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iNTERIM TECHNICAL REPORT 23REVISION 1
VERIFICATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK AND
INTERNALLYGENERATED MISSILE REYIEW
OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT FOR AUXILIARYFEEDWATER
SYSTEM AND CONTROL ROOM VENTILATIONAND
PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
—NOTICE—THE ATTACHED FILES ARE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THEDIVISION OF DOCUMENT CONTROL. THEY HAVE BEENCHARGED TO YOU FOR A LIMITED TIME PERIOD ANDMUST BE RETURNED TO THE RECORDS FACILITYBRANCH 016. PLEASE DO NOT SEND DOCUMENTSCHARGED OUT THROUGH THE MAIL, REMOVALOF ANYPAGE(S) FROM DOCUMENT FOR REPRODUCTION MUSTBE REFERRED TO FILE PERSONNEL,
DEADLINE RETURN DATE
1 8»~0~8'30gj.00171050008>> >>ASCII'gR
4
RECORDS FACILITYBRANCH
STONE 8c WEBSTER ENGINEE
1
I
lt ~
3i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Title ~Pa e
INTRODUCTION ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l-l
2 DEFINITION OF ITEMS REVIEWED. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 2 1
2.1 HELB REVIEW@ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 2-1
2.2 IGM REVIEWo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 2-1
AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM. o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 1
3.1 DESCRIPTION OF REVIEW... .. ............................... 3"1
3.1.13.1.2
HELB Reviews ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3-1
IGM Review . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3-5
3.23.2.13.2.2
SUMMARY OF REVIEW RESULTS........HELB Review....,...................IGM Review..................
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3-8
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 8
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 8
3.3 EOI REPORTS ISSUED................. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e 3 9
3.4 EVALUATION OF REVIEW RESULTS............................... 3"10
HELB Review. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 10
3.4.2t
3.5
3.5.13.5.2
CONCLUSIONS. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3-11
HELB Review...IGM Review..
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 1 1
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 ll
IGM Review...................................,............. 3-10
CONTROL ROOM VENTILATIONAND PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM......... 4-1
4.1 DESCRIPTION OF REVIEW...................................... 4-1
4.1.14.1.2
HELB Reviewo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 1
I AGM Review...,.....
I
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT)
Section Title ~Pa e
4.2 SUMMARY OF REVIEW RESULTS.............. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 8
4.2.14.2.2
HELB Review........IGM Review.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 8
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ \ ~ ~ ~
4.3 EOI REPORTS ISSUED...................... ~ ~ 4-9
4.4 EVALUATION OF REVIEW RESULTS............................... 4"ll4.4.14.4.2
HELB Reviewo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
GM Review...............I4.5 CONCLUSIONS.........
4.5.14.5.2 IGM Review.. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4-12
HELB Review................................................ 4 ll
APPENDIXES
A
B
EOI FILES
PROGRAM MANAGER'S ASSESSMENT
13.
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
Stone 8 Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) has performed a high-energy
line break (HELB) and internally generated missile (IGM) review in accord-
ance with the SWEC Scope of Work defined in Appendix D (DCNPP-IDVP-PP-002)
of the Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) Phase II Program
Management Plan issued by Teledyne Engineering Services (TES) as IDVP
Program Manager.
The review for adequate separation of safety-related equipment from the
effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, and IGMs was limited to the
following:
1. Evaluation of the effects of pipe whip and jet impingement originating
in any high energy piping system outside containment and IGMs outside
containment on the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) and Control Room Ventila-
tion and Pressurization (CRVP) Systems.
2. The evaluation was performed by area review of the geometric relation-
ship between postulated break locations, missile sources, safety-
related targets, and the restraints/shields required to mitigate the
effects of postulated pipe breaks and IGMs.
1" 1
SECTION 2
DEFINITION OF ITEMS REVIEWED
2.1 HELB REVIEW
The Scope of Work for the HELB portion of the review is defined in Appendix
D (DCNPP-IDVP-PP-002) of the Program Management Plan, Page ll, Item No. 7,
and is stated:
"...Determine if adequate separation (distance, barriers, or
restraints) exists to accommodate potential piping failure results
(pipe whip, fluid jet,...) such that the system can accomplish itsdesigned safety-related function during exposure to such pipe
breaks..."
2.2 IGM REVIEW
The Scope of Work for the IGM portion of the review is defined in Appendix D
(DCNPP-IDVP-PP-002) of the Program Management Plan, Page 11, Item No. 7, and
is stated:
"...Determine if adequate separation (distance, barriers...) exists to
accommodate...internally generated missiles such that the system can
accomplish its designed safety-related function during exposure to...missiles."
2"1
SECTION 3
AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM
3.1 DESCRIPTION OF REVIEW
3.1.1 HELB Review
The adequate separation review consisted of the determination of AFW system
targets that may be affected by postulated breaks in high energy lines.
The steps taken to perform the review were as follows:
1. Identified AFW system piping and mechanical equipment (targets) on
Pacific Gas 8 Electric (PGGE) piping area drawings.
2. Identified AFW electrical components, conduits, and instrumentation
lines (targets) on PG&E electrical drawings.
.3. Identified the FSAR, Section 3.6A, high energy lines and postulated
break locations and type of break on PGSE piping area drawings for the
following high energy systems:
Condensate System
Main Steam System
Feedwater System
Steam Generator Blowdown System
3"1
f l
Steam Supply to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine
Extraction Steam and Heater Drip System
Chemical and Volume Control System
Turbine and Generator Associated Systems.
Using the PG&E Line Designation Table (PGSE Drawing No. 102040, Change
9), all piping that exceeds the 200 F and 275 psig high energy line
criterion were identified on PGSE piping area drawings. The break
locations and types identified in the FSAR Section 3.6A were then
located on these drawings.
4. Identified pipe rupture restraint locations indicated in FSAR Section
3.6A on piping isometric drawings for high energy lines. Piping
isometric drawings were used for configurational purposes only and
primarily for the field verification portion of the review (see Section
7).
5. Established potential interaction zones (cubicles) in the plant for
high energy lines and AFW system safety-related targets. The inputs
from Sections 1, 2, and 3 were used to establish plant zones in which a
pipe rupture review occurred. A detailed location listing of all zones
within the plant was prepared for all AFW system piping, equipment, and
electrical components, as well as high energy lines. This information
was then transferred by color codes onto plot plan diagrams at all
major plant elevations. Wherever both color codes for system targets
and for high energy lines occurred simultaneously in any cubicle, a
pipe field verification review resulted.
3-2
The steps taken to perform the field verification were as follows:
6. Postulated break points were located in the high energy systems listed
in 3 above. This review consisted of visually verifying that the con-
figuration of the high energy piping was the same as the applicable
PGSE piping area drawings and isometric drawings of FSAR Section 3.6A.
If the piping configuration was different from that shown on the draw-
ings, it was noted and the effects of the relocation on AFW system
targets evaluated.
7. Pipe rupture restraint locations, types, and configurations on high
energy lines were verified. FSAR Section 3.6A piping isometrics were
used to identify the location, type, and configuration of the pipe
rupture restraints on the high energy piping run. Restraints were
visually compared to the configuration shown on the isometrics. If a
configuration or a location difference was encountered, it was noted
and the effects of the relocation of AFW system tragets evaluated.
8. AFW system mechanical targets (i.e., piping and piping system compon-
" ents) and locations were verified. The field routing of AFW piping and
piping components was visually compared to the routing on the PGSE
piping area drawings. If the routing was different, it was noted and
the effects on the AFW system targets were evaluated. If a target was
affected by jet impingement, the geometrical relationship between the
jet source and the target was sketched. If the effect on the target
was from pipe impact, this was noted.
3"3
9. AFW system electrical and/or instrumentation target locations were
verified. Since the PG&E electrical and instrumentation drawings were
diagrammatic, electrical and instrumentation targets were precisely
located in the field. If a target was affected by jet impingement, the
geometrical relationship between the jet source and target was
sketched. If the effect on a target was from pipe impact, this was
noted.
10. Where HELBs affected system electrical equipment, ISC equipment, or
conduit, it was determined that the conduit is essential by listingequipment serviced by the conduit and determining that the listed
equipment must operate to mitigate the effects of the break in question
and bring the plant to a safe cold shutdown.
11. Where HELBs affected system piping and equipment, it was determined
that it is essential by determining that it must operate to mitigate
the effects of the break in question and to bring the plant to a safe
cold shutdown.
12. Where safety-related targets in an interaction area were found to be
shielded by structures of substantial size (e.g., building structure,
steel supports, large bore piping, etc), the effects of jet impingement
on the target were considered to be mitigated.
The results of the field review for HELBs are classified into one of the
following categories:
3-4
EOI File - This document is generated when the licensing commit-
ment for protection assurance (proper restraints, shielding, or
separation) of an essential system or component is not met for
pipe whip or jet impingement for a postulated circumferential or
longitudinal break.
Meets Licensing Commitments - This category is used when a postu-
lated pipe break is properly restrained, shielded, or separated
from an AFW system safety-related target.
3.1.2 IGM Review
The adequate separation review consists of the determination of protection
assurance adequacy of AFW system targets that may be affected by postulated
sources of IGMs.
The steps taken to perform the review were as follows:
l. Identified sources of IGMs from FSAR Section 3.5.
2. Identified AFW system mechanical and electrical components existing in
the trajectory of the missiles as defined in the FSAR. Locations of
AFW piping and mechanical equipment were established from PGSE piping
area drawings. Locations of AFW electrical components and conduits
were identified in the field.
3-5
I
3. Identified missile shields or existing structures and components that
behave as effective missile barriers. This was accomplished by a
review of PGSE equipment location drawings. The review consisted of
the identification of natural plant barriers (concrete walls, floor
slabs, large equipment, etc), missile shields and their relationship to
the sources and trajectories of IGMs.
4. Determined if an AFW system mechanical and electrical component can be
hit by an unshielded missile. This task was performed by a thorough
review of FSAR Section 3.5. The information gathered from this review
were kinetic energies of IGMs, concrete wall penetration depths, and
reasons for not considering analysis (by PG&E). Engineering judgment
was used to determine the validity of the conclusions, especially in
the area where no analysis occurred.
The IGM portion of the review was conducted primarily by a plant walk-
down. Each of the sources of missiles was identified along with the
postulated trajectories. Missile shields and natural plant barriers,
(i.e., existing building structures) were noted. The relationship
between the sources, shields, barriers, walls, floor slabs, and safety-
related targets (if any) were evaluated in the field portion of the
review to determine if safety-related targets would be affected by a
postulated missile event.
5. Where an IGM affected system conduits, essential conduits were defined
by listing equipment services by the conduit and by determining if the
3-6
connected equipment must operate to mitigate the effects of the IGM in
question and to bring the plant to a safe cold shutdown.
6. Where an IGM affected system piping or mechanical equipment, essential
equipment was defined by determining if it must operate to mitigate the
effects of the IGM in question and to bring the plant to a safe cold
shutdown.
The steps taken to perform the field verification were as follows:
7. Located the sources of IGMs identified in the FSAR Section 3.5, Page
8b. The sources are:
~ Main Turbine
~ Main Feedwater Pump Turbine
~ Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine.
8. Located mechanical and electrical safety-related targets. See Section
.3.1.1 (8. and 9.).
9. Iocated missile shields and existing structures and/or components which
act as barriers.
The results of the field review for IGMs are classified into the following
categories:
3 7
ik
~ EOI File - This document is generated when the licensing commit-
ment for protection assurance of an essential safety-related
target is not met for the effects of an IGM.
Meets Licensing Commitments - This category is used when an IGM is
shielded or does not intersect a target in its trajectory.
3.2 SUMMARY OF REVIEW RESULTS
3.2.1 HELB Review
393 Break Locations were identified.
214 Restraints and restraint locations were identified.
35 Mechanical targets were located.
136 Electrical and I/C targets were located.
1 EOI file was issued.
3 Jet impingement loadings on AFW piping were referred to the IDVP
Manager.
3.2.2 IGM Review
0 EOI files were issued.
3 IGM sources were identified.
1 Missile shield was observed in place for purposes of shielding
potential missiles from the AFW Pump Turbine.
3-8
2 Plant barriers were identified (turbine pedestal and main con-
densers) for the purpose of shielding potential missiles for the
Main Feedwater Pump Turbine.
0 Safety-related targets were identified as affected by the LP
turbine missile.
3.3 EOI REPORTS ISSUED
One EOI file was issued as a result of the review of effects of postulated
HELBs on the AFW system outside containment.
EOI File 8049 was issued because of concern that a postulated longitudinal
pipe break at node 1800 on line 594 could damage conduit KK 792, resulting
in loss of power to the components required to provide AFW flow.
PG&E has provided additional analysis of the effects of HELB on conduit
KK 792 that addresses both the blowdown thrust force and envelopment temp-
erature due to jet impingement from the postulated longitudinal split on
line 594. The additional analysis provided uses the ANSI/ANS 58.2-1980
method for calculation of jet envelopment temperature which is technically
acceptable, although different from the method currently referenced in FSAR
Section 3.6A. PGSE has made a commitment to amend the FSAR to include the
ANSI/ANS 58.2-1980 method for jet temperature calculation.
Additional evaluation of the blowdown thrust force interaction with conduit
KK 792 is provided in the DCP External Action Sheet, IDVP File No. 8049,
Revision 10. The PGRE evaluation indicates that the actual jet impingement
3-9
pressure (12.6 psig) on conduit KK 792 is below the allowable jet pressure
(42 psig) as determined by standard Bechtel methodology, and, therefore, the
jet blowdown force from a longitudinal split at node,1800 on line 594 will
have no adverse affect on conduit KK 792. The evaluation provided by PGSE
is sufficient to resolve the concern of EOI File 8049 with respect to jetblowdown thrust force on conduit KK 792.
The concern of EOI File 8049 has been satisfactorily addressed by PGRE. No
physical modifications are required, and this EOI file has been closed.
3.4 EVALUATION OF REVIEW RESULTS
3.4.1 HELB Review
Since only one EOI file was issued with a sample size of 393 break locations
and the concern of that EOI file has been resolved, no generic concern
exists for assurance of adequate separation of the AFW System from the
effects of HELBs outside containment.
3.4.2 IGM Review
Since no EOI files were issued, no generic concern exists for the assurance
of adequate separation of the AFW System from the effects of IGMs outside
containment.
3" 10
I
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
3.5.1 HELB Review
No additional verification or sampling is required since no generic concern
was found as a result of the HELB review.
3.5.2 IGM Review
No additional verification or sampling is required.
3-11
I
SECTION 4
CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AND PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
4.1 DESCRIPTION OF REVIEW
4.1.1 HELB Review
The adequate separation review consists of the determination of CRVP system
targets that may be affected by postulated breaks in high energy lines.
The steps taken to peform the review were as follows:
l. Identified CRVP system mechanical equipment (targets) required to main-
tain Control Room habitability for a HELB outside containment on PG&E
air-conditioning drawings.
2. Identified CRVP electrical components and conduit and I/C lines
(targets) on PG&E electrical drawings.
3. Identified the FSAR Section 3.6A high energy lines and postulated break
locations and type of break on PG&E piping area drawings for the
following high energy systems:
Condensate System
~ Main Steam System
~ Feedwater System
4-1
~,
Steam Generator Blowdown System
Steam Supply to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine
Extraction Steam and Heater Drip System
Chemical and Volume Control System
Turbine and Generator Associated Systems.
Using the PG&E Line Designation Table (PGSZ Drawing No. 102040, Change
9); all piping that exceeded the 200 F and 275 psig high energy line
criterion was identified on PGSE piping area drawings. The break loca-
tions and types identified in the FSAR Section 3.6A were then located
on these drawings.
4. Identified pipe rupture restraint locations indicated in FSAR Section
3.6A on piping isometric drawings for high energy lines. Piping
isometric drawings were used for configurational purposes only and
primarily for the field verification portion of the review (see Section
8).
5. Established potential interaction zones (cubicles) in the plant for
HELBs and CRVP safety-related targets. The inputs from Sections 1, 2,
a'nd 3 were used to establish plant zones in which a pipe rupture review
occurred. A detailed location listing of all zones within the plant
was prepared for all CRVP system equipment and electrical components,
as well as high energy lines. This information was then transferred by
color codes onto plot plan diagrams at all major plant elevations.
Wherever both color codes for system targets and for high energy lines
4-2
occurred simultaneously in any cubicle, a pipe rupture field verifica-
tion review resulted.
6. Performed the field verification in those interaction zones established
in Section 5.
The steps taken to perform the field verification were as follows:
7. Postulated break points were located in the high energy systems listed
in 3 above. This review consisted of visually verifying that the con-
figuration of the high energy piping was the same as the applicable
PGScE piping area drawings and isometric drawings of FSAR Section 3.6A.
If the piping configuration was different from that shown on the draw-
ings, it was noted and the effects of the relocation on CRVP system
targets evaluated.
8. Rupture restraint locations, types, and configurations on high energy
"lines were verified. FSAR Section 3.6A piping isometrics were used to
identify the location, type, and configuration of the pipe rupture
restraints on the high energy piping run. Restraints were visually
compared to the configuration shown on the isometrics. If a config-
uration or a location difference was encountered, it was noted and the
effects of the relocation of CRVP system targets evaluated.
9. CRVP system mechanical targets and locations were verified. The review
showed that all CRVP mechanical targets required to operate to maintain
Control Room habitability for a HELB outside containment were located
4-3
in plant area "H". Since no HELBs were postulated in this area, an
interaction between HELBs and the mechanical portion of this system did
not occur; therefore, a field review was not performed for the
mechanical portion of the CRVP System.
10. CRVP system electrical and/or instrumentation target locations were
verified. Since the PGSE electrical and instrumentation drawings were
diagrammatic, electrical and instrumentation targets were precisely
located in the field. If a target was affected by jet impingement, the
geometrical relationship between the jet source and target was
sketched. If the effect on a target was from pipe impact, this was
noted.
11. Where HELBs affected system electrical equipment, IRC equipment, or
conduit, it was determined that the conduit was essential by listing
equipment serviced by the conduit and by determining that the serviced
equipment must operate to maintain the Control Room habitability and
bring the plant to a safe cold shutdown.
12. Where safety-related targets in an interaction area were found to be
shielded by structures of substantial size (e.g., building structure,
steel supports, large bore piping, etc), the effects of jet impingement
on the target were considered to be eliminated.
The results of the field review for HELBs are classified into one of the
following categories:
4-4
~ EOI Pile - This document is generated when the licensing commit-
ment for protection assurance (proper restraints, shielding, or
separation) of an essential system or component is not met for
pipe whip or jet impingement from a postulated circumferential or
longitudinal break.
Meets Licensing Commitments - This category is used when a break
is properly restrained, shielded, or separated from a safety-
related target of concern.
4.1.2 IGM Review
The adequate separation review consists of the determination of protection
assurance adequacy of CRVP system targets that may be affected by postulatedt
sources of IGMs.
The steps taken to perform the review were as follows:
l. Identified sources of IGMs from FSAR Section 3.5.
2. Identified CRVP system mechanical and electrical components existing in
the trajectory of the missiles as defined in the FSAR. Locations of
CRVP hardware (ducting, blowers, dampers, etc) were established from
PGSE air-conditioning drawings. Locations of CRVP electrical compon-
ents and conduits were identified in the field.
4-5
3. Identified missile shields or existing structures and components that
behave as effective missile barriers. This was accomplished by a
review of PG&E equipment location drawings. The review consisted of
the identification of natural plant barriers (concrete walls, floor
slabs, large equipment, etc), missile shields and their relationship to
the sources and trajectories of IGMs.~ /
4. Determined if a CRVP system mechanical and electrical component can be
hit by an unshielded missile. This task was performed by a thorough
review of FSAR Section 3.5. The information gathered from this review
were kinetic energies of IGM's, concrete wall penetration depths, and
reasons for not considering analysis (by PG&E). Engineering judgment
was used to determine the validity of the conclusions, especially in
the area where no analysis occurred.
The IGM portion of the review was conducted primarily by a plant walk-
down. Each of the sources of missiles was identified along with the
postulated trajectories. Missile shields and natural plant'arriers,(i.e.,'xisting building structures) were noted. The relationship
between the sources, shields, barriers, walls, floor slabs, and safety-
related targets (if any) were evaluated in the field portion of the
review to determine if safety-related targets would be affected by a
postulated missile event.
5. Where an IGM 'affected system conduits, essential conduits were defined
by listing equipment serviced by the conduit and by determining if the
4-6
connected equipment must operate to maintain Control Room habitability
and to bring the plant to a safe cold shutdown.
6. Where an IGM affected system components (ducting, blowing, dampers,
etc), essential components were defined by determining that the
affected components must operate to maintain Control Room habitability
and to bring the plant to a safe cold shutdown.
The steps taken to perform the field verification were as follows:
7. Located the sources of IGMs identified in the FSAR Section 3.5, Page
Sb. The sources are:
Hain Turbine
o Main Feedwater Pump Turbine
4 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine.
8. Located mechanical and electrical safety-related targets. See Section
4.1.1 (9. and 10.).
9. Located missile shields and exisiting structures and/or components
which act as barriers.
The results of the field review for IGMs are classified into the following
categories:
4-7
4 EOI File - This document is generated when the licensing commit-
ment for protection assurance of an essential safety-related
target is not met for the effects of an IGM.
Meets Licensing Commitments - This category is used when an IGM is
shielded or does not intersect a target in its trajectory.
4.2 SUMMARY OF REVIEW RESULTS
4.2.1 HELB Review
314 Break Locations were identified.
31 Restraints and restraint locations were identified.
12 Electrical and I/C targets were located.
2 EOI files were issued.
4.2.2 IGM Review
0 EOI files were issued.
3 IGM sources were identified.
Plant barrier was verified for the Feedwater Pump Turbine missile.
4.3 EOI REPORTS ISSUED
Two EOI files were issued as a result of the review of effects of postulated
HELBs on the CRVP system containment.
4-8
EOI File 8007 was issued because of concern over potential damage to CRVP
electrical conduit K6844 resulting from the pipe whip effects of a postu-
lated circumferential break at node 3510 on Main Steam Line No. 3.
EOI File 8008 was issued because of concern over potential damage to CRVP
electrical conduit K6844 resulting from the pipe whip effects of a postu-
lated circumferential break at node 4145 on Main Steam Line No. 4.
EOI Files 8007 and 8008 share a common concern; therefore, the following
discussion will address both Open Item files concurrently.
PGSE has provided additional evaluation (DCP Completion Sheet for EOI File8007, Revision 2, signed February 18, 1983, and DCP Completion Sheet for EOI
File 8008, Revision 2, signed February 18, 1983) of the pipe whip effects of
postulated circumferential breaks in the relief valve headers of Main Steam
Lines No. 3 and No. 4, at nodes 3510 and 4145, respectively. The PG&E
response indicates that the postulated accident sequence defined in EOI
Files 8007 and 8008 is not required as a design basis. This positionrepresents an interpretation of Paragraph 1(d) of the AEC letter from A.
Giambusso to F. T. Searls (PGSE), dated December 18, 1972, in that:
a. the dead-ended section of the main steam header does not have
sufficient, internal energy to produce pipe whip because of itslimited pressure reservoir; and
b. steam blowdown from the opposite end of the postulated break
represents an energy source external to the dead-ended section of
4-9
I
the header, and, consequently, need not be considered for pipe
whip of the dead-ended section of header.
The Nuclear Services Corporation (NSC) report on rupture restraints outside
containment indicates that the existing restraints on the main steam headers
are inactive, which is consistent with the DCP position taken. From NSC
Report, PGE 01"28, Table 7-5, which compares allowable restraint loads with
applied restraint loads, there are no applied loads listed nor protection
requirements specified for either restraint 1030-14RT or 1031-11RT.
In addition to the PG&E response provided, the specific concerns of EOI
Files 8007 and 8008 (i.e., potential damage to conduit K6844) have been
further evaluated by'he IDVP. Utilizing information gathered since these
EOI files were initially written, the IDVP has conducted a systems safety
evaluation which concluded that the cables in conduit K6844 are not
essential for reactor shutdown under the conditions associated with the
postulated main steam breaks at nodes 3510 and 4145.
On the basis of the additional evaluation and analysis provided, the con-
cerns of EOI Files 8007 and 8008 have been resolved, and these files have
been closed.
4-10
4.4 EVALUATION OF REVIEW RESULTS
4.4.1 HELB Review
Since only two EOI files were issued with a sample size of 314 break
locations and the concern of those EOI files has been resolved, no generic
concern exists for assurance of adequate separation of the CRVP System from
the effects of HELBs outside containment.
4.4.2 IGM Review
Since no EOI files were issued, no generic concern for the assurance of
adequate separation of the CRVP from the effects of IGMs outside contain-
ment.
4.5 CONCLUSIONS
4.5.1 HELB Review
No additional verification or sampling is required since no generic concern
was found as a result of the HELB review.
4.5.2 IGM Review
No additional verification or sampling is required.
4"11
~ 4J
APPENDIX A
EOI FILES
) ~J
APPENDIX A
REVH 0
DCHPP IDVP STATUS REPORT
LATEST REVH
FILE HOB
8007
8007
8007
8007
8007
8007
8007
8008
8008
8008
8008
8008
8008
8008,8049
8049
8049
8049
80498049
8049
8049
8049
8049
IN980498049
8049
8049
8049
8049
DATE
820913
820913
820913
82%13820913
820913
820913
820913
820913
820913
820913
820913
820913
820913
821025
821025
821025
821025
821025
821025
821025
821025
821025
821025
821025
821025
821025
821025
821025
821025
821025
REVR
0
1
2
3
5
6
01
2
3
4
5
6
0
1
23
5
6789
10
11
12
13
14
15
ie
DATE
820913
821001
821018
830225
830304
830310
830310
820913
821001
821018
830225
830304
830310
830310
821025
821026
821029
821207
821215
830103
830111
830207
830309
830309
830406
830406
830406
830428
830503
830509
830509
BY
%EC
%EC
TES
TES
SMEC
TES
TES
SMEC
%EC
TES
TES
%EC
TES
TES
%EC
%EC
TES
TES
%EC
TES
TES
%EC
TES
TES
TES
%EC
TES
TES
%EC
TES
TES
STATUS
OIR
PPRR/OIP
PRR/OIP
OIR
PPRR/CI
PRR/Cl
CR
OIR
PPRR/OIP
PRR/OIP
OIR
PPRR/CI
PRR/CI
CR
OIR
PPRR/OIP
PRR/OIP
OIR
PPRR/OIP
PRR/OXP
OIR
PPRR/CI
PRR/Cl
CR
OXR
PPRR/OIP
PRR/OIP
OIR
PPRR/CI
PRR/CI
CR
SUBJECT
EFFECT OF THE BREAK-PIPE RCPT
EFFECT OF THE BREAK-PIPE RUPT
EFFECT OF THE BREAK"PIPE RUPT
EFFECT OF THF. BREAK+XPE RUPT
EFFECT OF THE BRBK-PIPE RUPT
EFFECT OF THE BRFAK-PIPE RUPT
EFFECT OF THE BRBK"PIPE RUPT
EFFECT OF THE BREAK-PIPE RUPT
EFFECT OF THE BREAK"PIPE RUPT
EFFECT OF THE BREAK+IPE RUPT
EFFECT OF THE BREAK"PIPE RUPT
EFFECT OF THE BREAK-PXPF. RUPT
EFFFCT OF THE BREAK-PIPE IlPTEFFECT OF THE BREAK+IPE RUPT
AFM SYSTEM-PIPE BREAK XH LIHE
AFM SYSTEM-PIPE BREAK IH LINE
AFM SYSTEM'IPE BRBK XH LIHE
AFM SYSTEM-PIPE BREAK Ik LIHE
AFM SYSTEM-PIPE BREAK Ik LIHE
AFM SYSTEM+IPE BRBK IH LIHE
AFM SYSTEM-PIPE BRBK IH LIHE
AFM SYSTEM-PIPE BREAK IH LIHE
AFM SYSTEM-PIPE BREAK IH LIHE
AFM SYSTEM-PIPE BREAK IH LIHE
AFM SYSTEM+IPE BREAK IH LIHE
AFM SYSTEM-PIPE BRBK IH LINE
AFM SYSTEM-PIPE BREN IH LXHE
AFM SYSTEM-PIPE BREAK IH LIHE
AFM SYSTEM-PIPE BREAK IH LIHE
AFM SYSTEM-PIPE BREAK IH LIHE
AFM SYSTEM"PIPE BREAK IH LIHE
RESTRAIHT
RESTRAIHT
RESTRAIHT
RESTRAIHT
RESTRAIHT
RESTRAIHT
RESTRAIHT
RESTRAIHT
RESTRAIHT
REST RAIkT
RESTRAIHT
RESTRAIHT
RESTRAIHT
RESTRAIHT
594
594
594
594
594
594
594
594
594594
594
594
594
594
594
594
594
1030-14RT
1030-14RT
1030-14RT
1030-ihRT1030-14RT
1030-14RT
1030-14RT
1031"11RT
1031"11RT
1031"11RT
1031-11RT
1031-iiRT1031-iiRT1031-11RT
I
APPENDIX B
PROGRAM MANAGER'S ASSESSMENT
C II
APPENDIX B
PROGRAM NNAGER'S ASSESSMENT
Independent review by TES of the tasks performed by SWEC to verify theHELB and IGM outside containment for 'he AFW System and CVRP System.wasdone in accordance with IDVP Phase II Program Management Plan datedJune 18, 1982 and the Engineering Procedure EP-1-014.
The review involved a visit to the site and several visits to the SWEC
offices for detailed discussions and review, wi th SWEC personnel, of thework performed by SWEC including the methodology used in the evaluation ofthis task.
The files issued by SWEC were reviewed thoroughly and specificrecommendations were made to the IDVP Program Manager delineatingappropriate resolution.
As a result of the verification of the initial sampling selected bySWEC and the assessment of the impact of SWEC findings, TES as ProgramManager, is of the opinion that no additional verification is required.
~ ~
