(Review of Regulatory Requirements for Digital I&C Systems

KAERI/TR-1942/2001

71 T7A|

(Review of Regulatory Requirements for Digital I&C Systems)

KAERT

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Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

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Summary

This work analyzed and summarized systematically various regulatory requirements that are

necessary to develop digital nuclear instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, especially safety

systems. The requirements are categorized into system, hardware, software, and quality

assurance aspects. This report provides the explanations of terms and abbreviations to help

readers understand. Furthermore, appendices of this report summarize the code and standards

corresponding to each principal regulatory requirement.

The hierarchical structure of regulatory requirements has Nuclear Energy Laws,

Enforcement Regulations of Nuclear Energy Laws, and Notifications of Ministry of Science and

Technology as utmost level requirements [In case of the US, 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, 10 CFR 50

Appendix B, 10 CFR 50.55a(h), 10 CFR 50.49, etc.]. The requirements include the Draft

Regulatory Guidelines for Digital I&C Systems [In case of the US, Standard Review Plan

(NUREG-0800), Regulatory Guide, Branch Technical Position (BTP)], KEPIC as standards [In

case of the US, IEEE Standards, IEC Standards, ISA, Military Standard, etc.], and various reports

issued by Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety [In case of the US, NUREG reports, EPRI reports,

etc.].

This report can be referred for the development of safety grade control equipments, plant

protection system, and engineered safety feature actuation system.

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AFW Auxiliary Feedwater

ALWR Advanced Light Water Reactor

ARI Alternate Rod Injection

ANS American Nuclear Society

ANSI American National Standards Institute

AOO Anticipated Operational Occurrences

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram

B&W Babcock and Wilcox

BISI Bypassed or Inoperable Status Indication

BTP Branch Technical Position

BWR Boiling Water Reactor

CDM Certified Design Material

CM Configuration Management

CE Combustion Engineering

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CL Combined License

COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf

CP Construction Permit

D-in-D&D Defense-in-Depth and Diversity

DAC Design Acceptance Criteria

DBE Design Basis Event

DC Design Certification

DCD Design Certification Document

DCS Data Communication System

EAS Essential Auxiliary Support

ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System

EELB Electrical Engineering Branch

EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory

EMEB Mechanical Engineering Branch

EMI Electromagnetic Interference

EPRI Electrical Power Research Institute

-1 -

ERF Emergency Response Facility

ESF Engineered Safety Features

ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System

FR Federal Register

FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report

GDC General Design Criteria

GSI Generic Safety Issue

HHFB Human Factors Assessment Branch

FECB Instrumentation and Controls Branch

HVAC Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning

FO Input/output

I&C Instrumentation And Control

ICS Integrated Control System

IEEE Institute of Electronic and Electrical Engineers

ISA International Society for Measurement and Control (formerly Instrument Society of

America)

HAAC Inspections, Tests, Analyses, And Acceptance Criteria

EC SR Loop Current Step Response

LSSS Limiting Safety System Setting

MCF Maximum Credible Fault

MCR Main Control Room

MOIV Motor-Operated Isolation Valve

NDL Nuclear Data Link

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

OBE Operating Basis Earthquake

OL Operating License

PAM Post-Accident Monitoring

PDS Pre-Developed Software

PEC Programmable Logic Controller

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment

PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report

PWR Pressurized Water Reactor

QA Quality Assurance

-2 -

RAI Request for Additional Information

RCS Reactor Coolant System

RHR Residual Heat Removal

RTD Resistance Temperature Detector

RTS Reactor Trip System

SAR Safety Analysis Report

SCM Software Configuration Management

SC SB Containment Systems and Severe Accident Branch

SE Special Event

SER Safety Evaluation Report

SECS Standby Liquid Control System

SPDS Safety Parameter Display System

SPLB Plant Systems Branch

SRA Software Risk Analysis

SRM Staff Requirements Memorandum

SRP Standard Review Plan

SRXB Reactor Systems Branch

SSAR Standardized Safety Analysis Report

SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake

Std Standard

swc Surge Withstand Capability

TMI Three Mile Island

TSB Technical Specifications Branch

USI Unresolved Safety Issue

v&v Verification and Validation

VDU Video Display Unit

-3 -

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[4 5)-5L(Accuracy)]

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The degree of freedom from error of sensor and operator input, the degree of exactness exhibited by an

approximation or measurement, and the degree of freedom from error of actuator output.

| fUK Activity Group)]

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A collection of software life cycle activities, all of which are related to a specific life cycle topic. Eight

activity groups are recognized in BTP HICB-14: planning, requirements, design, implementation,

integration, validation, installation, and operations and maintenance.

| f!4( Activity) |

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A group of related tasks [IEEE Std 1074].

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[411#Aging)]

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General process in which characteristics of a structure, system or component gradually change with time or

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use.

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An operational process deviating from normal operation which is expected to occur at least once during the

operating lifetime of a facility but which, in view of appropriate design provisions, does not cause any

significant damage to items important to safety nor lead to accident conditions.

1445(Avai lability) |

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A fraction of time during which a system is capable of performing its intended purpose

[ 114(Bandwidth)|

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Any substance placed around a waste package in a repository to serve as an additional barrier to: stabilize

the surrounding environment; restrict the access of groundwater to the waste package

[°44#4 lE(Class IE)]

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[###4 jt o'fCommon Mode Failures)]

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Failure of two or more stmctures, systems or components in the same manner or mode due to single event

or cause

| #44 (Completeness)]

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Those attributes of the design outputs that provide full implementation of the functions required of the

software. The functions which the software is required to perform are derived from (1) the general

functional requirements of the safety system, and (2) the assignment of functional requirements to the

software in the overall system design.

- 6 -

[4 4 4 (Concurrency)]

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[44*414 t*1 (Configuration Control Board)]

3334144 4# #4 3*7} ^ # #* 3§7]-s]-fil #4* #3^1* ^#o] ^ 4*#.The authority responsible for evaluating and recommending disposition of proposed changes.

| 4 4'3 4 (Configuration Management)]

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A discipline applying technical and administrative direction and surveillance to: identify and document the

functional and physical characteristics of a configuration item, control changes to those characteristics,

record and report change processing and implementation status, and verify compliance with specified

requirements [610.12],

13 34 (Consistency)]

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as a software functional characteristic) The degree of freedom from contradiction among the different

documents and components of a software system. Internal consistency denotes the consistency within the

different parts of a component; for example, a software design is internally consistent if no set of design

elements are mutually contradictory. External consistency denotes the consistency between one component

and another; for example, software requirements and the resulting code are consistent with one another if

there are no contradictions between the requirements and the code.

[34 If llf Context Sw itching) |

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-7 -

17'fM 7-]| -^Control Systems)]

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Those systems used for normal operation that are not relied upon to perform safety functions following

anticipated operational occurrences or accidents. The control systems evaluated using SRP Chapter 7 are

those which control plant processes having a significant impact on plant safety but are not wholly

incorporated into systems addressed by other SRP chapters.

| o' (Correctness)]

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The degree to which a design output is free from faults in its specification, design, and implementation.

There is considerable overlap between correctness properties and properties of other characteristics such as

accuracy and completeness.

| cn 7-]| °c! °] (Critical Section)]

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[45- #1 7-]| 5f Data Communication Systems) |

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Systems that transmit signals between systems and between components of systems. Data communication

systems may include analog and digital multiplexers as well as non-multiplexed transmission. Where such

systems are included in a design, they support one or more of the I&C systems.

-8 -

|Ii'4'<H(Dcadlock)|

(4el 7^4 534]##4 #44 ^(resource)# 44431 4# 4 43 4# #34]#7]- 7}43i 4# ###4#& 44444 44 #3 44 ## 4444

[ 4 H44(Deadline)]

44 444 4###3 #47}# 444444 444 #44 ##4# 444 #44

4444(time delay)# 4444 444## 444 4#44 4## ##4 ##44 4

4#44##*l 4444

14 # cM (Defense-in-Dcpth) |

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#44444 44# 44 3# 4# #4# ## 44# # #44 444 3#

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A hierarchical deployment of different levels of equipment and procedures in order to maintain the

effectiveness of physical barriers placed between a radiation source or radioactive materials and workers,

members of the public or the environment, in operational states and, for some barriers, in accident

conditions.

The application of more than one protective measure for a given safety objective, such that the objective is

achieved even if one of the protective measures fails.

[44 ## #4(Design Acceptance Criteria (DAC))|

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A set of prescribed limits, parameters, procedures, and attributes upon which the NRC relies in making a

final safety determination to support design certification when detailed design information is not available.

The DAC are part of the Tier 1 information.

[44 71 ##jt(Dcsign Basis Accidents)]

444#4-5i# 44# 444 44 #44 444 ### 44- 4#4 443 44444

## 4-314-43.4 #44## ###4# 4#4. #E4 4## 4# 444# 4#4#

-9 -

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Accident conditions against which a nuclear power plant is designed according to established design

criteria, and for which the damage to the fuel and the release of radioactive material are kept within

authorized limits.

| id7-1] 7 | -v:ARj(DcSign Basis Event)]

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| tl7-]| 9]-^-]'-A](Design Certification Document (DCD))]

431The master document that contains the information that is referenced by the design certification rule. The

DCD includes both the Tier 1 information that is certified by the design certification rule and the Tier 2

information that is approved by and supports the rule. The DCD is composed of the certified design

material and the non-proprietary version of the SAR, including all material incorporated by reference.

l iMI ?! J,B?(Dcsign Output) |

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Documents, such as drawings and specifications, that define technical requirements of structures, systems,

and components (ASME Std NQA-1, "Quatity Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility

Applications"). For software, design outputs are the products of the development process that describe the

end product that will be installed in the plant. The design outputs of a software development process

include software requirements specifications, software design specifications, hardware and software

architecture designs, code listings, system build documents, installation configuration tables, operations

manuals, maintenance manuals, and training manuals.

[4# 7}9r# j!?'fDetectable Failure)|

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- 10 -

[## 4 Z1 (Deterministic)]

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#4 444 ^5 "4###" 444 444 #4#4^ 455 44 #5^44

554445 4#4 # 444 444 44# 4, 4 44 444 #44 #44 44

44# 44444 4 4 #4

[4444 44(Deterministic Timing)]

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Timing is deterministic if the time delay between stimulus and response has a guaranteed maximum and

minimum.

[44 4471 (Device Driver)]

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[4 #(Discrete) 454444]

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#5# 44445 444, 444444, 5# 4445 44 4455b] #4#4

1454 45444#(Diverse Instrumentation and Control Systems)]

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4#(Atws) 5# 444-4# 444#5 ##44544 4444 545 554#4

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Those systems provided expressly for diverse backup of the reactor trip system and engineered safety

features actuation systems. Diverse I&C systems account for the possibility of common-mode failures in

the protection systems. Diverse I&C systems include the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS)

- 11 -

mitigation system as required by 10 CFR 50.62. For plants with digital computer-based instrumentation

and controls, diverse I&C systems may also include hardwired manual controls, diverse displays, and any

other systems specifically installed to meet the guidance of the Staff Requirements Memorandum on

SECY-93-087, “Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light-

Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs/’

| 444 (Diversity)]

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4444. 4 44 444(4, 4# 4# 4#4#, 44 44, #44 44) #4 21

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The presence of two or more redundant systems or components to perform an identified function, where

the different systems or components have different attributes so as to reduce the possibility of common

cause failure.

[4445.44 #44 (DMA)]

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444# 444 EO 4444.

[44 sKDocumcntation) |

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Information recorded about a specific life cycle activity. Forty-one activities are recognized in BTP HICB-

14. Documentation includes software life cycle design outputs and software life cycle process

documentation. A document may be in written or electronic format, and may contain text, illustrations,

tables, computer files, program listings, binary images, and other forms of expression. A document for an

activity may be divided into several individual entities.

[44 741 (DR)|

44 #444 4# 4444# s.4 444 44 a/d ##44 4444

[H4#H(Drift)]

- 12 -

454 #4#41 44 *44 45454 ^541 4^1* ##^14, 4 444 #4 #5 44 4444 #44 44.

14 Z1 #4 *(Dynamic Schedule) |

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4^44 44. 45* 44 4444 444 44444 ^45

[444 #5.544 Si# 4 4 4 (Embedded Software or Firmware)]

44 444 44# 44 4444 444 ###44.

Software that is built into (stored in read-only memory) a computer dedicated to a pre-defined task.

Normally, embedded software cannot be modified by the computer that contains it, nor will power failure

erase it; some computers may contain embedded software stored in electrically erasable programmable

read-only memory (EEPROM), but changing this memory typically requires a special sequence of actions

by maintenance personnel.

[### 4##4 (Engineered Safety Features)]

#711444# #44 54 zl 4#4 ###4-444 4# #4 4444 #4* #4

#444 #4444-# ##* 4# #4 #444 4##, 44 #4 4444.

Those I&C systems which initiate and control safety equipment which removes beat or otherwise assists in

maintaining the integrity of the three physical barriers to radioactive release (cladding, reactor coolant

pressure boundary, and containment).

|45(Errors)|

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544 5#(Mnrey& #4# 4 44 #544#^# 5 #4144 5^ 4## 5#

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| #5 55 4 f! 7-l| J4Essential Auxiliary Supporting (EAS) Systems)|

- 13 -

#44 #2# 4444 4#^1 f zg# # #2# # % 4#.

Those systems that enable the I&C systems important to safety to perform their functions. Heating,

ventilation and air conditioning systems; electrical power systems; and cooling water systems are typical

examples of essential auxiliary supporting systems.

|4#(Evcnt)|

54 2# 44 #444 44# 4 44 44 44, 44 n#, 2# 444 #444

2#& 2.4 #244 #4 44.

In the context of the reporting and analysis of events, an event is any unintended occurrence, including

operating error, equipment failure or other mishap, the consequences or potential consequences of which

are not negligible from the point of view of protection or safety.

[4-4-71 #(Event-based) 44 4 4]

4444 44# 44 4444 444444

|1'111# Exception) |

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|4#( Faults) |

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[2# 2# #4 (Failures)]

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- 14 -

Inability of a structure, system or component to function within acceptance criteria.

[JZ'S'S-E. 4 0(j^5:i'lz1(Failurc Mode and Effects Analysis)!

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#444

[4 4 4 (Firmware)]

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| 4 4 Z1 44 (Formal Methods)]

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Mathematically based methods for the specification, design, and production of software. Also includes a

logical inference system for formal proofs of correctness, and a methodological fiamework for software

development in a formally verifiable way [MOD-OO-55].

[7] 4 #4 (Functional Characteristic)]

7]# 51% 44% 44 #%*]

A trait or property of a design output that implements a functional requirement, a portion of a functional

requirement, or a combination of functional requirements. For software, functional characteristics include

accuracy, functionality, reliability, robustness, safety, security, and timing.

[7]vf if fifFunctional Requirement)|

31# 4 44#% #4# # 7]% #4% #4.

A requirement that specifies a function that a system or system component must be capable of performing

[IEEE Std 610.12], In the SRP, the term functional requirement includes design requirements, interface

requirements, performance requirements, and physical requirements.

[7 ] #4 (Functionality (as a Software Functional Characteristic))]

- 15 -

#hb444 44 #44444 4# ###.

Those operations which must be carried out by the software. Functions generally transform input

information into output information in order to affect the reactor operation. Inputs may be obtained from

sensors, operators, other equipment, or other software. Outputs may be directed to actuators, operators,

other equipment, or other software.

[4#(Gain) _#4|

44# ### 4 ## 44^5.44 ^(transition) #444 ^1444(ideal) 4# ###

#4 a# 4 ## 44 #444. o] #% a/d 4444 4#4#- 4444 444

4% 444.

[44 4-1-(Global Van able) I

###44 44 4444# 5-44 #31 # 4 444 ti]##(non-nested) S##4 4##

# 4# 4#^14

145.4 °l-'.(Handshake) |

4& 4 4a 444 44 4##7] 44 ^1#4# 4444- #44 ^M4 4 #4 44

44.A four-step process of linked acknowledgments between a sender and a receiver used to transmit data or

signals reliably. A handshake involves a signal that (1) initiates the transaction (from the initiating member

of a pair), (2) accepts the transaction (from the passive member), (3) terminates the transaction (from the

initiator), and (4) acknowledges the termination and readiness for another transaction (from the passive

member).

[4 4 #4 (Hazards Analysis)]

44 4#444 #4 #44 44### #4 #### #44# #44444 a

#4# 4^### #444 SM # 4# #4 4444# #44#, s# 4#^4 44# ##4 44 #44# ## # 4# ### #4 s# 44# #44#4 44

| 44 4 #(ldle Time) |

- 16 -

44 4 54 55 54447} ### #31 444444 A]##4# ## #444.

| : r^(Implementation (as a Software Life Cycle Process Planning Characteristic))]

4^ #A]^ #4^ ###7] #4 #5# 7]#^ 44 #A]^ %]]# ##.

Those characteristics of planning documents that describe the work necessary to achieve the purpose of the

planning documents. The implementation characteristics of software life cycle plans discussed in BTP

HICB-14 are: measurement, procedures, record keeping, and schedule.

| o' 5. ## (Information Hiding)]

4 5#2] 444445 ZL 5.-42] 4# #4# 7]## # 5444 45 4# 5.-4445 5.#2] #4444 rg#A]# ^5.2] A]^& #4s}5 ##2] 55.544 7#4444

[44 4 544 4 5.4 ^-(Information Systems Important to Safety)]

44 #4, 44454:4, #5 4444 #452] #4 4:4# 44 #4444 45.#

4'o"^Hr 44 44.

Those systems which provide information to the operators for the safe operation of the plant during normal

operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and accidents. The information systems important to safety

include those systems which provide information for manual initiation and control of safety systems. They

indicate that plant safety functions are being accomplished and provide information from which

appropriate actions can be taken to mitigate the consequences of anticipated operational occurrences and

accidents. During normal plant operation, the information systems important to safety provide information

on the normal status and the bypassed and inoperable status of safety systems.

| ^-'ut Integration)!

44 444 4# 55# 4447]# 44.

The process of combining system entities into an overall functioning system.

[44(kiterface)]

- 17 -

437} 4#4# ## 44}

A shared boundary across which information is passed [IEEE Std 610.12],

1444 #34 9:l-oL7-]| ^-(Interlock Systems Important to Safety) |

#4 A}^4 ###3* Â]7]7]T_|. 44 4## A}3 A] 7}##^ 34#4

4]## #4# #43 #4#4 #4 4#^}# 4# 4#

Those systems which operate to reduce the probability of occurrence of specific events or to maintain

safety systems in a state to assure their availability in an accident. These systems differ from protection

systems in that interlock system safety action is taken prior to or to prevent accidents.

144 4 3(Intcrrupt)|

44 334]37} #44# 444 4 #44 4# 44##.

The suspension of a process to handle an event external to the process.

|44 43 4 xl] 4 (Intenupt Latency)]

4#44#^4 o]ig OlB]^3 34# ## 44 444 3 34# 44^}# 44#4

4 #44^14-.

[#4 43 ###(Intenupt Handler)]

##44(OS)4 ## ^(routine) 4#. #4437} #### 44337} a4 ###

#443 ##43 4443 ZL #443# 4344 344 4# 44# 34# 444 #4.

14 4(Kcmcl)|

7}# 44433 a]>4 333414 ### 3W># #47)144 ####. ##433 4## #7]44-441 ##433 44-44 #34, 7]4 ####7} ## 4# ###

7>43 33A)M3#44 ##44- 443#44 44434] 4###.

[4 # (Low-pass) #4]

- 18 -

44444 444 544 4444 #3. #4445, 3. 44544 ^144

544 4554 44445 45 44 44

[a=5l5]ti]B(LSB) A4]

A/D 4#7]o] 444 4A44 454 55 A/D 447H]a] 554 A5 #44 545

A%514

| Ac] (Management (as a Software Life Cycle Process Planning Characteristic))]

TIM g-A^] 7]## 5545 #54 444 7p§- 554 4^ 5444 44 54.

Those characteristics of planning documents that are primarily significant to the managing of the project

activities described in the planning document. The management characteristics of software life cycle plans

discussed in BTPHICB-14 are: purpose, organization, oversight, responsibilities, risks, and security.

[4 A14 (Message)]

5541A444 4#4B 4 554 4544 5454A54 4545

| 5L| 4 (Monitor)]

443-44 444 445 454a 4 4B4 55444 % 444AS. 4544

5.5.7144 44 4544.

[444 A 4 (Multitasking)]

5 7^ o]^-4 ^^4 45a#4 44 #^44 44 SB 45 444- 4^4 7]##

54 5544

[ti] 4444 4y] (Non Safety-Related SSCs)]

444 #y] 444 4444 4yl# 444 4y]54 445 4444 55 y1444

44 #4 A15^4 A 444 A#4 W544 55 44444#4 455 54^15

44 55 4444

- 19 -

[yl 91 44 -^-(Non-Safety Systems)]

€44 ^ti] ^]A| €44444 *-€4444 4€€ 44^14 €43 4444 34

44€ 3444 ^14€4€, 3. 44€ 34^1 €43. 44 % €444444 444

4€€4.

| 74c!44(Normal Operation)]

44444 44€ 444*34(LC0) 444 #43 44, 4 *444, €43 44,

4444, 4*, 34, 44 ^ ^]4g. 4444 34# €43 444 €444

Operation within specified operational limits and conditions.

| €44 €43 A] 4(Nuclear Installation or Facility)]

€44€43 444 €44 €444 34 4434 444 434 #404]- "444

€ti]")€ 444 4344 44 €ti](44 '4 €44 €ti]")3 4444. #14 434,

44 4 44(Structures, Systems and Components; SSCs)* 3444

[444 4 4 (On-line Testing)]

44 71-4 44M 44 444 4^44 44.

Testing performed on an operable system.

PH4-434(Open-loop) 444444]

3 444 €4 434 43* €4 4444 44 4^4 444 44 43*

€4-4 3 43* 4443 *44 4444, 43 €4, 33, 43, 3e]3 €4 44

444 €44

[44 7p^(0perable)]

4# 4^1 44 €4 44* 4^€ 4 €3 34 €4 4€ €4 44 4€ 44*

4^ € 4 €4 4 3 4# 44 44 7]-^4€-3 €.

A system, subsystem, train, component, or device is operable when it is capable of performing its specified

safety function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency

-20 -

electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the

system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its specified safety function(s) are also capable

of performing their related support function(s).

| 34 *1] ^(Operating System)]

#1# 4443 #4, 331*4, 4 *4 34, ZL^JL 444 #4*

#3 3^1*3* 4343 3*34444.

[4 (Performance)]

4# ^ *4337]- *4# 7]]# ^ sM]A] ojCTg f 43

The degree to which a system or component accomplishes its designated functions within given constraints,

such as speed, accuracy, or memory usage [IEEE Std 610.12],

[33 3!(Performance Model)]

*34 3#44 3#]4, % 44(3331, #344 3), 3334 33 33*4

#134, #3344# 35]3 433 444 3333 *444. 33 313 344

4# 3344 34 343 44#7] 44 3344. 3# 313 #1344

343433 #3333 33 3443 33# 3 *3 333 433 4333 #33

43* 43 3#34o]34 33 44# 4# 4 3# 3434 4 3 44 33 3*4

433 433 #3 334 3 43 3## 3*1 3#3 333 33# 143#]#

433 443 #3 34333 4434 44 444 433*3 33#3 44.

133 3 4 (Periodic Tests)]

33 #4 4 34 7]33# 4347] 4# 44# #7]3 3143 3144.

Tests performed at scheduled intervals to detect failures and verify operability [IEEE Std 338]. Periodic

tests include surveillance tests.

[4 *3(Precision)]

44 33(quantity)3 4443 3] 443 4444 43* 4444, 3]* *4 2 4b]#

-21 -

4454 5 44# 445# 4a4] # # SM-.

[71 4 52 '#5]] 4 (Predeveloped Software (PDS))]

44 #4444, 4^4 5# ^144 4#444, 4#4 7]# 7]#4 5445$^# 555414.

Software that already exists, is available as a commercial or proprietary product, and is being considered

for use in a computer-based function [IEC Std 880, Supplement 1 draft]. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)

software is a subset of PDS.

[4ii#4 44 (Probabilistic Method)]

7HM 444 €54 ^€# 47]-4a, 4^] #44^ a4a €45#7]]7]#44 444# 4# 4€€ 44 €€454 a4 4# 445# 44 4 3§7}47] 4#4^ #4 4^4 4.

[55 A] 4 (Procedure)]

44 444 44a# #€47] 44 444# #44 #4(action#]#.

[5.5-4] 4( Process) |

#4414(08) 5M]#5]7]- €44# #4 7>## €#]5#44

| #-914 7-]| #(Quasi-safety Systems)]

###€5455 4^#] #€4# #4##, # €45#4##44(Aiws), #4,544445(station blackout) 5# 4 4 €-7] 4 #44#4 ##-#€#44 4444

44-55V4M 4# €^554 €#7]## 4#^1# 4]5€,#4^554#^]#

| f tx#15L9.7-]|#( Reactor Protection System)]

€4-5554#-# #44#-4 €#54 #44## #44# €45444#-# #44

44#^] 4#4]#-# 5444, €45 44 € #444444 4# 45## 444#

-22 -

44 ^ #4* 4444.

Those I&C systems which initiate safety actions to mitigate the consequences of design basis events. The

protection systems include the reactor trip system (RTS) and the engineered safety features actuation

system (ESFAS).

| 4X]5 o' :z| 7-l| #( Reactor Trip Systems (RTS))]

447]*A]-4^ 4447] ^]4 44*& 4#44 ?]]#.

Those I&C systems that initiate rapid control rod insertion to mitigate the consequences of design basis

events.

| 44 ?HRcal-timc) 45-4|

#44 A]^^. ^ 4544 444 444 4# #44 #*# 44^1#44# A]^vflo]4 a]a]7> Al^vflo] A]A)17]] A}y* 4*545,

4*}5# 7>y 44* 4*44 44*4 4** #541* *4 545 ZL

4444* A]Ai]7lK #44*. 444 4##4 55544* *7}5 ##5 4]*& *4]

4*. 4* 5554444 444 4° 1 ###* 444-5, 5554147} 44 zl

#54-4* 4444 444 444 445. 4444 44 444 444 444

4444 444(haid) 444 4444 -n-44(so&) 444 44445 4444 444

444 45^4 E)]5444 4**7] 444 #415 44-4 47} ^4 **#

444 45^4 45 45.4 454#1 44* 44-4445 444 4## 4444

4^44 4#

[44 5(Rehabihty)]

44 4444 444 54 444 444 44 *44 554 44# *444 #*4*

The degree to which a software system or component operates without failure. This definition does not

consider the consequences of failure, only the existence of failure.

[44 5 4 *7 ] 4 (Reliability Growth Techniques)]

444 *4# #4 #44 7^4# 44*5 4* 4455A] 445 ^]# ^

44444 4*4 5*444 45* *°1# 4*44.

-23 -

| 444 (Repeatability)]

### #4^4414 # 4# 44 ^b# 47}#3i (451 4^1 #4# 44# #4 ^4

44# 45.# ###.

| br^l] ^ (Resolution) |

4344 444 4 #5# # 44# 4#(detail)#44 ^444# 4 4 #4

17'f f l(Rcsourccs (as a Software Life Cycle Process Planning Characteristic))]

4M #4^] f ^^nj] 43# #3

The material resources necessary to carry out the work defined in the planning document. The resource

characteristics of software life cycle plans discussed in BTP HICB-14 are: budget, methods/tools,

personnel, and standards.

| 444 ?KResponse Time)]

4% #434414 #4# 44# 4# 4 44 44##3 444 #4# 4 4 #4

[444 (Robustness (as a Software Functional Characteristic))]

4#44 #43371- 444 4#4# 33^13 344M 4##41 44# 4

The ability of a software system or component to function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs or

stressful environmental conditions. This includes the ability to function correctly despite some violation of

the assumptions in its specification.

[44 4 4 414(Safe Shutdown Systems)]

#44# #4 44 44# W444 #444 44 4### 4# 4#.

Those systems which function to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition of the plant. The safe

shutdown systems include those I&C systems used to maintain the reactor core in a subchtical condition

and provide adequate core cooling to achieve and maintain both hot and cold shutdown conditions.

-24 -

14 #4 (Safety (as a Software Functional Characteristic))]

43# ### jl#444 #### 37-] # 3#4 a]5. SIB##

43# 3#.

Those properties and characteristics of the software system that directly affect or interact with system safety

considerations. The safety characteristic is primarily concerned with the effect of the software on system

hazards and the measures taken to control those hazards.

[###-#3 Si'-.Hi1-])4 (Safety-critical Software)|

3 S334## #4 S3 ### ##S ###4 #### #33 # 3 3#4 S3 44# 4## S3 44# 3#3 S4# 3 33 33.34444.

[##43( Safety Systems)]

#4434-# #4 S3 3 o]34 ###3 S3 ####7]31 3^4 43^14

19314 3 S3 4#447]3(Safety Function or Safety-Related Function)]

#47134# ## S3 3 o]34 434 #3 #3# B#43 7]3^14

(D ##-B#444##4(RCPB)# ###

® #43## ^ ####44# 4# 3#

® S#4^1#34 4# rg# 4##4 44# S3 S44 43# ##1 44 S34443 3#

[#### #ti] (Safety-Related SSCs)]

### #ta] 344 ##7]3 S3 #### 7]3# 3^4S1 #4# 3S#, 43 ^7] 7]1- ###4

[343(schedule)]

43 # #43 #4 34## 43 4#(job) S3 4sal ##43 #44.

-25 -

| -'>11 fr 7] (Scheduler) |

^^^9] f^]# 4^(job) #^#2, 44^#34 ^3.

| iV? Kb1 (Security) I

#^]9]# ^7]#-, 4]### 9b#4] #91# ##.

The ability to prevent unauthorized, undesired, and unsafe intrusions.

| Ll] f!#t 1 I(Seismic Classification I)]

9b#####(S§E) S# #f4] ^#9] 7]#^ f ##### #

#2#, 4lf-, ZUe)5L 7]7] 4] ## 9>###°H.

P>7l A1 ^(Self-test)]

7}7] 7}# 4] l]]#- a]# ##01 o|4=- #7]## #ti]4] ## A}?]## ^##4] 9]#

Ab7]## ## &#.

A test or series of tests, performed by a device upon itself. Self-test includes on-line continuous self

diagnostics, equipment-initiated self-diagnostics, and operator-initiated self-diagnostics.

[^Lf|AT-Jl(Severe Accidents)]

#4# hi# ### ^7]s]-7]n]- #A]^ ## ####9] #### ###

44 4W# XWH ^417]Â>jis. ô]l]^ £]###-.

[Abs jtf!fSingle Failure)|

7]7]7b 3. 7]^ ### ##^b# ARM4. ## Ab#43. 91# ###9l <44

7}A] 3I##4r ## 3.443. 4^r#4. ##### 9b# (1) <44 4#

7]7]9] ##34(4^ 7)7]^ 444 7]#4 443 7p§) (2) <44 4^4

7]7]9] 4#34<44 7]7]9r 444 7]^ 443 7^)0] ### ##9]

9b#7]^ 4444 7b## ## 37#^] c]]#^ 44# 443 #^##.

- 26 -

#4454 55 717141 4# ##345 #444 #54 #444# ##.

Single failure: A Mure which results in the loss of capability of a component to perform its intended safety

functions, and any consequential Mures which result from it.

Single Mure criterion: A criterion(or requirement) applied to a system such that it must be capable of

performing its task in the presence of any single Mure.

[55.5414 7H #5 4 #4 (Software Development Process Characteristic)]

#4544 5#4 % 555414 7%#34 #4 #454 #4. #44, ##4, 444 44 47M1 4#

A trait or property of a software development process design output that results from the implemenMon of

a design process, including completeness, consistency, correctness, style, traceability, unambiguity, and

verifiability.

[555414 4 4 #71 (Software Life Cycle)]

55434] 44# 4# 344 ##4 #5.

A project-specific, time-sequenced mapping of activities [IEEE Std 1074].

[44 Af<i(Spccial Events)]

##3#47]3(plantdesignbasis)4 #4 ##44, #47l3##(DBE)33 5444 #4#,

44453 554# 53 4435 5433 441 #4^15 ##34##5##(AIWS),

44, 55 544###(sMon blackout) 54#.

[4"4-7l #(State-based) 5445]

4444 444- 5544 54# 4##433 34# #34 444# 5##5

54454#

[44 54# SMc Schedule)]

53340]# 435## #4# 4 4545 #4#7] #4 45# 434 ##54#

#4 ###, 54## 4## 4 #54 ## 5#4 #445 34# 5#(rota) 4#

-27 -

44 #M]#4# 34^1 43]#4 43] 4 3# 333^4 ##43#4 #444 #314 ##43 4444# #>#]: #4. 44#3]#44 44# 444^1 3. 31344# #4# 444# 4#4 #4 #4 4## # 43, 43]#4 #34#^1 3# #-#^M143 #4# 444# 4## #-9-4 44 44#3]#44 44#-## #44 4#44 ##3#1 # 4 #4

[444 44 (Structures, Systems and Components Important to Safety)]

444444 4# 4414 444 44# #434 44444= 4444 44444^14

44443. 444 ##& 4# # 44 4444# #4* ##4 444 ^]#44^]#3 4441 ?]## #4431^14.

14444 44 (Structures, Systems and Components not Important to Safety)]

444444 44 444 444] 44# 44(4 444 44) 44 4441 43144 44# 314# #4# 44##.

| f'l:]4(Stylc (as a Software Functional Characteristic))]

431 #4#4 ## 4 %

The form and stmcture of a design output. Document style refers to the structure and form of a document. This has connotations of understandability, readability, and modifiability. Programming style refers to the programming language characteristics of the software.

[44 44 (Surveillance Tests)]

44] 4-4 44 #444 4#4# #4#4 4# #4#3] 444# 4#.

Tests conducted specifically to confirm compliance with technical specification surveillance requirements.

[31# #4 (System Logic)]

# 31 44-4 4# #4# 44#4 444 3##4(4], 2/3, 2/4 #)4l #4 ###3# #44# 4444.

[#5. 4 #(Target Machine)]

-28 -

[Bflâ(Task)]

^ sMl ^ ##. ^4^1 ^-4

iazffi 1 71^0} ^6| <H(woric) 7^^Hr ^7>7lol ^ô]l]-

The smallest unit of work subject to management accountability. A task is a well-defined work assignment

for one or more project members [IEEE Std 1074].

[AMAj (Testability)]

Al^ _9_3M ^#^7]# #^s}7] 4#M Al^ ^ ^ #^^7] ^]# ô]

A1#E]^

(1) The degree to which a requirement is stated in terms that permit establishment of test criteria and

performance of tests to determine whether those criteria have been met [610.12], (2) The degree to which a

system or component facilitates the establishment of test criteria and the performance of tests to determine

whether those criteria have been met [IEEE Std 610.12],

1 ^Ê]ca. ^ ê]o]l]-

[Tier 1]

^7|]* &#E]^ 7g7|] ^ ^tAHerl fr ^7|] ^

^2)0] ijjfy} EM ^ ^^6]] 2]#Ajn> tô] 7^h

The design-related information contained in the DCD that constitutes the certified standard design. This

information identifies the scope of the standard design and consists of the certified design descriptions, the

IIAAC, the site parameters, and the interface requirements. Tier 1 material becomes part of the design

certification rule and may be changed only by rule-making.

[Tier 2]

^M%A14 ifsN- Tier 1 it 7]] ^ W.

The design-related information contained in the DCD that is not Tier 1 information. It supports the

certification of a standard design by providing additional details about the proposed implementation. The

Tier 2 information generally consists of the SAR with the proprietary information removed for purposes of

rule-making. Although Tier 2 information is not certified by the design certification rule, it consists of

-29-

"those matters resolved in connection with the issuance or renewal of a design certification" within the

meaning of 10 CFR 52.63(a)(4). Tier 2 material is approved by the design certification rule, but is not part

of the rule. Tier 2 material may be changed by a process similar to that described in 10 CFR 50.59, unless

designated as Tier 2* in the SER.

[Tier 2*]

NRC SER 4 4 Tier 2 *>3.2]

A subset of Tier 2 material that the NRC SER and DCD for the standardized plant design approval

identifies as requiring NRC approval prior to modification or change by the applicant/licensee.

[fiM 4 (Tuning (as a Software Functional Characteristic))]

7|]#o] a]-S$M aMM 4# f

The ability of the software system to achieve its timing objectives within the hardware constraints imposed

by the computing system being used.

|J r Z1 7 By 4 (Traceability)]

^M^r7] #3]^-2] z]- ^7} o]^ ^]o] #3]^-6(] MF^5]o] %^7]-*

The degree to which each element of one life cycle product can be traced forward to one or more elements

of a successor life cycle product, and can be traced backward to one or more elements of a predecessor life

cycle product.

[aM A tgf]

-fM A 7]ô] trM5]o] $Zx] ^ ^ 44^]*

44BrB] 4hL°H ^^]7]Â>j/(DBA) 44 9}47]^ #4#7]

44^] ^^.s]- ^7]^

#4^7] ^]sM ^n]sM, P]^^- fi]4- 7]^]] 7]^-

4-Mvr

-30 -

[#4 B 44]

#4 B 44# #4# 444 #4 iiAjEjj! 4^]# #44# 43# 4 #4#

4444^14. #43 447]### 4#3 44, 3# 44, 4434444# 4444

444# 444 -n"xl7l#(tid3"AT4r 4# 444#)# 3444.

[#4 c 44]

#4 c 44# 44# 44(banier)4 4433 4##44#^1 4#4# 4# 3.44-4

444 44 7]#4 3# 444 44 44# 444# 4## 4 #4# 444444 444 444 444# 44# 443 444, #4444 44444 444#44

[#4 d 44]

#4 d 44# 4 44444 4444444 #4 3# #4 44# 444# 4## 4#4# 4444#°14 °1 44## #444 43 44# 4444 444 444 #34 4 4## 4444] 4## 4 43# 4444

[#4 e 44]

4# E 44# 44#/4 #44 #### 4443 3# 4# 4## 44433 3§7M-4 4# ^34 4444^14

[ti] jiLe_4 (Unambiguity)]

4444 #4 3# 4#^1 34 444 44# 4# 444 44# 4# 43

The degree to which each element of a life cycle product, and of all elements taken together, have only one

interpretation.

[ti] 44 #3( Unbounded loop)]

44 444 4444 43 444# #34 3334 44 #3.

The term used to describe the situation in which a programming language control structure called a loop

has no upper limit to the number of times it may execute.

-31 -

| 44 4 # ^(Verification and Validation)]

### 3# 4# j44(component)°11 41# 444 ###31 4444 4 7H#4## #44 4S. 44 #4141# ### #4 B4 344 44#4#4 3Z#H ## #4# 34 4#^47} 444 34# #4^1##* 44^1# #444 #4# #4^4 4# 44 ^ 4# #### 4444 ^41 ##4 4# ### 4"# 4 4# #41 444f# ##41# #44# #^41 44 ###4 44 #^14

The process of determining whether the requirements for a system or component are complete and correct,

the products of each development phase fulfill the requirements or conditions imposed by the previous

phase, and the final system or component complies with specified requirements [IEEE Std 610.12],

[# -7f'-|4Walkthrough)|

#4144 #^tz4M7} ### 44# #3# #4 ##A]#o] ## 4 3#IB# 44 44B#4 44 4# 7i#

A static analysis technique in which a designer or programmer leads members of the development team

and other interested parties through a segment of documentation or code, and the participants ask questions

and make comments about possible errors, violation or development standards, and other problems. [IEEE

Std 610.12]

[4# 4 #o 11 i(Watchdog Timer)|

S#4# 4#44 #4] #44# #44# 44## 4 #4

A form of interval timer that is used to detect a possible malfunction and is typically arranged to cause a

hardware restart if not reset periodically by software.

[#2444 (Wordlength)]

4if#4l# 44# #4 4# 444# #4] A}### #44 43 7%#44

#4#]# #314# [89,90,91]

-32 -

4 1 # ^

4# 44-4444(44) 4^3-3 ####### 3. 44^4 3f#4 7]#4

43*33 #4 3! #433 4#4 ^443. 44*44 4* 43. 44 44#444 43# 4-433. 44^M 3 444 4444 44 43 44 44 #4## #4-43 44 444 44443 444 ^44 33* 4^1^14 444 ####### 444# 4434, 444 434 4-44 #433 4# 44 444## 44# 4## 4#43 44 ##44i92].

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(Codes)

10CFR 50.55am) 10CFR50AI 10CFR SOBGDCs II (giBSI

I10CFR52ANSI/IEEE 7-4.32(ljâ),IEC 60880 (SW)

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(RegulatoryGuidance)

STANDARD REVIEW PLAN (SRP) Chapter 7BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION (BTP)-14 f 17, 18(20) 21)

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Level 2:

(Industrial /Eng. Std)

NUREG/CR-6463 Level 3:

Level 4:

Level 5.'Submittals

IEEE 1028-1998

IEEE 1016-1987

IEEE 1016.1-1993

IEEE 1008-1987

IEEE 829-1983

(Anomalies SrIEEE 1044-1993

IEEE 1074-1997

IEEE 1059-1993

IEEE 830-1993

KINS

1-14

IEEE 982.1&2-1988 SW Measures)

IEEE 577-1976

IEEE 352-1987^4 xis]ASME/ANSI NQA-1&2

IEC 60880-1986 &2000sw)

ERRI TR-106439-1988(^jPXjJ212i 12i±MD

EPRI NP-5652

IEEE 1058.1-1997

IEEE 983-1986(§i agisms)

IEEE 730.1-1998

IEEE 1042-1987xia)

IEEE 1012-1986

IEEE 1228-1993

IEEE 828-1998

pi 4-1] 443. 447]]# 44 4444

441 447114 7flH 117]4 10 CFR 50 & 52, NUREG-0800 SRP(Standard Review Plan)

Chapter 7 [101], Branch technical Position(BTP)-14, IEEE Std 603-1991, IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-19934 4±£

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[ 1] 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants/’

GDC 1, “Quality Standards and Records.”

GDC 2, “Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena.”

GDC 4, “Environmental and Missile Design Bases.”

GDC 13, “Instrumentation and Control.”

GDC 18, “Inspection and Testing of Electric Power System.”

GDC 19, “Control Room.”

GDC 20, “Protection System Functions.”

GDC 21, “Protection System Reliability and Testability."

GDC 22, “Protection System Independence."

GDC 23, “Protection System Failure Modes."

GDC 24, “Separation of Protection and Control Systems."

GDC 25, “Protection System Requirements for Reactivity Control Malfunctions."

GDC 29, “Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences."

[2] 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel

Reprocessing Plants.”

[ 3] 10 CFR 50.49, “Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear

Power Plants.”

[4] 10 CFR 50.55a(h), “Codes and Standards - Protection and Safety systems.”

[ 5] 10 CFR 52. "Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certification; and Combined Licenses for Nuclear

Power Plant."

[ 6] ANSFANS 51.1-1983, “Nuclear Safety Criteria for the Design of Stationary Pressurized Water

Reactor Plants.”

[ 7] ASME NQA-1-1997. "Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications."

-79 -

[ 8] NP-5652. "Guideline for the Utilization of Commercial Grade Items in Nuclear Safety Related

Applications." Final Report, Electric Power Research Institute, June 1988.EPRI TR-102323-R1,

"Guidelines for Electromagnetic Interference Testing in Power Plants," Revision 1, January 1997.

[9] EPRI Topical Report TR-106439. "Guideline on Evaluation and Acceptance of Commercial Grade

Digital Equipment for Nuclear Safety Applications." Electric Power Research Institute, October 1996.

[10] Generic Letter 88-20. "Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities." November

23,1988.

[ 11] Generic Letter 89-02. "Actions to Improve the Detection of Counterfeit and Fraudulently Marketed

Products." 1989.

[12] Generic Letter 91-05. "Licensee Commercial-Grade Procurement and Dedication Programs." 1991.

[13] IEC 61000-2,1999, “Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 2: Environment."’

[14] IEC 61000-3,2000, “Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 3: Limits."’

[15] IEC 61000-4,2000, “Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)- Part 4: Testing and Measurement

Techniques."’

[16] IEC 61000-5,2000, “Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 5: Installation and Mitigation

Guidelines."’

[17] IEC 61000-6,2000, “Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 6: Generic Standards."’

[ 18] IEC Std 60880. "Software for Computers in the Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Stations." IEC

Publication, 1986.

[19] IEC Std 60880, Supplement 1 Draft. "Software for Computers in the Safety Systems ofNuclear

Power Stations." IEC Publication, October 1996.

[20] IEC Std 60880, Supplement 2 Draft. "Software for computers important to safety for nuclear power

plants - Part 2: Software aspects of defense against common cause failures, use of software tools and

of pre-developed software.

[21] ANSFIEEE Std 279-1971. "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

[22] IEEE Std 308-1991. "Standard Criteria for Class IE Power System for Nuclear Power Generating

Stations."

[23] IEEE Std 323-1983. "IEEE Std. for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating

Station."

-80-

[24] IEEE Std 336-1985. “IEEE Std. Installation, Inspection, and Testing Requirements for Power,

Instrumentation, and Control Equipment at Nuclear Facilities/’

[25] IEEE Std 338-1987. "IEEE Std. Criteria for the Periodic Surveillance Testing of Nuclear Power

Generating Systems."

[26] IEEE Std 344-1987. "IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class IE

Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Station/’

[27] IEEE Std 352-1987. "IEEE Guide for General Principles of Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power

Generating Station Safety Systems."

[28] IEEE Std 379-2000. "IEEE Std. “Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power

Generating Station Safety Systems".

[29] IEEE Std 383-1974. “IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables, Field Splices, and

Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations/’

[30] IEEE Std 384-1992. "IEEE Std. Criteria for Independence of Class IE Equipment and Circuits".

[31] IEEE Std 420-1982. “IEEE Standard Design and Qualification of Class IE Control Boards, Panels,

and Racks Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations/’

[32] IEEE Std 473-1985. “IEEE Recommended Practice for Electromagnetic Site Survey."

[33] IEEE Std 572-1985. “IEEE Standard for Qualification of Class IE Connection Assemblies for

Nuclear Power Generating Stations/’

[34] IEEE Std 577-1976. “IEEE Standard Requirements for Reliability Analysis in the Design and

Operation of Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations/’

[35] IEEE Std 603-1991. “IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating

Stations."

[36] IEEE Std 610.12-1990. “IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology/’

[37] IEEE Std 627-1980. "Standard for Design Qualification of Safety Systems Equipment used in

NPGS".

[38] IEEE Std 730-1990, “IEEE Standard for Software Quality Assurance Plans/’

[39] IEEE Std 741-1997. "Standard Criteria for the Protection of Class IE Power Systems and Equipment

in NPGS".

[40] IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993. "IEEE Standard for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power

Generating Stations."

-81 -

[41] IEEE Std 730.1-1989. “Standard for Software Quality Assurance Plans."

[42] IEEE Std 828-1983. “Standard for Software Configuration Management Plans/’

[43] IEEE Std 829-1983. “Standard for Software Test Documentation/’

[44] IEEE Std 830-1984. "Guide for Software Requirements Specifications/’

[45] IEEE Std 934-1987. "Requirements for Replacement Parts for Class IE Equipment in Nuclear

Power Generating Stations."

[46] IEEE Std 982.1-1988. “Standard Dictionary of Measures to Produce Reliability SWT

[47] IEEE Std 982.2-1988. “Guide for the Use of IEEE Standard Dictionary of Measures to Produce

Reliable Software/’

[48] IEEE Std 983-1986. "Guide for Software Quality Assurance Planning/’

[49] IEEE Std 1008-1987. “Standard for Software Unit Testing/’

[50] IEEE Std 1012-1992. “Standard for Software Verification and Validation Plans/’

[51] IEEE Std 1016-1987. “Recommended Practice for Software Design Descriptions/’

[52] IEEE Std 1016.1-1993. “Guide to Software Design Descriptions/’

[53] IEEE Std 1028-1988. “Standard for Software Reviews and Audits/’

[54] IEEE Std 1033-1985. “Recommended Practice for Application of IEEE Std 828 to Nuclear Power

Generating Stations/’

[55] IEEE Std 1042-1987. "Guide to Software Configuration Management/’

[56] IEEE Std 1044-1993. “Standard for Classification of Software Anomalies/’

[57] IEEE Std 1058.1-1987. “Standard for Software Project Management Plans/’

[58] IEEE Std 1059-1993. "IEEE Guide for Software Verification and Validation/’

[59] IEEE Std 1074-1995. “IEEE Standard for Developing Software Life Cycle Processes."

[60] IEEE Std 1228-1993. “Standard for Software Safety Plans/’

[61] ANSMEEE C62.45-1987, "Guide on Surge Testing for Equipment Connected to Low-Voltage

AC Power Circuits".

[62] MIL-STD-461C. 1986, "Electromagnetic Emissions and Susceptibility Requirements for the

Control of Electromagnetic Interference;’ DoD.

[63] MIL-STD-461D. 1993, "Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference Emissions

-82-

Requirement for

and Susceptibility," DoD.

[64] MIL-Std-461C Notice 2, "Electromagnetic Emission and Susceptibility

Control of Electromagnetic Interference."

[65] MIL-Std462 ENT Notice 5, "Measurement of Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics."

[66] Regulatory Guide 1.22. “Periodic Testing Protective System Actuation Function." U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, 1972.

[67] Regulatory Guide 1.28, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Design and Construction), 1985.

[68] Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification, 1978.

[69] Regulatory Guide 1.30. “Quality Assurance Requirements for the Installation, Inspection, and

Testing of Instrumentation and Electric Equipment."’ 1972.

[70] Regulatory Guide 1.47, "Bypassed and inoperable status indication for Nuclear Power Plant

Status indication for Nuclear Power Plant safety systems." U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

1973.

[71] Regulatory Guide 1.53, "Application of the single-failure criterion to Nuclear. Power Plant

Protection System." U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1973.

[72] Regulatory Guide 1.62, “Manual initiation of protective actions."’ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission. 1973.

[73] Regulatory Guide 1.75, "Physical independence of Electric System." U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission. 1978.

[74] Regulatory Guide 1.89. "Environmental Qualification of Certain Electrical Equipment Important to

Safety for Nuclear Power Plants." U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1984.

[75] Regulatory Guide 1.100. "Seismic Qualification for Electrical and mechanical Equipments in

Nuclear Power Plants." U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1988.

[76] Regulatory Guide 1.118, "Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection System.", U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission. 1995.

[77] Regulatory Guide 1.152. "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power

Plants." Rev. 1. Office ofNuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

January 1996.

-83-

[78] Regulatory Guide 1.153. "Criteria for Power, Instrumentation, and Control Portions of Safety

Systems." Rev. 1. Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

1996.

[79] Regulatory Guide 1.168. "Verification, Validation, Reviews and Audits for Digital Computer

Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants." Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1997.

[80] Regulatory Guide 1.169. "Configuration Management Plans for Digital Computer Software Used in

Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear


[81] Regulatory Guide 1.170. “Software Test Documentation for Digital Computer Software Used in

Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants,'’ Office ofNuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear


[82] Regulatory Guide 1.171. “Software Unit Testing for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety

Systems ofNuclear Power Plants," Office ofNuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, 1997.

[83] Regulatory Guide 1.172. “Software Requirements Specifications for Digital Computer Software

Used in Safety Systems ofNuclear Power Plants," Office ofNuclear Regulatory Research, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1997.

[84] Regulatory Guide 1.173. “Developing Software Uife Cycle Processes for Digital Computer Software

Used in Safety Systems ofNuclear Power Plants." Office ofNuclear Regulatory Research, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1997.

[85] Regulatory Guide 1.180. “Guidelines For Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency

Interference in Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems,'’ Office ofNuclear Regulatory

Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 2000.

[86] Safety Evaluation by the Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation. "EPRI Topical Report TR-106439."

May 1997.

[87] SECY-91-292. "Digital Computer Systems for Advanced Light-Water Reactors." September 1991.

[88] SECY-93-087. "Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced

Light-Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs." July 15,1993.

[89] IAEA Safety Glossary, April 2000.

[90] 4# ‘JMtN 5

-84-

(4), 2001.

[91] 4422, "44 4444 JIA1S]£ 222214 7H# 91 24432 7]#a] 3I%" '94

#43##23 222, 4424-2 33, 1994.

[92] Stephen J. Wilkozs, Consulting Report for EMLRFI Qualification, 1998

[93] Eric J. Lee, "Understanding of EMLRFI and Digital Updates," Proceedings of 96 ANS Topical

Meeting On Nuclear Instrumentation, Control and Human-Machine Interface Technology, 1996.

[94] NUREG/CR-5941, ORNI/TM-12221, "Technical Basis for Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-

Frequency Interference in Safety-Related I&C Systems," April 1994.

[95] Draft DG-1029, 1998, "Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency

Interference in Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems."

[96] NUREG/CR-6431, ORN1/FM-13158, "Recommended Electromagnetic Operating Envelopes for

Safety-Related I&C Systems in Nuclear Power Plants," 1997

[97] NUREG/CR-6436, ORNL/TM-13171, "Survey of Ambient Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency

Interference Levels in Nuclear Power Plants," 1996.

[98] 4243, 434 29 2 4 3[99] 4243, 433333333 3,42

[100] 4243 423423-4 199741 2,199742 2,1996-78 2,1996-79

[101] USNRC, NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan;’ Chapter 7, July 1997.

[102] 233447]#2, "344432 44347]27H2 (2234 447M2 22 2

23347134 (34 43- 43 334^) 2444 (m-2)r KiNS/GR-217,

20012 2 2.

[103] NUREG/CR-6463. "Review Guidelines on Software Languages for Use in Nuclear Power Plant

Safety Systems:’

[104] USNRC/CR-6421. "A Proposed Acceptance Process for Commercial Off-the-Shelf(COTS)

Software in Reactor Applications: ’

[105] 334#3 24, 232 442 4444434 34 44(4), 2001

-85 -

10 CFR Appendix A

♦ 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants."(#54*45 *4*711-9.4)

1. 55 Code & Standards

2. (Scope)

3. 4 5 —: General design criteria

4. 44 7} .3-5

• GDC 1, “Quality Standards and Records/’

554 #544 5S#, 4# 4 4S43## 5^# 444#4 53S4 5-0-55 554 #44*# 7M3. 54, 45 5 45445 54.

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• GDC 18, “Inspection and Testing of Electric Power System. ”

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• GDC 19, "Control Room.”

44*4# 444444# #43* 44541 #4541 5s 444 4# #4 #31 44# 44# 44 44 #444# 44# 45# 447}445 #5.

• GDC 10, “Protection System Functions.”

334## 53.#^#; 445s 44 *545# 4544 43 #4 4 #4# *4 4s# 55 #4.

Appendix-1

10 CFR Appendix A

GDC 21, “Protection System Reliability and Testability.

44 4#4 ### #4# # 4## #4 #4# 4 44 # #### 4#44 #4. 4# 4#3i4-7ie4 ### #4 4%

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444 4444 44 44 ^ 44 (71-4)44 4#44 44 ^4 4 444 4^3. 314444 44444 44.GDC 24, “Separation of Protection and Control Systems. ”

M4#4 444 444# *11 #4 314444 444 M4# ^44 4171444 44# 44#, 44# ^ 44#4 44# 4 4#4 44444 44444 #4.GDC 25, “Protection System Requirements for Reactivity Control Malfunctions.”

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#^4144 41#- 44 44 44# 4# 44 ### 3144 44 4## ### # 4## #4444 #4.

Appendix-2

10 CFR 50 Appendix B

♦ 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants” (44# #4:4: 4 3)4#4#4 ##5L#7]t)


• 10 CFR 50.34, “Contents of Applications : Technical Information’’

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• Reg. Guide 1.28 “QA Program Requirements (Design and Construction)

• Reg. Guide 1.30 “QA Requirements for Installation, Inspection, and Testing of

Instrumentation and Electric Equipment”

• ASMENQA-1, 1997 “QA Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications”

2. 44(Scope)

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3. Keyword: Quality Assurance, Quality Control, Quality Assurance Requirement, Design

Control, Audit, Inspection, Corrective action, Certificate

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iv. 44444#

Appendix-3

10 CFR 50 Appendix B

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7-1# 44, #44 ## 34* ^

Vll. 4444, 7] 7] # 44# *#

### #7} # % ### 4** 3§7% 4#A} ^4 ^ ##, 44

#& # 3S 4 3§7} ## ##

viii. 44, 44 3 7] 7] 2] Alti# ^

^##3. #4# 44*4 4#^31, *4^* ^#7] 44# #4*3*

44

ix. 43*4#4 * 444 4*4 44* 444 4*4 #4 * 444* #44

#* 4M 4*

X. Â}

44 * 344 4* #4## ^ Â}##^ #*4 A4 = #61] ## #*

xi. ###^

#4 # 4g.^*4 *## 4*4 *##-# # 7]#^] ## A}## 4*

xii. 4* * *### #44* * *#*-#4 #4 # *,a*4 ## A}#^ 4*

xiii. #|#, 4# ##

444 *44 ## A}#^ **

xiv. *A% *# # **##

#A}# A]#^| 4^##- # A]#, *#*"^ &A]6]] ## A}#^ **

XV. *## #4, f# # 7] 7]

4*4 #4, 4# * 4 7] 3 #4 A}** **

xvi. A] ;g 2^7]4*4 4 Aj-#<4] tg|# Al^S7ll- **

xvii. 4*5-4 7] 4

44 4* 4##3 44 4 444 ## A}#^ **

xviii. 4a>4*5.4^M4 44 44, *&* 471#- 4# #AM] ## **

Appendix-4

10 CFR 50.49

♦ 10 CFR 50.49, “Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plant (# 4@| 444] # 4.7]

7}7}$] 7]7]^)


2. 4 4 (Scope)

44 3(5^ 7| 7l 7| 7| # A] til

3. Keywords: Environmental qualification

4.

(a) 44^#444 444 vr 4# 7] 7]##

-> 4 secdon (b)4 #^#7] 44# 543.^# 44-4 44

4447} 4^ #4 ##.

(b) 44 °1] 44# 7] 7] 4 (Safety-related Electric Equipment)

(1) Safety-related Electric Eq.(4444 4 7| 7] 7])

-> 4 7] 7] 4 444 443!(Design Basis Accident) 444 444

44# 4^# f 444 44.

- The integrity of reactor coolant pressure boundary

(4^4444 444 44)

- The capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown

condition

(44-g. 444 4444^4# 4444 44 44)

- The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequence of accident that could

result in potential offsite exposure comparable to 10CFR100 guideline

( 10 CFR 100 4 10 CFR 50.43(a)(1)# 4^44 444 44 4#4

444 9] 7j 4 444] 44 7] 4)

* Design Basis -7/ 44 •' condition of normal operation including anticipated

operational occurrences, design basis events, external events and natural

phenomena for which the plant must be designed to ensure functions 1)~3)

#4^4 #4)4 # f 444 4444 44

Appendix-5

10 CFR 50.49

(2) Non-safety related Electric equipment whose failure under postulated

environment conditions (Th'S si 44 4*11 tt] 444 444 7] 7] *1 Jl4)

-> prevent satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions in subparagraphs (i)

~'(ii) of paragraph (b) (1) of this section by the safety-related equipment0!

(b)(l)4 (i),(n)*l 44444 4^444 444444 44.)

(3) Certain post-accident monitoring equipment

(45! 447171)

(c) Requirement for (445-344: 44)

(1) dynamic and seismic qualification of electric equipment important to safety

(444 4-9-4 47171714 ^4 ^ 44 44)

(2) protection of electric equipment important to safety against other natural

phenomena and external events

(4# 4444 4 44 4-34*11 4444 44*11 444 447144 M)

(3) environmental qualification of electrical equipment to safety located in a mild

environment are not included within the scope of this section.

(mild 44*11 444 44444 44444 4 444 44*114 &444 44)

4 7 | 4 mild 44 44 44 -> an environment that would at no time be

significantly more severe than the environment that would occur during normal

plant operation, including anticipated operational occurrence.

(41444 43* #43 444444*11 #4# 4 44

34- 4 44-4 444 44444 #4)

(d) The applicant or licensee -> shall prepare a list of electric equipment important to

safety covered by this section

(4444 4444 4 34*11 344 44*11 434 4?1 741 *1

444 4444 44)

The applicant or licensee -> include the information in paragraphs (d)(1),(2)and (3)

of this section for this electric equipment important to safety in qualification file

(34, 4*J4 4 4444 44 44*11 44*11 434 7l7H 44 4

Appendix-6

10 CFR 50.49

(d)(l),(2)(3)4R %1M#

The applicant or licensee -> keep the list and information in the file current and

retain the file in the auditable form for the "entire period" during which the covered

item is installed in the nuclear power plant or is stored for the future use to permit

verification that each item of electric equipment is important to safety meet the

requirement of paragraph (j) of this section

(^4 ^ 4# ^

RRR-7} ^_^Rr SRS. ttRô) tb4)

(1) The performance specification under conditions existing during and following

design basis accident

(^71171^43. ^7]7]7]^]

(2) The Voltage, frequency, load and other electrical characteristic for which the

performance specified in accordance with paragraph (d)(1) of this section can be

ensured

(£ M (d)(l)4 ilR^Rr 7]^^ cfl-0- 7l3lol

f #)

(3) The environmental conditions, including temp and pressure, humidity, radiation,

chemical and submergence at a location where the equipment must perform as

specified in accordance with paragraph (d)(1) and (2) of this section

(£ M (d)(l)4 iZ^Rr 71^4] R7]7]7] 7\ RRR

^7]7l7l^| ### f #4)

(e) The electric equipment qualification program must include

(#717171^ ^ ^ #4)

(1)

The time-dependent temperature and pressure at a location of the electric equipment

important to safety -> established for the most severe design basis accident

(%M4 7]7]^1 ^^^^7} 7}^- n}

^ ^^l7le43.4RS 7] 7]^|

(2) es

(3)

-> must be at least as severe as that resulting from the most limiting mode

Appendix-7

10 CFR 50.49

of plant operation

444 7>^T- 44.44 S.H-2] #3}# JIB^}0! S|44 #3}

4# 7}^ 4 7] 4# ^1)

(4) 44^

-> must be based on the type of radiation

-> the total dose expected during normal operation over the installed life of the

equipment and the radiation environment associated with the most severe design

basis accident during and following which the equipment is required to remain

functional including the radiation.

(4 7] 4 #4 7] 444 #4 ^

44# 4# #4)

(5) Aging

Equipment qualified by test must be preconditioned by natural or

Artificial(accelerated) aging to its end-of-installed life conditions.

(444 44 4^4 7 ] 7 ] 4 4444 4444 44 4 4

4# 3# 71^6}

iK All significant type of degradation which can have an effect on the

functional capability of the equipment

(444 444 3# 4% # 4 44!* 3.^)

On-going qualification0! additional-life 7} 4'4 4'4'4 /t g- 30) 44 44

4 -> at the end of this designated life 4| -> replace or refurbished 41 o |: 4

(7] 7] 44 414 5L4l4l0> a-)

(6) Submergence(4 4)

(if subject to being submerged)

(4*7} 44-4 °]# jib!)

(7) Synergetic Effects (44r 4-§-)

34," 4, 4 ^#4 471444 ^41#

4*4 *# 4 34"

(8) Margins

Margins -> unquantified, uncertainty's 3 4. 4. the effects production

variations and inaccuracies in test instruments

(4* 414^1 ^ #3M ^#4# 3.4)

Appendix-8

10 CFR 50.49

°1 4 15: 4 *** -> °1 4 4 conservatism °1 4 44 margin* 26* o}4 4

quantified 44 *44, local 44^444 4*4* *44 *7}4*g. Jl440> *4.

(f) 444 44444 * item * 4# 4 444 44AS. 44 44

44.

(1) Testing an identical item equipment under identical conditions or under similar

conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be

qualified is acceptable

(444 &4 4 *44 44MM 444 item 444 444 444

444 44 4444* *4# * 444 4)

(2) Testing a similar item of equipment with a supporting analysis

to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable

(444 #444*3. *44 444 444 444 444 44 44

44* 214# 4 444 4)

(3) Experience with identical or similar equipment under similar conditions with a

supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be quantified

(444 #444*3 *44 44MM4 *44 44 44 444

444 444 444 444 44 4444* 214# * 444 4)

(4) Analysis in combination with partial type test data that supports the analytical

assumptions and conclusions

(4*44 *4 44 4444 444 *44 *4 4 444 44**4 444 4## *4*4)

Appendix-9

10 CFR 50.55a(h)

♦ 10 CFR 50.55a(h), “Codes and Standards - Protection and Safety Systems”


• IEEE Std 279-1971

• IEEE Std 603-1991

2. ^4 (Scope)

44 5 4444

3. Keyword: Protection and Safety Systems

4.

4 444 M 5 44444 444 44444 M444 19714 ll 1<H

44 19994 5l 134 444 4444!- 44 44, IEEE Std 279-1971 44

IEEE Std 603-1991 4 19954 4444! 4444# 44431 44. 4# 19994

5# 134 °14-41 4] 2] 4 4 4 4444 (Design Approval), 44 4 4 (Design

Certificate), 4444, 4! 4444 44 4444 44444 444 IEEE std

603-1991 4 19954 44444 44444 44431 44. IEEE Std 279-19714

198444 44431 IEEE Std 603-19914 44444.

Appendix-10

ASME NQA-1

♦ ASME NQA-1, “Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications” 43. 333 4 It ##133 -S-4)


• 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel

Reprocessing Plants'’

• Reg. Guide 1.28 “QA Program Requirements (Design and Construction)"

• Reg. Guide 1.30 “QA Requirements for Installation, Inspection, and Testing of

Instrumentation and Electric Equipment"

2. 4 4 (Scope)

• 44-4 433 #45.34- 443 5.3 34 5 #31443 3##3

4443, #45.34- 443 5.3 447} 3444 #344-3. 4343

43

• 4 &33 ANSEASME N45.2# 333 344.3. A>^-x>7> o)^#?) #3#

4 #434. 334 44.

3. Keyword: Quality assurance, Quality control, Quality assurance requirement, Quality

assurance procedures

4. 447}_8-4□ Part 1 (Former NQA-1), “Requirements for Quality Assurance Programs for Nuclear

Facilities" :

- 44-443# #4, 34, 43-, 34, #44 43 #4334#4_43

4#

- 10 CFR 50 Appendix B4 4 4443 1871) 434 #43344 7)334

^ 43443 44.

- 44-4434 4#, 44 ^ #334 #34 433 #3 3 43 33

#4(activity)4 43. ** 44 : 34(siting), 341, 34, 44, 43,

44, 43, 43, 33(cleaning), 3#(erecting), 34, 44", 44, 34,

34, 213, 444, 44, #4

□ Part 2 (Former NQA-2), “Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility

Applications": Parti# 3#4_44.3, #43#4_4 ^ 43.443 44

- #4-443# 43, 44 ^ 333# 4&, 43, 44, 3# 4 34,

Appendix-11

ASME NQA-1

- Part 2.2 : #4^1 #^h ^ #1^47]#

- Part2.4: ^ ^7]7]7]^ Â} ^ A]^^ 7]#

- Part 2.7: €A}g.A]^-§_ 7]#

- Part 2.16 : €4^ ^^14 44-^^ 4^§ ^ ^

ê] *11 ?ttb M : IEEE Std. 498-19852] °]-g-

□ Part 3 (Former NQA-1 &NQA-2), “Nonmandatory Appendices'’:

7oMl^°l ^JLa] ^j(Nonmandatory Guidances) ^ At-§--§- -r] fb -r#

Subpart 3.1 App. 7A-2: Guidance on Commercial Grade Items(%lM]ri?^ll5y

^-4-^ 7] 7])

□ Part 4, “Nonmandatory Appendix: Positions and Applications Matrices'’:

- NQA <?HH1 4# 3-§-

Subpart 4.1: Guidance on Quality Assurance Requirements for Computer software

Appendix-12

EPRI NP-5652

♦ EPRI NP-5652, “Guideline for the Utilization of Commercial Grade Items in Nuclear Safety Related Applications.” Final Report, Electric Power Research Institute, June 1988. (€441^44: 447] 7] €44 €€ EPRI 7>o]H4€)

1. €€ Code & Standards

• 10 CFR 5 0 Appendix B

• 10CFR21, 1995

• IEEE Std 323-1983

• IEEE Std 344-1987

• ASME Section III

• ASME/NQA-1 orNQA-2

2. €€ (Scope)

€44#€4 4447]

3. Keyword: Commercial Grade Items

4. y^7> _s.€

' 4447] 4# 44 4€^€- 4447M 4# i^M^l 4€4- 44€ f 44 44-7] ^ €44 444 €444- €44 444 44, 4444, €444 44 €4444 44

- €44€ (44 #4 &#) 44

.i: 44444 44

. 44 2: 4444 44444 4# &4

. €€ 3: 44 ^ 44

. 44 4: 44 7}4# €4/444 444#

EPRI NP-5652 4444 4444 444 €€4 44444 44 ^ 4-g- 444 4443. €4. 4 4444 57^4 sectionAg. 4444 €4. 4444

44444 44 ^ 44, 44 444 &44-31 €44 44 #4444 444 44 77H4 444 44431 44.

o 77^ 44

Appendix-13

EPRI NP-5652

- Technical Evaluation

- Part Classification

- Determination of Commercial Grade Item Designation

- Establishing Procurement Requirements for Commercial Grade Items

- The Use of National Codes and Standards

- Maintaining Seismic and Environmental Qualification

- Specific versus Generic Application of Commercial Grade Items

o Section 1.0S] ***-§-

- 4*4*^471- 4**32. ** **4 4 4 *44 **444 *4M **

4*4 ^4* Code & Standard* 4#*3I **.

o Section 2.0S] ***-§-

- **471 *** ** **4* *g./il*

- **71 7] ** 7]*( safety function) °H 4* *4. 4 4

- ** *4 (critical characteristics)^ ^%7\

- **4 *4 ** 4* *4* 4#*3I **.

o Section 3.0S] ****

- **471 *4* 4*4 **4* method*!! 4* *4* 44

- * method*11 41* *41* 7(*

- * method** 4*4 ****441 41* 7(*

- ** 4*4 method* *** ** *31*31 4*4 27^ S* 31 4*4

**41 4* *** 414* *41 414*31 **.

EPRI NP-5652414 44*31 ** **7pl 4* *44 4**

*4*4** *** **.

o **7l 7l *i*H4 **4 7l*(safety function) * 4*(performance) *4*

#***.

o *** ** *** 32.4*4 ** 7171 4 ***4(critical characteristics)* *4

**.- ***4 (product identification)

-*44 *4 (physical characteristics)

- 4 * *4 (performance characteristics)

O *** ** 47*14 4-4* ** ** ZL 44-4 **#* ***4 *4*4

*4* ***** 4**4.

Appendix-14

EPRI NP-5652

- Method 1 : #5*4 1;! 4 AKspecial tests and inspection)- Method 2 : 5*4- 3#( survey of the supplier)- Method 3 : 334*(source verification)-Method 4: 4~4 * 53 5t 5Racceptable supplier)/* *°| 4 42/(itcm

performance record)o 444 4b)- 44 7] 7] 0)1 CD4 r§7> 334* 4-* #4.o 44- 7)7] 44: 534] 3 5# 3*5 * *4 #5 7] 7]* sampled 44 #4. O 45 7)7)7)- Method is) 44# 2)44 54# 4 44# 4544# 4454# 53 454# 4 45* 5 #54 *5*4# 4554.

o 4 7-1) 54 2) 44 u) 4 (cognizant engineer) 4 # 4 3*(quality assurance)547} 44 444 5444.

O #4 544 cognizant #444* 4# 7)7] 44#42) 44 435-5

#344 45 7) 7) 4 4 (dedication) 334* 44 45.

o Section 4.02) 5345- 5 4444 444 *54 *354 ** 44

o Section 5.02) 5*45- 444 7^44 344^4 #44 4454 *# 445^44 44444

4*433 #354* 4:4#.

Appendix-15

EPRI TR-102323

♦ EPRI TR-102323, “Guidelines for Electromagnetic Interference Testing in Power Plants" *x}7ls|- ^ 3§7> x]^)

1. ** Code & Standards

• 50.55a, Part 52

• IEEE Std 603-1991

• 10 CFR Appendix A, GDC 1, 2, 4, 13, 21, 22, 23

• IEEE ANSI C63.12

• IEEE ANSI C62.45

• IEEE Std 1050-1996

• MIL-STD-461D, 462D

• IEC 801-3,4,5,6

2. (Scope)

Safety Related I&C Equipment

3. Keywords: EMI(Electromagnetic Interference), RFI(Radio Frequency Interference),

Emission, Susceptibility, Conducted, Radiated, Magnetic Field, Electric Field, Site Survey,

EFT(Electric Fast Transient).

4.

□ Section 1 : Introduction

-Digital 4# EMI/RFI2] NRC7> f

-Site Survey* 4^43. 41^ 4^ 444 *4^-^ *x}7] *^^.4

* 44*4

- ^ 3§7}

- **7)7]^ ** ^ 4* 4W3. 7]e* 7^#

- I&C7] 7] 41 EMI7} # * 4* ** 7l]t

□ Section 2 : Emission Data6!] 41* *4

• MIL-STD* 7] ^ o_S. Data* 4" 4 44

' *4 *4

Appendix-16

EPRI TR-102323

• Standard W : MIL-STD-461, 462, IEC 801

' #4# 145 : 77^

□ Section 3 : Plant Emission Data6!] i:l] 4 4 7]-

• 4 #44 4M441 4# l#(57l, #4 54, 44- A}^-) 7]#

□ Section 4: 4 #414 41

. 41441 #*# 444 4rl&* 4 iM4 #4

□ Section 5 : Plant Emission # 4 4 4

. #4^-4

. 444 4444 h4 4#b1

□ Section 6 : EMI 45# 4"4"

.4-4 444#44(^44, 4a444)44 4#

. 44

. 444 44

. 44414 441

• 44 4 441 5441 44 4 4(as-tested as delivered)

□ Section 7 : Plant and Equipment Emission 4 44

• 454 4# 444 34

• 44 4# 444 a4

□ Section 8 : 44

• 444 4144*4 444 #44 Site ##44* #44 4444 #4

• 444 4147l*4 44 441444 414*45. 41 #

• 4# #44* 54 #4 ##4#4* 4#^#.

□ -f-# B : EMI Susceptibility Guide

. 414 41 #1 : MIL-STD 462D, IEC 61000, IEEE ANSI C62.45, ANSI/IEEE

C63.12

• #4 44

• Plant 4 EMI *1

• 4" HI Susceptibility(4| 4)41 4-4.

Appendix-17

EPRI TR-106439

♦ EPRI Topical Report TR-106439, “Guideline on Evaluation and Acceptance of Commercial Grade Digital Equipment for Nuclear Safety Applications.” Final report, Electric Power Research Institute, June 1988. (41.3-3 1:3.31 4"-§-7l 7]

3# 313 3 #4B$I13 34# 43 EPRI 7MH43)


" 10CFR21, 1995 (4#37l 43 ^ 3#S4• IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993• NUREG/CR-6421 (COTS 44, 33 3 441 34434 44)

2. 33 (Scope)

. 7}^34 #37^4 ^ 4434

. ^ 34 SBBÎM S3 3313# 44-^ 4##333

• 331 B#3# 7141 1 33 7) 7)• ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit)

3. Keyword: Commercial grade digital equipment

4. 337>.£l3

• 33 3s 313 1 4443133 33 33 33 7> 33 33- EPRI NP-56527> #433 443 3417}# 333 33 EPRI TR-1064393

B4B313 337M 33# *33

. 333 333 3-4- 433 333 34-713 34# 4^3# 33 33

S4 3 3 3 33:33 4 333# #4-# 4 3s# 333.. 3#3 !4#33 333 33 3B4, #3, ^lî- ^7} 43313 ^7} 43 47H 3^# 4-# 3^ 4-3# #3 3s3s 3#.

■ B4B313 S3 3333- 33 3# 334444713# 34-3 3433 333-3 33# 333.

- 334 #BS3- 3333 4343 34 #44■ 4-3443. 333 331 33 S3 333443 B3 433 331 333 s# 333413 3S343 3-3331 3## 4 3S4 333.

- 3#3 ^ #1434 #43s 1444# 433# 3144 USNRC

#3# 43.

Appendix-18

EPRI TR-106439

- 4**4# #91*4 44# 4## 91##* ### 4 ##3. 9lf.

- #*44 **#* 91# #4*(EPRINP-5652)4 44* Software-based

#7>x] 4 3#

- EPRI TR-102348 * IEEE 7-4.3.22] #4*4* 44

- #4*4 #** *** ***3 *#* #*4 **# *##

4# * $1# *33 #4* #4*7} 440): #3

- 9l#4 #33414* EMM 4 4*33 7^*44# 4# *3

9l#4 #444 #44444 *444 ^## #.

- * 4*4* 9}44 4##4 4# 44# 4##*# *3 *33

4#4* 334 4444 3#4* 49}4 ####43 ##*3#

4*4#

- 4 4*4* ##3## 344 444*4 ^4*44 33711## ##4*

*3# 44 4^#.

Section2.0: 4*444 ###3. 91# #3 #44 4# 44* 7]##.

Section 3.0: 4*491 7^3# 4##. 9}44 ##44 4# 44# 7*1 *#4

*44* 4# #*** #7%. #-g-7]7] 91# *444 9147}

4*## 7]#.

Section4.0: #4, 914?}, ##7]7] 91*4 7]5- #22.4114 91# 3341*4* Software-

based 91## 4W ### * 91*4* 4##.

Section5.0: 4*#47l 4#4 #43* #4 4*. 4444# 4#4 4717}

44* 43. 91# # ##717] 9l#4 ##44 4# #43* 444

914*. #444*4 44"#4 #44 4*4* #22.414 revision4l ##

#33414(4414)4 7H4# ## 4144414#* *4*4 *4# *

914# #4*.

Section 6.0 : Section 4 * Section 5414 44* 4 4 4 *# 44 4*. 4444*

#7}4 ## ##4 4 91#4 level of eGbrt* 34#. #, *** meter7l 32.4144 #4 multi-function controller, PEC# 4 ** 4*3

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) 4 * * 4* 4 4 *4

4##.

Section 7.0 : 4* 4*444 *#* *4## 4*4.

Appendix-19

IEC 60880-1986

♦ IEC 60880-1986, “Software for computers in the safety systems of nuclear power stations.” (44-S)1|f44 44 4 if 4 4^4 4J4J1L414 4 tfl#

IEC 7]#)

1 44 Code & Standards

• IEC 61513-2001, “Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control for systems

important to safety - General requirements for systems,"’

• IAEA Safety Guide 50-SG-D3 and D8 (DS252-2001), “Instrumentation and Control

Systems Important to Safety in Nuclear Power Plants."’

• IEC 60880 Part 2 - 2000, “Software for computers important to safety for nuclear power

plants - Part 2: Software aspects of defense against common cause failures, use of

software tools and of pre-developed software”

2. 4 4 (Scope)

3. Keyword: Software, safety Systems

4.

□ Section 3

. 444#4 4BB44 44_&4 ^

- B4 4BB44 Life-Cycle

- 4 444 44# 44, 4:44#

- 4 444 444 4# 4^, 4^Bm4

- BBB44 Life-Cycle 4 444 4# 44

□ Section 4

• BB44 4444 B4

- 4^4 4^4 44 B4- 4^4 444 44 B4

- MMI B4

- 4if4 4444 4 44444 44-9-4 -444444- 44444 BBB4M44 44B4

Appendix-20

IEC 60880-1986

- #4 34

- 454 434 444 53^14 4"434

- 3333M 4 #34

- 455444 44- 34

□ Section 5

' 444# 333514 ^45 coding 34

- 7H# 44 35

-7^# 54 5455 34

-44 4 m. 44

- 54 4 34

□ Section 6

' 444# 333514 4# 34

-333514 4# 44 34

-333514 4# 54 34

□ Section 7

• 4344/33344 ## 34

-4# ## 5M 34

-4# #44 4344/33344 444 44

-4# 4#44

-434 #444

-##4 434 4#

-3# 44 45

-## 434 4# 4433.4

□ Section 8

' 4#4434 44 34

-454434 44 334

□ Section 9

' 54 3f 45 34

- 45 3345

Appendix-21

IEC 60880-1986

-

- ■n'^1

□ Section 10

' ^

- Â|-g jg:5=l o_ y

- ^7]Â} ^

Appendix-22

IEC 60880-1986

♦ IEC 60880 Part 2 - 2000, Software for computers important to safety for nuclear power plants - Part 2: Software aspects of defence against common cause failures, use of software tools and of pre-developed software

44 4 ^ £ = W IEC 7ie, Part 2:CCF ^44 JE-f- 4 pre-developed A]--§-)


• IEC 60880-1986, “Software for computers in the safety systems of nuclear power

stations/’

• IEC 61513-2001, “Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control for systems

important to safety - General requirements for systems,”

• IAEA Safety Guide 50-SG-D3 and D8 (DS252-2001), “Instrumentation and Control

Systems Important to Safety In Nuclear Power Plants.”

2. 44 (Scope)

4444 44B44

3. Keyword: Software tools, Pre - developed Software

4. 444.3.4' 4444m.4 44 -3-4

• 44B44 £4 4-#-4 4# 44 44

• Pre-developed 42LH44 444 44 44 44

Appendix-23

IEEE Std 279-1971

♦ IEEE Std 279-1971. "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."(€7M#€3 33 4 € IEEE 7%

1. €€ Code & Standards

• 10CFR50.55a(h)

• Reg. Guide 1.53

• Reg. Guide 1.89

• Reg. Guide 1.75

• Reg. Guide 1.118

• Reg. Guide 1.47

• Reg. Guide 1.62

• IEEE 379-1983

• IEEE 323-1983

• IEEE 384-1992

• IEEE 338-1987

• IEEE 494-1983

2. € 4 (Scope)

€ €€€ €4-3* 44443, €43. 43 €44, €€4

€444* €€443 34 47] 4 7]4401 444 43(4441444

€€7] ^4 €7}4)** #€€€4 € &€4 €434* €43

444€ € €€4 €4*4 €€4€4 €434* €*€€4* €€€4 444 35]€ 4€#4 434 4-M4. ieee std 279-19712] 7] 33 33 4€4 444€ €444 €3# 44444*4 4433 44-4 €44*, €€4, 444, €434, 44, €443 4*, €444 € 44 €€

€44 €€€€. °1 198444 4343 IEEE Std 603-199133

444 €€.

3. 7]€3

4. €47} 34

• 4.14: 4€ 7]€34 - €4*4 €€3 334€€ € 4#4 444 €4€

44 344 €€ €444 °]3€, 4434- €43# €34 4€€ 33

34* €€33 7^44-4<4 €4.

Appendix-24

IEEE Std 279-1971

• 4.2 s: 4#2l47l* - M7i]f4lS] 444 4#2l45 7ll***4 4 44

55541- 4444* 4 44-

' 4.34: 44 ^ 5#4 #4 - 55^1*4 44 4 5## 45*4*4#

## 2i##4 4## #444* #4. #4**# #44 214-4* 4*

44* 445 444 444*4, 4 4444, 444 44-9-4(Drafting),

44, *444, 44, 4a4 4 44 *4 -9-4** *#4 44444

44.

. 4.4*: 444* - 554*4 447} 4*44* 4444 4#4 444

445 444 4*444, 4*4 4* *44, 4**21 4** *44 *

4* 4444 444 #* 44444* Els 4 4444 *44 44

**7} 7}*#* **.

' 4.5*: 2^##** . 5# 554*4 4#** *4, 444 *#, 21* *

4-3. *4 *44 4* 7}** *444 54 #44* 4*44 4**

*4# * %14# *4444 *4.

" 4.6*: 44*44 - *4* 55#*^ 45* 54* 441* *44*4

71*4 *44* *4*4, 444 *5*4- 4 *44 *21**41 ##

4**4 45 4*44 4:** *21, 21**4 ## 4* 21*4 2^#*

44 4*4* 7^*^ ## * 4** 45 *4421 #4445

*4444 44.

• 4.7*: 44 4 21*711 #4 *4*711

- 444 *4: 2444** 444* 5*4 4*4* 44* 44**

554*4 1*54 **44* *4, S* * &*4 4* 44**

4144 »> #4.

- 4444: 554*4 4444*4 444*1 #4 45* 4*#

4* 21*711*4 ***** **421 * **4 4* 44** 41

4* 4444* *414 4*44* #4. 4444 #444 444

214*5. 444 444 5*711*4 211*0] **4*<*4 44* ^5

4*44* 4*444 *414* 444. 444 544 41** 454

44 #* 44, 44, 545 445 4## 4* 4 5*4 444

*7]- *44-. 44444 54* 554*44 4* 444 544*

*44 4*5 471-44.

- 4# *4*54: 4# *4*544 444*4 4** *4444

54 44# 445 4* 444 444 4541 *5, 544 444

4444 #44# 5545# *7114 45 4 554* 444 444

Appendix-25

IEEE Std 279-1971

4## 4#4# # ## 4#4£, #44 ### £3 #

#4# 3#4] 4# ##4#7} 4##4#£ 44# £334*

#^# 4 #4# #4 # 444 4#4# £# ##££ ## #4

#44# ## 444## 4M£ # 3# 4 444 44# 4 44#

44 444 44444 #4. 44# 444 4444 4444 44

444 4, 44 ^#44 43# 44#3# 44444 4, #4

444 444444 £3£4# ;H444 4 444.

- ### ##44#g.44 44# ## 3#: ### 44444 44

4 #4 4## ##444 £334* #3£ 44 444 4^4 #3,

#44 £34# 4##4 £334* 44# 4 4^ 4#4£ 4 #4 3.444 #4.

' 4.8#: 4#4#4 £# - ## 4^# #£#4, £34#4 44# 3## ###4 ###3£#4 £#444 #4.

. 49^: g3|^| 4^#4 _ 44g. #4#4 4 4#4 44444 4# #4

4#£* ## #4£* #3-4 #4# # 4# ##4 ##44# #4. 4## ### ## ^ 44 #43£ ### # 44.

- 4444# £4444 44; £#

- 4.n#4 4##4 444, #4444 44444 ### 44# 4# 4444# 44 4 4444# 44; £#

- #3#4* 44 #3 43, ## 7}## 4## ^ #34£(Cross-

checking) 4# #4

' 4.10#: 4# # #a##4 - 4### 44 4#4 #3#44 4# 4#

#4#3# £###4 4#4# 44## 4# # #3## # #4#

#4. 44# 4# # 44#4 4##44 #444 #43 #44#£#

## 4#4# 4##4 4# 4#4 #4 #4#4 #4# # 44# #4.

• 4.11#: 4# #443 ## ##44 44 - £34## ##-###

£34* 7^444 #3£ #4 *4*4 4# # 4## £## # #3,

#344# 4444 #3## # #£# #4444 ##. 44# ##

*4£ 4#4 ***** 3 4-4]#£££ **3#4e# 4*#3£

**4°> ##.

• 4.12#: ## *443 - ## 34*4 £37]#4 4# #* ## **

#44## #3£ #* 4#, 4 #34 4 ##44 ## 44# #4

437} **33 44# # #£# #444# ##. £34#4 #443*

7}*3£ 44## #4# £34*4 ##*3£# * 4^4 ** #4

Appendix-26

IEEE Std 279-1971

!#4 #4.

• 4.131: 4# #3 44 - 44 3311#! 44 M54I- #!!444

## 444 4143. !3l33 1# #4# 4444 414 444

1444 44143 44444 44.

• 4.141: 4444 3441 14 - 414 33444 44 44 4444

3444 4144# 444 44.

• 4.151: 4# #14 - #14 #4334 144 #434 44 114 33

34# !!4 #14# 34 4 1144 414# #34 4# 4###

34 4 414 #144 44# # 43# 414 444 44444 44.

34 # 414 #14# #11411 4 #4# 1# 4444 44 444

44# 334#4 ###33 4#14 4 44, 1# 4 #4311 44 #

3#! 4# 41## 44 #4144 44.

• 4.161: 44 7H44 33341 43 - 334## 44 711414 41#-

#41 33344 43# 444 4143# 1t11144 44. #4

3331 44# #441 ##4 ##34# 133 #4 ##

' 4.171: ## 3# - 334## I]###! 1 3334(4 443 3%

144# 11, 44#!, 3### #)# ## 34# # 4# 344#

!#44 44. 4.211 ##41 114 44 41, 334#! ##, 4#,

## ##! ##411 4134# ## ## 4# #4# 14 33

34! 7^4* MU## 444. #M## #341! 34334###44 44.

' 4.181: #14 31, lal 4 4441 - 334## 3# #14! 31,

3#! !al, 3l3 4441 #33! 1## ^1 44# # 43#

#7111 #4 44.

• 4.191: 33341 44 - 3334# ##### #3444 4 413 44

!#4 44.

' 4.201: 13 4# - 334## 3 41! 411- 413 41#4 M

1443, 414 13# #14411 141] 44# # 43# #11!#4

44. 1144, 434, 441], ^ 434 #1 444 #14411 ###

## #44 4417m #34# # 43# #11! #4 44.

• 4.211: 11# 3# - 3311## 3# 4 ###4 3#1 #4, ##, #11,

3#, 3# 31# #11 # # 43# #11!#4 44.

' 4.221: ll(IdentiGcation) - # 3#! 31## #13 #1], 1#, #43#,

4 #144 1## # 444 44# 44 144 331]#! 44#(!1,

Appendix-27

4 nM

IEEE Std 279-1971

%44, **, s*, *)* *4* 444 4* ^ 444 4444

* 444 44. 444 444 ^4*4 4*4 44444 4 444 44. 444 4444 4* 47], ^ ^4*44 ^

44* 4444 444 * &444 *44 s#** ^.4* 44*

444 4-&* &4.

Appendix-28

lufi Jh

IEEE Std 308-1983

♦ IEEE Std 308-1991, “IEEE Standard Criteria for Class IE Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.” (#.4"4 #44 44#^ 4441#-s'

44 IEEE 7]#)


• IEEE Std 603-1991 Section 8 : “Power Source Requirements'’

2. 4 4 (Scope)

444444 44## 3€31#

3. Keywords: Class IE power systems, Nuclear safety, Nuclear power station design

4. 44 7> o.7l

□ Section 5

" 7]^ #4 7]^ 414

- 444(44)44 : 44 41 #4 444# £#4l 44#

£714 2n# 4 ^34^ 441 44 444 £4# £41 44 44#4°1 4

£4 44444 44.

- 444#4 Class ie 4444 44

- 4 4444 44 7l#

- 4 414 £41 44 :

. 4#£4

. 44 71144:2.

. 4444 44

. 4# # 44 £4

. 44 #444 4444 44, 44, 44 444#

. 444 444 444 # £ 44 44^-(malfunction), 431, 4444, 4

. 4144## 4 444 44 4£ 4 4#£4

. 44 4£

. 44 7}4 44 #

- 4# #4

- 4# 444 4 444 44

44 4 4 (Identification)

- #44

Appendix-29

IEEE Std 308-1983

- 7171 4# : IEEE Std 323-19834 4# 4

- 44 31# 7] # : IEEE Std 379-1988, IEEE Std 352-1987, IEEE Std 577-1976

- Non Class IE 7] 7] 44 44

- 4# 44 ^ #4

- 444-7] 4#

- 5-4.717] IEEE Std 741-1990

□ Section 6• Class IE power system #44 7]#• 5E-# 4 4 4] #

- 44 4444- 4444 44- 44 44444 - IEEE Std 765-1983- 44 44447] 44 IEEE Std 387, 741

• 44 4444

- 7] 4 4444 IEEE Std 946, IEEE Std 484- 4444# 44 IEEE Std 485, IEEE Std 450, IEEE Std 484- #47]

• I&C Power System- 7] o_y

- 44 4#- 444 #44, 444 #44- H444 #44

• 4"#( 4 4) 44 Execute Features• 44 4 44 #4(command) 44 #4: IEEE Std 603-1991

□ Section 7

• Surveillance Methods

. A]^ A]^ ^ Â}

. ^7] 4 4^

□ Section 8

• # 4 7> y] 7] 4 J5_ 4 (Multi-unit station consideration)

Appendix-30

IEEE Std 323-1983

♦ IEEE Std 323-1983, “IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Station.” (#4-4 91:4-4 7] 7] 44# IEEE 7]#)

1. #4 Code & Standards

• IEEE Std 603-1991 Section 5.4 : “Equipment Qualification’’

• Regulatory Guide 1.89 ( Endorses IEEE Std 323-1974 )

2. 44(Scope)

Class IE, Reg. Guide 1.89(10 CFR 50.49)4 A1 Z1 4 V) 4 4 Al (Important to safety)

3. Keywords: Class IE, Qualification, Qualified life.

s. 91471- _°4

□ Section 5

• Qualification Methods

- ^444(typetest), #444, 444 4"^, 4#49l #4□ Section 6

' 4^ 44- 7)7] 3ôl

71 7] 41 tfl-& #4

7] 7] 7] 714 914 44S

4^ #4 4&91:4 7]4Service Conditions

DBA, Seismic conditions

4^ TIM 44

Aging Considerations

47] 44

4^ #4 44s

#4# 44 444-4

44 4e

Appendix-31

IEEE Std 323-1983

- M 4 4

. TIM 44, 44 44, 4#, ^-A]^ -6]] ^

44

■ 44 ^4 4 4# ^-9-44

Aging 44 44

■ 44-44 4# 44 44 44

Seismic(IEEE Std 344-1987) and Nonseismic Vibration 4 4

■ DBE M444 44 44

. Â}

- MM

- 44

- 444 44

4 4 71 ^(Acceptance Criteria)

- 4^44

- 44444 MM

□ Section 7

• 44 44 M 4 5.2)4 44 (Test Profde)

□ Section 8

" MM4&4#4-4

Appendix-32

IEEE Std 336-1985

♦ IEEE Std 336-1985, “IEEE Standard for Installation, Inspection, and Testing Requirements for Power, Instrumentation, and Control Equipment at Nuclear Facilities” (€44 4 €4 44 4 414414 7] 7]$ €4, €4 ^ 44 -9-€1r €# IEEE 44)

1. €4. Code & Standards

• IEEE Std 603-1991

• IEEE Std 498-1985

2. 4 € (Scope)

€44 444 €4 ^ 4]44]4 7)7]

3. Keywords: Installation, Inspection, and Testing Requirements

4. y^7>

' 44 4444 ^-444 €41 €44 €4, €4 ^

4 4443. &€44 €4 43 44

. €44 €4: 444 44 4 4444 7]7]7} €444 fzM##4 4^4 €44 4€

' 44: €^M 444 44 ^ 4444 7]7] €4 ^

' 44^ ^4: 44 ^ 4444 7]7]^ 44^4 QA 333^4 4

44 44 4 444 4^44 44

. 444 44: 44 ^ 4444 4714 444 44, 44(47] 4€ ^ 4

44)

' ^ ^ 3§7}

• 44

Appendix-33

IEEE Std 338-1987

♦ IEEE Std 338-1987, “IEEE Standard Criteria for Periodic Surveillance Testing for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.” (-§^l"S|1Si#7l##^|# -$1 # IEEE 7]#)

1. ## Code & Standards

• 10 CFR 50.55a(h)

• Reg. Guide 1.22

• IEEE Std 279-1971

• IEEE Std 603-1991

• IEEE Std 279-1971

• IEEE Std 308-1980

• IEEE Std 603-1991

2. ^-r! (Scope)

l## 7l"llll#7| #7l 7] Surveillance testing ## 51# 7] 7],

Periodic testing 7] # # : Functional Testing 7! checks, calibration verifications 7!

Time response measurement.

3. Keywords: Periodic testing, Functional testing, Calibration, Verification, Time response

4. 71# 7} 5.#

□ Sec. 5 # 115.#(Design Requirement)

5.1. #llAl 5.### Elôl^ 7}## 5.711: # ## #

7l 1 71 surveillance testing 7)## JL3)

- 71 ##5.5. equipment testing#- 1 1) # # 1 # 7l 7l # #7) 1 71

surveillance°ll 5## # ##.

- Testing provision: ###7l ## 5# #11# ### zi 7] 7] 7| 7l## 71

7}# 1 (Functional capability)# 1## # #52# #111## #.

5.2 ## 717l 7| interface # ### Al#7l7l# ## ll# 5# load group #°1

11 # # # (Independence)# 1H ## 5.71 °1 # # ## # #.

- ####5.5 7}###^ll 5^ 7)7l# #5^7) ol^5|

5#### ##.

5.3 ##11## ###, ##5#, ##, ## 55. ## !l#5##

### °J## 5### #11## #. Coincidence logic# °1 5l# provision#

Appendix-34

IEEE Std 338-1987

44471 44# ##4 *# ####4 #4.

5.4 #4#(Testability)# 44### 5.# 7] 7} 4# a] ^^#^ 313)4# 44.

4]# #4, #4# 7}### 4#7T"#4ol, ### calibration# 4*!l *

4# #41 #444 #4.

5.5 ### 44### 444 #4 44# ### ##4 4.

41# #4, 4#414## #■####- 444 #### ###44 4# #4 #44. 444 4## 4# ## 44, ##^ ### overlap #4 ### #*#4 4. 41# #4, #### 4 ###### ### ##

#g.41 #4 #4## ## 7}#.

<* ##/#$/ surveillance A/W ##-# S/#4 protective action # initiate #

0# 4### 4^-# _z444 #4

(a) 5.# actuation device 4 7) 7} # 444# #44 group#5. 44 #4

# 4 444 #4. 41# #4, containment spray pump# actuation device

# # 4 # containment spray valve# actuation device#- ## # 4 # 4.

(b) ## 4#44# #4# °1# actuation device# #4#441# #4#

4# ##57# #4 #4. 41# #4, 4# 44 4## circuit breaker#

#4 #4## #4471 ## circuit breaker# #4 44 #441 pump

motor# #### 44# 444 44.

(C) 4#44# #4# 44# 4#7l4 ### #4# f

44(coincident operation). 41# #4, 4##TL# 4##7) ## #- ##4

#4# 44471 ## ### ##kz#5 #31# 44# 4 4#

4 #4 4.

5.6 #4 activity# 4 phase## 44#4, ##4 4# A}o]^| % 44

4## ##4 ### jib) #7) 4 44##4 44. 41# #4, #4##,

#4 44, 44 44## #4##4# 4^# 3.# 44 ##N4 44.

5.7 #4 #4# #44#- # #44 #■## ####4 44.

5.8 4# # 4 ##(Automatic testing features)# #4 ##4# ### 313)#

4 44.

* programmable digital computer 7} ##/# °] sj g/ ### J£ 4 #4 4 -A

5.9 44 #4, ##, 44 ##4# ## #4# #444 44 ### 3.#

44# 44 ##1/4## ##4# #4 #44 4444 44.

5.10 #44 44* #44# 4#44 #4 S* ## #4 4#* 44

Appendix-35

IEEE Std 338-1987

protective ### 4141 4 * tripping °1 ##*## #44 # ** 5.-2]

44 *5lr 4"§-#4 *#-.(?)

5.11 #4 44} 44(44 #44444 actuated 7l7l#4)* *## 4#4#l

444 #44 4**4 #4 5##4 #4# #4.5.12 4# devices (4* #4, test block) ## 4*4 4*4 4#4#4 4#

4444 4 44 5## 4 #4# 44.5.13 44444 44 5#44 44 444 4# 4# 5*# 444 44

44 444# 44444 #4.5.14 44 444 44 4444 44 af-444 44# 4, #44 444

44* *##54 4## 4 #4# *41444 #45.15 4a# 444 breaker# 7^4 4**445. 4*4* 4444 44#

* 44* #44 #444* #4.

5.16 4*4 #444*4 *4*4 inoperable 444 #4 44*4# 44#4 44# * #4# 414 #4.

□ Sec. 6 4* 555# 54 (Testing program Req.)

□ *454• 444**4 4* *7l * surveillance 4* 555#*

- 7l*4*(4# 7l*4* 5*-), 41# 4# 44, 4*4 calibration#

#444 4**4 5#- *44 4* 555#41* 4# 54# 4*44*4} *41 4* 4* # 4

4 44.6.1 444**4 44 44 4#* 444 44 *4*4 #4455 4##

44 44. 44 445 #4# 444 4## # * 4* 4#, 44571-

4444 444 4## # * 444 44.6.2 445 *4# *4*41 44 4#* #44 4*4 7} 544 ## 4*

#4 5# 4* 54# 4 4 44.6.3 ** #4* 444 444 #4# 4 444 444 ^#* **- *4 5

55 ###* 5* ## #4 54#44 44.6.4 44* 7>*44 4# 5* 5*4 *4 54444 ###44 44.

6.5 44# #44 4##44 #4444 44.6.6 4# 555## 4# #&*# 4*4444 *4*55 4544 44.6.7 4*4 4* 444 4*4 * *44 444 ** 44#44* 444.

44# #*#* 44# 4444 #7}#- *44 #*-0] 4##**: #4.

Appendix-36

IEEE Std 338-1987

7}##-#, a#4 e##9l €91 ## 4 #4 #44# #4.

6.8 4# 5g.a## 4#4 4#^4 €4 &## 4###g. ## # # 9144 44 7l 7] # 444 progressing4 #4 A14 4 4 44 44 4 91 seq.

4 &#44 444 #4.6.9 4 9M4#44 4# 5g.a## 44 44^44 4#^. 444 4 91^

4 44444 44.6.10 44 5L3.EI44 4 7]7] € 4 ##44" 444 44 4444 assessment

41 444 444# 44# 4 91 a# #41444 #4.6.11 4444 4 4 #4 44444 #4. 444 4444 444 44# a4

#4# #0>0> ##.

□ saa# #4

4 aaa## 44 44# 4 4# #44 44#4 a#1. #444 444 #4# #4-4

2. ## a##4 ###4

3. 441 ### #444 44# 4## # # 4# 44

4. 4## aa 4## 4 #€ a#4 4 #4 44 44

5. 44 #41 444 4# 44 #4## a## master 44# 4#

6. 44# 4 #4, #4 a### 447. #4 #4&44 7}## #444 44# # 91# 448. 4##7Hi 4# 44 #4## 4#

9. #7144 surveillance 4# 5L3.E14M1 4# #4

- 4#4 3.# SS 4 4#

- 44 31# S.H

- ## #44 4 4## #4- a# 4.314 #4 4 4# a# 44 444

- #4 ^4

- ##a ## 44

- 44 4^ #4

□ 44 4 4(Type Test)

1. 4 b 4 AKChannel check)

- 7H# 1 # 4#4 4# 2&3 #4* 4a.

(4# #4, power 4# 1# redundant power 2 & 3 4 a)

Appendix-37

IEEE Std 338-1987

- 71* 5* -5 X1 4 ** 444 Source range 4 *4 7} monitoring 4]# til

3)

- *4# #4444 17}#4 *54 #4&# ti]a

(4# #*, *44 power level 44 i#4 444 *4*57} 44 444

5* *71*44 4* 4444 *#*#)

4> Common mode failure 44 5 sjSfldf #

2. 7|4 4 4 (Functional Tests)

4*4#* 4## 4-til7!- #^] 4*# *^ # * 444* 44414 4.

- 4til 44444 44

(a) 4* starting *-ti](4]: 34, 4*44, 4# 5* **#)#* 4*4 4

44 -9-4(41, 44, 44, *5, 44, *5*)

(b) 444-5. 4445 444 *44* *5 5* timing stroke *H

Full Stroke A14°l 444 *44, partial stroke 44 *4

(4* *4, main steam stop valve, turbine stop or control valve* ),

(c) 4*4 3.714 4445* 47}

- 43^ 4 * 43^4 4*# 4*4-44# 4#

(a) 4-4-4 actuation device4 tripping, °141 4* *4 3f *4*

4 4 (°i): trip bus undervoltage relays & observe bus transfer, load shedding,

diesel Gen. Start and load sequencing)

(b) 4*35 initiated # * #* 444* 4*

*45 *4*41 44# * 434, 44# 44# #43 44

44*4 *4(41* #4, *# 47}5 trip*)

(c) *4144 4 *44 *#344 344*4* 44(d) *4- 5* 3 4*4 4*41 4# 4443* 4#44 4*4 7]4

4* 4* *4 **4 # 4#

3. 44 3* 4* 4#(Channel Calibration verification check)

4 44* #34* 444# 4*4 44#4 3*4* #44 #,analog,

bistable°1 4*4 4*3*71# 4*4* 444.

°}#53 4*4 4* 44 4(linearity) * 4*44 4 5 (hysteresis)* 44

41* *4, 3*4* #44 4-34, 4# #*4.

3*4* #44 4-34 *3#(4l* ##, bistable trip 4 3*4 * setpoint

44 4-44-7] 37-14- 5* °}#53 *44 out of tolerance 5* saturation

5* foldover 4 *4 * *4), 4# 4 #. gain-] 34 4 alignment # bias

4 trip set *# 3*4# 4#* ##4.

Appendix-38

IEEE Std 338-1987

4! 14! IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-19932] !!#.

4. # 1"A1 4 1( Response Time Verification)

## 411 111 4 111 114 !4 334 (Safety Analysis Report)2]

7l #44(Technical Specification)! 4 !#4! 7)142) i)) 1 l!4# 145. !4 3) a| y- rij yj -c- a) a| a) (Logic System Functional Test)

14 14 #2) 4^717l #4 S.S. ^2) 7] 711- !4 7] 7] 1 relay,

contacts, solid-state logic!#- 2] 1. A) 4 40) 3 #*11 4 !l 44, overlapping

Si! sequential! #4.

□ A1 1 H (Test Method)

°1 41# 144! 41 14 4 °l #14 7)111 #4# 4

4 HI #1 7111 414 1.

1. 41 S! 141 41!1 4 33 H ^ n 3#!# 142. 4411 4121 &4#

(a) 4HH 4! l(positive) Si! 1 # SL 4 (direct indication)

3. 4 7H141 414 41 44! 44414 4!! 4141 7}# 44 4.

4. 444 441, 4 111 !!4 443 44 4l!3 3! 441 11!

414 14 3! l7>4d> 1 41 ii, 44H.21 a7in 14

447}H 1®§. !, Till! H?} setpoint4l !H 4 protective action °1

141 !41 31 144 1.414321 ill

- A slowly changing signal

- A rapidly changing signal

- A large change signal 1□ 41 intervals

1. i<- 7| aH intervals

&4 44 intervals ! 4! 44# 3-144 44

- 471 l 4114 41

(a) Reg. Req.

(b) 111 #1! #4 14

(c) m 4#

(d) 113444

(e) #1! #4421 144 4# 44=

(f) 414 214 4421 4!44!

Appendix-39

IEEE Std 338-1987

- 7]7M 4#

(a) 7] 7]

(b) W 71712] o]a d]o]B]

4# M, 31^(415] Aj 41°lBl 4]o]4z&Ê]X 7>^ a]^5

(c) 7171^^: 115!A] ^ ^

(d) 5' 4- 3| ° | E] : MTTF, MTTR, failure »# ^

2. A1%1 intervals^]

AM intervals ^ 7^12] ^5] 51^

Appendix-40

IEEE Std 344-1987

♦ IEEE Std 344-1987 Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. (-S4-B) Class1E7]7]^

1. Code & Standards

• 10CFR50.55a(h)


• IEEE Std 323-1983,

• IEEE Std 382-1985/’

2. ^

Class IE 7171 4 7]^ 44

3. 7l^)H: Seismic qualification

4. ys]7> 44

□ Sec 3. a] xl ul 7] 7]-§-44 444 4 X[^-(General Discussion of Earthquake

Environment and Equipment Response)

3.1 :z| 4 4^(Earthquake Environment)

444r 37}4 ^-#44 ^4^] 4 ^ 4^7}

3 ^4:4 ##444^ 4^4

-. 4444 7>^t- y<^r^tV 44 10-15 4 44 444.

-. ground 4r-§-xr broadband random#"). 1 Hz - 33Hz 2] V) Ll] °i| 444 4 &l

^ 443. 444-

3.2 7] 3E(4|, 44: a] xl 7] 7] 2] 4" Aj (Equipment on Foundations)

-.(^4/^44 4#) ground ^4 4# 4^ 7] 7] 4 2]

# 43* ^4/43.

3.3 :f:744 7] 4 7] 7] 4Aj (Equipment on Structures)

^3*4 44 7] 7] 2) 44 -§-#4 441 ground 7}^32) 7}^ ^

444 7^3 ^7} 3* 4-3 # 4 4f.

- o] 7>4£ 444 7171 444 7] 7] 2] 21**444 2]4.

* seismic : 44-4 earthquake: 44, earthquake proof:

Appendix-41

IEEE Std 344-1987

aseismatic structure : 5* 55

3.4 :z| 4 4 f'_z)-44- 44) (Simulating the Earthquake )

4* 5*4 *** 7}#7)) 4*##* 3% 4*.

-. 5*# 4* *** 5*/** 4 7)7)* *** 5**54 *-§-

*4 *44- *4 #5 *4 **5 ** 55* *4-* 5 **

(1) 44 4*54, (2) A) ?t°| 4, (3) Power Spectral Density Function

□ Sec. 4 :z| fl 44 4 444 (Seismic Qualification Approach)

-. 7(7]2] 44444 444 44 44 4445.44 44 444 44 4

4# 44 44 55 5 4545 444 44444 *45 44444

* 54*54 444 **.

-. 44444 4# 7}4 #4 *-§-** ##45 444- 44. 4 444

47}4 445 44# 4 44.

(1) 444 44 47] 4 #44 44.

(2) 54#4 44 54444 44* ##.

(3) 44/444 *#4 4# 44* 44.

(4) 4444 444* 4444 44* 44.

□ Sec. 5 44 (Damping)

5.1 44

-. 444 444444 5*5 444 45 444*4 444 4444

4444. #4 445 44 544 4*44, 4* *4, 4544 44

4, 4* mode, 44, 44"4"4I4 4(normal force), 7]-*5, *#, # *5*

4 4#, **#*.

-. 445 7)7)4 55 554- 4444 454 bolted & welded

construction4 454 uniform material 54 55 7)7)5) #4M) 4)44.

5.2 444 444 (Measurement of Damping)

-. *#*54 #4 5 44 7}4 54* #455 ##4 4*.

5.2.1 44 4 4 444 4* 44 (Damping by Measuring the Decay Rate)

5.2.2 Damping by Measuring the Half-power Bandwidth ( Half-Power bandwidth

* 444 4# 44)

-. 7)7)5 slowly 4#4 *555 44# 5 #5. *#5 4*44 54

Appendix-42

IEEE Std 344-1987

#4# ##S3 43 ^ plotted 3.

5.2.3 Damping by Curve Fitting Method(Curve Fitting6!! -1 3 43# 4# #3)

-. 7]7] 4 swept 3## 4 random 37# #57 excitation# #7] 44-

°1# °1 #44 #4 33### #4. modal damping# ##3# 57

3# #3] #4# #4 #334 4# 4 44.

5.3 433 #-^(Application of Damping)

5.244 #4 434 44 4#4 #4 44# #4 ### #4444 #

#44 4#34. 43# #4/444 4#^ -§-§-44.

5.3.1 #44 4 433 ##( Application of Damping in Analysis)

#43 3#, 44 ##3 #4# 444434 #444 s## 4

44# 21444 4#.

&4# 3 #44# #43 conservative# #34# 44 44 #3 43

3 conservative 4# 4#.

5.3.2 434 3# 433 4 #(The Application of Damping in Testing)

-. 434 34 3#, Required Response Spectrum(RRS)4 33 334

S344 44##4 33 37}# # 4#.

4#(osciiators)# 7#M 3# 444 4#4, 433 #434 4#

#,5%# 44# # 4 RRS4 33 3#34, 44 44 433- 44

# 4## 4#.

□ Sec. 6 #4 (Analysis)

6.1 4#. 4714 444# 34# Safe Shutdown Earthquakc(SSE) # 44 Operating

Basis Earthquake(OBE)3 #4# #44 33 44# #3# # 4# 4

#333# 4##. 27}4 3### 4 44.

-. 44# Dynamic analysis, 4# 44# static coefficient analysis 3 •

#434 34# 4#4 34.

1) #3434 434 44#

2) 4#343 33# 43 33# #4 s# s 44# 4#44 #3

# 33.

3) #434##3 44 4 #H3^(displacement & stress)## 33.

4) #Til #343 33# #44 344 #3#4# 4#

Appendix-43

IEEE Std 344-1987

H# ### 44 3.# #3. #44 #### 1 7]

H 44144 44# f 44 14# 411# S# 3H4

6.2 4# #1 (Dynamic Analysis)

-. 71714 4 4 4414 #3444 341 mass 45L# H (viscous) 1

44# i##4 5.1444 #.

6.3 11 #4 4# (Static Coefficient Analysis)

-. 4 44444 444 141 4444 4444, 47>41 44 4#1

#4# 7]## A}#s]-4i 441. 4 #4# #44#4! n# ^

45. 44 &4.

6.4 til 4 4 7] 7] 41(Nonlinear Equipment Response)

-. ti) 444# #4 4#4 4144 41 #4.

6.5 4*4 4! 4#(Other dynamic loads)

-. 6.3 & 441 44 4114 'flllrtr hydrodynamic 1 #4 #4

dynamic loading 4 1## 4 4#.

6.6 QBE & SSE 41

-. 414 41 11# #14 #14 #4#4 41. #11 OBE4 1

7l y} mounting 4. 41 14 4# 44# 4## fatigue-inducing

potential0! 444 #.

6.7 411 41 ^-(Documentation of Analysis)

, 441 1144 413M4 #1 l###!# 4l]41 34#

i#14#.

□ Sec. 7 1 1 (testing)

7.1 14 (Introduction)

14 !#4 144411 ll?} mounting!4 4#3 7}4s}4 1#

4# 41# 4 44 44 444 4 H# 4^14 #.

7.1.1 mounting

-. 1 # 14 # 7] 7] 4 4414 service mounting# 5_##7] # # 441

11 4# 14 #

-. mounting #14 #1 444 4# 44# #144, #3#4 bolted

-3.7], type torque, 44 11 4144 3-1. 41 47]# 4 44,

conduit, H #4, #4 interface 1 4 #4 3-1144 #

7.1.2 #1 (Monitoring)

Appendix-44

IEEE Std 344-1987

454 ^ 4544 ## 455 45 44-54# Class IE 44# 4

44 44 Ji444 #. 44 444 45-4#5#(exposure)

4/444 7] 7] 4 7] 44 (functionality)#- 4 ?}.

7.1.3 Refurbishment/ 4 5 3])

-. 44 555# 444 4444 #^#5 44 4545 4 444

444 44* 5-4 4 44 5-44* 444*414 4:4*. 445.44

activities4 45. #4l°l# 54 4 4*54144 retorquing°l 544.

7.1.4 4 4 44 (Exploratory Tests)

### 45 44# 44 44 544 447} 445, 444 54

#4# #44*44* 45# 441 7}# #5 54# 44 #4# #4 #5# 5## % #4* iM#5 #5# 4#4.

-. 7}4 44:441 4*45 554 4*4 (Resonance search) 4.

7.1.5 44* 5# #(Vibrational Aging)

-. 44# 4# 444 44: 445 SSE 544 44454 455 #

4554# 445541 zl 544 44.

-. 45 5544 #45 #44 544 444 44 55 454

lower level 4 4 5 44 55 4# 4 7}54 4 7}4 4# intensity

444 #4 454 44 454 4% 54^44, 454

SSE54# 444 454 54* 444 45 544 44 554

444 4445 44. 444 444 ansi/ieee std. 323-19834

55# 45# 4445 4. 55 55# 444 obe&sse 4##

54#4 5^444 #.

7.1.6 OBE4 44 5##( Seismic Aging(OBE))

-. 7]7]4 4# 44 45 444 sse4 444 44, obe44# 5#

4# #. °1 444 4 444 44 events# 55# 4 41 peak cycle

# ## ##l ## 5 4#.

7.1.7 5#(Loading)

-.Class IE 44# ## 44 45 444 4544 544(4444 #

#, 4444 ##, 44##, #4##5)44 44# 441 5^41# #

4, 44# 444541 45# 55 #5 #44 445# 4##4 5

4 41##.

Appendix-45

IEEE Std 344-1987

7.2 4# ^ 44 A] 4 (Proof & Generic Testing)

4 #4 4# #4 #4# 44] 7)7]* 4 #4# 4] #44

7.3 Fragility Testing

-. °1 A] 4# ##4 215. 7] 7] 2] capability's #4 4# 4] °]'§'4. °1 4 4 4

^44 #444 444 4 #4 4 44444 444 4 $14.

7.4 Device Testing

-. Device A]44 7]r)]2]^ #ti]^ #44 4 A]4# #44 7]4 7]7]2]

4444 capability*]] 44 44 &44 #4# 4 $144 44444 $14.

7.5 Assembly Testing

-. tflfl-S. 444 Assemblies^ 4#4#4 #444 444# 444 7] 4 a)

444 44.

7.6 4 Vi 4^ (Test Methods)

7.6.1 44:( Introduction)

-. 44 A]sq 37>x]5. 44# # $14. 4 #4 proof & generic

testing(7.2) 4 fragility tcsting(7.3)$].

-. 7}4## 44 #4*] 7}4 4 #2] q]4 ^2] ^s]]# 4^-4 7}4# ## 44# ^ ^ ^

7.6.2 44 444 A1 4 (Single-Frequency test)

44 ground 444 444 44 45: mode 444 4 44 4 44,

4444 floor 444 444 4444 44444 444.

7.6.3 4 444 A14 (Multiple-Frequency Test)

-. 44 ground 444 7] *] 33Hz 444 4 444 444# 444.

7.6.4 4# A14 (Other Test)

-.7.6.24 444 4 4 7 6.34 444 444 M4 4444 4444

4 #444 4 444 4# 444 $1# 44 444 44 444 4

$14. #4#4 4 7]* 4444 44 4^4 444^4 444

Appendix-46

IEEE Std 344-1987

# 5!#.

(1) RRSS) bandwidth4 Test Response Spcctrum(TRS)S] bandwidth# til 51,

7l 7l ## # ## til 51.

(2) # S| # # # event# A1 # duration til 51.

(3) ## # # S| # # ### magnification# ##(#, # # S| JBL##

####&)

(4) 7171 S| natural mode # ## ###

(5) ### # 7171 damping

(6) fragility levels

(7) ;/l ### fatigue potential

(8) ## # ##, TRS# 7.6.3.1 Si ###5. RRS# envelop #)») #.

7.6.5 # Si 7| # # a] -cycle fatigue potcntial(Tcst Duration and Low-Cycle

Fatigue Potential)

-. ## buildup # low-cycle fatigue ### # ## ###71##, # #

## ##S) ### #5L#7l## duration0! # fatigue# ##1# ##.

7.6.6 ## # # (Multiaxis Tests)

-. ## ground ### ## ##5. 5.# #### ### ####. ##

#, AM### ## ###, ####

7.6.7 line-mounted 7) 7] (line-mounted equipment)

#-°l##4 ##%# 7l7lS) ## ##, ## ## ####7171,devices,

HVAC damper actuator, valve actuator # ### # # # # ## 71# #

accessories# ### # ## 71 7)## ### JL#.

□ Sec. 8 #1# # Aj'sto] ##El # #(Combined Analysis and Testing)

8.1 # #7MS) ## S# ## ### # ^#. °l#

7171 S| ##£# 7171 S| 3.7], ### configurations! #### ###.

1-fl ^ 7171 ## ##, £.#, ##71, multibay 7] 7] racks # consoles## #

# a)### Si ## #)## #### ###5. ###### #7>##.

8.2 modal # # (modal Testing)

S# ## ^ ### #1^ ^ ##^S) ####cll 0l#sl#t4l

Appendix-47

IEEE Std 344-1987

sec 7. !3 #34 4## # ^# 4#! 3##

8.2.1 34 S.H 41 (Normal mode Method)

-. In-service mounting 2:4# 5-2] 3*7] # 3 mounted E] JL 3H 7] 7] 3] 3],

#1# °] 7] (exciter)# 51°]] 4 3 E] 3 4 ###4 4 point6]] #44] 31 15".

8.2.2 H4# 3"! (Transfer-Function Method)

#### 41# 454441# 4455 4##5 ^#3, #,W

Fourier transformer lol4## °] #43 °] # ###4 1] 7] *1] 1#

144 -§-#43# ####* 444#3 3#1.

8.2.3 3! 134# o] ## #3 5] 21 41 (Analytical Methods Utilizing Test

Data)

-. 4## 443 options# 334 33134# 4447]33 434.

43 44 44 3]# 44, 44444, S.H 43, amplitudes] 44 4

344 43 43#4 43 ##4 444 &# 4437143] 444.

8.2.4 44(Qualification)

-. 313 4 34# 4433 4434 41# Class IE 44* 433

47} 314 4-.

8.3 444 7171 3 34 3 #1 (Extrapolation for Similar Equipment)

-. 4331 43] 444 7]7]4 444 3 34 7]7] 5.14 7H44#1 #

4 33] 44 34 444 5-4443] 134 44 444 34# 34

3] 344 44# 4ji4 4 4#.

8.3.1 34 44(Test Method)

-. 43] 33 55.3.1,7.6 3313 144, 44 4433(44 44),7.1.3

33 1#^. 4455 #3 1 33# # 1#.

8.3.2 #3(Analysis)

-. I’It^t7] 434# #4#1 3 3] 3 4344 4# 4 #(no resonances

exist in the frequency range of interest), 7] 7] 4 rigid 7] 7] 5 #43.

-. 444 444 44, 44# # 1# 5# points! 44 ### 1##

Appendix-48

IEEE Std 344-1987

g.4 4### &444 #714 4#4 ##4 #^_#

# ##.

8.4 Shock Al# (Shock Testing)

- AJÂJ6)|^ o] shock ### 444 mil-### 44 #444 44(4# #

4, MIL-S-901C-1963), 4 7]7] 4 ##4 31-44# shock-type #4# 44

8.5 4 4 4yl 4°1 #4444# #44 444 (Extrapolation for Multicabinet

Assemblies)

44 7}4 ^4 4^ ^44 344 44=4 4^4 444 M144

4 44 4# 444# 444# #4 #4#4 #44 4#.

8.6 44 4 4/#4 (Others Test/Analysis)

8.2-8.5 44s, 44# 4# 4 ## ##4 4444.

1) Al 4 #9 Ml 4 444 4# 44# 4 4 (explain unexpected behavior during

test)

2) 4#4 44# #4444# 444 #44 ### #4 4#44 4#

4 #4

3) 44 #4] 444# #4# 4#44 44.

□ Sec. 9 # # (Experience)

9.1 4 4 (Introduction)

_ 4444 44 3E4 44# 4441 4# #4 ### 444 #444 #

# 4 #44 4## 7}# 44 7M ^44 7]7]7} 4^-.

-. 441 444 4# #44 ### 441 ##4 444 #4## #44 #

#4 S# 4# #4 4#4H 4#4 444 44 44. 4# #444

44# #M # 4#.

9.2 # 4 # 41 °14 (Experience Data)

### 4144# 444 ######4 41444. #,

1) #4 ## #5E3I##5E#4 A14 °l 4 #4 4 °14 .(Analysis or test data

from previous qualification programs)

2) ### #44 7] 7] 5E#4 ## #4 4# 4 °14 (Documented data from

equipment in facilities that have experienced earthquake)

Appendix-49

IEEE Std 344-1987

3) 34 34 34" 33 4# 34 44 33.34 u)] o] e) (Data from operating

dynamic loading or other dynamic environment)

9.2.1 44 r) 3 4 4 3 (previous qualification)

44 44 ^ 34 43 33343 444 344 4# 4444

444 3# A>-g-5>0^ 7)7] 443 33 # 3 43-

9.2.2 a] a)(earthquake)

-. 44 ô]e)2] 3 4# 443 34 4444 33 7] 7] $] 343# 7]

333 344. 4 5)# tilo)e) till4713 434 71714 34443

34 3330) 4AM 0} #4.

9.2.3 4*3 44 til °1 4 (other experience)

-.44 ^44* ## 9.2.2 4 43# 43343 34 34 34* 33

4^tii 43434 S3 434 71443. 4# 34 #4 44 #44

444.

9.3 344 (Similarity)

-. 444# 444^.44 44-4 4^- 4^^- 34 3444

7W4 4333 AM4161: 4-. 0)51# 7^43 44-4-4 44 44:

44-(process)3 #3 7134 4 33# 34 4.

1) 4 71 (excitation)

2) 3444 A134(physical system)(34 4 44 4" 3433 4333)

3) 34 34(dynamic response)

44433. 444- 344 43^3 4# 344 3443 434 4# 4444 ^44334 ^^6ii 4^ 4^ 34# f 43.

Appendix-50

IEEE Std 352-1987

♦ IEEE Std 352-1987, “IEEE Guide for General Principles of Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems.” (4:^4#

IEEE 4^)

1. A 4 Code & Standard

• IEEE Std 279-1971

• ANSI/IEEE Std 603-1991

2. (Scope)

• SS4#4 #4###

• ##4# 4### (#4# #4" ^ ^ ##) 4#

• IEEE Std 279-19712] SS4# #4# #4# #4 AS ##

• S4# 44# #4#^4 ##

3. 44#: #4###, 4###, 4###, 43)4 J#-A4 A4 4, ETA, RED

• #4### 44

- #4A# ji# : 4444 44# 44, ###44 4444 4# #4# ##

- #### : M 7}## 4##4# #44# #o]7]

44## (# 4 # 4, administrative procedures #)

- #### : 4## #44 s#s4 &#(4#s#)44 #4# # 4## 44-

- #4# #4#4 ## : (D #4#^ ^ 44 ## (2) #44# ##(ETA) ® 4# ® #4# 44 #4 4#

- #4# ## # ## : ANSI/IEEE Std 603-1980# 4#4 4### #4

• #4### #4- (##): #4# ## &S4-* 4# 4##4# # ### W 7^ 4 4-44 4# 444 #4AS 4#(1) 4#44 : 4#44 4# # s# #4

(2) # 4### (####) : ## A###AS4 4#s#AS

##4# 444 A###(unsafe system failure) #4 4 S4#4

(3) #### A### common mode failure analysis : 4##44 4#

A#4

Appendix-51

IEEE Std 352-1987

(4) (#91 3.%# 91 ##)

(5) #4^/44^ 41# (4#^r4): 4sl# (logic diagmm)g. &## ##4

5. #4 °1 -§- (4: fault tree, Reliability Block Diagram: RBD 4)

(6) #7}

- 447]test interval #4 : #4 if# #44 #4, #4 #51

surveillance frequency # 4 (#4 #4 i#)

- :

- (D 7]7l # 3I#46iluie rate, 44 S# &44#4^ (4M4^)

- (2) ### 44 (4^- 4# 444 #91)- ® 44 4### #4 (4&#4 44)

Appendix-52

IEEE Std 379-1994

♦ IEEE Std 379-1994. “IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety System.” (4r#4l# ##3I#7l4 IEEE 54) (Revision of IEEE Std 379-1988)


• IEEE Std 603-1991. “IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power

Generating Stations/’

2. ## (Scope)

• €3 ##41 #41 #7] ##4l# 5 4l#4M 4# ##3i# ##

" ##4l## ### ## ##4l# #4l44#3l4l _S_#4# S4

##4##4 4^# 4 #4# #.

- ## 7}### ### 4 ## 3i## 4## ##41#4 S4 ##

7}## ##3I#

- ##31#4l 7]# ##4# 5# 31#

- #5444 #44 #4 #4144#31* ^7^ 54 4 #3141 7]#

##4# 44 31# ^ 4# 41# 4##^:.

3. 4 4 E: Single-failure criterion, Independence, Redundancy, Design basis events

4. 7147} 0.54^# ^ ###: ##3i#4 4^44 ## 7^/41#7] ##4 #4144

444 4.

• 4X14 4 44 31#(nondetectable failure): 4714444" 4 7L 54 4 54

444M1 7]41 31#4 ^

• 47>45 31# #44 44 44(4# #4, 444, 444 54 44 444

7]4 44)#g.#4 443144 4444 454 4 44 3i#4 44 4#

31#(cascade6iluie)45 # # #31 ##31#45 444.

' 444^ ### #45 44 #41444314 41# 44, 4# 55 7^#T]

31## ##4# 4 44. #41444-y76i] 7]^] ##44 3i#44#E]

4447] 3i#4 #^44 #45 ^4^ ##4#7]3i #444# #.

• ###7l3I#(CCFs: Common Cause Failures):

- ##3i# 4#o] ^4# #4: 44 4-4 31# ^ #4144^1-316]] 7]#

31#

Appendix-53

IEEE Std 379-1994

- 443# 444 #43 4 *#(44] 4# 4 #43# 333^ 4#):

4# 44 4#, 4* 3#, #4 33 3# 4 #44 3*4 sM

4*4# #43*.

• -o"* 7]]*(Shared Systems)* #43* 7] ## 4 *

- 3* Units] #4 7]]*: **7]l*ol* ##**# #7]1# 33 *4 *ti]

444 7}*# #43*4 4#4 #47]*# **#o]:

- 4 Units] 444*: **44 44 4#S] 4 Unit4 4 44 7]]44

1443.44 4414 44444 **## 4.

• 44344 44 4444 44:

- 4434444 4444 4444 444 4444 4434444

4444 *4 447]-* 44*7] 44 444 44 4444 444

44444 4. 4434444 44 4# 444 ieee std 352-19874

4*44 4*.

- 4 444^434 444 ### 4* 44 4*3 4*4.

. ** *44*(4: #4 4% 444-7] 414 #) 44

- #44*# 4444 44 7}## 4# 4444s] 33 34(4:

444S] 4* 44, 444-7] *##3 44 *) 44.

- #47]*# #44 4## * 44 4444 3#(4: 443*

4*447] *7M #7]-3 3344 4444 7^444 3*

44S] 435]] 4 4444 #7%S] 44 4*7^ 4## 4*)#

44

- 443*s] AM 444 **

■ 444°1 4344 44 7]lf-oi4 444 443147] *4 4444 #444 44: 44

• 447]]* ** 444 44 4*3* 444 4*4 4* ô 4444

4 a 4* 4.

- 4# 7H444 441(41# *4 444 34 #44 4]*3 *3) ***

4444 3*44 ## 444. 4# 44 ##4 #*3*4 44 4*

*4# 34*4 ### 344 #.

- 4*4 34# 4#7343A] 4*433 4*3# #4414 #4 *3.

4*4 34 4-s] #*3*4 444* *## 34*4 #3* 344 #.

- 44 *441 4* *4 33(preferred mode)3 3*441 4414 *4*4#

(actuators)# #4 3*4 *44* *44 ##44 #3# 44 4#

*4 E] o] d> *.

Appendix-54

IEEE Std 379-1994

- 4444 44# 447M 4444 *## &4# * 44.

44314 *4* *4 444*4#4 cflTSrflî *4444 #. o] #44 444 444 IEEE Std 308-19914 #&.

- 443147144 4444 44444 44# 444 44 4444 4444 44(auxiliary supporting features)4 44.4144 4**4 4431*

44 4 444 4 4.

- 44444 444 44 44(sensinglines)* 44314 444 #444 4.

• 44 J1S) A>^>

- 443147144 44444 44 4441441 444 #4 4# 44*

(41* *4 444 4444)4 44 4144 3i*4 444 44444

44444 4444 4444 4.

- 4##4 "§7} #4* 44414 44314 44414 414 7^* 314#

- 4431441 444 414 4441 7}*# 44#* 4444 °1 444

4*4 4441 444 44# 444 4# #4.

Appendix-55

IEEE Std 383-1992

♦ IEEE Std. 383-1992. "IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." (€4^#4#i Class IE Ml 4#, ##, <444 44 71#)


2. 44 (Scope)

• ### Class 1E##M Electric Cable, Field Splice# 4 #4

A}#4# Connection## ##5}#M1 A}#4# Type Test# #45}#Ml Ml#

44# #45}yi #4.

3. Class IE Electric Cables, Field splices, and Connections

4. #^7} ##

• Type Tests as Qualification Method

- Cable Description - Cable Description# ### Conductor, Insulation, Assembly,

Shielding, Covering, Characteristics, M #(Identification)## ### ### °|:

#4.- Field Splice or Connection Description or Both - #4"44 #4"4 Ml°l#4

4444 ##7}#- Conductor 44 #4# 71#.

- Description of Significant Environmental Conditions - 4# # 4 #4 4

#M41#A}# #44 45}# ## &4# 4#.

- Operating Requirements - #4 A| 4 °1 4 #4 (Meeting Service Conditions4

LOCA, Fire ## #Ml7l#A}#)# 4 #4 ##

- Type Test Conditions and Sequences - #44 4# Al#4 #471 #a}#

#44 4# Al# #A1# 71#

• Documentations

-General - ### ### 4#5}yi

- Test Program Outline - A| 4 # 4 7l #.

- Test Result - Al# 44# 4 #4 444 #####7} # ###

#^5}^#7}* ##44

-TestEvaluation- Ml4# ##4 4### ### # ### #7}5Ho} 4.

• Modification - 44# 5}7l 4 ## o]ô] a] ofl 4# jl%o] 4#4 4# #.

444 4## #7}.

Appendix-56

IEEE Std 383-1992

• Examples of Type Tests - 44 44 444 4444431 a]o] a]^]

4# 44# 4# #7p>ji #4.

Appendix-57

IEEE Std 384-1998

♦ IEEE Std. 384-1998. “IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class IE Equipment and Circuit.” (Class IE 7) 7}S\- 3] 3..2] 31 IEEE71#)

1. #4 Code & Standards• 10CFR50.55a(h)• IEEE Std 279-1971• Reg. Guide 1.75

2. 44(Scope)Class IE 4 #4 4 43 (Circuits) ^ #44 34# 4 4 #4.

3. 7] 4 H: Independence of Class IE Equipment and Circuit

4. 444-

• 4 4 3 4 # 4 4 3 4 (General Independence Criteria)- 5.1 e 334# #44 (Required Independence) - #44 #4 4 #7l a]

4 4 (Physical Separation & Electrical Isolation)- 5.2# #^44 - 4### #3, 44#4, ^(barriers) ^34

4#2] 3#. 44 44 44# Tie] #4, 44 Devices, Shielding, Wiring4# ^ 4#4 3#

- 5.3# #^## 3### 313 ^ #4 - M3 #31 4 ## 3#(4 44# IEEE 494-197431 44)

-5.4# 33444#44 € #4 (Compatibility) - 3331#4 4 #3 ##3l3 Class IE 31 #2) #^## #4

-5.5s 44 € 3 (Associated Circuits) - Class !E2j- Non-Class IE #4 #44 4 33 3 2121 44 #, 343 #4 4# 4 Class IE #37} #### 4# 44 443 44444# #4 4 4444. 4# 44 ##

- 5.6# Non-Class IE 43 - Non-Class IE 43# Class IE #32j- #44,44433 44446I: 44, 3#4 ## ##7} ### 44# #4# #44 Class ie 4 34 4 #4 4# 3444 ### 4 #4 4 #4*.

- 5.7# 43144 4#4 - #4€4 ### 3#31 4# Pipe Whip, Water Spray, Flooding, Radiation, Pressurization, Elated Temperature, Humidity ##

Appendix-58

IEEE Std 384-1998

JL3}. Si# ## 41 ## # 5}# ## (Rotating Equipment)-^ #214} -2]#

3#3 313}.

- 5.8# #3## #ti} (Structures and Equipment) - #7}} 7}# #2.41 ^-#0)

#3## W# 31# 44^ Class IE #32}

#3} E) O) d) ##,

- 5.9# #4) #2. 7}}# (Fire Protection Systems) - #41 #2. 7}}## Class IE

#3.2} #^#°} #^5}x} ## ## 4}4}# ###0}6}: ##.

-5.10 s #4 - Class IE division4}#2} #7} 41 2} # #4)7}- °1#2) Class IE

division^}## ##4} ## ^3# ^#i#6}: ##.

• #1# #5} 3#

-6.1s Cables and Raceways

2 # 9)## - ti} ####, 41#### 9} #####3 ##

2 ## #3} 7} 3}

■ 3# 4}### IEEE 383-19742} #4)# #3# ##

■ 3##(exposed) raceway# ti} #7])# (ASME 136-79)

■ Raceway ### #7} ##} ### ##33 ## #4M

#21#}# #

2 Lesser #3}7} 3} - ## #3}# 3##, ##2} #3# ##2} ##

(mitigative measures) ## 33} 3## Class IE #3 # ##

5}3cable raceway2} ## # 4.5m( 15 ft)# #x) ### #. Class IE

# ###3 cable raceway# # 1,5m(5 ft)#3#, 3# ### Class

1E2}- °1 #2} Class IE ##2} ## #### ##

2 ti} #2 ## . ## 41## #ti}# 3##2 ## 2:# ##, 41#

##, switchgear, transformers, 5} # ## #°1 # 9} 4} 2} #3#

olxl9}4}2l #ti} 41## ##. 3#2 #914}2} ###3 41###

enclosed raceway3 ##. °1 # 9}# °1 # ### #7]} ## #x| 9}

3###3 ## # $1# # ## (ANSEANS 59.4 - 79). 3# missile

212 x} 91# #3}. Cable Tray ##2} #37}3}# Tray #°1 41

###33 1 ft(0.3m) #4 3} 33# 3ft(0.9m) enclosed raceway 3#

division #°1 4} # 1 inch(25mm).

2 41 #41 ##91 . ## 412| x} #ti}# i##2 ## ##. cable

tray#°l 2} # 37} 3} # ###33 3ft(0.9m) ## #33# 5ft (1.5m)

division#0} 41# 1 inch(2.5cm)

2 #### -Class IE #3^2} #### ##

Appendix-59

IEEE Std 384-1998

S Non Class IE Circuit Cable Tray 2j- Class IE 4 il 4 Tray Af°| 4| i :

44 42121 3ft(0.9m) 44 4 2121 5ft(1.5m). Enclosed raceway 4"4 2]

! !! 1 inch(2.5cm).

y o]^4 o] x]^! ^4 Pipe 3.4- Missile 4^ 44, #4

44

- 6.2 e Standby Power Source - 4 4! Class IE Standby Generating Units!

444-31 444 4^45. !4

- 6.3! DC 4!^ - %414 ^ M4 #^7] 44 Standby Power

447] 4 4 44-4] 44

-6.4s !4r 4 2' 4 - 2' 41 :>.| 7| »|. Motor control center, Distribution! 44:2

44S. !4 !4

- 6.5! 44-g-7] 44 4#4 - !4!444, 4!4#4! 44 444

4 4^44! 44!!

- 6.6! Control Switchboards - Main Control switchboard 44 4 44 ! A v|] $]

444 444 44.

S Class IE Equipment & Circuits! 44 4 44 4 Control Switchboard 4

#4444 444 444 44. 444 44 Class ie 44 4

wiring! 4 44 4 4 !4 4 4:44 !4-4 44.

S Non-Class IE 4*4 wiring 4 Class IE 4*4 wiring 4-o] e>)] *j 7]]

4^## 4 ![4 &4 44.

■/ °l! ! Common Termination Non-Class IE Wiring Cable Entrance 4 4

44.

-6.7s 4# Cabinets - 44r! 4# Cabinets! 44 44

- 6.8! #4 ^ #44- 5g.Ai]!!-! 4! - 44r! Class 1E#4 ^

!!!]!!-! 44! 44444, 444 44!4°> #.

- 6.9s Actuated Equipment - Class IE Actuated Equipment! 4 ! #4, pump drive

motors, valve operating motor)! ! 4 4 44" 4"4! ! ! 4 ! 4 4 444*.

44 4-! 44! !!# 444H #4-.

• 44- 44 44 !4

-7.1s Power circuit - 4! Devices! 4! 314" 44"4 ! 4 Circuit Breaker

Trip, 31 4 444 ! 4 Circuit Breaker Trip, Input Current Limiters 4°|

4.214 4"7} 4-4-4 !4 !4. 4# #4 Diesel Generator Excitation

444! 4! 31! 4! 4 !4 Circuit Breaker Trip! !4

- 7.2! Instrumentation & Control Circuits - 4! devices! 4! Non-Class IE

Appendix-60

IEEE Std 384-1998

#4 4### S# ##7} 44 44# Class IE sjss 4444 #4## 42. S# shorts, grounds, open circuits 44 4 4 S#\ 4 4 4

devices IE 4 Amplifiers, Control Switch, Current Transformer, Fiber Optic couplers,

Photo-optical Couplers, Relays, Transducers Power Packs, Circuits Breakers, Fuses

44

• Class IE Safe Shutdown Circuits and Equipments

- 8.1# 44 - 444 Class IE Safe Shutdown Equipment 4444 4 #

Postulated Exposure Fire# 44

- 8.2# Postulated Exposure Fires - 44 #4 4 44 444 ### Cable or

Equipment 4# 5L44JL #4 #4# 44(44# 44)44 #444

44.

- 8.3# 44 #4 - 4444# 4# 444 Class IE 4-4 4 4#4 44

44 4s. #4. 4# 444 #44 44 #41 #444# Class if

44 ^ 4S4 44# #4 # #4## ##.

Appendix-61

IEEE Std 420-1982

♦ IEEE Std 420-1982, “IEEE Standard Criteria for Periodic Surveillance Testing for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.” (44^ 4.^ ^7]44'& 4 4IEEE 7]#)


• 10CFR50.55a(h)

• IEEE Std 381-1977

• IEEE Std 323-1974

• IEEE Std 344-1975

• IEEE Std 566-1977

• IEEE Std 383-1974

2. 44 (Scope)

44^4452] Class 1E2] «>, 44, 44 4# 44 4 4#

44-44 44 :

(a) Non Class IE components 4 module

(b) Class IE 444 7]7] 4 544 444 4# 45 4 44

(c) External field run 71 °1 4

3. 7] 44: Periodic Surveillance Testing

4. 44 7} 54

□ Sec. 4 444 53] 4^-(Design Consideration)

4.1 4 ?t54 (Human factors)

4444 4#44 ^]]o]42] &444 ^ 7]^44 4

4454 44# TIB]#4 445]44 4.

4.2 44

44445. 444, 44, 444 ieeestd344-19782] 544 44 4444 4444 45

(a) Class IE components 4 7] 44 45 4 44 444 4 4-74 444 53]

(b) 44 44 44 444

(C) 5444 44 44 444.3 45 53]A>4

Appendix-62

IEEE Std 420-1982

(a) ## # mounting 41 ## ## 41A141# ##, plug-in ##, slide-mounted #7] Si# device ## #414 #

restraints 41#(b) Class IE# 41### 41 ### ## ### ## # ## ##71### 41

# ###41# ##### Class IE ##41 ### ## ### ##

##»> #.

(c) ### ### #4## ## S# 41## ##41 #### ####

### ### ## 11### #### #41.

(d) ## # wiring # termination device## 41# #-4 ## # # motion 41### #41

4.4 ## (Separation)

4.4.1# 41 3!3lAl"#(Design Consideration)

IEEE Std 384-1981# # # # # ## ##

(a) #### #^## ###-# ## ### 41# ## &

##41 redundant Class IE #71#- #### #### #, ## #5. ### ### IEEE Std 384-1981# #### ### #### ##

(b) Class IE # Class lE/Non Class IE #### ### ##, IEEE Std 384-

1981 # ##### ###-# ### ##41 #-#41# #.

4.4.2 #41# lit ###(Circuitry Consideration)

Class IE# ##41# ##### ###-# ## ### #41 # 414# 4# #4## 31#.

(a) ## 41## entrance, wire ducts and terminal points # redundant Class IE

# ## ##41 41#### ##.(b) Terminal points # ## 41# #41 41### cable entrance area# IEEE Std

384-1981# ## physical separation# ##### #41(c) Class IE 41##, ##, #41 ### 7171# component# Class IE #-

Non-Class IE ### ## ## ### ##### #41

(d) ##### ### ###- #41 Class IE 41##, ##, ## ###

##### #### ## ## #.4.4.3 ## ### #### ^ ###

### ### ##### 4#H## ## ## IEEE Std 384-1981#

## ###### ## ##( 6 inch (15.24cm)) of air space. ## ##

##### ### # ^# ## ^ wiring ##41 #### ##.

Appendix-63

IEEE Std 420-1982

4]# #4, Class IE 4] <4#, ##, #414 4#4 # acceptable fire barrier

(a) Metallic conduits separated by 1/2 inch free air space

(b) Two sheets of fire-retardant material separated by 1/2 inch free air space or

equivalent thermal shielding

(c) A single sheet of fire-retardant material with one inch of free air space or

equivalent in thermal insulating material between the sheet and the nearest Class

IE components or wiring

4.4.4 Barrier Attachment

Conduit, raceway 3# 4# ### # ## barrier 3. 4## 41,

44] "4" 4—3 3# 4 4 4: ##.(4# #4, welding, bolting, 43 4## 4433)

4.4.5 #4

44 #, 4 b, tFw 4444 Station ground4 4 #4 44444 4.

4.5 # 4 # # 4 43# 4 4 (Control of combustible)

4.5.1 #4 #4# #4# #4-

4.5.2 ## 34# 4# #4, 444, 44, 44 A>#4# #4# 44

44# #4# ##.

(a) wiring & cabling

(b) 4# nonmetallic materials

: ANSI/UL 94-1979,94 V-0,1,2 4 444# 44# #44, 4# 44

3# 3 4433 ##4# ##.

4.5.3 47M ### 4#44 4444#33 4#

(a) 444 44

(b) 4 #, 3/^(Impregnation)

(c) 4 4 4 #(Pressure Impregnation)

(d) 34 (coating)

4.5.4 4434 44 4 coating## 3444 #4, 4# 444 44#

444# 4433 #4

4.5.5 44## 4 444 #444 43#4 ##44 ## ## 4#

4.5.6 44#4 # ### 3444 4# 4 #, case# 4#44 44#4 #

##4 #44 4#.

444 4#44 #34, IEEE Std 384-19814 4# ## 4#.

Appendix-64

IEEE Std 420-1982

4.6 #44 ^ 44 2^4#

4.6.1 4444 #44 #4 2#

#44 : aM, ^2 ## ^2, #2, #4#, 44 4# 2### 44

4 #5 : IEEE Std 323-1974 2] 2## #447]44# 4# 44244 44 4 4# ambient # #2 #2 &, 44

4.6.2 #4

444, % 424 ##24 % 4# ##244 ### 2#, 4##

## 244 #22] Class IE 4### #f- 2# 2.52] ##4 #442

4#. #2 222## ##2 ##-## 4##2 4 #47} ## ## ^

#44 4##4* #244 #.

4.7 Wire 4# (Wire Selection)

444, 44, # 5# 91 2##4# #2442)1 A}-g-E|5 wire5 IEEE Std

383-19742] 544 4#

jL l'| t]] 44 4 if 44. derating factor. 7| 7]] z] 4 4, thermal rating 4 insulation 4

42. 4 7] 4 cable & wire# #444222 444]# 24. untreated polycthylcns. polyvinylc chloridc(PVC) 4 44444: 7)22]44 4#

4.8 Wire Practices

4.8.1 Class IE wiring 4 44 444 44

(a) Wire bundle 4 44 18 inch 4442 a]x] l]] 4:>-|

(b) Terminal block, plug connectors 4 44 terminating devices 4 4 4 4]

4444 2c4^4_g. 44

(c) Smooth edged surface (4]# #4, 4 45] 4 4]4 )# barrier 4 4 4444 any

opening4] 44444 #44?)

(d) 2# Wiring # Sharp edge2#4 22 444 #4.

(e) 444, 4^4 A}-§-5]^ wiring # #422#42 #4 444 ^2#^444*> #4-.

(f) Wire splices(2) 4 224 4 4 #4.

(g) Hinge cable2 24 4 wire# multistrad flexible wire, hinge 4 444

22444 44, strain fatigue4 4 #4 4 2 444 4.

4.9 EMI

Appendix-65

IEEE Std 420-1982

44#, 4, ## #7114 #4.

### 4 4 # 4 yf. #4 /:) 4 c]_ shielding of susceptible components, shielding

of the source of the interference #4 7]H.

4.10 A] HlI(Identification)

H 7] 7]/wiring tr Class IE 44 #, 44 #4M1 4 44 —5. marked 4

4## 4 $^44 #.

4 #4# O] ^ #4 ^.#4 -g-O] ^ 14^.# A}?} 3/8- #^4 ^

4 #444 44#

4.11 4# 314 4#

4.11.1 47] 4 4 4 # (Periodic testing)

44#, 4, 47] 31 4 4#1 IEEE Std 338-1977 ##.

#44# 4# device 4 4M4# A^ ^

4# 444 4# 4## ^444 4## # 1 41

44 44# 4 #4 4 41 4# 4#4 44# 41, 4 7]711- 44

444 44# 4 444 #.

4.11.2 Modification

1444 44 Til ## 511344 n 444 444 postulated #41

14441 ^.4-

4.11.3 #7-11 14

#7iH 414 41 41 &##3 444 #4.

(a) #4

(b) Fabrication

(c) 7171 4 mounting

(d) Wiring

(e) Terminal 7l 7l

(f) Grounding

(g) Installation

(h) 4#

(i) 4 4 loading

(j) Separation

(k) Packing & Shipping

(l) Receiving, Handling & Storage

Appendix-66

IEEE Std 420-1982

(m) #4#

(n) Wiring & component Identification

(o) Environment & Location

(p) Flame-retardant

(q) Ventilation & Cooling

(r) Identification nameplates

(s) Aging with respect to qualified life

4.11.4 ZL 2)2] 313#}#

4^ ####4 Til# ### < 5.# #### Class IE

7#] 2) ##### ####

4.11.5 ## (Design Change)

^#2) ^ A}#4

4.11.6 w e2L#(Quality Assurance)

ANSIN. 45.2-1977 ## E>#

4.11.6.1 Al# # #A}(Testing & Inspection)

A1 ## wiring A1 ^ A1 <4] # x]] a] ## 5.# # JA # 4|# xS ## #

#### ^-01# #

4.11.6.2 £#(Tools)

5.# £## ## #5]## IAM»> #.

4.11.7 # A1 iV'r(Maintcnancc)

JA#2] #al# Class IE 4% M#1A1 JA#7>

4.11.7.1 Field #1 °1 Wire ways, Termination area# -mAl 2L#-8.°1 field cable##

^7% 31%1 f #7|]A1 31^2]ô}

4.12 3) # (Qualification)

4.12.1 Aging

Agings % 41* #44% #4% #4 ^ #4

7MM# #tiHl 4# aging# IEEE Std 323-1974 2] aging ##

W 7]# ## ^7}^] 7}#2]# aging

# Arrhenius # A] Z1 #.

#A}# aging # mechanical aging 2) A] VLB) 2]°#} #

Appendix-67

IEEE Std 420-1982

4.12.2 ## # ol JL5] A]-^-(Environmental Considerations)

414#, #4, 4#4 4# 4## #4#- 44 444 44#.(a) Air flow# 4 #4 4(b) Air flow patterns# 4##7] 44# 4(c) Engineering judgment# 5] # 4 # 4

4.12.2.1 33 ### ### 4, #44 ## &## # 4# 44 #4 ## 4#.

4## #3 #4# 44# #4, 4#4 #4# #444 #4.

#4# 44#, #4, 3334 4# ##7} #4 #4A^ 4%

## #### ##.

4.12.2.2 4 ###4 ### wire #44 #44# #3# 4### #3#

4# #. 44# 4 ### #44 444 #4.4.12.2.3 #3 ## #4# #3, #a}# ###4 44 ## # #4# 4#

#4# #4# 4##44.12.3 4 #44 31#

IEEE Std 344-1975# 4# ##4.12.3.1 #4

IEEE Std 344-1975# sec. 6 #--§-.

#, 44#, #4, 4## RRS, OBE, SSE#4# ## 44, ####

A1 4 exploratory resonance search # # 4 #

4.12.3.1.1 44#, #4, 4## 4## 27}# #4# ##:bolting or welding to embedded steel#7}# ### #7}x]-§- A]—§-#4 ## #7} #### A}-§-^ #.

4.12.3.2 Device Functionality## Class IE device7} 44# #4, 4#4 4##4 4#4, 4# 44#

4 #4 44# 44 ### #4##4 #444# ###.##7} 4## ## ## #43## trs# #44# ###.

4.12.3.3 Combined #4/44IEEE Std 344-1975 sec. 7# 4#

#4 ## ### #4# ##, #4, #4 Amounting, 44 44

#44# ##.

Appendix-68

IEEE Std 420-1982

#444 37]7} ### 4, 44, 444, 44 4 444 44 444 44

44 44 444 s## 44444, 4 s## 444 444 ##444 44.

4# A]^^- q]Al^ ^44 7]^ ^-§-_

4.12.3.4 Modification

4.12.3.4.1 Class IE 444, 44, 44 44 444 Modification 44

444, 44, 44 44 #22# 4 modification4 44

^7}5]714 ^4# ### Overall 44 ##4 44 44

444, 4, 4444 mass 44 444 44# modification 4

4# 44## #2844: 4.

4.12.3.5 4# 4#4 44 44(a) modification4 4 4 #444 44 4 4 4 4 444 4# component4

44 44# ##4 44

(b) #44# #44 &# 44#g.#4 #4 : Spot or area

(c) 444## IEEE Std 323-1974 4#

(d) Class IE 444, 44, 4#4 4#4# 44# 44 ## #44 44#

IEEE Std 323-19744 4# 444 #444 4##5. ##(4# #4,

44# # 4. #.#4 simulation, functional 44#)

Appendix-69

IEEE Std 473-1985

♦ IEEE Std 473-1985, “IEEE Recommended Practice for an Electromagnetic Site Survey(10kHz to 10GHz)” (44"44- #4 Site 4^4"^)



2. 44(Scope)

3. Keywords: Electromagnetic site survey

4. ol^7>o_5

□ Section 4 : Test Planning

• Site Electromagnetic Environment

- 44 ^4 434 4444 44 ^ 43 44 44 7]#

. DataSampling: 444 3^34 44(l4), #44 4# 44 4444(144),

4444 44(144)

• Site Characteristics 4 34 §i 34

□ Section 5 : Site Survey 4 4

' 44 43 ^ 44 4341 4# 3.444 4 3444 44

• Power Density Surveys : 444 414 4144" 2:444 4 4 44 °1 44 44

44 44

• Power Distribution System(44444)4 442:4 : 444 44 44 44

Background 44 44

□ Section 6 : 444. A)-§-A]

• 4414 34 44

• 444 44

□ Section 7:4 4 4yl

' 44 4-4 443

' 4414, 44 444, 4344, 444 44 4# 434-4 44

Appendix-70

IEEE Std 473-1985

. ^ ^ %1M

□ Section 8 : Detector 7] ^

" ^&î, e

• 7]" Detector ^- Aj ^ J15.

□ Section 9 : Data Handling

• ^ M 71] a]

Appendix-71

IEEE Std 577-1976

♦ IEEE Std 577-1976, “IEEE Standard Requirements for Reliability Analysis in the Design and Operation of Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generation Stations,” (IEEE #©©]# ©©©#© #_©)

1. © © Code & Standards

• IEEE Std 279-1971 (ANS N42.7-1972)

• IEEE Std 603-1991

• IEEE Std 308-1974

• IEEE Std 352-1987

2. (Scope)

IEEE Std 279-1971 © IIEEE Std 308-1974 ©©© M©## ©4©#

©©©!#© ©©©#©

3. ©©#: ©©©#©, 2.^7]©, ©©©#© 4©#©,

4. #©7} #© (©©© #©#©)

• #©#© (actions, ©-§-©71)

- Actions: (D©©©#© ® ©7} @

testing interval © 7} (4) 7] 7] © ©© 7} © 32© 33© (corrective action)

- ©©©©: Q ©©#© Q) @ #©

• © © #© © 5

- #©# : 354 ©## ©4 (©#©^_ : #©##, 3I©©4,

©©^r©, #3)-)

- 4© 31© : Section 4.5 of IEEE Std 352-1975

- #© ^ &©&© 7]# : #©4© 7©8# 4©#© ^ &©&© 7]#

- ©©4© 31©

• ©##©#©

- ©©=#© 4© : ©©S© 7}-§-c

- 4© ©©: IEEE Std 352-1975© "Section 5" 5E# "## A"4 7] #4 ©©

- ©©4© 2.©: IEEE Std 352-1975© "## A"© 4©4 ©©#1 ©4©

©©7}©

- ©©S/7}-§-S ©4, ©:©#, #-§-, ©©#©, 31©©©© ## ^ 7}©©

#©#, 31©© ©B) #©, 31©#, #©-£ #©, ©44© (IEEE Std 338-

Appendix-72

IEEE Std 577-1976

1975, Sections 4.7, 4.8, 6.5) 7]#

- 47] A] ^ ; IEEE Std 338-1975 (IE 4 f 7] A] ^ 3334

44 : ^r^l^l0! E1, 44, A1 4 44/44 x]]fl- limitation 44)

• KINS 4444

- KINS 4444 3, "44^-4^ 444#4 444 ^7}" (44 ^)

- 4#4 444 44# 7]4

- 4444 4.4: (D 44 4M 3#34 ® ^44 3.^-4 3.4

4f 34 ® 4334M 3444

- 4334M 444: (D 7^444 ® 444 S14444 4444

34

- 34^4: 4##4 444 44 444 47}7]44 4# 3§7} (44#

4444 44)

- 441-44 44414 444: 4 #4 444 44341 #34144

333414 314 4# 4444 7]n 714)

Appendix-73

IEEE Std 603-1991

♦ IEEE Std 603-1991, “IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.” 4% IEEE 7%

1. Code & Standards

• 10 CFR 50.55a(h)

• ANSEANS 51.1-1983

• Reg. Guide 1.53

• IEEE Std 279-1971

• IEEE Std 379-2000

• IEEE Std 352-1987

• IEEE Std 577-1976

2. 4 -4] (Scope)

3. 71 t-] ; Safety Systems

4.

□ Section 4

• 44 a] 444444-4 44 A]

- 4 44S.H4A1 4444 A>ji nl S)-g-5}^ #43 444 #4

- 4 444e a>jl41 4% 44444 44 44 4 44 M 34

(protective action)

- M444 4% 44-34

- M 34* 4* 34 4*444*4 4444 44 44 4 4#

44*4 3%, 4 44*4 4444 *4, 44, 444 4 4-3.44

44, M 344 444 4444 444 444

- 444 *o) ^^^433 ^4)4 44 4344 34

- 44*4 *444 44 444434 4*4 44#4 434 4 44

- 4%, 44% 4 %34 4*, 44, 44 4 #44 4% 4%%4 4

4%%4(steady-state) 34A] »>A|4%01 44* 4 4.3 44

- 444* 4^* 43433 4*44* %4

- 444*4 4444 4 444*4 444 4^44*4 343 4#4,

444 *3* 4***4* 44** 44

Appendix-74

IEEE Std 603-1991

- #44 4#-j7 44 4" critical points 4 # # 244 4# 4 2]- 444#-2] 444# 4# 7] 7] 2] J22#4

- 444# ## ^ #4* ##44 # # 4# #44#

□ Section 5

• 4# 344 2 (Single-failure Criterion):

' 2224# 4&: 444## 4#4# 4444 #^##4 44-

444 444 4# #4

" ##: 44#- 2## 4^44 #424 4 #T# 3##4- #4## ###

44# #

• 7] 7} 2] 44: IEEE Std 323-1983, IEEE Std 627-1980 #2

« 4#^ 44# 44: 444444 44444 ##

• 44 44 4 514: IEEE Std 384-1987 #2

' #234: 4#^ #-434, #434

« 44: 444## 3.4 4 442| 44, 2#, #4# # 44

• 4# (Identification): 44444 444 44444 444 44# 444

44# 4 #4# #4-. IEEE Std 384-1987, IEEE Std 420-1982 #2

« 3224421 24:

• Multi-Unit Station# 44: 44444 4# 4# 444 IEEE Std 308-1988,

4#444 4434444 4# 344 IEEE Std 379-1988 #2

• 444#44 44: IEEE Std 1023-1988 #2

• 4#2: IEEE Std 352-1987 #2

Appendix-75

r(tf

IEEE Std 627-1980

♦ IEEE Std. 627-1980. "IEEE Standard for Design Qualification of Safety

Systems Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

44## 44# 4# ## IEEE 4#)


4 (Scope)

4### 444# 44## 4# 44 #4#

#4 4##9l ^4^ ###31$)#-.

3. 4#4

4. 9m 7} _a_4

• Qualification Principles - Qualification# i:l] 4 y| # z) o| w) # # a o] jl:iLAf2Kt.

Qualification 7]# 21###: # a}#-#.

• Specification Criteria - fl fl 9t7l7-]| #- 4# # qualification 77 727/„ # # 7]] y/„

44# #S4 44# 44#4## 4444 ## 4### #4.

• Qualification Program - Qualification 5.72.2144 ## 5) 5# °l 7L# 4| 4# 7l

91# 544# 4### 5# 7} 44# 74 4# #4 #4. 4# 4## 4##

#4 44# 444 72# °1 qualification# 47) 7} # # 4 44.

• Documentation - Qualification 4# # 44## 4^1 7} -§-5# 4444 724#

4#] 7] ##4 44444 44 #4#4 44. Qualification 4444 # # 44-7>7> 4##4 44 44A] 44 44#a) 4## 444 44.

Appendix-76

IEEE Std 730-1998

♦ IEEE Std 730-1998, IEEE Standard for Software Quality Assurance Plans.= 7)133 333 IEEE 7]#)



• ASME NQA-1-1994

• IEEE Std 983-1986 (33 IEEE Std)

• IEEE Std 730-1-1989(33 Old Version IEEE Std)

• IEEE Std 730-1-1995 (33 Old Version IEEE Std)

2. tj§-rl (Scope)

3. Keyword: Software Quality Assurance Plans.

4. y^7> 33

« ^5344 #3^-3 334 334 333 ^-33 33# 33 44

- 35) (Management)

- 34 ^-(documentation)

- SL3, 34, Vt ^1 72 B) 72 x] {{(standards. practices, conventions and metrics)

- 33 3 3AR Reviews and Audits)

- 4 3 (Test)

- 344 32L 3 A1 o' A :>'| AR3( Problem reporting and corrective action)

- 33, 7] R). 25] JL 33 {' (Tools, techniques, and methodologies)

- 33 3 5) (Code control)

- "| c| o] j-1- c] (Media control)

- 333 3B| (Supplier control)

- 3 s 33 71 3333 b) (Records collection, maintenance, and retention)

- 3 3 (Training)

- 3333 (Risk Management)

IEEE Std 730-1998°))3 43333 Safety-critical software.

33333 33333 IEEE Std 730-199833 3333 33 SQAP3 33333

7)333 33 333444 3333 333 3A>33 3.

Appendix-77

IEEE Std 730-1998

IEEEStd 730-1998## SQAP# 44# ###-## ###

- 7#JEB#1 # 44 ### 41 ?! # (Configuration Control Board) ##

- til) B## (Release Management)

- ###*11 #51# escrow rule ##

IEEE Std 730-1998# #### Safety-critical ##B#1# ##B#7)1## #####

####. IEEE Std 730-1998# # #### ###B ####-# B##B#

BBB#1# #### #### #.

### #### #4# ### ### #-## ##/###

## # ###-# °> ##.

IEEE Std 730-1998## # # #JI ## ##B#### ### ##(##-)# ###

1. ## (Purpose)

2. #JL##(Reference Documents)

3. # L'l (Management)

4.4':# #( documentation)

5.31#, # #. ## 72# JL # ^(standards, practices, conventions and metrics)

6. #51 # ##-(Reviews and Audits)

7. ## (Test)

8. ## # 5L2L ’ll # # if: *| #-#( Problem reporting and corrective action)

9.51#, *1#, 72# 2L ## #(Tools, techniques, and methodologies)

10.5751 ## (Code control)

11. ### ## (Media control)

12. ### ## (Supplier control)

13. # #51## ###### (Records collection, maintenance, and retention)

14. ## (Training)

15. # # ## (Risk Management)

1. ## (Purpose)

- SQAP # Section 1.0

SQAP# #### ## # ### ##

- ### ## ## SQAP# #### ### ##

Appendix-78

IEEE Std 730-1998

- 944 BBB41931 9*4 9* *4* SQA 49*

444 9**4. ** SQAP?} 9*44 ^9949-31 931* 9*.

2. #*94

- SQAP 3| Section 2.0SQAP*4 9*99 EE 9431 94* 7]#.

3. #3]- SQAP 3) Section 3.0

47149 E?], 94, *4* 49*4 9* 4# 9*. ^3] . 9^3]3l #99* ^ 49* 494.

SQA,SW,SCM,SSA3}3l 931431* 4 #94.

■ 9* : *9 SQAP91 3]91 44 44 BBB41* 4447131 *9* 9*,

SQA #9 9*4 9&49 44, 4# 444:31 4:44 ^ 3149*4 9*

**B9B 44 444. 44431 4444 4444 44 4444 44

- 49#* : 4 44* 4444 #4* 4*4*9. 4#44

4. 444- SQAP 3| Section 4.04444 #99*431 ;%#, 44 ^ 99, 4#, 44 B4 4* 4444

44* 44 *31 4431 9*4* *9(check for adequacy)94 99-4 B 4*

9431 997144- 9994* #444 4 494 4 44(Section 64 #4*

99).

9714 *444 44*31 94**94 9*4- *4.

■ SRS : Software Requirement Specification

■ SDD : Software Design Description

■ SVVP : Software Verification and Validation Plan

■ SVVR : Software Verification and Validation Report

■ User: Documentation

■ SCMP : Software Configuration Management Plan

5. 5.9, 4S<§, 931 *4* #B(Standards, Practices, Conventions and Metrics)- SQAP 31 Section 5.0

4444 4-9-9 *4, 49, 431, *4* 4* 9* 994* 4*431

Appendix-79

IEEE Std 730-1998

f M 44# #45-444 #* 7]###.^^4# 444- Documentation standards

- Logic structure standards

- Coding standards

- Testing standards and practices

Selected software quality assurance product and process metrics such as Branch metric.

Decision point metric. Domain metric. Error message metric. Requirements demonstration

metric

6. #5. 4 ##(Reviews and Audits)

- SQAP# Section 6.0<47]#^ 4s ^ 4443., 4s ^ 44*44# ##7.] zlE\JL o_5. 4## 4S4 o]6§

44 4 4444* 4*444 #4.434 4*4 S4444 #4

- SRR( Software Requirement Review)

- PDR(Preliminary Design Review)

- CDR(Critical Design Review)

- SVVPR(Software Verification and Validation Plan Review)

- Functional audit

- Physical audit

- In-process audits

- Managerial reviews

- SCMPR(Software Configuration Management Plan Review)

- Post-mortem review

7. # ^ (Test)- SQAP# Section 7.0444^ svvp# s*#4 44 s.4 4^^ *443 ##44# ##44.

8. *#4 5.3 4- SQAP # Section 8.0

Appendix-80

IEEE Std 730-1998

333314 item# 7%# ^ ##3* #^*44 ##* *4## 33, *4,

4##^#4 337^#, #* ^ #4* ###3 4# **#4 34*444

4 #34* ### ##**.

9. 3#, 4^, 3#3 M#- SQAP* Section 9.0444* SQA# 4*** *314* i£H0|oj 7l^5 35)3 ####

4#*3 444 444 #44 44 4##4

10. 33 #4 (Code control)- SQAP* Section 10.0333314 4# *4# 3* *4*#r #4# 333314# version# #4, 44, 34 343 44 #444 ##44 ## ^ 3#*4# ^##*(ex.

QAVault). 44 444 333# *4344* 4433 4^# 4 #*.

444 SCMP4 4434 444 4 44-. 44 44 4 44 #3444 4444# *#.

11. 444 #4(Media Control)-SQAP* Section 11.04444 #4# 44 *#4 #4# #4 4 3##44 4444# *#.

4 444 4**(computer product)# 4# 4 4 4 4(restore) 44 44 4 44

#3# 4444 4# 444* iM. 333314 4**44 3* *4

*441 4*4 33344 *44 444* 4*44 4*4# **44 4*

441 ## *#33#4 33. 4*# SCMP4 #*34 4## * #34

44 4* 44# #3*44 4444# *#.

12. *##- *S] (Supplier control)-SQAP4 Section 12.0444* #**71- 4##* 333314* *4* 3*# *### 3**4

4 4 #4 (Provision)* 71*4#. 3* 4*4* 333314 ##*71- 4#

*3 #4# 3*# 31*##*# 3***4 **# *## 71**46): **.

71 7H*# 3333144 444* SQAP314 #*3 #* 333314 item*

*41 ****41 3 333314 7} 4 **X1 (Suitability of the product)#

3***4 **** #4* 4**4* *#. 7H*# 3333144 444*

Appendix-81

IEEE Std 730-1998

#4444 °1 44 SQAP# *4 #ji 4^4## #444 4 44.

(4444 S4 7^444 o] #4# ##4-3. $^4# 4# ^.#44

4 4 4 44 444 4*4"<40T: #4. 444 4 #£4 escrow mle°l

4444# 44.

13. ####4 #4S-(QA Records)- SQAP4 Section 13.04444 ##444 # SQA #4# 4^444 44. 4 44# 44,

4* #4 zl^zl #4444 4444 44 4 #**4# 4#44. zl^zl

#* 4 4:(lifetime record, permanent record)# 44444 44

14. #4(Training)- SQAP4 Section 14.04444 SQAP4 #444(needs)# 4444 444 ##4 #4###

44444 44.

15. 4 4 44 (Risk Management)- SQAP4 Section 15.04444 sqap4 #44 ##B#4 #4444 ###44 444 # 4#

4444(area of risk)# #4, 47h 44 #4 31 #4 4#4 4 #4# 44 444* #44## 4*444 44.

Appendix-82

IEEE Std 741-1986

♦ IEEE Std 741-1986. "IEEE Standard Criteria for the Protection of Class IE Power Systems and Equipment in Nuclear Generating Stations." (Class IE

*44*4 ^til jus#.#)

1. *4 Code & Standards

• IEEE 603-1991

• IEEE 308-1991

2. Scope

• &*# Class IE ### *#4*4 ^4# ###

7l**# #4 #5! ^4.

3.

4. *#7} o_y

• General Design Criteria

- 4* ^ #44 5!## 44## ^

##* 7}*## ^- *## ###5i 44 4* a## # ### ## 4

- ^ **# #*# # 3

- #7] A]ô] ^

- 5-# 44 4 4.(Protection Control Power)°l *A1 7}# #51# * 7A

- *4# #4# 4# #7] 4^0] 7}##ca_ % ^• Principal Design Criteria and Requirements

- AC Power Distribution System

■ Switchgear and Bus Protection - IEEE Std 141, IEEE Std 142, IEEE Std 242#

#&# #

■ Bus Voltage Monitoring Schemes - Bus Voltage Monitoring Scheme# # SL*4

#*# *### &# ## #21# 4S# 4-5!

■ Feeder Circuits - ANSEIEEE C37.96, C37.91, IEEE Std 141, 242, 384# Standby

■ Power Supply Protection - ANSI/IEEE Std 387, IEEE Std 242# #2E# 7A

• Load Shedding and Sequential Loading - #*# #*-*# 4# 4444

#4##4 *## Load# # #47} ^4# #.

Appendix-83

IEEE Std 741-1986

■ Surge Protection - ANSI/IEEE C37.96, IEEE Std 141, IEEE Std 487, IEEE Std

518# ^

-DC Power System-ANSI/IEEE Std 446# ^

- Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System - ANSEIEEE Std 446, IEEE Std

142# ^

- Primary Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies - IEEE Std 242, Section 11,

"Conductor Protection'’ # ANSEIEEE Std 317# 4 A# 4

7]# - 4#^ #%# &M4 #4.

■ Purpose

■ Assumptions and design basis

■ Sources of information/references

■ Data

■ Computations

■ Supporting graphics

■ Summary of results

■ Conclusions

■ Design Verification

^4 aM, relay

burden, mechanical and thermal ratings, current and voltage transformer saturation

curves, ratings and ratios, relay and breaker settings 4 fuse section# 5L#44.

Testing and Surveillance

Device Testing - IEEE Std 141, IEEE Std 498, IEEE Std 336, IEEE Std 338#

3

Preoperational Tests - ANSI/IEEE Std 415# 4 A '4 4 Surveillance-ANSI/IEEE Std 308, IEEE Std 338# 44^ 7]# - 7]## 4# #4.

■ Test description

■ Description of test equipment

■ Test prerequisites

■ Environmental conditions

■ Conditions of device prior to test

■ Abnormal alignment

■ Comparison of test results against expected results

Appendix-84

IEEE Std 741-1986

Identification of conditions different than those anticipated

Corrective action

Evaluation of test results

Appendix-85

IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993

♦ IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993. “IEEE Standard for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations.” (#7j-§) 4;£i4:ir-444# #$444$ #4 IEEE 4$)


• 10 CFR 50. Appendix B


• Reg. Guide 1.53

• IEEE 279-1971

• IEEE 603-1991

• ANSEANS 51.1-1983, ANSI/ANS 52.1-1983

• IEEE Std 379-1988

• ASME NQA-lc-1993

• ASME NQA-1-1989

• ASME NQA-2a-1990 Part 2.7

• SECY-91-192

• IEC Std Pub 60880-1986

• IEEE Std 610.12-1990

• IEEE Std 730-1989

• IEEE Std 828-1990

• IEEE Std 1012-1986

2. #4 (Scope)

$ &$$ 444 #4^4 $4 4$#(safety system)^ #$47} 44-#4

IEEE Std 603-1991$ #44 4$#4 7]$#, $4$4

444 44 4$$ 7] #4:1 %4.

3. Keyword: Digital Computers in Safety Systems

4. 4#7h9.4

□ Section 4- 444# 44 4$

• 4444 44 4$$ ANSI/ANS 51.1-1983, ANSEANS 52.1-1983 4 IEEE Std

603-1991$ 4444 431 $7}S. section 5# $$$ 4444 4$.

Appendix-86

IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993

□ Section 5- 444# *4

' 4*34

-IEEE Std 603-1991 #4

• 3* s5 31 2} #3

-IEEE Std 603-1991 #4

' ##

1.

- 4*b1 ASME NQA-2a-Part 2.7# 4#4*

QA TfllH 4#, THii, #*, 4* ##4 #4. 4*33 IEEE Std

730-19894 IEC 60880-1986# 4## * 44.

2. 4# ## 4*421 ## 3#

- ASME NQA-lc-1993, Appendix 7 A-2 3) 44 Commercial Grade

Item(CGI)2] 434 ##3#

- 4*4 7^ #44 44 ##3#

3. 45331H £4

- 45331H 44# 4 #44 4 #4 55B31M7} 445. 44

44* v&v# * 444 44 44# v&v # 4#4 ^4.

a44 54* 4444444 4445 44444 44.

4. 44 4 4#

- 4*4 443*4 V&V* ASME NQA-2a-Part 2.7 section 3# 4*

44 **5444 44. 44*4 v&v* asme nqa-i-198931 44

**<9444 44.

5. 4533114 *444

- 4*4 4533114 4444* ASME NQA-2a-Part 2.7 section 54

44 **5444 44. 453114 *444* asme nqa-i-1989

supplement 3S-1, section 54 44 **5444 44.

• EQ

IEEE Std 603-1991 #44 EQ testing* memory, CPU, EO, Display function,

diagnostics, 44 *#, #4 path interface# 54 44 44.

' #34 44*

E 4*4 44*# 44 #4

- IEEE 603-19914 it*** 3*4 44 4*4* 5# *4 5*4

4# 4471*4 *4454 #4444 44.

2. *534 3* (Calibration)# 314 #4

Appendix-87

IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993

- 511434 a44 4347} 44443 444^4 44% 444^

444.

» 444

1. Safety channel 44 5)]o]b] #44 safety 5}- non-safety 44 5)]o]b]

#43 444#4 4% 4^144 ^44 #4.

2. iE.Er|44 firmware 4 safety4 non-safety 44 444444 444

44 ^##4.

- non-safety 45.34] 4 4 firmware 7} safety 444 444 4444

4444 444 # 4 44 barrier 444 4444. °l barrier4

4 544 5.344 5.544 44444 44440} 44.

. 511334 2/84 44 4^

- IEEE Std 603-1991 44

. 4334

- IEEE Std 603-1991 44

' 4e44

- IEEE Std 603-1991 44

• 45]

- IEEE Std 603-1991 44

• 44

- IEEE Std 603-1991 34

. 334#

- IEEE Std 603-1991 34

• Multi-unit stations

- IEEE Std 603-1991 34

• 4434 34

- IEEE Std 603-1991 34

' 443: 444 443 437} 334 4, 4344 43 #4#

434144 441 444 553445 5444 44.

□ Section 6 - Sense and Command feature

• IEEE Std 603-1991 34

□ Section 7 - Execute feature

• IEEE Std 603-1991 34

□ Section 6 - Power source requirements

Appendix-88

IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993

• IEEE Std 603-1991 *4

♦ Annex A: Relationship of this standard to IEEE Std 603-1991

4444* £ S*2] **4 IEEE Std 603-19912] 7] *(criteria)*

44# 4*4 4##3I $1*.

♦ Annex B: Diversity need determination

*44*^(sa&ty system)^] 4*4 ^*34144 4-*r@ 4 **3*3I#

(common mode failure)0] t ASf 4"* 4 °1 $14 **4 (diversity)* °1# 44

44 4741 44 $1 4 Annex B4 a1 °] 4 44 44 4 44431 $14.

♦ Annex C: Electromagnetic compatibility

4444 444 44 (electromagnetic interface : EMI)4] 44 44 44431

4444. °M1 44 emi4 44 44444 44444 4444 emi2]

42]# 44, EMI* 44 44^ *44 44 4414 4##3i $14. s#

EMI 4444- *4 444 *44 44* 444 *31 $14.

♦ Annex D: Qualification of existing commercial computers

444*4 (safety system)0] * SL*2] 7] *°] 4*44 44 44 44

71]*4 4*444 44* **°1 *4.

* Annex* °] 4 4*4 4** *44 44 *44-31 $1*4 asme

NQA-lc-1993, Appendix 7A-244 4*4* 4*4 $1 44* ****

*444 4*44 *4* **4 *4 *4* 44* 4**4.

4444 *** 4** 4-** 4*.

CD Identifying the safety functions the computer must perform

(2) Identifying the characteristics the computer must process in order to accomplish the

safety functions

(3) Demonstrating that the characteristics are acceptably implemented.

♦ Annex E: Verification and Validation (V&V)

v&v* #44** **444 4# #44 4*144. 4 ### #4] *4 444 4#4 444514* 4*#3i 7%#2] * *444 #4# *#* 4*# 4* 44 444 *^44.# Annex44 V&V2]- 7fl# 44 4°] 2] 44# 4*431 44 **

Appendix-89

IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993

(standard)#- 44431 #4.

#4 ASME NQA-1 -1989'dl4 Independent V&V(IV&V)4 ##431 ## "Ml

44 4444# rv&v4 ##44# 444 ^^43. %4,

GD Independent performance of activities

(2) Independent witnessing of original designer activities or

(3) Independent reviews or inspection of documented results

4# 4###4

GD Independent V&V activities :

Reviews, witnessing, inspection, analysis, testing

(2) V&V for development activities :

Requirements allocation V&V

Non-computer hardware requirements V&V

Computer hardware requirements V&V

Software requirement V&V

Integration requirements V&V

Non-computer hardware design and implementation V&V

Computer hardware design and implementation V&V

Software design and implementation V&V

Site acceptance V&V

Operation and maintenance

(3) Documentation

IEEE Std 1012-198644 #### V&V documents^ #444 44# 4#

#4.

- 44 ^ 4^(V&V)

- ° l 44 4 #314 (anomaly report)

- 44 ^ #314 (V&V ftnal report)

♦ Annex F: Identification and resolution of abnormal conditions and events

4#^4 444# 4# 4## 4# # # abnormal

conditions and events (ACEs)-S] 44# ###4.444 ## # # ## #4# 31### 4### (Failure Mode and Effect

Analysis : FMEA), 3'4#4 #4 (Fault Tree Analysis : ETA)# 4# #4 "I 4 °l

IEEE Std P1228# Mil-Std-882BG]4# 444 # 4# 44# 44431

Appendix-90

IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993

4 Annex## 0 ACEs2] ##4 ### 444 #4# 4l ##3 00#

#3 400 404 #4.

0 General guidance for ACE resolution

0 Identification of ACEs through the use of analysis

0 Identification of ACEs throughout the life cycle

0 Previously developed systems

© Documentation

♦ Annex G: Communication independence

###04] ###7]- #0# #4 0# ### 30 ##-40# 7^##2]

4144 0#4 44-2171] 44. 4 #4 714*1 #044 7144: #4144

##4104 4]7]#0 4471] 4 4 04 7]-44°l 41404.

0 Annex0 040 004104 44 444 000 44 00! 44# 40

# 4 03# 40 ### 4]##4.

Safety computer# 44# 44044 44444 44140 #440 #4

004# 0# 04# 0444 #04 #4# 404 00040 ieee std

384-19920# 400 00 0 Annex 0 0# 40# 00# 0## 440

04. 404 #4 0044 4 #43 04.

© Communication between Computers in different safety channels

© Communication between safety and non-safety computer

♦ Annex H: Computer reliability

0 0041# #040 #402] 4#404] 441 #4# 4]043. 04.

44# 4]#4 4000 #0#40 #00# 4#4041 444 #0

##3#4 04.© ###2] #030 #-0#(speciGcation)2] 7]## 3##-#4 4M#

##03 #0# 4414 ##0 3# 4# 004.

© #4# 414# 4000 non-redundant #042] ### #03

4 # 4# 044 redundant common mode 30 common cause failures#

#04 3## 4000 414404. 44# 44# 41## 7}#3###. #43 #4# 40# 4410 #-0#(speciGcation)4]# ###

7>4# 4 00 304 ##33 (common mode) 30 common cause

failures3042] 30# 44# 3#444 #4.

04.

Appendix-91

IEEE Std 828-1998

♦ IEEE Std 828-1998. “Standard for Software Configuration Management Plans.” (#SB3M IEEE St)

1. Code & Standards


• Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Chapter 7 Rev. 4, Branch Technical Position 14

• IEEE Std 730-1998

• ANSI/IEEE Std 1042-1987

2. ## (Scope)

• A i£ H 4-]) # # A1' 3,A c] 7-]| 3] (Software Configuration Management Plan, SCMP) #A1

44, 4^ #4 4^4 4## ##4# 44

• Critical Software^#0! 4 #4 #44 4 ## #44" 4 4 4 A## 4 ## S #

## #4# # 4# S5.H411 °i)2] 44 #4#7l, Noncritical So Aware 4 °14

4 #4 4# 7>#.

• 4 444 ## 4M^ scm 4 #4 4# Til si 44# 4447-14 scm

audit# 4# ###.

3. 7] #32: Software configuration management (SCM), Software configuration management

plan (SCMP), Software configuration activities, Configuration item (Cl),

Configuration control board (CCB)

4. #47} #4

• "SSH## 7j x.1- 34 l'1 7-l| S] (Software Configuration Management Plan)"°14jt A1

44 #47} 74#4# 44# ## S#4# ## #44 ####5. i#

44 44444 4.

• 4 Til 31 #4# 5.# SCM Til 31 #0_f} 4## ###7-1 # #44

4## 4#^4 4# ## ## 44## #4444

. TIM 4^)# ## ^44

• IEEE Std 828-1998# 4# SCM Tfl^ #4# 444 #4 67># ### ##

4### #M4 #31 4^ #4* ### 4 4# 4 ## #4 #44

Section## 4 #4# #.

1) /MfWwcftOM—44 #44 #4, 4# 44, ## #4 ^ ##

## #4

Appendix-92

IEEE Std 828-1998

- MM 447> 4 #3## 4# #33 ##7)-4 4# #44 ##4 ##.

- 4# ##444 SCM 4# 7}^ ##, 4###, ##, 3M1#, 44

44 3## 7}^ #-#M ### 7]#

2) SCMmoMogemeMt—Ml## #4 #^# 4^# #41 33^3 34 ^ 4

4 #4 4# #3# 2]4 a}## c])# ## #»)# ^Tg (Who?).

- 3.711 SCM°1 4-§-213 33^)3 34, 4 ^4# o]â}#, 35)3

o) 333)34 4##4 SCM 44 # #3A)-#(directives) 33 4#

4 444 7)^4o> #.

3) SCM o^Wh^—33434 43# 4 34# 3# #4#^ if#

(What?).

SCM 44 #44 34 4 7#) 7)3# 44" 44 (configuration control),

44 f-4(configuration control), #4 7| #( status accounting). 35) 3 4

4 #A|- # 4 3(configuration audits and reviews)3 34-##. IEEE Std

828-199844 4 4f #4 7)4# ## 3## Section 4.3.144

4.3.44 7)#5)o)

4) SCM sc/Ww/es—SCM #4#4# 3343# ## #4 #4## #4

coordination# 3# ###- ir# (When?).

- 44343 3343 #434 #344 SCM 33 44### #3

SCM #4 ### #4# &# 44# ###M1* ##4# #. 3

Ml# 43# 4## ##3 ###7)#, 3343 44 444# #

#4433 ###7-)#, 34 #44 4432) 433 ### 43

#4. 34## #434 44 34# #.

5) SCMôw^—Ml# 4^4 #4 34#4 34, #5)4/44## 4#(How?).

- 44#5) 4#4 33344 34# 44# 4#4* 4444 44

# 4 ##. 34# SCM 44 3# 4#44 3343 444# 4

#4. 344 #4344 43# 44 44, 44 M)## 44, 33

44, baseline 44 44, #4 44, 433# # 44, ##/44#

44, #4 434, 4444 #4##M1 4# #3 3#, #4, ##

34 SCM 4 3) 4# #44 4## 4 ##.

- 44# # SCM #4#4# 444 ## Ml## 4# 33, #4, #

#, ^4 33344 3443 44M1 # ##M 44#3 ## 4 #4 4 #4)# #.

Appendix-93

IEEE Std 828-1998

- 4 £££44 £44 4444 4 £44 ££#£444

£ ££#£ 4444 /14M4 44 44 44 444 4 4444

###£ £44 4 44 44 44(configuration control)# 4444

#.

6) SCM plan maintenance—444 444 444 444# 44.

- ££#£ 4444 #4 444 SCM 44 44# £444 44

*£# 4###4 4# *^*# 4, #7} 4^^ 444#4

444- 444 44 ;W4 444 #£, 44 4^44-# 4

W ### ^44, £ 4 444-M 4^4 **£ ^

££## # #44* 4##4 #.

• IEEE std 1042-1987# # 444 4444 £££44 £££4 4#4 #4

£4 4# *#4 4# 4^ 4 4^4 * 444 4#4#4 44* 44

#£ 4#.

• IEEE Std 828-19984 IEEE Std 1042-19874 Section# Cross Reference 44#

# 4#4 ##.

IEEE Std 828-1998 IEEE Std 1042-19871. Overview 1. Introduction- 2. SCM Disciplines in SM4. The SCMP 3. SCMP

4.1 Introduction 3.1 Introduction4.2 SCM Management 3.2 Management4.3 SCM Activities 3.3 SCM Activities

4.3.1 Configuration Identification 3.3.1 Configuration Identification4.3.2 Configuration Control 3.3.2 Configuration Control4.3.3 Configuration Status

Accounting3.3.3 Configuration Status

Accounting4.3.4 Configuration Audits and

Reviews3.3.4 Audits and Reviews

4.3.5 Interface Control 3.2.3 Interface Control4.3.6 Subcontractor/Vendor

Control3.5 Supplier Control

4.4 SCM Schedules 3.2.4 SCM Plan Implementation4.5 SCM Resources 3.4 Tools, Techniques and

Methodologies4.6 SCM Plan Maintenance 2.5 The Planning of SCM

5. Tailoring of the Plan 2.5 The Planning of SCM6. Conformance to the Standard 2.5 The Planning of SCM

Appendix-94

IEEE Std 829-1983

♦ IEEE Std 829-1983, “IEEE Standard for Software Test Documentation”a]*] ^sH!- ieee 7]it)

1. Code & Standards• 10 CFR 50 GDC 1,21

• 10CFR50 Appendix B


2. ^-rl (Scope)

3. Keyword: Software test documentation

4.. ^

- Test plan identifier;

- Introduction;

- Test items;

- Features to be tested;

- Features not to be tested;

- Approach;

- Item pass/fail criteria;

- Suspension criteria and resumption requirements;

- Test deliverables;

- Testing tasks;

- Environmental needs;

- Responsibilities;

- Staffing and training needs;

- Schedule;

- Risks and contingencies;

- Approvals.

- Test design specification identifier;

Appendix-95

IEEE Std 829-1983

- Features to be tested;

- Approach refinements;

- Test identification;

- Feature pass/fail criteria.

• Test-Case ^

- Test case specification identifier;

- Test items;

- Input specifications;

- Output specifications;

- Environmental needs;

- Special procedural requirements;

- Intercase dependencies.

• Test-s # ^

- Test procedure specification identifier.

- Purpose;

- Special requirements;

- Procedure steps.

• Test-^4 W JiTZAl

- Transmittal report identifier;

- Transmitted items;

- Location;

- Status;

- Approvals

• Test 7]#

- Test log identifier;

- Description;

- Activity and event entries. •

• Test a}ji r,ui

- Test incident report identifier;

Appendix-96

- Summary;

- Incident description;

- Impact.

IEEE Std 829-1983

• Test ## IiJL

- Test summary report identifier;

- Summary;

- Variances;

- Comprehensive assessment;

- Summary of results;

- Evaluation;

- Summary of activities;

- Approvals

Appendix-97

IEEE Std 830-1993

♦ IEEE Std 830-1993. “IEEE Recommended Practice for Software Requirements Specifications.” HM]# -rl'?t IEEE

1. Code & Standards

• 10 CFR 50.55a(h)


2. 44(Scope)

4:441# ^53414 3# 441

3. Keyword:

4. 444-.2#l

O ^53414 3#44l(SRS)4 #4

- Functionality

- External Interface

- Performance

- Attributes

- Design constraints imposed on an implementation;

□ SRS #4

- 5,# ##3414 requirements# 4 4 6)| a) ##-.

- 44# 4414 #4 #4 #-§-# #444 #4#

- ##34144 4# #7>4 #

□ $# srs4 #4- Correct;

- Unambiguous;

. 4444 #4

- _R#441 44

■ ####

- Complete;

■ TBD(To Be Determined)4 4#

- Consistent;

■ 4 # consistency

- Ranked for importance and/or stability;

Appendix-98

IEEE Std 830-1993

■ Requirement# irjTJE# ##527} # # # ##.

- Verifiable;

- Modifiable;

- Traceable

O SRS# ##

SRS# customer# supplier/} -§"#21.51 ##### ##.

□ SRS 713}

□ Prototyping

□ SRS# ##

□ SRS# iL## ##

□ Section 5. SRS# ##

1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose

1.2 Scope

1.3 Definitions, acronyms, and abbreviations

1.4 References

1.5 Overview

2. Overall description

2.1 Product perspective

2.2 Product functions

2.3 User characteristics

2.4 Constraints

2.5 Assumptions and dependencies

3. Specific requirements

3.1 External interface requirements

3.1.1 User interfaces

3.1.2 Hardware interfaces

3.1.3 Software interfaces

3.1.4 Communications interfaces

3.2 System features

3.2.1 System Feature 1

3.2.1.1 Introduction/Purpose of feature

3.2.1.2 Stimulus/Response sequence

3.2.1.3 Associated functional requirements

Appendix-99

IEEE Std 830-1993

3.2.1.3.1 Functional requirement 1

3.2.1.3.n Functional requirement n

3.2.2 System feature 2

3.2.m System feature m

3.3 Performance requirements

3.4 Design constraints

3.5 Software system attributes

3.6 Other requirements

Appendixes

Index

Appendix-100

IEEE Std 934-1987

♦ IEEE Std 934-1987. “IEEE Standard Requirements for Replacements Parts for Class IE Equipment in Nuclear Power Generating Stations.”

IE 7}7}S\ 2^1] f #4 4# IEEE ####)


• ANSI/ASME NQA-1-1986

• ANSEASME 15S-1

2. (Scope)

• #### IE 7 ] 7 ] .2] 51 x)]##

• IEEE Std 934-1987# ## # ###^M1# #### IE

7] 7]# 44# 5Lx)l##2] »] ## 44# (#### IE 7] 7]

#xl]2] 51x1]<41# 7] -g-E]y4 ### PCB# drawout circuit breaker'll# 5]-g-

3. ?] 44

4. #9] 7}##

• 7] ###

## #E3] 0_y:

(D ##2-7)] #44- 'll 7] # (identity))

@)

2#°1 #A3# #7111(1,2,3) 2##S # ### -> IEEE

Std 934-1987 ^44 #4#

(3) 7] 7] ## #74 (preservation)

## -> #### IE #71 ^^1

## # # (categories) ##:

(D #7}

## -> #### IE 7] 71 2] 51# #7> ###7> 51 x)]##

##; ^'H 51 x)]## ##; part conditioning -> #### IE 7] 7] 5]

4 #4 7^#/### #^1 ^^1, ####

IE #71 -> 7]^1 3§7]-

(2) #7} ### 54

Appendix-101

IEEE Std 934-1987

2*1] 5 4 -> critical characteristics 4 71002 40, 2*1] 554

0444 04 40; 500 A} -> 0 AM] 4; 5004 5 04 ->

0000 IE 7144 #4 5 4000 54; 50 0445 ->4000 IE 71712] 02 404 02; 07}20 -> 07}

004-7} 00# 50444, 05 20 4^ 041 004

50 25 0400 22&2522 504 critical characteristics 407}0

© 54 25 0544 5054 4 4544 -> 07}0 e 4"(approved procedure); 217}

00A}^] 54 ^ 4544 -> 07}# 0020 2220,

(certificate of conformance) 40; 07} 004 °12] 2] 5440 0

4544 -> critical characteristics 2] 0A} 4 A] #- 4^2] 2] 217] 4}

45 440 50 -> 0AMM; 5024 4 4544 -> 0000 IE 7M2] #4 4 4000 54; 55 #44^ _>

4000 IE 7] 7] 2] 02 004 #2

50 2 *]] (replacement) 25:

0 05 415

504 24105 40; 0040 40 -> 4450 44,40-00 4170 40-002] 05], 2*11 002] 2020 40

05, 00 40, 2040 5^05 % 4044(work

instructions); a] a] _> 7]040, 5 2(wamings), 44 A}0

(cautions), 4 05 7] 0, 20 20

(2) 4404(special process)

In-Process Checks -> 24504 4544 44 00; #A} #

40 -> 0000 44, 0040 44 4-4, 44 4-4,

44 07]] 444 #0©4 4400, 44 A] #24 ^5#

44, 4© 404 40 4#; Follow-up 404 5440 504

44 -> 400 440 4 44, 0040 044 44 45#

22] (actions), 4 04 7] ©(acceptance criteria)4 4044 7] 0

(3) Nonconforming Conditions

44204 4440 2*1154 -> ansfasme nqa-i

Supplementary 15s-l, PARAGRAPHS 2, 3, 4.3, 4.5; 2*1)504

Nonconforming 45 02 -> 54 00 04 40)

© 0020 7]5 (0020 2220; ANSFASME NQA-1-1986)

Appendix-102

IEEE Std 982.1-1988

♦ IEEE Std 982.1-1988. “IEEE Standard Dictionary of Measures to Produce Reliable Software (444 3334H#- 44 44 413^34 3^44)

1. Code & Standards

• IEEE Std. 982.2-1988

2. 4 ©4 4 (Scope)

• 444 33B4H

• IEEE Std 982.14 4444 433 A>-g-E]ji 43 7^t ©4 ©343444, 3 444 34, 44#^, 343 ©#4444 A1

• 440?1 4 ©44 4444 3§7l_ ^

• ANSEIEEE Std 729-19834 4# 44©A1 4444 44 ©B43 44°1

4444 444 44© 4# A)-g-

• 44, % 444 44-4 44 43434 44 4434 4-g- 7}^

3. 444: 444 3334M, 44 4343, 3334M 444, 3334M

444 44, 3334M 4444

4. 447>34

• #4 43434 444 4# 3#

- 4# #4 41343 :

©3#, 44, 34-: 44 44(human cause), 3334 43, 444

4#4©4 4# 4444 #4©4© 34- 44, 34-^r : 44#44 444 4-3 #4 41343

(derivative measures)0444 44- 4 44-(projection): 44 ©444 ©4©4

334-(failure-freeness)°11 44 444 44®4# 4#44: 4#, 44, 34 3©©4 4©4 ©44(fault-

freeness) 4 4©44(completeness) 4 444 : #34 34 33344 ©4404 4 4 4 (agreement) 44

© 444 (complexity) : 444 444 34 44- 44 44 ^343 (44444 44 44 ^3434 3?l-4 ©#):

Appendix-103

IEEE Std 982.1-1988

(D4414: 144 4!©! 114 l7)-

<2)l-§-44 (coverage): ©5LB4))4 Iwir ttH©!

4©4 ©© 4©-4 ©1 (presence) 1 1

©44, °1 ©(benefit), H-H: ti] -© H, 225) J1 ©©-2] 5151

(process tradeoffs) © l

• 141 ©534)144 ©1 1)34© (11: IEEE Std 982.1 45 #©)

14©11U-XI 3.# ©3©oi

144=:11 1© 44

=41

41)4 1©1 Afl oi

715©21-14 3l©A©1444©54©y© Xl

©-©1 #44 © l x# 1553 ©54 ©2.#© 4 #54 © ©©31444 ©1 i©© ©1©-414 ©5 ©1©Cyclomatic complexity4© 4414 44© 14 11 14©14©©K 11© ©14© 1511©©344 1©© ©e

4 ©4© 1© 114 15Requirements compliance444© 4335 ©1©14 4544 141 114©Residual fault count1411© 554 a.!©!11 ©4115 2.114©15©©34D4515&©© 44© RELY: ©5 ©©341)4 141 ©©34)) 4 5©1HI (completeness)11 1#©1# 1©14©©4 ©114©5©3144 ©©34)) 4 (1#) 144 ©1 551

Appendix-104

IEEE Std 982.2-1988

♦ IEEE Std 982.2-1988. “IEEE Guide for the Use of IEEE Standard Dictionary of Measures to Produce Reliable Software.” (444 333414'S' 44*71 44# 04 413*34 IEEE A>-g-x]^)

1. *4 Code & Standards

• ANSI/IEEE Std. 729-1983

• IEEE Std 982.1-1988

• ANSEIEEE Std. 729-1983

2. 4 40 4 (Scope)

• 444 33B4M 7Dii

• IEEE Std 982.1-19884 3)0* 7]] * * 0 040(conceptual insights), #14

2.3)40, * 7} t]] ^(assessment suggestions)# 40

• 3334M 1^1 0044 a=)t])4 4^4 03* IEEE Std982.1-19884 #-§-4 X|-o] o} y]-a 7]]0

3. 443: 444 3334M, 44 4343, 4444, 4444, 4444

4. 444 34

#4444 : IEEE Std 982.14 4444 #3

• IEEE Std 982.1-1988 4 4 44 <4/34(rationale)3 44 43434 44

444 44

. 44, 3343, #44 44 43434 444 4# 444 44

43434 444 0444 44 04] @44(interpretation) @ 43#

%110

• 444 333414: 034 4 0(constructive approach), #4 44, 444443

. 4434: 444 44- 4]# 44 413434 04 44 413433 0*

• 4404: 34 4404, 04 4404, #4 44043 00

4 B(indicator) 4 4]#0 4"(predictor). #4 41343* 4# * : 444-44 44*711* 9*4]3 444 *4

0#4: 44340#

0*4] : 3334M 444 43*4

0*4] : 444-4 0#

Appendix-105

IEEE Std 982.2-1988

@44 : ^3 #4 4344 44

0^44 : 444 44 ^ 4444 4^

®44 : 44 344

®4r4 : 444 4?]-

®4r4 : 33344 44-

®4r4 : 33344 #4444 ##

*444 #4: 3#, ##, 3I%74 (4 6 4)• [4#] 4s]4 4334144 44 4344 : IEEE Std 982.1-1988, "6.3 #4

4344" 44 (4 397]] 44 4344 444 Application, Primitives,

Implementation, Interpretation, Considerations, Training, Examples, Benefits,

Experience, References3 4444 4 4)

Appendix-106

IEEE Std 1008-1987

♦ IEEE Std 1008-1987, “IEEE Standard for Software Unit Testing,”#44 ieee 7]#)

1. #^1 Code & Standards• Reg. Guide 1.171

2. ^£1 (Scope)

##®l#;5i3 ##4# 3332]]°] unit testing

3. Keyword: Software Unit Testing

4.. E1133 3#

-

- El] 33# features ##

- #4#

• El] 33 set $j#

- El]33 set 2] ##

- E1133

• Ell 33 #44 4#

- E1133 #7}

- #3##

- Ell33 3# # ## # 71-

Appendix-107

IEEE Std 1012-1986

♦ IEEE Std. 1012-1986. "IEEE Standard for Software Verification and Validation Plans." = V&V ## 4^ IEEE *#)


• IEEE 7-4.3.2-1993

2. * # (Scope)

Er 2£** £' 2£ H* * 4* * * * 7-]| * (Software Verification and Validation Plans:

sw?)# ^*4 44* *4 **4# *l#45i 44.

3. 44s

4. 4*7} **

• Software V&V Plan - Software V&V Plan* * *. # 52}'r*. £j 5]. Overview,

^4*71 V&V V&V 215!, ## #7} 4#4-

• V&V Overview

- 2£*

- Master Schedule

- 7}#

- *4

- **, 7]# 4 44#

" ^4*7l V&V - 4 4*143. V&V* 4W7l 4# 4*4

* * # * *: * Activity** 7]**JI 44-

• V&V 2131 - **#* tlT!*** <8*2151, 4Til* **2131, Anomaly 213!,

*#*51 #* 44.

. ## *4 _ Anomaly 2151 ^ *7% 4* **, #* **, **

** *<41 *4* 71**4.

" #5171-4:

- Critical software *## - * SL**}* *## * *4* V&V ##, input,

output* swp* *4**4 44. 4#, * **** 4** 4**5.

^l*# #**4 v&v *4741- #7}# *3 **4431 44# v&v

#** *7}*# swp* 4*# * 4* 444.

- Non-critical software *## - # SL** #*# *34# V&V ###

7}#* #51451 #3 *47}^ 4*71-^ 7^34 v&v 4* *

**4* swp* *** 4*1 4*# * 4*1 444.

Appendix-108

IEEE Std 1033-1985

♦ IEEE Std 1033-1985. “IEEE Recommended Practice for Application of IEEE Std 828 to Nuclear Power Generating Stations.”(€14 IEEE Std 828 4 #4 4# IEEE 1# #3##)

1. H Code & Standards

• ANSI/ASME NQA-1-1983• ANSI/IEEE Std 828-1983• ANSI/IEEE/ANS 7432-1982

2. 1 4 (Scope)4 4## €144 555414 4##4 4M# 4# 4 ANSEIEEE Std 828- 1983, “IEEE Standard for Software Configuration Management Plans'’4 1 -1 * Z1 # 4 -g-

4 4# #3A}#4 444 4##.

3. 4 4 —: Software configuration management plan

4. #47} ##

• ANSI/ASME NQA-1-19834# €44 44 4444 #444 44214 44#

4 4414 4444 #4*. 45344 ^##4 4^# 44 #4

(organizational structure), ###4 (terminology), 3# 3 #4 5# 44, 4#, 4 4444 44 4#€ ANSEASME NQA-1-1983 34## #4*# #4*.

• ANSI/IEEE Std 828-19834 34## ANSI/IEEE/ANS 7-4.3.2-1982 4 4#4 °44 4#4 #4# 434 53344 4444 4#44. #44# 4#4 ## 4 #4# ANSEASME NQA-1-1983 4 4 4## 355444 444# 555 44 #444 44# 4# 4 ANSI/IEEE/ANS 7-4.3.2-1982# ANSEIEEE Std 828-1983# 4 #33 44M# #4.

• ANSI/IEEE/ANS 7-4.3.2-1982# €4 #44# 4 533# 4-## 441 4# 4 4#4 4# 4# 4# 4## #4-. ANSI/IEEE/ANS 7-4.3.2-19824 44 3 ##3 ## 555414 4! 4 4 (software development plan)4 4*4* 55541 4 44*4:4# 4 444#

• IEEE Std 828-1983, Section 24 14# 4 4 (definitions)# ANSI/ASME NQA-1- 1983# ANSEIEEE/ANS 7432-1982 4 4 44# 44# #7}453 ####.

Appendix-109

IEEE Std 1042-1987

♦ IEEE Std 1042-1987. “IEEE Guide to Software Configuration Management.” (BiXB41# #4444 4# IEEE ##)

1. # 4 Code & Standards

• 10 CFR Part 50

• Regulatory Guide 1.169

• NUREG-0800, BTP-14

• ANSI/IEEE Std 828-1983/1990/1998

2. #4 (Scope)

• Software Engineering Project# ## # 4' J£ N 71) # # 444 (SCM: Software

Configuration Management) 44 i:l] 41 # 7]#.

• X| # (planning)# ## (implementation) # #3. #### 33.341# #444 #

#4#4 ### XM# 4 44• 33B41# #444 Xl# 4X1 #91 ANSEIEEE Std 828-1983# #4X1 33B.

4# #33# 7m# #43# ## #4-4 4# X14 # 4 #4 #4 44#

444-3. $1#.

• # 444# aXI 4-4-4 ## # 4-33 #44.-4# #B: 33 #3 B# a## 4# 33B41# #444# Xl44 a 444 # #4 #### #4.

-## 4-B: 4# 4-34# #4# #4 7>4 #-# #444 ;W## 44

4# Xl?}# #444 X14 #4### 44#.

3. 7] # B: Software configuration management, SCMP

4. ##7> 34

• 33B41# 44444 #4421 7fl#(4-#3444 b# #) B/H

- SCM 71)4

- SCM #4 (SCM #4 #4, Baseline 7^#)

- SCM #4 (333# # 4-#B44, 44444 44(CCB: Configuration

Control Board))

- SCM B# (Basic, Advanced, On-Line and Integrated Tool Sets)

- SCM XI4" ANSEIEEE Std 828-1983## ###3 ## ##33 33B41# #444 Xl

Appendix-110

IEEE Std 1042-1987

^ 7]#

-

- SCM (&3],SCM ^^]^]^,SCM ^]^grA| AM)

- SCM iM, 7]#, #4(audit) ^ ^

3, 333^] °1 Â1 (release) sA}

- 33, 7]# 7}^

- 3^4 mM ^14 333^]^ ^ 333^]^)

- 7]# ^

* f f 4f3W^ ^$/ o/g/ ^

^ ^ ^ ^y## ^x/gy

- Appendix A: Critical Software for Embedded Systems

- Appendix B: Experimental Development Small System

- Appendix C: Software Maintenance Organization

- Appendix D: Product Line System

Appendix-111

IEEE Std 1044-1993

♦ IEEE Std. 1044-1993. "Standard for Classification of Software Anomalies." Anomaly 44 IEEE 7]#)


2. 4 4 (Scope)

4 Anomaly## 4##7] 44# 4B#2] B4## 4443. 444

44 44W 4444 4###

3. 7MB

4. 444 44

• Classification Standard

- Classification Process - Classification 444 (1) Recognition (2) Investigation (3)

Action (4) Disposition^] rj] 44] 4 44.

■ Recognition : Anomaly-2] 4 4

■ Investigation : Anomaly-2] 824

■ Action : Anomaly 824 44°1] 44 827]

■ Disposition: 827] 7} 444 # 7]4

- Standard Classification Scheme

■ Classification Codes

■ Compliance Required

■ Recognition - Project activity, Project phase, Suspected cause, Repeatability,

Symptom, Project status 4# 44

■ Investigation - Anomaly-2] Actual cause, Source, Type 4# 44

■ Action - 4444 4 Resolution 4 Corrective action 44

■ Impact - Severity, Customer value, Priority 4# 44

■ Disposition

Appendix-112

IEEE Std 1058.1-1987

♦ IEEE Std 1058.1-1987. “IEEE Standard for Software Project Management Plans.” ^ IEEE S.&)

1. BB Code & Standards

• IEEE Std 729-1983

• ANSEIEEE Std 730-1984

2. (Scope)

• BB^)B

• IEEE Std 1058. lB BBBBB BB(format)B ^ 7]#

• B 4)1 °1, i|| B7-l| 41' 5717. softwarc-in-silicon. programmable logic arrayll B'fl'BB

BB 7)]^g- BB P1 ^ °1 (media) °ll ^-§-

• BB BBB4)M 7)]^ BBBA1 BB

3. ?MB: BBB4)M BB^B, BBB4)M BB^B

4. ol^l 7>B5

• BBB4)1°) Bfi^jB Bc) 7-l| 7] (Software Project Management Plan, SPMP)

- BB^B : B^B# : BB oMB(milestones), BBB, BB, 4^

B##, BB^B BB, BB(sign-oSs)## BB BB^B

(BB^lB 4BB BB B#); BBBB ->

BB^B^l idlBBzlBB 7]#; B^B^l ^ B^l -> ^ Bsl^^l7]#; BB^B ^"9 -> 4 BB^B 4B4

BB B a1 (statemen^B^l H ^1^4# BB

- Bz!^ : BzlBB ^ BBB4 -> BB^B BB

#B4B, BzjB BB^B# 7]#; 7}^, B#B, ^114 -> BBBB4BBB B 7>B, BBBB7> BBBB BBBB, zl^jl BBBb BH

BB %114 4A1; BBBB -> BB^BB BBB B^BBB 44 4B7]-; BA1 B BB BB -> SPMP°ll BIB BA1 B BIB adherence °11

B4-BB BB 4^Wechanism, BB^, ^§BB#, BB B 44BB,BBBB BB; BBBB(Staffing plan) -> BB^B BUB BBBB

7^7^B BB 44 (BB BBBe B)

- : 44, BB, 7M -> 4B4A1B4, 7^444#, 4BB,

BBB44 44, 7lB; BBB4)M BA1# -> BBB4)M BB^B*

Appendix-113

IEEE Std 1058.1-1987

44# *43 44 *3; BB4H. 433* -> BB4B3

433** 33 44 B#43 434, 34, 4# : 43 434 -> BB4* 34* *443 34 3*344 4* #* 4 44* 3# 43 434 44; 3*4 - > 43 434#4 *444 44; 43B* -> BB4* 344B*3* 44 433 *4* 44 #*B 4*; 44 4 4334 -> BB4* 3*, #*, 444 44 3 4334; 34 -> BB4* 34, 34, 443 44343 4434* 3.43 34*3'** (Additional Components)

43

4*

SPMP 34 4^34)

Appendix-114

IEEE Std 1058.1-1987

SPMP Format

(Title Page)73-ti7] S- (Revision Chart)

Aixr (Preface)

Ej-sj] (Table of Contents)

(List of Figures)

(List of Tables)

1. Al# (Introduction)

1.1 TiTLSjTT 7flT3: (Project Overview)

1.2 TiTLSjfT PlJE (Project Deliverables)

1.3 SPMP (Evolution of the SPMP)

1.4 ^ (Reference Materials)1.5 trl ^xrXj-oj (Definitions and Acronyms)

2. TiTLSjTT 7£2j (Project Organization)

2.1 (Process Model)

2.2 (Organizational Structure)2.3 TEA1zj t]] m o) Tjj (Organizational Boundaries and Interfaces)

2.4 TiTLSjTT ^ (project responsibilities)

3. (Managerial Process)

3.1 tjl -p-pilr-Tj (Management Objectives and Priorities)

3.2 7}^ (Assumptions), Pj0A3 (Dependencies), zjjpt (Constraints)

3.3 (Risk Management)

3.4 Monitoring and Controlling Mechanisms

3.5 Staffing Plan

4. (Technical Process)

4.1 (Methods), JEu1 (Tools), 7]pt] (Techniques)

4.2 Jg-Ajj]- (Software Documentation)

4.3 TiTLSjTT -8. 7] vr (Project Support Functions)

5. ®f|y]^] (Work Packages), (Schedule), 4] El (Budget)

5.1 4^ 471^1 (Work Packages)5.2 Pj0A3 (Dependencies)

5.3 (Resource Requirements)

5.4 4] El 3l x]-SliEi (Budget and Resource Allocation)5.5 (Schedule)

(Additional Components)

^ Pi (Index)

Appendix-115

IEEE Std 1058.1-1987

*311 (KINS: 9}*1 #333133 4# # 1# ##3 ##1#, #1 #)

- #33313 3M<g^ 7%M3 (#33313 11*3 #1)#

3**1(assurance process : *! 3#, 3* 7l#7l##

**M3 #91 # 1#)33 ##

- (KINS3 33333 3333 #33 3# 1*11 #333# 1*)

- 333313 9>1#*1(IC-1: #33-## 333313, IC-2:9>33-#3

#33313, Non-IC: #91:33 #33313)3 3**1 ##33 #3 3*3# 3# 3# ###3 *#1** 3#

- 331-33 3433333 3339} :

(D ###33# 7}#3 (#3^113 + 333313 *#):#1333## 1# #331333 1## ##1 13* #713#

* 1# #*

(2) 713 333313* *## 331 #3(3,PLC): 13#

333313 13 #3 3 3# #3 1 3## #13# (#3:APR-

14003 9>31331 9.20: 1*3-3# 3*333#3

33333* *3333 A}#)

- (ftJL) The Programmable Logic Controller and Its Application in Nuclear

Reactor Systems (UCRL-ID-112900) Appendix B: Application of PLCs in Safety

Shutdown Systems : Project Management (MIL-STD-l 512B/1521B/1042/499'A/

ZEEE g2g //FEE 70MJ)

Appendix-116

IEEE Std 1059-1993

♦ IEEE Std 1059-1993, "IEEE Guide for Software Verification and Validation.” V&VIEEE 7MH)


2. Scope

£ #4* V&V task# 4*421 #4* ** 4# ##44 *#4*

33*# 4*44 *434 43# 4# * 4*# #4.

3. 34#

4. 44 7> *#

• SVVP Guidance - SVVP *44 * 414* 4# #7i]4 *** 3*44.

Purpose (Section 1 of the Plan) - °1 44# *#.*414 4# 4 ** 3*4

#334 #44 44* 4**4

Referenced Document (Section 2 of the Plan)

Definitions (Section 3 of the Plan) - °1 44# *444 4*4 #4, 44

^ *3* 34, *4*4.

Verification and Validation Overview (Section 4 of the Plan) - V&V 44*

*3#* &3, 43, 4444 4* 4 434 *# 44, 4 4*444 ^4, 3## 4^#44 ## 4**4

Life Cycle Verification and Validation (Section 5 of the Plan)

■ Management of V&V

- SVVP 33

■ Baseline Change 3 4

■ v&v #* 44- 3* 44

- Concept Phase V&V - 4 44# # ** 3.5*44 4*4 4 4* 744

*44 44 #*44 *4.

Requirements Phase V&V - 4 44# # #* 3.5*44 4*4 4 4*

77>4 *44 44 4*44 44. Critical ***444 3* 4 ###

3^* 4*4 3*# *444 44.

- ***44 *#44 *33 #3

- ^*344 *#43 37}

Appendix-117

IEEE Std 1059-1993

■ 333# 4 3444 4# #4 3 Â1

- #33 M #4

Design Phase V&V - 4 #44 4 34 3.54## 444 4 44 77>#

4## 4# 44#4: #4. Critical °1 444 #34

4421 ^#4 34# 4 ##-.

- 333# 4 4#^ 44

- 333# 4 4# "§7}

■ 333# 4 4# 4# #4 3 âi

- 5i]33 #4

- 51133 4# #4

Implementation Phase V&V - °1 #44 4 IE 3.54 ## 444 4 $13

77>xl 3^31 ^1 4# 44# 4 #4. Critical 333# 4 2} 44 4 443

#3# 4321 3## 4 #4.

■ 3333 444 44

- 3333 ^7}

■ 3333 44443 44

- 3333 34 W

- 433 4143 44

- 51133 44 44

■ 4343. 51133

Test Phase V&V - 4 444 3 S3 3.5444 444 4 43 77>4

444 44 4444 44. Critical 333444 44 4 444 434

4f 2] 3## 4 #4.

- 4-43 433 ^4 #4

■ 51133

Installation and Checkout Phase V&V - 4 444 4 S4 3.544 4 444 4

44 77>4 444 4# 44#4 44. Critical 333#421 44 4

444 #3# 4421 ^#4 34#4 #4.

- 44 ^4 44

- ## v&v #33 #4Operational and Maintenance V&V - 4 #44 4 34 3.54#4 444 4

44 77># 4## cfl# 44#4 44. Critical 333#421 44 4

444 #3# 4421 ^#4 34#4 #4.

■ SVVP 71145.

Appendix-118

IEEE Std 1059-1993

■ Anomaly ^

■ Ig7>

■ Phase Task

Reporting (Section 6 of the Plan) -4®! °15j2] #3}?} A| tgi 7|] xrrA1 S)-

o] v&v 44-4 44 4 #444*

Verification and Validation Administrative Procedures (Section 7 of the Plan) / V

3.7.1-3.7.544 4#4 V&V4 444 #^b4 44 #4.

Appendix-119

IEEE Std 1074-1997

♦ IEEE Std. 1074-1997. "IEEE Standard for Developing Software Life Cycle Process." 4)4^71 7%# IEEE 7]#)


2. Scope

4 344 333^14 ^4 #7] #44 434^ 43# 444 ^1444.

3. 7]4H

4. 21^7} 34

• Activities

- Format: Activity# Input Information, Description, Output Information^] /|)

4433 444 4

- Entry and Exit Criteria: Activity-4 4 4 4 34 Input°l tl 4 4 lit 34

Output4 44434 44444 4

- "If Applicable" Activities: Activity4 mandatory4 “If Applicable'’3 444.

- Organizational Structure

• Elements of the SLCP

- SLCM

-SEC

-OPAs

-SLCP

• Mapping - Activity#4 444 SLCM4] 444. 444 44 4] 7>x]

44 33 Mapping.

- Instance

- Iteration

- Invocation

• Input Information and Output Information

- Conventions

- External Information

- Generic Information

- Information vs. Documents

Appendix-120

IEEE Std 1228-1994

♦ IEEE Std 1228-1994. “IEEE Standard for Software Safety Plans,” Til S3i: W IEEE Tie)

1. Code & Standards• NUREG-0800, SRP

• IEEE 7-4.3.2-1993

2. ^-rl (Scope)BB 9}^Ti]# BBB41H 9MB TIM

3. Keyword: Software Safety Plans

4.• BBBBM 9M%M _9M

- 3.1 Organization and responsibilities

- 3.2 Resources

- 3.3 Staff qualifications and training

- 3.4 Software life cycle

- 3.5 Documentation requirements

- 3.6 Software safety program records

- 3.7 Software configuration management activities

- 3.8 Software quality assurance activities

- 3.9 Software verification and validation activities

- 3.10 Tool support and approval

- 3.11 Previously developed or purchased software

- 3.12 Subcontract management

- 3.13 Process certification

• BBBBM 9MBBB- 4.1 Software safety analyses preparation

- 4.2 Software safety requirements analysis

- 4.3 Software safety design analysis

- 4.4 Software safety code analysis

- 4.5 Software safety test analysis

- 4.6 Software safety change analysis

Appendix-121

IEEE Std 1228-1994

• Aj-Jf 31-5} 0,5

- 5.1 Training

- 5.2 Deployment

■ 5.2.1 Installation

■ 5.2.2 Startup and transition

■ 5.2.3 Operations support

- 5.3 Monitoring

- 5.4 Maintenance

- 5.5 Retirement and notification

Appendix-122

IEEE Std C62.45-1992

♦ IEEE Std C62.45-1992, “IEEE Guide on Surge Testing for Equipment Connected to Low-AC Voltage Power Circuits” (4'£!*]' b: 44 #4 4 44 4^^)



• IEEE Std C42.41(Companion Standard)

2. 44 (Scope)

1000V444 444 7l 7] 2] 444447}

3. Keywords: Over-voltage, Surge, Surge-protective device, Test procedure

4. tM1-S-4

□ Section 4 : Planning of surge testing: Basic objectives

• General

- 4 -§-44"(ports): 67]] 5] Ports(AC, DC, Signal, Process Control, Enclosure, Earth)

AC Ports, Earth Ports 4] 4 4

• Surge Environment : Surge Withstand Capability to Each Environment^ )

^44 4# 44 444^4 3.7])\r IEEE Std C62.414

• 4444 4 r]j: Upset, damage, No change, etc.

• 44 -o"h"4 4: Un-powered Test, Powered Test, or both.

. 47} 44 4 4: Voltage(214444 4&: Winding, ), Current(444

44s] 5.: Capacitor, Surge diverting protective device, etc.)

□ Section 5 : Implementation of Surge testing : Test Equipment.

• Surge Generator(44444 4 7])• 47} 44:ac 4447}

• 47}44 (coupling) : 4 444 44 Coupling Device44

• EUT 44 44

- Section 6 : 44 44"

- Section?: 44 4?} 44 ^ 44 4_4

- Section 8 : Grounding(44 4 4 4-4)

- Section 9 : 44 3§7}j3_4

Appendix-123

Reg. Guide 1.22

♦ Reg. Guide 1.22, “Periodic Testing Protective System Actuation Function.”OL&Tm 4-^4 ##i #m e#44)

1. €4 Code & Standards

. IEEE Std 338-1987

2. 4# (Scope)

€###43 3341-1-

3. Keywords: Periodic Testing

4. tM134

• 3341 f-# f7]A]#

33### 4-*### #4"* 4# #4 *#433 44# * sis# #4

#4°> #4.- *44## 7}## #-##44 3# 4] 4=

- 33## # 33##4 #41 ##-4# 41## €43. #4 #4 4-##

4* 4## * 43# #4#4# #4.

• 4714444

- 33### 4 ##43#- ### 3# ### ###

44 4 4 4 #4.

- 34 44444 444 44* 7^##33 ## 444 3##3 44

# 44#4.

- #43 4444 44 444 444 #44 444 #414* 4444

4 44 44 444 #44 447} 4444 #34 ##-.- # 7^ 4*# ###4## ## ### #44 4M4^ 4- #-##4#

7HI433 44*4.

' 4444# ####

33444 €43 44 44 44# *433 #3433 ##€ 4#4*

#-44 4* #-#=4 4*33 ## 4-# 7} #*4# *44* #*#

4*4 #4* *3. # f#4-#7} #44 #4 7^ #4 4 3 ^33 #4#

4°> *#-.

Appendix-124

Reg. Guide 1.22

€43 44 #4 4444 #4 44# 44

€4^. 44 #4 4444 #4 44# 444 444 4##^1 4 #4 4 4 #4.

- #43 444 44 4444 4444 44 #3 444 44# 44#

4 #4 44444 #4 #4.

- €43 44 44 44# 44# 4444 #443 33444 44#

444 #4# 44444 #4# 4#4 4# 44.

- 44# 444 €437} 344## 4 #4433 4# #4.

Appendix-125

Reg. Guide 1.28

♦ Reg. Guide 1.28, “Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Design and Construction).” ^51 ^4^ 45HH5 #^5-^44)



• ASMENQA-1, 1997

• ANSI/ASME N45.2

2. 44(Scope)

ANSEASME N45.2 55 ASME NQA-1-19834 44 5 45444

44 #4554^ 44 ^ 4^4 44 4454 ^ 5#5445 444 4^ "9# ^4

3. Keyword : Quality Assurance, Quality Assurance Requirement

4. 447>54

• 4 NRC5 Reg.Guide 1.28, Rev. 344 ASME NQA-12] 44 544

554 10 CFR 50 Appendix B# 4#45 444.

• 19854 Rev. 35. 5 4444 ASME NQA-12] 44 #454 554

4544-, ASME NQA-lfr ZL 5 199351 4454 7# 1997445 ##

asmenqa-i4 5*5554. f-454 545 asme nqa-i4 asme nqa-2

# 5445 44.

Appendix-126

Reg. Guide 1.30

♦ Reg. Guide 1.30, “Quality Assurance Requirements for the Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Instrumentation and Electric Equipment” (Tfl##7171713 #3, #A>, #1M1 ##

1. Code & Standards• 10 CFR 5 0 Appendix

• ASME NQA-1, 1997

• ANSEASME N45.2

2. tg-r! (Scope)€4^##^ 711##%! ^ #7l7M ^^1, 4^4 ## ##

3. Keyword: Quality Assurance, Quality Assurance Requirement

4. #^7}°.#ANSI N45.2.4# 10 CFR 50 Appendix B# #### Âl#.

Appendix-127

Reg. Guide 1.47

♦ Regulatory Guide 1.47, “Bypassed and inoperable status indication for Nuclear Power Plant Status indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems.” U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.” (#4 ‘ti:*. 7)144 #44: 4f)1 4# 444^ # x]X\)

1. 4 4 Code & Standards

• Criterion XIV, “Inspection, Test and Operating Status,"’ of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50,

“Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants."’ (#

444 3## #444 4# % 44, 44#4 7}^ #4# 44#

4 #4 44 4*4 4444* #)

• Paragraph (h), Section 50.55a, “Codes and Standards,"’ of 10 CFR Part 50 (33444

IEEE 27944 7]## i?l|| *44# #)

• Section 4.13 of IEEE Std 279-1971, “Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power

Generating Stations."’ (also designated ANSI N42.7-1972) (3344 4 --7 o' 444

ti>44# 47-)# 44433 til7>4 443 4# 44#4A1 °1 44# 44

# 4 *3# #4 #).

2.Scope

4 Reg. Guide4 IEEE Std 279-19714 10 CFR Part 502] Appendix B41 Ai if' 4 45' 4

4 *** 4# #44 q)# 3*## *4*44 #44# *#*# 71#

43.

• 3341# 44 444 til 44 44(inoperable status)# 4 A1 (IEEE Std 279-

197M14 44#),

• 34.444 4 4 4447-14 41444 444

. 33444 44 44 44# 4^44 4# 71-444 444 4^#

#44 33 34 44 44.

3. 4 4 4: Bypass, Inoperable status indication

4. 444 34• 33444 33444 444 3447)4 444# 444 til-443 44

34 4M4* ti)7)-# *4)# 4# e)l#44 4433 4AN# 4 *4 Al

3## 44## #4#4 44* 47M4 4.

• 444 #44 44444 33444 33444 444 34444 444

Appendix-128

Reg. Guide 1.47

* 4** 4*45.5. 4 7] 7i 4 til 7}^ *45 *4% 5551*

44 4 € 4*4 tiM4^4 4*44 til7}^ *44 44 7^55 4^4

444 #.444 4## 44 444 444 44 5.4 444 4444 4 tiM4* 44 4444 til7}* 444 444 44444 44444 44.

- til 7}^ *45 # *

- 444 44 44 44

- ^** ** 4 #4 4*455 7}^4 *5# 4

4# 4*444 4 444* ** 444 441 4* 54-4 44*44 4 44 °> 4.

Appendix-129

Reg. Guide 1.53

♦ Regulatory Guide 1.53, “Application of the Single-failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection System.” U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.” (#.# 4# ##31# 7]e #-§-)

1. # # Code & Standards

• 10 CFR Part 50.55a, “Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities”# 4 # vf 7]

e# ##4#

- ANSI/IEEE Std 279-1971. “Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power

Generating Stations/’ (also designated ANSI N42.7-1972)

-Section 4.2: 557]] ## 44# ##32#4 44 #4 #5 21 7]#o] 55

4 4 4# 444# 44# 55### #^##4 4#4

# ##.• IEEE Std 379-1972 (also designated ANSI N41.2). “IEEE Trial-Use Guide for the

Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station

Protection Systems/’ (44 554## 444 4444 44324 4## 44

44 44 444 4## 4.)

2. 4 4 (Scope)

##5554# 4 ##3i# 4e 44-

3. 7| 4 H: Single-failure criterion

4. 447} 4#

44 554## 44 4 444 44324444 44471 44 IEEE std 379-

19724 44 44# 4#4 AS. 44- 7}##21 IEEE Std 279-19714 Section 4.2#

#### 44# 54* 4#.

• IEEE std 379-19724 4# 4 44445. 44# 44 444 44 #5 4.

• IEEE Std 379-1972, Section 5.244 #7#}# 7]#: #432# ### 32##4

4###7} 5#4 ^ ### ### #5#* 7}^#4 4444#

# 4-&.

• IEEE Std 379-1972, Section 6.244 #7>a># 7]#: ## 55 #4 4 7> #5*

*# 3D45. 54# #45#4## ### 4# 444 #44 * 4#.

- 71)44# 444 444 #54 #* 31)45 54 4

- #444 4# 444# ## #57} 4## ####7} 644 4

Appendix-130

Reg. Guide 1.53

445 5444 44 4

• IEEE Std 379-19722] Section 6.34 6.444 M4lf 544 actuator^

44 44 444 31444444 444 44. 44314454 444 45415 544 actuator6!] 444 4444 544 44 4.

Appendix-131

Reg. Guide 1.62

♦ Reg. Guide 1.62, “Manual Initiation of Protective Actions.”

(33344 44IM4)

1. 4 4 Code & Standards• 10CFR50.55a(h)• IEEE 279-1971 (Section 4.2, 4.16, 4.17)

2. 4444 (Scope)33344 4#;^ 4 (4# 3334)

3. 4 4 17: Protective action, Manual initiation, Automatic initiation, Single-failure

4. ol^7>o_5• 4444: Reg. Guide 1.62 4#- 4 3334 (4: €43. 3€, 444# 44)4

44 41# (IEEE Std. 279-1971, Section 4.17)- 4#f#4 4^44 3# 34*- 4#f*4 4#;^1 344* 41444 44- 4# ^ 4#;^1 4#4 ##44 43 444 44 44

CD 44: action-sequencing functions, interlocks(2) 3334 4H* 4# €#34-4 #^€4 ^4^ 4 (IEEE std. 279-

1971, Section 4.17)- 4444: 4 W4 444 43 444 443 44 (usnrc srp

14.3.5 : 44 4444, IEEE Std. 279-1971 : Section 4.17)- 444 4 4& : IEEE Std. 279-1971 (Section 4.16)

.KINS *44# (Reg. Guide 1.62 *#)- 4 #4-4 4 33 ^ 444 #4 444 €4 4### 4#4#44

4#33 4# 4-## 444 i;^ 43# 444 4 #4-4 4 4 #4# *44* 444 4# 4444 4444 44, 4*4-4# 4#44 444 4444 43444 44

Appendix-132

Reg. Guide 1.75

♦ Reg. Guide 1.75-1978 Rev. 2, “Physical Independence of Electric System.”

(#4 4^4 #444 #4)


• 10 CFR 50.55a(h),

• 10 CFR 50 App. A GDC 3, GDC 17, GDC 21

• IEEE Std 279-1971 Sec. 4.6

• IEEE Std 384-1974

2. ## (Scope)

-r#}#### #441## 5.45- circuits # equipment 41 41# #2} 7]#

3. Keyword: Separation, Independence

4. ##7}

□ Sec. A : Introduction

• #7] 4 #4!-5] #2l 4 # ##41 41# ##7} 4?4] JT# 4]41

- 10 CFR 50.55a " M41## IEEE Std 279-19714]# 414## ## ##”

- IEEE Std 279-1971 Sec. 4.6 "### ## ### 41### ### #214

##”

- GDC 3,”Fire protection", "### ### ###, 4##, 471# #4#4 4

- GDC 17, "Electric System”, ”###414 #51## ### #4 ##

4### ##4## # 41## ### #4”

- GDC 21, ’’Protection Reliability & Testability”, "##21# ##7> M###

4##: ## #4 #:## #4”

- 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, "4# H#21## ## 4# # ## ###4 ##

44 #4# #”

□ Sec. B: Discussion

- IEEE Std 384-1974# 41# NRC# #41 ## #4

IEEE Std 384-1974 endorse

- NRC #4#} ## ### Sec. C# #41 #44 #4

Appendix-133

Reg. Guide 1.75

□ Sec. C : 44 4 4

4 5- 4 7] 7] 7} redundant445 44 4 544 5 redundancy4

4 55 °1 guide 4 standard 4 4 4444 54.- M45 91 5*454 2] 4 *445 4*4, 71 ^ 55 4**4

4*45* 444 * (IEEE Std 384-1974).

1) Sec. 3 Isolation Device

Isolation Device : should be supplemented as follows :"(5*454 4 71]4 Vt

445] 4 Interrupting 7] 7] 4 °1 54 4 isolation device* 315] 44 44)

2) Sec. 3 Raceway

Interlocked armor enclosing cable-f-'Yaccway"4 4| 4] 4 4 44 5 444

3) Sec. 4.3 444 43. 444 444 45*4] 44 redundant 4 3. 4

7] 7] 2] 444 44 events 7} redundant 44*4] 444 44 44

44 444 4.

4) Sec 4.5(1)4 4444 444 44 4*5 cable derating, environmental

qualification, flame retardance, splicing restrictions and raceway fill 4 44

class IE 444 4*4] 44 2-4 444 4444 44.

5) Sec4.5(3), 4.6.3, 5.1.1.2 4 4444 44 5^45 444 SAR4 444

4444 444 44.6) Non Class IE 4]*%M 42-4 sec4.6.2 4 45* ^4445 ^4.

7) Sec. 5.1.1.1 should not be constructed to imply that adequate separation of

redundant circuits can be achieved within a confined space such as a cable tunnel

that is effectively unventilated.

8) Sec. 5.1.1.3 —>raceway 44 cable 444 445 44

9) Sec. 5.1.2 —> “at a sufficient number of points'’ * : 44 cable 4°17T- 5 ft

* 5*44 444 4*, marking cable* 44 coding* 444.

10) Sec 5.1.2 444 4#44 4.

444 444 4444 44 Class IE 4 Non Class IE **, 44

redundant Class IE A1444 444 Non Class IE 45. 4 redundant ClassIE 454444 4** 4# *5 45* 4554 5*#45 ^

44.11) Sec5.2.i 4 44* 4*45 4

“4444 57] 4471 (airsupplies)7} 444 44"

12) 4#(Ventilation)4*** 4445 44, Sec 5.3.144 4445 544

445 45*4 5444 4*4444 45444 44.

Appendix-134

Reg. Guide 1.75

13) Sec. 5.7^| ^7}^

Sec 5.6^| ^-§-44

Appendix-135

Reg. Guide 1.89

♦ Reg. Guide 1.89-1974 Rev. 0, “Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Plant" Class IE 7}7}*\

1. #4 Code & Standards• 10 CFR 50.55 App. B Criterion III “Design Control'’

2. 'e?}'# Code & Standards• IEEE Std 323-1974

• IEEE Std 344-1971

• Reg. Guide 1.7

3. #4 (Scope)Class IE 7] 7] <4] # # ## 5# 7] 7] # components 4 #4 interface

4. Keyword: Qualification of Class IE Equipment

5.

□ Sec.A: 4#

• Class IE 7171 <4] 4# 447} #4 j3_# x)] 4

10 CFR 50 App. B Criterion III “Design Control"’, “ 47-]| control measures#

4## 4# 44 ## #4 #4 #4#44 4##4* 4^"

- 4 Guide# LWR4 4# Class IE 7] 7) 2] #4 444 44 444

4% 44# 4 44 ### 44


- IEEE Std 323-19744 44 NRC4 44 4# 44

- 4 7]## #44##544 4444 class IE 7]7] # Interface4 44

#4#7]4# 7]^ #### 44

IEEE Std 323-1974 ## (approved by)

□ Sec. C : 4" 4 4#

- ##5 Class IE 4 ## IEEE Std 323-1974 ##

#315. IEEE Std 323-19744 Sec. 2 6.3.2(5) 4 6.3.5# IEEE Std 344-1971 5#

Appendix-136

Reg. Guide 1.89

c## -t]# ###z! Source Termer Reg. Guide 1.7°i]Ai ###

source#

Appendix-137

Reg. Guide 1.110

♦ Reg. Guide 1.100-1988 Rev. 2, “Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plant” ([email protected]îi8^ #7] 8 71818 7188 818 8#)

1. 8# Code & Standards• 10 CFR 50 App. A GDC Criterion III, ’’Design Control”, XI, ’’Quality Assurance

Records”

• 10 CFR 50 App. B

• 10 CFR 100 & App. A Sec VI (a)(2)

2. 88 Code & Standards• IEEE Std 344-1987

• IEEE Std 323-1983

3. 8 8 (Scope)

Class IE 7171 <41 # 8 88 5.8 7] 7] 8 components 8 88 interface

4. Keyword: Seismic Qualification, Electrical & Mechanical Equipment

5. 887h&8

□ Sec. A : 88

• 87] 8 888 888 88 888 88 887> 88 88 8]81- 10 CFR 50 App. A Criterion III “Design Control”, “888 88 88 88,

852#, 88^8 888 88 8888-81 8% 88# 8 852#

10CFR100, Sec. VI, ’’Application to Engineering Design”, “ 88*8 8858;

88 88 8 8(safe shutdown earthquake)8 #88158 88 852# #

88^88 8### #88^8- #8 888 #”

- 10CFR100App.A,SecVI(a)(2),”888 #^88^, 88#, 88^, 888

8 88 88 7] #8 8(0perating Basis Earthquake)# 88852 8 #8 #8

^3 3.88 888 fzg# f 888 #”


- IEEE Std 344-1987# #8 NRC# 8# 88 8 8 (approved by)

Appendix-138

Reg. Guide 1.110

- 4 4## 44 4## 4# #4, 44, #### 44"°1 Guide 44 Design Basis Event-4

loading imposed by seismic events: Operating basis earthquake(OBE) and Safe

Shutdown Earthquake(SSE).

* Rev. 7^ 44^

Rev .7 -4 ## 7/#^ <3#/# 4 444 4444

444 4444 4f 4444 44 #4 W4 4444

444 44 4# 4 444-E 444# 4# #4. g#operators, 4# chiller, air handler, 4 1r#4 #44

- ## 444E1 7]7]^| ^#, #44 4# 44401 7]7]^| o]4

# 447} 44# ### 44# 4 Sis# s### 444 #4

°1 Reg. Guide4 4 7] 7]# # 7}x|5. 4:4" 1) Safety-related Electric Eq(Class

IE) and Safety-related Mechanical Eq. 2) Non-safety-related Eq. °1 A A 4

374-0] 4444# #^## 4# #### 44.

□ Sec. C : 44 44

- IEEE Std 344-198744 44# 5.4 #4 4#(NRC44 acceptable)

- 44 # 44 44 4 4 4 44, #44 Thermal distortion 4# 4 #4 #4

444 4444 444# Ji444 #4.

- #4 4#4 ### #4 4#4 #4-^# 4#, 4#4 4#

&4444 4#4 444 444#^ 4-Îf- A 1. End loading are applied and are equal to or greater than postulated events

loads

&4 2. S# #4 ampliation <§# #4 37^ ^

33# 3. 5.4 components# #47} 444# 44 ## 31# ZL #4#

operating mode4 444 #4.

&4 4. 44# #44 #_&#4 4# #4 4## #44 444#

4#44 4 #4.

Appendix-139

Reg. Guide 1.118

♦ Reg. Guide 1.118-1999 Rev. 3, “Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems” ^ ^.7]^^ ^7M%1 A] si)

1. Code & Standards

• 10 CFR 50.55a(h),’’Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities”

• 10 CFR 50 App. A GDC 18,” Inspection and Testing of Electric Power”

• 10 CFR 50 App. A GDC21,” Protection System Reliability and Testability”

• 10 CFR 50 App. B, Criterion XI, ’’Quality Assurance criteria of NPP and Fuel

Reprocessing Plants”

• IEEE Std 279-1971 Sec. 4.9

• IEEE Std 279-1971 Sec. 4.10

• IEEE Std 338-1978

2. ^-rl (Scope)

7] 7]

3. Keyword : Periodic testing, Surveillance, Functional testing calibration testing, Time

response testing

4. y^7> m□ Sec.A: A1fr

• f 7] a] ol a] ^6)| cfl-g- ol^7> if 7]] o_5 x)] z]]

- 10 CFR 50.55a(h) IEEE 279^ 4 M ib#”

- IEEE 279 Sec. 4.9 “zf

- IEEE 279 Sec. 4.10 7]7]* ^ A]^ # f $144 #”

- GDC 21, 44 ^ 4

^7]A]S^ % ^z

- GDC 18, ^7] ^7]^01 A]^^- % ^

- 10 CFR 50 App. B, SL^ A]^ ^

Appendix-140

Reg. Guide 1.118


- IEEE 338-197891 4# NRC# 9# ## ##

- IEEE 338-1978919 ####43 #949# Surveillance 333####3 9714# 491 # 4# 39# 49#7l #94 1) 719# A] s4 ul # Afunctional tests and checks) 2) 3#

^^(Calibration verification) 3) 4 ?!: # 9# (Time response measurement)

=9

- 94 4 #4 #4494 3## #449# #9494* #9#

□ Sec. C : 44 #9

- #43 4449 # 33494 4# f 7] a) # # 91 ## IEEE 338-1987

914 4 4 # #44 9 91 (approved by NRC)

- IEEE Std 338 499 491 ##33 4#

(a) IEEE Std 338914 9 $1 4 Safety systems, Safety group4 IEEE Std 603-

1991914 44# 9#3 44.

(b) IEEE Std 338-19874 sec 5(15) 4 sec 6 4(5)4 ##33 44

944## #49 444 914&44 4443. 44443. 4# #9

(makeshift test connection)# 4 4 441) 44 94 wire4 portable test 7) 7] 4 44434 449 994

#44# 4 3# 91 44# 4 414. 44# 44# 44 43###43 #444 IEEE Std 338-1987# 34 344 #444 #.

2) 43# 44# breaker# 7%##9 44 44# ^#7} ## 4^#

trip 44 #9 load 3## 4## 944# 4 94 #491# 49.

3) 4#### 97144## #4 94 open #3# 99 39 44

##44 4#4 #4 #943 ####94# 99#9 ##

397} 3## 4 #4# #.

(c) 4# 43## 719# 444 IEEE Std 338-1987# sec. 6.3.5.91 914.

#71914 44# #49 443 3##.

4> logic system functional test —> a test of all logic components (i.e. all relay 9 contacts, trip

units, solid state logic element Ji ft) of logic circuit, from as close to the sensor as practical up

to but not including the actuated device, to verify operability.

Appendix-141

Reg. Guide 1.152

♦ Reg. Guide 1.152, “Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants”

NRC^ *1^)

1. Code & Standards

• 10CFR50, GDC 21

• 10CFR50, Appendix B

• Reg. Guide 1.53

• IEEE Std 603-1991

• IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993

• SECY-93-087

2. ^-rl (Scope)

3. Keyword: Digital Computers in Safety Systems

4.

□ <y^7>

- YlY|£

• Accept a deterministic reliability goal

• Do not endorse the concept of quantitative reliability goals

• Accept the reliability based on deterministic criteria for both the hardware and

software.

- If! -S-Cl (Sense and Command Features - Functional and Design

Requirements)

• IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993^ IEEE Std 603-1991# .

• IEEE Std 603-199 9}^ 7]^ aff# Â1?M

• ALB) t-)- °1 Reg. Guide°1] A1 vr YlS. # ^ Al Sampling rate5; JLB)

Appendix-142

Reg. Guide 1.153

♦ Regulatory Guide 1.153, "Criteria for Power, Instrumentation, and Control Portions of Safety Systems." (44314 44, 3] 4" 4 4] 4#^ 7]tr)

1. 44 Code & Standards• 10CFR50 Appendix A

3. 4 4(Scope)4 431444 444#44 44 3]#4 44, 314 4 3144^31 44-44

5_4## 4 #43.44-.

4 7] t-] Safety systems

5 44 7} 5-4

• Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena - 443]## x]*o] y] 45]

4#3ls 444## #### #4# ###4 4s# #31444 #4.

• Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases - 443]## 3 4 v:44 Lf

#45.#, 4# 4 3144 # 4s# 4 #4 #4 s4#31 4## 4 4s#

#31444 ##.

• Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components - 4 5 7-]| #5] :iLIA 'rf °| 4 7-]| # if

4S43## #4S# 4# 4444 ##44 444# #^ #4##44 4444 S44 4S4 444444 444.

• Reactor Design - 5,3.3]## 4S#3] 3] 47] 7} 444 4 444 4 44#

444 44444 44.

• Suppression of Reactor Power Oscillations - 434] #4 45-4 44 4 4 4

&44 444 44 #4 4## 44, 44 4 44# 4 4s# #4444 #4.

• Instrumentation and Control - 444:4, 444:444 4 4 3. 4444

4##4 4### 444-714# 44447]- 44444 #4. 4##4

4### #4 4# 431 44#7] 4# 44 444 444 #4.

• Reactor Coolant System Design - 44# 3]#4 44:4. 5-25314, 3] 4 3] # 4

S3:3]## 3144444# S## ###444 44# ##314S 444

44 4314* #4 4S# #^r# 4#S# 7}4s 431444 #4.

• Electric Power Systems - 443] 444 #S#4 3]4 4 45L4H-S] 7] 44

7>4431 44 443144 444 #4.

Appendix-143

Reg. Guide 1.153

Inspection and Testing of Electric Power System - ## # 3 Z13 44 4 3 3

7}3#4 7]3 4333 44433 4#3#ril ### 4

#3# #4444 #4.

Protection System Functions - 33.433 a]-j7 34 #3 44 444#4

4344 43 44 444* 44 #33 #4 #4.

Protection System Reliability and Testability - 33433 44 7| -c- 4434-

43 3 4337} 7^1-3# #4444 #4.

Protection System Independence - 44 444 4 4444, 44 34, 4444

444 34 444 443 444 33444 443 #4443 4 44.

Protection System Failure Modes - 33433 434 4444 44 44 4

44 (738)43 4344 #3^3 4 44# 443 3443# 44444

#4.

Separation of Protection and Control Systems - 33433 444 4443 444

34 444 444 3343 444 44443 443 343, 343 ^

4##3 34# 3 4133 44434 34444 #4.

Protection System Requirements for Reactivity Control Malfunctions - 33433

44# #33 44 434 3#43 #33 #4 4#4* 44 #33

#4444 #4.

Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences - 33434 #33

44433 43344# 443 43 33 ##3 344 ## 433

4^# 3 #34 #4444 #4.

Appendix-144

ofJ

Reg. Guide 1.168

♦ Reg. Guide 1.168, "Verification, Validation, Reviews and Audits for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants."(€4 44 4 #41 33341441 4# 44, 4#, 4£ ^ ^-A>)


4 (Scope)

4 44 41 #41 A}-§-5]3 333^14

3. 4-r)H: Verification, validation, reviews and audits, Safety systems ofnuclear power plants

4. 444

• Independence of Software V&V - 3332)14 2| 4442} 5}4 4## 4#

#44 444 #4.

' Design Changes - 3332)142) ^4* 444# 4# 4# #4)2} 44

432) 44 ^))4 #4 (#4)# 444 #4.

• Conformance of Materials - 444#2] 7144 444 4 44, 44, 44 4

43-4 4444 444444 4343 344 4## 4444 44

437} 444 44.• Quality Assurance - #ll 3# 44. w e 3#ir 44 71#. 3332)14 44

44 44.

• Tools for Software Development / IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-1993 4=3:

• V&V Tasks

- Configuration Management - 44444 44444 44 444 4 444-

3332)14 V&V2) 2844-7} ^444* 44 # 44.

- Audits - 43. 333414 4434 344 4444 344 4444

v&v 344 441 4^4 m3 44.

- Regression Analysis and Testing - 333414 44 44 regression 444

4334 333414 44 v&v4 4444 4444.

- Installation and Checkout Testing - Proof 433 (44 4 44), Pre-Operational

rll33, Operational 433 44 433 33344 3344.

- Test Evaluation - 44, 44, 442} 44 433 material#4 71#4

444 44

Appendix-145

Reg. Guide 1.168

- Evaluation of User Documentation

ClariGcations - 444# 4^444# 4^4 $^44 #4. 4^4

444# M #44 ### #4 444 #4 4 4 #4 #44 o_â

##4 4% % #4## 44 W 44, #4 44 4## #4.

Appendix-146

Reg. Guide 1.169

♦ Regulatory Guide 1.169. “Configuration Management Plans for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants,” September 1997. (44 4 #2] 44 ll 44 4444414)

1. 4 4 Code & Standards

• 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,'’

paragraph 55a(a)(l)

• 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, GDC 1, “Quality Standards and Records/’

• 10 CFR 50 Appendix B (Criterion III, VI, VIII, XVI, XVII)

• IEEE Std 828-1990

• IEEE Std 1042-1987

• Paragraph 4.3 of IEEE Std 279-1971

• SRP, NUREG-800, BTP-14

2. 44(Scope)

• 444 BBB4M (IC-1: 444-44 4BB4M, IC-2:

444-44 4BB414) 7]] #44

• IEEE Std 828-1990 (IEEE Standard for Software Configuration Management Plans),

IEEE Std 1042-1987 (IEEE Guide to Software Configuration Management) 4 2]

444 4B

" 444# BBB444 4# 44444^2] NRC 44 44 4#

3. 7| 2] 12; Software configuration management (SCM), Software configuration management

plan (SCMP), Safety systems, Digital computer software

4. 44 4 * * 7> B4

• IEEE Std 828-1990: 10 CFR 502] 444# BBB444 4# 4445144

44# 4#44 4444BB ##

• IEEE Std 1042-1987: IEEE Std 828-19902] #44 44 44 41 ^ #A1#

44444 44 44 44 4B4 ##

• 10 CFR 50 Appendix A #4 444 44 Appendix B2] 44 (4 4 42]

submittal(s)44 444 44°] 444 AppendixB 7]it 44 (42]44))

• Authority Levels : IEEE Std 1042-1987 (section 2.2.4, 3.3.2.1)

Appendix-147

Reg. Guide 1.169

Acceptance criteria

- Criterion II (# £ 5 / /. f!). V (Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings)

- IEEE Std 828-1990 (section 1.3) : Control point

^35:4

- 4534 45354 3## 45 47>x) 434 ^4 3 SCMP : IEEE

Std 828-1990

- Criterion II, III (4 4 5 4). IV (34 5 4). IIV (Control of Purchased

Material, Equipment, and Services), VIII (Identification and Control of Materials,

Parts, and Components), XVII (wril 35 4 3), XVIII (35)

Corrective Action

- Criterion XVI (Corrective Action)

- IEEE Std 828-1990 (section 2.3.2 : Partial description of corrective process)

34 #: IEEE Std 828-1990, Section 2.3.1.144 SCMP4 453 45443

# 33 %4r4 533# #335 33. 4445 3534144

4414 ^344 43 43 54 3433 333 4^ ^# 3343 3.

- 553414 34, #454, 33,

- 44 4 5345 4 4 3334)1 4 (Exact versions),

- 434 5354 555414 5]-ol 3el el,

- #34 "3% 443 355514 44,

- 44 555414 35, 554 45-43 4434 33 33,

- 355514 #43^4 45-43 4 #54,

- 355514 #4554 45-43 34 4 #4,- 3334)14 34,

- 4444435 3334)14 44 444,

- 444# 33341144 45- 3334114 #3,

- 3334)14 45 34.

34 534 5 4 (Control of purchased materials):

- Criterion VII, “Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services/’

- Criterion VIII, “Identification and Control of Materials, Parts, and Components/’

43 33

- 3345 3334)14 434 5343 533 IEEE std 7-4.3.2-1993

(Reg. Guide 1.152, Rev. 14 4 4 Endorse4)5 334 4 3.

- 34 scm 33344 44 54 (3 4334 5553)443 3

533 3 Reg. Guide44 553 IEEE Std 828-1990# 333 5.

Appendix-148

Reg. Guide 1.169

#-§- 7]#:

- Criterion V, “Instruction, Procedures, and Drawings/’ (#3 4

#4#7] ## ### ###, 444 #4- 4## #### #)_

- Criterion VIII, “Identification and Control of Materials, Parts, and

Components/’3]- Criterion II, “Quality Assurance Program’’0]]# 4 1]34°i|

4 # # 44# 4 #### nl®] #44# 3# (suitably controlled

conditions) #4 4 # 4 4 4 # #43. 7]# si.

- ##4#4 44 Criterion V# ###3 Criterion II4 Criterion VIII4

4444 4 4# #43## #4447] 44 IEEE Std 828-1990 Sec.

3.2# # Reg. Guide0]] 4 4##4 4# (not endorsed).

#4] ##: IEEE Std 828-1990 -Paragraph 2.3.2(4) / Criterion III

#43414 4 44-4 4 4 (SCMP) : IEEE Std 828-1990 -Paragraph 2.1(7)

Backfit clarification : IEEE Std 828-1990 (Section 1.1)

4# S3 & 3#

- IEEE Std 828-1990, IEEE Std 1042-1987# #3## : 7]] ###

- Incorporated : #4] ##33 4 4

- Endorsed: 44### #### NRC Staff7} ### # ## #4 #4

institution

-7]#: 4## #### %### ## 44 ### #### #3

##4 43 #4-

Appendix-149

Reg. Guide 1.170

♦ Reg. Guide 1.170, "Software Test Documentation for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants." (-8.^1"^

1. Code & Standards

• 10 CFR 50 GDC land 21

• 10 CFR 50 Appendix B

• IEEE Std 279-1971

• IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993

• IEEE Std 829-1983

• IEEE Std 1074-1991

• IEEE Std 1012-1986

2. ^-r! (Scope)

3. Keyword: Software test documentation

4. °i#7h°ti

• #33.

IEEE Std 829-1983°! 4^ vF## ufl a] ^

##7}# 44# #3?t i^#°!°> # #33 4?4 W.

- Qualifications, duties, responsibilities, and skills required of persons and

organizations assigned to testing activities,

- Environmental conditions and special controls, equipment, tools, and

instrumentation needed for accomplishing the testing,

- Test instructions and procedures incorporating the requirements and acceptance

limits in applicable design documents,

- Test prerequisites and the criteria for meeting them,

- Test items and the approach taken by the testing program,

- Test logs, test data, and test results,

- Acceptance criteria, and

- Test records indicating the identity of the tester, the type of observation, the

results and acceptability, and the action taken in connection with any deficiencies.

Appendix-150

Reg. Guide 1.170

#44

- 4^ #4# QA2] #4 SH 4##4 5] 4 4 #4.44 #44

- IEEE Std 829-19834 ##44 444 4# 444# ##31 444,

44 44 444 444444# #4444 44 5.4 44444 44.

4 #4 testing

- IEEE Std 829-19834 section 4.2.244 4#4# feature# #4# 4 4# feature# 51 44444, 44# 4444 4# 4 £ 5.4431 431

4#4 €4 44 333^114 44# 4414# 4344 444 ##344 #44# 344 4# 44# 444 44 #4 444 44433 44444 44.

#44

- 10 CFR 50 Appendix B criterion XI “Test Control'’ 4# '4444 444#

#44 344 #4 44.- v&v 444H #444 3444 #3# 4 44 #444 4# #4

4-3 444 #444 i#44°> #4.

Appendix-151

Reg. Guide 1.171

♦ Reg. Guide 1.171. "Software Unit Testing for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants." ’tir'S.Tll-lr-S]

##41H ^1 X]#)

1. ## Code & Standards• 10 CFR 50. GDC 1,21

• 10 CFR 50 Appendix B

• IEEE Std 279-1971

• IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993

• IEEE Std 1008-1987

• IEEE Std 1074-1991

• IEEE Std 1012-1986

2. #-rl (Scope)

3. Keyword: Software unit testing

4.

• 333414 Bl]3# 34#

333414 *4 4# 4 343, 4# 34### #47}* #4] 43#

#3# #3 43* 3##4# ##..

Qualifications, duties, responsibilities, and skills required of persons and

organizations assigned to testing activities,

Environmental conditions and special controls, equipment, tools, and

instrumentation needed for accomplishing the testing,

Test instructions and procedures incorporating the requirements and acceptance

limits in applicable design documents,

Test prerequisites and the criteria for meeting them,

Test items and the approach taken by the testing program,

Test logs, test data, and test results,

Acceptance criteria, and

Test records indicating the identity of the tester, the type of observation, the results

and acceptability, and the action taken in connection with any deficiencies.

Appendix-152

Reg. Guide 1.171

433

44 144 test coverage-E 4444 4 44.

■ Coverage of Requirement : 414 H 41' 4 HI 443 A] a] 541»] o]: etc|-

■ Coverage of Internal Structure: IEEE 1008-198744 1 4 #3 statement

coverage! 44 4^1 #33133! 4^-#433 3334 44

- IEEE Std 1008-198744 !4! 433 14 343 111 4144 3334 444 44444 314.

33344 144 4^1

- 33344 1444 1441 333414 14444 144434444 44.

Appendix-153

Reg. Guide 1.172

♦ Reg. Guide 1.172. "Software Requirement Specifications for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants." ([email protected])#44^4 44# 4 #4 555414 5.#^ 414 4# #41 4#)

1. ## Code & Standards• 10CFR50 Appendix B

• IEEE Std 603-1991

• IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-1993

• IEEE Std 830-1993

• IEEE Std 1074-1991

• IEEE Std 1012-1986

• IEEE Std 610.12-1990

2. ^-rl (Scope)@4^HM5 #44# 44# 4if4 555444 5544]

3. Keyword: Software requirement specifications

4. #47>54. 44

- Baseline: IEEE Std 610.12-199044 44# "baseline'4 4#4 2)4# IEEE

Std 830-19934] 4£ 2245. ## 7}# #47 444 formal review and

agreement# 44 4# #44" 5 baseline# #5#5 #4S!##

4 4 #4".

- Interface: Interface4 4# IEEE Std 610.12-1990444 47#] 447l 5#

• 55544 5444

- IEEE Std 830-19934# 44 555414 5#444 4# 444 44". 4

#4"# ## 555414 5#44]7} 44 444# "...54444

tb4-”5 ##4 °\ #4".

- #44# 555444 #4 55544 4444# 444# 444#

#7>s. 4# 447} 5#446> #4.

- #444 4#4: 55544 #544 7} #4 44 (formal)# 5#*

Appendix-154

Reg. Guide 1.172

4#44 34# 4 °1# 444# 4 4## 44# 4#4

44# #4444 #4 4^44 #4.

. 44#

.

- #3#4 #3

- 447}##

- 4#7}#4

■ # Z1 4: backward #4 #4 forward #4## 444 44.

srs4 44 44

- 144 44-44444 44.

444 SRS 44

- 444444 tbd 444 44441 34# 444 444 #444

3#44 #414## 41 #414 44.

44444 44

- IEEE Std 830-1993 section 4.7414 module partitioning, function allocation,

information flow # design specific issues# 432-431 44. 44 44 #33

#44 #4, 444, 4#4 #°1 #44 4 °1 section#4 4 #44 4

44.

43B4M #4

- IEEE Std 830-1993 section 5.3.6### requirements#4 4 °1 4 44 #4#

#44# 44.

- 444# 43B#M 3## 417} 4^#ol= # #34 #4# 4#4

44.

■ 444

- 344

- 444

4## 7}# 44

- IEEE Std 830-1993# 4#4 4#4l 444 444 4441###

#444 ## 4## 4343 44. 444 44# #44444 44.

Appendix-155

ofj

Reg. Guide 1.173

♦ Regulatory Guide 1.173. "Developing Software Life Cycle Processes for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants."

A5^7l #7} 7flf)


# (Scope)

# ##4]5 44# #34 555^14 4437]

3. 7] #5: Software life cycle process

4. #47} 35

• Clarifications

- Regulatory Requirements Identified - 10 CFR 50 Appendix B7} z] 34 5 4] 54|

43# 3 $^3 #4] 7]&4 343### 44, 34, 57} 4 544^3 ##34] 34^344 4# 457} ^3

- Consistency - 4557] #53 4] 5 # 555- 55°] wl0]6} #5.

- Commercial Software - 554]#5 7154] 554 5 15 43, 55 4^37} 5554] 434^34 #5#3 34# 433 #4#4 4#437} #4.

• Compliance with IEEE Std. 1074-1995 - IEEE Std. 1074-1995# #3# (53#3)

5# 5# 4544 #54 4444, 'shaii'3 #443 55##5°1#544, IEEE Std 10744] ##4. 55 44, #4, pre-conditions # postconditions 7} 4437] 5#4] #445 44##.

• Software Safety Analysis - 43# 5 #5 #4] 7]34]3##°1 44],

34, #7} ^ 444-535 ##34] 34^344 4# #57} #3- Input Information

- Description

- Output Information

• New or Modified Safety System Software - 45, 55, 45#H#°] 554 #4] #347]# #7] 4 4 #35 35##4] #4 #3 553 414# 3 413 3#4 ^3##.

- Temporary "Work-Around"

- Installation

- Operation

Appendix-156

Reg. Guide 1.173

Tailoring Software - w lM] 4 A1 44 xl

44 ^ 4443. 344 444 #4.

Appendix-157

Reg. Guide 1.180

♦ Regulatory Guide 1.180, “Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference in Safety-Related I&C Systems”

3N ^7> x]^)

1. il~ // Code & Standards

• 10 CFR 50.55a

• 10 CFR Part 52

• IEEE Std 603,

• 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, GDC 1, 2, 4, 13, 21, 22, 23

• IEEE Std C62.41

• IEEE Std 1050-1996

• MIL-STD-461D, 462D

• EPRITR-102323

2. ^ -rl (Scope)

Safety Related I&C Systems EMI/RFI ^

3. Keywords: Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency interference

4.

□ Section A : Introduction

• EMI ^1^7} ^ if M xllTil

- EMI/RFI, Surge Withstand Capability(SWC)# '/! o|

- Endorsement

.- Safety-related systems

- 9} 4 7]^f ^ 44 Non-safety systems

- Reg.Guide-E89^| EQ 44 44 444 4*

□ Section B : Discussion.

' €4 ^14^4 7]# ^ 444#44 4#

• EPRI TR-102323 44 44

• IEEE Std 1050-1996, IEEE Std C62.45, MIL-STD 462, 44 5 IEC 61000-4 44

4 44

Appendix-158

Reg. Guide 1.180

• Operating Envelope#] 4 #4 4 'o' :>-l)-I 4 4 4# #4 (Tailoring IT 4)

Section C : #4 4 4"

• General

°1 #4 4:4 2] ; Design and Installations, Emission & Susceptibility 4 4

7] #, swc 44 7(^4 4# 421

- #44"^2] 4#7]%# ^7}(#A}7] ## : #44, ##7], #4

7]...) : Operating Envelope## 8dB°14" 4"0]-0]2 #.

- 7]7]# ### ### 4^# 4

Configuration Control and Maintenance

- EMI 4--§- ## Zone 44

. IEEE Std 1050-1996

- IEEE Std 1050-1996# 442] 5 7}x] #2]# 4 2] #21# NRC7> EMERFI

^ swc4 4# 44 ^ 44 44 7]##A] 4^4-.

- 1 4.3.7.42] 'Radiative Coupling'2] 4# 4 '#A]-7]#2] 47] # 4 5] 2] 4

#4] #2] 444'# 444 4# 4°] 44. 4, far field 44 near field,

44 44 444c4 44 44^14, 444 42] 4, 7-11444 42] 4

2] ai]7>4 445. 4444.

- IEEE 1050-1996 4 4 44 4444 IEEE Std 518, IEEE Std 6654 4°1 44

4 44 4 4 4 (Endorsement)

. 4 4 44 MIL-STD 461

- mil-std 461D 67]]2] 44444 44 44 7(1444442] 44444

5. 44(CE101, CE102, CS101, CS114, RE101, RE 102, RS101, RS103)

- MIL-STD 46ic 2] 2]4# 67^ ### 67^ 44]# 44444 44(44

461D2] 4444- 44 444)

Operating Envelopes# #4 44 : Site survey 4 4# 4444 4#

. 4444 MIL-STD 462D

- 444 44444 44 mil-std 462D2] 44444 444.

4 444 Operating Envelope(4 444 444) 44

- ceioi 44^4(44w4#4°l 444# 4#): mil-std-461C2] 4#

44-

- CE102: MIL-STD-461D 7]## 7] ##5. 21#44444 CISPIR7] ## 4

# 4#

- CS101: MIL-STD 4614#, EPRI TR-102323# 7-] 2] #4

Appendix-159

Reg. Guide 1.180

CS114 Signal Line Susceptibility 44 JL#: A14vr #5] 4-§-a] 4 ##

#44 nl 4444# al^ MIL-STD-461DJ5L4 ##44, Site Survey 4

4# #4# 444.

RE101(Magnetic field): 44 Magnetic field sensitive I&C 44 4 4 A 4 44

4#, MIL-STD-461Dj5l4 44

RE 102: MIL-STD-461D #4 30dB°14 44

RS101: MIL-STD-461D #4# 44

RS102: MIL-STD-461D5.4 4442. TR-1023234 4444(447] 44

44 44 #4#4 44] 4444)

4444 MIL-STD-462

MIL-STD462D 44444 444 44 44 444 44 Limit

IEEE Std C62.41, €62.452] 4 444 a] 4 4-4

IEEE Std €62.414 €62.45# 444

3 7]] 2] 4 & 4444 #4 4 4 (Ring Wave, Combination Wave, EFT)

4 4 4 # 4 4 7] ^(Category B, Low to Medium Exposure 44:7. ##)Ring Wave : 3kV-peak, 100kHz, 0.5usec-rise time, 60%/peak-#4] #

Combination Wave : 3kV-peak, 1.5kA-short circuit current, 1.2usec-rise time,

Exponential decay.

EFT(Electrical Fast Transients) : 3kV-peak, 5nsec-rise time, 2.5kHz, 15msec-bust

duration, 300msec-burst period

Documentation 4 ##44 # 4#

444 44 # ##44 444^44 ### 444^

44 44

4444 . 444 44 .44444 44-

. 44#^ ^ 444

. 44#4

. 444444 44 #4 4 44 emi# swc 44 7]7] ## ## # ##_o_<yb nl a|s.

44 44

Appendix-160

BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SHF.FT

Performing Org. Report No.

Sponsoring Org. Report No. Standard Report No. INIS Subject Code

KAERI/TR-1942/2001Title/Subtitle

Review of Regulatory Requirements for Digital I&C Systems

Project Manager and Department Kee-Choon Kwon (MMIS Team)

Researcher andDepartment

Cheol-Kwon Lee, Jang-Soo Lee, Jang-Yeol Kim, Kyung-Ho Cha, Jung-SooKim, Se-Woo Cheon, In-Koo Hwang, Jai-Bok Han(MMIS Team), Han-Seong Son(KAIST)

PublicationPlace Daejeon Publisher KAERI Publication

DateNovember

15,2001Page 250 Fig. & Tab. YES(V),No() Size 21x29.7 Cm

Note

ClassifiedOpen (V),

Restricted ( ), Class Document Report Type Technical Report

Sponsoring Org. Contract No.Abstract (15-20 Lines)

rarized systematically various regulatory requirements that are necessary rentation and control (I&C) systems, especially safety systems. The system, hardware, software, and quality assurance aspects. This report ind abbreviations to help readers understand. Furthermore, appendices of standards corresponding to each principal regulatory requirement.

? regulatory requirements has Nuclear Energy Laws, Enforcement vs, and Notifications of Ministry of Science and Technology as utmost S, 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, 10 CFR 50.55a(h), nts include the Draft Regulatory Guidelines for Digital I&C Systems [fir Plan (NUREG-0800), Regulatory Guide, Branch Technical Position

ise of the US, IEEE Standards, IEC Standards, ISA, Military Standard, Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety [In case of the US, NUREG reports,

r the development of safety grade control equipments, plant protection re actuation system.

This work analyzed and sumrr to develop digital nuclear instrun requirements are categorized into provides the explanations of terms £ this report summarize the code and

The hierarchical structure o: Regulations of Nuclear Energy La1 level requirements [hr case of the U 10 CFR 50.49, etc.]. The requireme case of the US, Standard Review (BTP)], KEPIC as standards [In c< etc ], and various reports issued by EPRI reports, etc.].

This report can be referred fo system, and engineered safety featu

Subject Keywords (About 10 words)Digital I&C, Digital Salety Systems, Regulatory Requirements

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