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Cambridge University Press

International Organization Foundation

The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of FundamentalInstitutionsAuthor(s): Christian Reus-Smit

Source: International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 555-589Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703499

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TheConstitutionaltructurefInternationalociety nd theNatureofFundamentalnstitutionsChristianeus-Smit

Modem tates aveconstructedmultiplicityf ssue-specificegimeso facilitatecollectivection. hemajorityf hesenstitutionsre pecificnstancesf he eeperinstitutionalracticeshat tructureodemnternationalociety,otablyhefunda-mentalnstitutionsf ontractualnternationalaw andmultilateralism.woobserva-tions anbe made bout undamentalnstitutions.irst, heyre"generic" tructuralelements f nternationalocieties.' hat s,their racticeranscendshangesn thebalance fpower nd he onfigurationf nterests,ven f heir ensitynd fficacyvary. hemodern racticesfcontractualnternationalawandmultilateralismnten-sifiedfter945,but ostwarevelopmentsuilt n nstitutionalrincipleshatwerefirstndorsed y states uringhenineteenthenturynd structurednternationalrelationsongbeforehe dvent fAmericanegemony.econd, undamentalnsti-tutionsifferrom ne society fstates o another. hile hegovernancefmoderninternationalociety ests n the nstitutionsf contractualnternationalaw andmultilateralism,o such nstitutionsvolved n ancientGreece. nstead, hecity-states eveloped sophisticatednd successfulystemfthird-partyrbitrationofacilitaterderednterstateelations.his nstitution,hich peratedn the bsenceof a bodyof codified nterstateaw,is bestcharacterizeds "authoritativeri-lateralism."The mportanceffundamentalnstitutionsas ongbeen cknowledgedy nter-national elations cholars.2 et existing erspectivesn internationalnstitutions

I wish o thankhefollowingeoplefor heir houghtfulommentsn earlier ersions fthis rticle:RobynEckersley, amesGoldgeier, myGurowitz, ichaelJanover,eterKatzenstein,udie Klotz,Margaret ash, Richard rice,Heather ae, GillianRobinson, enry hue,David Strang, lexanderWendt,membersftheMelbournenternationalelations heory roup,eminar articipantst CornellandYaleUniversities,ndthe nonymousefereest nternationalrganization.alsothankMargaretNashfor er xtensiveesearchssistance,ndgratefullycknowledgehefinancialupportrovidedyan SSRC-MacArthuroundationellowship n Peace and Securityn a ChangingWorld,nd by theFacultyfArts t MonashUniversity.1. See Ruggie1993a,10; Bull 1979, 8-73; andWight 977.2. SeeMorgenthau949, 79;Bull 1977;Keohane1989,162-66;andYoung1986,120.

Internationalrganization1,4, Autumn997,pp.555-89? 1997byThe10 FoundationndtheMassachusettsnstitutefTechnology


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556 Internationalrganizationhavedifficultyccountingor itherhegeneric aturefbasic nstitutionalracticesor nstitutionalifferencesetween ocieties f states. eorealistsrgue hatnstitu-tions eflectheprevailingistributionfpower ndthe nterestsfdominanttates.These are ambiguousndicators,owever,fbasic nstitutionalorms;undamentalinstitutionsersist espite hiftsnthebalance f power,ndunderhe amestruc-tural onditions, odernnd ancient reek tates ngagedn differentnstitutionalpractices. eoliberalslaimthat tates reatenstitutionso reduce he ontractualuncertaintyhatnhibitsooperationndernarchy,rguinghat henaturend copeof nstitutionalooperationeflecthe trategicncentivesnd constraintsosed bydifferentooperationroblems.et, ecause tates anchoose rom range f quallyefficientnstitutionalolutions, eoliberals ave to introducetructuralonditions,such s hegemonyndbipolarity,oexplain hebasic nstitutionalracticesf par-ticular istoricaleriods. ikeneorealism,his pproachails oexplainnstitutionalformshat ndure hiftsnthe alance fpower nd s contradictedy he mergenceofdifferentundamentalnstitutionsnderimilar tructuralonditions.onstructiv-ists rgue hathe oundationalrinciplefsovereigntyefineshe ocial dentityfthestate nd, n turn,onstituteshebasic institutionalractices f internationalsociety.overeigntates resaidto facecertain racticalmperatives,f which hestabilizationf territorialropertyightss paramount.he nstitutionfmultilater-alism, hey laim, volvedto serve hispurpose.Whilethis ine of reasoningssuggestive,tfails oexplainnstitutionalifferencesetweenocieties fsovereignstates. heancient reek ity-stateslsofaced heproblemfstabilizingerritorialpropertyights,et heynstitutedsystemfarbitration,otmultilateralism.This article raws nthe nsightsfcommunicativection heoryndthe nstitu-tional istoriesfdifferentocieties f tatesodevelop new onstructivistccountoffundamentalnstitutions.ike other onstructivists,groundundamentalnstitu-tionsntheunderlyingormativeoundationsf nternationalociety. onstructiv-istshave o far ailed orecognizehe ull omplexityf hose oundations,owever,attachingoo much xplanatoryeight o theorganizingrinciplefsovereignty.Sovereigntyas never een n ndependent,elf-referentialalue; thasalways eenembeddedn argeromplexes f constitutiveetavalueshat ogethertructuren-ternationalocieties. o facilitateystematicomparisonscrosshistoricalocietiesofstates, conceptualizehese omplexess constitutionaltructures,nsemblesfthree eepconstitutivealues: shared elief bout hemoral urposefcentralizedpolitical rganization,n organizing rinciplefsovereignty,nd a norm fpureproceduralustice.Themoral urpose fthe tate epresentshe oreofthisnorma-tive omplex ndprovideshefoundationsor oth heprinciplefsovereigntyndthenorm fpureproceduralustice, hus eterminingtandardsf egitimatetate-hood ndrightfultate ction. he prevailingorm fpure roceduralustice onsti-tutes nd constrainsnstitutionalesign ndaction,eading tates o adopt ertainbasicinstitutionalractices. ecause societies f states evelopdifferentonstitu-tional tructures,hey volvedifferentundamentalnstitutions.hesecondhalf f


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 557the rticlellustrateshis heoryhroughcomparisonf ancient reek ndmodeminstitutionalractices.3

To fully nderstandhe nstitutionalimensionf nternationaloliticswe mustaddresswo nterrelateduestions:Whydostates reate ertainorts f nstitutions,andhowdo thesenstitutionsffecttate ehavior?hefirstuestiononcernsform,the econd fficacy. ostresearchninternationalnstitutionsoncentratesn thelatteruestion, ithneoliberalsmarshalingpowerfulrgumenthat nternationalregimesmatter,nd thatwithoutuch nstitutionsontemporaryelationsetweenstateswould e very ifferent.4ycomparison,he uestionf nstitutionalorm asreceivedittle ustainedttention.5hismeans hat he asic nstitutionalracticesfinternationalocietieshave goneunexplained,ndwe have few nsightsntothesources f nstitutionalnnovationnd he imitsf nstitutionaldaptationnparticu-larhistoricalontexts.eginningrom he ssumptionhat nternationalnstitutionsexert n importantnfluence n relations etween tates, his rticle akesup theneglecteduestionf nstitutionalorm.t seeks oexplainhenature ffundamentalinstitutionsndwhy hey ary romne societyf states oanother.ntheprocesstclarifieshenormativeoundationsf nternationalocieties,overeignty,nd egiti-mate tatehood,nd temphasizes he ulturalndhistoricalontingencyf nstitu-tional ationality.FundamentalnstitutionsefinedWhenseeking o define undamentalnstitutions,hechallenge f achievingndsustainingnternationalrderepresentsnappropriatetartingoint. ollowing ed-leyBull, definenternationalrders "a patternf ctivityhatustainshe lemen-tary rprimaryoalsof the ociety f states,r nternationalociety."6ull identi-fies hese oals s security,he anctityf greements,nd he rotectionf erritorialpropertyights.n thepursuitf nternationalrder,tates ace twobasic types fcooperationroblems: roblemsf collaboration,here hey ave tocooperateoachieve ommonnterests;ndproblemsfcoordination,here ollectivection sneeded o avoidparticularutcomes.7o dealwithhese roblems,ocieties f tatesevolvefundamentalnstitutions.nstitutions,ngeneral,recommonlyefined s"persistentetsof rules formalnd nformal)hat rescribeehavioraloles, on-strainctivity,nd hape xpectations."8undamentalnstitutionsre those lemen-tary ules fpractice hat tates ormulateosolvethe oordinationnd collabora-tion roblemsssociatedwith oexistencender narchy.undamentalnstitutions

3. This rticle raws nargumentsndmaterial resentednmy orthcomingookTheMoralPurposeof he tate: ocial dentitynd nstitutionalction, obe publishedyPrincetonniversityress.4. See Krasner 983;Keohane1984,1989; ndStein1990.5. An exceptions John erard uggie's ecent ork n multilateralism;uggie 993a,1996.6. Bull 1977, .7. Stein1990, 9-44.8. Keohane1989, .


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558 Internationalrganizationareproducedndreproducedybasic institutionalractices,nd themeaning fsuchpracticess defined y thefundamentalnstitutionalules hey mbody.9e-cause of thismutually onstitutiveelationship,hetermsundamentalnstitutionandbasic nstitutionalractice refrequentlysed nterchangeably,practicemain-tainedhroughouthis rticle.Societies f tates suallyxhibit varietyfbasic nstitutionalractices.nmod-ernnternationalocietycholars ave dentifiedilateralism,ultilateralism,nter-national aw, diplomacy,ndmanagementy great owers. imilarlyiverse istscould be made of basic institutionsn other ocieties f states,ncluding hat fancientGreece.Thishaving eensaid,societies f states end oprivilegeertainfundamentalnstitutions,lbeit ifferentnes.For nstance,lthough thens rieflyexperimentedithmultilateralismnthefourthentury.C.E., arbitrationnduredfor enturiess thedominant undamentalnstitutionf ancientGreece.Althoughcases ofarbitrationccurrednthenineteenthentury,ontractualnternationalawandmultilateralismavebecome he ominantnstitutionalractices overning od-ern nternationalociety.his articles concerned ith hese ominantundamentalinstitutions,nd he heoreticalrameworkdvanced ere s designed oexplainwhydifferentocieties fstates rivilegeifferentasic nstitutionalractices.From heperspectivedvanced ere, nstitutionsperatet threeevelsofmoderninternationalociety. s Figure llustrates,onstitutionaltructuresrethe ounda-tionalnstitutions,omprisinghe onstitutivealues hat efineegitimatetatehoodandrightfultate ction; undamentalnstitutionsncapsulatehe asicrules fprac-tice hat tructureow tates olve ooperationroblems;nd ssue-specificegimesenactbasic nstitutionalracticesnparticularealms f nterstateelations. hesethreeiers f nstitutionsre"hierarchicallyrdered," ith onstitutionaltructuresconstitutingundamentalnstitutions,nd basic nstitutionalracticesonditioningissue-specificegimes.

Existing ExplanationsNeorealismSinceneorealists elieve hat institutionsave minimalnfluencen state ehav-ior;" 0 hey ave devotedittleystematicttentiono explainingasic nstitutionalpractices. hey implyrgue hat hepossibilityndnature f nstitutionaloopera-tionbetweentates reheavily onditionedytheprevailingistributionfpowerandconfigurationf interests.nstitutionalooperations consideredmost ikelyunder onditionsfhegemony,hen dominanttate an create nd enforce herulesof the nternationalystem,nd dominanttates end o create nd maintaininstitutionshat urtherheirnterestsndmaximize heir ower.1As an explanation

9. Rawls1955.10. Mearsheimer994/95,.11. See ibid., 3; andGilpin 981.


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 559

Issue-specificegimese.g.,GAYT,NPT

Fundamentalnstitutionse.g.,multilateralism,internationalaw

Constitutionaltructuresmetavaluesefiningegitimatestatehoodndrightfultate ctionFIGURE 1. Theconstitutiveierarchyfmodernnternationalnstitutionsfor henature f fundamentalnstitutions,hisperspectives problematicnthreerespects.Even fhegemonic owers o help ocreate ndenforce he ules f nternationalsociety, eorealists ave difficultyxplaininghe nstitutionalracticeshat omi-nant tates ave historicallymployedo achieve hisgoal.The logicofneorealisttheoryuggestshat egemons illpreferilateral ormsf nterstateooperation,which etternable hemo exploit heirelativeower ver ther tates,norderomaximize heflexibilityndminimize he ransparencyf theirctions,ndtopre-ventweaker tates romncreasingheir ower hroughollective ction.Yet thisexpectations contradictedytheUnited tates' nthusiasticromotionfmultilat-eralism fter 945.As SteveWeberhas shown n thecase ofNATO,andJudithGoldsteinnthecase ofGATT,power lone cannot xplainWashington'snstitu-tional references.12Ifneorealistsould stablish clear elationshipetweenhe istributionfpower,thenstitutionalreferencesfhegemons,nd henatureffundamentalnstitutions,theywould tillhavetroubleccountingor hegeneric ature f basic nstitutionalpractices. s I explain ater,heprinciplef multilateralismas firstndorsed ystates uringhenineteenthentury,nd he ensitynd fficacyfmultilateralnsti-tutionsncreasedteadilyhereafter.merican egemonyertainlyntensifiedndacceleratedhisprocess, ut nstitutionalevelopmentsfterWorldWar I built nnormativerinciplesaiddownwellbeforeaxAmericana,otablytthe woHague

12. SeeWeber 993, 67;andGoldstein993, 02.


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560 InternationalrganizationConferencesnd tVersailles.hedevelopmentfmultilateralismasthus xhibitedan evolutionaryynamicnd an enduringuality hat vensophisticatedeorealistarguments,hich nvoke institutionalags"and"punctuatedquilibria"oexplaininstitutionalersistence,avedifficultyccommodating.13Neorealist ttemptsolink hebalanceofpower o institutionalreferencesndoutcomes re furtherrustratedythefact hat ncientGreek nd modern tatesengagedn differentnstitutionalracticesnder he ame structuralonditions.sneorealistsave frequentlybserved, thenswas a hegemon peratingn a bipolarsystem, etunlike heUnited tates t never romotedmultilateralnstitutionsomanagenterstateelations.4For enturiesheGreek ity-statesracticedhird-partyarbitrations the rincipalnstitutionalechanismor olving ooperationroblemsandfacilitatingoexistence,nd tremainedhekey undamentalnstitutionhrough-out, nd ong fter,heperiod fAthenianegemony.NeoliberalismIncontrastoneorealists,eoliberalsoldthat nternationalnstitutionsxert sig-nificantnfluence n internationalelations,nabling tates, s rational ctors, osolvecooperation roblemsnd realizegoalsthat utonomyndself-helpannotprovide.15 ithout enyinghe anarchical ature fthe nternationalystem, heself-interestedaturefstates, rthe mportancefpower, hey rgue hatnstitu-tions facilitategreementsyraisingnticipatedosts fviolatingthers' ropertyrights, yalteringransactionoststhroughlusteringf ssues, ndby providingreliable nformationomembers."6 he nature f particularnstitutions,hey on-tend,s determinedythe onfigurationf statenterestsndthe trategicilemmasposed bycooperationn differentssue areas.17While neoliberalsoncentratenissue-specificnstitutions,r"regimes,"everal cholars averecentlysedrational-ist nsightso explain henature nd developmentffundamentalnstitutions,ithLisaMartin's ork n multilateralismeing mblematic.18Martin ssumes that tates re elf-interestednd urnomultilateralismnlyf tserves heir urposes,whatever hesemight e." 9Afterdentifyingour ypes fcooperationroblemsncounteredystates-collaboration,oordination,uasion,and assurance-she examineswhen t is rational or tates o choose multilateralsolutions o eachproblem. er nquiryeveals, owever,hat atthis bstractevelofanalysishe utcomes emainndeterminate.ultiple easible olutions xist oreachproblem."20n short,ational hoicetheorylonecannot redictwhen tateswill construct ultilateralnstitutionso solvecooperationroblems.o overcome

13. See Krasner 976; ndKrasner 988.14. See Fliess 1966;Gilpin 988; ndGilpin 991.15. See Axelrod ndKeohane1985;Keohane1984,1989; ndStein 983,1990.16. Axelrod ndKeohane1985, 7.17. Stein1983,140.18. Martin 993.See also Morrow 994; ndWeingast 995.19. Martin 993, 2.20. Ibid.


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 561this imitation, artinnvokeswo tructuraleaturesf thepost-1945nternationalsystem-Americanegemonyndbipolarity-to xplainwhymultilateralnstitu-tions roliferated.heargues hat t s rational or ar-sightedegemons o promotemultilateralorms f governance,ndthat one of themost mportantmpacts fbipolaritys toencouragear ightedehavior n thehegemon'sart."'21 y combin-ingthe neoliberalmphasis n rationalnstitutionalelectionwith heneorealiststress nstructuraleterminants,artinlaims o overcomehe ndeterminancefabstractationalismnd, nturn,xplain ost- 945multilateralism.Thisperspectivenfundamentalnstitutionss problematicn several espects. sMartinuccessfullyemonstrates,bstractationalistheoryannot xplainwhy tatesadopt ne nstitutionalormver nother. ppeals o structuraleterminantsre nosolution,ecause heyxposeneoliberalsikeMartin o the amecriticismss neo-realists. o beginwith, mericanolicymakersdvancedmultilateralrinciples orstructuringhepost-1945nternationalrder eforehe mergencefbipolarity.sJohn uggie bserves,t s "more han littlewkward oretrojects incentivesoractor ehaviortructuralonditionshat ad notyet learly merged,ndwerenotyetfully nderstood,ndthat n some measure nlythesubsequent ehavior factors elped oproduce."22econd,modernnternationalociety asexperiencedonly neperiod fhegemonynder onditionsfbipolarity,nd lthough ultilater-alism eceived major oostduring hat eriod,tsignificantlyredatesaxAmeri-cana, inbothprinciplendpractice, s I later xplain.Third, ttemptso deduceinstitutionalreferencesndoutcomes romtructuralonditionsuch s hegemonyandbipolarityreconfounded y thefact hat nder uchconditionsmodern ndancient reek tatesngagedndifferentractices.ConstructivismConstructivistsrgue hatocial nstitutionsxert deep onstitutivenfluencen theidentitiesnd, n turn,nterestsf actors. Cultural-institutionalontexts," eterKatzensteinrites,do notmerelyonstrainctors ychanginghe ncentiveshatshapebehavior.heydo not imply egulate ehavior.hey lsohelpto constitutethevery ctorswhose onducthey eektoregulate."23nternationalnstitutions,tfollows, efine he dentitiesfsovereigntates.24nderstandingow nternationalinstitutionshape tatedentityscrucial, onstructivistsold, ecause ocial denti-ties nformhe nterestshatmotivatetate ction. Actors onothavea 'portfolio'of nterestshat hey arryroundndependentfsocialcontext;nsteadhey efineinterestsntheprocess fdefiningituations.. Sometimes ituationsreunprec-edentednourexperience... More oftenhey ave routineualitiesn whichweassignmeaningsn thebasis ofinstitutionallyefined oles."5 Employing hese

21. Ibid.,112.22. Ruggie1993a, 9.23. Katzenstein996, 2.24. Wendt ndDuvall1989, 0.25. Wendt 992, 98.


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562 Internationalrganizationinsights,onstructivistsave oughto xplain widerange f nternationalhenom-ena, ncludinghepractice f self-help,he nternationalovementgainst part-heid, he ndoftheColdWar, nd, mportantlyor urpurposes,henature fbasicinstitutionalractices.26When hey urn heirttentiono fundamentalnstitutions,onstructivistsrawconstitutiveinkbetweenhe rganizingrinciplefsovereignty,he dentityf thestate,ndbasic nstitutionalractices.overeigntysconsideredheprimarynstitu-tion f nternationalociety.27hemeaningshat efineovereigntynot nly onsti-tute particularind f state-the sovereign'tate-butalso a particularormfcommunity,ince dentitiesre relational."28onstructivistsrgue hat overeignstates ave "certain ractical ispositions"hat hapethefundamentalnstitutionsthey onstructofacilitateoexistence.29The classicalgameofsovereignty,"ob-ertJackson laims, exists o order herelationsfstates, revent amagingolli-sionsbetween hem, nd-when they ccur-regulatetheconflictsnd restorepeace.'30Thisgamegeneratesertainundamentalnstitutions.Forexample,radi-tional ublicnternationalaw belongs othe onstitutiveart fthegame n thatt ssignificantlyoncerned ithmoderatingndcivilizingherelationsf ndependentgovernments."'31ikewise, iplomacyalsobelongsnsofars itaims treconcilingandharmonizingivergentationalnterestshroughnternationalialogue."32

Therelationshipetweenhe nstitutionf overeigntyndbasic nstitutionalrac-ticeshas beenclarifiedomewhat yRuggie'swork n multilateralism.uggie m-phasizes he nextricableonnectionetweenovereigntyndterritoriality,rguingthat he distinctiveeaturefthemodernystemfrule s that thasdifferentiatedits subject ollectivitynto erritoriallyefined,ixed,nd mutuallyxclusive n-clavesof egitimateominion."33he state's laim oexclusiveurisdictionithingiven erritorysessentiallyclaim o privateroperty.34hen he ystemfsover-eign tates irstmerged,omeongoingmeanshadtobefound o stabilizeerritorialpropertyights,ecause onflictingurisdictionallaims romisederpetualonflictand nstability.uggie rgueshatmultilateralism-withtsprinciplesf ndivisibil-ity, eneralizedules fconduct,nddiffuseeciprocity-washe inevitable"olu-tion othisproblem.35e thusdraws clearconnectionetweenhefoundationalprinciplef overeignty,he ocial dentityf he tate, nd henatureffundamental

26. See ibid;Finnemore996;Katzenstein996;Klotz 1995a,b;KoslowskindKratochwil995; ndRuggie1993a.27. See Ashley 988;Bartelson 995;BierstekerndWeber 996;Jackson 990; Onuf1991;Ruggie1983;Ruggie 993b;Weber 995;Wendt 992;WendtndDuvall1989.28. Wendt 992, 12.29. WendtndDuvall1989, 1.30. Jackson990, 6.31. Ibid.32. Ibid., 5.33. Ruggie1993b, 51.34. Ruggie 983, 75.35. Ruggie 993a, 1.


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 563institutions,oncludinghatmultilateralismis a generic nstitutionalorm n themodem tate ystem."36

To explain he ncreased ensityf multilateralnstitutionsfter 945, severalconstructivistsave advanced "second mage" argumentbout he nstitutionalimpact f American egemony.37hey argue hat heUnited tates' dentitys aliberal emocracyirectlynfluencedhepoliciesWashingtonmployed o structurethepostwarnternationalrder. ccordingo Anne-Marieurley, merican olicy-makers elieved hat hedomestic eformsf theNewDeal wouldonly ucceed fcompatibleegulatorynstitutionsxisted t the nternationalevel. Consequently,they et bout onstructingultilateralnstitutionshatmbodied he ame rchitec-tural rincipless those f heNewDeal regulatorytate.38he dentityf heworld'smost owerfultate s thus onsideredcrucial actornthe roliferationfmultilat-eral nstitutionsfter 945. nRuggie'swords,twas "American egemonyhatwasdecisive fterWorldWar I, notmerely merican egemony."39Theseconstructivistrgumentsufferrom woweaknesses. irst,he onnectionRuggie raws etween erritoriality,ropertyights,ndmultilateralismitsuncom-fortablyith he nstitutionalistoriesf both hemodem nd ancient reek ys-tems.nthefirst 50years fterWestphalia-theo-called geof absolutism-theEuropean tate ystem eveloped elativelyewgenuinemultilateralnstitutions.sI later xplain,multilateralismtook off"duringhe nineteenthentury,ot theseventeenth.uggie's rguments furtherontradictedythepreviouslytated actthat hecity-statesf ancientGreecepracticedrbitration,otmultilateralism,ostabilize erritorialropertyights.econd, lthoughurley rovides compellingexplanationorwhyAmericanolicymakersere "ideologically"nclined owardmultilateralorms f internationalovernance,nd why heUnited tatesplayedsuch catalyticole n their ost-1945 roliferation,er rgumentmplies hat hearchitecturalrinciplesdvanced y heUnited tateswerenew othe ommunityfstates. mericanolicymakers,owever,laboratednstitutionalrincipleshatwerefirstmbracednd mplementedythegreat owers lmost centuryarlier.Toward a New ConstructivistTheoryConstructivistsorrectlyocus n howprimaryocial nstitutionshape tateden-tity,nturnnfluencingasic nstitutionalractices.heyhavepaid nsufficienttten-tion, owever,o thediscursivemechanismshatinkntersubjectivedeasof egiti-

36. Ibid., 4.37. Burley 993.Burley's rguments echoed n Ruggie 993a, ndfurtherevelopednRuggie 996.Not ll constructivistsollow urley ndRuggie n ntegratingomesticources f tatedentitynto heirexplanatoryrameworks.ostnotably,nhis ommitmento ystemicheorizing,endt xplicitlyracketsdomestic, r "corporate,"ources f statedentity,ocusing ntirelyn the onstitutiveole of nterna-tional ocial nteraction;endt 994, 85.38. Burley 993,125.39. Ruggie 993a, 1.


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564 Internationalrganizationmate tatehoodndrightfultatectionothe onstitutionffundamentalnstitutions.Drawing n the nsightsfcommunicativection heory,articularlyhework fJuirgenabermas,ndreflectingn thediscursive racticesurroundingnstitutionalproductionndreproductionn the ncient reek ndmodernocieties fstates,hefollowingection utlinesn alternativeonstructivistccount ffundamentalnsti-tutions.Communicativectionnd nstitutionalonstructionWhenstates ormulate, aintain,ndredefinehe nstitutionalorms, ules, ndprincipleshat acilitatenternationalooperationhey ngagena process f ommu-nicativection. hat s, they ebatehow egitimatetates hould, rshould ot, ct.Theoristsf communicativection fferhreensightselevanto understandinghepractical iscoursehat urroundsnternationalnstitutionalonstruction.hese n-sights, abermasnsists,re "not oncerned ithwhat ational,easonable,rcor-rect rgumentations,butwithhow people,dumb s they re, actually rgue."40First, a communicativelychieved greement ustbe basedin theendon rea-sons.41 Parties ave to ustifyheparticularrincipleshey dvocate, ebatere-volves around hemerits fparticulareasons,nd stable greements,esultingnlegitimateules f onduct,ltimatelyest n those easons eemed ocarryhemostweight. econd,not ll reasonshaveequal standing;nly hose hat esonatewithpreexisting,utuallyecognized igherrder aluesare consideredalid."In thecontext fcommunicativection,"Habermas rgues, only hose ersons ount sresponsible ho, s membersf a communicativeommunity,an orient heir c-tions o ntersubjectivelyecognizedaliditylaims."42hird,he easons hat arrythegreatest eightnpracticaliscoursere hose hatppeal odeep-rooted,ollec-tivelyhareddeasthat efinewhat onstituteslegitimateocialagent.43dentityvaluesrepresenthe ore of the"lifeworld,"he "storehousefunquestionedul-turalgivensfromwhich hoseparticipatingn communicationrawagreed-uponpatternsf nterpretationor se n theirnterpretivefforts."44hese nsightsnder-gird hediscussionhat ollows,nforming y rgumentbout he ocial dentityfthe tate, hedeepmetavalueshat tructurenternationalocieties,ndthemecha-nisms ywhich hese onstituteasic nstitutionalractices.State dentity,overeignty,nd PoliticalActionAll humanctors-bothndividualndcollective-have ocial dentitieshat nablethem ooperaten a world fcomplex ocialprocesses ndpractices. ollowingother onstructivists,define ocial identitiess "sets ofmeaningshat n actorattributeso itselfwhile akingnto ccount heperspectivefothers,hats, as a

40. Habermas 984, 7.41. Ibid.,17.42. Ibid.,14.43. Connolly 993,190-91.44. Habermas 991,136.


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 565socialobject."45ocial dentitiesredefinedy ntersubjective,ocially anctioned,and nstitutionalizedeaningshat efinehenaturendpurposef gents nd gencyina givenocial ontext.uch dentitiesulfillvarietyf ocial-psychologicalurposes.Most mportantly,hey rovidectorswith rimaryeasons or ction.n a purposivesense, s George . McCall andJ.L. Simmons rgue, ocial dentitiesrovide theprimaryource fplansfor ction," nformingn actor's oals as well as the trate-gies they ormulateo achieve hem.46n a ustificatoryense, ocial dentitiesro-vide he asisonwhich ction an berationalized,rovidingctorswith reason orbeingand acting, raisond'etre.For instance, doctor's ocial identitympliescertain orms faction,uch s prescribingrugs nd doing urgery,ut lsogivesmeaningo those ctions: I am a doctor,hat'swhy dosuch hings."As we have seen, onstructivistsssume hat hefoundationalrinciplef sover-eigntyefineshe ocial dentityf he tate.n DavidStrang's ords, overeigntysunderstoodas a socialstatus hat nables tates s participantsithin communityofmutual ecognition."47his ssumptions both ogicallyndhistoricallyroblem-atic.Unless mbedded ithinlargeromplex fvalues, he rinciplef overeigntycannot loneprovide he statewith coherentocialidentity,orhas it donesohistorically.overeignty,ike ndividualiberty,snot self-referentialalue apableof ndependentlyrovidingctorswith ubstantiveeasons or ction. obeginwith,sovereigntyas nopurposiveontent. ithouteferenceo somehigherrder aluesit cannotndependentlynformlansof action r the strategieso achieve hem.Furthermore,tprovidesn nadequateustificatoryasis for ction.f behave n away hatnnoys,rustrates,rmerelyffectshose roundme, heyre ntitledoaskwhy actednsuch fashion.sserting y ndependencer ibertyannot rovidenadequate esponse,s they an mmediatelysk why am entitledo suchfreedoms.Atthis oint must roundmy laims o ndependencensomehigherrder,ociallyrecognizedalues.Taken o anextreme,hiswould nvolve ppealingo ntersubjec-tivevalues hat efinewhat t means o be a fully ealizedhuman eing. imilarly,when tates reforcednternationallyo ustifyheir ctions here omesa pointwhen heymust eachbeyondmere ssertionsfsovereigntyo moreprimaryndsubstantivealues hatwarrantheir tatusscentralized,utonomousolitical rga-nizations. his is a necessary eaturef internationalommunicativection, ndhistoricallyt hasentailed commonmoral iscourse hat roundsovereignightsindeeper alues hat efinehe ocial dentityf the tate: We are entitledopos-sessandexercise overeignightsecausewe areancient olises, bsolutist onar-chies, rmodernemocracies."Recognizinghat he dentityf he tatesgroundedn a largeromplex fvaluesthan implyhe rganizingrinciplefsovereigntys thefirsttep nformulatingmore atisfactoryonstructivistccount f basic institutionalractices. or thesevaluesnot nly efine he erms f egitimatetatehood,heylsoprovidetateswith

45. Wendt 994, 85.46. McCall andSimmons 966, 9.47. Strang 996, 2.


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566 Internationalrganizationsubstantiveeasons or ction,whichnturnxert profoundnfluencen institu-tional esign nd action. urthermore,hevalues hat round overeigntyave var-iedfrom ne society f states oanother,eneratingontrastingationales or tateaction nddifferentasic nstitutionalractices.ConstitutionaltructuresTo facilitateystematicomparisoncrosshistoricalocieties fstates,conceptual-ize thecomplexes fvaluesthat efine tate dentitys constitutionaltructures.Constitutionaltructuresre coherentnsembles fintersubjectiveeliefs, rin-ciples, ndnormshat erformwo unctionsnorderingnternationalocieties: heydefine hat onstituteslegitimatector, ntitledo all therightsndprivilegesfstatehood;nd they efinehebasicparametersfrightfultate ction.They re"constitutional"ecausethey resystemsf basicprincipleshat efinendshapeinternationalolities,ndtheyre "structures"ecause hey limit ndmold gentsand gencies ndpointhemnways hat end oward common ualityfoutcomeseventhoughhe ffortsnd aimsofagents ndagencies ary."48s Figure illus-trates,onstitutionaltructuresanbesaid o ncorporatehreentersubjectiveorma-tive lements: hegemonic elief bout hemoral urpose fcentralized,utono-mouspolitical rganization;norganizingrinciplef sovereignty;nd a norm fpure roceduralustice.Hegemonic eliefs bout hemoral urpose fthe tate epresenthe oreof thisnormativeomplex,rovidingheustificatoryoundationsor he rinciplef over-eigntynd theprevailingorm fpureproceduralustice.The term urpose efershere othe easons hat istoricalgents old or onstructingndmaintainingutono-mous olitical nits. uchpurposesre "moral" ecause hey lways ntail concep-tion f he ndividualr ocial"good"served y utonomousolitical rganizations.We referothemoral urposefthe state" ecause uch ationalesreof differentcategoryo themoral urposesf suzerain r heteronomousorms fpolitical rga-nization. inally,hese eliefs rehegemonic,otbecause heyrethe nly oncep-tions f themoral urpose f the tate ropagatedna given ulturalnd historicalcontext,ut ecause,na narrowense, heyre mbracedythedominantoalitionof states nd, na broaderense, hey onstituteheprevailing,ocially anctionedjustificationor overeignights.gainsthese egemoniceliefs,lternativeoncep-tions f themoralpurpose f the statehavehistoricallyssumed n oppositionalquality,heirroponentsftenecryingheway nwhich revailingeliefsonditionadmissiono nternationalocietynd hape tsbasic nstitutionalractices.49

48. Waltz1979, 4.49. Note howtherevolutionarytates f France nd theUnited tates hallenged hedynasticrin-ciples f bsolutistnternationalocietyn the ighteenthentury;ow hemajorAsian tates hallenged,thenccepted,he iberal-constitutionaliststandardfcivilization"hat tructuredarlymodernnterna-tional ocietyn the atenineteenthentury;ow theSovietUnion nd SouthAfrica ucked gainst hesameduringheCold War, ubsequentlymbracinghevery rincipleshey pposed or ecades ogaineffectiventryo contemporarynternationalociety. ee Gilbert 951;Gong 1984; Klotz 1995; andKoslowskindKratochwil995.


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 567

Moral purposeof the tate

Organizing Norm fproceduralprinciplef justicesovereigntyFIGURE 2. Theconstitutivetructuref nternationalociety

Societies f sovereigntates,uzerainystems,ndheteronomousystemsreallstructuredyorganizing rinciples.hese principles,uggie rgues, stablish hebasison "which he onstituentnits re eparatedromne nother."'50hat s,theydefinehemodeof differentiation.n societies fstates, he rganizingrinciple fsovereigntyifferentiatesolitical nits n thebasis of particularityndexclusivity,creating systemfterritoriallyemarcated,utonomousenters fpoliticaluthor-ity. onstructivistsrgue hathe recisemeaningndbehavioralmplicationsf hisprinciple ary rom ne historicalontexto another.s Janice hompsonbserves,"while overeigntyiffersrom eteronomyntheoreticalndempirical ays, herecanbe much ariationnthe uthoritylaimswithinovereignty."51he ctors eemedworthyfsovereignights,henature fthe ightshey ain nd he bligationsheyassume, he onditionsnderwhich hose ightsanbe legitimatelyxercised,ndthe ituationsnwhich nternationalocietyslicensedo nterveneocompromiserremove hose ights avevaried reatly,articularlycross ocieties fstates. ege-monic eliefs bout hemoral urpose fthe tate rovideheustificatoryasis forsovereignights,nd ndoing o define hemeaningf overeigntyn a given istori-calcontext,s well as itsbehavioralmplications.Constitutionaltructureslso incorporatethirdlement: norm fpureproce-duralustice.Norms fpureproceduralustice pecifyhecorrectrocedureshat"legitimate"r"good" statesmploy ollectivelyo formulateasic rules f nter-state onduct. hese norms o notprescribeubstantiverinciplesf nternationaljustice, hey imply ictate a correct r fairprocedureuchthat he outcome slikewise orrect rfair,whatevert s, providingheprocedure asbeen properlyfollowed."'52heexistencef generallyccepted ormfpure roceduralustice s

50. Ruggie 983, 74.51. Thomson 994,151.52. Rawls1972, 6.


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568 Internationalrganizationa prerequisiteor rderedocialrelations,omesticallynd nternationally.nlessminimal,ase-line greementxists mong ociety'smembersbouthow rules fcoexistencendcooperationhould e formulated,obasisexists or ollectivec-tion rthe esolutionfconflict,et lone he ormulationf ubstantiverinciplesfjustice.This s true f internationalocieties s wellas domesticocieties, ut sfollowingections emonstrate,ifferentonceptionsf themoralpurpose fthestate avegeneratedifferentystemicorms fpure roceduralustice.As we shallsee,theraisond'etreundergirdinghe overeigntyf ancient reek ity-statesn-volveda "discursive" orm f ustice,whereas hemoralpurpose ustaininghesovereigntyfmoderntates as nvolved "legislative"onceptionf ustice.Before roceeding,hree bservationsemain. irst,hese ormativelementsremutuallynterconnectednd dependent,onstitutingsingle, oherent ormativesystem. ne cannotrguen defense ftheprinciplefsovereigntyithoutppeal-ing o the"good" served y a system f rulebased onterritoriallyemarcateden-ters fpoliticaluthority,ndsince,nJohn awls' words, justices the irstirtueof social nstitutions,"t s difficulto definehat oodwithouteferenceo someconceptionfproceduralustice.53econd, hevaluesthat onstitutionaltructurescomprise riginate ithin he domestic olitical ulturesf dominanttates, ndcoalitions fsuch tates enerallyxert disproportionatenfluencentheirnterna-tional nstitutionalization.nce embeddednthepracticesf states, owever,hevalues thatmakeup constitutionaltructuresonditionhebehavior f strongndweak states like,facilitatingothdominationnd resistance. hird, onstitutionalstructuresre hegemonic,ot otalizing.he normativerincipleshey mbody e-fine hemembershipf nternationalociety nd thebounds f egitimatetate c-tion, ut hisdoes notmean hat hey ouncontested.t s notuncommonor tateandnonstatectorsooppose he ominantnterpretationfwhat onstituteslegiti-matestate r appropriatetatebehavior.n fact, hisrepresentsne of the moreinterestingxesoftensionncontemporaryorld olitics.Constitutionaltructuresnd nstitutionalesign ndActionHistorically,ocieties f sovereigntates aveevolved ifferentonstitutionaltruc-tures,nd his as ed them o develop istinctiveundamentalnstitutions.s domi-nant onceptionsfthemoral urposefthe tate avevaried, o toohavesystemicnormsfproceduralustice.Animated ydifferentorms,tates ave dopted iffer-ent nstitutionalractices.he ancient reek nstitutionf arbitrationerved ssen-tiallyhe amefunctions themodernnstitutionfmultilateralism,ith oth eingemployedo solve collaborations wellas coordinationroblems etween tates.This s not osay hat he ity-statesfancient reecewere oncerned ith he amesubstantivessues smoderntates, nly hathey aced he ame pectrumfcoop-erationroblems,nd hat heirnstitutionsere esignedo address hese roblems.The crucialdifferenceetween he two societies f statesayintheir ontrasting

53. Ibid., .


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 569norms fproceduralustice, orms hat ncouragedtateso choosedifferentnstitu-tional olutions.t mattersittlewhether,n an abstractational ense, rbitrationrmultilateralismonstitutemore fficientesponse ocoordinationnd ollaborationproblems; hatmatterss that t particularistorical omentstates ave deemedthem he ight esponses.Systemic orms fpure roceduralustice nfluencenstitutionalesign nd ctionthroughhree onstitutive echanisms.irst, hey efinehe ognitive orizons finstitutionalrchitects.hat s, they hape the nstitutionalmaginationsf thosepoliticalctorsngagednproducingndreproducingundamentalnstitutions,ak-ing omepracticesppearmandatoryndothers nimaginable.nimatedy discur-siveconceptionfproceduralustice, he ity-statesfancient reece magined ndconstructedhe nstitutionf interstaterbitration-not ultilateralism-andm-buedwith legislative onceptionf proceduralustice,modemnstitutionalrchi-tects onceived nd establishedontractual-legalndmultilateralorms f nterna-tional overnance.nboth ases, nstitutionalractices ere roducedndreproducedpartly ecause, n Paul DiMaggio and Walter owell'swords, individuals ftencannotven onceive fappropriatelternativesorbecause hey egards unrealis-tic he lternativeshey an magine)."54Second,norms f pureproceduralusticeare themetanormshat tructureheprocess fcommunicativection hat urroundsheproductionndreproductionffundamentalnstitutions.undamentalnstitutionsre setsofprescriptiveorms,rules, ndprincipleshat pecify owstates ought" oresolve heir onflicts,oor-dinate heir elations,nd facilitateoexistence. he constructionnd maintenanceofsuch nstitutionsecessarily ntails n ongoingmoraldialoguebetween tatesaboutwhat hesenorms,ules,ndprincipleshould e.As theoristsfcommunica-tive action bserve, uchdialogues re structuredya "higher rder onsensus"about heprimaryocialvalues hat uch nstitutionsre ntendedoembody.55ys-temic orms fpure roceduralustice epresenthe alient higherrder alues" nthemoral ialogues hat roducendreproducehe undamentalnstitutionsf nter-nationalocieties. he architectsfmodernnternationalnstitutionsppealed o theproceduralorm f egislativeusticewhenustifyingultilateralnstitutionalolu-tions,ndthenormfdiscursiveusticeprovidedheustificatoryoundationor heancient reek racticefarbitration.Thesetwo onstitutive echanismshapebasic nstitutionalracticesecause nideological onsensusxists mong hemajorityf states bout heprimacyf theprevailingystemicorm fpureproceduralustice.Oncesuch consensusxists,however,orms fproceduralustice lsoconstrainhe nstitutionalctions fthosestates hat o nothavea deep cognitivermoral ttachmento them.When uchstateswish oportrayheirnteractionsith thertatess legitimate,heyreundersignificantompulsiono ustifyheir ctionsnterms f he ystem's rimaryormsofcoexistence.t is a general eature fhuman ocialaction,Quentin kinnerb-

54. DiMaggio ndPowell1991,11.55. Heller 987, 39.


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570 Internationalrganizationserves, hat such nagentmaybe saidtohave strong otive or eekingoensurethat isbehavior an plausiblye describedn termsf a vocabularylready orma-tivewithin is ociety,vocabulary hichs capable f egitimatingtthe ame imeas describinghat ehasdone."56 ontraryo commonssumptions,his egitimat-ing mperativeorces tates oadjustmore han heiranguage. laiming hat ne'srelations ith thertates reconsistentith revailingormsfproceduralusticeis a successfulegitimatingtrategynly f theres a minimaloincidenceetweenrhetoricndactions,t east n the onger erm.Thus theproblemacingn agentwho wishesto legitimate hathe is doingat the sametime s gainingwhathewants," kinnerrgues, cannot imply e the nstrumentalroblemftailoringisnormativeanguagen order o fithisprojects.t must npartbe theproblemftailoringisprojectsn orderofit he vailablenormativeanguage."57his s not osay, fcourse,hat ll states losely bserve heirystem's orms fpure roceduraljusticeall the time.Rather,t is to suggest hat uchnorms xert constraininginfluencen the nstitutionalctions feven hose tateshat o not ubscribeotheideological onsensusftheirystem.By these hreemechanisms,ystemicorms f pureproceduralustice hape hefundamentalnstitutionshat tates reate o solvecooperationroblemsndfacili-tate oexistence.hesemechanismsrehierarchicallyrdered, ithhe irstxertingdeeper onstitutivend onstrainingnfluencehanhe econd,nd he econd eeperthan hethird.ystemic orms fproceduralusticeshapethebehavior f statesthroughll threemechanismsimultaneously,lthoughheprecise alancebetweenthesemechanismsaries romnesettingoanother.he netresults that he on-trastingehavioral receptsfthemodernnd ancient reeknorms fpureproce-duralusticehavebeenclosely eflectednthe rchitecturalrinciplesmbodiedntheirespectiveundamentalnstitutions.

Comparing heAncientGreek ndModern Societies fStatesThe ancient reekndmodernocietiesf tates xhibit basic imilarity:oth avebeenorganizedccordingotheprinciplefsovereignty.hat s,not nlyhave heirconstituentnits laimed upremeuthorityithinertain erritorialimits,heseclaimshavebeenrecognizeds legitimateytheirespectiveommunitiesfstates.AsMartinWightbserves,nmodernnternationalocietythis asbeenformulatedinthedoctrinef the egalequalityf states. heancient reek oleisand theHel-lenicKingdoms,n a similarway,bothclaimed overeigntyndrecognizedneanother's." Inboth ontexts,herefore,he overeigntyf he tate asbeen nstitu-tionally rounded.etdespitehis ikeness,he ncient reek ndmodern ocieties

56. Skinner 978,xii.57. Ibid., ii-xiii.58. Wight 977,23.


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 571of states ave produced ery ifferentundamentalnstitutionso facilitateoexist-encebetween overeigntates. explain his nstitutionalariationhrougheferencetothe ontrastingonstitutionaltructureshat efinedegitimatetatehoodndright-ful tate ctionnthese wo ystems.In brief, he rgumentroceeds s follows. t thehearts f the ncient reek ndmodem onstitutionaltructuresie radically ifferentonceptionsfthemoral ur-poseofthe tate. or the ncient reeks, ity-statesxisted or heprimaryurposeof ultivatingparticularorm fcommunalife-whatAristotlealls biospolitikos,the oliticalife.Thepoliswas the ite n which itizens,reed rommaterialabors,couldparticipate-throughction nd speech, otforce ndviolence-inthedeci-sions ffectingheirommonife.Throughuchparticipation,itizensscapedwhatHannahArendtalls "thefutilityfindividualife."'59he moralpurpose f themodem tate,ncontrast,nvolves o such dealized onception f communalife.Instead,tsraison 'etre s individualist,estingnthe ugmentationf ndividuals'purposesndpotentialities,speciallyntheeconomic ealm. ince the ateeigh-teenthentury,hesovereigntate's egitimacyas beenincreasinglyiedto thecultivationf an environmentnwhich ndividuals anfreely ursue heir inter-ests," freedomrotectedystate-sanctionedrights."Informedy these ontrasting oral urposes fthe tate,he ncient reek ndmodem onstitutionaltructuresmbody ifferentorms f proceduralustice.Theancient reek orm fproceduralustice rescribeddiscursive ode fruledeter-mination.he politicalife ftheGreek ity-stateevolved round ublic peech nddebate, heprincipalimofwhichwas therational ursuitf ustice.Cooperationproblems etween ndividuals ereresolved hrough process fpublicpoliticaldiscourse,which entered n theadjudicationfparticular isputes eforeargepublic ssemblies ndury ourts,nd he ulingsfthese odies pplied nly othedisputingartiesna particularealm ftheirnteraction.nthis rocedure,odifiedlaw played ittle ole n the ecisions f djudicatingodies,norwas their urposeoinscribe eneralizableules f conduct.nstead,ssembliesnd courts xercised nAristoteliansenseof ustice," nvolvinghehighly ubjective valuation fthemoral tandingf thedisputants,hecircumstancesf thecase athand, onsider-ations fequity,ndtheneeds fthepolis.General ules f socialconductrose utof his rocess nly ndirectly,ith iscursiveractices radually eneratingustom-arynorms fbehavior.Incontrast,hemodemnorm fproceduralustice icenses legislativemodeofruledetermination.nce the egitimacyf the tate adbeentied o the ugmenta-tion f ndividuals'urposesndpotentialities,he bsolutistrinciplehat ulefor-mulation as the ole preservefthemonarchost ll credence. fterheAmericanandFrench evolutions,ightfulaw wasdeemed o havetwo haracteristics:thadto be authoredythose ubject o the aw,or their epresentatives;nd thad tobeequally indingn all citizens,nall likecases. Thepreviousuthoritativeodeofrule determinationas thus upplanted y the egislative odificationf formal,

59. Arendt958, 6.


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572 Internationalrganizationreciprocallyinding ccords. ourts xistnsuch systemo nterpretodifiedawand o determinehether,n a particularase,that aw has beenbroken.

The modernegislativeorm fproceduralusticehas nformedhepaired volu-tion fthe woprincipalundamentalnstitutionsfcontemporarynternationaloci-ety: ontractualnternationalaw, ndmultilateralism.s explainedater,he ransla-tion fthemodernonceptionf aw asreciprocalccordnto henternationalrenaafterhe ateeighteenthenturypurredotonly hebroadeningnddeepeningfinternationalaw as aninstitutionirmlyroundednthepracticesfstates, ut hedevelopmentf multilateralism.ormultilateralism,uggie bserves,s an nstitu-tion hat coordinatesehaviormong hree r more tates n thebasis ofgeneral-ized principlesfconduct:hat s,principles hich pecifyppropriateonduct orclassof actions,withoutegard otheparticularisticnterestsf theparties rthestrategicxigencieshatmay xistnany pecificccurrence."60The ancient reek racticef nterstaterbitrationmbodiedhe amediscursivenormfproceduralustice hat nformedhe ity-states'omesticegalprocesses. sweshall ee, disputes etween tateswere djudicatednpublic ora, efore rbitra-tors harged ith xercisingsense f ustice ndequity,swellas anawarenessfthe articularityfeachcase.This ystemnvolved eitherhe ormalodificationfgeneral, eciprocallyinding aws,northe nterpretationf such aws. Norms finterstateonductertainlyvolved, ut heywere ccretions,ustoms orn fcase-specific iscourse,ot ollectiveegislation.TheAncientGreekSociety f StatesTheAncient reek onstitutionaltructureAristotle'sthical ndpoliticalwritingsrovide useful tartingoint or discus-sionofancient reek iews bout hemoral urposefthe tate. ristotle olds hatidealhuman gents-whohe nsists re lwaysmale-combine easonwith ction.61The politicalmplicationsfthisbecome clearonly f we recognize hat or heancientGreeks hegreatestxpressionfreasonwas the"perceptionfgoodandevil, ustandunjust."62he rational ursuitf ustice hroughctionwas deemedpossible nlywithin particularort fpolitical ommunity-theolis.To beginwith,usticewas consideredn nherentlyocialvirtue,ecause ne cannot ctustlywithoutreatingheneeds nd nterestsfothersqually ndfairly.urthermore,hepursuitf usticewasinextricablyinked ospeech, he rticulationf moral laimswithin wider ublic olitical iscourse.63he questforusticewasthus houghtobe an nherentlyoliticalctivity,ndmennherentlyolitical eings. hepoliswasinturn onsidered hepreeminentorm f human rganization,ecause,Aristotleclaims, in thestate, hegoodaimed t is justice; nd thatmeanswhat s for he

60. Ruggie 993a,14.61. Aristotle962,17.62. Aristotle981, 0.63. Ibid.


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 573benefit f thewholecommunity."64he moralpurpose f theancientGreek tatethus ay n the ultivationfbiospolitikos, form fcommunalife haracterizedythe ational ursuitf ustice hroughction nd peech.Thismoral urpose ntailed discursive orm fpure roceduralustice, ne thatlicensed ase-by-case eterminationfrightndwrong onduct hroughprocess fpublicmoraldebate nd deliberation.65his s notto say that he ancientGreeksnever romulgatedodifiedaws; thehistoryfthe ity-statess punctuatedygreatmoments f constitutionalaw making. hese aws,however, ere argely,houghnot xclusively,rocedural. ennisMaio has shown, or nstance,hat thenianawofthefourthentury.C.E. "was not so much systemf commands or xtra-judicial activitys it was a system f regulationsor heconduct f udicial pro-cess,"66whichs significantince his spreciselyhe imewhenAtheniansresaidtohave embraced the ruleof law."67Within hisproceduralramework,ncientGreekurycourts ndassemblies-frequentlyonsistingf hundreds f urors-exercised onsiderable eliberativeiscretion,djudicating isputeswithouttrictreferenceo codified ubstantiveaws. nstead f objectivelypplying he etterfthe aw, urorswere xpectedo exercise "senseof ustice," ubjectivelyeighingthemoral ectitudef thedisputants,hepeculiaritiesf the ase,theneedsof thecommunity,ndprinciplesfequity. s Sally Humphreysbserves, heywere in-vited obehave s iftheyweremembersf the ocal community,eciding n thefairest olution or ach particularase, rather han pecialistsn applyingaw tocases."68 peechwriterstrove ot o nterprethe aw,but oestablishhe ighteous-nessof defendants'ositions,69ndwitnesses ere allednot o determinehefactsofa case,but otestifyo defendants'espectability.70nsuch system, eneral ulesof social conductwere ess theproduct f legislationhan ustom,with terateddiscursive ractices radually eneratingorms f socialbehavior.The discursiveorm fpureproceduralustice eached ts nstitutionalpogee nclassicalAthens,ut hebelief hat ublicmoral iscoursewas the ppropriateayfor ivilized olitiesodecide uestionsfrightndwrong haped oliticalnd egalpracticescross he ity-states.ythe ime fPlato ndAristotle,emocracy as themost ommon orm fpolitical rganization,ithAthenianrinciplesndpracticesinfluencinghe onstitutions,fnot ll the nstitutions,fmany ity-states.71oreinterestingly,hough, hediscursiveonceptionf ustice lso structuredheprac-tices foligarchictates,ven parta. heGreatRhetra-the aft f awssupposedlybequeathedothe partans yLycurgus,he egendaryawgiver-was argely roce-dural, ndbeyond his heres little vidence hat heSpartansverdeveloped n

64. Ibid., 07.65. See Humphreys983; Humphreys985; Humphreys988;Maio 1983;Garner 987;Ober1989;andOsborne 985.66. Maio 1983, 0.67. Ostwald 986;andSealey1987.68. Humphreys983, 48.69. Ibid.70. Humphreys985, 13.71. Hansen1992,16.


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574 Internationalrganizationextensive odyof codifiedubstantiveaw. Furthermore,lthoughtwas once be-lieved hat ecision-makingowerwas concentratednthehands fthefive phorsand heGerousia,rCouncil fElders,t ppearshat he ublic ssembly,pen oalladultmale partans,had he ltimateecisionnmattersf egislationndpolicy."72heimportancef publicdiscourse,ndthepower f the ssembly,reclearly pparentinThucydides'ccount fthe amous ebate tSparta,wherehe ongregatedpar-tansheard nddebatedhemoral laims ftheir isgruntledlliesandthedefensiveAthenians,ltimatelyecidingo aunch hePeloponnesian ar.73InterstaterbitrationThe city-statesracticednterstaterbitrationorwelloverfive undredears,withdocumentedases stretchingrom he ixth othe irstenturies.C.E..7 Literaryndhistoricalmaterials,n addition o extant nscriptions,ecord he details f someeighty ases,themajorityfwhich ccurredfter he iseofthenewcivic deologyin the ifthentury.75he nstitutionroughtogetherwo, ccasionallyhree,artiesandanarbitrator,he atterharged ith djudicatinghe ase anddeterminingepa-rations, here ppropriate.wo examples estifyo both hehistoricalongevityfthepracticend therange f ssues tencompassed. erodotus escribesn earlyfifthentury.C.E. dispute etween thens ndMytilenever he olony fSigeum,which he ormeradseizedfrom he atterndrecolonized. ewriteshathe warbetweenMytilenendAthenswasbroughtoan endbyPeriander,howas invitedbyboth artiesoactas arbitrator;he onditionhat eproposedwas that ach sideshould etainwhat t at themomentossessed.n thisway Sigeumpassed nto hepower fAthens."76he second ase,dated round 20 B.C.E., involved he egula-tion f a varietyfrelations etween nossosandTylissus. he decision yArgosestablishedulesgoverningroperty,alendars,acrifices,nd even "breaches fhospitality."77he practice f rbitrationhus ridgedhe raumasfthePeloponne-sianWar, rovidingmechanismor he uccessfulettlementfa wide pectrumfissuesbetween trongndweak tates like.The nstitutionf arbitrationas structuredythe amediscursiveorm fpureproceduralusticethat nformedegal practiceswithinhecity-states.rbitratorsruledwithouteferenceoa body fcodifiednterstateaw, he bsence fwhich aslongbeennoted.78hecity-statesertainlyoncluded largenumberftreaties,utthese eldom nshrinedeneral rinciplesf nternationalonduct.79hesystemf

72. Sealey 1976, 1. See also Andrews966.73. Thucydides972, 2-87.74. The most mportantorks nancient reek rbitrationrePhillipson 911;Raeder1912;Ralston1929;Niebuhr od 1913; ndWestermann907.75. For list fcases, ee Niebuhrod 1913,1-52.76. Herodotus 972, 78.77. Niebuhr od1913, 3-34.78. SeeAdcock ndMosley1975,182;andBauslaugh 989, 6.79. Adcock ndMosley1975, 03.


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 575arbitrationhusrested n the arbitrator'sbility o arrive t a fair nd equitabledecision hroughhedeliberativessessment f competing oral laims.This wasreflectedn the ath hatudgeswere equiredo recite efore ommencingelibera-tions.n a characteristicase between alymma nd Cos, the rbitratorwore byJupiter,yLucianApollo, ndbythe arth hat will udge the ase oinedbetweenthe artiesnder ath s will ppear omemostust.80Not urprisingly,reputationformoral xcellencewas theprimaryriterionn the election f ndividuals,ribu-nals, rcity-statess arbitrators.81s in domestic ourts,rbitratorserenot olely,orevenprimarily,oncerned ith he facts" fthe ase, admittingbroad ange ftestimony,romhemoral ectitudef he arties oconsiderationsf quity. "skill-fulpleader,"Niebuhr od observes, might nfluence popular ourt y appealswhichwould e regardedt thepresent ay s whollyrrelevant."82Ancient reek rbitrationsbest haracterized,herefore,s authoritativerilater-alism. twas authoritativeecause hepower fdecision ay solelywith he rbitra-tor; twas trilateralecause he rbitratoruledwithin dynamic ormativenviron-ment,ctivelymolded ythe ompeting oral laims fthe isputingarties.Whileit s difficulto generalize rom he vailable vidence,nd systematicvaluationsbeyond he cope ndpurposefthis rticle,t eems hat his orm fextraterritorialgovernance asremarkablyuccessful.irst,nterstaterbitrationttainednorma-tive niversality,"oborrow term oined yJack onnelly.83his s not osaythatitwas usedbyall states o solve ll their ooperationroblemsllofthe ime, s theonsetof thePeloponnesianWartestifies.t seems,however, hat ity-stateseltpowerfulompulsiono prove he egitimacyf their laimsbysubmittinghemoarbitration,ndstrongnd weak states requentlymployedhepracticenprefer-enceto other orms f settlement,ncluding ar. econd, he ncient reeks lacedno apparentimit n the ypes f problems heywerewilling o submit o arbitra-tion.84 hat s more, great umber f recorded ases involved he ettlementfterritorialisputes. hird,he ity-statesot nly elt bliged osubmitheir isputestoarbitration,hey lmost lways bidedbyarbitralecisions.85heoverwhelmingmajorityf ases were ettledy nitial rbitration,nd hose hat efied uch esolu-tionwere lmost lways eturnedor second ound, ot ettled n thebattlefield.86Finally,hepracticefarbitrationidnot implyeflecthedistributionndexerciseofpowerbetween ity-states.venin the "era ofhegemoniceagues" 479-379B.C.E. ),when largenumberfthe ecordedases nvolved onflictsetweenmem-bers fthe ame eague, rbitrationas not educedo nstrumentf mperial ower.Hegemonswere eldom rbitrators;eyond ontributingothe nternaltabilityf

80. Raeder 912, 64.81. The mostpowerfultates,ncluding parta ndAthens,were eldom alled ontoarbitrate;eeNiebuhrod1913, 6.82. Ibid.,132.83. Donnelly 989,1.84. Westermann907,19985. Ibid., 08-209.86. NiebuhrTod 913,186.


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576 Internationalrganizationleagues, ittle vidence uggestshat ecisions onsistentlyavored heir nterests;and rbitrationas still racticedcross eagues.87

Thucydides' istoryf he eloponnesianWar estifiesothenormativeniversal-ity fthediscursiveorm fpure roceduralustice nd he ractice farbitrationnthe ncient reek ociety fstates. rbitrationlearly ailed o preventhe nset fthewar n431B.C.E., but hroughoutheHistoryhepracticeppears s an mportantleitmotif,ith tatesmeasuringherighteousnessf their ositions,ndthemoralbankruptcyftheir pponents',ccordingo theirwillingness,rreluctance,oen-gage narbitration.owhere s thismore pparenthanntheAthenians'requentattemptso defend hemoralityftheir tand.nconcludinghe ity's efensen thecrucial ebate t Sparta, hey eclare heir illingnesso settle utstandingisputesthroughrbitration,ligning hemselves ith henormativerinciplesfthe ocietyof tates.88cknowledginghe eracityfAthenianppeals, he partan ing, rchi-damus, espondshatt s "therighthingo do since heAthenianshemselvesrepreparedo submit oarbitration,ndwhen nepartyffershis t s quite llegal oattack imfirst,s though e was definitelyn thewrong."89 adly,Sthenelaidissuccessfullyways he ssembly,laiminghat heAthenianseserve obepunishedtwofold,or though heywere ncegood, hey avenowturned ad."90 ometimelater, n the veofthewar, ericles eeksto bolster thenian nity nd ustify hecity's tand. gain, he ity'swillingnesso submitts laims o arbitrationsused oasserttsrighteousness.ericles eclares hat he"Spartans avenever nceaskedfor rbitration,orhavethey ccepted ur offers o submit o it. . . Whenone'sequals,before esortingo arbitration,ake laims ntheir eighborsndput hoseclaimsnthe orm fcommands,twouldbe slavish ogive n tothem, owever igorhowever mall uch laimsmay e." 1Furthereferenceso arbitrations thewaycivilized tates ettleheir isputes ot he emainderfThucydides' istory,nd tis not urprisinghat hepractice as reinstitutedfter hewar, ersistingong fterthe ity-statesieldedheirndependenceoPhillip fMacedon nd ater heRomanSenate.92

Modern nternationalocietyTheModernConstitutionaltructureDuring he ighteenthentury,profounddeological evolutionroded henorma-tive oundationsfthe bsolutistocietyfstates.93cientific,conomic,ndpoliti-

87. Phillipson 911, 0.88. Thucydides972, 2.89. Ibid.90. Ibid., 6.91. Ibid.,119.92. Ralston 929,167-68.93. The ideas that onstitutedhemoral urpose f the bsolutisttate re discussednBodin1967;Collins1989;and Kantorowicz 957.On the nstitutionalracticesfthe bsolutistociety fstates eeDe Callieres 983; ndHamiltonndLanghorne 995.


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 577cal theoristsll abandoned raditionalolisticways of conceiving henatural ndsocialorder,alling or he issolutionfnaturalnd ocial ntitiesnto heir rimarycomponents.hekey o scientificnowledge,rgued hilosophersf cience uch sDavid Hume,was the dentificationf thenatural orld's rimaryomponentsndthe mpiricalbservationf their constant onjunction"y studyingelations f"cause and ffect."94dam mithndothers ngaged n a two-steprocess fdisag-gregation,educingociety o atomisticndividualsnddividing roductionccord-ing o a systematicivision f abor.Humanswereportrayeds restless,cquisitive,andcompetitive,ursuingocialpositions ommensurateith heirmbitionsndcapacities,ndformingocialrelationshipsor he akeofefficiencyndproductiv-ity.95 hese sameassumptionsransformeddeas aboutpolitical ommunity,ithpoliticalheorists,uch s Rousseau, efininghe olity s a notionallyqual, ontrac-tually asedcollectivityf freendividuals,movebegun y John ockea centuryearlier.Reinforcedy he imultaneousransformationf conomic nd ocial ifewroughtbythe ndustrialevolution,hisdeological evolutionrofoundlyltered henatureand ermsf ntraterritorialovernance,eneratingistinctivelyodem tandardsflegitimatetatehoodndrightfultate ction. fterheAmericanndFrench evolu-tions,t became ncreasinglyifficulto egitimizetate ower ndauthorityffec-tivelyn terms fpreserving rigidly ierarchical,ynasticocial order.As thenineteenthenturyrogressed,he tate'smoral urposewasincreasinglydentifiedwith ugmentingndividuals' urposesndpotentialities.his, nturn, eneratednew egislativeorm fproceduralustice. he authoritativeode frule etermina-tion hat revailednderbsolutism assupplantedythe egislativeodificationfformal,eciprocallyindingocialrules. hisnewmodeofdeterminingules peci-fied, irst,hat nlythose ubject o the aw have therighto legislate-becausereciprocallyinding greementsetweenociety'smembersremain he asis of lllegitimateuthoritymongmen"-and, second, hat he ules fsocietymust pplyequally o allcitizens,nall ike ases.96 oth fthese haracteristicsere nshrinedinthe rench eclarationf heRightsfMan andCitizen,which eclareshat lawis the xpressionf thegeneralwill;all citizens avethe ighto concur ersonally,orthroughheirepresentatives,n tsformation;tmust e the amefor ll,whetheritprotectsrpunishes. 7These institutionalrinciplesookroot lowly, radually ransformingationalsystemsfrule hroughhenineteenthenturynd nto he wentieth.nsome asesthisprocesswas relatively eaceful, s inBritainwhere hemajorreformillsof1832, 1867, nd 1884progressivelyxpanded he lectoraterom ne-fiftho two-thirdsf the dultmalepopulation.98lsewhere t took moreviolent urn. olsticalculateshat he principlesf iberalismndnationalismere hemajor ausesof

94. Hume1978,1-90.95. Smith 976, ,477.96. Rousseau1988,88.97. Laqueur ndRubin 979,119.98. CookandStevenson 983, 2.


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578 Internationalrganizationboth iviland nternationalarsbetween 815and1914."99 ythe econdhalf fthenineteenthentury,he tate's ewraison 'etre ndassociatedegislative ormof proceduralusticehadbecome heprinciplemeasure fpoliticalegitimacyndrightfultate ction. his snot o saythatnstitutionalracticeshangeds quicklyas rhetoric,ut heprogressive ove owardonstitutionalndrepresentativeormsofgovernanceemains neof themore emarkableeaturesf the atenineteenthcentury.nebyone, heEuropeantatesmbracedonstitutionalismndthe ule flaw,with venRussiaadoptingeformsn 1905.As David Thomson bserves, inalmost hewholeofwesternnd central urope, arliamentarynstitutionsevel-opedbetween 871and 1914," ndduringhe ameperiodwesee the radualmove-ment oward niversaluffrage.00

The egislative orm fproceduralusticefilterednto nternationalegalandpo-litical houghtnthe ateeighteenthentury,indingxpressionn thewritingsfearly positivist"egaltheorists,101nd ncalls bypoliticalheoristsndrevolution-ary tates or newdiplomaticrder.02 Itwasnotuntil hemiddle fthenineteenthcentury,owever,hat henewprinciplefruledeterminationegan tructuringheactualpracticesfstates,stablishingnew nternationalnstitutionalrchitecture.The principlehat ocialrules hould e authoredy those ubject o them ametolicensemultilateralormsfruledetermination,hile heprecepthat ules houldbeequally pplicable oall subjects,n all likecases,warrantedheformalodifica-tionof contractualnternationalaw,to ensure heuniversalityndreciprocityfinternationalegulations.he net esultwastheproliferationfmultilateralreaties,institutions,nd organizations,eadingChristopherill to characterizeevelop-ments fterheCongress fVienna s "themost trikingineofevolutionndiplo-macy."03To illuminateowthevalues fthenew onstitutionaltructurehaped he unda-mentalnstitutionsfmodernnternationalociety,tracewokeynstitutionalevel-opmentsf he atenineteenthnd arly wentiethenturies.hefirstevelopmentsthegrowingommitmenturinghisperiod oregular,hen ermanent,niversalconferencesfstates.Once itwas accepted hat herulesgoverningnternationalsocietyhould eauthoredythose ubjectothemnd qually indingnall,somemeanshadto befound oenable he ollectiveegislationf nternationalaw.From1850onward, eacetimeonferencesf tatesmergedofulfillhis ole.Theseconddevelopments the reationf thePermanentourt fArbitration,hich ater e-camethe nternationalourt f Justice.nitiatedt theFirstHagueConferencef

99. Holsti 991,145.100. Thomson1962,323. The power ndrepresentativeature f theseparliamentarynstitutionsvaried romne state o nother,ut s DavidKaiser rgues,by 1914 very uropean overnmentad omaintainworking ajority ithinnelected arliamentn orderocarryn the ssential usiness fthestate";Kaiser1990, 75-76.101. See Ward 795; ndvonMartens 795.102. Gilbert 951.103. By onecount, etween 648and1814Europeantates oncluded nly127 multilateralreaties,less than ne per year. n theperiod etween 814and 1914,however,hefigureumped o 817; seeMostecky965.See also Murphy994; ndHill1991, 0.


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 5791899, he ourt's volution rovides window n thenormativescendancyfcon-tractualnternationalaw and itsdevelopments a basic institutionalractice fmodernnternationalociety. he importancef this oncept f aw inthe ourt'sconstitutionlso highlightshe adical ifferenceetween ncient reek ndmodernpractices f arbitration.hesetwo nstitutionalevelopmentsvolved hroughhreestages: oundation,onstruction,ndrenovation.hefirsttage enteredn theHagueConferencesf 1899 and 1907,thesecondon theVersailles eace Conferencef1919, nd he hirdn the an Francisco onferencef 1945.Foundation. heHagueThe Hague Conferences ere crucialwatershedn the nfluencef the egislativenorm f pureproceduralusticeonthebasic nstitutionalractices f nternationalsociety,or here uropean tates irst ollectivelyndorsed hebasicinstitutionalpractices fmultilateralismnd ontractualnternationalaw.TheConcertfEuropehad nstitutionalizedegularmeetingsf he reat owers,ut hese atheringsackedtheuniversalistnd egislativedealsthat nspiredheHague Conferences.nitiallyconvenedo stemhe conomicallyebilitatingndmilitarilyestabilizingrms acebetween heEuropean owers,heywere xplicitlyntendedo enable he elativelysmall ommunityfrecognizedovereign tates oformulateeneral,eciprocallybindingules f nternationalonduct. iplomacy,sserted hepresidentfthe irstHague Conference,is no longermerely n art nwhich ersonal bility lays nexclusive art;tstendencys tobecome sciencewhich hallhavefixed ules orsettling isputes.. and it cannot e disputed hat reat rogresswillhave beenmade fdiplomacyucceedsn establishingnthisConferenceomeof therules fwhich have ustspoken."04InopeningheSecondHagueConference,heDutchministerfforeignffairseclared hatuch onferences ere convokedo discussrules f nternationalawand ogive hem recision."05Tothis nd,delegates tthetwo onferencesormulatedn extensive ewbody f nternationalaws governingthe onduct fwar ndthenature nduseofarmaments.They lso moved o establish judicial nstitutionointerpretnternationalawand toadjudicate isputes etween tates. he FirstHagueConferencestablishedthe ermanentourt fArbitration,body hen onsistingf ittlemore han list fnominatedrbitratorsromwhich isputing arties ould select tribunalo settletheir ifferences.ccordingo the onference'shird ommission,esponsibleordraftingheConventionor he acific ettlementf nternationalisputes,he far-theraw progresses,nd themore t enters ntothesociety fnations,hemoreclearlyrbitrationppearswovennto he tructurefthatociety."06 eflectinghejurisdictionalanons pplied odomesticourts,henewcourt's olewasexplicitlyrestrictedo the nterpretationf aw,understoodrincipallys codified, eciprocal

104. Scott 917, .105. Ibid.,195.106. Ibid., 5.


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580 Internationalrganizationaccords.Delegates nsisted hat judicialbody-nationalorinternational-couldnot, nd shouldnot, eal withnonlegal uestions. henew court'surisdiction,e-ported heThird ommission, as strictlyimited o"questionsf legalnaturendprincipallyuestions fthe nterpretationrapplicationf treaties.... Differenceswhere heopposing laimsof theparties annot e stated s legal propositionsrethus .. outside heurisdictionfaninstitutionalledupon o speakthe aw.' 107As wehave seen, onfiningrbitrationithinuchboundswouldhavebeen ncom-prehensibleo the ncient reeks,whose ystem elied ntheudge'ssenseof us-tice-the abilityo arrivetan equitablendfair ecisionnthe bsence f body fcodifiednterstateaw.As AddaBozeman bserves,Modern rbitration,hen om-paredwithGreek rbitration,ssumes he haracterf itigation."08Construction:ersaillesIn1919, fter our ears funprecedentediolence nd uffering,heworld'seadersconvened t thePalace ofVersailleso constructnew,more eacefulnternationalorder.109hebasic institutionalrameworkstablishednder he Covenant f theLeagueofNations uilt n the nstitutionalnitiativesursued t The Hagueandreflectedconsensusn basicarchitecturalrinciplesmong hekeymembersf hewinningoalition-Britain,rance, ndtheUnited tates-notthehegemonyf asinglepower.The earliest raftsfthe Covenant-Britain's hillimore eport fMarch1918,and theJuly 918 draft ytheAmerican iplomat olonel EdwardHouse-envisaged general onferencef tates nd n nternationalourt, he amestructureaterdvocatedy he rench tVersailles.0Thisbasic nstitutionalrame-workwas eventuallyugmentedytheaddition fan executive ouncilofgreatpowers. irst dvocatedna December 918 draftyGeneralJan muts,he truc-ture f a conference,council, nda judicial ystemoundxpressionn all subse-quent ritish ndAmerican rafts.111hesedraftsiffered,owever,ver henatureofthe udicial nstitutiono be created, ith heBritish avoringpermanentourt,andWoodrowWilson roposinglooser ystemftribunals.12 mmediatelyriorothe peningfthe arisConference,heBritishndAmericanelegationsgreed na single raftovenant-the urst-Millerraft-whichncorporatedondon's isionofa permanentudicial ourt ndprovidedhe asis for ll futureegotiations.13Holding egularonferencesf states adbeenonthe genda ince he ndoftheSecondHagueConference.n 1907,ElihuRoot, heU.S. secretaryfstate,old he

107. Ibid., 5.108. Bozeman1960, 4.109. The classicworks n theParisPeace Conferencere Miller1928; Marburg 932;Baker 1923;Lloyd George 1938;House and Seymour 921;Nicolson 1919; Duggan 1919; and Schwarzenberger1936.110. Baker1923, 7-88, 152-62.111. Ibid., 4-99.112. Ibid.,117-43.113. Ibid.,144-51.


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 581Senate hat he achievementsfthe wo Hague] onferencesustifyhebelief hattheworld as enteredpon n orderlyrocess hroughhich, tep y tep,nsucces-siveConferences.. theremaybe continualrogressowardmakinghepracticefcivilizednations onformotheir eaceful rofessions."14 The upheaval f WorldWar beliedRoot'soptimism,ut talso transformedhe dea ofregularonferencesinto allsfor permanentonferencef tates,alls thatwere ealizednthe reationofthe eagueofNations'Assembly.rom he utset,he ssembly as envisaged sa quasi-legislativeody, obe charged ith he romulgationfreciprocallyindingrules f nternationalonduct.n a letter ccompanyingis draftovenant fJuly1918,House explained o Wilson hat or all intentsnd purposesherepresenta-tives f the ontractingowerswill]become utomaticallyn Internationalarlia-ment,nd am uretwillbe necessaryor hemobe n lmostontinuousession."15In the nd,however,he ssembly ellwell short f this deal. tsdecision-makingrolewas argely eactive,n most ases requiringhegreat ower-dominatedounciltorefero tmattersor onsideration.he only venuethadto nitiateebateay nArticle 9 of heCovenant, hich llowedt o "advise he econsiderationyMem-bers ftheLeagueof treaties hich ad become napplicablendthe onsiderationof internationalonditionswhosecontinuancemight ndanger he peace of theworld." 16 etwithin hishighlyircumscribedealm f egitimatectivity,hefactthat ssemblyesolutionsad to be unanimousuggestshat heLeague'sarchitectsassumed hat uchdecreeswould arryomeweight. fcourse, heunanimityulealso paralyzedhe ssembly,s wellas the ouncil, reventinghe ollectivectionneeded osustainnternationalrder.Attempts eremade at theSecondHague Conferenceo create more ffectivejudicial nstitutionhanhe ermanentourt fArbitration.ecausethe ourt's ribu-nalswere elected ydisputingarties ohear pecificases, t acked he ontinuityneeded o develop consistentet of udicial nterpretationsf internationalaw.Delegates husmoved o establish permanentudicial rbitrationourt, utdis-agreementsver he election f udgesmeant hat newcourtwas not reated ntiltheVersailles onference.117Whenfinallystablished,herole of the PermanentCourt f nternationalustice as againrestrictedo the nterpretationfnarrowlydefined ontractualnternationalaw,or evidence hereof.ritain's hillimore e-port et the onefor ll subsequenttatementsn theCourt's egitimatephere foperation,icensingudges o adjudicate isputes etweentates as to the nterpre-tation f a treaty,s to anyquestion f nternationalaw,as tothe xistence fanyfactwhichf stablished ould onstitutebreach f ny nternationalbligation,ras tothenaturend extent f thereparationo bemadefor nybreach."118s thisconceptionfthecourt's ole was echoed n theAmerican nd French raft ov-enants,t s not urprisinghathe inal ovenantfthe eagueofNations efinests

114. U.S. Senate1907.115. Baker1923, 0.116. Ibid.,183.117. Choate1913, 1.118. Baker1923, 5.


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582 Internationalrganizationjurisdictionnvirtuallyhe amewords. inally, he ourt's ole n nterpretingodi-fied nternationalaw was made bundantlylear n ts tatute,hich irectedudgesto apply nternationalonventions,nternationalustom as evidence fa generalpractice ccepted s law," "general rinciplesf law recognized y civilizedna-tions," ndthe judicialdecisions ndteachingsf themosthighly ualified ubli-cists f thevarious ations,s a subsidiary eansfor hedeterminationfrules flaw." 19 ach ofthese ourceswasthoughtoprovidevidence freciprocalccordsbetweentates,he ssence fmodernontractualnternationalaw.Renovation:an FranciscoDespite laims hat dealistic aithnmultilateralismnd nternationalaw contrib-uted o theoutbreakf WorldWar I, the rchitectsfthepost-1945nternationalorder idnotabandon hese nstitutionalommitments.he new orderwas againconstructedround hebasicandbynowfamiliarrchitecturalrinciplesaid downatTheHague:thatherehould ea regularrpermanentonferencef states asedon theprinciplefmultilateralism,ndthat herehould e an nternationaludicialbody ointerpretontractualnternationalaw.UpheldbytheAtlantic harter,heDumbarton aks Conference,nd heYaltaAgreements,hese rinciples ere ivennew ife hrough substantialrocess frenovation.Negotiatorstthe an Francisco onferenceubstantiallytrengthenedhe erma-nent onferencef states, moveexplicitly esigned o facilitatend encouragepeace throughnternationalaw.In comparisono the argely eactive ole of theLeague's assembly,heCharterftheUnitedNations rantsheGeneral ssemblyquasi-legislativeole. nfulfillinghe rganization'srimaryurpose fsolvingn-ternationalisputes in conformityith heprinciplesf ustice nd nternationallaw (Article )," theGeneralAssemblys authorizedo "initiate tudiesndmakerecommendationsor hepurposesf .. promotingnternationalooperationnthepolitical ield ndencouragingheprogressiveevelopmentf nternationalaw andits codification.120 It does this n twoways.First, ccordingoNagendra ingh,formerresidentf the nternationalourt fJustice,heGeneralAssemblys em-poweredo dopt eneralegal onventions,onvenenternationalonferences hichthen roduce uchconventions,ndpassresolutions.121helast ofthese,RosalynHiggins rgues,re notnecessarilyinding, utwhen hey mbody eneral ules fconduct hey ecome n mportantource fcustomarynternationalaw. 22 Second,in 1947 the GeneralAssembly stablished he nternationalaw Commission oprepare draft onventionsn subjectswhichhave notyetbeenregulatednterna-tional aw or nregardo which he aw has notyet een ufficientlyeveloped,"ndtocodify internationalaw infieldswhere here lready as been extensive tate

119. Wheeler-BennettndFanshawe 929, 3.120. Brownlie 983, , 5.121. Singh 993, 92-93.122. Higgins 963, .


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 583practice, recedent,nddoctrine."23 Ifthe ecommendationsfthe ommissionreadopted ytheGeneral ssembly,hey urtherhedevelopmentfcontractualnter-nationalaw.The competencefthe udicialbody reated t San Francisco nceagainprovidesa useful ndicator f theprevailingonception f nternationalaw. Although el-egatesdecided o replace heLeague's courtwith he nternationalourt fJustice,thenew nstitution'statute as ittlemore han revision f tspredecessor's.t toolimits he ourt'surisdictiono the djudicationf narrowlyefinedegal disputesinvolving the nterpretationf a treaty,"anyquestion f nternationalaw," "theexistencefanyfactwhich,festablished, ould onstitutebreach faninterna-tional bligation," nd "the nature r extent f thereparationobe made for hebreach f aninternationalbligation."24 Inruling n suchdisputes,udges areex-pected o basetheir ecisions olely nthe ermsfrelevantgreementsr on evi-denceof reciprocallyinding orms nd principlesmbraced y the ommunityfstates. incethe deaof aw asreciprocalccordwasbythis ime undamentalothedomesticegitimacyfthe eading tates, nd was alreadynstitutionalizedt theinternationalevelbytheHague andVersailles onferences,t was unlikelyhat henew ourt'surisdiction oulddepart ery ar rom astpractices.Post-1945 nitiativeshus eassertedndreconstructednstitutionalrinciplesndstructureshatwere irstndorsednd nitiatedy eading uropeantatesnthe atenineteenthentury.he proliferationf these asic nstitutionalractices,nd theirapplicationo an everwideningealm f nterstateelations, as of coursegreatlyacceleratedyAmericanttemptsotransplantheprinciplesftheNew Deal regu-latorytate nto he nternationalrena.nthehistoryfmodernnternationalociety,however,his eems ess a period f architecturalnnovationhan ne of masscon-struction.

ConclusionBecause societies f statesmergendifferentultural nd historicalontexts,heyevolve differentonstitutionaltructuresharacterizedydifferentonceptionsfthemoral urpose f the tate nd differentdeas aboutproceduralustice.This nturneadsthemoconstructifferentundamentalnstitutions.ulturallyndhistori-cally contingenteliefs boutwhat onstitutes "civilized"state, nd how suchstates ught o solvecooperation roblems,xert fargreaternfluencen basicinstitutionalracticeshan o materialtructuralonditions,he trategicmperativesofparticularooperation roblems,r the tabilizationfterritorialropertyights.By conceivinghenormativeoundationsf nternationalocietiesntermsf onsti-tutionaltructures,ndby understandingowprevailingdeas about hemoral ur-pose of thestateundergirdheorganizing rinciple f sovereigntynd inform

123. Sohn1956, 3.124. Brownlie 983, 96.


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584 Internationalrganizationnotions f pureproceduralustice,we can better xplainwhytheancientGreekcity-statesracticednterstaterbitrationhilemodem tates aveconstructednsti-tutionsfcontractualnternationalaw andmultilateralism.By groundingasic nstitutionalracticesnconstitutionaltructures,he oreofwhich re ntersubjectiveeliefs bout hemoral urpose fthe tate,he heoreticalframeworkdvancedhere ontrasts ithTerry ardin'smuch ited onception finternationalociety s a "practicalssociation." ccordingo Nardin, "practicalassociation s a relationshipmong hose ngaged n thepursuitf differentndpossibly ncompatibleurposes,nd who areassociatedwith neanother,fatall,only nrespectingertain estrictionsn how achmay ursue isownpurposes."25Internationalociety, e contends,s ust such n association. tates ursue iverseends, ound ogethernly ythe authoritativeractices"hat acilitateoexistence,notably hefundamentalnstitutionsf internationalaw anddiplomacy.126WhileNardin'sonceptionf nternationalocietysintuitivelyersuasive,esonatingithprevailingationalistonceptionsf ocietynd he ery ealdiversityf he ontem-porary orld,t shistoricallyll-foundedndconceptually isleading.Practical ssociation,orNardin,s more undamentalhan urposivessociation;gesellschaft recedes emeinschaft.n reality, owever,ll historical ocieties fstates avebegun sgemeinschaftocieties,s communitiesf tatesinked ycom-mon entiment,xperience,nd dentity.27This s true oth fthe ncient reek ndof themodern ocieties f states. his s notto suggest hatmodernnternationalsocietys a gemeinschaftommunityrtodeny he mmense racticalmperativesthat ustaint. "Present ay nternationalociety,"sBarry uzanastutelybserves,"is a hybrid."28 On theonehand, tgrew ut of theculturallynified ystemfnineteenthenturyurope, ndan expandingommunityf iberal-constitutionaliststates as remainedt tscore,prevailings thewinningoalition fter achofthiscentury's ajor onflicts, ost ecentlyheCold War.Contemporaryundamentalinstitutionsere pawnednthat arlierystem;ore tates avebeentheprincipalagents n theproductionndreproductionf thesepractices,nd their aluesoflegitimatetatehoodnd rightfultate ctionhave becomehegemonic,hapinghemodern onstitutionaltructure,nd, nturn, efininghediscursiveerrainn whichinstitutionalonstructionastaken lace.On theother and,modernnternationalsocietysmulticultural,xtendingeyondhe iberal-constitutionalistore oencom-passa widevarietyf states. hepracticalmperativesfcoexistence nder ondi-tionsof high nterdependenceave, however, ncouragedhese tates o employ,evenfurther,xistingWestern"nstitutionalractices. "strikingeatureftheglobal nternationalociety ftoday," ull and Watson bserve, is theextent owhich he tates fAsia andAfrica aveembraced uchbasic elements fEuropeaninternationalocietys the overeigntate, he ules f nternationalaw, heproce-

125. Nardin 983, .126. Ibid.,19.127. Wight 977, 3.128. Buzan 1993, 49.


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Constitutionaltructuref nternationalociety 585duresnd onventionsfdiplomacy,nd nternationalrganization."29 In onesense,therefore,odernnternationalocietys indeed practical ssociation,ut n anequally mportant,eeply tructuralense, t is informedythe nstitutionalndorganizationalaluesof theconstitutivelyrior uropeannow Western) emein-schaftociety.Nardin's ailure o grasp hepurposiveoundationsfpracticalnternationaloci-ety, articularlyhe ntersubjectivealues hatnformhe ocial dentityf the tateandstandardsfrightfultate ction, reatlynderminesheheuristicower fhistheoreticalerspective.lthoughe givesprimacyo authoritativeracticesuch sinternationalaw anddiplomacyn his account f nternationalociety, e cannotexplain heform hese racticesake r why hey ary rom ne society fstates oanother.nternationalaw is presenteds the odificationfcustomarytate rac-tices, ut hismerelyegsthe uestionfwhy ertainracticesecome he avored,routinized ethodsffacilitatingnterstateooperation.130na passing bservation,Nardinwrites hat racticesalwaysreflectn ideal conceptionf the ctivitiesutofwhichhey row ndofthe gentsngagedn them:he irtuosoerformance,hejustwar, he esponsiblearent,he perfectmbassador.' 131 Yethis ownperspec-tive n nternationalociety oreclosesny ystematicnalysis fthese eepernter-subjectivealues hat efineegitimategency ndaction. he constructivistheoryoutlinednthis rticle lacesthesevaluesat thefore, cknowledginghehistoricalandcultural articularityfdifferentocieties f states, nabling stoexplain heirdivergentnstitutionalractices.ReferencesArendt,annah. 958.TheHumanCondition.hicago:ChicagoUniversityress.Adcock, rank,ndD. J.Mosley. 975.DiplomacynAncient reece. ondon: hames ndHudson.Andrews, . 1966.The GovernmentfClassicalSparta. n Ancient ociety nd Institutions:tudiesPresentedo Victorhrenberg,dited yE. Badian,1-20. Oxford: asilBlackwell.Aristotle.962.Nicomacheanthics.NewYork: obbs-Merrill.. 1981.ThePolitics.Harmondsworth:enguin.Ashley, ichard . 1988.Untyinghe overeigntate:A DoubleReading f theAnarchyroblematic.Millennium:ournal f nternationaltudies. 7:227-62.Axelrod, obert,ndRobert . Keohane.1985.Achieving ooperation nderAnarchy:trategiesndInstitutions.orldolitics 8:226-54.Baker, ayStannard.923.WoodrowWilsonnd Worldettlement.vols.London:Heinemann.Bartelson, ens. 995.A Genealogyf overeignty.ambridge:ambridgeniversityress.Bauslaugh, obert . 1989.TheConcept fNeutralityn ClassicalGreece.Berkeley: niversityfCali-

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586 InternationalrganizationBozeman, dda. 1960.Politics nd Culturen nternationalistory.rinceton,.J.: rinceton niversityPress.Brownlie,an, d. 1983.Basic Documentsn nternationalaw. Oxford: larendon.Bull,Hedley. 977.TheAnarchicalociety: Study fOrder nWorldolitics. ondon:Macmillan.Bull,Hedley, ndAdamWatson. 984.Conclusion.nTheExpansion f nternationalociety, dited yHedleyBullandAdamWatson, 25-35. Oxford: larendonress.Burley, nne-Marie. 993.RegulatingheWorld:Multilateralism,nternationalaw, and theProjectionoftheNewDeal Regulatorytate. nMultilateralismatters: heTheoryndPraxisof n Institu-tional orm, dited yJohn erard uggie, 25-56.NewYork: olumbiaUniversityress.Buzan,Barry. 993.From nternationalystem o nternationalociety: tructuralealism ndRegimeTheoryMeet he nglish chool. nternationalrganization7:327-52.Choate, oseph. 913.TheTwoHague Conferences.rinceton,.J.: rincetonniversityress.Collins, tephen . 1989.From ivineCosmos oSovereigntate:An ntellectual istory fConscious-

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Age, dited yRichard edLebow andBarry . Strauss, 1-49. Boulde