Response Thiselton Post Modernity 1999

8/6/2019 Response Thiselton Post Modernity 1999

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POSTMODERNITY AND THE CRISIS OF TRUTH

A Response to Anthony Thiselton at Singapore Conference 1999

Ng Kam Weng

POSTMODERNITY ON LOCAL TERMS

Anthony Thiseltons paper has an obvious polemical thrust. As such, it is easier to determine

what Thiselton rejects rather than what he affirms concerning the matters of theory of truth. He

mounts a strong critique of the pragmatic version of Postmodernity exemplified by Richard

Rorty. In this regard, I share much in common with Thiselton. As such, it would be more useful

for me to attempt a critical appropriation rather than a critique of his paper. By critical

appropriation I mean the need to identify and analyze the dynamics of Postmodernity. By

appropriation I mean my intention to relocate the discussion of Thiseltons paper from an

evidently Western context to an Asian one.

Thiselton links Postmodernity to the crisis of truth. To this one would naturally ask Why a

crisis of truth? What are the contours of the contemporary crisis of truth? One cannot help but

be struck by the proliferation of theories spinning across the various disciplines of Western

academia. Such proliferation is accompanied by intense disputes with no obvious winner.

There is no evidence that the competing theories will be subsumed under an overarching,

unifying framework. The resulting fragmentation of knowledge leads to doubts about the

viability of the academic enterprise in securing certain or indubitable knowledge. Hence the

advent of Postmodernity described by Lyotard as incredulity toward metanarratives or

distrust of grand theory.

Does this Postmodernity represent the latest phase in the development of Western society?

Thiselton notes a caution from Richard Roberts and Thomas Docherty that it simply runs

counter to any analysis of our social and cultural situation to conceive of the pre-modern,

modern and post-modern as three neatly sequential stages of development rather than three

source of conflicting cross-currents which seek to draw us in different directions

simultaneously through choppy waters (p.5). Those of us in Asia should be able to confirm

that this is precisely our Asian experience. Indeed, we sometimes wonder if there is a need to


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rush into the latest academic fashion of theorizing on Postmodernity when our societies are still

in the high noon of Modernity.

I am grateful then for Toulmins argument that current Postmodernity be viewed as an

opportunity to synthesize two divergent streams of Western thought. Toulmin argued that the

ideal of knowledge of Cartesian Enlightenment which favours universal abstract knowledge

needs to be enriched by the humanism of the Renaissance with its epistemological modesty

and cultural and intellectual experimentation. So called current Postmodernity can be viewed

as providing new opportunities to integrate these two streams and is more appropriately viewed

as the third phase of European Modernity.

Undoubtedly the term distrusts grand theory emphasizes the epistemological dimension of

current debates on Postmodernity. Nevertheless, sociologists like James Hunter and Peter

Berger have alerted us to the fact that the fundamental forces propelling Modernity are not

philosophical forces so much as social forces.

Postmodernity does not imply the end of Modernity. The enduring quality of Modernity lies in

two mutually reinforcing components, that is, a moral understanding (e.g. the value of reason,

the supreme importance of individuality, the value of tolerance and relativism) and social

/institutional life. James Hunter elaborates how these key values and ideas are carried by

powerful social carriers such as industrial capitalism, the modern state and the knowledge

sector (found in the modern university, the mass media and popular culture).

Our critique of modernity and post-modernity therefore needs to go beyond analysis of the

history of ideas. We need to identify how conditions in modern society impact our lives, in

areas of beliefs and practices and formation of social identity. Anthony Giddens provides vital

help here. First, Giddens describes how Modernity has the capacity to disembed and

rearticulate social relations across indefinite tracts of time-space. This is achieved through

disembedding mechanisms such as symbolic tokens (e.g. money) and expert systems. As

such, personal identity is no longer restricted to local spatial and time markers or local

community relations, but may be reembedded/reconfigured across space-time [MSI 18]. The

current explosion of Internet chat groups which encourage participants to adopt unlimited

forms of virtual identity provides a startling preview of the plasticity of identity in todays

Network society.


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Second, Giddens highlights the remarkable modern achievement of institutional reflexivity,

that is, the regularized use of knowledge about circumstances of social life as a constitutive

element in its organization and transformation. Traditionalists view institutions as repositories

of cultural resources. Hence their preference for maintaining institutions as they are. This is

psychologically understandable. However, maintenance only leads to obsolescence. It is

precisely because the modern world is a runaway world that only those institutions with the

capacity of reflexivity will survive. The unpredictability lies not just in the nature of

incomplete knowledge but essentially in the open nature of human systems and relationships, a

situation neatly captured by Ulrich Becks concept of risk societies.

Giddens concludes, Modernitys reflexivity refers to the susceptibility of most aspects of

social activity, and material relations with nature, to chronic revision in the light of new

information of knowledge. This is necessary because of the reflexively mobilized but yet

intrinsically erratic dynamism (note chaos theory) of modern social activity[MSI 20]. The

combined effect of disembedding mechanisms, virtual reality and the erratic dynamism of

modern institutions intensify the individuals sense of anomie and periodically trigger off

social-economic crises. Bermann well captures such a crisis.

To be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises adventure, power, joy,

growth, transformation of ourselves and the world and, at the same time, that threatens to

destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are. . . modernity can be said

to unite all mankind. But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity; it pours us all into amaelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity

and anguish. To be modern is to be part of a universe in which, as Marx said, all that is solid

melts into air [ D. Harvey 11].

Postmodernity is a reaction to instrumental rationality as well as the social forces projected by

institutions of Modernity. Of relevance too are the studies on the origins of the Holocaust

which serve as powerful refutations of the project of Enlightenment rationality. I only need to

turn to the classic work by Adorno and Horkheimer, The DialecticsofEnlightenment, where it

is clearly pointed out that the Holocaust was itself one of the consequences of instrumental

rationality that had come to dominate European Modernity. I am more concerned to determine

if contemporary critiques of modern society are accurate and elicit a resonance that seems

plausible in the light of our experiences in everyday life. There is no need to follow uncritically

the Western experience. After all, if Postmodernity itself subscribes to distrust of grand theory

it follows that there is no need for Asians to submit passively to the grand theory of

Postmodernity.


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Thiselton himself acknowledges that there are two variants of Postmodernity, that is, firstly,

the Postmodernity of European ideological suspicion, and secondly the Postmodernity of the

American pragmatic tradition oriented to the consumer. Perhaps because he has already

discussed the European philosophers in his earlier works that he currently focuses on the North

American pragmatic Postmodernity.

It is true that we cannot deny the powerful social forces of globalization emanating from USA

which have shaped an increasingly global culture epitomized by Coca-cola, MacDonald, MTV

and Hollywood film stars. One may argue from these phenomena that traditions will inevitably

be displaced and discarded as Modernity marches on. Surely the death of the grand narrative of

Modernity has been widely exaggerated. But beyond the progressive face of Modernity

exemplified by democracy and instrumental rationality, we need to point out the dark side of

Modernity which is ignored by Western thinkers in the form of colonialism and disruptive

economic forces projected by fund managers and the IMF. Both these expressions of

Postmodernity should be kept firmly in view if we want to mount a social and theological

critique of our local Asian society.

LOCAL TRUTHS AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

Thiseltons running battle with Richard Rorty represents an ongoing debate among the

academia of the North Atlantic. At the surface level, we read of Rorty suggesting a consumer-

oriented epistemology. He expresses disdain for any high minded quest for moral knowledge.

The reason behind this epistemological cynicism lies in his perception that attempts to attain

certain knowledge exemplified by foundationalism, realism and representation/reference

theory of knowledge have failed.

Rorty explains that his skepticism of epistemology lies in doubts about the effectiveness of

appeals to moral knowledge, that these are doubts about causal efficacy; not about epistemic

status (TP 172). I think he plays down the theoretical significance of his epistemological

skepticism at this point. Still, he advocates abandoning foundationalism/representationalism

and concentrating our energies on manipulating sentiments and sentimental education. That

sort of education gets people of different kinds sufficiently well acquainted with one another

that they are less tempted to think of those different from themselves as only quasi-human. The


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goal of this sort of manipulation of sentiment is to expand the reference of the terms our kind

of people and people like us (TP 176).

He claims that the definition of humanity underlying human rights has relevance only in the

sense in which rational agency is synonymous with membership in ourmoral community.

Rorty declares that producing generations of nice, tolerant, well-off, secure, other-respecting

students is allthat is needed to achieve an Enlightenment utopia (TP179). He concludes that

the spread of the human rights culture is not a matter of or becoming more aware of the

requirements of the moral law, but rather as what Baier calls a progress of sentiments (TP

181).

I support Rortys attempt to demythologize the myth of universal efficacy of instrumental

reason in solving human problems. If, indeed, Rorty is reminding philosophers that they are

merely commentators of social life (hopefully prophetic) rather than legislators of social

change, then he deserves to be applauded. Unfortunately, his Postmodern pragmatism displays

superficiality and naivete in its reading of human relationships. Perhaps sentimentality and

good rhetoric will suffice in the academia of the North American context. [ I have my doubts,

though, knowing what large egos academics have and how intense academic rivalry is in the

academia]. There is in Rorty little sense of the brutality of life in developing societies, the

recalcitrance of authoritarian governments toward change and the power of social institutions

to suppress demands for greater democratic freedom and social justice. Is it not the case that the

rational instruments of Modernity embodied in the bureaucracy and the discipline apparatus

[the police, the prison and the press] only serves the authoritarian governments too well in

keeping society in subservience? Surely, it takes more than learned discourse to challenge and

change such entrenched powers.

Ironically, some Asian authoritarian governments have rejected Western democracy on

grounds that Westerners have cynically manipulated it to maintain hegemony over the rest of

the world. Rortys suggestion that priority be given to the issue of security and sympathy would

certainly be welcomed by some Asian authoritarian government which urge citizens not to fuss

about matters of human rights and political freedom since priority should first be given to

economic prosperity.


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Asian authoritarian governments have only been too adept in brushing aside criticisms of their

abuse of power by suggesting that Asians need to be wary of and resist claims of universal truth

which after all, are devices of the Western media and academia. Undoubtedly, this matter

confirms the Postmodern suspicion that all too often, truth claims function to legitimize

dominant behaviors rather than promote equal recognition in relationships. But even if it is

granted that social bonding rests on sentiments, we must still recognize that sentiments are

displayed precisely because the context of social relations evidently support truth and trust.

Truth without sentiments merely exploits but sentiments without truth means being exploited.

In Rortyian spirit we can improved on upon Marx with a new maxim, Philosophy has failed in

interpreting the world. Surely I can change it with sentiments. In any case, authoritarian

governments have no problem promoting feel-good sentiments. One only need to look at mass

rallies sponsored by such governments with their assuring slogan, We are OK, We Boleh.

Good sentiments will be promoted so long as we support business as usual for local politics. Is

it not the case that some Asian governments deploy a of carrot and stick strategy to control its

citizens? Citizens are all expected to feel good not only for the bread and circuses but also feel

grateful because Caesar wields his power with a benevolent face. But surely an iron hand

covered with a velvet cloth is still an iron hand nevertheless.

Rorty declares that truth is a matter of rhetoric. That being the case then surely he who is able to

project power through the mass media wins the day. According to Rorty there is no standard

higher than the assent of the relevant community. It is evident that such a relevant community

holds a consensus on what constitutes acceptable social goods and what social practices

ensures fair distribution of social goods. But Richard Bernstein remarks that Rorty commits

here a hidden ahistorical essentialism. For Rorty writes as if we all know what these practices

are. Given Rortys constant appeal to history and historicism, he ignores the historical fact that

we are confronted with conflicting and incompatible practices even in so-called liberal

democracy (NC 240).

A further question arises: What community is Rorty referring to and who has the power to

decide who is in or who is out of this relevant community? Rorty chooses to ignore how a

dominant group which controls the mass media may easily hijack public discourse and shape a

public consensus according to its terms. The hegemonic group then demands compliance with

its social agenda on ground that it is shaped by the majority of the community. Anyone who


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dissents is socially sanctioned and possibly excluded from this relevant community. All too

often authoritarian governments legitimize their suppressions of dissent in the name of the

silent and silenced majority.

It is easy for Rorty to derogate the serious man and recommend the Rhetorical man who

sees through philosophy and theology to the basic assumption (if this is not a contradiction)

that only socio-political forces of persuasion instrumentally determine who are winners in

the market place of power. But Rorty fails to see the reality that there are no equals nor is there

equal access to instruments of persuasion. In this regard the European Postmodernists are right

in engaging in social critique with the aim of unmasking networks of power camouflaged in

rhetoric of public discourse.

Rorty talks as though truth and knowledge are neutral commodities to be chosen at will by

consumers. He fails to follow through with the insights of his counterparts in European

Postmodernity on the intimate relationship between truth and power in social relations. I

suggest that we look to Foucault to gain a more accurate understanding of the relationship

between knowledge, public discourse social discipline and power. Foucault, in his book,

Discipline and Punish observes that discipline produces docile bodies and relies on a

procedure of training that includes hierarchical observation of individuals who are deliberately

placed under detail control so as to transform them. Foucault argues that knowledge is

inescapably linked to power. Power produces knowledge . . . that power and knowledge

directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution

of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same

time power relations. These power-knowledge relations are to be analyzed, therefore not on

the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on

the contrary, the subject who knows. . . . it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that

produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the

processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms

and possible domains of knowledge (DP 27-28).

In this regard, different forms of knowledge are deployed to sustain the technology of

surveillance. Foucault emphasizes that power in modern society is no longer located in one

central sovereign institution. Instead power is transmitted/dispersed throughout society so that

no one can escape from its surveillance and discipline. In contemporary society power is


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co-extensive with society and interwoven with other social relations such as production,

politics and law. A grand state ideology that is all inclusive leaves no room for difference and

dissent. So pervasive is this power that individuals submit to it voluntarily with active consent.

One characteristic of an authoritarian society is the absence of Civil society between state and

family. The family becomes the last avenue of choice, albeit, private choice. Hence the

pervasiveness of consumerism and private religion in such societies.

However despite this depressing scenario, Foucault also insists that there is always the

possibility for resistance against power. To be sure, power is omnipresent but not omnipotent.

However, resistance can only arise if one unmasks the pretension and false legitimacy utilized

to camouflage the exercise of power. Obviously, to uphold truth is not just an academic game

that Rorty assumes. For those facing hostile authorities, truth is a matter of life and death. Truth

matters in calling authorities to be accountable. Without raising the issue of truth, we will slide

into relativism that is politically irrelevant and impotent to guide social choices. Just as

Kuhnian epistemological relativism undermines the basis for distinguishing between an

African witchdoctor and a Western medical specialist, Rortyian pragmatism provides no moral

resources to guide well-fed citizens on how to choose between a Saudi Arabian theocracy and

Swiss democracy.

I suppose one can challenge the state by offering different bread and circuses to the populace.

But it is surely futile to challenge Caesar on his own terms. On this score, Postmodernity lacks

the moral resources to mount a social critique against Caesar. On Rortys terms, if the customer

determines truth, then the final decision must rest on the biggest customer, namely, the State.

To engage in social and moral critique means the need to expose the myth that Caesars world

is the best of all possible worlds. In other words, Caesar may exercise a monopoly of power but

he is still accountable to a higher law or reality or ultimate truth. Unfortunately on Rortys

terms there is no basis to expect or demand Asians to develop a democracy polity since a

democratic polity (community) is only historically contingent.

Rorty nonchalantly suggests that philosophy [political philosophy?] is irrelevant to social

changes. Such a statement usually comes from someone who is enjoying the benefits of a

ruling elite and sees no reason for change. After all, even if truth is a judgment of the

community, is it not the case that it is the elite which speaks out on behalf of the community?

Not surprisingly, Rorty often prefaces his judgment with remarks like we pragmatists, we


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liberal ironists, we antirealists. Presumably he speaks for his community. But surely, such

nonchalance betrays ignorance or indifference to the dark side of the we. Rorty, I suppose,

does not expect the elite to utilize the we as an exclusionary tactic. Demands for political

correctness on American campuses however tell another cautionary tale.

At this point Thiseltons running battle with Rorty on the possibility and nature of truth

becomes relevant. It should be helpful to recapitulate some aspects of Rortys position culled

from Thiseltons paper:

p. 8 Truth becomes a pragmatic social construct shaped in accordance with consumer choice

and consumer interest.

p. 10 all truth claims belong to the realm of social construction.

p. 12 The true is whatever proves itself to be good in a way of belief. . . what proves itself to

be good within a trajectory of a progress-oriented futurology.p. 13 The audience, not the speaker, the consumer, not the producer, defines the criteria for

what counts as true.

One despairs to note that on Rortys terms, Truth is both relativized and trivialized. To be

sure, Rorty merely commends his pragmatic Postmodernity as a counter rhetoric rather than as

a vehicle of logical analysis and argumentation. Primarily, Rorty assumes that because the

Correspondence of truth/ representation theory of truth and its related moral realism faces

difficulties, one should then opt for a pragmatic theory of social constructivism. Rorty appeals

to Donald Davidson in order to reject the representation theory of truth on grounds that it is

non-epistemic. But is not the requirement of truth to be epistemic, that is, the presence of a

human act of knowing for a proposition to be true amounts to a reduction of truth to human

construction? Given the lack of argumentation I can only judge Rortys brand of pragmatism

an expression of hubris rather than epistemological humility. One searches in vain in his

writings for evidence of serious engagement with competing philosophical positions. He

merely falls back on Davidsons coherence theory of truth. Likewise he appeals to Dewey for a

pragmatic theory of truth. I note however that both Richard Bernstein and Richard

Shustermann disagree with Rortys violent reading of Dewey, a reading that fails to take

seriously the moral earnestness of Dewey. Susan Haack has challenged Rortys claim to be a

philosophical descendent of the classical pragmatists. For Susan Haack Rorty merely

represents a vulgar pragmatism: an unedifying prospect.


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BEYOND CARTESIAN ANXIETY

I can agree with Rorty that it is unnecessary for us to continue the epistemological projected

burdened by the anxiety of Cartesian foundationalism and representationalism. On the other

hand, I disagree that the abandoning of Cartesian foundationalism amounts to surrendering to

relativism/contingency and pragmatic license. Rorty never considered the more nuanced

response to the problems of foundationalism. Again this is consistent with his strategy of

redescription, of rhetorical assertion rather than proof (p. 19). Since the abandonment of

foundationalism provides a starting point in Rortys project, it is surprising that his use of the

epistemological terms like foundationalism remains ambiguous. So long as Rorty fails to

address this ambiguity he continues to enjoy a rhetorical privilege in tailoring his epistemology

to his social preferences.

FOUNDATIONALISM DEFENDED

Rorty ignores important discussion of foundationalism in current philosophy. Lets begin with

William Alstons discussion on two forms of foundationalism. He notes that relativists cannot

ignore the problem of infinite regress or that a proposition can be true for me but not true for

you at the same time. Alston concedes that in iterative foundation for knowledge, one that is

self-evident and demonstrable is beyond our rational powers. But he insists that there must be

a stock of directly justified beliefs constituting a foundation for the network of beliefs if acts of

knowing are to possess any integrity. These foundations may be hypothetical postulates but

neither can they be disproved. Alstons suggestion that it is possible to stop regress without

dogmatic assertion of strong foundationalism requires careful consideration.

Be that as it may, there is certainly more to foundationalism than Rorty is willing to recognize.

Some thinkers like Nicholas Wolterstorff are prepared to concede that foundationalism needs

to be abandoned. Nevertheless, Wolterstorff continues his serious theorizing that is evidently

different from Rortys. Perhaps our confusion will be overcome if we note that what

Wolterstorff abandons is merely Cartesian foundationalism. Alvin Plantinga does not support

Cartesian foundationalism but he argues that the Christian belief in God is properly basic.

Surely this are other forms of foundationalism. It is apparent that some clarification is in order.

Thiele is helpful in pointing out that non-foundationalism does not mean constructing a body of

knowledge floating on air. Theologizing must still be grounded on criteria but these criteria

are not defined by some other extra-tradition sources. As Thiele describes it,


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Foundationlessness, then, names the web of practiced Christian belief faithful to the norms

shaped by its ecclesial life. Or negatively expressed, it names Christian belief defined not by

some other meaningful particularity, but by its own (F 87).

Thieles proposal follows Wolterstorffs which pointed to data-background beliefs or

control beliefs. Although these are not foundations of knowledge, background theories

function as beliefs as to what constitutes an acceptable sort of theory on the matter under

consideration (F 94). I may add that no control belief is immune from challenge. But we

cannot challenge all of them at the same time. Thiele elaborates, control beliefs neither lead to

circular reasoning nor are determinative of the theories our knowledge comprises. They are

open to modification throughout most of our experience and even in the moment of

adjudication theories must yield to the evidence they explain. Control beliefs offer a

nonfoundational heuristic to guide inquiry and pose the actual framework within which inquiry

proceeds (F 95).

This does not mean that Christian reflection is constrained to hermetic walls of its own

tradition. Indeed, such theology requires philosophical analysis. But if their appeal to

philosophical analysis were ad hoc and governed by the contextuality of Christian meaning, the

speculative approach in such an instance would not trust reason to set its agenda but would

measure speculative proposals by their conformity to the standard of Christian commitment (F

100)

Debates on the viability of a more nuanced view of foundationalism will continue. It is

pertinent here merely to emphasize that perhaps we need not be forced into a false dichotomy

of either supporting a Cartesian foundationalism or Rortyian pragmatic relativism.

How can we compare and choose between competing truth claims if we abandon Descartes

clear and distinct ideas? This is surely a vital question for our pluralistic society. Let me note

that unlike Rorty, even such a strong advocate of the coherence theory of truth like Nicholas

Rescher/Philip Griffiths are able to offer a fruitful model for inter-religious dialog with their

epistemological framework of Orientational Pluralism. However I will concentrate only on the

insights drawn from Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre.


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MacIntyre agrees that we cannot appeal to neutral criteria to adjudicate between competing

traditions. Nor should we compare rival positions against independent facts so much as to lay

out how the new conclusion must be accepted on premises which both sides accept. As Taylor

explains MacIntyres position, What may convince us that a given transition from X to Y is a

gain is not only or even so much how X and Y deal with the facts, but how they deal with one

another. . . In adopting Y, we make better sense not just of the world, but of our history of

trying to explain the world, part of which has been played out in terms of X (PA 43).

Taylor modestly suggests that the claim is not that Y is absolutely true, but that whatever is

ultimately true, Y is better than X. It is, one might say, less false. . . .: whatever else turns out

to be true, you can improve your epistemic position by moving from X to Y; this is a gain (PA

54).

Taylor emphasizes that such a move does not amount to a claim to have arrived at the final

rational explanation. It is rather a choice for the best explanation so far. More important than

merely being more rational is a concomitant requirement to be morally responsible for our

epistemological choices. In this regard, the epistemological enterprise is a serious business. As

such, I find it facetious that Rorty has disregard the serious man, that is, the man who is

dogged by problems for which he takes moral responsibility as passe (P. 15).

Perhaps Rorty can afford to waffle around since he works as a secured, tenured professor in a

North American academia. But surely, on his own terms he cannot generalize (or universalize)

his rhetorical kibbutzing (since an epistemological project will be contradictory on his own

terms). At most he may suggest that his rhetoric suffices somewhat for his context. But by the

same token, I can exercise my personal choice to judge his perspective inadequate in our

context where the contest of rationality between traditions is intense, if not violent. We are

aware that often, the decision to speak the truth under authoritarian regime is a costly venture.

In fact, unless one takes moral responsibility as the outcome of moral conviction and exercises

courage one will fail to think clearly or mount an effective challenge/critique against the

reigning ideology/ status quo/paradigm.

RECLAIMING TRUTH FOR EVERYDAY LIFE


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How then ought we to prosecute a theology in a Postmodern world? In light of the above

discussion it is evident that I agree with Thiseltons suggestion that theology must explore the

relation between truth-claims, knowledge and power in social and ecclesial institutions p. 11

In this regard, Evangelicals can profit from the challenge coming from the Postmodernist like

Rorty. It must be admitted that Evangelicals have confused epistemological certainty of the

Enlightenment with the spiritual certitude arising from the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit.

Accordingly, doctrinal formulation is expected to lay out with clarity, a system of

self-consistent beliefs. All too often we end up with a sterile conceptual system lacking

connection with the pastoral life of the church. Is it any wonder that the theologian has been

labeled as someone who produces beautiful blossoms with inedible fruit.

To be sure, Thiselton has suggested that the theological training should put tradition and

history before rhetoric. I can accept this only if we can ensure that tradition (usually Western

theology) is not imposed on us as a completed system. Is it not the case that the Reformation

represented liberation from the deadweight of tradition? As someone wrote, tradition is the

living faith of the dead but traditionalism is the dead faith of the living. In other words, tradition

must be critically appropriated as a repository of insights drawn from an effective history of

Christian faith. That is to say, tradition cannot foreclose the eschatological dimension of the

faith. On the contrary, we should expect new understanding and application as we flesh out a

living tradition in a new context.

From this perspective, the Christian epistemological enterprise goes beyond securing

theoretical knowledge and involves trust and commitment. To this extent, we agree with the

pragmatist that knowledge entails commitment. The biblical approach agrees that truth is not

merely a successful and final description of ultimate reality. Truth always proves itself

effective again and again in changing present reality. That is to say, truth claims entails

authentic living.

Vaclav Havel has offered helpful insights arising from his own struggles with a communist

dictatorship in Czechoslovakia. He suggests that authenticity begins with a concern for

living the truth. Authentic living does not arise from following cues given by authoritative

institutions. Neither does authentic living arise from fighting the cause for abstract ideologies


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or from pursuing the goal of taking control of socio-political institutions. Authentic living

springs from the aims of life and the authentic needs of real people [LivingThe Truth: 102].

Any existential revolution should provide hope of a moral reconstitution of society, whichmeans a radical renewal of the relationship of human beings to what I have called the human

order, which no political order can replace. A new experience of being, a renewed rootednessin the universe, a newly grasped sense of higher responsibility, a new-found inner

relationship to other people and to the human community [117-118].

Social planners demand compliance with their policies on the grounds that such policies act as

bulwarks of stability against the barbarians outside the gates. Unfortunately, such compliance

leads to loss of personal identity when every detail of ones life comes under supervision. It is

vital that the mundane matters of everyday life be jealously guarded as opportunities to

exercise choices that are truthful to oneself and not be sacrificed on the altars of social

engineering. That is to say, we need to take responsibility for our own lives. Such a simple

sense of being human captures Havels challenge to be living the truth.

Power politics aim at securing political goals. There is no such thing as a neutral, disinterested

truth. In politics there is only one truth, that is, effective truth. Power/Truth is confirmed by the

barrel of the gun. The social witness of the Church consists in mediating moral values based on

witness to a higher truth than that proffered by the State. Not surprisingly, authoritarian

governments encourage private religion. But they persecute any church that witnesses as an

institution that calls the government to be accountable to a transcendent reality. By witnessing

to a higher truth, the church denies the claim that there should be nothing outside the state.

Biblical truth as such entails an element of risk and responsibility and demands a recovery of

ethical life. Ethical life is particularly described as graced life. Truth is not so much a social

construct as a gift. It also expresses its pragmatic force as love. As such, ethical life is lived out

in the context of a community. Truth claims therefore demand embodiment in a an ecclesia. On

Rortys terms, the ecclesia is the relevant community. After all, as Leslie Newbigin points out,Jesus did not write a book but formed a community. I can do no better than to end with a

challenge from Newbigin for believers to demonstrate in their congregation a way of life which

validates the truth claims of the Gospel.

If the gospel is to challenge the public life of society, if Christians are to occupy the high

ground which they have vacated in the noon time of modernity. . . it will only be by


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movements that begin with the local congregation in which the reality of the new creation ispresent, known, and experienced, and from which men and women will go into every sector of

public life to claim it for Christ, to unmask the illusions which have remained hidden and toexpose all areas of public life to the illumination of the gospel.(GPS 232-233).

Documents

Response Thiselton Post Modernity 1999