This article was downloaded by: [University of Strathclyde]On: 05 October 2014, At: 16:25Publisher: Taylor & FrancisInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Canadian Water Resources Journal /Revue canadienne des ressourceshydriquesPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tcwr20

RETURN OF THE FEDS, PART II: THEOLDMAN RIVER DAMRob de LoëPublished online: 23 Jan 2013.

To cite this article: Rob de Loë (1997) RETURN OF THE FEDS, PART II: THE OLDMAN RIVER DAM ,Canadian Water Resources Journal / Revue canadienne des ressources hydriques, 22:1, 35-44, DOI:10.4296/cwrj2201035

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.4296/cwrj2201035

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

RETURN OF THE FEDS, PART II:THE OLDMAN RIVER DAM

Submitted May 1996; accepted January 1997Written comments on this paper will be accepted until September 1997

Rob de Lo6'

AbstractThe role of the Federal government in Alberta water management has gonethrough four distinct phases since the 1870s. This paper examine events leadingup to the 1990 court decision on the Oldman River Dam, which forced the federalgovernment to conduct an environmental impact assessment of this Albertaproject. The court decision and the impact assessment that followed represent thereturn of the federal government to an area in which it had played a relativelyminor role since 1973. Water management in Alberta between 1973 and 1990was left almost entirely to the provincial government, despite the fact that thefederal government still had several key constitutional responsibilities. The paperexamines why the federal government had to be forced to take up theseresponsibilities again.

R6sum6En Alberta, le r6le du gouvernement f6deral dans la gestion des eaux est pass6par quatre stades diff6rents depuis les ann6es.l 870. Le present documentexamine les 6v6nements qui ont men6 d la d6cision du tribunal en 1990 quant aubarrage de la rividre Oldman, qui a forc6 le gouvernement f6d6ral d proc6der dune 6valuation de l'impact environnemental de ce projet de l'Alberta. La d6cisionjudiciaire et l'6valuation de l'impact qui a suivi marquaient le retour dugouvernement f6d6ral dans un domaine ou il avait jou6 un r6le relativementmineur depuis 1973. En effet, entre'l 973 et 1990, la gestion des eaux en Albertafut laiss6e presque entidrement entre les mains du gouvernement provincial,malg16 le fait que le gouvernement f6d6ral continuait d'6tre investi de plusieursresponsabilit6s constitutionnelles cl6s. Le pr6sent document se penche sur lesraisons pour lesquelles il fallait forcer le gouvernement f6d6ral d assumer denouveau de telles responsabilit6s.

IntroductionThe conflict over the Oldman River Dam dragged the federal government back intoin southern Alberta (Figure 1) culminated a sphere which in many respects it hadin an important change in the nature and abandoned in 1973. While this seems tolevel of federal government involvement in suggest a renewed role for the federalAlberta water management. ln 1990, the government in Alberta water manage-Federal Court of Canada ruled that the ment, it is more likely that the federal gov-Government of Canada had to apply its ernment's role through the environmentalEnvironmental Assessment and Review assessment is an aberration. On the na-Process to the dam being built by the tional scene, the federal government'sGovernment of Alberta. This decision withdrawal from water manaoement has

1. Department of Geography, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON

Canadian Water Resources JournalYol.22. No.'1.1997

35

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 16:

25 0

5 O

ctob

er 2

014

been both raoid and dramatic in the 1990s(Pearse and Quinn, 1996).

This shift in federal government in-volvement in Alberta water management is

only the most recent of several that haveoccurred since 1894, when the Canadiangovernment created the legislation thatlaid the foundation for the system of waterallocation still in use today. The period oflow profile activity that started in 1973 waspreceded by a period of high profile in-volvement beginning in 1946. During thatyear, the federal government began con-struction of the St. Mary Dam for theSt. Mary-Milk River Development (de Lod,1997). This signalled the end of a period ofdormancy which had stafted in 't 930 whenthe Government of Canada transferredcontrol over water and other natural re-sources to the Prairie Provinces under theNatural Resources Transfer Agreement.The development and operation of majorwater projects that occurred between 1946and 1973 was a new role for the federalgovernment in Alberta. lts explicit policybetween 1894 and 1930 was to limit its ac-tivities to allocating water supplies, con-ducting hydrometric and irrigation surveysand inspections, and designing projects.Under this policy, development and opera-tion of large water projects was left first toprivate irrigation and hydro electric powercompanies, and then, after 1915, to thesecompanies and the irrigation districts cre-ated under provincial legislation.

The purpose in this paper is to examineevents leading up to the 1990 coud deci-sion, which forced the federal governmentto conduct an environmental impact as-sessment of the Oldman River Dam. Giventhat the senior government's constitutionalresoonsibilities for water in Alberta have not

changed significantly since 1930, and thatthese were present in the case, it is worth-while to examine why the governmenthad to be forced to take a more activerole in 1990. This paper complements an-other paper in this issue (de Lo6, 1997),which examines why the federal govern-ment became active in the development

36

and operation of the St. Mary-Milk RiverDevelooment in the late 1940s.

Overview: Federal WaterManagement Before 1990Primary responsibility for water passed fromthe federal government to the province of

Alberta in 1930 under the NaturalResources Transfer Agreement. This trans-

fer started a period of relative dormancy,during which federal involvement in Albeftawater management was limited mainly to

the activities of the Prairie FarmRehabilitation Administration (PFRA).These activities included the construction of

numerous small water storage and controlprojects for ranchers and farmers.Renewed federal involvement occurred in

1946, when the PFRA began constructionof the St. Mary Dam for the St. Mary-MilkRiver Development (de Lo6, 1997). Under

an agreement with Alberta in 1950, Canadapaid for and operated a system of dams,reservoirs and canals that took water from

the Waterton, Belly and St. Mary Rivers.Alberta agreed to build, operate and main-

tain the distribution system.In a parallel decision, Canada Pur-

chased the Canada Land and lrrigationCompany's irrigation project in 1950. Threeprojects were planned for the Bow RiverDevelopment (BRD), as it became known.

These included Western, Central, andEastern Blocks. Canada agreed to assumeresponsibility for all main reservoirs, works,

and connecting canals to service all three

blocks. The Central Block, which comprisedthe existing Canada Land and lrrigationCompany project, would be owned and op-

erated by the PFRA as a means to resettle

farmers from sub-marginal land in

Saskatchewan and Alberta. The Westernand Eastern blocks were to be developedby the province. However, only the Western

Block was ultimately built (Kirk, 1955;Topham, 1982). PFRA enlarged, and where

necessary replaced, virtually the entire sys-

tem built by the irrigation company.Federal involvement in the SMMRD

and the BRD came to an end on March 29,

Revue canadienne des ressources hydriquesVol.22. No.1,1997

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 16:

25 0

5 O

ctob

er 2

014

'_ [,rii"oo l--^, \ =dKH:'.n""l"\n=t;---R.

5"7,.-ry_. / BrocketHrncner )Creek , | (

\ esZ."',/

\flt

Oldman River Basin

, Sites for thef Oldman River

Dam mentioned intext

1 Gap Site

z Three Rivers Site3 Brocket Site

4 Fort Macleod Site

.,, Other Oldman RiverDam sites

River Basin

South SaskatchewanRiver Basin

Source: Data from Alberta Environment, Planning Division (1976); AWRC (1986)

0 100 200

1;9,574,000

Figure 1: Oldman River Basin

Canadian Water Resources JournalYol.22. No.1.1997

37

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 16:

25 0

5 O

ctob

er 2

014

1973, when Canada and Albeda signed anagreement that transferred to Alberta thevarious headworks it owned, along with theCentral Block of the BRD. The headworksbecame the responsibility of AlbertaEnvironment, while the irrigation projectwas merged into the Bow River lrrigationDistrict. Following the 1973 agreement, thefederal government's role in Alberta watermanagement was considerably reduced.

. lts resoonsibilities under the federalFisheries Act and the NavigableWaters Protection Act, and its respon-sibilities for inter-jurisdictional matters,Indian reserves, and national parkswere unchanged, but it did not pursuethem aggressively. For instance, whileresponsibility for day-to-day adminis-tration of fisheries rested with Albertasince 1930, the federal governmentbehaved as if its jurisdiction also hadbeen transferred. This distinctionwould prove to be important.

. The passage of the Canada Water Act,which was proclaimed on September30, .1 970, involved the federal govern-ment in some joint activities relating toconservation, planning and research.

. lt retained its coordinating role throughthe Prairie Provinces Water Board.This role was assumed in 1969 whenit signed the Master Agreementon Apportionment with Alberta,Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, whichallocated the flow of Prairie rivers(Prairie Provinces Water Board, .l 989).

. The Prairie Farm RehabilitationAdministration continued to be in-volved in the kinds of activities it had

undertaken since its creation, includingsmall-scale farm and community watersupply projects (Mactavish, 1 985).

Although these activities are important,it remains true that until it became involvedin the controversy over the Oldman RiverDam in the late 1980s, the federal govern-ment played a distinctly secondary role in

water management in southern Alberta.

38

Several factors may account for thefederal government's decision to withdrawfrom development and operation of majorwater projects. First, the Government ofAlberta was in a much better position tomanage its affairs in the late 1960s than it

was in the 1940s, when it asked for federalassistance to build the St. Mary-Milk River

Development. A 1967 provincial committeeestablished to review earlier joint federal-provincial economic and physical ap-praisals of irrigation projects in Albertarecommended that Alberta should takeover ownership of all on-stream head-works, along with responsibility for opera-tion and maintenance (McAndrews, et a/.,

1967). Second, as demonstrated by theMaster Agreement on Apportionment andlhe Canada Water Act, the federal govern-

ment was moving to a role that stressedcoordination and facilitation, rather than de-velopment and operation. Hence, it ap-pears that the federal government wantedto divest itself of its development and oper-ation responsibilities at the same time as

the provincial government was ready and

willing to take them uP.

The Oldman River DamIn 1975, as part of the provincial electioncampaign, Premier Lougheed announcedthat a dam would be constructed on the

Oldman River. This decision fulfilled a long-

standing desire of federal and provincialwater managers in Albefia to regulate theflow of the Oldman River. As early as 1912,

the lrrigation Branch of the federalDeoartment of the Interior conducted a re-

connaissance survey of a reservoir site at

the Gao site on the north branch of theOldman River (Figure 1) (Canada,Department of the Interior, 19'l 3). Otherproposals were investigated in 1915 and in1921 (Canada, Department of the Interior1916a; Canada, Department of the lnterior,

1922). The Depanment of the Interior, did

not pursue any of these ProPosals.However, the idea of a dam on the OldmanRiver at the Gap site was revived seriouslyin 1958 when Alberta's Deputy Minister of

Revue canadienne des ressources hydriquesYol.22. No. 1,1997

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 16:

25 0

5 O

ctob

er 2

014

Table 1: Oldman River Dam Chronology of Events

Date Event

1975 (February) . Premier Lougheed announces that a dam will be constructed on theOldman River

1975 (July) . Preliminary study of possible dam sites released by Alberta Environment

1976 (January) . Report summarizing 70 submissions commenting on July 1975 repod released

1976 (June) . Phase I planning studies released (Alberta Environment, 1976). Dam at the Three Rivers site tentativelv recommended. Further study recommended

1978 (August) . Phase ll planning studies released (Oldman River Basin Study ManagementCommittee, 1978)

. Dam at either of Three Rivers or Brocket sites recommended

1978 (November) . Environment Council o1 Alberta (ECA) holds hearings throughoutsouthern Alberta

1979 (August) . ECA releases report (Alberta, Environment Council of Alberta, 1979). Recommends that ofl-stream storage and improvements in irrigation efficiency

be used instead of a dam

1980 (August) . Announcement that a dam will be built, either at the Brocket or Three Rivers site. The decision depends on the Peigan, who are to consider whether or not they

' want a dam on the reserve

1984 (August) . Premier Lougheed announces dam will be built at the Three Rivers site

1986 (Septembe0 . First contracts for construction awarded

1987 (September) o lrlrt"tous court challenges launched, primarily by the Friends of theto 1992 (January) Oldman River (FOR)

. lmportant decisions include:. December 9, 1987: Government's Oldman River Dam permits and licences

are quashed because they were improperly issued. March 13, 1990: Licences quashed again, and federal EA ordered. January 23, 1992: Supreme Courl of Canada rules B:1 against Alberta and

other provinces; states Ottawa has the right to do an EIA on any project thatfalls even partially under federal jurisdiction

1991 (June) . Court mandated federal environmental assessment hearings begin

1992 (May) . Federal EA panel releases its repod (Canada, FEARO, 1992). Primary recommendation is to decommission the dam. Recommendation rejected by Alberta and federal government

1992 (August) . Alberta Environment receives permit to operate the dam

Source: Newspaper coverage in the Calgary Herald and Edmonton Journal.

Agriculture asked the Prairie Farm PFRA engineers recommended an eanhfillRehabilitation Administration to conduct en- dam at the Three Rivers site, with a reser-gineering feasibility studies. These studies voir capacity of about 493,400 dam'(cubicsoon were expanded to include the feasibili- decametres), costing approximately $28ty of a dam at the Three Rivers site on the million (Canada, Department of Agriculture,Oldman River (Figure 1). In its 1966 report, 1966). This proposal was not pursued.

Canadian Water Resources JournalYol. 22. No.1 . 1997

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 16:

25 0

5 O

ctob

er 2

014

Following Premier Lougheed's Februaryannouncement, Alberta Environment re-leased a preliminary study of possible damsites in July, 1975 (Table 1). A report sum-marizing 70 submissions commenting onthe July report was released in January1976. Two major planning studies subse-quently were released in 1976 and 'l 978.These were followed by public hearings inNovember 1978 by the EnvironmentCouncil of Alberla, which released its repofiin 1979. The Council made many recom-mendations, the most important being thatthe government should not build an on-stream dam, except if access to theLethbridge Northern lrrigation District(LNID) weir on the Peigan reserve could notbe guaranteed. lf this was the case, theCouncil recommended, a dam should bebuilt at the Fort Macleod site (Figure 1). Thegovernment did not accept this recommen-dation. In 1980 it announced that a damwould be built, but the final location was leftopen to allow the Peigan Indians to consid-er options. A final decision was taken in1984, when the government announcedthat a dam would be constructed at theThree Rivers site (Figure 1). This is thesame site recommended by PFRA engi-neers in 1966. Construction began in 1986,and the dam was operational in 1992.

This is not the whole story, however.As soon as it became known that the gov-ernment favoured the Three Rivers site,following the release of the Phase I stud-ies in 1976, (Alberta Environment,Planning Division, 1976) opposition beganto coalesce. As with the Red Deer Dam(Figure 1), initial opposition was from landowners at the site who would lose theirproperties. Unlike the Red Deer Dam,however, opposition from a new directionoccurred after the landowners had givenup. Various environmental groups, as wellas some of the Peigan who lived on a re-serve downstream of the Three Riversdam site (Figure 1), launched a concertedeffort to stop the project. Unprecedentedcourt challenges took place, and many ofthem were successful. One of them led to

40

the federal environmental assessment ofthe project, conducted when the dam wasvirtually completed, over the objections ofthe province (Table 1).

The 1990 Court Decision and theFederal Environmental AssessmentThe last major act in the drama of theOldman River Dam planning process, theone most pertinent to this paper, is the en-vironmental assessment that the federalgovernment was forced to undertake be-cause of the successful court challengeby the Friends of the Oldman River(FOR). Following its withdrawal fromwater development activities in southernAlberta in 1973, the federal governmentdid not see itself as having a significantrole. Thus, when the Friends of theOldman River, a group opposed to theOldman River Dam, asked the federalMinister of the Environment in January1988, to conduct a full federal environ-mental assessment, he replied that hisdepartment had no jurisdiction in the mat-ter because no federal funds were in-volved, and because federal jurisdictionwas not threatened (Calgary Herald,January 10, 1988). Federal lawyers madesimilar arguments two years later in theFederal Court of Appeal, in relation to acase launched by FOR (Calgary Herald,January 24, 1990). However, the judge inthat case ruled on March 13, 1990 thatthe project had to undergo a full-scale fed-eral environmental assessment. He statedthat the federal ministers of bothTransport and Fisheries and Oceans werebound by Ihe Guidelines Order which un-derlay the Environmental Assessment andReview Process (EARP). Fufthermore, heruled that the Minister of Transport's fail-ure to follow the EARP rendered the li-cence he had issued to the provinceunder the Navigable Waters ProtectionAct void (Elder, 1992). More importantly,however, the court reaffirmed that the fed-eral government did have constitutionally-defined resoonsibilities for fisheries andnavigation in Alberta.

Revue canadienne des ressources hydriquesYol.22. No. 1.1997

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 16:

25 0

5 O

ctob

er 2

014

After some delay, the federalEnvironment minister announced a full en-vironmental review of the dam, but did notorder work to stop, citing safety concerns(Calgary Herald, April 25, 1990). Thepanel was not actually named untilNovember 16, 1990 (Calgary Herald,November 17, 1990). Because construc-tion was not ordered halted in the March13, 1990 court decision, an unusual situa-tion was created in which theEnvironmental Assessment Panel heldhearings on a nearly complete dam. ltshearings on the safety of the dam startedon June 6, 1 991, one day after the reser-voir was filled (Calgary Herald, June 5,1991). The hearing was made even moreunusual because both the provincial gov-ernment and the Peigan Band declined toparticipate formally.

The panel released its report onMay 2'1 , 1992, at which time the projectessentially was completed. Key recom-mendations from the reooft include the fol-lowing (Canada, Federal EnvironmentalAssessment and Review Office, 1992):

. Decommission dam;

. lf decommissioning is unacceptable,approve subject to stringent require-ments;

. Create environmental managementcommittee with full authority to mitigateand supervise decommissioning (ifchosen) or operation;

. Province and Peigan must reach equi-table agreement;

. lf dam is operated and conditions notmet, or if agreement with Peigan notreached, decommission the dam.

The federal government rejected therecommendation to decommission thedam. However, it indicated that it wouldpursue proposals to address the negativeimpacts of the dam. The provincial govern-ment, not surprisingly, also rejected the re-port's main recommendations (CalgaryHerald, May 22 and 23, 1992).

Canadian Water Resources JournalYol.22. No.1.1997

DiscussionThe 1990 Federal Court of Canada decisionand the federal environmental assessmentthat eventually was conducted (Canada,Environmental Assessment Review Office

IFEAROI, 1992) signalled a larger role forthe federal government in water manage-ment in Alberta. lt and the Raffefty-AlamedaDam decision in Saskatchewan (McConnell,1991 ; Stolte and Sadar, 1993) launched theredefinition of the role of the federal govern-ment in resource develooment in Canada.The January 23, 1992 decision of theSuoreme Court of Canada confirmed thistrend. The court ruled that the federal gov-ernment has an obligation to conduct envi-ronmental reviews, and must adhere to itsown Guidelines Order (Elder, 1992;Sundstrom, 1994).

One possibility opened up by these de-cisions is a strong federal presence in theapproval of provincial water developments.However, this seems unlikely, especially in

light of the federal government's withdrawalfrom water on the national scene (Pearseand Quinn, 1996). lt is true that the federalgovernment's environmental assessmentpanel did not accept uncritically many ofthe key tenets underlying Alberta watermanagement. For instance, panellistsmade the following points in their report:

. Taking economic costs and benefitsinto consideration, the Oldman RiverDam would be very difficult to justify oneconomic grounds (Canada, FEARO,1 992).

. Existing irrigation in southern Albertawas important and valued on regional,provincial, and national scales, andneeded to be maintained. However,expansion of irrigation was not justified(Canada, FEARO, 1992).

. Substantial non-irrigation benefits tout-ed by proponents, such as recreationand water supply for communities andindustries, could have been providedat less cost without the dam (Canada,FEARO, 1992).

41

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 16:

25 0

5 O

ctob

er 2

014

These points are challenges to thedominant paradigm of water managementin Albefta, which asserts that proper watermanagement requires control and regula-tion of streamflow, and that the benefits ofirrigation are widespread (de Lod, 1995).However, the report was rejected by theprovincial government, and its key recom-mendation to decommission the dam wasrejected by the federal government. In thefinal analysis, it cannot be said that thefederal environmental assessment reore-sented a shift in Alberta water manage-ment, or a new direction for the federalgovernment. First, it did not originate with,and was not supported by, the people whoundertake water management in Alberta.Even federal officials in relevant deoart-ments were reluctant to cooDerate(Canada, FEARO, 1992). Second, whilethe panellists believed that the federalgovernment had all the power it needed toimplement every recommendation, adopt-ing the role in water management that thiswould have required does not seem tohave been something the federal govern-ment was interested in doino.

ConclusionWhen set against the backdrop of theSt. Mary Dam case (de Lo6, 1997), theOldman River Dam case shows strikingcontrasts. In the 1940s, Alberta was es-sentially a rural province. Oil had beendiscovered, but not yet in great quantities.Water management was narrow in scope,focused primarily on the development ofwater supplies for irrigation. The St. Mary-Milk River Develooment stretched if notexceeded the provincial government's en-gineering and financial capabilities.Cooperation with the federal governmentwas essential. Achieving cooperation wasfairly easy because water managementofficials in both governments were part ofa closely-knit group. Their commitment tothe cause of harnessing the rivers to bringwater to the land seems to have beenmore important than the particular govern-ment that employed them. The title of a

42

book written by the first director of thePFRA, describing this cause, is quite ap-propriate: Survival of a Vision (Spence,1 e67).

This situation stands in marked con-trast to the 1970s and beyond. WhenPremier Lougheed announced in 1975that a dam would be built on the OldmanRiver, Alberla was a wealthy urban, indus-trial province. The provincial governmentcertainly did not need the engineering orfinancial resources of the federal govern-ment to build the dam. Furthermore, theunity of vision and purpose among federaland orovincial officials that was evident in

the 1940s and 1950s (de Lod, 1997) wasabsent following the 1970s. While therestill was a closely-knit water managementcommunity in Alberta, its membershipdoes not seem to have included manYfederal officials, certainly not from outsideof the PFRA.

The final significance of the OldmanRiver Dam case to federal involvement in

Alberta water management is yet to be de-termined. Opporlunities for federal involve-ment exist, but whether or not anyparticular federal government chooses toexploit these opportunities is subject toconsiderable political discretion, and totrends in federal-provincial relations. Forinstance, in Alberta the federal drift awayfrom involvement in water managementwas so complete by 1988 that the Ministerof the Environment claimed there was no

federal interest in the Oldman River Dam.He took this position despite the fact thataccording lo provincial studies, the damhad obvious and significant impacts onfish and fish habitat a federal responsibility(Oldman River Basin Study ManagementCommittee, 1978). This was reaffirmed bythe 1990 and 1992 court decisions whichstated that even though the Governmentof Canada had delegated administrativeaspects of fisheries management toAlberta, it could not ignore its ultimate re-

sponsibility. Clearly, the issue of the na-ture and level of federal involvement is notclear cut.

Revue canadienne des ressources hydriquesYol.22. No. 1.1997

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 16:

25 0

5 O

ctob

er 2

014

An obvious opportunity for federal in-volvement in provincial water manage-ment, besides general constitutionalprovisions that currently exist, derivesf rom the Canadian EnvironmentalAssessment AcL Under this new federalenvironmental assessment system, majorwater projects are included on the list ofprojects that must undergo a comprehen-sive study. This suggests some minimumlevel of federal involvement in projectssuch as the Oldman River Dam.However, even these provisions by nomeans guarantee federal involvement,because the Act provides considerableopportunities for discretion. Additionally,Canada's federal and orovincial environ-ment ministers are attempting to harmo-nize their environmental activities throughthe Canadian Council of Ministers of theEnvironment (Forand, 1996). Therefore, a'watchdog' role, such as the one forcedupon the federal government in theOldman River Dam case. seems unlikelv.

ReferencesAlberta Environment, Planning Division.1976. Oldman River Flow Regulation:Preliminary Planning Sfudies. MainReport, Volume l. Edmonton: AlbertaEnvironment.

Alberta, Environment Council of Alberta.1979. Management of Water ResourcesWithin the Oldman River Basin: Reportand Recommendation. ECA 97-14 RR.

Canada, Department of Agriculture. 1966.Progress Report: Preliminary Engineeringlnvestigations, Oldman River Project,Proposed Three Rivers Dam and Reservoir.Calgary: Alberta Regional Division, PrairieFarm Rehabilitation Administration.

Canada, Deoadment of the Interior. 1913,Report on lrrigation for the Year 1912. ParIof Part Vl, Annual Report, Department ofthe Interior, 1912. Ottawa: GovernmentPrinting Bureau.

Canada, Department of the Interior,I rrig atio n B ran c h. 1 91 6a. Re port on

Canadian Water Resources JournalYol.22. No.1.1997

lrrigation Surveys and lnspections, 1915.Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau.

Canada. Deoartment of the Interior. 1922.Annual Report of the Department of thelnterior for the Fiscal Year Ended March31 , 1921 . Ottawa: F.A. Acland, Printer tothe King's Most Excellent Majesty.

Canada, Federal EnvironmentalAssessment Review Office. 1992. OldmanRiver Dam: Report of the EnvironmentalAssessment Panel. Hull, P.Q., The Office.

de Lod, R.C. 1995. "Stability and Changein Southern Alberta Water Management."ln Managing the Water Environment: HardDecisions From Soft Data. Proceedings ofthe 48th Annual Conference of theCanadian Water Resources Association,Fredericton, New Brunswick, June 20-23.

de Lod, R.C. 1997. "Return of the Feds,Parl l: The St. Mary River Dam." CanadianWater Resources Journal, 22(1): 25-34.

Elder, P.S. 1992. "One More Look at theOldman Dam." Resources: The Newsletterof the Canadian lnstitute of ResourcesLauz 39(Summer): 6-10.

Forand, L. 1996. "Federal-ProvincialHarmonization: Finding the Balance."Paper Presented at Conference on lmpactof the New Environmental RegulatoryLandscape April, 1996. Toronto: InsightInformation, Inc.

Kirk, D.W. 1955. The Bow River lrrigationProject Part l. The History andDevelopment of the Bow River lrrigationProject Up to and lncluding its Purchase bythe Government of Canada in 1950.Regina: Canada. Depaftment of Agriculture.Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration.

McAndrews, C.J., G.R. Purnell, and R.E.Bailey. 1967. Alberta lrrigation PolicyRecommendations. Alberta I rrigationStudies, Volume Vll. Edmonton: AlbertaDepartment of Agriculture.

McConnell, J.G. 1991. "The Rafferty-Alameda Project in Relation toEnvironmental lmoact Assessment."Operational Geographer, 9(4): 1 4-1 8.

43

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 16:

25 0

5 O

ctob

er 2

014

Mactavish, John S. 1985. Ihe Federal Rolein Water Management. Inquiry on FederalWater Policy, Research Paper No. 15.Ottawa: lnquiry on Federal Water Policy.

Oldman River Basin Study ManagementCommittee. 1978. Oldman River Basin -Phase ll Studies: Report andRecom mendafions. Lethbridge, Alberta:The Committee.

Pearse, P.H. and F. Quinn. 1996. "RecentDevelopments in Federal Water Policy:One Step Forward, Two Steps Back."Canadian Water Resources Journal,21(4):329-40

Pralrie Provinces Water Board. 1989.Prairie Provinces Water Board. Regina:Prairie Provinces Water Board.

Stolte, W.J. and M.H. Sadar. 1993. "The

Raffert-Alameda Project and itsEnvironmental Review: Structures,Objectives and History." Canadian WaterResources Journal, 1 8(1 ): 1 -1 3.

Spence, G. 1967. Survival of a Vision.Historical Series No. 3. Ottawa: Queen'sPrinter.

Sundstrom, M. 1994. "Oldman River Dam."ln Public /ssues; A GeograPhicalPerspective, eds. J. Andrey and J.G,Nelson. Department of GeograPhYPublications Series No. 41. University ofWaterloo.

Topham, H.L. 1982. History of lrrigation inWestern Canada. Prairie FarmRehabilitation Administration.

Revue canadienne des ressources hydriquesYoL 22, No. 1 , 1997

44

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 16:

25 0

5 O

ctob

er 2

014