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Case analysis of the emergency response to the U.S. embassy bombing in Nairobi, Kenya.
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Case Analysis
Response to the U.S. EmbassyBombing in Nairobi, Kenya on
August 7, 1998
Roberta McMichaelOctober 25, 2007
On the morning of August 7, 1998, a truck carrying two passengers pulled up to
the exit of the underground garage of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Two unarmed
local security guards were manning the gate, located at the rear entrance of the U.S.
embassy. A white truck carrying two occupants pulled up to the exit of the underground
garage. One of the occupants demanded entry, and the security guards refused. One
occupant began shooting at the security guards, while the other tossed a homemade flash
grenade in their direction. The security guards ran for cover, and attempted to contact the
Marine Security Guards (MSGs) by both hand-held radio and telephone. The only radio
frequency available to them already had traffic on it, and the phone line was busy.
Employees in the embassy and surrounding buildings were drawn to the sound of gunfire
and the subsequent grenade explosion. They crowded to windows to see what was
happening below.
At approximately 10:45 a.m., the truck bomb was detonated. The Ufundi
Cooperative, a 5-story building directly behind the embassy, collapsed completely onto
itself and into the rear of the U.S. embassy, trapping many beneath the debris. The
embassy itself was destroyed internally, especially on the rear side facing the Ufundi
building and parking lot. The remainder of the casualties and injuries were incurred by
pedestrians on the busy streets adjacent to the embassy. In total, 213 people were killed,
including 12 Americans and 32 Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) employed at the
embassy. 4,000 people were injured. Another truck bomb was detonated in Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania nearly simultaneously, resulting in another 11 deaths and injuring 86
others.
The response to this terrorist attack was unprepared and disorganized. The
location of the embassy and the condition of its security made it a prime target for
terrorists. The lack of disaster planning or emergency management training at the local
level caused a scene which was unnecessarily chaotic. Logistics and transportation
problems plagued response teams from the United States and military response from
Europe. This paper attempts to understand the source of the problems leading up to,
during, and after the terrorist attack.
Problem Analysis
Most of the mistakes made in emergency response come from the fact that man-
made disasters, such as terrorist attacks, come as a surprise. We can see the path a
hurricane takes, and can recommend evacuations and make some preparations for
landfall. A terrorist attack is more like an earthquake. From terrorist threats and activity
you may know you are sitting on a fault line, but have no idea if and when the earthquake
will hit. Still, preparation and planning make all the difference.
Security
Security guards at the embassy were unarmed and untrained. Their employer was
United International Investigative Services (UIIS), a private firm contracted to
supplement the Marine Security Guards at the embassy. UIIS had fallen behind on their
contractual obligations to provide security training of certain quality and frequency. The
guards had no training in detection of vehicular bombs (Champagne et al). There were
no procedures in place about what would cause the guards to trigger an alarm if a
suspicious vehicle attempted to enter the parking lot. The guards did not train with the
Marines, nor did they participate in embassy emergency drills (Accountability Review
Board).
The two security guards correctly denied entry to the underground parking lot, an
act that saved the lives of many of those inside the embassy. When threatened with
gunfire, the two security guards ran for cover and attempted to alert the MSG about the
situation. But they had no panic or duress alarms they could trigger, unlike their
counterparts that guarded the embassy residences (Accountability Review Board). They
tried to contact their Marine counterparts by radio and telephone. The only frequency
that was available to the guards had other traffic on it. Though the embassy had requested
another radio frequency from the Kenyan government, their requests had been repeatedly
denied. The phone lines were busy. Despite their efforts, the security guards were unable
to warn others before the truck bomb was detonated.
Even if they had been able to sound an alarm, the Emergency Action Plan (EAP),
sanctioned by the State Department, had no procedures in place for gunfire or vehicular
bombs. The employees were not trained to lie down or take cover when they heard the
gunshots or grenade blasts (Accountability Review Board). Instead, human curiosity
made them crowd to the windows. The EAP had no practice scenario for a large-scale
event of any kind, especially one that would require emergency response or search and
rescue (Champagne et al).
In the case of the U.S. embassy bombing in Kenya serious flaws in location and
security had already been pointed out by Ambassador Prudence Bushnell. In 1985, after
the Marine barracks attack in Lebanon, the U.S. State Department created a commission
to investigate the security of U.S. embassies and other diplomatic buildings around the
world. Their recommendations were coined the Inman standards after commission chair
Admiral Bobby R. Inman. These standards included replacing or renovating 126 of the
262 United States’ embassies abroad, along with 210 structures owned by other agencies.
(McCutcheon). The commission proposed a minimum 100 foot setback from public
streets specifically to minimize collateral damage from a bomb blast, and mitigate the
threat of a car bomb parked next to the government building (Champagne et al).
In a cable communication in December 1997, Ambassador Bushnell reviewed the
recent threats made against the chancery1. She called attention to the lack of sufficient
setback – the embassy sat only 30 feet from the street (Risen) -- and requested funds for a
new chancery that met the Inman standards. The State Department responded that the
embassy met security standards for its medium-threat location in Nairobi. When
USCENTCOM commander General Zinni visited the embassy in early 1998, he noted the
lack of security, calling it “an easy and tempting target for terrorists,” and made an offer
to the State Department to send his own team to assess the security of the embassy and
make recommendations (Champagne et al). The State Department declined the offer, but
sent a security assessment team the following March to evaluate any need for upgrades to
the existing structure. The security team did approve several security upgrades, but they
focused on protection from political or criminal violence, not a terrorist attack directed at
the building itself (Accountability Review Board).
In April 1998, Ambassador Bushnell again requested a new chancery from the
State Department. In June 1998, they responded that there was no need for a new
1 The term "embassy" is often used to refer to the building or compound housing an ambassador's offices and staff. Technically, "embassy" refers to the diplomatic delegation itself, while the office building in which they work is known as a chancery, but this distinction is rarely used in practice. Ambassadors reside in ambassadorial residences, which enjoy the same rights as missions. <http://www.reference.com/search?q=embassy>
chancery, but approved a plan to extend the existing chancery’s useful life and provide
new windows (Accountability Review Board).
The U.S. embassy in Kenya was located near one of the busiest intersections in
the city, at the corner of Moi and Haile Selassie Avenues in downtown Nairobi. At the
front entrance of the building was Moi Avenue (Figure 1). To the rear, the embassy
shared a parking lot with the Cooperative Bank House, and between them was the Ufundi
Cooperative Building. The location made it particularly susceptible to a vehicular bomb
(Vick). The bomb blast collapsed the Ufundi Cooperative Building, which contained a
secretarial school, trapping many people inside. The collapsed building partially fell onto
the embassy building, destroying the rear face. Debris reached 4 feet deep inside the
chancery. The detonation caused windows to blow out up to one and half miles away
(Vick).
Figure 1. (Source: Washington Post, 1998 www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/eafricabombing/maps/nairobimap.htm)
Figure 2. A Toyota Dyna, like the one used in the attack.
Initial Response
As happens in most disasters, the first responders were civilian bystanders.
Volunteers and good Samaritans swarmed over the piles of rubble, in an attempt to save
and direct help to those buried beneath (Vick). They were also putting themselves in
danger. Traffic surged towards the embassy, as thousands of people tried to find the
source of the blast (Clack et al). There was concern over another possible attack in the
area. All of this interfered with rescue efforts.
Control of the area took several hours, and rescue efforts were chaotic throughout
the first day (MacIntyre et al). The Kenyan riot police established a several block
perimeter around the embassy and Cooperative Bank. They allowed some members of
the media to pass through, giving them full access to the disaster site. They were seen
climbing on the collapsed Ufundi building (Macintyre et al). The MSGs and security
established a tighter perimeter, closer to the embassy. The British Embassy in Nairobi
sent troops over to help secure the perimeter until more U.S. security could arrive and
they also sent engineers to aid in recovery efforts.
Local emergency agencies were quickly overwhelmed. Fire and rescue resources
were already very limited, and they were not trained for emergency disaster response.
All local medical facilities filled up rapidly as patients were carried in by the general
public. Ambulance services in Nairobi operate on a prepaid system, and most cannot
afford it (MacIntyre et al). Buses, taxes, and bicycles were used to get the injured to
hospitals. Americans were transported to at least six different locations in the city, and it
took three days to find them all (Geiling).
Washington’s Response
The State Department was alerted immediately following the terrorist attack. The
staff began notifying officials in the White House, Pentagon, and intelligence and law
enforcement communities. A cable alert was sent to all U.S. embassies to place them on
heightened alert. The State Department Operations Center joined with the Bureau of
African Affairs to form the East Africa Task Force. The task force made arrangements
for medical, security, and transportation support. This task force would operate 24 hours
a day, on 8 hour shifts. They were the liaison between the State department and
personnel in Kenya. They were the only form of centralized control of the situation, but
they were thousands of miles away.
The East Africa Task Force was part of a rehearsed and organized crisis response
team. It was headed by the Bureau of East African Affairs, but contained members from
different government agencies. The Bureaus of Consular Affairs, Diplomatic Security,
Political and Military Affairs, and Public Affairs, the Office of the Medical Director, the
Secretary’s Office of Counter Terrorism, and the Family Liaison Office all had
representatives on the task force. The FBI, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the USAID
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance were also represented (Miles).
The task force deployed medical supplies and support to the region within hours.
They coordinated the efforts of U.S. government agency medical professionals in the
area. They also requested military medical assistance from the DoD.
The Office of Family Liaison handled desperate phone calls from embassy family
members looking for loved ones. When family members arrived in Washington, D.C.,
Family Liaison representatives met them at the airports and helped them with
accommodations.
Funerals and ceremonies were coordinated by the Bureau of Western Hemispheric
Affairs. They were responsible for the arrival ceremonies at Andrews Air Force Base.
Those that passed away in the attack were laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery.
They also made provisions for family members to visit the injured in Washington
hospitals, or for them to attend services for those buried at Arlington (Miles).
The Bureau of Public Affairs handled the media attention. Members collected
details on the bombings for the State Department spokesperson to use at press briefings
(Miles). On the ground in Kenya, the embassy public affairs office was quickly
inundated with requests for information. When they focused on international press
queries, they ignored the local press. The local press quickly turned on them, focusing
the brunt of their anger on the embassy and the United States, insinuating that the U.S.
was concerned only with its own people. The State Department’s public affairs office
cleared in advance what the Ambassador could and could not say. This “limited her
ability to counter the firestorm of criticism in the local media” (Accountability Review
Board).
Search and Rescue
The first response team to arrive was the 170-person Israeli Special Response
Team from Tel Aviv, which arrived 22 hours after the blast. They were a highly skilled
search and rescue operation that had offered their services to the Department of Defense
(DoD). The DoD readily accepted their offer (Fullerton). They brought hydraulic
equipment, sensitive listening devices, stretchers, and dogs trained to find corpses (Vick).
They were the first trained rescue personnel on the scene.
The U.S. response was much slower, in part due to the relative location of Nairobi
to U.S. resources. Ambassador Bushnell and her staff moved operations to the nearby
USAID mission offices in Nairobi. The East Africa task force that was established
earlier in the day was able to determine the extent of the injuries and begin the logistical
operation of getting resources to Nairobi. Overall confusion occurred because of a shift
change within the task force in Washington, and field requests for resources from Nairobi
were needlessly duplicated (Accountability Review Board).
The Foreign Emergency Service Team (FEST) departed from Fairfax, Virginia
within 6 hours of its alert time. But the plane experienced mechanical difficulties in
Spain which delayed the FEST an additional 16 hours. By the time they landed in
Nairobi, it was 41 hours after the initial blast. While they were able to assist with rescue
operations, communications, and restoration of embassy functions, they also found they
could not find necessary resources in large quantities in Kenya. And while the FEST was
familiar with terrorist activities such as hostage taking, the “regular personnel package
was not quite accustomed to the situation in Nairobi” (Accountability Review Board).
Because international search and rescue groups had already taken over the
operations on the collapsed Ufundi building, they confined their operations to the
chancery building. On the following day, the decision to keep operations separate was
reversed, and the FEST was permitted to assist the Ufundi building search and rescue
teams.
The FEST was also unable to respond to the bombing in Dar es Salaam for
another 24 hours, since two separate attacks had not been anticipated (Champagne et al).
Additional support personnel were sent from Washington, but their plane also had
mechanical difficulties in Sicily. It was delayed an additional 8 hours. Another aircraft
delay was experienced by a group of 50 Marines deployed from Bahrain to provide
supplemental security.
Medical Response
The embassy staff included one medical officer and one nurse, who were
incredibly spared from any injuries during the bomb blast, although they were less than
30 yards away. The medical officer, Dr. Gretchen McCoy, was able to assume the role of
lead medical advisor and report assessments and needs back to the State Department
(Geiling). She coordinated with Dr. Cedric Dumont, the State Department’s medical
director, through an open telephone connection set up by the East Africa Task Force. A
U.S. Army physician and two Medical Service Corps officers arrived from the US Army
Medical Research Unit Kenya, which was only 3 miles away. Dr. McCoy was able to set
up several medical triage stations.
The State Department sent a medical response team comprised of medical
personnel from surrounding embassies. Upon arrival, they completed an evaluation of
medical facilities and resources in the area. They found a lack of coordinated emergency
medical response. Some of the agencies they found were St. Johns Ambulance Service, a
private service that only had first aid capabilities. The Kenyan Red Cross could
transport victims, but they had no vehicles with medical capabilities. The Israeli search
and rescue team included some medical personnel, but their capabilities and supplies
were not known to the U.S. response team (Macintyre et al).
When they attempted to assess the resources of local hospitals, they were unable
to gain entry due to the large crowds formed outside. When they were able to establish
telephone contact, they found the hospitals filled to capacity with critically injured
patients (Macintyre et al). They would have to find alternate means of providing injury
care, and medical evacuation seemed to be the only viable option. Private air ambulances
were considered, but the quickest one would still take hours.
The medical team coordinated with the US military to establish military
transportation for medical needs (Geiling). The U.S. Air Force sent medevac aircraft
which arrived in Nairobi on August 8 from Ramstein Air Base, Germany. The
Accountability Review Board also found that medical supplies, already palletized and
positioned, had not been loaded onto this aircraft due to load capacity restrictions on the
C-9 Nightingale. Miscommunication on the ground meant that they did not immediately
return to Ramstein with the most seriously wounded Americans. Only one flight crew
deployed, and they needed crew rest before being able to take off again.
The DoD flew 17 missions, moving 418 people and 140 short tons of equipment,
from Washington, the Middle East, and Europe (Fullerton). But with confusion about
requests from the field, not all of those supplies were needed, and may have hindered
operations on the ground. For instance, the DoD shipped 200 units of blood without
demonstrated need. The influx of blood units burdened medical personnel, who now had
to distribute the blood to local medical facilities (Geiling).
Recommendations
Security
First, the security guards should be trained according to their contractual
agreements. Until the bombings, the security guards and MSGs had not been trained in
vehicle bomb detection, or what to do if they found a vehicle bomb. Vehicle bombs had
been used before, and there was no reason to think one could not be used. The
Ambassador herself had raised concerns about the use of a car bomb, and so requested a
new chancery in line with the Inman standards. Her requests were ignored, and one State
Department staffer admitted she was viewed as “…a nuisance who was overly obsessed
with security” (Champagne et al).
The U.S. embassy should secure use of an additional radio frequency for
emergency use only. Security guards should also have use of a panic or duress alarm.
Perimeter security was an issue in the immediate aftermath of the explosion.
While the general public did make valiant efforts to save those in the collapsed building,
the chaos also kept response agencies at bay. A secure perimeter, allowing only those
involved in emergency response through, could have alleviated a lot of the initial
confusion. It would also allow responders to work while minimizing the threat of another
attack.
Preparation & Training
The EAP for the embassy should be reviewed and modified. Specifically, it
should include procedures for small arms fire or vehicle bomb detonation. Had those
inside the embassy known to lie on the floor and stay away from windows, lives could
have been saved and injuries minimized. The embassy had prepared for criminal acts and
political violence, but the stakes have been raised significantly in the past 20 years. Car
bombs and suicide bombs are choice methods used by terrorists today.
The EAP should emphasize common problems and solutions. Evacuation routes,
search and rescue, communication outages, casualty tracking, dealing with the media, and
dealing with volunteers should all be a part of a standard EAP, since all of these could be
in response to a number of emergency situations.
Public affairs personnel should also be deployed when a disaster of this nature
occurs. The lack of a sufficient number of public affairs officers in Nairobi allowed those
in place to focus on only international inquiries. Had they not been overwhelmed, they
would have been able to respond to local journalists as well. This would have placated
the journalists, and they may not have been so aggressive in breaking through the
perimeters, or writing negative articles about the embassy or the United States.
Medical
A local emergency medical management system should be established.
Communication between response agencies is essential. In Nairobi, there was confusion
about the location of patients, the capacity and resources of hospitals, and finding proper
medical staff. The system should also include the training of likely first-responders, such
as police, doctors, and firefighters, but should also include local bus and taxi drivers.
An emergency civilian medical team could be trained to manage a disaster until
more support arrived, military or civilian. The International Medical Surgical Response
Teams (IMSuRTs) were formed after the Kenya and Tanzania embassy bombings,
specifically to augment military medical assets (Rollins). They are a cooperative effort
between the Department of State and the National Disaster Medical System, and deploy
up to 10% of their volunteer members to any given disaster. They include doctors,
nurses, EMT/Firefighters, paramedics, and other medical personnel. A system like this
would have greatly helped on the ground in Nairobi.
There should be an evacuation plan in place for when medical facilities are
overwhelmed or operating at maximum capacity. Those requiring evacuation should be
held at a central location. Medevac personnel should deploy with more than one crew, to
stop delays due to crew rest. Again, there is room to use commercial aircraft when
necessary.
The military response came primarily from U.S. military bases in Europe,
although Nairobi falls under USCENTCOM’s geographical coverage area.
Finally, there should be plans in place for logistical problems. Several planes
were grounded for hours due to mechanical issues. Could the State Department (or
Department of Defense) secure a commercial aircraft to complete emergency missions?
Conclusion
Since the bombings, there have been marked improvements in the response
planning. The IMSuRTs have been established. FESTs no longer deploy on a single
team with no medical personnel. They are deployed on two separate teams, about 10
hours apart, and include personnel trained to make an evaluation of the medical
requirements and conditions. The State Department has reviewed the option of using
commercial airplanes when necessary for more reliable transportation. The U.S. embassy
in Nairobi has been moved to a location outside Nairobi, and meets all Inman standards.
“Sudden impact disasters,” like terrorist attacks, often occur without warning, but
their effects are predictable. They typically overwhelm local resources, whether in the
United States (Oklahoma City bombing) or abroad. They possess certain characteristics
that are predictable by analysis of past events (Geiling).
The sources of the mistakes made in the response to the Nairobi embassy
bombing are rooted in lack of planning and preparation. While everyone involved made
heroic efforts with what they had, a bit of training and preparation would have mitigated
the effects. There will always be room for improvement in disaster response.
Bibliography
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Fullerton, Robert. (1998). Criticism of Marines Actions in Kenya Bombing Said Unfortunate. Retrieved October 9, 2007, from USIS Washington File. http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1998/08/98081303_apo.html
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