Spanish agriculture, 1931-1955: crisis, wars and new policies in the reshaping of rural society

Juan Pan-Montojo (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid)

The two decades that run between 1935 and 1955 were for the Spanish agriculture a period of

deep changes. However the first Western European tourists that decided to visit the Iberian

Peninsula in the 1950’s, met a peasant world that looked strangely archaic. It is true that under

the weight of a long tradition of reading Spain as an exotic South, not only travellers but

anthropologists like Pitt-Rivers were prepared to interpret rural life in Andalucía in 1949 on the

basis of concepts such as “honour” and “shame”, and discover equalitarian communities, where

anti-francoist guerrilla men were understood as “primitive rebels”, a hardly altered version of

the 19th century bandits1. Even the well trained eye of Eric Hobsbawm identified Spain as late

as 1966 with a country, where “capitalism has always failed”2. In the 1960’s the demographic

collapse of rural society and the big leap forward of agrarian productivities, offsprings of the

growth rates achieved by the Spanish economy as a whole and of the application of the green

revolution techniques, were not only turning Hobsbawm’s vision into an obsolete if not totally

erroneous statement –as the British historian humbly stated in his memoirs- but bringing to the

forefront the transformations undergone in the previous years by the Spanish countryside and by

the Spanish cities. In the 1960’s the Spanish rural society was not a “traditional” world

destroyed by exposure to modernization. It was rather a capitalistic rural society, poorer than

other European ones and subject, like them, to an ample state regulation at all levels. The rapid

economic growth of the 1960’s just opened the way to an accelerated restructuring of the farms

and to a quicker outflow of surplus agrarian labour.

Which were the changes that had occurred in the previous decades? And why were they

so hidden? To answer the first question in a rather radical –and therefore simplistic- manner, it

1 . A Spanish anthropologist, Serrán Pagán, did in the 1970’s a field study in the same village, Grazalema, where Pitt-Rivers had collected his materials for his People of the Sierra in 1949, and after a thorough historical analysis revised his interpretations in Serrán (1980). 2 . Hobsbawm (2002).

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can be said that between 1935 and 1955 the Spanish agrarian economy concluded its transition

from a liberal to a regulated sector. Simultaneously, it ceased to be dominated by rentiers and

became an agriculture of farmers-owners. In the third place, rural society greatly accelerated its

evolution from a world of peasants to a world of agriculturalists. To answer the second question,

the reasons for the apparent stability of the rural population despite these changes, I shall argue

that the profound inequality in the distribution of income, the deficit of public services and the

combination of an authoritarian political rule and the Catholic monopoly of social and cultural

life in the villages, disguised transformations under the cover of a frozen sameness.

What role played the Second World War in this evolution? If we consider this conflict

in a narrow way, its impact was limited. Spain did not take part in the war unless we accept as

participation Franco’s military help to Hitler –a division sent to the Soviet Union and occasional

shelter for German ships and submarines-, his good will towards the fascist side -a friendly

environment for German and Italian spies and some privileges for the importers and the

companies of the Axis powers until 1943- and his propagandist support of the New Order to be

created in Europe. But Franco’s Spain was not either a really neutral country, as its bending

towards Berlin and Rome showed and its declaration of non-belligerence proved. This

intermediate position between participation and neutrality was far more meaningful than it may

be thought. Spanish agriculture, like the ones of other non participant countries, was of course

affected by the fall in its exports of Mediterranean agrarian products (wine, oranges, raisins,

almonds…), by the shortages of fertilizers, pesticides, machinery and tools –very damaging in a

country that so far had depended upon imports and did not have the technical know-how to

improvise an industry of agrarian inputs- and by the lack of raw materials such as oil. But the

consequences of these temporary scarcities and market closings could have been at least

partially compensated by other advantages of being out of the conflict, as the Portuguese

example reveals, were it not for the fact that rural society, society as a whole, was coming out of

its own war and was doing so under the guidance of a military regime, that copied fascist

solutions and linked itself to the Axis.

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The Civil War, as any civil war, had profound internal roots. Nevertheless

contemporary observers were not wrong when they judged it as the first step of the coming

struggle between democracy and fascism. The Spanish Civil War was from every point of view

impossible to understand without reference to processes well beyond the Spanish borders. In

other words, Spain lived the Second World War twice. First as only actor in its rehearsal and

then as a deeply involved spectator of the drama. It suffered the Depression that created the

conditions for the world conflict, its population resisted or fought for fascism and in so doing

altered very many of the inherited rural structures and its agriculture stood the pressures created

by its own and by the external total war. The main differences were at the end of the process:

Franco’s regime survived Pétain’s, Hitler’s and Mussolini’s. For this very reason there was no

Marshall plan for Spain and the EEC was closed to Spanish farmers. But fascism as a socio-

economic programme was as well defeated in Spain, even though the winners were not new

liberals, social conservatives or social-democrats, but Catholic authoritarian conservatives, who

in any case, although with some delay, left aside the fascist recipes for agriculture and embraced

the post-war consensus of an intervened and upside-down technically modernized agriculture.

1. A global view of the Spanish agricultural markets and policies, 1931-1955

Between 1931-35 and 1950-54, the Spanish agricultural production underwent a short

but dramatic fall, with the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936, followed by a stabilization of the

low levels of output until 1950, and finally by a rapid recovery between 1951 and 1955 of the

pre-war figures, so that in global terms these two decades were a period of stagnation (Fig. 1).

This evolution inverted the previous trend, because agrarian production had been growing

without interruptions since the late 19th century: the agrarian GDP, at constant prices of 1913,

had increased from an index of 82.47 in 1900 to one of 135.21 in 1929 (Prados, 2003). A

similar pattern of growth can be identified in nearly every other variable of agrarian

development in the first three decades of the 20th century: yields, productivity, non-agrarian

inputs, capital investment… According to Bringas (2000), total factor productivity in agriculture

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reached in Spain, between 1905 and 1931, an annual rate of growth of 1.13 %, relatively similar

and even superior to those of other Western European countries.

Figure 1. Agrarian GDP, 1929-1960

Source: Cuadro A.5.8, Prados (2003)

The decline of the agrarian output in the 15 years after 1935 coincided with an increase in rural

and agricultural population. Labour data (table 1) show how after 1930, the gradual decrease of

both the total and the relative figures of the labour force in agriculture gave way to the opposite

tendency: actually the amount of manpower in agriculture hit its historical absolute maximum in

1950.

Table 1. Active population in Spanish agriculture, 1920-1960

Year of census Male active population in agriculture (‘000)

Percentage of the Active Population in the Primary Sector

1920 4,302.3 57.2 1930 3,826.5 45.5 1940 4,525.0 50.5 1950 4,935.6 47.6 1960 4,114.9 36.6 Source: Nicolau (2005)

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The stagnation of output and the increase in the agrarian labour force took place without

any relevant changes in the area cultivated or in the intensity of cultivation: in fact, the total

amount of land under cultivation diminished from 21,964 thousand hectares in 1931 to 20,522

in 1960 and the proportion of productive land under fallow grew slightly from 30 % to 31.9 %

between these two years.

What are the factors that explain these global tendencies? The Great Depression of 1929

had initially a relatively low impact in Spain since agrarian exports did not fall as much as they

did in other countries and domestic demand for foodstuffs expanded as a result of rising wages

in 1931-33 (Palafox, 1991). However the global reduction of sales abroad and the political

changes, especially the threat of the agrarian reform, led to a reduction of investment in

agriculture and a growing rural unemployment. Both factors eventually pushed down wages and

then domestic demand for agrarian products after 1933. In the case of wheat, the main product

of the Spanish diet, the coincidence of good harvests and the decision to allow imports in 1933

depressed the price in 1933-34 and 1934-35. The Republican government tried to stabilize the

wheat price through public purchases and other measures in its two last years of peace, but it

was not too successful.

The outbreak of the Civil War changed the trend in prices, since it cut supply and

increased consumption. During the war, the Francoist side reinforced the mechanisms of

intervention of the wheat market developed by the republican governments. In 1937, the

Francoist State created the Servicio Nacional del Trigo, SNT [Wheat National Service], a public

agency that was given the monopoly of the trade of wheat. The SNT aimed at combining

rewarding prices for cereal producers and a cheap supply for the population and the army. It

managed to keep sufficient levels of consumption in the Francoist side until the end of the

conflict (Martínez, 2006). But once the war was over, feeding the population became a major

problem and a coupon rationing system was put in place. According to the explanation of

Barciela (1986) the SNT fixed a relatively low ceiling price to ensure urban consumption,

despite the low wages, and under the assumption that the wheat market tended to

overproduction, and therefore the supply of wheat had to be reduced to meet demand. Supply

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fell more than expected but there was no correction in the policy: quotas of production were

allocated to each farm, in order to sustain wheat supply. Farmers turned then to other products

that could be sold in the free market, and to counteract this strategy in the following years the

State enlargened the list of agricultural commodities subject to its control. The result of this

trend plus the radical decrease in the supply of inputs such as fertilizers (table 2) and oil (a

consequence of World War II but as well of the industrial policy of the quasi-fascist regime and

its autarkic views), plus relatively dry seasons in the middle of the 1940’s, caused a brutal fall in

the declared agrarian production, progressive reductions in the rations and a generalized loss of

quality of the food that was legally commercialised (Richards, 1998).

Table 2. Consumption of fertilizers per ha

N P2O5 K2O

1930 3.8 11.0 1.7

1935 4.6 10.1 1.5

1945 0.7 5.2 2.0

1951 4.6 10.0 2.7

1955 11.0 15.0 3.4

1960 14.9 17.7 4.3

Source: Barciela, Giráldez, GEHR e Inmaculada López (2005).

Christiansen (2005) defends a different view: the fall of supply was a result of the

scarcity of fertilizers and other inputs as well as work animals, which had been sacrificed during

the war. Under these circumstances, he maintains, the Nuevo Estado was faced by a classic food

dilemma: if it allowed the higher prices derived from a fall in supply and an inelastic demand, a

large part of the poor population would not afford to buy bread; if it opted to guarantee a

minimal amount of bread per head at an acceptable price, it would foster further reductions of

the supply. The victors decided to do what nearly all other European governments did during

the war and chose the rationing coupons and the low official prices, a solution that led to a

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supply shortage and to the emergence of a large black market. It must be said that the

explanation of Christiansen seems acceptable even though it does not refer to the fact that a

policy of direct or indirect subsidies to producers, that could have enabled the combination of

low prices and stimuli to increases in the cereal output, was not put into place not only because

of its technical problems, but because of the redirection of public expenditure to the army and

the war industry, in a country that was not at war. Rosés (2009: 360) has estimated that if the

budget of defence had been kept at the level of the Republican years and not multiplied by two

as it happened after 1940, the recovery of production would have been attained by 1944.

Not until 1951, when the war and the embargo that followed were behind, and profiting

from a relatively good wheat harvest, dared the government to increase bread prices and

liberalize to a certain extent agriculture. Within two years, rationing could be abandoned and

agrarian production started to rise. By 1955, the supply of food in Spain was again at the same

levels of 1935. A new agrarian policy that increased the amount of non-agrarian inputs of

agriculture beyond the pre-war level and deep changes in the technological policy allowed the

recovery of growth in all the agrarian magnitudes in the second half of the 1950’s and an even

quicker change in the 1960’s.

Table 3. Indexes of production and yields per hectare of main agrarian products

Production Wheat Barley Rye Corn Must Olive oil

Potatoes Sugar beat

Oranges

1931-35 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1001950-54 89 79 71 92 90 99 75 113 1011955-59 102 75 93 112 92 99 88 134 104Yields 1931-35 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1001950-54 97 95 84 109 93 91 93 87 1061955-59 106 95 96 125 93 88 100 102 106Source: Barciela (1986), p. 422.

If by the mid fifties the Spanish consumption of food and drinks, in terms of calories, recovered

the pre-war levels –after more than ten years of subnutrition and even hunger among certain

groups of the population-, the agrarian sector was not capable of keeping the position in the

foreign trade it had had before the war. After 1955 most agrarian exports recovered but imports

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rose as well because of the new diet demands and the agricultural balance of trade became

negative during the 1960’s.

The comparison of this evolution with the one of other European countries in the 1940’s

and the early fifties shows the peculiarities of agrarian policy in Spain. Not being an importing

country and having a land frontier with the regions occupied by the Germans, where food was

scarce, Spain should have increased its sales abroad even though that could have created

internal shortages as it had happened during World War I. Instead, between 1939 and 1945

exports fell but so did internal supply. The destruction of capital (except cattle) during the Civil

War had been limited, therefore it cannot be totally blamed for the fall in production. It is true

that it can be assumed that the losses of human capital as a consequence of the home front

repression in both contending sides –cooperative leaders, village elites and skilled workers-

were probably quite high but it is nearly impossible to estimate their effects. The available

quantities of agrarian inputs decreased and their quality was by far worse. But this was only

partially due to scarcities in the international market. The decision to promote industrialization

in order to achieve self-sufficiency was behind the lack of foreign currency for the import of

fertilizers, pesticides and agrarian machinery.

Table 4. Net foreign trade of leading agricultural commodities

1926-35 1940-49 1951-59Oranges + 837 +266 +732Olive oil +74 +18 +33Wine +3,155 +553 +903Grapes +45 +5 +38Onions +139 +32 +87Bananas +132 +20 +114Almonds +22 +9 +26Potatoes +62 -46 -18Rice +43 +7 +49Raisins +14 +2 +5Wheat -93 -387 -248

All figures in tons, except wine in 000 hls. + = exports; - = imports Source: Simpson (1995), p. 244.

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Official low prices and production controls were, in the context of lack of agrarian inputs, the

basic reason for a situation that was similar to the one of occupied Europe: the State acted vis à

vis its farmers like a military power, trying to get the maximum amount of food with the lowest

cost in terms of investment and in terms of price. Since the response to such policy was

underinvestment and underwork plus diversion of products to the black market, more and more

controls were enforced upon a reluctant peasant population. A policy that during the Civil War

had proved to be viable would show its weaknesses in the following twelve years of

international war and in the post-war embargo. Fifteen years of a policy thought in terms of

“internal occupation” left important trace upon agriculture.

2. Regulating agricultural production

In the Republican period –in the context of the international economic crisis- some

regulatory bodies for agricultural products, mainly for those exported, were created3. The Statute

of the Wine of 1932 established a central wine agency, the Instituto Nacional del Vino, and

provincial ones, the provincial Juntas Vitivinícolas. These agencies, directed by boards in which

sat representatives of viticulturalists, wine-growers and exporters, all together with agricultural

engineers on behalf of the Ministry, acted as wine courts to decide upon fines on those who

trespassed the legislation on wine production, trade and sale of wines, and commanded the new

body of local supervisors or “veedores”. Most of the wine legislation was justified on the

protection of consumers against fraud, but fraud was defined in such a way as to protect the

wine sector interests and specially those of industrialists and exporters (Fernández, 2008). In

1933, and following the example of the wine, the Juntas inspectoras de la naranja [Supervisory

commissions for oranges] were created: their task was the enforcement of rules to ensure the

quality of the product but they acted in fact to stop the growth of production. In 1933 too, a

public regulatory agency was set up to give subsidies to rice exports. The production of cotton

and tobacco, protected since the 1920’s through various tax devices and subsidies, were

3 . In relation to the oranges, see: Abad (1982). For a wider view on the regulatory agencies in the Republic: Pan-Montojo (2005).

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developed by the new Instituto de Fomento del Cultivo Algodonero and by the quasi-public

monopoly of tobacco. The list of subventioned sectors was expanded by the Republic with silk

and medicinal plants and after 1934 with wheat, although in these three cases no special agency

was created. In 1935, the production and import of fertilizers was as well regulated: an official

registry of traders to enable supervisory visits and a strict system of labels, authorized names

and composition of fertilizers, were introduced.

All these regulations with regards to the internal market were supplemented with the

standards on exports, to consolidate the outlets of the Spanish products through a system of

quality guarantee controls at the borders. The Comité de Vigilancia de la Exportación,

established in 1929 to award the label “Spanish product” to those commodities that fulfilled

certain requirements, was turned into a wider institution in 1934: the Servicio oficial de

Inspección, vigilancia y regulación de las exportaciones (S.O.I.V.R.E.) [Official service for

inspection, vigilance and regulation of exports], that had the task of giving a special stamp of

quality to oranges, mandarines, lemons, bananas, tomatoes, nuts, grapes and raisins, that met

official standards of quality.

Regulatory mechanisms for the internal and external markets of agrarian products, the

political answer to the crisis of the 30’s, were not temporary measures. The Civil War and the

Second World War strengthened the regulation of agrarian markets as the latter did elsewhere in

Europe. The Francoist regime turned “autarky”, economic self-sufficiency, in its explicit aim,

and following the Italian fascist example, it sought to eradicate socio-economic conflicts

through corporatist institutions, presided by State officials. To achieve both objectives, a single

official corporation, “sindicato”, was established in each agrarian branch (vine and wine, wheat,

olive oil…), including State designated representatives of cultivators, industrialists, wholesalers

and exporters. All the agrarian and agroindustrial sindicatos were federated with the industrial

sindicatos in the Organización Sindical. At the same time a territorial corporatist scheme with a

first level of local official unions (hermandades de labradores y ganaderos) and a second level

of provincial unions (cámaras oficiales sindicales agrarias) was constructed. The functions of

these institutions were ample and frequently overlapping: they fixes wages, determined labour

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conditions, supplied inputs, recommended prices, authorized new mills, caves or factories,

promoted civil works… Their existence did not lead, however, to the suppression of the

Ministry of Agriculture and its dependant services, some of them created by the Republic (like

the SOIVRE) and some established by the Francoist such as the Servicio Nacional del Trigo:

after a long struggle in the 1940’s, state officials were able to subordinate the sindicatos to the

Administration and use the corporatist organization as an added instrument of agrarian policy.

This scheme was far more complex than the one set up in other European countries in

the war and after it, and looked very much like the “totalitarian” Italian corporatist institutions.

However the major difference between the Spanish Republic and the European democracies, on

the one hand, and Franco’s authoritarian regime, on the other, was not so much its complexity

or the extent of its regulatory powers in all fields but the fact that in the Spanish “New State”

the absence of liberties silenced any public opposition or critic and enabled a unilateral

intervention, based more on direct commands and economic sanctions than on budgetary

subsidies. The reaction of damaged interests consisted on private arrangements with the

regulatory agencies, lobbying and corruption, and illegal practices.

The reduction of declared production in controlled cultivations, a direct consequence of

the establishment of official ceiling-prices and of the rationing, encouraged in the 1940’s the

development of a huge black market. The estimates of historians reveal that the quantities traded

in the black market were larger than the ones sold in the official market all along the 40’s: maybe

a 60 % of the total production was illegally marketed. In the second place historians have shown

that black market prices were between 100 and 200 % higher than the official ones (Barciela and

García López, 1986). The effects of this situation can be summed up in the following way:

• In the first place, estimates confirm that the estraperlo (the name given to the black

market operations) was the determinant factor in a relationship between agrarian prices

and industrial prices that was favourable to the former until at least 1955, causing a global

transference of income to rural producers.

• Secondly, the allocation of production quotas, to be sold to public institutions at the

official price, was fixed through a double negotiation: between provincial and local

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authorities and between local authorities and families. If the first type of negotiation

reinforced communitarian identities and interests4, the second opened the way to new

forms of social control upon families, especially effective against those who had

supported the defeated side in the Civil War.

• In the third place, illegal networks that were necessary to hide and sell bulky amounts of

corn and fruits, demanded a high local cohesion, based upon generalized though unequal

participation of rural society in the estraperlo and communitarian resistance to official

inspections and repressive measures: personal witnesses always underline the negative

role of corrupt civil servants, identified as the only “bad agents” since all the others

appear to be justified by the extremely difficult context. A perception that backed the idea

of a conflict between locals and the State5.

• Repression of the participants in the black market was unequal: Christiansen (2006: 90)

has analyzed the actual functioning of the complex legal devices created by the Regime,

that combined a very hard system of punishments with a highly arbitrary application, thus

allowing light sentences based upon “extra-jurisdictional circumstances, such as political

ideology, social status or personal connections of the defendants”.

• For all these reasons the black market was highly unequal: it favoured people living in the

countryside in relation to urban residents, those who managed personally farms in relation

to those who either worked in farms or leased the land and those who had connections in

the bureaucratic and political apparatus against those who did not.

• Apart from these distributive effects, the black market fuelled a spiral of interventions

and regulations with very important consequences. On the one hand, different official

institutions tried to estimate costs, potential production, possible demand, necessary

inputs… to allocate quotas, fix prices and distribute resources, and developed

4. All studies show that local authorities defended their local circles against the inspections and sanctions of the fiscalía de tasas (the officilas in charge of enforcing the legislation on prices). Even official agrarian unions (Hermandades de Labradores) played an active role in the defence of peasants before excessive quotas and minor faults against the all-embracing legislation: see, for instance, Bretón (2000), p. 129. 5. The corruption of the employees of the “fiscalia de tasas” and the civil servants is underlined by all sources: Naredo (1976), Bretón (2000), Barciela (1989), Moreno Fonseret (1994), Sanz (1999)...

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techniques to increase their efficiency in all these tasks, even though they were globally

unable to subordinate agriculture to their planning. On the other hand, farmers got

acquainted with bureaucratic intervention in new fields, had to learn a different

language to deal with public authorities and developed their own strategies to escape the

negative aspects of intervention and squeeze financial, technical or political resources

out of the authorities.

The autarkic experiment created an ample network of public agrarian institutions that

had a limited degree of coordination, despite the central role of the Ministry of Agriculture, and

caused high costs in terms of efficiency. Their very existence and the way they interacted with

landowners, cultivators and farm labourers, changed the shape and the logics of the market

mechanisms in agriculture. The Francoist regime radicalised the public intervention developed

by the Republic between 1931 and 1936, turning it into an institutional grid that affected all the

aspects of agriculture: wages, labour conditions, inputs, production, technology… In the 1950’s

the most authoritarian elements of the model were reconsidered and some of its more

outstanding rigidities changed, but the type of agrarian markets that liberals had sought to

establish in the 19th century stopped to be a reference for farmers and for the administrative and

political elites of the country, as it happened elsewhere in Western Europe, and a differentially

thorough intervention of agriculture was developed at all levels. For instance, the compulsory

authorization of the purchase of tractors by the Ministry of Agriculture in the 1950’s, filtered in

favour of “viable” farms (those that met the requirements of seize and production established by

the public agricultural engineers), the allocation of machinery (Clar, 2009). Agrarian markets

were subordinated to an ample regulatory intervention, whilst agrarian policies tried to achieve

simultaneously the aims of stable revenues for the modernizing agriculturalists –not for all the

rural population- and a regular supply of basic foodstuffs for the domestic and the foreign

markets. This policy was more successful from both points of view in the late 1950’s than in the

1960’s, but this is a further problem that will not be analyzed in this text.

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3. The 2nd Republic, the war and the post-war: the defeat of rentiers

In the early years of the 20th century, successive waves of mobilization of the rural

labourers, who grouped in anarchist or republican unions launched strikes and developed other

forms of pressure on landowners, and landless peasants, who in certain regions tried to negotiate

rents, challenge political bosses or organize their relationship with the market through new

unions, gave rise to a new item in the Spanish political agenda: la cuestión agraria [the agrarian

question]6. The expansive genre of agrarian literature suggested in the first decade of the 20th

century radically different solutions for the cuestión agraria, but all authors, conservatives,

Catholics, georgist, socialists or anarchists agreed in their critic of absentee landownership,

favoured the extension of property (collective property in the case of socialists and anarchists)

and defended some kind of regulation of leases, that replaced the liberal Civil Code contractual

freedom.

By 1931, when the republic was established, there was a widespread consensus in the

political forces on the need of an agrarian reform7. After several months of debate, in 1932 the

Law of Agrarian Reform was passed. It foresaw the nationalization of the lands of estates above

certain limits (100 to 150 Has if the land was dedicated to vine; 100 to 200 if to fruit trees; 150

to 300 if to olive trees; 350 to 600 if to cereals; 400 to 750 if to pasture; 10 to 50 if irrigated

areas). Forestry estates would not be nationalized. Model farms could be exempted from this

limits and avoid the expropriation. Estates that belonged to old seigneurial families or to

grandees would be confiscated, unless their owners could prove special services to the nation. It

also included other possible nationalizations: parts of smaller estates could as well be

nationalized to fulfill the principle that no single estate had more than a sixth of the surface or a

fifth of the taxable income of a municipality; plots situated in the “ruedos” (land in a circle of

two kms. around villages) could be expropriated if their owners did not till them personally and

had a yearly income above 20.000 pesetas (a fairly large quantity in those days). The agrarian

6 . “The agrarian question” received its name from “the social question”. On the literature on rural problems and the birth of the “agrarian question”: Robledo (1993). 7 . On the agrarian reform, the best global work is still Malefakis (1970). For a recent revision with updated bibliography: Robledo (2008).

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reform included as well the prevision of a new regulation of land leases that included long-term

contracts, “fair” and officially limited rents, reimbursement of unexhausted improvements, total or

partial cancellation of rents in case of natural catastrophe and a special jurisdiction for land leases.

The Law of Agrarian Reform was conceived as a balanced and long-term proposal. It

did not satisfy anybody though: it was rejected by landowners whose property not was only

endangered but as well “frozen” and devalued by the inclusion of their lands in the special

register of lands that could be affected; it frightened middle and small peasants because of the

possibility of nationalization of small holdings in the ruedos; it was rejected by labourers and

landless peasants who had to wait until State technicians and lawyers determined what amount

of the estates had to be nationalized and redistributed and with which compensation, and until

the State had the money to finance the foreseen technical plans for the new farms. Moreover the

agrarian reform was to be initially applied in 14 Southern provinces where big estates were

prevalent, but it casted a shadow on property all over the country, since the register of land for

the agrarian reform, was established in every province.

The rhythm of the Republican reform was not quick enough to turn it into a reliable

instrument to fight unemployment. For this reason, the State allowed temporary occupations of

untilled or undercultivated estates, long before the administrative process of nationalization was

finished. These occupations, authorized by engineers, gave a limited outlet to the growing rural

unemployment –due to the economic crisis and to the political reaction of landowners- but

caused many conflicts. Anarchist and socialist unions of labourers tried to force the government

to speed up the reform and very often they were met by the violent reaction of the guardia civil,

the rural State police, sent by the republican authorities to protect landowners. The agrarian

reform and temporary occupations started to be applied in a much quicker way after the victory

of the left wing force grouped in the Frente Popular, in February 1936, and acquired a massive

scale in the Republican side during the war. But these late changes were reversed by the

Francoist rebellion.

Despite the radical agrarian counterreform –since the old owners were given back their

lands with all the products and machinery that could be found in them- put into place by the

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military government of the rebellious nationalist side after July 1936, first in the areas it

controlled and then in those it conquered, the nationalist side had from its very beginning a pro-

peasant discourse. The fascist and conservative forces that backed the fight against the

republican democracy needed to mobilize popular support for their cause, and they did so by

using the defence of family, property and religion as main arguments in their discourse. The

defence of property was very effective amongst those small peasants who had seen in the

agrarian reform and in the rural labour movement a potential threat to their estates. Furthermore,

small peasant had been damaged by the republican agrarian policies in a double sense. In the

first place the reform of tenancy contracts in 1935 –a central element of the agrarian

counterproposal to the agrarian reform, under the right wing government that had been elected

in 1933- produced a high number of evictions, since landowners were trying to avoid the new

stable contracts that undermined their rights. In the second place, the radicalisation of labourers

after the victory of the Popular Front in February 1936, affected small peasants not only because

very many family farms hired workers in certain times of the year but because in some regions

small owners and even landless peasants who possessed their own oxen or mules felt the pressure

of the poor labourers who belonged to anarchist or socialist unions. Defending the peasants as the

Francoist promised was not only equated to eliminating the “useless” and “socializing” agrarian

reform, finishing with social unrest and guaranteeing property and stability, but as well to creating

a new social order in which peasant families would have their revenues secured by the political

authorities and as many as possible would be given access to their own property. If the first part of

the Francoist programme was developed without hesitations, the second one –protecting family

farming and expanding property- even though a key element of discourses of the Falange and of

the Catholic political forces was postponed until the end of the war.

The victorious Francoist regime reflected in the 1940’s its “ruralist” discourse in an

ambiguous policy of “agrarian structures” in the countryside8. In 1940 a new law of tenancy was

passed. It was very similar to the republican law of 1935 and differed from the old liberal Civil

8 . On ruralism: see Gómez Benito (1995). On the agrarian structures: Pan-Montojo (2008). The latter text is the basic reference for this section.

16

Code in at least five fields: the fixation of minimal terms for leases; the existence of one

compulsory extension of contracts without changes in the initial rent; the possibility for

leaseholders to ask the courts to revise and reduce unfair rents; the compensation of unexhausted

improvements; and the reduction of rents in case of small harvests arising from natural

phenomena that were not covered by insurances. These limits to the contractual freedom were

supplemented, in the case of sharecropping, with the obligation of giving in leasehold to the

evicted sharecropper a part of the estate, corresponding to the participation of the sharecropper in

the products. Soon afterwards, in 1942, the 1940 legislation was reformed following the

guidelines that had been passed by the Second Union Congress of the Falange in 19419: rent had

to be fixed in wheat quintals (and paid in cash according to the official price of wheat) and a

specially protective regime was created for the leases of small plots (with rents below 40 quintals

of wheat), when tenants cultivated the land personally. These protected tenants did not only have

the right of one extension of the contract, as the other leaseholders, but to life-long stability in the

tenancy and therefore to a fixed rent in terms of wheat.

Both the 1940 and the 1942 law enabled landowners to evict tenants, provided they

undertook direct cultivation. The anti-Francoist historiography has underlined this fact, and the

numerous evictions that followed, to defend that behind those pieces of legislation there was no

will of protecting the peasantry. But the legislation and the evictions have to be read under a

different light10. If there were evictions it is because the new rights given to tenants alarmed

landowners. They tried to look for loopholes in the law to evict leaseholders: a reform in 1944 was

actually designed to avoid unjustified evictions, especially of the protected leases11. From then

onwards, to evict a protected leaseholder the decision of the owner to cultivate directly his land

did not suffice; cultivation needed to be direct and personal, and the agricultural administration

had to accept that the landowner could really undertake the personal cultivation before the eviction

could take place. In the following years, the Instituto Nacional de Colonización –the institution in

9. Consejo (1941). 10. Mateu (1996), pp. 143-144, or Pérez Rubio (1995), see in the evictions the evidence of the anti-peasant nature of the agrarian policy of Francoism. 11. Law of 18.03.1944. See the comments on this law in García Royo (1945), p. 97.

17

charge of the promotion of small property upon the bases of bought or donated or public land- was

confronted with a large offer of estates for sale, that were mainly in the hands of protected

leaseholders12.

The effects of this social legislation were different in different contexts. Since real

inflation was very high and official prices of wheat lagged behind real ones, rents decreased quite

rapidly throughout the contractual term (six years in normal leases; without limits in protected

ones). Direct cultivation was therefore the logical option... when it was possible. It was not

possible for many landowners in the case of protected leaseholdings, since in their case evicting

the tenant implied personal cultivation and that could not be done in physical terms when the

landowner held small estates in different areas and was almost impossible for many rentiers who

had never been in agriculture. After 1944, agricultural engineers did not even accept as possible

personal cultivator somebody who had not been a farmer before. The only solution was accepting

a rent that tended to decrease in real terms or sell the plot to the leaseholder.

Figure 2. Index of the deflated official wheat price used for the calculation of rents (1940-1975)

020406080

100120

1940

1942

1944

1946

1948

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

Pan-Montojo (2008)

We do not know the exact area of “protected leaseholdings”, but an estimate of 1953, when quite a

few plots had already been sold, refers to 1.851.000 hectares: approximately a 9 % of the

12. Lamo de Espinosa (1953), p. 17 .

18

cultivated surface of the country13. But even in the normal leases, the change to direct cultivation

was not always easy: for most of the old landowning families who lived in cities, finding the right

local administrators and supporting their active involvement in the black market networks, a

necessity if the direct running of the estate was to be profitable, turned the change of the old

rentiers into new farmers a difficult option.

In fact it seems that thousands of hectares changed hands as leases were replaced by direct

cultivation. Naredo points out that "intruders", people from outside the consolidated landowning

families had larger incentives to participate fully in the black market14. The estraperlo has to be

understood as one of the fundamental factors of redistribution of property: it fostered the sale of

land by those who did not have access to the information, the political contacts and the local

networks that enabled a secure participation in the illegal sale of products, and it enabled the

accumulation of wealth in the countryside. But there were other reasons, apart from the legislation

and the black market. The harsh repression after the Civil War entailed growing tensions in the

Spanish rural society. When the Second World War turned in favour of the Allies, a lot of

landowning families feared the collapse of Franco’s regime and a foreign invasion that would

restore the Republic. The active rural guerrillas that murdered or kidnapped or blackmailed

landowners between 1944 and 1947 reinforced their fears of the coming back of revengeful union

leaders and of a possible new agrarian reform.

We lack the necessary statistical data to establish the amount of sales and their impact

upon property. We know that in 1960, when the first agrarian census was done, tenancy had

undergone a clear decline. But this source does not say anything about property. There are,

however, several sources that back the existence of a process of substitution of landowners15. The

republican experience, the war and the uncertainty about the future pushed many landowners to

sell. The new position of leaseholders and the political organization of the market pushed in the

same direction: the legislation on leases breached the liberal landlord rights and intruded the

13. The estimate was made by Gallardo Rueda, in an article published in the Boletín de información del Ministerio de Justicia, de 5-VIII-1954. 14. Naredo (1976), p. 80. 15. For Andalucia see Naredo (1976) and (1996), p. 291, Mata (1987), II, cap. VI, and Cobo (1999), pp. 298 y 306. A general overview of sources including the Register of Property in Pan-Montojo (2008).

19

mediation of civil servants between landlords and tenants, whereas the autarkic regulation of the

market opened the alternative of being a loser within the law, or entering risky business with high

profits. In both fields rentiers lost and new larger farmers and peasants won, even though not at all

in an even way. Inequality did not diminish in the countryside and rural labourers, whose real

wages did not recover the 1935 level until 1964 (Maluquer, 2005), did not gain access to land.

Francoism did not carry out an agrarian reform; it just promoted direct cultivation for economic

and political reasons.

4. The end of the peasantry

The Civil War and the victory of the Francoist side came after a long wave of

mobilization, politization and unionisation of the Spanish rural society. The harsh repression,

during and after the war, especially fell on the shoulders of left wingers and union leaders. But

the coup d’état in July 1936 caused a revolution wherever the conspirators failed. Many

members of the revolutionary groups read the annihilation of class and political enemies as a

necessary step towards victory in the war. It is not easy to calculate the exact number of peasant

and peasant “leaders” (union organizers, directors of cooperatives, local councillors…) who

were murdered, but it seems that they were an important percentage of the almost 200.000

civilians killed between July 1936 and the mid 1940’s. On the Republican side, the red terror of

the summer of 1936 stroke a severe blow against leaders of Catholic unions and landowners’

federations: again we cannot tell how many of the 50.000 victims were peasants or

landowners16. In any case, the new regime was constructed upon the vacuum left by a

generalized massacre and the widespread passivity of a terrorized population: the fear of the

losers was nourished by the falangist bureaucrats that landed in the villages, by the active

control of the local priests and by the violent methods of the guardia civil, the State rural police;

the fears of the winners were awakened after 1944 by the allied victories and the republican

guerrillas.

16 . The total number of victims in the home front in both “Spains” has not been settled yet: historians are now revising the figures that were established by the Administration in the 1940’s: see Juliá (2008).

20

Closing local associations, cooperatives and unions and imprisoning or pushing into

exile local leaders, schoolteachers, scientists and agricultural engineers, and handing over the

Catholic and “orderly” unions to the new official sindicatos destroyed an institutional network

that had played an important role in the introduction of all types of innovations (fertilizers,

newspapers, football clubs, choirs, assemblies, democratic procedures…) in the countryside17.

But despite its rhetoric about the old virtues of the peasants, the new agricultural authorities did

not want to preserve a peasant world, despised as ignorant if not “barbarian” and incapable of

economic progress. Falangists, old and new landowners and engineers worked together

(notwithstanding their differences) within the sindicatos and the local sections of the single

party (Movimiento Nacional) to destroy and weaken horizontal solidarities and replace them

with hierarchical relations between the urban engineers, the new local authorities imposed by

the Regime and the falangist bureaucrats, on the one hand, and the cultivators, on the other. The

chains of local dealers built around the black market, the social winners of the 1940’s, did not

use an alternative discourse and were as urbanized as the official elites.

The new institutional framework of francoism was a much more efficient instrument of

“modernization”, than any of those that had been utilized by the liberal or the republican state,

since it did not have to face any local rivals or any common and alternative readings of possible

modernizations among the peasants. The old dialogue between urban reformers and peasant

views gave way to a virtual monologue of the technocrats that after 1951 monopolized the

Ministry of Agriculture and after 1956, with the import of American model of Agrarian

Extension, imposed their discourse in virtually every aspect of rural society18. At the same time,

the Female Section of the single party educated rural women in “new household economics”,

which aimed at transferring to the countryside middle class domestic values, the Youth Front

(Frente de Juventudes) of the single party organized summer camps and sports meetings, and

the sindicatos invited farmers to ferias del campo, machinery exhibitions and contests of

labourers or farm animals, as well as to day excursions to tourist and religious centres or to

17 . A wide approach to the modernization processes in Sapin and its European context under the guidance of new organizational elements in Fernández Prieto (2000). 18 . On the Servicio de Extensión Agraria: Gómez Benito and Luque (2007).

21

political demonstrations in Madrid or Barcelona19. The totalitarian approach of the falangistas to

social organization resulted in new fields of state action that worked in practice towards the

acculturation of peasants in a single direction. Totalitarian policies were however constrained by

the budgetary restrictions of a very weak fiscal state and by the official acceptance and

protection of the parallel and, often rival, Church associations and activities. The Catholic

Church was in the 1950’s an active agent in favour of traditional rituals and values and collected

a large “harvest” out of its unchallenged position: ecclesiastical seminars reached a historical

maximum of students at the end of this decade and a large proportion of its members came from

rural environments. The imposed Catholic uniformity of the countryside was a crucial factor in

its apparent archaism. However the Church was not in those years, as it had not been before

either, against technological progress or against the other active agrarian aspects of a regime

that proclaimed itself officially and exclusively Catholic20. Catholicism could be, and was, an

obstacle to new cultural habits but as long as its religious monopoly was not challenged, it did

not oppose “material progress”.

In the 1950’s, the grid of social and economic institutions introduced to regulate the

agricultural sector, backed by the mechanisms displayed to foster political consensus and avoid

conflict, were used to transform the peasants, by then turned in a large proportion into middle or

small owners or quasi-owners of their plots, into agricultores (agriculturalists) or empresarios

agrarios (agrarian entrepreneurs). A substitution of terms, from the initial campesinos

(peasants) or labradores (farmers), that had been completed in the official documents by the

mid-fifties and heralded an aggressive policy of change in the countryside along three axes: the

watering down of local identities in favour of the national one, the professionalization of

peasants in agriculture and the selective and upside-down diffusion of new technologies21. It is

19 . Lacruz (1997) explains the role of the different institutions (Sección Femenina, Frente de Juventudes, sindicatos, Extensión Agraria, Ministerio de Educación…) in the agrarian education of Franco’s Spain. 20 . Lannon (1987), a social history of the Church in Spain, explains the large power attained by the Church in the 1950’s, when nearly every indicator of religious practice and influence in daily life attained the highest historical values (number of nuns and priests, scholars in Catholic schools, mass attendance...). 21 . On the change of identities and languages: Izquierdo (2007). On the renovation of the technical apparatus: Fernández Prieto (2007). On the discourse of modernization in agriculture: Gómez Benito (1995).

22

obvious that the replacement of the old terms did not entail in itself a radical change in the

identities and behaviours of the rural population but together with the new institutions and their

impact upon daily practices, put the foundations of a cultural transformation of rural society that

would show its relevance in the 1960’s when rural exodus went hand in hand with rapid

mechanization to destroy the “traditional” agriculture.

5. Spain and Portugal: lessons from a comparison

Spanish and Portuguese agricultures shared c. 1930 various common traits. In both sides

of the Iberian frontier, agriculture was by far the majoritarian employment of the active

population, although in Spain the census data of 1930 placed for the first time the relative

weight of the male labour force of agriculture below the line of 50 %, 45.5 %, whereas in

Portugal it surpassed the 60 %. Secondly, rural society was characterized in Spain and in

Portugal by its profound regional and social inequality. In the third place, agrarian human

capital was integrated by a peasantry with very low educational levels, even though illiteracy

was much higher in Portugal, where it reached the 68 % of the population, as against a 29 % in

Spain. Finally, labour productivity, yields per hectare and use of non agrarian inputs were very

low in the Iberian agricultures, but in those three variables the Portuguese one lagged clearly

behind.

In the following three decades, the paths of both agricultures –and of both societies-

diverged. Divergence cannot be explained without reference to political and military factors. In

1930, the replacement of the president of the Portuguese Government enabled the Minister of

the Treasury, António Oliveira Salazar, to consolidate his position as a strong man of the

authoritarian republic established in 1926: two years later, in 1932, he was personally appointed

head of the government, an office he held without interruptions until 1968. The dictatorship of

Salazar, legally founded on the new constitution of 1933, introduced some corporatist elements

and defined itself as Estado Novo, New State, but was basically a highly conservative

authoritarian regime. The initial Estado Novo displayed, during the 1930’s and the 1940’s, a

ruralist discourse and put into practice a set of policies in favour of agriculture: between 1935 and

23

1950, a third of the investment foreseen in the state economic plan applied in those years was

directed towards the agrarian sector (Lains, 2003).

In the three decades before 1960, the Portuguese agriculture experienced a relatively rapid

growth in terms of output, land in cultivation and labour force. Portuguese agricultural output

grew at an annual rate of 2.42 % between 1930 and 1960, whilst the Spanish one between 1930

and 1958 only grew at a rate of 0.75 % (Lains, 2009; Prados, 2003). The clue element in the

increase of the agrarian output was not the land (even though the land cultivated reached its

maximum in the early 1950’s), the labour force (that grew to a historical maximum in 1950) or

capital investment (which, however, increased at unprecedented rates), but Total Factor

Productivity (Lains, 2009) that explained almost 79.7 % of the total increase in output.

This Portuguese agrarian expansion of the post-war period had three central features:

1. It was based upon the growth of the total area dedicated to cereal, under the protection of tariff

of 1899 and especially of the Campanha do trigo, launched in 1929 and designed to achieve full

self-sufficiency in cereals. In the 1950’s, feed grains replaced bread grains, increasing total output

through this specialization. Forest production also grew but vines and olive trees remained stable.

A new production mix, more dependent on the domestic market, was the actual outcome.

2. It did not bring about a wide technical innovation: labour productivity and land yields were very

stable. Labour saving mechanization did not spread because wages were very low and labour

plentiful. The consumption of chemical fertilizers nearly trebled between 1940 and 1960, but in

1956-60 the average amount of kg. of fertilizers per ha was 31.5 and in Spain, with a much

smaller increase in the previous years, was already 34.4.

3. In the third place, the structure of farm seizes and land property did not change very much. The

stability of land structures and the increase of rural population caused a land hunger that pushed

up land prices and rents and a hardening of contractual conditions. No reforms were introduced in

the regulation of land market until de 1960’s (Baptista, 1993). From 1934 and until 1944, Rafael

Duque, minister of Agriculture, presided over a far reaching agrarian policy (called by Rosas after

a contemporary agrarian author, 2000:160, neofisiocratismo), that tried to increase agrarian

production and redistribute the land through enclosures, incentives to division of large estates and

24

land acquisitions by the state. However, after 1945, the policy of extension of property, that faced

a strong resistance from the lobby of Southern landowners, was abandoned.

Rapid growth with limited technical progress and hardly any changes in land property or

tenure: a counter-model of the Spanish agriculture between 1929 and 1960. In Portugal, where

there was no civil war and a strict neutrality or a even a pro-ally stance was kept throughout

WW2, the 1930’s, the 1940’s and the 1950’s were a period of expansion of the agrarian output,

with an intensification of the use of the land –via a strong reduction in the fallow- achieved

through more labour inputs but especially through more and better agrarian inputs. In this country,

the agrarian discourse had a budgetary translation, both in the final 1920’s (when the campanha

do trigo [wheat campaign] was launched) and in the 1930’s and 1940’s. There was no budgetary

militarism as in Spain in the decade of 1940 and the defence industry was not stimulated via

preferential access to foreign currency and state investment during the international shortages of

machinery and primary resources during the 2nd World War. And furthermore, Portuguese

neutrality enabled salazarismo to escape the international blockade and to receive financial

support from the Marshall Plan.

From a lower initial point around 1929, the Portuguese agrarian sector grew faster than

the Spanish one and by 1960 it was much closer to it, thanks to an active public support. However

in the period 1962-73, whilst in Spain a far-reaching agrarian modernization was taking place that

combined growing production, a rapidly falling employment and a swift mechanization, output

diminished in Portugal with a similar abrupt fall of agrarian labour and a clear tendency towards a

dualistic economy with a very poor rural sector. Whereas in Spain profound transformations

resulted from the agrarian policies of a regime that aimed at defending a contested victory in a

civil war, the Portuguese state did not develop its ambitious corporatist Project, did not introduce

changes in the property and tenure legislation and delegated in the Church the literacy campaigns,

not only protecting but as well subsidizing at the same time the growth of traditional agriculture.

Between 1930 and 1960, growth without transformations and transformations without growth

seemed to be the alternative –although not really sought after- paths of the Iberian dictatorships.

25

Conclusion: transformations of Spanish agriculture and its limits

Spanish rural society underwent deep transformations under the pressure of the cycle of

economic crisis, political mobilization and war between 1930 and 1955. A long interruption of

agricultural change followed the outbreak of the Civil War, delaying for nearly twenty years the

recovery of pre-war productivities and yields. The official prices set by the State, well below the

equilibrium price, encouraged the development of a black market that altered the distribution of

income between agriculture and other sectors and, within the new legislation on tenure, induced

an ample redistribution of land in favour of farmers-owners. Thorough regulation of the agrarian

markets, defeat of rentiers and the acceleration of a process of acculturation under the strong

authority of an unchallenged administration, those were the ultimate results of the political

management that brought about the long post-war stagnation.

The general trends I have tried to underline were not very different from those in other

Western countries. The regulation of agrarian markets, the final crisis of rentism and rentiers

and the metamorphosis of the rural world into an economic sector are processes to be found

everywhere in the Western World in approximately the same decades and were brought about

by similar factors. However, similar does not mean identical.

Two decades of stagnation increased the gap between Spanish agriculture and the ones

of other Mediterranean countries such as Italy and France. Relative poverty and technical

backwardness was one of the reasons for the lack of visibility of the transformations in the

1950’s. The existence of an authoritarian political regime that had to seek consensus but was not

prepared to give any participation in public life to the rural population and promoted efficiently

a unilateral assimilation of the peasants into urban values and ways was the other one. Both

factors explain that whereas the loss of weight of agriculture and rural life was a gradual

evolution, smoothed by agrarian policies, in most Western European countries between the

1940’s and the 1980’s, it took the shape of a dramatic earthquake in Spain in the 1960’s. But a

dramatic earthquake that opened the gates of a rural society that had been deeply changed not of

a traditional –whatever tradition we refer to- as the comparison with Portugal contributes to

reveal.

26

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