2
Responding to the changed realities Syed Fattahul Alim Star THE ruling AL's desperate bid to reverse the trend that the first phase of the upazila polls had set was not able to bring desired result in the second phase of the polls. Even so, it could at least arrest the drift -- the tendency of further widening of the gap between AL and BNP scores. In the first phase BNP grabbed 45% of the total chairman posts, while AL secured 35%. But in the second phase, though AL's performance remained at the same level (35%), the BNP's came down to 43%. This steadiness in AL's performance in the second phase can be attributed to its better handling of the phenomenon of rebel candidacy and certainly not to violent activities like occupying election booths, stuffing of ballot boxes or other kinds of polls-related offences blamed largely on the pro-AL candidates and their musclemen. The violence that marred the second phase was ill-advised and uncalled- for, especially after peaceful holding of the first phase, for which the Election Commission (EC) and the ruling party were commended by all quarters. Worse yet, whatever benefit the AL could derive from adopting necessary organisational measures to combat rebel candidacy in the different constituencies was largely wasted due to the various election-related offences with attendant violence. Moreover, it made matters worse for the AL, while the BNP not only could maintain the lead, but also gain on moral grounds. Here, the CEC cannot shrug off its duty by simply stating that the election was fair and peaceful, while

Responding to the Changed Realities

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

Realities

Citation preview

Page 1: Responding to the Changed Realities

Responding to the changed realitiesSyed Fattahul Alim

Star

THE ruling AL's desperate bid to reverse the trend that the first phase of the upazila polls had set was not able to bring

desired result in the second phase of the polls. Even so, it could at least arrest the drift -- the tendency of further

widening of the gap between AL and BNP scores. In the first phase BNP grabbed 45% of the total chairman posts, while

AL secured 35%. But in the second phase, though AL's performance remained at the same level (35%), the BNP's came

down to 43%.

This steadiness in AL's performance in the second phase can be attributed to its better handling of the phenomenon of

rebel candidacy and certainly not to violent activities like occupying election booths, stuffing of ballot boxes or other

kinds of polls-related offences blamed largely on the pro-AL candidates and their musclemen. The violence that marred

the second phase was ill-advised and uncalled-for, especially after peaceful holding of the first phase, for which the

Election Commission (EC) and the ruling party were commended by all quarters. Worse yet, whatever benefit the AL

could derive from adopting necessary organisational measures to combat rebel candidacy in the different constituencies

was largely wasted due to the various election-related offences with attendant violence.  

Moreover, it made matters worse for the AL, while the BNP not only could maintain the lead, but also gain on moral

grounds.

Here, the CEC cannot shrug off its duty by simply stating that the election was fair and peaceful, while the incidents of

irregularities and violence were stray. In fact, a large part of the responsibility for these negative features of the second

phase of the upazila polls rests squarely on the EC's shoulders.   

Page 2: Responding to the Changed Realities

Given the support the law-enforcement agencies, including members of the armed forces, have extended to the EC, there

was no reason why the second phase of the upazila polls could not be held in a  violence-free manner as it was the case in

the first phase. It would have been possible if only the EC had been able to use the resources at its disposal with more

confidence and firmness.

It should not be lost on the leadership of AL that they have a huge stake in ensuring free and fair elections at the upazilas,

especially after  the one-sided  January 5 election to the 10th Jatiyo Sangsad.

The EC and the ruling party, it is hoped, will take lessons from the first and second phases of the upazila polls and   try to 

present more credible polls in the remaining phases through controlling election-related violence and other irregularities

with an iron first.

The upazila elections have definitely provided a morale boost to BNP, which was lying rather low in the face of AL's

propaganda offensive, especially after the January 5 national election. Battered by the onslaughts of the government to

foil BNP's anti-government movement prior to the January 5 controversial election, BNP has been in the worst crisis in its

history. Organisationally, too, it has been in disarray, a fact that even the party's chief Khaleda Zia admitted at a recent

public meeting at Rajbari.  

But what the AL should not fail to note is that, despite its organisational weakness, the BNP has performed well in the

upazila polls. There is little room for complacency by dismissing the upazila polls results as something of little

consequence since these are local government elections. Communications Minister Obaidul Quader sounded more

pragmatic after seeing the results of the upazila polls. He recently admitted that not having BNP in the Jatiyo Sangsad

was an 'embarrassment' for the government.

In fact, the incessant negative propaganda that the ruling party has been waging against BNP to relegate it to the

position of a political pariah has hardly succeeded in impacting the voters' mind. The upazila polls held one and a half

months after the 10th Jatiyo Sangsad election speaks volumes for that. Rather, too much negative propaganda against any

party or person more often than not proves to be counterproductive.

Propaganda, if used effectively, is undoubtedly a useful tool in the arsenal of politics to weaken one's adversary. But one

also has to know where to draw the line.

AL should be able to distinguish between the ground realities before and after the January 5 election. The January 5

election could not give AL the same moral advantage over BNP as it (AL) enjoyed after the 9th JS election. The reason is

obvious. No amount of sophistry can ensure AL that kind of moral authority in the post-January 5 conditions.

The ruling AL must face facts and try to deal with its main political rival BNP more rationally.

The writer is Editor, Science & Life, The Daily Star.E-mail: [email protected]