12 From Self-Assessment Global Report, Executive Summary, p. 5.


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accounts of National Societies to be audited. To improve cost-effectiveness, it should also consider targeting such audits, either in terms of information and/or National Societies covered.

It is possible that some National Societies simply do not understand how to calculate countable income or the importance of providing this information on a regular basis. The International Energy Agency faced such a problem with some countries regarding its annual questionnaire on energy production and consumption. It reportedly solved a large part of this problem by targeting the most “important” countries (in terms of world energy production and consumption) that appeared to be having the largest problems with data anomalies by inviting representatives of relevant government offices to participate in training seminars.

Recommendation: If the IFRC decides to keep some measure of National Society income as part of the barème calculation, it should consider inviting relevant representatives of selected National Societies for training in calculating the amount of countable income. Such seminars could be done on a regional basis.

However, one of the most important incentives for submitting timely data (though not necessarily accurate data) may be sanctions. Currently there are only rather weak sanctions for non-payment but none for non-supply of information.

The current practice of adding 10% to the previous year’s countable income in the country’s own currency does not seem to act as a sanction, especially when deteriorations in exchange rates in some countries effectively outweigh such additions. An alternative could be to add 10% to the previous year’s Swiss-franc total, and/or to raise the amount, e.g., to 20%, if a country does not supply the requisite information by the deadline.

Suspension of travel reimbursement privileges could be imposed (as they currently are for non-payment), but this would only affect those National Societies that are dependent upon travel reimbursements.

Recommendation: If the IFRC decides to keep some measure of National Society income as part of the barème calculation, it should introduce stronger penalties for those National Societies that do not supply the required information on a timely basis.

In theory, one form of penalty could be to impose the full UN quota (i.e., with no reference to own resources) on National Societies that do not submit audited accounts. The problem with such a solution is that, in practice, it would actually result in a lower quota for over half of the National Societies that did not submit any accounts for the last barème calculation. According to ECON’s simulation, such a measure would punish only 43 National Societies, while rewarding 55 that did not submit the required data. Moreover, the net reduction in the combined quota for those that did not submit data would raise quotas for the others, effectively punishing those National Societies that did submit their accounts on time. The reason for this is that there seems to be little correlation between size of countable income and whether or not a National Society submits its accounts on a timely basis. It is also important to keep in mind that a member’s UN quota will


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not always be larger than a quota based on own resources – otherwise totals for the latter would be less than 100.

Nevertheless, we have used a variation of this idea as the basis for one of the scenarios (Scenario 2) in the next chapter: National Societies are assessed by the UN quota of their home country unless they prefer to have their own resources taken into account. However, they may take advantage of the latter possibility only if they submit audited accounts by the required deadline.

3.2.2 Other measurements for determining National Societies’ ability to pay

Total income or total expenditures Another possibility is to use a less restricted definition of income, such as WWF recently did with its members after apparently finding the use of un-earmarked income too unreliable.

Although ECON feels that total income is likely to give a better indicator of actual ability to pay than “un-earmarked” income does, it is not in a position to make a categorical statement in this regard. Moreover, it is not clear that National Societies would submit the new data set on a timelier basis, though an important exception could be cases where non-supply may be related to lack of capacity for making the current required calculations. In other words, the relative complication of the figure may be a factor in its availability. Related to this, a further advantage of total income is that it is likely to be a more straightforward figure to audit.

Another option is to use expenditures instead of income, e.g., as the IUCN does for its NGO-members. In theory, expenditures should correspond roughly to income, while providing some possible advantages, e.g., National Societies may be less reluctant to share information on expenditures than on income, and it would avoid the earmarking problem. However, a major potential disadvantage is that it would effectively tax expenditures, which could provide a perverse incentive for some National Societies to cut back on programmes. Another disadvantage is that, to an even greater extent than total income, it would involve changing to a very different system without assurances that the new data would actually be significantly more reliable (or provided in a more timely manner) than the current data are.

Recommendation: If the IFRC decides to keep some measure of National Society income as part of the barème calculation, it should consider using total income instead of unrestricted income. However, given the current lack of information on total income of National Societies, it should investigate this matter further before making the switch. One possibility could be to introduce use of total income in a second phase of adopting a new formula. Use of total expenditure could also be investigated, but its use seems more likely to produce perverse incentives, e.g., to cut programmes.

The Secretariat already should have some indications of both total income and total expenditures for most National Societies, since these were both items in the questionnaire used in the National Society self-assessment project organised over the last few years by the Secretariat’s Monitoring and Evaluation department.


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(The relevant questions are H.2 and H.4.) However, the information collected by the self-assessment apparently may not be used for this purpose, since it was provided by National Societies on the basis of confidentiality. Targeted regional seminars to help National Societies better understand the calculation method for the current definition of National Society income (mentioned above) could also help in determining an eventual replacement indicator by providing opportunities for the Secretariat to gain a greater understanding of National Societies’ accounts.

Membership Some international organisations, such as the World Council of Churches and the World Organisation of the Scouting Movement, use membership as a basis for determining the annual dues for each member organisation. Usually this works out to be a fixed fee per individual member (e.g., per scout) that is discounted according to income per capita.13

The main problem with such a system in the context of the IFRC is that the definition and concept of individual membership reportedly varies significantly from one National Society to another. In fact, “Adult membership” was used up to 1976 as one of the factors for calculating National Society contributions in the forerunner organization of the IFRC. Up to 1971 this criterion was weighted 2/7 (i.e., almost 30%), and was included along with “financial resources of the national society” (4/7) and “per-capita national income of the country” (1/7). According to a League Secretariat document produced in 1983, the criterion of adult membership eventually “was judged to be unreliable because of the total lack of consistency in the definitions of membership used by the various National Societies. The Commission deemed that the different approaches to this problem by Societies were too deep-rooted to enable a common solution to be found.”14

Even providing that a common definition of individual membership existed, a theoretical disadvantage of this indicator is that it could provide a perverse incentive to keep membership low or to fiddle with the reporting of such statistics, though prestige attached to high membership figures presumably would provide some incentive against undercounting.

Conclusions regarding data provided by National Societies In summary, data provided by National Societies appear to have the following disadvantages:

• Unrestricted income may not be a very relevant indicator of ability to pay membership fees, especially in cases where the membership fee comes in the form of earmarked income from the government. (It is not known how many National Societies receive money to pay their quota this way.)

13 For example, if the calculation required a charge of CHF 0.10 for each scout in the United Sates, it would

require only CHF 0.05 for each scout in a country with a per-capita income that is half that of the United States.

14 ”A short history of the work of the permanent scale of contributions commission”, compiled July 1977, updated May 1983 (FIN/MK/ds).


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• A focus on unrestricted income may provide an incentive to avoid raising such income, or at least provide an incentive to classify as much income as possible as restricted.

• Vetting information provided by National Societies will imply some expense either to National Societies or the Secretariat. Total income or total expenditures would at least probably be less prone to interpretation and simpler to audit.

• It is not clear that National Societies would provide other types of data (e.g., total income, expenditures, or membership) on a more reliable basis, except in cases where complication of the calculation was a barrier.

However, without further study, notably including examination of the accounts of a number of National Societies and their national contexts, it is difficult to reach a firm conclusion on the reliability/suitability of one indicator of National Society wealth or another as a proxy for ability to pay the barème – while not creating other perverse incentives. ECON therefore would hesitate to advise that National Societies be required to provide new types of indicators at this point, not least because such provision would imply costs without the assurance of improvements.

ECON thus reluctantly endorses maintenance of the current definition of countable income with the following caveats (as already noted in previous recommendations):

• Improve the quality of the figures through (targeted) audits and training.

• Improve the timeliness of submission through stronger penalties.

• Investigate further other indicators of actual ability to pay, notably total income. Such an indicator could replace restricted income in a second phase of a phased approach to changing the formula.

• Consider relying less or not at all on figures supplied by National Societies and more on indicators that are publicly available (see below).

Aspirational indicators An alternative approach to relying on data provided by National Societies could be to use some sort of aspirational measurement. For example, the Secretariat could develop norms based on certain relatively objective factors. The major advantages of such aspirational measurements is that 1) they are more readily available than data provided by National Societies and 2) there is less risk of punishing National Societies that do better than the norm, e.g., those that are particularly good at raising money, whether from the private sector or their home governments – while also providing an important incentive for improvement to other National Societies.

The roughly similar statutory position that each National Red Cross and Red Crescent society enjoys in its home country would seem to be an important argument for holding National Societies accountable for certain norms, e.g., those that relate income to certain objective features of the country. Certainly National


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Red Cross and Red Crescent societies are at least more comparable than other types of NGOs that do not enjoy a similarly unique statutory position.

One approach is to look at the total potential funding pool available to National Societies. This is essentially some portion of the national income. For example, the IFRC could set a guideline that each National Society should seek a donation rate that is equal to 0.001% of a person’s income from 10% of the relevant country’s population. However, this figure can more simply be expressed as a percentage (0.0001%) of the country’s total income, e.g., as represented by GNP or GNI. The assumption behind this is that, on average, each potential donor should be able to contribute the same percentage of his or her income, thus arriving at the same total whether the country’s income is divided among 10 or 1 million people. If instead one assumes that the government pays most of the National Society’s budget, national income should still be a relatively good measurement of how much each home government should be able to pay, assuming roughly equal government taxation rates across countries.

In reality, given an equal fundraising effort in every country, donation rates would probably vary by income group and by country, due to a number of factors. Cultural factors, such as the extent to which there is a tradition of giving to charity, are difficult to account for. Others have to do with notions of disposable income. For example, persons or countries with a high amount of debt can be expected to give less, because debt service payments cut down on their disposable income. Level of development may also be an important factor to account for, since countries at a lower level of development arguably should devote a portion of their income to “catching up”. Low level of development may also affect the ability of a National Society to take full advantage of the funding pool available to it, for example due to difficulties in local banking and communications systems. Thus some adjustments to national income figures ideally should be made.

Figures on debt are relatively easily available. The main problem is deciding how much to subtract from total income, given that countries often pay more or (usually) less debt service than they are scheduled to pay in a given year.

Accounting for level of development is also tricky. One possibility could be to use the Human Development Index, which measures the average achievements in a country in the following three areas: 1) life expectancy at birth, 2) education level (adult literacy and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment), and 3) GDP per capita. The result is an index that relates a country’s results to goalposts set in each of the three areas mentioned above. For example, the index value for Brazil is 0.775.15 One way to use this number could be to simply multiply it by national income as a sort of discount rate. It should be noted, however, that the HDI is still somewhat experimental. Moreover, it is not available for the home countries of all IFRC members, although this should not be a major hindrance.16 Data on GNI (or GNP) is actually likely to be a greater problem, since reliable

15 See www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/hdr03_backmatter_2.pdf 16 HDI data for the following 12 countries with IFRC members are not available: Andora, Lichtenstein,

Monoco, San Marino, Palau, Iraq, Kiribati, Serbia & Montenegro, Afghanistan, Korea PDR, Liberia, and Somalia.


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GNI figures are still unavailable for over 20 IFRC countries. (HDI x GNI is used in scenario 4 in the next chapter.)

In general, since there are a number of ways to make adjustments to income, some adjustment methods will be more favourable to some members than others. In practice, agreeing on what adjustments to use could thus involve a fair degree of negotiation and compromise. One way to avoid this could be to use an adjustment formula that already has been worked out in another forum. For example, the UN quota scale – which is already used by the IFRC as one part of its current formula – contains substantial adjustments for debt and low per-capita income. (The UN quota calculation is described in detail below.) Although the IFRC could perhaps develop its own customised adjustments that would relate more directly to the ability of a National Society to raise money in a particular country – e.g., the degree of competition for donations that the local National Society faces from other NGOs17 – on balance it may be easier to employ an “off-the-shelf” model into which much effort and political compromise already has been invested, instead of trying to “reinvent the wheel”.

Recommendation: Use of an aspirational indicator, such as available funding pool, should be considered, since it avoids current problems in obtaining data from National Societies, and is less likely to create perverse incentives or to punish National Societies that do well, while providing useful benchmarks and an incentive for improvement for others. The UN quota is particularly recommended.

A solution based on an aspirational norm(s) may cause immediate hardships for those National Societies currently underperforming against such norm(s), especially new National Societies. A switch to such a system would thus have to be instituted over a reasonable period of time to give affected National Societies time to catch up. A special fund to temporarily cover the increase in dues for affected National Societies may be required. This could be funded by a temporary increase in the quota of willing “donor” societies or of some well-defined group of National Societies, e.g., those located in countries defined by the World Bank as “high income per capita” or “high human development”. As noted earlier, it is important to keep in mind that, for many National Societies – even those in poor countries – the UN quota will be smaller than a quota based on own income.

An option (described earlier) for National Societies that are relatively less well off than their country as a whole could be to give a choice of using either the full UN quota or an alternative quota that takes into account the National Society’s own income (see Scenario 2 in the next chapter).

3.2.3 Other approaches Fixed charge element based on marginal cost Each National Society could be charged a general, fixed overhead element that represents (at least a portion of) the marginal cost of membership. This could be reflected in a flat charge in a two-part quota scheme, with other elements

17 It is assumed that this particular problem is more of a factor in wealthier countries.


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particular to the situation of individual countries/National Societies combined to produce the variable part. However, without a study on the marginal cost of IFRC membership, it would be difficult to come up with a number for this figure that is much more than random.

Although a minimum amount might be the cost of travel reimbursements (CHF 2,500), the experience of other organisations seems to indicate that marginal cost could be quite a bit greater. (Moreover, such reimbursements are not provided to all members.) For example, the OECD notes that, “in 1997, in connection with a study of accession of new members, the Organisation calculated that the marginal cost ranged from an amount equal to around 0.7% of the budget for a small country and around 1% for a medium-sized country”.18 If the situation within IFRC turns out to be similar, this could make such an approach unrealistic, especially when it comes to the dues of smaller countries.

Use of co-ordination services Some National Societies rely on the IFRC more than others for co-ordination of aid. In theory, it should be possible to institute the “user-pays” principle for at least a portion of the barème calculation. Of course, this is likely to encourage more National Societies to handle co-ordination bilaterally, notably those for whom IFRC co-ordination turns out to be more expensive than bilateral co-ordination.19

Historically, however, the level of statutory contributions has in no way been linked to services provided, but to ability to pay. Changing the focus like this would require a review of the costs of such co-ordination and other services provided by the IFRC, something that is beyond the scope of this study. It would also presumably entail a strategic change in thinking that would have implications beyond calculation of the barème. For those reasons this idea has not been developed further in this paper.

3.3 UN quota The UN quota accounts for 40% of the current IFRC quota calculation. It became clear to us that there was some misunderstanding within the RC community about how the UN quota is calculated. For example, one common misconception we encountered was that the UN quota was based strictly on national income with

18 See Council, Review of the Principles and Rules for Establishing the Scale of Contributions by Member

Countries to the Budget of the Organisation (Note by the Secretary-General), C(97)140REV1, 10 October 1997, quoted in Council, Re-examining the Scale of Contributions (Note by the Secretary-General), C(2002)214/REV1, 8 October 2002.

19 The quota could also conceivably seek to take into account the degree to which the country is likely to call upon the co-ordination efforts of the IFRC as a recipient. For example, the United Nations Development Programme has created a “disaster-risk index” for countries. However, the costs of disasters (or at least of relief efforts) are likely to be higher in poor countries, since richer ones are able to invest more in natural disaster preparation and prevention/mitigation. This implies that many of the poorest countries would have to pay more than many rich countries – at least for this component of the calculation. One would also have to take into account that much relief effort within the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement is not multilateral but bilateral.


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little consideration for the financial situation of the country. This section explains how the UN quota is calculated.

SUMMARY:

• Quotas are calculated every three years. The UN Committee on Contributions continues to evaluate the formula and has changed aspects of it fairly often.

• The UN quota is essentially based on gross national income (GNI, formerly called GNP) at market exchange rates.

• The “experience factor” (to use the IFRC term) is effectively very high, since the GNI figures for the previous six years are averaged, although with the most recent years receiving the greatest weight.

• Deductions are made to GNI figures for external debt and low per-capita income, effectively lowering the amount of income counted for most developing countries.

• There is an overall maximum assessment of 22%, another ceiling of 0.01% for Least Developed Countries, and a minimum assessment of 0.001%.

• A scheme that limited the percentage increase of national quotas was phased out.

• There is a mitigation process for ad hoc quota adjustments for countries undergoing severe financial difficulties.

3.3.1 Frequency of calculation UN quotas are calculated every three years. The present scale is for the period 2004-2006.

3.3.2 Gross National Income (GNI) as base The base component of the calculation is gross national income (GNI), formerly called gross national product.20

The UN Committee on Contributions notes that it has “considered a number of alternative basic measures of capacity to pay […] These alternative measures have included the use of indicators other than national income – e.g., wealth, socio-economic indicators, dependence on one or a few products, dependence on non-renewable resources, deterioration of terms of trade and balance-of-payments problems. Following review, however, these were all deemed to have serious technical drawbacks, given problems with the reliability and

20 Many bodies dealing with statistics have now shifted from GDP to GNI, reflecting a change in the

protocols of the System of National Accounts. The two are calculated slightly differently, but differences in results are negligible. As the UN Contributions Committee notes, “the renaming of GNP to GNI is just a refinement of product and income concepts and does not entail a change in the actual coverage of the concept”. GA Official Records, 58th Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/58/11)


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comparability of data, since these should be available for all Member States. It was also suggested that inclusion of some of these indicators with national income could also constitute double counting. Consequently, the General Assembly has continued to use a measure of national income as the first approximation of Member States’ capacity to pay.”21

Adjustment for external debt Nevertheless, the UN makes several adjustments to the GNI figures, effectively lowering the amount of income taken into account for most developing countries.

The first adjustment is for external debt: 12.5% of total external debt is deducted from income, based on the assumption that total external debt will be paid off in 8 years. This assumption thus results in a somewhat generous deduction for countries that take more than 8 years to pay off their debt. This deduction is made only for countries whose per-capita income falls below a certain threshold, which was US$9,360 for the 2004-2006 scale.

Adjustment for low per-capita income A second adjustment is made for all countries whose debt-adjusted per-capita income falls below the average. The amount by which the country’s per-capita income falls below the average is multiplied by 0.8 (an arbitrary weight determined politically). This figure is deducted from per-capita income, and the adjusted figure multiplied by population to arrive at a new adjusted figure for national income.

Minimum UN assessment (floor) A minimum assessment of 0.001% is applied to all Member States whose assessment falls below this rate. A corresponding decrease in quotas is then applied on a pro-rata basis to all other countries.

The floor has been progressively lowered over the years. It started out at 0.04% in 1946, was lowered to 0.02% in 1972, to 0.01% in 1995, before it was decreased by a factor of 10 in 2000.

Maximum UN assessment (ceiling) for Least Developed Countries Any LDC whose quota exceeds 0.01% has its quota lowered to this amount, with a corresponding pro-rata increase for all other countries, except those affected by the floor.

Overall maximum UN assessment (ceiling) Any Member Country whose quota is above 22% has its quota lowered to this amount, with a corresponding pro-rata increase for all other countries, except those affected by the floor and LDC ceiling. This ceiling, which in practice only affects the United States, was lowered from 25% in 2000 after much negotiation.

21 UN, p. 38.


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Limits on amounts by which UN quotas may rise or fall In 1986 a “scheme of limits” was added to the UN quota calculation that limited the amount by which a member’s assessment rate could rise or fall between each three-year calculation period. The UN notes that “over time this was found to cause serious distortions, and it was phased out gradually during the scale periods 1995-1997 and 1998-2000”.22

UN “Experience factor” It should be noted that the UN’s formula uses two sets of adjusted GNI figures, giving them equal weight:

1) the average GNI over the past six years, and

2) 2) the average GNI over the past 3 years.

Given that the data from the most recent year is thus weighted only 25%, the “experience factor” could be said to be effectively 75%.

Mitigation process Every year a number of countries request and are granted an adjustment to their UN quota after a hearing by the Committee on Contributions.23 Typically the adjustment involves using a different exchange rate to convert the local currency into dollars, e.g., replacing market exchange rates with a price-adjusted exchange rate.

Conclusion The UN quota system seems to be a reasonable indicator of a country’s potential to pay, especially because it adjusts straight income figures for debt and poverty.

Because such adjustments cannot be completely objective, the UN quotas are arguably even more valuable. This is because they combine continual objective review with political discussion and compromise. This creates precedents so that such political compromises do not necessarily have to be rehashed again in other fora.

Recommendation: The IFRC should continue to use the UN quota as measurement of national income.

3.4 IFRC six-year experience factor 20% of the IFRC barème calculation is based on a National Society’s average contribution over the previous six years.

22 Ibid, p. 39. 23 A typical recent case noted by the UN is the following: The country “provided supplementary information

for consideration in the preparation of the scale, including on the economic and social impact of restructuring and on a growing debt problem, which were not adequately reflected in the GNI data.” ( Ibid, p. 4)


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Given the approximately 75% “experience factor” already built into the UN quota (see above), the IFRC experience factor seems to be largely redundant with respect to this part of the formula.

The experience factor is probably even less relevant for the part of the quota represented by National Societies’ budgets, since the budget is the factor most directly related to a National Society’s ability to pay.

Related to the last point, an “experience factor” is actually a disadvantage to those National Societies whose income is falling, since it prevents the decrease in income from being directly reflected in the formula. In the case of falling National Society income, the experience factor really only benefits the IFRC by smoothing out drops in contributions. The experience factor also benefits National Societies whose income is rising, since it prevents the rise in income from being directly reflected in the barème – though in such cases it does not benefit the IFRC.

Historically, the practice of averaging income data over six years for the UN quota came about in the 1970s at the insistence of oil-producing states that were receiving oil-revenue windfalls at the time but did not wish to see their UN quotas rise. (Ironically, the higher quotas finally caught up with them just as they began facing a period of low oil prices.) In other words, the experience factor is not really designed to help those countries going through financial difficulties, but those facing an increase in their ability to pay, while actually putting them at risk for declining circumstances later.

A final point is that the 20% experience factor of the current IFRC formula is very weak compared to the effective 75% weight that previous years carry in the UN formula. The change limit of 10% has much more impact, making the IFRC’s experience factor largely ineffective and redundant.

Recommendation: Eliminate the 6-year “experience factor”.

3.5 Maximum contribution The current maximum contribution payable by any IFRC member National Society is 25%. Currently, only the American Red Cross Society is affected by this limit. The American Red Cross furthermore wishes to have this ceiling lowered so that it pays a smaller percentage of the total.

Providing that the formula used is generally accepted as representing ability to pay, all ceilings effectively lower the responsibility of those members affected by it, while raising the price to those not affected. Thus in principle, ceilings are a deviation from the concept of ability to pay.

However, an important role of ceilings can be to mitigate the effect of one or more of the largest members stopping payment. For example, the relatively low 9% ceiling imposed by the ISO is reportedly specifically for this purpose.

Ceilings also help limit the effective or informal influence of the largest members, especially important in an organisation run on the basis of each member having an equal vote. It is interesting to note that the UN, which gives (some of) its largest contributors the opportunity to have a larger say in policy by virtue of sitting on


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the Security Council, currently has a ceiling (22%) that is even lower than that of the arguably more democratic IFRC. The current IFRC ceiling was set at 25% because that was the UN ceiling at the time.

Most membership organisations have instituted ceilings for various reasons. However, all ceilings are essentially negotiated political decisions in practice, since there are no objective ways of determining what a ceiling should be. Nevertheless, there are some factors that could be used as guidelines. One of these is precedent from other international organisations, such as the 22% of the UN or the 9% of the ISO. For example, based on precedent, there should be a case for lowering the quota for the American Red Cross at least to 22%, given that its current level of 25% was made with reference to the US UN quota of the time.

A more practical guideline may be to choose a limit based on the extent to which others (National Societies and their home governments) have been willing or able to fill the gap left by the American Red Cross. In other words, for practical considerations, the ceiling should probably not be higher than the share of additional “direct” contributions in the total of such additional contributions and barème income that does not include the US quota.

A rough calculation based on figures for barème income and “direct” income for 2000, 2001 and 2002 (the first years of the budget crisis) produces suggested ceilings of about 15%, 10% and 14%, though these go as high as 30% for 2003 and 2004, due to higher levels of “direct” contributions in those latter years. Based on these rough calculations, a practical ceiling representing the extra amount that other members (and their governments) are willing or able to provide in the first few years of a crisis may be around 15%.24

Recommendation: For practical reasons, the ceiling for the highest member should not be higher than an amount that other members are likely to be willing or able to cover during the first few years of a non-payment crisis. (The experience of the first few years of the recent non-payment crisis could be used as a guideline.)

Another observation is that many international organisations have more than one ceiling. Based on this precedent, one could propose for example a “regular” ceiling that would apply to all members, as well as a higher “special” ceiling that could be negotiated with members willing to pay more. For example, based on the precedent of the ISO, the “regular” ceiling could be set at 9% for all members (compared to current rates for Germany and Japan of 10.164% and 13.247% in 2004), with a “special” rate of 15% for the US.

Recommendation: Institute two ceilings, a “regular” ceiling for all members, and a higher, “special” ceiling for members willing to pay more.

24 However, the Secretariat may wish to do its own calculation, since we did not have enough data to

determine with any certainty the level of contributions outside barème payments that should be considered “normal” in a given year and thus what amount should be considered additional.


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If maintenance of two ceilings is not acceptable as a long-term solution, it could be instituted as a transition measure, gradually lowering the “special” ceiling until it reaches the “regular” ceiling.

Another way to set the ceiling could be to give the US, German and Japanese National Societies the same percentage reduction in their quotas. For example, lowering the US quota to 15% would imply a reduction of 40% from its present level. A similar reduction for the German and Japanese National Societies would result in quotas of 6.12% and 7.92% respectively. Providing the quota shares shed by these three were absorbed only by the 37 National Societies in the “richest” countries (as defined by the highest World Bank per-capita income group), the French National Society would end up paying more than the German one (7.50%), while the UK National Society would end up paying more than either the German or Japanese societies (8.22%). It therefore could be difficult to justify the permanent maintenance of such individual ceilings, though they could perhaps be provided on a temporary basis and allowed to “drift” back to their normal levels via the 10% change-limiting factor (see below).

3.6 Minimum contribution Currently the minimum contribution is CHF 1,000. The main complaint we have heard about this limit is that it does not begin to cover the marginal cost of some of the smallest members. In particular, we have heard recommendations that the minimum membership fee should at least cover the travel costs that are commonly reimbursed for such members, estimated by the Secretariat at about CHF 2,500.

ECON has no particular recommendation regarding the minimum contribution, other than to point out that

• even CHF 2,500 is not likely to cover the marginal cost of membership.

• in any case, the current system is based on ability to pay and not on services received.

• the extra money gained by the Secretariat from raising the floor to CHF 2,500 is likely to be only around CHF 50,000, which is a relatively small sum compared to the budget covered by the barème – though perhaps significant for some National Societies.

• There does not seem to be much recent precedent for raising the floor in the international organisations we have looked at; and the trend at the UN is significantly in the opposite direction.

In the scenarios presented in the next chapter we have not included any floor/minimum contribution.

3.7 Change limit / phase-in Currently the quota payable by a National Society may not change by more than 10%. For example, a member with a quota of 10% should not pay more than 10.1% the following year.


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While some international organisations maintain such limits, we also note that the UN has phased out this feature because it found it led to too many distortions.

In fact, distortions have built up in the present IFRC system so that the amount payable according to the formula without the change limit (the “theoretical quota”) appears to be significantly different from the actual quota for many members.

While the change limit already causes changes in financial circumstances to take a long time to work their way through the present system, if maintained at the present level, they imply that it would probably take even longer to reflect changes in the calculation method itself. For this reason it may be advisable to significantly raise or even suspend the change limit for at least an adjustment period.

A simpler (but harsher for some members) alternative would be to base the change limit on the difference between the present quota and the calculated assessment under any new system. For example, if it is decided to introduce a new system over a period of four years, the annual change limit for the transition period could be 25% of the difference between the new and old quotas.

One way to mitigate the impact on poorer National Societies could be to apply the higher change limit only to a selected group, e.g., those National Societies in “rich” countries as defined by the World Bank “high” per-capita income group – while the 10% limit could continue to apply to all other National Societies.

Recommendation: Significantly raise or suspend the quota change limit during the transition period, preferably basing it on a percentage of the difference between the quotas under the old and systems.


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4 Recommended approaches 4.1 Introduction This chapter describes four approaches for changing the current formula. The four scenarios are supported by an accompanying Excel spreadsheet file, from which the summary table is excerpted below. Resulting quotas for individual National Societies are in Annex 1.

The summary tables show how each scenario re-distributes the barème across the IFRC’s geographic regions. (Because the quotas for the US, German and Japanese National Societies are reduced under each scenario, quotas for these three are listed separately and not included in the geographic totals.) The summary table also shows the number of National Societies whose quotas increase under each scenario, as well as the number of National Societies whose quotas increase by over 10% and decreased by over 10%.

It should be noted that the current 10-percent limit on quota changes has caused a large backlog of accumulated changes, so that the “theoretical” quota calculated by the Secretariat for 2004 (i.e., the one before the change limit is taken into account) is in many cases substantially different from the quota that the Secretariat actually proposes to National Societies (“Secretariat’s proposed quota”). It thus may be “fairer” to compare new quotas to the current “theoretical” quota rather than to the Secretariat’s proposed quota. However, since most National Societies will probably only wish to compare any new quota to the one they currently really pay, we provide a comparison with the proposed quota as well.

Two variants of the summary table are provided:

• The first contains two ceilings for all four scenarios: a “normal” ceiling of 9% (in practice affecting the German and Japanese National Societies) and a “special” ceiling of 15% for the largest member (in practice affecting the American National Society)

• The second contains a common ceiling of 9% for all National Societies.


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The accompanying Excel file also provides an interactive version of the summary table that allows the user to change both formula weights and ceilings, thus allowing the creation of more scenarios in practice.25

Table 4.1 Scenario summaries (two ceilings)

25 Figures in blue in the tables are inputs that may be changed in the Excel version to produce new scenarios.

Scenario Scenario Scenario Scenario1 2 3 4

Factor weights 2004 2004NS resources 50,0 0 / 50 0,0 0,0 Sec's Sec'sUN quota 50,0 100 / 50 100,0 0,0 Theoretical ProposedGNI x HDI 0,0 0,0 0,0 100,0 quota quota

Share of total quota by region (%)Africa 0,7 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,7Americas (- US) 6,2 8,1 9,7 10,0 5,4 5,0Asia & Pacific (- Japan) 9,3 9,6 9,6 12,0 6,9 6,6Europe & Central Asia (- Germany) 49,3 47,4 45,6 42,2 36,8 37,0Mideast & N. Africa 1,9 1,5 1,9 2,2 1,8 1,8

Germany 9,0 9,0 9,0 9,0 10,2 10,2Japan 9,0 9,0 9,0 9,0 13,2 13,2US 15,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 25,0 25,0

TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0

Compared to Sec's theoretical quotaNumber of NS whose quotasIncrease 48 29 57 95Increase by more than 10% 35 22 54 83Decrease by more than 10% 96 130 103 76

Compared to Sec's proposed quotaNumber of NS whose quotasIncrease 52 31 48 80Increase by more than 10% 44 25 45 74Decrease by more than 10% 108 139 122 91


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Table 4.2 Scenario summaries (one ceiling)

Scenario Scenario Scenario Scenario1 2 3 4

Factor weights 2004 2004NS resources 50,0 0 / 50 0,0 0,0 Sec's Sec'sUN quota 50,0 100 / 50 100,0 0,0 Theoretical ProposedGNI x HDI 0,0 0,0 0,0 100,0 quota quota

Share of total quota by region (%)Africa 0,7 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,7Americas (- US) 6,5 8,6 10,3 10,9 5,4 5,0Asia & Pacific (- Japan) 10,2 10,4 10,4 12,7 6,9 6,6Europe & Central Asia (- Germany) 54,0 51,9 50,2 46,6 36,8 37,0Mideast & N. Africa 2,0 1,6 2,0 2,2 1,8 1,8

Germany 9,0 9,0 9,0 9,0 10,2 10,2Japan 9,0 9,0 9,0 9,0 13,2 13,2US 9,0 9,0 9,0 9,0 25,0 25,0

TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0

Compared to Sec's theoretical quotaNumber of NS whose quotasIncrease 49 31 62 98Increase by more than 10% 35 26 56 89Decrease by more than 10% 95 129 103 76

Compared to Sec's proposed quotaNumber of NS whose quotasIncrease 55 32 49 82Increase by more than 10% 45 26 45 77Decrease by more than 10% 107 139 120 90


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Scenario 1 (50/50 UN quota/N.S. income) The main features of our main recommended approach are as follows:

• Continue to use a combination of UN quota and National Society income with the same relative weights as under the current.

• Drop the 6-year “experience factor” (currently 20%), thus making the new weights of UN quota and N.S. income 50% each.

• Improve the reliability of the data for calculating the part of the formula related to N.S. income.

• Institute 2 ceilings: a “normal” ceiling of 9%, and a “special” ceiling of 15% for the largest member. (However, a variation with a common ceiling of 9% is also presented in the Summary table.)

• Distribute the quota reductions of the US, German and Japanese National Societies among those located in the countries in the World Bank’s “high” income-per-capita group.

4.1.1 Same relative weights for UN quota and N.S. income – but improve the reliability of N.S. income figures

As noted in the previous chapter, we have heard anecdotal evidence that the current definition of N.S. income may not accurately represent ability to pay. There could even be incentives for National Societies to avoid raising income that could be categorised as “unrestricted” and/or to ensure that most income is categorised that way – not least because the figures are not audited. However, we do not have enough information to state categorically that these things are happening. Nevertheless, there are enough questions in our mind about the current figure for N.S. income that we would at least have difficulty recommending that the IFRC increase the weight of this factor without further study.

In the meantime, it seems sensible to continue using the UN quota as a sort of balance against the N.S. income figure. Our investigation into the UN quota (see previous chapter) has convinced us that this is a relatively robust proxy for the potential pool of funds available to each National Society: taking GNI as a base, it makes significant adjustments for debt and low levels of per-capita income. As such it seems to be a reasonable indicator of the funds that a relatively competent National Society should be able to raise and hence should be able to pay – with caveats for certain situations, e.g., National Societies that are new or undergoing significant reorganisation.

While some other aspirational measurement of a National Society’s available funding pool could be used instead, e.g., GNI or GNI discounted by the Human Development Index, continued use of the UN quota is recommended because it represents a convenient and fairly sophisticated off–the-shelf model that already incorporates adjustments for debt and poverty, thus eliminating the need to “re-


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invent the wheel” and engage in political compromise that already has taken place in other fora.

Even if we could be more certain about the value of the current N.S. income figure, there is really no objective way to determine the desired weights between this figure and the UN quota, since essentially it depends on whether one believes more in basing the quota on actual ability to pay or on potential ability to pay. In the end, this will have to be a political decision. We therefore have opted to keep the relative weights (50/50) the same between the two existing factors.

However, we suggest a number of measures to improve the reliability of National Society income figures, including audits and use of training/awareness raising for targeted National Societies. This could probably be done cost-effectively on a regional basis.

We also suggest use of sanctions for those National Societies that do not submit required financial information in a timely fashion, e.g., adding the 10% annual increase to the Swiss-franc total instead of the local-currency total, or substantially increasing this percentage.

For the medium term, we also strongly recommend investigating the use of total income instead of unrestricted income, eventually replacing the latter with the former in a second phase. Use of expenditures instead of income could also be investigated, though this would seem to provide greater possibilities for creating unwanted incentives, e.g., to cut expenditures and save income.

The reason we do not recommend adoption of total income (or expenditures) right away is that, without further study, we do not have enough information to say categorically that this would provide a better measure of ability to pay – while requiring National Societies to supply new indicators will almost certainly entail at least some new costs. To obtain the requisite information on which to base a recommendation to change the measurement of national societies’ ability to pay, it would probably be necessary to first study the accounts of a number of National Societies and the contexts in which they operate.

4.1.2 Drop experience factor We recommend dropping the six-year “experience factor”, as this currently is very weak and is anyway probably redundant in the case of the UN quota. In the case of National Society income, it seems to provide an advantage only for National Societies facing an increase in their funds.

4.1.3 Two ceilings We suggest instituting two ceilings: A “normal” ceiling and a “special” ceiling for the largest member (in practice the US National Society).

It should be recognised that there is no objective way to determine a ceiling and that all ceilings will involve political compromise. Nevertheless, a relatively objective way to determine the higher (“special”) ceiling could be to ensure that it


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is no higher than an amount that other IFRC members are able to cover in the event that the largest member continues to withhold payment.26 A very rough calculation based on additional direct donations by other National Societies and governments during the first three years of the current non-payment crisis indicates this limit could be about 15%. However, the Secretariat may wish to do its own calculation, since we did not have enough data to determine with certainty the level of contributions outside barème payments that should be considered “normal” in a given year and thus what amount should be considered additional.

A “regular” ceiling of 9% would meet the request from the German Red Cross for a lower quota (currently its quota is 10.164%). We have chosen this number simply based on the precedent of the ISO, which has used it for many years.

4.1.4 Groups based on World Bank per-capita income groups

Lower quotas for several of the top contributors must necessarily lead to increased quotas for other members. In order to limit the hardship on the poorest members, most or all of the increase ideally should be picked up by those most able to afford it. This involves creating groups. Unfortunately, creating groups can be problematic, mainly because it involves subjective decisions on where to draw borderlines. Subjective borders may lead to objections from members that end up on the higher side of a border between groups.

One way to address this problem that has been used by other organisations is to use groups that are defined elsewhere and that are already relatively widely accepted. For example, we recommend using World Bank income-per-capita groups, which divide countries into “high”, “upper middle”, “lower middle” and “low”. Thus the decrease in quotas for the US, German and Japanese National Societies could be picked up on a pro-rata basis by the 34 other National Societies in “high” countries as defined by the World Bank, i.e.,

Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, South Korea, Kuwait, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom.

Additional National Societies that wish to be part of this group could be encouraged to do so under a self-selection process. National Societies in countries with certain indicators above particular thresholds might be especially encouraged, e.g., those whose UN quota is higher than 1%: This would add four National Societies: Brazil, China, Mexico, and Russia. For the purposes of our calculations, we have assumed that three of these National Societies (China, Mexico and Russia) would consent to being included in the top group.27

26 Ratio of additional direct income received to total of this + barème budget not including the share of the

American Red Cross. 27 Lowering the UN quota threshold to 0.5% would further add Argentina and Saudi Arabia.


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For National Societies from very small, “high-income” countries, it may be desirable to create a population threshold for being included in the top group. However, this would open up the difficulty of where to set the threshold. (The threshold suggested above in the context of N.S.s invited to join the top group is likely to be less problematic because it is voluntary.) In any case, it should be remembered that National Societies are picking up the increase only a pro-rata basis.28

Another set of groups that could be considered are OECD groupings (LDC, Other Low income, Lower Middle Income, etc.). However, OECD groups are devised with reference to World Bank Groups. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD) has a similar set of groups though uses somewhat different thresholds for per-capita income. The UN has produced groups based on the Human Development Index (HDI): High Human Development (HDI of 0.8 and above), Medium Human Development (0.5 – 0.799) and Low Human Development (below 0.5). (HDI groups are used in Scenario 4, below.) In practice, however, there does not seem to be a great deal of difference in the composition of groups under the different systems. On balance, ECON would recommend the World Bank groupings because they appear to be more widely used as a reference by other organisations.

As far as we are aware, there are no widely used groupings based on national income (as opposed to income per capita).

4.1.5 phase-in The new quota system should be phased in, but probably could be introduced more quickly than if all National Societies were required to take up the additional quota burden. However, the current change limit of 10% should probably be dropped or suspended – at least for National Societies in the “high income” group. For these, an alternative approach of phasing in a given percentage of the total change in each Society’s quota each year over a given number of years could be used, e.g., 25% of the quota change each year over a period of four years. During the phase-in period the quotas should be frozen to simplify the adjustment.

If the current change limit were left in place for National Societies in the lower-income-per-capita groups, those in the high group would have to take up the difference – about CHF 700,000 on a pro-rata basis. This is in addition to the over CHF 5 million it would absorb from the reduced quotas of the US, German and Japanese National Societies under the two-ceiling variant.

Simulations of two versions (two-ceiling and one-ceiling) are provided for each scenario in Annex 1.

28 The largest increase for a small country in this scenario compared to the Secretariat’s theoretical quota is

59% for Malta under the two-ceilings version, and 76% under the single-ceiling version.


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4.2 Scenario 2 (choice of 100% UN quota or 50/50 UN Quota/N.S. income)

Scenario 2 is the same as Scenario 1, but with the following changes:

• National Societies are given a choice to base their IFRC quota on either 1) 100% of their home country’s UN quota, or 2) the formula used in Scenario 1, i.e., 50% UN quota + 50% N.S. income.

• Only those National Societies providing audited accounts will be allowed to take the “50/50” option.

• All National Societies in the highest World Bank income group (including those that elect to become part of this group) use the UN quota. It is assumed that National Societies outside this group will use the system that produces the lower quota for them.

• In addition to absorbing the quota share shed by the US, German and Japanese National Societies, National Societies in the highest income group must also absorb the difference in quota left by those electing to take the 50/50 option. Thus in practice the quota for those electing to take the 50/50 option will be fixed, as will the quota for National Societies using the UN quota that are outside the highest group – while the quota for those in the highest group will be adjusted to take up the slack.

Advantages of UN quota Primary reliance on an indicator that is publicly available would reduce reliance on National Societies to provide correct data in the absence of auditing and to provide such data in a timely fashion.

As noted under Scenario 1, the UN quota is based on an adjusted figure for national income that seems to provide a reasonable fundraising/income norm for a National Society to aspire to. An aspirational figure does not distort incentives for raising income because it does not punish National Societies that are successful in raising income (or particular types of income) or that take on more ambitious roles, such as running hospitals and blood systems. At the same time, it provides an incentive to do better for National Societies that do not capture a “normal” percentage of national income from either the private sector or the government.

The main disadvantage is that there may be unique barriers in some countries that could prevent some National Societies from taking full advantage of the “pool” of national income available to them. But while some countries may have tax laws that are more favourable to individual contributions, few are likely to have laws that actually discourage contributions.

Possible barriers related to poverty and level of development are arguably accounted for, since the UN quota adjusts national income for debt and poverty (low per-capita income).

An important barrier in some countries could be level of competition for donations between the National Society and other organisations. This is likely to


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be more of a problem in developed countries. Nevertheless, the Red Cross or Red Crescent Society arguably has (or is supposed to have) a unique status in its home country that conceivably gives it an advantage over other NGOs in this area.

Other main barriers are likely to be cultural rather than legal or poverty-related. The most important limit may be related to the administrative competencies of individual societies – though this is also the one that National Societies should be most in control of. Major exceptions could be new National Societies or those going through significant restructuring.

50/50 Option For those National Societies that find it difficult to pay according to the UN quota, there would be the option to pay according to the system presented in scenario 1 (basically the present system but with the elimination of the 6-year “experience factor”).

National Societies would be allowed to use the “50/50” option only if they submitted audited accounts by the required deadline.

Allowing some National Societies to use the 50/50 option means that there will be a gap in the quota that will need to be assumed by other National Societies. We would propose that those located in countries in the highest World Bank income group (plus others that elect to be part of this group) take up this additional quota. In any case, according to our simulation, the gap is likely to be only about 2.6% of the total quota, i.e., much less significant than the quota likely to be shed by the top three National Societies or even by the American Red Cross alone.

Similar to Scenario 1, we also propose that the quota reduction for the US, German and Japanese National Societies be absorbed by National Societies in countries in the highest World Bank per-capita income group (plus those that join this group voluntarily).

It is assumed that all National Societies located in countries in the highest World Bank per-capita income groups will have their IFRC quota based on the relevant UN quota. In a few cases, this is likely to result in quotas for National Societies in this group that are smaller than their “50/50” quota. However, in the present scenario this is likely to be the case mostly for relatively rich National Societies in small countries.29 If this were considered a problem, it would be fairly easy to institute a further rule – perhaps only a voluntary rule – that all National Societies in the highest income-per-capita group use the larger of their UN quota or their 50/50 quota.

Possible problem with total for all N.S.s’ income The present quota based on National Society resources is an index based on the total of the resources of all National Societies. In a system under which only those National Societies that choose to use the “50/50” quota are required to submit a figure for National Society income, it may be difficult to arrive at an accurate figure for the total for all National Societies. Some estimation would need to be

29 Andora, Bahamas, Bahrain, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Monoco, Norway, San Marino, Sweden, and UAE.


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made, perhaps taking the last figure for this total that was derived during the last year of the old (present) system and extrapolating on a pro-rata basis the changes noted in the totals of those National Societies that submit accounts under the new system.

The number of National Societies choosing to use the 50/50 quota – and thus that will be required to submit accounts – is likely to be about 81, though only about 60 if all those in the highest per-capita income group use the UN quota. However, this compares to only about 80 accounts submitted by National Societies during the calculation of the most recent barème. If an effort is made to get this data from those National Societies likely to have the highest income – e.g., by targeting those in the highest income-per-capita group (11 out of 37 of which did not submit during the last calculation period) – then it may even be possible to derive an estimate of the sum of countable income for all National Societies that is even more accurate than that achieved today.30

4.3 Scenario 3 (100% UN quota) A third recommended approach for consideration is basically the same as Scenario 1 but with complete reliance on the UN quota and no consideration of National Society income.

It is included here primarily as a reference for Scenarios 1 and 2.

The advantages of using the UN quota are discussed under Scenario 2.

The main drawback is that some method presumably would have to be found to give a reprieve to those National Societies that in practice would face considerable difficulty paying the UN quota. The solution presented in Scenario 2 was to allow such National Societies to use the “50/50” quota. Another could be to handle things on a case-by-case basis with a commission analogous to the UN’s Committee on Contributions.

As stated earlier, it is important to keep in mind that, for many countries, the UN quota would actually be smaller than the present quota that takes N.S. income into account.

4.4 Scenario 4 (GNI x HDI) Scenario 4 is essentially the same as Scenario 3, except that each National Society’s quota is based on its home country’s GNI that has been discounted by multiplying it by the relevant human development indicator (HDI).

Similar to the other scenarios, the quota shares shed by the American, German and Japanese National Societies are absorbed only by the National Societies in the “richest” countries – though in this case that group is defined by those countries in

30 That is, the amount may be a more accurate total of income as calculated individually by National

Societies, but not necessarily a more accurate representation of the funds that individual National Societies actually have for paying their membership dues.


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the World Bank’s “High Human Development” category, i.e., those with a Human Development Index of 0.8 and above.

A complication in using this method is that HDI figures are not yet available for 12 home countries of IFRC member Societies. (We have estimated figures for those 12 countries by using the average HDI for the others in their World Bank income-per-capita groups.) However, a potentially bigger problem is that reliable GNI figures are still difficult to obtain for over 20 IFRC countries. (We have therefore had to estimate figures for these as well, which we did with reference to relevant countries’ UN quotas.)

It should be borne in mind that the HDI is still somewhat experimental. Moreover, as far as we are aware, use of the HDI to discount GNI or some other measure of national income is not a practice currently used by any organisations for the purpose of determining ability to pay. The UN quota is arguably more robust as an indicator of potential ability to pay, since it specifically discounts for debt and poverty (low per-capita income), and is widely accepted and used in the international community.


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Appendix 1: Quotas under 4 scenarios (2 variants) ECON has calculated these quotas for illustrative purposes.

Two ceilings Table A1.1 Quotas under four scenarios (two-ceiling variant)

2004 2004 Scenario Scenario Scenario Scenario

National Societies WB HDI Donor IFRC UN

Scale Sec's Sec's 1 2 3 4

group group Forum region 2003 theoret. proposed quota Quota Quota Quota

quota (%)

quota (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

Afghanistan A 1 AP 0,001 0,003 0,009 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Albania B 2 ECA 0,003 0,011 0,012 0,010 0,003 0,003 0,014

Algeria B 2 MENA 0,070 0,053 0,071 0,042 0,042 0,070 0,141

Andora D 3 ECA 0,004 0,014 0,014 0,018 0,006 0,006 0,007

Angola A 1 AF 0,002 0,011 0,011 0,011 0,002 0,002 0,013

Antigua and Barbuda C 3 AM 0,002 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,003

Argentina C 3 AM 0,969 0,543 0,210 0,594 0,594 0,969 0,650

Armenia B 2 ECA 0,002 0,007 0,018 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,007

Australia D 3 x AP 1,627 1,524 1,589 2,049 2,473 2,369 2,213

Austria D 3 x ECA 0,947 0,646 0,646 0,910 1,439 1,379 1,093

Azerbaijan B 2 ECA 0,004 0,011 0,027 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,017

Bahamas D 3 AM 0,012 0,026 0,026 0,036 0,018 0,017 0,018

Bahrain D 3 MENA 0,018 0,107 0,100 0,161 0,027 0,026 0,028

Bangladesh A 2 AP 0,010 0,028 0,029 0,025 0,010 0,010 0,092


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Barbados C 3 AM 0,009 0,009 0,009 0,008 0,008 0,009 0,012

Belarus B 2 ECA 0,019 0,037 0,066 0,020 0,019 0,019 0,041

Belgium D 3 x ECA 1,129 1,221 1,221 1,736 1,716 1,644 1,368

Belize C 2 AM 0,001 0,004 0,005 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001

Benin A 1 AF 0,002 0,002 0,005 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,004

Bolivia B 2 AM 0,008 0,006 0,008 0,005 0,005 0,008 0,018

Bosnia Herzegovina B 2 ECA 0,004 0,014 0,013 0,015 0,004 0,004 0,017

Botswana C 2 AF 0,010 0,014 0,014 0,013 0,010 0,010 0,012

Brazil B 2 AM 2,390 1,199 0,974 1,196 1,196 2,390 1,232

Brunei D 3 AP 0,033 0,019 0,019 0,027 0,050 0,048 0,052

Bulgaria B 2 ECA 0,013 0,045 0,045 0,038 0,013 0,013 0,044

Burkina Faso A 1 AF 0,002 0,006 0,006 0,006 0,002 0,002 0,004

Burundi A 1 AF 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Cambodia A 2 AP 0,002 0,034 0,020 0,036 0,002 0,002 0,008

Cameroon A 2 AF 0,009 0,013 0,013 0,012 0,009 0,009 0,017

Canada D 3 x AM 2,558 1,771 1,910 2,268 3,888 3,725 3,878

Cape Verde B 2 AF 0,001 0,016 0,016 0,016 0,001 0,001 0,002

Central African Rep A 1 AF 0,001 0,002 0,004 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Chad A 1 AF 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,003

Chile C 3 AM 0,212 0,111 0,100 0,110 0,110 0,212 0,315

China B 2 AP 1,532 0,824 0,744 1,240 2,329 2,231 3,506

Colombia B 2 AM 0,201 0,300 0,300 0,255 0,201 0,201 0,207

Congo A 1 AF 0,001 0,002 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,004

Congo D.R. A 1 AF 0,004 0,006 0,011 0,003 0,003 0,004 0,007

Costa Rica C 3 AM 0,020 0,058 0,041 0,059 0,020 0,020 0,078

Croatia C 3 ECA 0,039 0,035 0,044 0,028 0,028 0,039 0,108

Cuba B 3 AM 0,030 0,036 0,077 0,016 0,016 0,030 0,044

Czech Republic C 3 ECA 0,203 0,128 0,128 0,105 0,105 0,203 0,324

Denmark D 3 x ECA 0,749 0,823 0,864 1,089 1,139 1,091 0,921

Djibouti B 1 AF 0,001 0,004 0,005 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001

Dominica C 2 AM 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Dominican Republic B 2 AM 0,023 0,038 0,053 0,033 0,023 0,023 0,044

Ecuador B 2 AM 0,025 0,124 0,035 0,137 0,025 0,025 0,057


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Egypt Arab Rep. B 2 MENA 0,081 0,089 0,090 0,081 0,081 0,081 0,203

El Salvador B 2 AM 0,018 0,076 0,076 0,073 0,018 0,018 0,034

Equatorial Guinea A 2 AF 0,001 0,002 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Estonia C 3 ECA 0,010 0,031 0,031 0,028 0,010 0,010 0,031

Ethiopia A 1 AF 0,004 0,051 0,054 0,044 0,004 0,004 0,008

Fiji B 2 AP 0,004 0,004 0,005 0,002 0,002 0,004 0,005

Finland D 3 x ECA 0,522 0,714 0,863 0,894 0,793 0,760 0,715

France D 3 x ECA 6,466 5,099 5,099 7,105 9,829 9,416 7,714

Gabon C 2 AF 0,014 0,008 0,008 0,008 0,008 0,014 0,010

Gambia A 1 AF 0,001 0,001 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Georgia B 2 ECA 0,005 0,008 0,008 0,003 0,003 0,005 0,009

Germany D 3 x ECA 9,769 10,164 10,164 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000

Ghana A 2 AF 0,005 0,006 0,008 0,004 0,004 0,005 0,012

Greece D 3 x ECA 0,539 0,458 0,503 0,597 0,819 0,785 0,718

Grenada C 2 AM 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Guatemala B 2 AM 0,027 0,053 0,023 0,057 0,027 0,027 0,051

Guinea A 1 AF 0,003 0,003 0,004 0,002 0,002 0,003 0,005

Guinea-Bissau A 1 AF 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,000

Guyana B 2 AM 0,001 0,003 0,005 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,002

Haiti A 1 AM 0,002 0,015 0,019 0,013 0,002 0,002 0,005

Honduras B 2 AM 0,005 0,022 0,024 0,019 0,005 0,005 0,015

Hungary C 3 ECA 0,120 0,448 0,237 0,460 0,120 0,120 0,295

Iceland D 3 x ECA 0,033 0,339 0,339 0,479 0,050 0,048 0,045

India A 2 AP 0,341 0,218 0,224 0,200 0,200 0,341 1,121

Indonesia B 2 AP 0,200 0,135 0,136 0,119 0,119 0,200 0,397

Iran Islamic Rep. B 2 x MENA 0,272 0,235 0,302 0,189 0,189 0,272 0,323

Iraq B 2 MENA 0,136 0,087 0,116 0,069 0,069 0,136 0,109

Ireland D 3 x ECA 0,294 0,215 0,197 0,321 0,447 0,428 0,541

Italy D 3 x ECA 5,065 4,078 4,078 5,762 7,699 7,376 6,215

Ivory Coast A 1 AF 0,009 0,009 0,009 0,008 0,008 0,009 0,015

Jamaica B 2 AM 0,004 0,008 0,011 0,006 0,004 0,004 0,018

Japan D 3 x AP 19,516 13,247 13,247 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000

Jordan B 2 MENA 0,008 0,007 0,008 0,006 0,006 0,008 0,024


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Kenya A 1 AF 0,008 0,011 0,011 0,010 0,008 0,008 0,020

Kiribati B 2 AP 0,001 0,001 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,000

Korea PDR A 1 AP 0,009 0,049 0,109 0,027 0,009 0,009 0,005

Korea, Republic of D 3 x AP 1,851 2,718 2,287 4,122 2,814 2,696 2,782

Kuwait D 3 x MENA 0,147 0,106 0,140 0,132 0,223 0,214 0,224

Kyrgyz Republic A 2 ECA 0,001 0,003 0,007 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,004

Lao P.D.R. A 2 AP 0,001 0,008 0,013 0,006 0,001 0,001 0,003

Latvia C 3 ECA 0,010 0,016 0,020 0,013 0,010 0,010 0,042

Lebanon C 2 MENA 0,012 0,124 0,058 0,133 0,012 0,012 0,046

Lesotho A 1 AF 0,001 0,011 0,011 0,009 0,001 0,001 0,002

Liberia A 1 AF 0,001 0,004 0,006 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001

Libyan Arab Rep C 2 MENA 0,067 0,070 0,115 0,048 0,048 0,067 0,059

Lichtenstein D 3 ECA 0,006 0,043 0,144 0,014 0,009 0,009 0,010

Lithuania C 3 ECA 0,017 0,014 0,030 0,010 0,010 0,017 0,071

Luxembourg D 3 ECA 0,080 0,125 0,237 0,120 0,122 0,117 0,100

Macedonia F.Y.R B 2 ECA 0,006 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,006 0,011

Madagascar A 1 AF 0,003 0,002 0,004 0,002 0,002 0,003 0,008

Malawi A 1 AF 0,002 0,008 0,012 0,007 0,002 0,002 0,002

Malaysia C 2 AP 0,235 0,143 0,143 0,136 0,136 0,235 0,247

Mali A 1 AF 0,002 0,002 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,004

Malta D 3 ECA 0,015 0,010 0,010 0,016 0,023 0,022 0,024

Mauritania A 1 AF 0,001 0,003 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,002

Mauritius C 2 AF 0,011 0,009 0,010 0,009 0,009 0,011 0,013

Mexico C 3 AM 1,086 0,659 0,659 0,944 1,651 1,582 2,777

Moldova A 2 ECA 0,002 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,005

Mongolia A 2 AP 0,001 0,004 0,010 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,003

Monoco D 3 ECA 0,004 0,122 0,158 0,148 0,006 0,006 0,007

Morocco B 2 MENA 0,044 0,064 0,064 0,059 0,044 0,044 0,082

Mozambique A 1 AF 0,001 0,011 0,009 0,011 0,001 0,001 0,005

Myanmar A 2 AP 0,010 0,052 0,052 0,051 0,010 0,010 0,006

Namibia B 2 AF 0,007 0,007 0,008 0,007 0,007 0,007 0,008

Nepal A 2 AP 0,004 0,007 0,009 0,005 0,004 0,004 0,010

Netherlands D 3 x ECA 1,738 2,072 2,072 2,809 2,642 2,531 2,184


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 62

New Zealand D 3 x AP 0,241 0,294 0,405 0,363 0,366 0,351 0,320

Nicaragua A 2 AM 0,001 0,012 0,013 0,011 0,001 0,001 0,009

Niger A 1 AF 0,001 0,002 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,002

Nigeria A 1 AF 0,068 0,041 0,041 0,036 0,036 0,068 0,067

Norway D 3 x ECA 0,646 2,735 1,775 4,301 0,982 0,941 1,027

Pakistan A 1 AP 0,061 0,045 0,046 0,041 0,041 0,061 0,114

Palau C 2 AP 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,000

Panama C 2 AM 0,018 0,055 0,051 0,055 0,018 0,018 0,033

Papua New Guinea A 2 AP 0,006 0,019 0,019 0,016 0,006 0,006 0,005

Paraguay B 2 AM 0,016 0,020 0,019 0,019 0,016 0,016 0,015

Peru B 2 AM 0,118 0,066 0,066 0,064 0,064 0,118 0,146

Philippines B 2 AP 0,100 0,073 0,095 0,059 0,059 0,100 0,219

Poland C 3 ECA 0,378 0,340 0,340 0,308 0,308 0,378 0,930

Portugal D 3 x ECA 0,462 0,508 0,508 0,741 0,702 0,673 0,603

Qatar D 3 x MENA 0,034 0,047 0,065 0,060 0,052 0,050 0,051

Romania B 2 ECA 0,058 0,133 0,111 0,127 0,058 0,058 0,132

Russia B 2 ECA 1,200 1,230 2,565 1,031 1,824 1,748 0,990

Rwanda A 1 AF 0,001 0,032 0,007 0,035 0,001 0,001 0,003

Samoa B 2 AP 0,001 0,002 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

San Marino D 3 ECA 0,002 0,017 0,059 0,005 0,003 0,003 0,003

Sao Tome & Principe A 2 AF 0,001 0,002 0,004 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,000

Saudi Arabia C 2 x MENA 0,554 0,370 0,375 0,329 0,329 0,554 0,472

Senegal A 1 AF 0,005 0,017 0,014 0,016 0,005 0,005 0,008

Serbia and M B 2 ECA 0,020 0,095 0,099 0,081 0,020 0,020 0,037

Seychelles C 3 AF 0,002 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,003

Sierra Leone A 1 AF 0,001 0,004 0,008 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,001

Singapore D 3 AP 0,393 0,252 0,172 0,399 0,597 0,572 0,442

Slovak Rep. C 3 ECA 0,043 0,062 0,062 0,055 0,043 0,043 0,121

Slovenia D 3 ECA 0,081 0,120 0,100 0,185 0,123 0,118 0,113

Solomon Islands A 2 AP 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,001

Somalia A 1 AF 0,001 0,003 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

South Africa B 2 AF 0,408 0,337 0,300 0,323 0,323 0,408 0,279

Spain D 3 x ECA 2,519 3,770 3,770 5,450 3,829 3,668 3,498


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 63

Sri Lanka B 2 AP 0,016 0,013 0,014 0,012 0,012 0,016 0,044

St. Kitts and Nevis C 3 AM 0,001 0,003 0,005 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,001

St. Lucia C 2 AM 0,002 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,002 0,002 0,002

St. Vincent & G C 2 AM 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Sudan A 2 AF 0,006 0,010 0,012 0,008 0,006 0,006 0,026

Suriname B 2 AM 0,002 0,016 0,007 0,017 0,002 0,002 0,002

Swaziland B 2 AF 0,002 0,004 0,007 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,003

Sweden D 3 x ECA 1,027 1,894 2,104 2,487 1,561 1,495 1,328

Switzerland D 3 x ECA 1,274 0,998 1,066 1,315 1,937 1,855 1,490

Syrian Arab Republic B 2 MENA 0,080 0,057 0,057 0,054 0,054 0,080 0,048

Tajikistan A 2 ECA 0,001 0,004 0,005 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,003

Tanzania A 1 AF 0,004 0,004 0,005 0,003 0,003 0,004 0,014

Thailand B 2 AP 0,294 0,396 0,396 0,347 0,294 0,294 0,347

Togo A 1 AF 0,001 0,003 0,004 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,002

Tonga B 2 AF 0,001 0,002 0,004 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,000

Trinidad and Tobago C 3 AM 0,016 0,013 0,015 0,010 0,010 0,016 0,042

Tunisia B 2 MENA 0,030 0,022 0,023 0,019 0,019 0,030 0,055

Turkey B 2 ECA 0,440 2,482 1,427 2,572 0,440 0,440 0,492

Turkmenistan B 2 ECA 0,003 0,013 0,010 0,012 0,003 0,003 0,014

Uganda A 1 AF 0,005 0,010 0,010 0,009 0,005 0,005 0,010

Ukraine B 2 ECA 0,053 0,128 0,338 0,034 0,034 0,053 0,121

United Arab Emirates D 3 MENA 0,202 0,309 0,210 0,487 0,307 0,294 0,302

United Kingdom D 3 x ECA 5,536 5,460 5,460 7,785 8,415 8,062 8,547

United States D 3 x AM 22,000 25,000 25,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000

Uruguay C 3 AM 0,080 0,042 0,041 0,041 0,041 0,080 0,058

Uzbekistan A 2 ECA 0,011 0,021 0,054 0,010 0,010 0,011 0,025

Vanuatu B 2 AP 0,001 0,003 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,000

Venezuela C 2 AM 0,208 0,125 0,159 0,104 0,104 0,208 0,230

Viet Nam A 2 AP 0,016 0,013 0,013 0,012 0,012 0,016 0,089

Yemen A 1 MENA 0,006 0,005 0,011 0,003 0,003 0,006 0,016

Zambia A 1 AF 0,002 0,004 0,006 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,005

Zimbabwe A 1 AF 0,008 0,016 0,017 0,015 0,008 0,008 0,004


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Table A1.2 Comparison to Secretariat’s “Theoretical” quota (two-ceiling variant)

Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4

Difference Difference Difference Difference

National Societies from Sec's from Sec's from Sec's from Sec's

theoret. Quota theoret. Quota theoret. Quota theoret. Quota

(%) (%) (%) (%)

Afghanistan -70 -70 -67 -82

Albania -11 -73 -73 30

Algeria -20 -20 32 166

Andora 30 -57 -58 -53

Angola 1 -82 -82 15

Antigua and Barbuda -19 -50 -50 -22

Argentina 9 9 78 20

Armenia -52 -71 -71 4

Australia 34 62 55 45

Austria 41 123 113 69

Azerbaijan -66 -66 -64 51

Bahamas 38 -30 -33 -32

Bahrain 51 -74 -76 -74

Bangladesh -12 -64 -64 229

Barbados -12 -12 0 35

Belarus -46 -49 -49 11

Belgium 42 41 35 12

Belize -24 -75 -75 -80

Benin -23 -23 0 109

Bolivia -21 -21 33 201

Bosnia Herzegovina 7 -71 -71 18

Botswana -10 -29 -29 -17

Brazil 0 0 99 3

Brunei 41 164 153 174

Bulgaria -16 -71 -71 -2


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 65

Burkina Faso -7 -67 -67 -40

Burundi -43 -50 -50 -61

Cambodia 5 -94 -94 -77

Cameroon -6 -31 -31 32

Canada 28 120 110 119

Cape Verde -2 -94 -94 -90

Central African Rep -38 -50 -50 -39

Chad -23 -50 -50 32

Chile -1 -1 91 184

China 51 183 171 325

Colombia -15 -33 -33 -31

Congo -27 -50 -50 97

Congo D.R. -45 -45 -33 8

Costa Rica 2 -66 -66 34

Croatia -19 -19 11 207

Cuba -55 -55 -17 22

Czech Republic -18 -18 59 153

Denmark 32 38 33 12

Djibouti -15 -75 -75 -76

Dominica -36 -50 -50 -71

Dominican Republic -14 -39 -39 17

Ecuador 11 -80 -80 -54

Egypt Arab Rep. -9 -9 -9 129

El Salvador -4 -76 -76 -55

Equatorial Guinea -41 -50 -50 -61

Estonia -9 -68 -68 0

Ethiopia -14 -92 -92 -85

Fiji -46 -46 0 24

Finland 25 11 6 0

France 39 93 85 51

Gabon 1 1 75 29

Gambia -41 -41 0 -34

Georgia -56 -56 -38 16


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 66

Germany -11 -11 -11 -11

Ghana -28 -28 -17 106

Greece 30 79 71 57

Grenada -44 -50 -50 -51

Guatemala 7 -49 -49 -5

Guinea -27 -27 0 59

Guinea-Bissau -10 -50 -50 -88

Guyana -39 -67 -67 -45

Haiti -12 -87 -87 -67

Honduras -13 -77 -77 -31

Hungary 3 -73 -73 -34

Iceland 41 -85 -86 -87

India -8 -8 56 414

Indonesia -12 -12 48 194

Iran Islamic Rep. -20 -20 16 37

Iraq -20 -20 56 25

Ireland 49 108 99 152

Italy 41 89 81 52

Ivory Coast -9 -9 0 64

Jamaica -25 -50 -50 131

Japan -32 -32 -32 -32

Jordan -20 -20 14 249

Kenya -13 -27 -27 86

Kiribati -22 -22 0 -80

Korea PDR -45 -82 -82 -90

Korea, Republic of 52 4 -1 2

Kuwait 24 111 102 111

Kyrgyz Republic -64 -67 -67 28

Lao P.D.R. -30 -88 -88 -60

Latvia -20 -38 -38 164

Lebanon 7 -90 -90 -63

Lesotho -14 -91 -91 -84

Liberia -13 -75 -75 -82


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Libyan Arab Rep -32 -32 -4 -16

Lichtenstein -67 -79 -80 -77

Lithuania -27 -27 21 407

Luxembourg -4 -3 -7 -20

Macedonia F.Y.R 2 2 50 167

Madagascar -13 -13 50 277

Malawi -16 -75 -75 -71

Malaysia -5 -5 64 72

Mali -40 -40 0 86

Malta 59 128 118 138

Mauritania -55 -67 -67 -40

Mauritius -5 -5 22 45

Mexico 43 150 140 321

Moldova -11 -11 0 142

Mongolia -70 -75 -75 -34

Monoco 22 -95 -95 -95

Morocco -9 -31 -31 28

Mozambique 4 -91 -91 -58

Myanmar -3 -81 -81 -88

Namibia -5 -5 0 9

Nepal -25 -43 -43 39

Netherlands 36 28 22 5

New Zealand 24 25 19 9

Nicaragua -10 -92 -92 -26

Niger -58 -58 -50 14

Nigeria -11 -11 66 62

Norway 57 -64 -66 -62

Pakistan -9 -9 36 154

Palau -14 -50 -50 -80

Panama -1 -67 -67 -39

Papua New Guinea -13 -68 -68 -73

Paraguay -7 -20 -20 -23

Peru -3 -3 79 121


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Philippines -19 -19 37 201

Poland -10 -10 11 174

Portugal 46 38 32 19

Qatar 28 10 5 9

Romania -5 -56 -56 -1

Russia -16 48 42 -20

Rwanda 11 -97 -97 -92

Samoa -56 -56 -50 -64

San Marino -71 -82 -83 -81

Sao Tome & Principe -29 -50 -50 -95

Saudi Arabia -11 -11 50 28

Senegal -7 -71 -71 -53

Serbia and M -15 -79 -79 -61

Seychelles -7 -7 0 45

Sierra Leone -59 -75 -75 -82

Singapore 58 137 127 76

Slovak Rep. -11 -31 -31 95

Slovenia 54 3 -2 -6

Solomon Islands -3 -50 -50 -72

Somalia -81 -81 -67 -82

South Africa -4 -4 21 -17

Spain 45 2 -3 -7

Sri Lanka -7 -7 23 237

St. Kitts and Nevis -26 -67 -67 -51

St. Lucia -8 -50 -50 -58

St. Vincent & G -52 -52 -50 -55

Sudan -16 -40 -40 158

Suriname 7 -88 -88 -89

Swaziland -32 -50 -50 -36

Sweden 31 -18 -21 -30

Switzerland 32 94 86 49

Syrian Arab Republic -5 -5 40 -16

Tajikistan -34 -75 -75 -32


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Tanzania -33 -33 0 245

Thailand -12 -26 -26 -12

Togo -44 -67 -67 -18

Tonga -62 -62 -50 -80

Trinidad and Tobago -25 -25 23 219

Tunisia -12 -12 36 150

Turkey 4 -82 -82 -80

Turkmenistan -9 -77 -77 4

Uganda -13 -50 -50 1

Ukraine -73 -73 -59 -6

United Arab Emirates 58 -1 -5 -2

United Kingdom 43 54 48 57

United States -40 -40 -40 -40

Uruguay -2 -2 90 39

Uzbekistan -52 -52 -48 21

Vanuatu -25 -67 -67 -84

Venezuela -17 -17 66 84

Viet Nam -5 -5 23 584

Yemen -36 -36 20 217

Zambia -16 -50 -50 27

Zimbabwe -9 -50 -50 -73

Table A1.3 Comparison to Secretariat’s “Proposed” quota (two-ceiling variant)




proposed quota proposed quota proposed quota proposed quota

(%) (%) (%) (%)


Albania -18 -75 -75 19

Algeria -40 -40 -1 98


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 70

Andora 30 -57 -58 -53

Angola 1 -82 -82 15


Argentina 183 183 361 209

Armenia -81 -89 -89 -60


Austria 41 123 113 69

Azerbaijan -86 -86 -85 -38

Bahamas 38 -30 -33 -32

Bahrain 61 -73 -74 -72

Bangladesh -15 -66 -66 218

Barbados -12 -12 0 35

Belarus -70 -71 -71 -38

Belgium 42 41 35 12

Belize -39 -80 -80 -84

Benin -69 -69 -60 -16

Bolivia -40 -40 0 126


Botswana -10 -29 -29 -17

Brazil 23 23 145 27

Brunei 41 164 153 174

Bulgaria -16 -71 -71 -2


Burundi -62 -67 -67 -74

Cambodia 79 -90 -90 -61

Cameroon -6 -31 -31 32

Canada 19 104 95 103

Cape Verde -2 -94 -94 -90


Chad -49 -67 -67 -12

Chile 10 10 112 215

China 67 213 200 371

Colombia -15 -33 -33 -31


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 71

Congo -71 -80 -80 -21

Congo D.R. -70 -70 -64 -41

Costa Rica 45 -51 -51 90

Croatia -35 -35 -11 144

Cuba -79 -79 -61 -43


Denmark 26 32 26 7

Djibouti -32 -80 -80 -81

Dominica -57 -67 -67 -80

Dominican Republic -38 -57 -57 -16

Ecuador 292 -29 -29 63

Egypt Arab Rep. -10 -10 -10 126

El Salvador -4 -76 -76 -55


Estonia -9 -68 -68 0

Ethiopia -19 -93 -93 -86

Fiji -57 -57 -20 -1

Finland 4 -8 -12 -17

France 39 93 85 51

Gabon 1 1 75 29

Gambia -80 -80 -67 -78

Georgia -56 -56 -38 16

Germany -11 -11 -11 -11

Ghana -46 -46 -38 55

Greece 19 63 56 43

Grenada -63 -67 -67 -67

Guatemala 147 17 17 120

Guinea -45 -45 -25 19


Guyana -64 -80 -80 -67

Haiti -31 -89 -89 -74

Honduras -20 -79 -79 -37

Hungary 94 -49 -49 25


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 72

Iceland 41 -85 -86 -87

India -11 -11 52 401

Indonesia -13 -13 47 192

Iran Islamic Rep. -38 -38 -10 7

Iraq -40 -40 17 -6

Ireland 63 127 117 175

Italy 41 89 81 52


Jamaica -46 -64 -64 68

Japan -32 -32 -32 -32

Jordan -30 -30 0 205

Kenya -13 -27 -27 86

Kiribati -74 -74 -67 -93

Korea PDR -75 -92 -92 -96

Korea, Republic of 80 23 18 22

Kuwait -6 60 53 60

Kyrgyz Republic -85 -86 -86 -45

Lao P.D.R. -57 -92 -92 -75

Latvia -36 -50 -50 111

Lebanon 129 -79 -79 -21

Lesotho -14 -91 -91 -84

Liberia -42 -83 -83 -88



Lithuania -66 -66 -43 137

Luxembourg -49 -49 -51 -58


Madagascar -56 -56 -25 89

Malawi -44 -83 -83 -80


Mali -76 -76 -60 -26

Malta 59 128 118 138

Mauritania -73 -80 -80 -64


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 73

Mauritius -14 -14 10 31

Mexico 43 150 140 321

Moldova -41 -41 -33 61

Mongolia -88 -90 -90 -74

Monoco -6 -96 -96 -96

Morocco -9 -31 -31 28


Myanmar -3 -81 -81 -88

Namibia -17 -17 -13 -5

Nepal -42 -56 -56 8


New Zealand -10 -10 -13 -21

Nicaragua -17 -92 -92 -32

Niger -83 -83 -80 -54

Nigeria -11 -11 66 62

Norway 142 -45 -47 -42

Pakistan -11 -11 33 148

Palau -43 -67 -67 -87

Panama 7 -65 -65 -35


Paraguay -2 -16 -16 -18

Peru -3 -3 79 121


Poland -10 -10 11 174


Qatar -7 -20 -24 -21

Romania 14 -48 -48 19

Russia -60 -29 -32 -61

Rwanda 405 -86 -86 -63

Samoa -82 -82 -80 -85

San Marino -92 -95 -95 -94




~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 74

Senegal 12 -64 -64 -42

Serbia and M -19 -80 -80 -62

Seychelles -38 -38 -33 -3

Sierra Leone -80 -88 -88 -91

Singapore 132 247 233 157

Slovak Rep. -11 -31 -31 95

Slovenia 85 23 18 13


Somalia -89 -89 -80 -89

South Africa 8 8 36 -7

Spain 45 2 -3 -7

Sri Lanka -13 -13 14 213


St. Lucia -8 -50 -50 -58

St. Vincent & G -68 -68 -67 -70

Sudan -30 -50 -50 115

Suriname 145 -71 -71 -75

Swaziland -61 -71 -71 -63

Sweden 18 -26 -29 -37



Tajikistan -47 -80 -80 -46

Tanzania -46 -46 -20 176

Thailand -12 -26 -26 -12

Togo -58 -75 -75 -39

Tonga -81 -81 -75 -90


Tunisia -16 -16 30 139

Turkey 80 -69 -69 -66

Turkmenistan 18 -70 -70 35

Uganda -13 -50 -50 1

Ukraine -90 -90 -84 -64

United Arab Emirates 132 46 40 44


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 75



Uruguay 0 0 95 42

Uzbekistan -81 -81 -80 -53

Vanuatu -25 -67 -67 -84

Venezuela -35 -35 31 45

Viet Nam -5 -5 23 584

Yemen -71 -71 -45 44

Zambia -44 -67 -67 -15

Zimbabwe -14 -53 -53 -74


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 76

One ceiling Table A1.4 Quotas under four scenarios (one-ceiling variant)

2004 2004 Scenario Scenario Scenario Scenario

National Societies WB HDI Donor IFRC UN

Scale Sec's Sec's 1 2 3 4

Group group Forum region 2003 theoret. proposed quota Quota Quota Quota

quota (%)

quota (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

Afghanistan A 1 AP 0,001 0,003 0,009 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Albania B 2 ECA 0,003 0,011 0,012 0,010 0,003 0,003 0,014

Algeria B 2 MENA 0,070 0,053 0,071 0,042 0,042 0,070 0,141

Andora D 3 ECA 0,004 0,014 0,014 0,020 0,007 0,006 0,007

Angola A 1 AF 0,002 0,011 0,011 0,011 0,002 0,002 0,013

Antigua and Barbuda C 3 AM 0,002 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,003

Argentina C 3 AM 0,969 0,543 0,210 0,594 0,594 0,969 0,721

Armenia B 2 ECA 0,002 0,007 0,018 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,007

Australia D 3 x AP 1,627 1,524 1,589 2,263 2,717 2,613 2,457

Austria D 3 x ECA 0,947 0,646 0,646 1,004 1,581 1,521 1,214

Azerbaijan B 2 ECA 0,004 0,011 0,027 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,017

Bahamas D 3 AM 0,012 0,026 0,026 0,040 0,020 0,019 0,020

Bahrain D 3 MENA 0,018 0,107 0,100 0,178 0,030 0,029 0,031

Bangladesh A 2 AP 0,010 0,028 0,029 0,025 0,010 0,010 0,092

Barbados C 3 AM 0,009 0,009 0,009 0,008 0,008 0,009 0,013

Belarus B 2 ECA 0,019 0,037 0,066 0,020 0,019 0,019 0,041

Belgium D 3 x ECA 1,129 1,221 1,221 1,917 1,885 1,813 1,519

Belize C 2 AM 0,001 0,004 0,005 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001

Benin A 1 AF 0,002 0,002 0,005 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,004

Bolivia B 2 AM 0,008 0,006 0,008 0,005 0,005 0,008 0,018

Bosnia Herzegovina B 2 ECA 0,004 0,014 0,013 0,015 0,004 0,004 0,017

Botswana C 2 AF 0,010 0,014 0,014 0,013 0,010 0,010 0,012

Brazil B 2 AM 2,390 1,199 0,974 1,196 1,196 2,390 1,232

Brunei D 3 AP 0,033 0,019 0,019 0,029 0,055 0,053 0,058


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 77

Bulgaria B 2 ECA 0,013 0,045 0,045 0,038 0,013 0,013 0,044

Burkina Faso A 1 AF 0,002 0,006 0,006 0,006 0,002 0,002 0,004

Burundi A 1 AF 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Cambodia A 2 AP 0,002 0,034 0,020 0,036 0,002 0,002 0,008

Cameroon A 2 AF 0,009 0,013 0,013 0,012 0,009 0,009 0,017

Canada D 3 x AM 2,558 1,771 1,910 2,505 4,271 4,108 4,305

Cape Verde B 2 AF 0,001 0,016 0,016 0,016 0,001 0,001 0,002

Central African Rep A 1 AF 0,001 0,002 0,004 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Chad A 1 AF 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,003

Chile C 3 AM 0,212 0,111 0,100 0,110 0,110 0,212 0,350

China B 2 AP 1,532 0,824 0,744 1,369 2,558 2,460 3,506

Colombia B 2 AM 0,201 0,300 0,300 0,255 0,201 0,201 0,207

Congo A 1 AF 0,001 0,002 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,004

Congo D.R. A 1 AF 0,004 0,006 0,011 0,003 0,003 0,004 0,007

Costa Rica C 3 AM 0,020 0,058 0,041 0,059 0,020 0,020 0,086

Croatia C 3 ECA 0,039 0,035 0,044 0,028 0,028 0,039 0,119

Cuba B 3 AM 0,030 0,036 0,077 0,016 0,016 0,030 0,049

Czech Republic C 3 ECA 0,203 0,128 0,128 0,105 0,105 0,203 0,360

Denmark D 3 x ECA 0,749 0,823 0,864 1,202 1,251 1,203 1,022

Djibouti B 1 AF 0,001 0,004 0,005 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001

Dominica C 2 AM 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Dominican Republic B 2 AM 0,023 0,038 0,053 0,033 0,023 0,023 0,044

Ecuador B 2 AM 0,025 0,124 0,035 0,137 0,025 0,025 0,057

Egypt Arab Rep. B 2 MENA 0,081 0,089 0,090 0,081 0,081 0,081 0,203

El Salvador B 2 AM 0,018 0,076 0,076 0,073 0,018 0,018 0,034

Equatorial Guinea A 2 AF 0,001 0,002 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Estonia C 3 ECA 0,010 0,031 0,031 0,028 0,010 0,010 0,034

Ethiopia A 1 AF 0,004 0,051 0,054 0,044 0,004 0,004 0,008

Fiji B 2 AP 0,004 0,004 0,005 0,002 0,002 0,004 0,005

Finland D 3 x ECA 0,522 0,714 0,863 0,987 0,872 0,838 0,794

France D 3 x ECA 6,466 5,099 5,099 7,845 10,797 10,385 8,563

Gabon C 2 AF 0,014 0,008 0,008 0,008 0,008 0,014 0,010

Gambia A 1 AF 0,001 0,001 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 78

Georgia B 2 ECA 0,005 0,008 0,008 0,003 0,003 0,005 0,009

Germany D 3 x ECA 9,769 10,164 10,164 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000

Ghana A 2 AF 0,005 0,006 0,008 0,004 0,004 0,005 0,012

Greece D 3 x ECA 0,539 0,458 0,503 0,659 0,900 0,866 0,798

Grenada C 2 AM 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Guatemala B 2 AM 0,027 0,053 0,023 0,057 0,027 0,027 0,051

Guinea A 1 AF 0,003 0,003 0,004 0,002 0,002 0,003 0,005

Guinea-Bissau A 1 AF 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,000

Guyana B 2 AM 0,001 0,003 0,005 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,002

Haiti A 1 AM 0,002 0,015 0,019 0,013 0,002 0,002 0,005

Honduras B 2 AM 0,005 0,022 0,024 0,019 0,005 0,005 0,015

Hungary C 3 ECA 0,120 0,448 0,237 0,460 0,120 0,120 0,328

Iceland D 3 x ECA 0,033 0,339 0,339 0,529 0,055 0,053 0,050

India A 2 AP 0,341 0,218 0,224 0,200 0,200 0,341 1,121

Indonesia B 2 AP 0,200 0,135 0,136 0,119 0,119 0,200 0,397

Iran Islamic Rep. B 2 x MENA 0,272 0,235 0,302 0,189 0,189 0,272 0,323

Iraq B 2 MENA 0,136 0,087 0,116 0,069 0,069 0,136 0,109

Ireland D 3 x ECA 0,294 0,215 0,197 0,354 0,491 0,472 0,601

Italy D 3 x ECA 5,065 4,078 4,078 6,362 8,457 8,134 6,899

Ivory Coast A 1 AF 0,009 0,009 0,009 0,008 0,008 0,009 0,015

Jamaica B 2 AM 0,004 0,008 0,011 0,006 0,004 0,004 0,018

Japan D 3 x AP 19,516 13,247 13,247 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000

Jordan B 2 MENA 0,008 0,007 0,008 0,006 0,006 0,008 0,024

Kenya A 1 AF 0,008 0,011 0,011 0,010 0,008 0,008 0,020

Kiribati B 2 AP 0,001 0,001 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,000

Korea PDR A 1 AP 0,009 0,049 0,109 0,027 0,009 0,009 0,005

Korea, Republic of D 3 x AP 1,851 2,718 2,287 4,551 3,091 2,973 3,088

Kuwait D 3 x MENA 0,147 0,106 0,140 0,146 0,245 0,236 0,248

Kyrgyz Republic A 2 ECA 0,001 0,003 0,007 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,004

Lao P.D.R. A 2 AP 0,001 0,008 0,013 0,006 0,001 0,001 0,003

Latvia C 3 ECA 0,010 0,016 0,020 0,013 0,010 0,010 0,047

Lebanon C 2 MENA 0,012 0,124 0,058 0,133 0,012 0,012 0,046

Lesotho A 1 AF 0,001 0,011 0,011 0,009 0,001 0,001 0,002


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 79

Liberia A 1 AF 0,001 0,004 0,006 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001

Libyan Arab Rep C 2 MENA 0,067 0,070 0,115 0,048 0,048 0,067 0,059

Lichtenstein D 3 ECA 0,006 0,043 0,144 0,016 0,010 0,010 0,011

Lithuania C 3 ECA 0,017 0,014 0,030 0,010 0,010 0,017 0,079

Luxembourg D 3 ECA 0,080 0,125 0,237 0,132 0,134 0,128 0,111

Macedonia F.Y.R B 2 ECA 0,006 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,006 0,011

Madagascar A 1 AF 0,003 0,002 0,004 0,002 0,002 0,003 0,008

Malawi A 1 AF 0,002 0,008 0,012 0,007 0,002 0,002 0,002

Malaysia C 2 AP 0,235 0,143 0,143 0,136 0,136 0,235 0,247

Mali A 1 AF 0,002 0,002 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,004

Malta D 3 ECA 0,015 0,010 0,010 0,018 0,025 0,024 0,026

Mauritania A 1 AF 0,001 0,003 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,002

Mauritius C 2 AF 0,011 0,009 0,010 0,009 0,009 0,011 0,013

Mexico C 3 AM 1,086 0,659 0,659 1,042 1,813 1,744 3,083

Moldova A 2 ECA 0,002 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,005

Mongolia A 2 AP 0,001 0,004 0,010 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,003

Monoco D 3 ECA 0,004 0,122 0,158 0,164 0,007 0,006 0,007

Morocco B 2 MENA 0,044 0,064 0,064 0,059 0,044 0,044 0,082

Mozambique A 1 AF 0,001 0,011 0,009 0,011 0,001 0,001 0,005

Myanmar A 2 AP 0,010 0,052 0,052 0,051 0,010 0,010 0,006

Namibia B 2 AF 0,007 0,007 0,008 0,007 0,007 0,007 0,008

Nepal A 2 AP 0,004 0,007 0,009 0,005 0,004 0,004 0,010

Netherlands D 3 x ECA 1,738 2,072 2,072 3,102 2,902 2,791 2,425

New Zealand D 3 x AP 0,241 0,294 0,405 0,401 0,402 0,387 0,355

Nicaragua A 2 AM 0,001 0,012 0,013 0,011 0,001 0,001 0,009

Niger A 1 AF 0,001 0,002 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,002

Nigeria A 1 AF 0,068 0,041 0,041 0,036 0,036 0,068 0,067

Norway D 3 x ECA 0,646 2,735 1,775 4,749 1,079 1,038 1,140

Pakistan A 1 AP 0,061 0,045 0,046 0,041 0,041 0,061 0,114

Palau C 2 AP 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,000

Panama C 2 AM 0,018 0,055 0,051 0,055 0,018 0,018 0,033

Papua New Guinea A 2 AP 0,006 0,019 0,019 0,016 0,006 0,006 0,005

Paraguay B 2 AM 0,016 0,020 0,019 0,019 0,016 0,016 0,015


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 80

Peru B 2 AM 0,118 0,066 0,066 0,064 0,064 0,118 0,146

Philippines B 2 AP 0,100 0,073 0,095 0,059 0,059 0,100 0,219

Poland C 3 ECA 0,378 0,340 0,340 0,308 0,308 0,378 1,033

Portugal D 3 x ECA 0,462 0,508 0,508 0,818 0,771 0,742 0,669

Qatar D 3 x MENA 0,034 0,047 0,065 0,067 0,057 0,055 0,057

Romania B 2 ECA 0,058 0,133 0,111 0,127 0,058 0,058 0,132

Russia B 2 ECA 1,200 1,230 2,565 1,138 2,004 1,927 0,990

Rwanda A 1 AF 0,001 0,032 0,007 0,035 0,001 0,001 0,003

Samoa B 2 AP 0,001 0,002 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

San Marino D 3 ECA 0,002 0,017 0,059 0,005 0,003 0,003 0,004

Sao Tome & Principe A 2 AF 0,001 0,002 0,004 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,000

Saudi Arabia C 2 x MENA 0,554 0,370 0,375 0,329 0,329 0,554 0,472

Senegal A 1 AF 0,005 0,017 0,014 0,016 0,005 0,005 0,008

Serbia and M B 2 ECA 0,020 0,095 0,099 0,081 0,020 0,020 0,037

Seychelles C 3 AF 0,002 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,003

Sierra Leone A 1 AF 0,001 0,004 0,008 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,001

Singapore D 3 AP 0,393 0,252 0,172 0,440 0,656 0,631 0,491

Slovak Rep. C 3 ECA 0,043 0,062 0,062 0,055 0,043 0,043 0,135

Slovenia D 3 ECA 0,081 0,120 0,100 0,204 0,135 0,130 0,125

Solomon Islands A 2 AP 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,001

Somalia A 1 AF 0,001 0,003 0,005 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

South Africa B 2 AF 0,408 0,337 0,300 0,323 0,323 0,408 0,279

Spain D 3 x ECA 2,519 3,770 3,770 6,017 4,206 4,045 3,884

Sri Lanka B 2 AP 0,016 0,013 0,014 0,012 0,012 0,016 0,044

St. Kitts and Nevis C 3 AM 0,001 0,003 0,005 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,002

St. Lucia C 2 AM 0,002 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,002 0,002 0,002

St. Vincent & G C 2 AM 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001

Sudan A 2 AF 0,006 0,010 0,012 0,008 0,006 0,006 0,026

Suriname B 2 AM 0,002 0,016 0,007 0,017 0,002 0,002 0,002

Swaziland B 2 AF 0,002 0,004 0,007 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,003

Sweden D 3 x ECA 1,027 1,894 2,104 2,746 1,714 1,649 1,474

Switzerland D 3 x ECA 1,274 0,998 1,066 1,453 2,127 2,046 1,654

Syrian Arab Republic B 2 MENA 0,080 0,057 0,057 0,054 0,054 0,080 0,048


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 81

Tajikistan A 2 ECA 0,001 0,004 0,005 0,003 0,001 0,001 0,003

Tanzania A 1 AF 0,004 0,004 0,005 0,003 0,003 0,004 0,014

Thailand B 2 AP 0,294 0,396 0,396 0,347 0,294 0,294 0,347

Togo A 1 AF 0,001 0,003 0,004 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,002

Tonga B 2 AF 0,001 0,002 0,004 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,000

Trinidad and Tobago C 3 AM 0,016 0,013 0,015 0,010 0,010 0,016 0,046

Tunisia B 2 MENA 0,030 0,022 0,023 0,019 0,019 0,030 0,055

Turkey B 2 ECA 0,440 2,482 1,427 2,572 0,440 0,440 0,492

Turkmenistan B 2 ECA 0,003 0,013 0,010 0,012 0,003 0,003 0,014

Uganda A 1 AF 0,005 0,010 0,010 0,009 0,005 0,005 0,010

Ukraine B 2 ECA 0,053 0,128 0,338 0,034 0,034 0,053 0,121

United Arab Emirates D 3 MENA 0,202 0,309 0,210 0,538 0,337 0,324 0,336

United Kingdom D 3 x ECA 5,536 5,460 5,460 8,596 9,244 8,891 9,488

United States D 3 x AM 22,000 25,000 25,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000

Uruguay C 3 AM 0,080 0,042 0,041 0,041 0,041 0,080 0,065

Uzbekistan A 2 ECA 0,011 0,021 0,054 0,010 0,010 0,011 0,025

Vanuatu B 2 AP 0,001 0,003 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,000

Venezuela C 2 AM 0,208 0,125 0,159 0,104 0,104 0,208 0,230

Viet Nam A 2 AP 0,016 0,013 0,013 0,012 0,012 0,016 0,089

Yemen A 1 MENA 0,006 0,005 0,011 0,003 0,003 0,006 0,016

Zambia A 1 AF 0,002 0,004 0,006 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,005

Zimbabwe A 1 AF 0,008 0,016 0,017 0,015 0,008 0,008 0,004

Table A1.5 Comparison to Secretariat’s “Theoretical” quota (one-ceiling variant)




theoret. Quota theoret. Quota theoret. Quota theoret. Quota

(%) (%) (%) (%)


Albania -11 -73 -73 30


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 82

Algeria -20 -20 32 166

Andora 43 -52 -54 -48

Angola 1 -82 -82 15


Argentina 9 9 78 33

Armenia -52 -71 -71 4


Austria 55 145 135 88

Azerbaijan -66 -66 -64 51

Bahamas 52 -23 -26 -24

Bahrain 67 -72 -73 -71

Bangladesh -12 -64 -64 229

Barbados -12 -12 0 50

Belarus -46 -49 -49 11

Belgium 57 54 49 24

Belize -24 -75 -75 -80

Benin -23 -23 0 109

Bolivia -21 -21 33 201


Botswana -10 -29 -29 -17

Brazil 0 0 99 3

Brunei 55 190 179 204

Bulgaria -16 -71 -71 -2


Burundi -43 -50 -50 -61

Cambodia 5 -94 -94 -77

Cameroon -6 -31 -31 32

Canada 41 141 132 143

Cape Verde -2 -94 -94 -90


Chad -23 -50 -50 32

Chile -1 -1 91 216

China 66 210 199 325


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 83

Colombia -15 -33 -33 -31

Congo -27 -50 -50 97

Congo D.R. -45 -45 -33 8

Costa Rica 2 -66 -66 49

Croatia -19 -19 11 241

Cuba -55 -55 -17 36


Denmark 46 52 46 24

Djibouti -15 -75 -75 -76

Dominica -36 -50 -50 -71

Dominican Republic -14 -39 -39 17

Ecuador 11 -80 -80 -54

Egypt Arab Rep. -9 -9 -9 129

El Salvador -4 -76 -76 -55


Estonia -9 -68 -68 11

Ethiopia -14 -92 -92 -85

Fiji -46 -46 0 24

Finland 38 22 17 11

France 54 112 104 68

Gabon 1 1 75 29

Gambia -41 -41 0 -34

Georgia -56 -56 -38 16

Germany -11 -11 -11 -11

Ghana -28 -28 -17 106

Greece 44 97 89 74

Grenada -44 -50 -50 -51

Guatemala 7 -49 -49 -5

Guinea -27 -27 0 59


Guyana -39 -67 -67 -45

Haiti -12 -87 -87 -67

Honduras -13 -77 -77 -31


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 84

Hungary 3 -73 -73 -27

Iceland 56 -84 -84 -85

India -8 -8 56 414

Indonesia -12 -12 48 194

Iran Islamic Rep. -20 -20 16 37

Iraq -20 -20 56 25

Ireland 65 128 120 179

Italy 56 107 99 69


Jamaica -25 -50 -50 131

Japan -32 -32 -32 -32

Jordan -20 -20 14 249

Kenya -13 -27 -27 86

Kiribati -22 -22 0 -80

Korea PDR -45 -82 -82 -90


Kuwait 37 132 123 134

Kyrgyz Republic -64 -67 -67 28

Lao P.D.R. -30 -88 -88 -60

Latvia -20 -38 -38 193

Lebanon 7 -90 -90 -63

Lesotho -14 -91 -91 -84

Liberia -13 -75 -75 -82



Lithuania -27 -27 21 463

Luxembourg 6 7 3 -11


Madagascar -13 -13 50 277

Malawi -16 -75 -75 -71


Mali -40 -40 0 86

Malta 76 150 141 165


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 85

Mauritania -55 -67 -67 -40

Mauritius -5 -5 22 45

Mexico 58 175 165 368

Moldova -11 -11 0 142

Mongolia -70 -75 -75 -34

Monoco 34 -95 -95 -94

Morocco -9 -31 -31 28


Myanmar -3 -81 -81 -88

Namibia -5 -5 0 9

Nepal -25 -43 -43 39


New Zealand 36 37 32 21

Nicaragua -10 -92 -92 -26

Niger -58 -58 -50 14

Nigeria -11 -11 66 62

Norway 74 -61 -62 -58

Pakistan -9 -9 36 154

Palau -14 -50 -50 -80

Panama -1 -67 -67 -39


Paraguay -7 -20 -20 -23

Peru -3 -3 79 121


Poland -10 -10 11 204


Qatar 42 21 16 22

Romania -5 -56 -56 -1

Russia -7 63 57 -20

Rwanda 11 -97 -97 -92

Samoa -56 -56 -50 -64

San Marino -68 -80 -81 -79



~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 86


Senegal -7 -71 -71 -53

Serbia and M -15 -79 -79 -61

Seychelles -7 -7 0 61

Sierra Leone -59 -75 -75 -82

Singapore 75 160 150 95

Slovak Rep. -11 -31 -31 117

Slovenia 70 13 8 5


Somalia -81 -81 -67 -82

South Africa -4 -4 21 -17

Spain 60 12 7 3

Sri Lanka -7 -7 23 237


St. Lucia -8 -50 -50 -58

St. Vincent & G -52 -52 -50 -55

Sudan -16 -40 -40 158

Suriname 7 -88 -88 -89

Swaziland -32 -50 -50 -36

Sweden 45 -9 -13 -22



Tajikistan -34 -75 -75 -32

Tanzania -33 -33 0 245

Thailand -12 -26 -26 -12

Togo -44 -67 -67 -18

Tonga -62 -62 -50 -80


Tunisia -12 -12 36 150

Turkey 4 -82 -82 -80

Turkmenistan -9 -77 -77 4

Uganda -13 -50 -50 1

Ukraine -73 -73 -59 -6


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 87




Uruguay -2 -2 90 54

Uzbekistan -52 -52 -48 21

Vanuatu -25 -67 -67 -84

Venezuela -17 -17 66 84

Viet Nam -5 -5 23 584

Yemen -36 -36 20 217

Zambia -16 -50 -50 27

Zimbabwe -9 -50 -50 -73

Table A1.6 Comparison to Secretariat’s “Proposed” quota (one-ceiling variant)




proposed quota proposed quota proposed quota proposed quota

(%) (%) (%) (%)


Albania -18 -75 -75 19

Algeria -40 -40 -1 98

Andora 43 -52 -54 -48

Angola 1 -82 -82 15


Argentina 183 183 361 243

Armenia -81 -89 -89 -60


Austria 55 145 135 88

Azerbaijan -86 -86 -85 -38

Bahamas 52 -23 -26 -24

Bahrain 78 -70 -71 -69


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 88

Bangladesh -15 -66 -66 218

Barbados -12 -12 0 50

Belarus -70 -71 -71 -38

Belgium 57 54 49 24

Belize -39 -80 -80 -84

Benin -69 -69 -60 -16

Bolivia -40 -40 0 126


Botswana -10 -29 -29 -17

Brazil 23 23 145 27

Brunei 55 190 179 204

Bulgaria -16 -71 -71 -2


Burundi -62 -67 -67 -74

Cambodia 79 -90 -90 -61

Cameroon -6 -31 -31 32

Canada 31 124 115 125

Cape Verde -2 -94 -94 -90


Chad -49 -67 -67 -12

Chile 10 10 112 250

China 84 244 231 371

Colombia -15 -33 -33 -31

Congo -71 -80 -80 -21

Congo D.R. -70 -70 -64 -41

Costa Rica 45 -51 -51 111

Croatia -35 -35 -11 171

Cuba -79 -79 -61 -36


Denmark 39 45 39 18

Djibouti -32 -80 -80 -81

Dominica -57 -67 -67 -80

Dominican Republic -38 -57 -57 -16


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 89

Ecuador 292 -29 -29 63

Egypt Arab Rep. -10 -10 -10 126

El Salvador -4 -76 -76 -55


Estonia -9 -68 -68 11

Ethiopia -19 -93 -93 -86

Fiji -57 -57 -20 -1

Finland 14 1 -3 -8

France 54 112 104 68

Gabon 1 1 75 29

Gambia -80 -80 -67 -78

Georgia -56 -56 -38 16

Germany -11 -11 -11 -11

Ghana -46 -46 -38 55

Greece 31 79 72 59

Grenada -63 -67 -67 -67

Guatemala 147 17 17 120

Guinea -45 -45 -25 19


Guyana -64 -80 -80 -67

Haiti -31 -89 -89 -74

Honduras -20 -79 -79 -37

Hungary 94 -49 -49 38

Iceland 56 -84 -84 -85

India -11 -11 52 401

Indonesia -13 -13 47 192

Iran Islamic Rep. -38 -38 -10 7

Iraq -40 -40 17 -6

Ireland 80 149 140 205

Italy 56 107 99 69


Jamaica -46 -64 -64 68

Japan -32 -32 -32 -32


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 90

Jordan -30 -30 0 205

Kenya -13 -27 -27 86

Kiribati -74 -74 -67 -93

Korea PDR -75 -92 -92 -96


Kuwait 4 75 69 77

Kyrgyz Republic -85 -86 -86 -45

Lao P.D.R. -57 -92 -92 -75

Latvia -36 -50 -50 134

Lebanon 129 -79 -79 -21

Lesotho -14 -91 -91 -84

Liberia -42 -83 -83 -88



Lithuania -66 -66 -43 163

Luxembourg -44 -44 -46 -53


Madagascar -56 -56 -25 89

Malawi -44 -83 -83 -80


Mali -76 -76 -60 -26

Malta 76 150 141 165

Mauritania -73 -80 -80 -64

Mauritius -14 -14 10 31

Mexico 58 175 165 368

Moldova -41 -41 -33 61

Mongolia -88 -90 -90 -74

Monoco 4 -96 -96 -95

Morocco -9 -31 -31 28


Myanmar -3 -81 -81 -88

Namibia -17 -17 -13 -5

Nepal -42 -56 -56 8


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 91


New Zealand -1 -1 -4 -12

Nicaragua -17 -92 -92 -32

Niger -83 -83 -80 -54

Nigeria -11 -11 66 62

Norway 168 -39 -42 -36

Pakistan -11 -11 33 148

Palau -43 -67 -67 -87

Panama 7 -65 -65 -35


Paraguay -2 -16 -16 -18

Peru -3 -3 79 121


Poland -10 -10 11 204


Qatar 3 -13 -16 -12

Romania 14 -48 -48 19

Russia -56 -22 -25 -61

Rwanda 405 -86 -86 -63

Samoa -82 -82 -80 -85

San Marino -91 -94 -95 -94



Senegal 12 -64 -64 -42

Serbia and M -19 -80 -80 -62

Seychelles -38 -38 -33 7

Sierra Leone -80 -88 -88 -91

Singapore 156 282 267 185

Slovak Rep. -11 -31 -31 117

Slovenia 104 35 30 25


Somalia -89 -89 -80 -89

South Africa 8 8 36 -7


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 92

Spain 60 12 7 3

Sri Lanka -13 -13 14 213


St. Lucia -8 -50 -50 -58

St. Vincent & G -68 -68 -67 -70

Sudan -30 -50 -50 115

Suriname 145 -71 -71 -75

Swaziland -61 -71 -71 -63

Sweden 31 -19 -22 -30



Tajikistan -47 -80 -80 -46

Tanzania -46 -46 -20 176

Thailand -12 -26 -26 -12

Togo -58 -75 -75 -39

Tonga -81 -81 -75 -90


Tunisia -16 -16 30 139

Turkey 80 -69 -69 -66

Turkmenistan 18 -70 -70 35

Uganda -13 -50 -50 1

Ukraine -90 -90 -84 -64




Uruguay 0 0 95 58

Uzbekistan -81 -81 -80 -53

Vanuatu -25 -67 -67 -84

Venezuela -35 -35 31 45

Viet Nam -5 -5 23 584

Yemen -71 -71 -45 44

Zambia -44 -67 -67 -15

Zimbabwe -14 -53 -53 -74


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 93

Annex 2: Increases/Decreases under Scenario 1 ECON has calculated these quotas for illustrative purposes.

for ref. for ref. Scenario 1 Scenario 1 Scenario 1 Scenario 1 Scenario 1 For ref:

2004 2004 Revised Difference Difference Increase in Quota 2004 quota

National Sec's Sec's Quota from Sec's from Sec's Quota Proposed by

Society theoretical proposed proposed theoretical Secretariat

quota (%) quota (%) (%) Quota (%) Quota (%) (CHF) (CHF) (CHF)

United States 25,0000 25,0000 15,0000 -40 -40 -3 302 522 4 887 891 8 190 413

Japan 13,2470 13,2470 9,0000 -32 -32 -1 407 202 2 932 734 4 339 936

Germany 10,1640 10,1640 9,0000 -11 -11 -397 160 2 932 734 3 329 894

United Kingdom 5,4600 5,4600 7,7850 43 43 748 029 2 536 815 1 788 786

France 5,0990 5,0990 7,1054 39 39 644 831 2 315 348 1 670 517

Italy 4,0780 4,0780 5,7619 41 41 541 556 1 877 576 1 336 020

Spain 3,7700 3,7700 5,4497 45 45 540 712 1 775 826 1 235 114

Norway 2,7350 1,7750 4,3008 142 57 819 940 1 401 459 581 519

Korea Rep. 2,7180 2,2870 4,1219 80 52 593 892 1 343 151 749 259

Netherlands 2,0720 2,0720 2,8093 36 36 236 620 915 441 678 821

Turkey 2,4820 1,4270 2,5721 80 4 370 645 838 154 467 509

Sweden 1,8940 2,1040 2,4868 18 31 121 050 810 355 689 305

Canada 1,7710 1,9100 2,2684 19 28 113 431 739 179 625 748

Australia 1,5240 1,5890 2,0494 29 34 147 241 667 824 520 583

Belgium 1,2210 1,2210 1,7362 42 42 165 732 565 752 400 020

Switzerland 0,9980 1,0660 1,3155 23 32 79 425 428 664 349 239

China 0,8240 0,7440 1,2403 67 51 160 421 404 168 243 747


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 94

Brazil 1,1990 0,9740 1,1959 23 0 70 594 389 693 319 099

Denmark 0,8230 0,8640 1,0886 26 32 71 679 354 740 283 061

Russia 1,2300 2,5650 1,0306 -60 -16 -504 513 335 823 840 336

Mexico 0,6590 0,6590 0,9437 43 43 91 610 307 509 215 899

Austria 0,6460 0,6460 0,9097 41 41 84 779 296 419 211 640

Finland 0,7140 0,8630 0,8937 4 25 8 477 291 210 282 733

Portugal 0,5080 0,5080 0,7412 46 46 75 110 241 539 166 429

Greece 0,4580 0,5030 0,5968 19 30 29 688 194 479 164 791

Argentina 0,5430 0,2100 0,5942 183 9 124 839 193 638 68 799

UAE 0,3090 0,2100 0,4869 132 58 89 858 158 657 68 799

Iceland 0,3390 0,3390 0,4792 41 41 45 074 156 136 111 062

Hungary 0,4480 0,2370 0,4602 94 3 72 323 149 968 77 645

Singapore 0,2520 0,1720 0,3988 132 58 73 606 129 956 56 350

New Zealand 0,2940 0,4050 0,3632 -10 24 -14 345 118 340 132 685

Thailand 0,3960 0,3960 0,3473 -12 -12 -16 560 113 176 129 736

Saudi Arabia 0,3700 0,3750 0,3287 -12 -11 -15 757 107 099 122 856

South Africa 0,3370 0,3000 0,3226 8 -4 6 846 105 131 98 285

Ireland 0,2150 0,1970 0,3209 63 49 40 035 104 575 64 540

Poland 0,3400 0,3400 0,3077 -10 -10 -11 125 100 265 111 390

Colombia 0,3000 0,3000 0,2551 -15 -15 -15 150 83 135 98 285

India 0,2180 0,2240 0,2003 -11 -8 -8 105 65 281 73 386

Iran Islamic Rep. 0,2350 0,3020 0,1887 -38 -20 -37 459 61 481 98 940

Slovenia 0,1200 0,1000 0,1848 85 54 27 464 60 226 32 762

Bahrain 0,1070 0,1000 0,1614 61 51 19 831 52 593 32 762

Monoco 0,1220 0,1580 0,1484 -6 22 -3 398 48 365 51 763

Ecuador 0,1240 0,0350 0,1373 292 11 33 273 44 740 11 467

Malaysia 0,1430 0,1430 0,1362 -5 -5 -2 452 44 397 46 849

Lebanon 0,1240 0,0580 0,1329 129 7 24 321 43 323 19 002

Kuwait 0,1060 0,1400 0,1319 -6 24 -2 872 42 994 45 866

Romania 0,1330 0,1110 0,1266 14 -5 4 893 41 258 36 365

Luxembourg 0,1250 0,2370 0,1198 -49 -4 -38 607 39 038 77 645

Indonesia 0,1350 0,1360 0,1188 -13 -12 -5 844 38 712 44 556

Chile 0,1110 0,1000 0,1100 10 -1 3 081 35 843 32 762


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 95

Czech Republic 0,1280 0,1280 0,1051 -18 -18 -7 684 34 251 41 935

Venezuela 0,1250 0,1590 0,1041 -35 -17 -18 178 33 913 52 091

Egypt Arab Rep. 0,0890 0,0900 0,0809 -10 -9 -3 135 26 350 29 485

Serbia & Mont. 0,0950 0,0990 0,0806 -19 -15 -6 171 26 263 32 434

El Salvador 0,0760 0,0760 0,0728 -4 -4 -1 189 23 710 24 899

Iraq 0,0870 0,1160 0,0694 -40 -20 -15 395 22 609 38 004

Peru 0,0660 0,0660 0,0643 -3 -3 -685 20 938 21 623

Qatar 0,0470 0,0650 0,0603 -7 28 -1 630 19 665 21 295

Philippines 0,0730 0,0950 0,0595 -37 -19 -11 740 19 384 31 124

Costa Rica 0,0580 0,0410 0,0593 45 2 5 888 19 320 13 432

Morocco 0,0640 0,0640 0,0585 -9 -9 -1 891 19 076 20 967

Guatemala 0,0530 0,0230 0,0569 147 7 11 008 18 543 7 535

Slovak Rep. 0,0620 0,0620 0,0551 -11 -11 -2 344 17 968 20 312

Panama 0,0550 0,0510 0,0546 7 -1 1 087 17 795 16 708

Syrian Arab Rep. 0,0570 0,0570 0,0541 -5 -5 -1 032 17 642 18 674

Myanmar 0,0520 0,0520 0,0506 -3 -3 -551 16 485 17 036

Libyan Arab Rep. 0,0700 0,1150 0,0477 -58 -32 -22 124 15 552 37 676

Ethiopia 0,0510 0,0540 0,0437 -19 -14 -3 438 14 253 17 691

Algeria 0,0530 0,0710 0,0424 -40 -20 -9 428 13 833 23 261

Uruguay 0,0420 0,0410 0,0411 0 -2 -48 13 384 13 432

Pakistan 0,0450 0,0460 0,0410 -11 -9 -1 707 13 363 15 070

Bulgaria 0,0450 0,0450 0,0377 -16 -16 -2 461 12 282 14 743

Nigeria 0,0410 0,0410 0,0363 -11 -11 -1 599 11 833 13 432

Bahamas 0,0260 0,0260 0,0359 38 38 3 181 11 699 8 518

Cambodia 0,0340 0,0200 0,0357 79 5 5 087 11 639 6 552

Rwanda 0,0320 0,0070 0,0354 405 11 9 238 11 531 2 293

Ukraine 0,1280 0,3380 0,0340 -90 -73 -99 662 11 072 110 734

Dominican Rep. 0,0380 0,0530 0,0326 -38 -14 -6 732 10 632 17 364

Croatia 0,0350 0,0440 0,0284 -35 -19 -5 148 9 267 14 415

Estonia 0,0310 0,0310 0,0281 -9 -9 -984 9 172 10 156

Korea PDR 0,0490 0,1090 0,0271 -75 -45 -26 891 8 819 35 710

Brunei 0,0190 0,0190 0,0267 41 41 2 475 8 700 6 225

Bangladesh 0,0280 0,0290 0,0247 -15 -12 -1 468 8 033 9 501


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 96

Belarus 0,0370 0,0660 0,0200 -70 -46 -15 119 6 504 21 623

Tunisia 0,0220 0,0230 0,0194 -16 -12 -1 206 6 329 7 535

Honduras 0,0220 0,0240 0,0192 -20 -13 -1 614 6 249 7 863

Paraguay 0,0200 0,0190 0,0187 -2 -7 -134 6 091 6 225

Andora 0,0140 0,0140 0,0181 30 30 1 325 5 912 4 587

Suriname 0,0160 0,0070 0,0172 145 7 3 306 5 599 2 293

Papua N.G. 0,0190 0,0190 0,0165 -13 -13 -851 5 374 6 225

Cuba 0,0360 0,0770 0,0163 -79 -55 -19 919 5 307 25 226

Malta 0,0100 0,0100 0,0159 59 59 1 914 5 190 3 276

Cape Verde 0,0160 0,0160 0,0158 -2 -2 -108 5 134 5 242

Senegal 0,0170 0,0140 0,0157 12 -7 545 5 132 4 587

Bosnia Herz. 0,0140 0,0130 0,0149 15 7 602 4 861 4 259

Zimbabwe 0,0160 0,0170 0,0146 -14 -9 -811 4 758 5 569

Lichtenstein 0,0430 0,1440 0,0143 -90 -67 -42 511 4 666 47 177

Haiti 0,0150 0,0190 0,0131 -31 -12 -1 943 4 282 6 225

Latvia 0,0160 0,0200 0,0127 -36 -20 -2 401 4 151 6 552

Botswana 0,0140 0,0140 0,0126 -10 -10 -496 4 091 4 587

Viet Nam 0,0130 0,0130 0,0123 -5 -5 -245 4 014 4 259

Cameroon 0,0130 0,0130 0,0122 -6 -6 -295 3 964 4 259

Sri Lanka 0,0130 0,0140 0,0122 -13 -7 -628 3 959 4 587

Turkmenistan 0,0130 0,0100 0,0118 18 -9 560 3 836 3 276

Mozambique 0,0110 0,0090 0,0114 27 4 766 3 715 2 949

Angola 0,0110 0,0110 0,0111 1 1 25 3 629 3 604

Nicaragua 0,0120 0,0130 0,0108 -17 -10 -737 3 522 4 259

Lithuania 0,0140 0,0300 0,0102 -66 -27 -6 501 3 327 9 828

Uzbekistan 0,0210 0,0540 0,0102 -81 -52 -14 378 3 313 17 691

Albania 0,0110 0,0120 0,0098 -18 -11 -725 3 206 3 931

Trinidad & T. 0,0130 0,0150 0,0097 -35 -25 -1 744 3 170 4 914

Kenya 0,0110 0,0110 0,0095 -13 -13 -498 3 106 3 604

Lesotho 0,0110 0,0110 0,0095 -14 -14 -511 3 093 3 604

Uganda 0,0100 0,0100 0,0087 -13 -13 -437 2 839 3 276

Mauritius 0,0090 0,0100 0,0086 -14 -5 -481 2 795 3 276

Sudan 0,0100 0,0120 0,0084 -30 -16 -1 187 2 744 3 931


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 97

Ivory Coast 0,0090 0,0090 0,0082 -9 -9 -267 2 682 2 949

Gabon 0,0080 0,0080 0,0081 1 1 14 2 635 2 621

Barbados 0,0090 0,0090 0,0079 -12 -12 -369 2 580 2 949

Malawi 0,0080 0,0120 0,0067 -44 -16 -1 750 2 181 3 931

Namibia 0,0070 0,0080 0,0067 -17 -5 -447 2 174 2 621

Jamaica 0,0080 0,0110 0,0060 -46 -25 -1 653 1 951 3 604

Jordan 0,0070 0,0080 0,0056 -30 -20 -787 1 834 2 621

Lao P.D.R. 0,0080 0,0130 0,0056 -57 -30 -2 443 1 816 4 259

Burkina Faso 0,0060 0,0060 0,0056 -7 -7 -150 1 816 1 966

Nepal 0,0070 0,0090 0,0052 -42 -25 -1 246 1 703 2 949

San Marino 0,0170 0,0590 0,0049 -92 -71 -17 738 1 591 19 329

Bolivia 0,0060 0,0080 0,0048 -40 -21 -1 067 1 554 2 621

Ghana 0,0060 0,0080 0,0043 -46 -28 -1 208 1 413 2 621

Macedonia F.Y.R 0,0040 0,0040 0,0041 2 2 18 1 328 1 310

Azerbaijan 0,0110 0,0270 0,0037 -86 -66 -7 638 1 208 8 846

St. Lucia 0,0040 0,0040 0,0037 -8 -8 -108 1 202 1 310

Georgia 0,0080 0,0080 0,0035 -56 -56 -1 486 1 135 2 621

Liberia 0,0040 0,0060 0,0035 -42 -13 -835 1 131 1 966

Djibouti 0,0040 0,0050 0,0034 -32 -15 -534 1 104 1 638

Zambia 0,0040 0,0060 0,0034 -44 -16 -867 1 099 1 966

Armenia 0,0070 0,0180 0,0034 -81 -52 -4 805 1 092 5 897

Congo D.R. 0,0060 0,0110 0,0033 -70 -45 -2 531 1 073 3 604

Antigua and B. 0,0040 0,0040 0,0032 -19 -19 -257 1 053 1 310

Yemen 0,0050 0,0110 0,0032 -71 -36 -2 558 1 046 3 604

Belize 0,0040 0,0050 0,0030 -39 -24 -645 993 1 638

Swaziland 0,0040 0,0070 0,0027 -61 -32 -1 403 890 2 293

Tanzania 0,0040 0,0050 0,0027 -46 -33 -759 879 1 638

Tajikistan 0,0040 0,0050 0,0026 -47 -34 -779 859 1 638

Vanuatu 0,0030 0,0030 0,0022 -25 -25 -270 730 1 000

St. Kitts and Nevis 0,0030 0,0050 0,0022 -56 -26 -917 721 1 638

Guinea 0,0030 0,0040 0,0022 -45 -27 -595 715 1 310

Fiji 0,0040 0,0050 0,0021 -57 -46 -939 699 1 638

Solomon Islands 0,0020 0,0030 0,0019 -35 -3 -368 632 1 000


~3769883.doc\GWe\01.07.05\12:28 98

Seychelles 0,0020 0,0030 0,0019 -38 -7 -393 607 1 000

Guyana 0,0030 0,0050 0,0018 -64 -39 -1 045 593 1 638

Guinea-Bissau 0,0020 0,0030 0,0018 -40 -10 -414 586 1 000

Moldova 0,0020 0,0030 0,0018 -41 -11 -422 578 1 000

Madagascar 0,0020 0,0040 0,0017 -56 -13 -742 568 1 310

Palau 0,0020 0,0030 0,0017 -43 -14 -439 561 1 000

Togo 0,0030 0,0040 0,0017 -58 -44 -762 548 1 310

Sierra Leone 0,0040 0,0080 0,0016 -80 -59 -2 089 532 2 621

Chad 0,0020 0,0030 0,0015 -49 -23 -497 503 1 000

Benin 0,0020 0,0050 0,0015 -69 -23 -1 136 502 1 638

Congo 0,0020 0,0050 0,0015 -71 -27 -1 163 475 1 638

Sao Tome & P. 0,0020 0,0040 0,0014 -64 -29 -846 464 1 310

Mauritania 0,0030 0,0050 0,0014 -73 -55 -1 196 442 1 638

Dominica 0,0020 0,0030 0,0013 -57 -36 -581 419 1 000

Central African Rep. 0,0020 0,0040 0,0012 -69 -38 -909 401 1 310

Mongolia 0,0040 0,0100 0,0012 -88 -70 -2 879 397 3 276

Mali 0,0020 0,0050 0,0012 -76 -40 -1 250 388 1 638

Equatorial Guinea 0,0020 0,0050 0,0012 -76 -41 -1 255 383 1 638

Burundi 0,0020 0,0030 0,0011 -62 -43 -626 374 1 000

Grenada 0,0020 0,0030 0,0011 -63 -44 -635 365 1 000

Kyrgyz Republic 0,0030 0,0070 0,0011 -85 -64 -1 940 353 2 293

St. Vincent & G. 0,0020 0,0030 0,0010 -68 -52 -684 316 1 000

Afghanistan 0,0030 0,0090 0,0009 -90 -70 -2 655 294 2 949

Samoa 0,0020 0,0050 0,0009 -82 -56 -1 349 289 1 638

Niger 0,0020 0,0050 0,0008 -83 -58 -1 362 276 1 638

Kiribati 0,0010 0,0030 0,0008 -74 -22 -745 255 1 000

Tonga 0,0020 0,0040 0,0008 -81 -62 -1 062 248 1 310

Gambia 0,0010 0,0030 0,0006 -80 -41 -806 194 1 000

Somalia 0,0030 0,0050 0,0006 -89 -81 -1 453 185 1 638

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