Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States and Europe

8/14/2019 Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States and Europe

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RethinkingWestern StrategiesToward Pakistanan action agenda for the

united states and europe

Frdric Grare


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2007 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without

permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment.

The Carnegie Endowment normally does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views

represented here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Endowment, its staff, or its trustees.

For electronic copies of this report, visit www.CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs.

Limited print copies are also available.

To request a copy, send an e-mail to [email protected].

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20036

Phone: 202-483-7600

Fax: 202-483-1840

www.CarnegieEndowment.org

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

Frdric Grare is a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. With Ashley J.

Tellis and George Perkovich, he leads a project assessing U.S. and European policies toward Pakistan and,where appropriate, recommends alternatives. Grares research focuses on the tension between stability

and democratization in Pakistan, including challenges of sectarian conflict, Islamist political mobilization,

and educational reform. He also facilitates interactions between U.S. experts and officials and European

counterparts on the main policy challenges in South Asia.

Grare has written extensively on security issues, Islamist movements, and sectarian conflict in Pakistan

and Afghanistan. He also has edited the volumeIndia, China, Russia: Intricacies of an Asian Triangle.

The author would like to thank the Smith Richardson Foundation, whose generous grant has permitted the

realization of this project. My gratitude also goes to John Judis and George Perkovich, who have made

experts who did not always agree with my conclusions and whose names do not figure in these lines.

Ultimately, the responsibility for the opinions and ideas expressed in the present document is entirely

mine.

this report readable. This report has also benefitted from the advice of many colleagues and Pakistan


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Rethinking Western

Strategies Toward

Pakistan:An Action Agendafor the

United States and Europe

Frdric Grare


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Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan4

Table of Contents

Executive Summary .................................................................................................5

Chapter 1: Defining the Issue ....................................................................................7

Chapter 2: Pakistans Narrow Military and Civilian Elites ..............................................11

Chapter 3: Musharrafs Pakistan and U.S. Interests on a Collision Course? ......................... 17

Chapter 4: Civilian vs. Military Power and U.S. Regional Interests .................................25

Chapter 5: Breaking the Links Between Army and Politics ............................................33

Chapter 6: Grand Geopolitical Bargains? ...................................................................43

Chapter 7: A Matter of Political Will .........................................................................51

Notes ..................................................................................................................53


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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 5

Without Pakistans active and full cooperation, the United States and the broader international

community cannot reconstruct Afghanistan, defeat the Taliban, and turn the tide of internationalterrorism. Yet most observers agree that Pakistan has not provided the fullest possible cooperation.Debate is growing about whether the Pakistani state is merely unable to do better or is activelyundermining international efforts in Afghanistan and against terrorism.

This report makes the case that the Pakistani state bears responsibility for the worsening securitysituation in Afghanistan, the resurgence of the Taliban, terrorism in Kashmir, and the growthof jihadi ideology and capabilities internationally. At the core of the problem is the Pakistanimilitary, which has dominated Pakistans politics since 1958 and has developed over the yearsa nationalism based more on its own delusions of grandeur rather than on any rational analysis

of the countrys national interest. Inheriting a highly divided polity, the Pakistan Army has triedto muster solidarity by stoking religiosity, sectarianism, and the promotion of jihad outside itsborders, particularly in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

The United States and most Western countries have traditionally dealt with Pakistan according toshort-term interests, and they have left deep, structural problems to the next administration.Pakistan exploited this natural tendency by offering (for a price) assistance in achieving urgentU.S. objectivesestablishing listening posts to spy on the Soviet Union, offering entry to China,and assisting in expelling Soviet forces from Afghanistan and capturing Al Qaeda leaders.

Throughout much of this history, Pakistan has been led by military dictators. In return for helpingthe United States pursue its objectives, these dictators obtained sizable economic and militaryaid and political support. As in Afghanistan today, however, the degree of Pakistans cooperationhas been much less than claimed. Indeed, Pakistan is now arming and training forces that theUnited States and NATO are fighting, just as the Pakistani military establishment has for sometime supported Al Qaeda and other jihadi organizations operating out of Afghanistan, northernand western Pakistan, and in Kashmir.

This report shows that these Pakistani priorities reflect the specific institutional interests ofthe military and therefore cannot be fundamentally changed unless the army gradually cedes its

political role to representative civilian leaders and limits itself to defending borders. In otherwords, the United States and other international actors vital to Pakistans future must stop takingthe metaphorical bribe of partial Pakistani cooperation in fighting Al Qaeda terrorists in return forpropping up an unrepresentative, military government.

This report calls for a new strategy designed to encourage Pakistanis, particularly the military,to reestablish the preeminence of civilian government according to the Pakistani constitution.The key to this strategy is to not allow Pakistan to trade off democratization for the countryscooperation on terrorism, Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent, Kashmir. Pakistani progress on theseobjectives would bring increased international rewards, while its abandonment of a single one of

them would expose the Pakistani leadership to the withdrawal of foreign assistance. Conditionalityof cooperation assistance applied by a large number of countries, not simply by the United States,should be applied to Pakistans leadership, in particular the military leadership, and should notaffect the general population.

Executive Summary


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Defining the Issue

Chapter1

In the wake of Pakistans invaluable assistance

in 2001 in ousting the Taliban government andin capturing or killing Al Qaeda forces, manyAmericans thought of Pakistan as a key U.S.ally. But since then the actions of the militarygovernment led by General (and President) PervezMusharraf have raised the question of whetherPakistan is an adversary as well as ally. Thevisit to Islamabad of Vice President Richard B.Cheney in February 2007 was widely interpretedas a message sent by President George W. Bush

to General Musharraf, warning him that the U.S.Congress, now with a Democratic Party majority,could cut aid to his country if he failed to liveup to its commitments in the war on terror.1

Of course, Pakistans fear of a larger, morepowerful India has caused the countrys leadersto use the low-intensity conflict of terrorism topreserve Pakistans influence in Afghanistan andto weaken India, particularly its control over the

Kashmir valley. India is bigger, more powerful,and often haughty toward Pakistan. The Indo-Pak conflict is real. Yet the military actors whohave largely determined the character andactions of the Pakistani state also have usedthe specter of India to consolidate and justifytheir power domestically.

Pakistans military leaders have mobilizedreligious parties, militants, foreign freedom

fighters, and other players to get and keepnational power and resources. They also haveadeptly used their external vulnerabilitiestothe Soviet Union and, more recently, to AlQaeda and bearded mullahsto elicit U.S.support and assistance. Pakistans leadersYaqub Khan, Zia ul-Haq, and Musharrafhavehighlighted their countrys position as afrontline state facing U.S. adversaries and haveoffered cooperation in pursuing U.S. objectives

in return for billions of dollars in economic andmilitary assistance and political support of thedictatorship.

The Pakistan Armys adept bargaining with the

United States has helped ensure its ongoingpolitical power. This has undermined civiliangovernment and impaired almost every aspectof Pakistans social, economic, and politicallife. It has also permitted the military toimpose its own mind-set on the countrysstrategic interests. U.S. policies have thereforenot only failed to mitigate Pakistans politicalweaknesses, they have reinforced them. SinceSeptember 11, 2001, U.S. policies have failed

to convince Pakistan to renounce terrorismin deeds as well as words. Instead, they havereinforced the mind-set that has helped makeSouth Asia one of the most volatile regions ofthe world.

The present study argues that Pakistans lack ofdemocratic culture is an essential problem thatis too often set aside in favor of more pressingshort-term objectives. The military not only

sets Pakistans foreign policy, it also shapesdomestic politics by nourishing a climate ofinsecurity and sectarian violence, allowing itto portray itself as the only bulwark againstextremism.

Demilitarizing Pakistan and setting it on thelong path toward democracy are thereforeprerequisites for the long-term stability of theregion. The restoration of stable civilian rule

in Pakistan would help lessen the obsessionwith an Indian threat and focus Pakistansenergies on its own economic development. Itwould also create better conditions for endingthe use of terrorist organizations in order tosecure Pakistans objectives in Kashmir andAfghanistan.

In the light of the current Iraq disaster, one maywonder whether this objective is achievable. In

Iraq, the United States used military force to getrid of a dictator and to establish a functioningdemocracy that it hoped would serve as a modelfor the entire Middle East. Although the U.S.


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military succeeded in toppling the Iraqi regime,it failed miserably to establish a democracy.The present report proposes nothing of thatsort of action. Instead of importing a modelof democracy, this report advocates achievingdemocratization by returning to the principleswritten in the Pakistani constitution itself.

It does not call for using military force; itcalls instead for using political and economicleverage to achieve this objective. And it relieson the reality that Pakistani political partiesand civil society are healthier than those thatsuffered under Saddam Husseins brutal tyrannyfor decades.

Other countries have made uneasy yet peacefultransitions toward democracy. Spain and

Portugal in the 1970s and, more recently,South Korea and Chile have moved away frommilitary dictatorship. Turkey was plagued bymilitary coups dtat, and the army has left itsimprint on the political process,2but democracyhas still made sufficient inroads for Turkey toenter negotiations to join the European Union.Finally, there is the example of India. If Indiacan maintain a real, albeit imperfect, democracy,why should not Pakistan?

Civilian elites share responsibility for theliabilities of the current Pakistani system.Political leaders have repeatedly allowedthemselves to be manipulated by the militaryand in turn have used the military in partisanbattles. Pakistans political crisis is a directfunction of the compromises civilian elites havemade. Civilian entrepreneurs have also usedtheir relationship with the military to their own

benefit.

Both civilians and the military share a commonresponsibility in setting the ideological mind-set of the country. For different reasonsmilitarism on the one side, preservation of classprivilege on the otherboth have concurredin keeping the Pakistani masses in a state ofsemiliteracy, making them prone to adopt areligiously based culture of resentment while

depriving them of the theoretical and practicaltools that would allow them to challenge theexisting social order.

The current military regime is not transitional,neither is it simply the unfortunate butnecessary step toward stronger institutions andtrue democratization. Rather, the Musharrafgovernment perpetuates military power byundermining political institutions for thebenefit of the military. Some in the Pakistani

military acknowledge that military rule hasbeen ineffective, but they insist that themilitary originally seized power because of anincompetent civilian leadership incapable ofacting in Pakistans national interest. Civilianleadership in Pakistan has been flawed, butits flaws pale compared with the structuraldysfunction of military rule.

Effectivenot to mention democratic

governance requires peaceful and rule-basedturnover of officeholders on the basis ofpopular judgments of performance. By contrast,militaries are rigidly hierarchical permanentinstitutions subject to internal discipline, but(in the ideal case) subject to overall civiliancontrol. When the military controls politics(and economic policy), it undermines the basisof effective government by blocking peacefulturnover through accountability. Thus, the

military in Pakistan is largely responsible forthe current mediocrity of the countrys politicalelites.

Two questions are at the center of this report:

How can Pakistan demilitarize itself?

How can Pakistan democratize itself?

By demilitarization, the report obviously does

not mean the elimination of the army. Rather,the concept of demilitarization suggests theend of the armys quasi monopoly on every leverof power in the country, whether it exercisesthese levers directly when the army is officiallyin power or indirectly when it withdraws behindthe faade of a civilian government. This reportargues for eliminating the armys interferencenot only in the politics and economics ofPakistan, but also in the countrys judiciary and

administration.

Although demilitarization is obviously part ofdemocratization, the two processes are not


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identical. Democratization is not limited toreshaping military-civilian relations. The numberof people and power centers that control theentirety of the countrys political-economiclife is simply too limited. In such conditions,effective checks and balances, althoughguaranteed by the countrys constitution,

cannot exist. Part of the challenge, and perhapsthe most important one, is therefore to identifyways and means to enlarge the elite pool. Asecond part of the challenge is the promotionof a democratic culture. The expressiondemocratic culture should be understood herein the minimal definition of political toleranceand respect for majority rule, implying, forexample, both the organization of elections foreach representative position and acceptance of

election results.

This report breaks new ground by describingthe processes by which these issues might beaddressed and focuses on the upcoming 20072008 elections, which promise a return to civilianpower. A series of steps must be taken beforethe 20072008 elections in order to ensure atransition as smooth as possible toward civilianrule. To induce the Pakistanis to take these steps,

the United States and other countries shouldoffer conditional international assistance to allsuccessive Pakistani governments.

The report does not in any way pretend thatits proposals would solve all regional anddomestic problems in Pakistan. Its objective ismore modest and yet extremely ambitious. Itproposes means to open up the political spaceand create the conditions to gradually build

up and reinforce a process of democratizationwhose progress is the necessary condition forthe emergence of a true political democracy.These conditions will be the object of a secondreport.

The author is also fully aware that the UnitedStates, Great Britain, and other countries arenot eager to pressure Pakistan. They thinkthey need Pakistan more than Pakistan needs

the West. This puts Islamabad in a strongerbargaining position with the West than itsunderlying situation merits. But that couldchange as the international community

faces the Taliban sanctuary in southern andsoutheastern Afghanistan and the support ofPakistani groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toibaand Jaish-e-Muhammad for terrorist actionsin the United States, Europe, or elsewhere.Terrorism by groups based in Pakistan is nota pure abstraction, as demonstrated by the

successful terrorist attack in London on July 7,2005, and the foiled attack on July 11, 2006.Should a new attack be successful and theevidence point toward Pakistan, the politicalconditions will suddenly be changed and theneed for alternative solutions will become morepressing.


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Power in Pakistan is monopolized by military

and civilian elites who enjoy an incestuousrelationship with each other and whose interestshave almost always been misaligned withthose of Pakistans general population and theinternational community. Making up less than1 percent of the population, these elites havedominated the state and rigged the markets tocapture the benefits of economic growth.

Political Involvement of the Pakistan Army

The army owes its importance in Pakistanspolitical life to the extremely difficultconditions in which the new country emerged.Sheer survival was the number one priorityfor Pakistani decision makers. The militaryalso benefited from those conditions thatin developing states generally favor militaryrule. These include tenuous social cohesion,a fragmented class structure, a weak middle

class, the lack of common symbols to facilitatepolitical and social mobilization, the weaknessand inefficiency of the political parties, andmediocre political personnel.

In October 1958, the army took power. It cededpower for only a short period between 1971 and1977, after the defeat against India and thesecession of East Pakistan. Even when it was inpower, it did not always rule directly. Twice, in

June 1962 and December 1985, the army seemedto be willing to withdraw. However, each timeit took great care to plan its disengagementand to restructure the political arrangementsaccording to its own preferences so as to ensurethe permanence of its own policies. It assumeda much more subtle, yet no less real, politicalrole in the sectors it considered vital.

The 1971 debacle of the war against India,

which led to the secession of East Pakistan,allowed civilians to take power. But the armysoon took advantage of the mistakes of theelected prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,

in particular the dissolution of Balochistans

assembly that started a five-year civil war in theprovince, to become again the central player onPakistans political scene. In 1977, the chief ofarmy staff, Zia ul-Haq, seized power, and a yearlater Bhutto, the elected former prime minister,was hanged.

In 1988, the army seemed ready to give powerback to the civilians. During this period, withthe end of the Cold War, the United States and

the nations of western Europe began to pressureauthoritarian governments to move towarddemocracy. Moreover, the Pakistan Army wasworried that its direct control of the politicalsystem could threaten its corporate interests.The chief of army staff, General Aslam Beg,decided to transfer power to civilians. However,he did it in such a way as to ensure that themilitary still controlled the political system.Then, in 1999, the army took over again.

Civil-Military Relationship in Pakistan

The military would not have been able todominate Pakistan if the civil establishment,lacking a democratic culture, had not tacitlyaccepted the armys power. The interests ofmilitary and civilian elites partly converge.The military has developed over the years a

savior complex: It believes that it possessesprofessional skills necessary to run the societyas well as the army and, in addition, that it isalso the only institution capable of running thecountry. The military also feels it is entitled toeconomic rewards for preserving the integrityand stability of the country. The military iswilling to accommodate the civilian elites, whoare motivated by greed and addiction to power,as long as the civilians play by military rules.

The military is the dominant institution, but itdoes not always exercise power directly. Whenthe army could not fulfill economic, social, and

Pakistans Narrow Military and Civilian Elites

Chapter2


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political expectations or when internationalpressure for democracy has been too strong, thearmy has withdrawn behind the scenes. However,this withdrawal has always been accompaniedby changes in the constitution that favoredthe military and by the co-optation of politicalelites. These political elites have distributed

civilian jobs to retired generals who retain closeties to the army.

The transition led by General Musharraf is acaricature of past efforts. Six years after hiscoup, the Pakistani president managed to unitea substantial part of the political class underhis leadership by promising to take off hisuniform after his reelection, but he has failedto do so. He has also modified the constitution,

transforming a parliamentary system into apresidential one, and he introduced a NationalSecurity Council dominated by the army.

The army has also used the party system toperpetuate its own rule. By playing one partyagainst the other, it creates a situation in whichthe army is forced to step in as the final arbiterof political conflict.

Civilian governments in Pakistan can develop adegree of autonomy only within the frameworkdefined by the military leadership. Theirideologyliberal, conservative, Islamic, leftist,rightistdoes not matter.

With the military ultimately in control, a smallconstellation of landlords, industrialists, traders,professionals, intellectuals, politicians, militaryand civil bureaucrats, and some members of the

religious oligarchy dominate every government.This monopoly has led to a general decay ofinstitutions, including nepotism, corruption,lawlessness, and a lack of security. Meanwhile,the military, inflamed by ambition, has generateda strategic posture that far exceeds Pakistanscapacity, generating strategic, ideological, andsocioeconomic problems that have put Pakistanat odds with the rest of the world.

Misplaced Socioeconomic Priorities of thePakistan Army

Pakistan in the 1990s was entangled in aclassical model of a debt trapforced to repayold loans as it was trying to keep the economygoing. Aside from this crisis, the growth of

its gross domestic product (GDP) has beentolerable during recent decades. Pakistans percapita income tripled between 1950 and 1999and, in purchasing power parity terms, washigher than one-third of the worlds countriesby 1999. Pakistan, however, has systematicallyunderspent on social and infrastructural needs,particularly health and education, as it hassustained heavy military expenditures.

During the past six years, Pakistan has almostconstantly had the highest military expendituresas a percentage of GDP in the entire South Asianregion(table 1).

By contrast, Pakistans performance in educationis alarming. According to UNESCO, the overallpercentage of literate people in the countryin the age category 1524 is 65.5 percent.3Moreover, these figures conceal large gender

and provincial disparities. UNESCO statisticsestimate the percentage of literate women at 42percent compared with men at 65 percent. Theliteracy rate varies from province to province;Punjab is the most educated, while Balochistan,with a 24.8 percent literacy rate according tothe 1998 census, lags miserably behind all otherprovinces. A survey conducted in 2001 in somedistricts of Balochistan province estimated theliteracy rate among women at 3 percent.

Pakistan compares poorly, even compared tosimilar South Asian countries. In 2004, theliteracy rate (for citizens 15 years of age andabove) was estimated by the World Bank at90.68 percent for Sri Lanka, 63.46 percent forIndia, 49.85 percent for Pakistan, 48.59 percentfor Nepal, 47.5 percent for Bangladesh, and59.52 percent for South Asia as a whole.

Between 1997 and 2002, national expenditures

on education as a percentage of GDP haveremained at about 1.7 percent, helping to makePakistans primary education system one of theleast effective in the world.


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Even the little money allocated is not fullyspent because of incompetent administration.The proportion of funds actually spent runs fromabout 80 percent in Balochistan to 90 percentin Punjab. The quality of education is alsoadversely affected by poorly trained teachersand endemic absenteeism, especially in rural

areas where, very often, the government doesnot even provide schools.

The result has been a multiple-track educationalsystem. The mediocrity of the public educationsystem has generated three parallel systems,each of which follows its own curriculum,teaching methods, and examination processes.Alongside state-run schools, religious seminariesand private schools have been developing

rapidly over the past two decades. The army hasalso developed its own school network, whichbenefits exclusively the children of the military.Some private schools provide quality educationto the upper end of society.

Madrassas, which offer religious education,provide food and accommodation, making themparticularly attractive to poor parents. Althoughthere are no reliable data about their actual

number, they are said to contribute to theliteracy of about one-third of Pakistani children.If they are often presented as problematicfrom a security perspective, their seeminglyexponential development is the direct result ofthe failure of the public education system.

These trends reflect the values of an oligarchythat sees no incentive in investing in humancapital. Pakistan appears stuck at the early stageof development, where land is abundant relativeto physical capital, where ownership of the landis highly concentrated, and where landownersdisplay little interest in the development of

the peasantry. In South Punjab, for instance,the landlords opposed establishing governmentschools for the rural poor, which led to thedevelopment of madrassas. The madrassas aremerely a symptom rather than the cause of thePakistani oligarchy.

The lack of investment in public educationdeprives students of the theoretical and practicaltools to envisage an alternative society. That

prevents the emergence of a revolutionarysituation in Pakistan, but it also prevents theemergence of a strong middle class. Madrassasand the public education system reinforce theexisting social order at the expense of thedevelopment of the Pakistani economy andsociety.

Sectarian and Jihadi Violence

Military power is also partly to be blamed forthe sectarian and jihadi violence that hasdeveloped in Pakistan since the Zia ul-Haqera. This violence is the result of regionalturbulence. It has sometimes been sustainedby outside money. The importance of the

Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2005-2006,London, Routledge, 2005. Compiled by the author.

Table 1. Military Expenditures by Countries of South Asia, 20002005 (in billion U.S.$)

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Pakistan

India

Sri Lanka

Nepal

Bangladesh

South Asia

(average)

4.05 4.08 4.28 4.31 3.96 3.36

3.05 3.02 2.93 2.76 2.94 2.90

4.53 3.85 3.11 2.67 2.78 2.66

0.96 1.18 1.57 1.75 1.88 1.98

1.4 1.34 1.25 1.2 1.19 1.14

3.07 3.02 2.95 2.87 2.99 2.89


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Islamic revolution in Iran and the Iran-Iraqwar cannot be underestimated. Both eventsbrought in Iranian, Saudi, and Iraqi money insupport of the most violently anti-Sunni andanti-Shiite organizations in Pakistan. But theseorganizations also fulfilled other tasks for thePakistani state and have been supported by

the domestic military establishment, which hasalso used them as a tool to perpetuate itself inpower.

Military support has varied according to the rolethe ideologically motivated institutions weresupposed to play. Such support did not consistexclusively of training, funding, and logisticallysupporting jihadis. During the relief operationsthat followed the earthquake of October 8,

2005, radical groups not only were authorizedto contribute but also were (and still are) theonly organizations that have been given fullvisibility so as to generate the perception thatthey were the only expression of civil society.

Occasionally the military has used radicalgroups to manipulate Western perceptions. Togain some breathing space, the military playedthe Islamist card to mobilize support among the

international community in 2002 and convinceit that Pakistan was under extremist pressures.Accordingly, the current military regime willneed to convince the West that it is doing whatit can to prevent the rise of political Islam inPakistans 2008 elections. Although the 2008election results are likely to be only marginallydifferent from 2002 results in terms of Islamistrepresentation, General Musharraf will mostlikely have to demonstrate that he (and he

alone) can contain the rise of the Islamistsby making sure the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, acoalition of six Islamist parties, gets slightlyfewer votes than during the previous elections.

Yet, maintaining an Islamist threat outside thepolitical field will prove to the United Statesthat a strong military government is necessary.So Musharraf has reauthorized some previouslybanned sectarian organizations such as the

Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) to hold publicrallies, although under a new nameMillat-e-Islamia.4 In such a context, any incidentwill play in favor of the military as it will be

presented as more evidence that the military isneeded to meet an Islamic threat.

Indoctrination through education is obviouslythe core issue. The madrassa network, whichhas experienced an exponential developmentover the past three decades, is often blamed

for spawning jihadisa charge that is true.Madrassas have contributed to the sectarianphenomenon by using their teaching andpropaganda to create an atmosphere of hatredconducive to the polarization of society and tothe radicalization of some of its most marginalelements. Historically, sectarian violence findsits roots in madrassas.

Yet, not all madrassas are sectarian, and

Pakistans public education system also deservessome of the blame. As noted by A. H. Nayyar andAhmad Salim: The textbooks tell lies, createhatred, inculcate militancy, and much more.5Textbooks used in the public schools distort theevents in Pakistani history, are insensitive tothe religious diversity of Pakistan, and glorifywar and the use of force.

Most Western foreign policy experts assume that

Pakistans educational problem is caused bythe divisions within Pakistani society betweensecular and modernist elites on one side, andreligious pressure groups on the other. They seethe underinvestment in education as merelyan accident of history, the unfortunate butunavoidable consequence of the armys weighton the countrys budget.

They argue that the way to correct the present

system is to lobby the Pakistani governmentto increase the share of education in the statebudget and encourage Western governments toprovide international assistance, both technicaland financial, in the belief that rehabilitatingthe public education system will bring childrenback from the madrassas and thereforegradually diminish the culture of hatred. Otherexperts in international organizations believethat madrassas themselves can be modernized

and the ideological content of their teachingmitigated.


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However, the distortions of education in Pakistanare not merely the result of a laissez-faire policy;instead, they stem directly from the instructionsgiven to textbook authors by the CurriculumWing of the Ministry of Education. The slantof the textbooks is a deliberate state policyaimed at encouraging religious chauvinism and

glorifying militarism. This culture of hatred hasbeen able to develop only because an oligarchy,acting in conjunction with the military, has seenit as the means to keep the masses illiterate orsemiliterate, a policy that has also led to theconstant underfunding of education. Thus,the demilitarization of Pakistani politics is anecessary yet insufficient condition to reducePakistans ideological problem.


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Military power has its greatest impact in

foreign policy. Although U.S. officials generallysee Pakistan as an ally in the war on terror,Pakistans cooperation with the United Statesis limited by its regional geopolitical interests.Relations with India obviously remain at thecore of Pakistans foreign policy. Alliances withmajor powers such as China and the UnitedStates are meant to protect Islamabad againsta perceived or imagined threat from New Delhi.The rivalry between the two South Asian giants

has turned both countries relations withAfghanistan, Central Asia, and the Middle Eastinto a zero-sum game. The asymmetry of theirrespective powers has generated a situation inwhich Pakistan, the weaker of the two, continuesunder its nuclear umbrella to nurture terroristgroups as a means of securing its geopoliticalgoals.

Neither 9/11 nor the ongoing peace process

with India has radically altered Pakistansstrategic outlook. Since 9/11, Islamabad hassystematically drawn a clear distinction betweeninternational organizations such as Al Qaeda,whose impact on Pakistans foreign policy wasnegative and whose members could be tradedfor Western goodwill, and regional organizationswhose usefulness in Afghanistan or Kashmir hadto be and have been preserved. The Pakistanimilitary allows officially banned organizations

such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, which is active inKashmir and in other parts of the Muslim world,to maintain its infrastructure.6

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan understoodthat terrorism had become, at least temporarily,unacceptable as a means of solving internationaldisputes. Thus, it joined the war on terror,turning itself once again into a frontline state.The question remains, however, whether the

decision to support U.S. policy in Afghanistan inthe wake of 9/11 was a major strategic decisionor a mere tactical shift. The same questioncan be asked about Musharrafs decision about

Kashmir. Militant groups were kept quiet for

two years until India agreed to come back tothe negotiating table in January 2004, but theyreemerged in force during the summer of 2005,once the peace process had been consolidated.The October 2005 earthquake revealed that thesupposedly dismantled training camps in AzadKashmir were still active.

Terrorism, whether related to Afghanistan orKashmir, is the issue where these contradictions

are emerging. A close examination of Pakistansstrategy regarding the terrorism issue showsthat Islamabad is gradually setting a trap for allcountries involved in Afghanistan and that arepotentially victims of international terrorism,the United States and the United Kingdom inparticular. In Kashmir, the continued supportto terrorist organizations can be interpreted asPakistans willingness to preserve some meansof pressure on India but can also be read as an

indication that Islamabad has changed none ofits strategic objectives.

The Joint Statement on United States-PakistanStrategic Partnership, issued on the occasion ofPresident George W. Bushs visit to Islamabad inMarch 2006, underlines a real although partialconvergence of interests at the strategic levelbut, in a somewhat contradictory manner, barelyhides the growing opposition between the two

countries at the tactical level.

Pakistans Strategic Interests

Pakistans strategy toward the United Statesand the international community can only beunderstood if each of its theaters of action(Kashmir, Afghanistan, and the FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas along the border withAfghanistan) is considered as part of an overall

foreign policy. Islamabad has specific objectivesin each of these regions, but the regional and theinternational aspects of each of these conflictsare linked. Islamabad constantly attempts to

Musharrafs Pakistan and U.S. Interests on a Collision Course?

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exchange acceptance of one specific aspect ofits regional policy for cooperation on another.

When U.S. officials use the term Islamic threat,they are putting very diverse geopoliticalrealities and interests under one designation.What happens in Kashmir, Afghanistan, or the

Federally Administered Tribal Areas mattersto the United States and to the internationalcommunity because a continuing conflict inany of these three areas either has generatedor is likely to generate a power vacuum thatinternational terrorist groups threateninginternational interests could fill. The 9/11attacks were not perpetrated by the Talibanbut were the result of their complacency andtheir complicity with Al Qaeda. Similarly, the

presence of the Lashkar-e-Toiba in Kashmirwould not be seen as a major issue should itsobjectives be limited to Kashmir.

For Pakistan, the Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Toiba are essential tools of regional policy. Atthe same time, Islamabad is always ready totrade international terrorists such as Al Qaedafor Western goodwill because they constitutea major liability by bringing Western wrath

to Pakistan. Pakistans cooperation againstinternational terrorism is therefore real andsincere. But Islamabad can at the same timethreaten to loosen its cooperation and lookthe other way in the face of a specific threatwhen the pressure becomes unbearable inAfghanistan, where it feels it has vital interests.Because this strategy is backed by decades ofpropaganda about a so-called Islamic threat, itresonates in the United States and its European

partners, allowing Islamabad to extract manymore concessions from them than wouldotherwise be possible.

Lets look at how Pakistan has operated in eachof these theaters.

Kashmir

Because of Indias centrality to Pakistans

foreign policy, it is necessary to examine firstthe situation in Kashmir. Despite the peaceprocess and a few important yet largely symbolicmeasures such as the bus lines between

Muzaffarabad and Srinagar and between Sialkotand Jammu, Pakistan is still wedded to thesame assumptions that produced the 2002border crisis. This crisis arose from Pakistansdangerous belief that it could talk peace withNew Delhi and at the same time fuel a guerrillawar in Kashmir.

Pakistans Use of the War on Terror

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan understoodthat terrorism had suddenly become anunacceptable way to pursue internationaldisputes. The government officially joined thewar on terror, once more turning itself into afrontline state. But in doing so, it faced a crisisof public legitimacy.

On the domestic front, Pervez Musharraf triedunsuccessfully to rally the secular partiesthecenter-left Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) andthe center-right Pakistan Muslim League, Nawazfaction (PML-N)without their leaders BenazirBhutto and Nawaz Sharif. He then favoredcreating an alliance of six Islamist parties inthe form of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),led by former members of the Pak-Afghan

Defence Council. The MMA had been officiallyopposing Musharrafs regime, but the Pakistanipresident wanted to use the MMA to intimidatehis opposition should he fail to get a majorityin Parliament.

At the same time, Musharraf realized that heneeded to play on the fear of an Islamic threatto attract strong U.S. military and financialsupport and cement his international support.

Pakistans October 2002 legislative electionsprovided the opportunity, and the militaryestablishment made sure that the MMA obtainedmajorities in the legislatures of the provincesof Balochistan and the North West FrontierProvince (NWFP) although it received only 11.1percent of the votes at the national level. Itremained, however, officially in the opposition.

The message to the international community

was simple: Dont pressure us too much or wemay be overthrown by Islamists. And it largelyworked. The West adopted a lenient attitudeon the restoration of democracy and came to


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believe that Pakistan had only a limited abilityto control militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir.The apparent rise of Islamists made the militaryregime look like a moderate stalwart againstextremism.

The other key component of Musharrafs strategy

was to engage in peace talks with India. Pakistanhad taken the blame for the 1999 Kargil war andthe 2002 escalation of tensions, andcontraryto Islamabads expectationsinternationalinterest in the Kashmir issue had benefitedIndia, not Pakistan. To reverse this trend, it wasnecessary to bring India back to the negotiatingtable by accepting Delhis terms regarding theformat of the negotiations without making anystrategic concession.

To make its goodwill credible, Pakistan hadto tangibly reduce the violence in Kashmir.It turned out that jihadi organizations wereable to use this lull in the fighting to recruityoung Kashmiris. Musharraf reasoned that oncethe dialogue appeared irreversible and theprotagonists serious, violence could be resumedand be plausibly considered a local rebellion.During the spring and summer of 2005, violence

resumed, initiated by supposedly new terroristorganizations such as Al Nasreen, Al Afreen,Farazan de Islam, and Al Mansoorah, whichwere cover names for the more traditional,Pakistan-supported Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen.

Of course, Pakistan denied all responsibility forthe violence, claiming that it had done what it

could and that militants were acting on theirown accord. But sources close to the Pakistangovernment told a different story. They admittedprivately that Pakistan had not fundamentallychanged its attitude toward Kashmir. At thesame time, sources close to the jihadis weresaying that Islamabad had not reined in the

jihadis. One can argue that Pakistans posturewas essentially defensive and that Islamabad feltthat any sign of weakness could be exploited by

India, but the fact is that Pakistan continued tomaintain the terrorist infrastructure. Moreover,mujahideen themselves indicated that they werebeing trained, for example, on a replica of the

fence separating Pakistan from India along theLine of Control (LOC) in Kashmir, while Pakistaniobservers occasionally went as far as declaringthat maintaining terrorist pressure was theonly way to bring India along to become moreamenable to Pakistani demands.

If any doubts persisted regarding Islamabadssupport of jihadi organizations in Kashmir, theywere removed by the October 2005 earthquakethat devastated most of Pakistans Kashmir andthe NWFP. Militant outfitswhich had sufferedon both sides of the LOC as had the Indianand Pakistani armies7were often the firstorganizations to reach the disaster spots. Onthe Pakistani side of the LOC, the United JihadCouncil, led by Syed Salahuddin, called for a

temporary cease-fire and set up medical campsin devastated areas. On both sides of the borderin Kashmir, extremist religious groups steppedinto the administrative vacuum, providing reliefand humanitarian assistance in the earthquake-affected areas and generating respect from thelocal population. Local people, alienated fromtheir central governments, became increasinglysympathetic to fundamentalist and terroristorganizations in Pakistan.

Caught in a dilemma, Musharraf went so far asto praise the Lashkar-e-Toiba8 for the work itconducted in Kashmir. He warned the jihadiorganization that if the government saw itinvolved in anything other than welfare, it wouldban it, which was an indirect acknowledgmentthat the government had not really banned itbefore. The groups infrastructure had neverbeen dismantled.

The earthquake made it obvious that previouspromises had not been respected. It becameeven more embarrassing a few days later when,on October 29 in Delhi, seventy-one peoplewere killed and two hundred injured by aseries of bomb blasts engineered by the sameorganization. This trend continued in 2006,with questions being raised about the linkbetween Pakistan-based groups and terrorist

attacks in India and the sincerity of Pakistansinvolvement in the peace process.


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Unintended Consequences?

The recent management of the Kashmir issueconfirms that the Pakistan Army is, in fact, themain reason for the rise of Islamic extremism.This is likely to create at some point anotherclash with India, which so far has shown

remarkable restraint but whose patience cannotbe taken for granted. This does not mean thatIndia is not also partly responsible for thesituation that prevails on the other side ofthe LOC; surely, it has contributed in no smallmeasure to the perpetuation of terrorism in theKashmir valley. Neither does this mean thatIslamabad is masterminding every operationon Indian soil, although it tolerated and,more often than not, helped terrorist groups

develop their infrastructure on its territory.Delhi, more than Islamabad, is accountable toa public opinion that could pressure the Indiangovernment for a tougher response to Pakistanssponsored terrorism. This could lead to anotherconflict, potentially increasing the nuclear riskin South Asia.

In December 2006, President Musharraf statedthat Pakistan would give up its claim to

Kashmir if India agreed to a self-governanceplan with New Delhi and Islamabad jointlysupervising the region.9But there was nothingnew in this proposal; it reiterated previouspositions and still affirms Pakistans sovereigntyin Kashmir. The offer of joint supervision overself-governance does not amount to the totalcontrol of the state that Islamabad has claimedso far, but it still confers some legitimacy onIslamabads claim for a role in the area, which

is unacceptable to India.

The presence of Kashmiri terrorist groups onPakistani soil is assuming an increasinglyinternational dimension. The terrorist attackof July 2005 in London and the foiled attackthe following month, when terrorists plannedto explode several planes over the Atlantic, hada Pakistani connection. Again, the Pakistanistate had no direct responsibility in either ofthe events. The United Kingdom even benefitedfrom Islamabads cooperation. Yet in bothcases, the people who were incriminated hadbenefited from the support of the Jamaat-ud-

Dawa, whose infrastructure remains intact inPakistan.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan, once described as the bear trapby Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin,10is the

most important component of IslamabadsIndia policy and a growing source of concern tothe international community. Once considereddefeated, Taliban insurgents and their AlQaeda allies have regained strength. They haveregrouped and reorganized and are now bettertrained and better equipped, conducting moresophisticated operations as well. The numberof military casualties in Afghanistan doubledbetween 2005 and 2006, a clear indication of

the resurgence of the Taliban.

Islamabad keeps pursuing its own objectivesat the expense of its troubled neighbor.Afghanistans domestic situation is partly,perhaps primarily, to blame for the Talibaninsurgency, but evidence points to activePakistani support for the Taliban:

The insurgency started in a corridor 35 miles

wide along the border between Afghanistanand Pakistan, spanning the provinces ofKonar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Zabol,Kandahar, and Helmand, before moving west.Most attacks are carried out in southernAfghanistan by Taliban coming from theQuetta district. The guerrillas could notoperate without the benefit of sanctuariesin Pakistan. Islamabad rightly argues that itcannot control the border. It has proposed

fencing the border, but this proposal is totallyimpractical, as the former director generalof Inter-Services Intelligence, LieutenantGeneral Asad Durrani, has acknowledged.11

Witnesses say that militants are brought from

the Quetta district to the Afghan border byPakistani military trucks. Senior lieutenantsto Mullah Omar are said to operate fromQuetta, from where they run military

operations in the south-central Afghanistanprovinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan,and Zabol.12Moreover Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,of the Hizbe Islami, is particularly active in


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the Konar, Nangarhar, Kapisa, Laghman, andNurestan provinces and recently declared hisallegiance to the Taliban before retracting hisstatement. He continues to visit Peshawarregularlyaccording to Robert Kaplan, hisheadquarters are located therein additionto the Bajaur Agency in the Federally

Administered Tribal Areas.13

Finally, Western troops operating in southern

Afghanistan are unequivocal about thefact that part of the Taliban movement isoperating from Pakistan; this has alwaysbeen denied by the Pakistani government.Colonel Chris Vernon14 of Great Britain,chief of staff for southern Afghanistan,publicly declared that the thinking piece

of the Taliban is out of Quetta,15which isdescribed as the major headquarters of themovement. Vernon confirmed not only anumber of previous Afghan statements butalso the statements of local witnesses, whodenounce army actions in their own districts,and of U.S. counterterrorism officials,who had previously declared that parts ofPakistan were a safe haven for terrorists.16The British government later said that

Vernons statement did not represent theofficial position of the British government,but that is not equivalent to saying thatit was inaccurate. The British government(and many others) suffer from the subtle,double game of Pakistanwhile Pakistanhelps Great Britain combat internationalterrorism, it also aids, passively at the veryleast, the Taliban in endangering troopsin Afghanistan.17 Vernons accusations,

however, are confirmed in private by otherInternational Security Assistance Force(ISAF) officers present in Afghanistan.

To be sure, the Pakistani military, when underpressure from the West, will cooperate to somedegree in constraining the Taliban. Two recentexamples are particularly telling:

On July 18, 2006, the press agency Reuters

reported that the British government hadbanned the Baloch Liberation Army, an armednationalist organization at war with thefederal government in Balochistan province,

and that scores of Taliban had beenarrested in a crackdown, including MullahHamdullah, a former commander of Talibanforces in the southern Afghan province ofHelmand, where British troops have metfierce resistance since their deployment.18These arrests confirmed the presence of parts

of Taliban leadership in Quetta, which hadbeen alleged for months by local observersand denied by the Pakistani government. TheReuters report indicated that the Pakistanigovernment was willing to be more activeagainst the Taliban if some of its demandswere met.

Similarly, in November 2006, a new series of

Taliban arrests took place immediately after

Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britainvisited Pakistan and pledged a doubling ofaid to Islamabad.19 In the following days,the Pakistani police arrested more thanforty Taliban in madrassas in Pashtoonabad,Satellite Town, Ghousabad, Chandi Chowk,and Kuchlak, all areas of Quetta.20

Even the arrest in Quetta of the former Talibandefense minister, Mullah Obaidullah Akhund,

following the visit of Vice President RichardB. Cheney, although significant because of hisbeing a top deputy of Mullah Omar,21can be seenas a sacrifice necessary to protect Pakistanslarger interests. Such arrests, meant to provethe goodwill of the Pakistani government, arepolitically and financially highly rewardingbut they do not significantly affect Talibanoperations in Afghanistan.

Federally Administered Tribal Areas

The conflict in Waziristan on the Afghanistanborder has been the scene of cooperation betweenthe United States and Pakistan. Waziristan, inthe Federally Administered Tribal Areas, reflectsboth the ambiguities of the Pakistani militarygovernment in the war on terror as well as theconsequences of the governments manipulationof the political process in the region and,

more generally, in the Federally AdministeredTribal Areas. Pakistans military government ismanipulating Waziristan to achieve its goals forthe management and the effectiveness of the


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fight against the Taliban, the perceptions ofthe residents of Waziristan of the governmentpolicy in the region, the perceptions of theUnited States, and ultimately, the perceptionsof the Pakistan Army as well.

The Pakistani military government has put forward

Waziristan, where some 80,000 Pakistani troopshave been mobilized, as proof that Islamabadis doing whatever it can to stop the Afghanfundamentalist insurgency from spilling overinto Pakistani territory. A close examinationof Waziristans recent history, however, offersa different picture of the problem and raises anumber of questions.

When the coalition forces moved into Afghanistan

in October 2001, the attack came from the Northof Afghanistan. The military rationale was tosandwich Al Qaeda and the Taliban, who camefrom the East and the South, to eliminate them.It was therefore imperative to close the bordersas much as possible. In Waziristan, however, theMiranshah and Mirali routes were left open. Evenif it had been impossible to seal every border,at least these two routes, well known for havingbeen intensively used by the mujahideen during

the jihad against the Soviets, should have beensealed. Keeping them open was a deliberateeffort by the Pakistan military establishment toaid the Taliban. The local Taliban welcomed bothTaliban and foreign fighters in Waziristan. Duringthis period only minor cadres of Al Qaeda werecaptured and delivered to the Americans.

This policy changed in 2002 when increasing U.S.pressure forced a reluctant Islamabad to send

regular army troops into South Waziristan to checkthe influx of Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants fleeingthe U.S.-led Operation Anaconda in southeasternAfghanistan. Local Taliban were surprised tobe asked by Pakistans intelligence agencies tosurrender foreign militants. They refused on thebasis of Pashtun hospitalitywhich, incidentally,has generated fortunes for some of the localTaliban leadersand Islamic solidarity. Militaryoperations in South Waziristan started in February

2004 when the U.S. military complained that theterritory was not just a hideout for Al Qaeda andTaliban fighters, but also a launching pad againstallied troops in Afghanistan.22

Even after December 2005, when the first signsof Taliban-like rule started to emerge, Pakistanimilitary and civilian authorities looked theother way and did nothing to stop the militants.According to the magazine Newsline,the [local]administration was under clear instructions notto impede the movements of the local Taliban

who remained unchecked and continued toconsolidate their position in the area.23

As a matter of fact, the proximity of militantshideouts and paramilitary forces check poststo the regular Pakistani troops and intelligenceofficials in Waziristan has led many observersto suspect that Pakistan authorities arecooperating with the Taliban.24 The Pakistanigovernment is not only turning a blind eye

to Taliban activities but also interveningto protect Taliban commanders who servePakistani objectives in Afghanistan. Accordingto Intikhab Amir, the current operation isonly directed against the Taliban foot soldiersof local origin, led by insignificant leaders,whereas places like Shawal from where topAfghan Taliban commanders such as JalaluddinHaqqani and Mullah Akhtar Mansoor are stillorganizing guerrilla raids against Afghanistan,

remain calm and quiet.25As a result, Talibanbased in Waziristan continues operations inKabul and the Afghan eastern regions of Khost,Logar, Paktia, and Paktika,26and also Helmand,Kandahar, and Oruzgan.

Some in the diplomatic community and inmilitary circles argue that counterinsurgencyis a complex military operation for whichthe Pakistani military is neither trained nor

equipped. They are undoubtedly right, but atthe same time the Pakistan Army has madeno effort to obtain the sort of equipment thatwould help it combat the Taliban effectively.Although Pakistan asks the United States andsome European countries to provide helicoptersand night vision equipment free of charge,the army keeps buying F-16s, submarines, andfrigates, which are of little help in the tribalareas.

Moreover, analysts tend to forget the politicaldimension of the issue. All madrassas trainingthe Taliban in the tribal areas are controlled


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by the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI/F), whoseleader, Fazlur Rehman, is a de facto memberof the ruling coalition in Islamabad. FazlurRehman limited himself to mild protests whenthe government took action against the Taliban,indicating that his opposition to governmentaction was largely formal while preserving

his political credit in his constituency. Buthis capacity to mobilize the local populationbehind the government to end the conflict hasapparently not been employed.

Implications for the United States

In Afghanistan, Pakistan is now in the uniqueposition of helping both belligerents. It doestrain, equip, and provide shelter to the Taliban

while providing logistics to NATO and ISAF atthe same time. Pakistan is in a position tostop NATO and ISAF fuel supplies that transitits territory. This gives it leverage over thealliance. At the same time, its support to theTaliban allows it to vary the intensity of theharassment against ISAF troops according tothe need of the moment.

Islamabads strategy of brinkmanship is not

without risks. A growing number of regionalpowersIran, Russia, and some Central Asianstatesare increasingly uneasy about the U.S.and NATO long-term presence in Afghanistan,for reasons that are only partly related toAfghanistan itself. Security officials in Kabul sayIran is building up its positions in the eventualityof a U.S. military intervention if Tehran doesnot end its military nuclear program.27Tehrancould ultimately join the Taliban in a loosely

coordinated front against NATO, which wouldthreaten NATO and potentially underminePakistans national interests.

From this perspective, the current situationin Afghanistan can be characterized as one ofcompeting ambivalences, where Iran, Russia,China, and the Central Asian republics wouldlike NATO to leave but fear a resurgence of theTaliban that would be likely to re-create a series

of domestic problems for each of them. Others,particularly Pakistan, can live with the Talibanbut have no interest in NATOs departure. Thecurrent equilibrium is therefore extremely

unstable. Should the overall situation furtherdegenerate, Afghanistan could once againbecome the location of a series of small proxywars, as it had been for years before the U.S.intervention in October 2001. The risk is realthat an Afghanistan totally or partly controlledby the Taliban could again become a sanctuary

for international terrorists.

For the United States, the problem goes beyondAfghanistans stability alone. Central Asia wasincluded in the portfolio of Assistant Secretaryof State Richard Boucher, with the idea ofworking toward the integration of Central Asiawith South Asia through energy corridors andtrade. A return of the Taliban would not onlyspoil the reconstruction effort of Afghanistan

and threaten U.S. and European lives but wouldalso put an end to any hope of integratingCentral Asia with South Asia, pushing it insteadinto closer relations with Russia. Islamabadsposition vis--vis Washington is furtherstrengthened by the Bush administrationstense relationship with Tehran and Uzbekistan.

If the United States were to normalizeits relations with Iran, that could create

a different situation. It might allow, forexample, ISAF supplies to transit through Iran.Competition between Tehran and Islamabadwould undoubtedly make Islamabad moresusceptible to U.S. pressure. But Washingtonand Tehran are unlikely to reconcile soon. Anattempt at normalization would conflict withother major U.S. interests (regardless of whichparty holds the majority in the United States)such as preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear

weapons or protecting Israel. There is also noguarantee that Iran would not reject proposalsfor rapprochement, especially because it is in aposition of relative regional strength thanks tothe U.S. failure in Iraq.

In the short term, Pakistan has been able totake advantage of the conflict in Afghanistanto maintain its leverage with the West. All ofthe outside forces, including NATO, are under

Pakistans sway. Pakistans alliance with theUnited States against Al Qaeda will bringtangible benefits in the form of weapon sales.On July 13, 2006, the Bush administration


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presented the U.S. Congress with its plan to sellPakistan F-16 fighters in a deal worth $5 billion.Moreover, several countries with an armamentindustry will use the U.S. decision as a pretextto resume arms sales to Pakistan. Pakistan willultimately obtain weapons and additional cloutin the region.

The situation in the region is noteworthy for twoadditional reasons. Because of the tremendousinternational pressure faced by the Islamistnetworks with since 9/11, they are increasinglyidentifying and working with each other. It isno longer possible to distinguish internationalgroups from regional ones. This developmentmeans that Pakistans strategy of supportingregional groups it considers useful while

cooperating in combating international groupsis no longer tenable.

Also, in their funding of Federally AdministeredTribal Areas, the United States and Britainhave promoted the idea that Pakistan can bebought off with development support. This is amistake. Development funding will bring UnitedStates and Britain no additional security. It willmake Pakistan dependent on Western largesse

as well as benefit Islamabads clients in theregionincluding the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam,numerically the most important Islamist party,and its network of madrassas.

The linkages established by Islamabad betweenits Afghan and Kashmir policies on the one sideand its cooperation in the war on terror on theother indicate that ultimately none of theseissues can be solved separately.


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Would the return of civilian power automatically

help foster U.S. interests in the region?According to many in Washington and elsewhere,the ultimate reason for the consistency of U.S.policy toward Pakistan is not Musharrafs visionor trustworthiness but the perceived lack ofalternatives. The dominant view is that the armyis the only effective institution in Pakistan.

Performance of Civilian Leadership inPakistan

An examination of the performance of recentcivilian governments, whether led by BenazirBhutto or Nawaz Sharif, provides no reason foroptimism. Neither prime minister performedvery well. Both left the country in worse shapethan they had found it. Neither initiatedthe structural reforms that would have beennecessary to make Pakistan a viable state atpeace with itself and its neighbors.

Although recent history is undoubtedly a goodindicator, past performance and behavioralpatterns are only one element of whether thereturn of civilians to power would prove morefavorable to the interests of Pakistan, theUnited States, and other countries. The futureis never the simple continuation of the past.The eventual return of civilians to power wouldtake place in a different environment and under

much tighter international scrutiny, and perhapsunder the threat of international sanctions,should a civilian government cross a number ofred lines.

The problem goes beyond the personality of theprime minister. Although personalities matter,democratic processes and structures at thegrassroots level are even more important, andtheir potential impact on U.S. interests and on

the regional stability of Pakistan is too oftenunderestimated.

Management of Foreign Policy

Assessing civilian management of Pakistansforeign policy is difficult because civiliansnever were solely responsible for foreign policy.When Benazir Bhutto became prime minister in1988, the military had already begun playingan active role in the foreign policy process. Yetdifferences existed between her and the military.The military elite advocated that Islamabadexplore the feasibility of confederation with

Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh.28The army had started to support vigorouslythe uprising in Kashmir, and it proposed thatPakistan challenge Indias role of regionalpoliceman. By contrast, Benazir Bhutto favoredthe development of an association of democraticnations and, in this spirit, had started reviewingrelations with India, making overtures that wereopposed by the military.

Clear divergences also existed over Afghanistan.Benazir Bhutto wanted to respect the April1988 Geneva Accords, in particular thebilateral agreement between Afghanistan andPakistan that included a clause signed by herpredecessor that related to noninterference andnonintervention, and she supported U.S. effortsto promote a political solution to Afghanistan-Pakistan issues. In line with the policies pursuedduring the jihad against the Soviet Union, the

military wanted to impose Gulbuddin Hekmatyaras the new head of the Afghan state. Themilitary ultimately prevailed, but by the timeBenazir Bhutto was removed in 1991, she hadbegun exercising some autonomy vis--vis themilitary and was improving relations with theUnited States.

During her second term, between 1993 and1996, Benazir Bhutto was more careful not to

antagonize the military. Her policies were toa large extent those of the military. She wasin no position to stop military support to themilitancy in Kashmir, but she spent a lot of

Civilian vs. Military Power and U.S. Regional Interests

Chapter4


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energy (and funds) trying unsuccessfully to gaininternational support for Pakistans positionon the Kashmir issue. Her government alsosupported the emergence and the rise of theTaliban in Afghanistan. In neither case was sheable to significantly influence or alter a policydecided in military headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Nawaz Sharifs record is perhaps more surprising.When he became prime minister, he took pridein identifying himself with Zia ul-Haq andcontinued to defend Zias policies.29 NawazSharif, however, supported the U.S. coalition-building effort in Iraq, against the wishes ofChief of Army Staff Aslam Beg. In regionalmatters, he was as powerless as Benazir Bhuttowhen she was prime minister. On Kashmir and

Afghanistan, he was, like his predecessor,obliged to execute decisions the military hadalready made.

In Nawaz Sharifs second term in office,divergences between him and the military grew,leading to the military coup dtat by PervezMusharraf. Being a businessman, Nawaz Sharifwas keenly aware of the potential economicbenefits of rapprochement with India. The

nuclear tests conducted in 1998 by bothIndia and Pakistan had made a rapprochementpossible by establishing a sort of psychologicaland (largely) symbolic parity between them.The process led to the Lahore declarationsigned by Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee andPrime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Lahore inFebruary 1999. It included a clause in which thetwo countries reaffirmed their condemnation ofterrorism in all its forms and manifestations and

their determination to combat this menace.

The Kargil war, which started in May 1999, soonderailed the process. Pakistani intrudersmujahideen backed by the Pakistan Armyhad infiltrated across the LOC and entrenchedthemselves on several hilltops in the Kargilsector, threatening Indias strategic highway toLadakh and access to Siachen. Two months later,India regained control of the situation, but the

dynamic engendered by the Lahore declarationwas dead.

A controversy erupted very quickly regardingwho was responsible for the Kargil operation. Thecivilian leadership believed it was a completefiasco, but Pervez Musharraf has presented it inhis recent memoirs as a military achievement.30There is no doubt, however, that the military wasprimarily responsible for initiating an operation

that Nawaz Sharif probably authorized underextreme pressure.

Overall, civilian leaders of Pakistan have in thepast conducted foreign policies more compatiblewith Western ones and more conducive toregional stability even though they had to actwithin a framework defined by the military.Although not an absolute indicator, this meansthat the objectives of a civilian foreign policy

would more likely be compatible or at leastmore sensitive to Western objectives. Hence,there is a good argument for enhancing thepreeminence of civilians in the foreign policydecision-making process.

Leadership and the Sectarian Issue

The difference between civilian and militaryleadership is not as clear on other terrorism-

related issues such as sectarianism. TheZia ul-Haq regime systematically promotedsectarianism in order to counter what it sawas a growing Iranian influence in the country.Unfortunately, subsequent regimes did notdo any better. Political parties have routinelycompromised with sectarian groups and havecynically used sectarian conflicts for short-termpolitical gains. Both the SSP and the Tehriq-e-Fiqh-e-Jafferia Pakistan (TJP) were allowed to

engage in electoral politics. Both entered intoalliances with mainstream parties, the PPP orthe PML.

Even Benazir Bhutto, whose party and familysuffered the most from the policies of Zia ul-Haq, turned a blind eye to sectarian extremism.She formed a parliamentary alliance with theFazlur Rehman faction of the JUI and providedthe SSP an opportunity to pursue its sectarian

activities. On January 22, 1995, Interior MinisterNaseerullah Babar announced that the federalgovernment intended to ban direct fundingof all madrassas as well as track down those


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institutions that were fanning sectarianism.He also promised that an antisectarian bill tofacilitate the governments effort would bepassed in the National Assembly.31 The bill,unfortunately, was not even submitted to theassembly.

In 1995, an eminent SSP leader, Sheikh HakimAli, even became minister of fisheries in thePunjab government because the PPP neededthe SSPs support in order to gain a majorityin the province.32 In 1996, Sheikh Hakim Aliwas indicted in eight cases of murder.33He wasnever tried.

Azam Tariq, an SSP leader and member of theNational Assembly who was assassinated in

2004, also enjoyed complete immunity fromlaw enforcement agencies during the entireBhutto tenure despite his active role in anti-Shiite violence. He was valued because he wasan archenemy of Syeda Abida Hussain, a veteranShiite leader from Jhang who was at politicalodds with Benazir Bhutto.34

Nawaz Sharif was the only prime minister whotried to address the issue seriously. In 1997, an

antiterrorism act was adopted by the Parliament,reinforcing the punishment for sectarianterrorism and directing the army and police tocombat it. About 1,500 sectarian activists werearrested between February and May 1997. NawazSharif also closed a Shiite seminary for sectarianactivities and arrested even more activists afterthe resumption of sectarian violence in January1998.35The comfortable majority he enjoyed inParliament made Nawaz Sharif less susceptible

than Benazir Bhutto (who was overreliant onthe JUI36) to sectarian pressure. However, onJanuary 3, 1999, Nawaz Sharif narrowly escapedan assassination attempt by sectarian terrorists.The law was subsequently strengthened by theantiterrorism ordinance of July 1999.

Even though civilian governments did notnecessarily approve of sectarian violence,they were not prepared to actively disband

groups, or perhaps they were simply too weak.Instead, they adopted halfhearted measures,encouraging dialogue between the differentgroups and eventually giving police protection

to threatened religious congregations,37 butthey essentially turned a blind eye to sectarianactivities.

Civilians were therefore not totally innocent butnot directly responsible for the process that after9/11 led to a dangerous rapprochement between

sectarian movements such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and internationalist organizationssuch as Al Qaeda. However, it is also clear thatcivilians inability or occasional unwillingnessto combat sectarianism was due to their ownweakness. The effectiveness of the struggleagainst sectarianism is therefore closely linkedto the process of democratic consolidation thatincludes the ability of the civilian governmentto control the forces (army, paramilitary, police,

and judicial system) that have the capacity toconfront sectarian terrorist activities.

Cost of Perpetuating Military Power

The flaws of civilian power are not likely to becorrected by military rule. On the contrary, theflaws will be reinforced. Army rule in Pakistanis not simply an unfortunate, yet necessary,transition toward a true democracy. Behind

a faade of democratization and the alibi ofdevelopment, no previous leader has done asmuch damage to the social and political fabricof Pakistan as the current military leadership.Far from contributing to improving the stabilityof the country, the military leaders policieshave wittingly and unwittingly reinforced thecountrys vulnerabilities and will continue todo so as the behavior of the regime becomesincreasingly erratic as it grows more alienated

from the population.

Two issues in particular need to be examined:the deliberate and systematic weakening ofPakistans political system and the concurrentweakening of the provinces at the expense ofthe center.

Weakening the Political System

Military leaders have attempted to weakenthe political system and the political partiesalthough they have always avoided destroyingthe parties because they wanted to be able


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to play them against each other and presentthemselves as the ultimate arbiters. But PervezMusharraf was faced with a special problem.Unlike Zia ul-Haqs coup dtat, Musharrafscoup took place after the Cold War, whichmeant Musharraf has had to maintain at least afaade of democracy. Moreover, a Supreme Court

verdict of May 2, 2002, required that electionsbe held to facilitate the transition from militaryto civilian rule.

No more than his predecessors, however, wasMusharraf willing to transfer real power tocivilians. In fact, he has presided over tacticaland more important structural changes that haveaffected the nature of the relationship betweenParliament and the executive in Pakistan.

The first significant tactical move was themanipulation of the 2002 provincial andnational elections in order to promote theMMA. According to the European Union ElectionObservation Mission, all opposition partiesexpressed concern that the Pakistan ElectionCommission was diluting strongholds of partiesthat opposed the regime while favoring partiesthat supported it.38Serious concerns were also

raised regarding which voters were registered.39The Election Observation Mission noted: Theelectoral process was marked by the introductionof a new set of qualification criteria for thenomination of candidates, some of which [were]not in accordance with international standardsor [were] clearly targeting specific prominentpoliticians.40For example, university bachelorsdegrees were required of candidates butmadrassa diplomas were considered equivalent.

This measure significantly benefited theMMA, particularly in Balochistan, where someprominent nationalist leaders without universitydegrees were prevented from running in theelection even though several had previouslyexercised the functions of governor, or chiefminister, or both, of the province. Rallies andthe use of loudspeakers were forbidden duringthe entire campaign. The length of the campaignwas reduced to a minimum.

In addition, these restrictions were appliedselectively. The PML-N and the PPP, for example,were denied permission to organize rallies, but

the MMA was allowed to do so. Moreover, becausethe MMA campaigned essentially in madrassasand mosques as part of religious observances, itwas relatively unaffected by the ban on ralliesdecreed by the military government.41

As a result, the MMA, a coalition of six Islamist

parties, was able to form or be part of thegovernments in the two Pakistani provincesadjacent to Afghanistanthe NWFP andBalochistan. The MMA obtained 11.1 percent ofthe votes at the national level, which allowedMusharraf to raise the specter of the Islamistthreat whenever he felt too pressured by theUnited States. Domestically, Musharraf was in aposition to forge an alliance with any of the twomainstream parties whenever he felt the need

to. His relationship with the MMA, in particularwith one of its members, the Jamaat-i-Islami,was always smooth, and he managed to use theIslamist alliance to obtain the constitutionalamendments he needed from the Parliament tochange the system itself.

The second tactical move took place in 20052006, when the local elections were riggedto ensure the success of the Pakistan Muslim

League (Quaid-i-Azam) (PML-Q), the maincivilian support for Musharraf. That was alsointended to ensure his success in the upcoming20072008 elections. As the local bodies are incharge of the logistics of the elections on theground, the machinery is now in place to ensurethe success of whatever party or combination ofparties the executive thinks will best serve hisinterests.

The main strategic move came in the form ofconstitutional amendments introduced by theLegal Framework Ordinance, thanks to thesupport of the MMA. The new constitutionalamendments give the president the power todissolve Parliament and sack the prime ministerand provincial chief ministers, effectivelytransforming Pakistans political system froma parliamentarian to a presidential one andreinforcing the power of the center at the

expense of the provinces.

The deepest and probably most destructivestructural change introduced by Pervez Musharraf


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was the devolution program. As demonstratedby the International Crisis Group, the politicaldevolution program, initiated in 2000, farfrom enhancing democracy, has strengthenedmilitary rule and actually [raised] the risks ofinternal conflict.42

Although widely supported by the internationalcommunity, the devolution program has servedessentially two purposes:

Bypassing the provincial governments, and

therefore the political parties, to createa local clientele created by and entirelydevoted to the central government; in thatsense, devolution does contribute to theweakening of the political system; and

Reinforcing centralized control over the

lower levels of government; by creatinga compliant local political elite, owingits position and privileges to the regimeand exercising only nominal powers, thedevolution helps the military to dominatelocal politics.

Devolution initially consisted of reestablishing

elected councils at the district and subdistrictlevels, each elected council being run by anelected nazim(mayor) and naib nazim(deputymayor) with executive powers and responsibilityfor law and order.43 To help them fulfill theirresponsibilities, they were supposed to getsufficient allocations to match federal andprovincial grants.

As a result, because they owed their positions

entirely to the federal govepnment, not onlydid the new local bodies exercise only nominalauthority within their own districts but theyalso helped manipulate elections for the benefitof the federal government at the expense of thepolitical parties, which were formally bannedfrom the elections. The allocation of fundsguaranteed that loyalties went to the military.

Devolution provided few of the benefits it

was supposed to deliver to the population:The absence of checks and balances betweenand across the various levels of districtgovernment led to the virtual disappearance

of all accountability on the part of the nazims,thus encouraging corruption. A shortage offunds and difficulties in raising additional fundslocally impeded developments projects.

More important, however, the new systemcreated tensions between local and provincial

governments. Most politicians, including thosein the ruling PML-Q, saw devolution as a furtherblow to provincial autonomy. The supposeddepoliticization of governance led to thereinforcement of loyalties at the subnationaland subprovincial levels, exacerbating socialand political divisions within society. Combinedwith the exclusion of local leaders fromparticipating in elections, it fueled provincialresentment against the center.

The Provincial Issue

The provincial issue did not start with thepresent regime. The most deadly internal conflictin Pakistan, the secession of East Pakistan,was the result of ill-conceived policies by themilitary regimes of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan.Civilians have also been responsible for civilwars. The Balochistan war of 19731977 arose

from a series of nondemocratic decisions takenby an elected, civilian prime minister, ZulfikarAli Bhutto.

The army has never recognized ethnic identitiesand has always promoted a united Pakistan.Refusing to recognize ethnic identities as theelements of national identity is, however, notnecessarily contrary to democracy. The Frenchpolitical philosopher Raymond Aron gave a very

simple, yet very inclusive, definition of a nationas a community of culture united in a commonpolitical will.44

A transcendent bond between the people of anygiven nation does not require the eliminationof all ethnic identities. It does require someform of popular consensus. In other words,the absence of democracy is the core of theprovincial issue today in Pakistan. Despite many

crises, Pakistan has managed over the years topromote a slow, yet real, integration processbecause previous military regimes had partlycompensated for the absence of democracy


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by the co-optation of traditional leaders, thusallowing a form of representation. This processhas been endangered and perhaps even reversedby Pakistans current military regime.

The crisis that erupted in Balochistan during thesummer of 2005 reflected the deep alienation

of an entire province, which resulted from asense of dispossession. Thirty years after thepromises of development by former dictator Ziaul-Haq, the people of Balochistan enjoy neitherthe benefits of development nor the politic

Documents

Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States and Europe