Research Paper Two

7/30/2019 Research Paper Two

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The Language of Thought

The computational theory of mind in short likens the brain to a digital processor and/or

computer. It encompasses the banding of three theories: 1) the representational theory of mind, 2)

the casual-syntactic theory of mental processes, and 3) the language of thought hypothesis (Katz,

2009). The representational theory of mind suggests that propositional attitudes are relations

between subjects and mental representations(Katz, 2009). The casual-syntactic theory of mental

processes implies that mental processes are casual processes defined over the syntax of mental

representations(Katz, 2009). The language of thought hypothesis purports that mental

representations have a linguistic structure, or in other words, that thought takes place within a

mental language known as the language of thought, the topic of emphasis (Katz, 2009).

The language of thought hypothesis was first introduced by Jerry A. Fodor in his 1975 book,

The Language of Thought (Katz, 2009). The language of thought hypothesis constitutes two

combatant theories. The first of these theories being that, language of thought is learned and is

thus derived from ones natural language. The second theory confers that language of thought is

both innate and abstruse. In proceeding we will delve deeper into the two opposing theories of

the language of thought hypothesis.

The first theorem having that language of thought is learned and is thus derived from ones

natural language is cited in Sapir and Whorfs discourse on linguistic determinism and

Wittgensteins on meaning and representation. There are two versions of the Sapir-Whorf

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Hypothesis and/or the Whorfian Hypothesis. The first of these, the strong version, regards

linguistic determinism and asserts the notion that thoughts are limited and dependent on

language and its composition which influences ones thought patterns and how one interprets the

world around them (Aydede, 1998). The second of these, the weaker version, states that ones

natural language merely influences ones thoughts concerning the world (Aydede, 1998).

Together, the strong and weak version generally states that natural language and its composition

influences ones thought patterns and how one conceptualizes their world.

Wittgensteins discourse on meaning and representation is likewise the notion that thoughts

are limited and dependent on natural language and its composition. Moreover, words serve as

instruments of language employed for various conventions and through use construct our

thoughts and hence our reality (Biletzki, 2002). Further, the meaning of a word is not contingent

upon what it is meant to represent, but rather upon the context for which it is used (Biletzki,

2002). Summarily, Sapir, Whorf, and Wittgenstein concur that thoughts are fashioned from

natural language and its composition and are not independent of.

The latter theorem positing the language of thought as both innate and abstruse is cited in the

discourse of both Jerry Fodor (1975) and Steven Pinker (1994) and is recurrently labeled as

mentalese. Language of thought and/or mentalese is a representational structure of symbols

that employs both a combinatorial syntax and compositional semantics (Katz, 2009). Hence, it

does bare a resemblance to natural language in that it does have a linguistic structure. It is;

however, not equivalent. Both Pinker and Fodor theorize that mentalese is both an innate and

abstruse language of thought and that it is not dependent on nor limited by ones natural language

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and its composition. In fact, in The Language Instinct, Steven Pinker dubbed linguistic

determinism as a conventional absurdity(Pinker, 1994, p. 57). Both natural language and

language of thought and/or mentalese are completely separate and independent of one another. In

fact, people dont think in their natural language, but rather in language of thought and/or

mentalese (Pinker, 1994, p. 81).

Pinker recounted that the more he examined Whorfs arguments, the less sense they

made (1994, p. 60). Needless to say, there is no scientific evidence to substantiate the Sapir-

Whorf and/or Whorfian hypothesis.

The idea that language shapes thinking seemed plausible when scientists were in the

dark about how thinking works or even how to study it.There is; however, two sets of

tools that now make it easier to think clearly about the whole problem. One is a body of

experimental studies that break the word barrier and assess many kinds of nonverbal

thoughts. The other is a theory of how thinking might work in a satisfyingly precise way

(Pinker, 1994, pp. 58-59).

There are four key arguments for the language of thought and/or mentalese: 1) the language

of thought hypothesis is accepted by the whole of credible psychological models, 2) productivity

is an element of thought, 3) systematicity is an element of thought, and 4) inferential coherence

is an element of thought which are all properties of a representational system of symbols that are

linguistically structured(Katz, 2009).

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There are five chief arguments and/or complications regarding the language of thought

hypothesis and/or mentalese.

The first of these concerns the predicament of individuating the symbols of the language of

thought and/or mentalese. The second of these pertains to the difficulties in spelling-out the

context-dependent properties of thought which should not exist if thinking is indeed

computational. Third is an objection in that the language of thought hypothesis and/or mentalese

fails to encapsulate the whole of the nature of human thought as contemporary cognitive science

shows that some thinking takes places as mental images which do not have a linguistic structure.

The fourth objection suggests that systematicity, productivity, and inferential coherence may be

accounted for in representational systems that do not employ linguistic formats. The fifth

argument contends that connectionist networks, computational systems that do not employ

linguistic representation, provide a more biologically realistic model of the human brain than do

classical digital computers. The last of these simply raises the question as to whether or not the

mind is best viewed as an analog or digital machine(Katz,2009).

The debate between classicist theorist and connectionist theorist regarding the language of

thought hypothesis rages on giving rise to an excess of research, data, and literature in support of

either position. However, neither fully encapsulates the nature of human thought. In my humble

opinion the most plausible theorem would comprise the hypotheses of both classicist theorist and

connectionist theorist which as of late is a recent trend (Aydede, 1998).

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References:

Aydede, M. (1998). The Language of Thought Hypothesis.

In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October

15, 2011 from

Biletzki, A. (2002) Ludwig Wittgenstein. In Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 15, 2011

from

Katz, M. (2009). The Language of Thought Hypothesis. In

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 15,

2011 from < http://www.iep.utm.edu/lot-hypo/ >

Pinker, S. (1994). The Language Instinct. New York: W Morrow

and Company. Print.

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http://www.iep.utm.edu/lot-hypo/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/http://www.iep.utm.edu/lot-hypo/http://www.iep.utm.edu/lot-hypo/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/language-http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/language-

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Research Paper Two