Research Article Motivation System of Crowdsourcing ...downloads.hindawi.com/journals/mpe/2016/8306950.pdf · Crowdsourcing Community .Acrowdsourcingcommunityis the platform that

Research ArticleMotivation System of Crowdsourcing Communityfrom a Supply Chain Perspective

Jiangang Pang1,2 and Zhiying Liu2

1Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang, Sichuan 621010, China2University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui 230026, China

Correspondence should be addressed to Jiangang Pang; [email protected]

Received 7 December 2015; Accepted 9 June 2016

Academic Editor: Zhimin Huang

Copyright © 2016 J. Pang and Z. Liu. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

This paper uses principal-agent theory to study the issue of incentivizing crowdsourcing communities. It proves that enterprisescan generate innovation plans of high quality and expected utility using the crowdsourcing community. Outsourcers can encouragehigh-quality people to join by adopting a linear variable compensation scheme and make the low-quality people quit by requiringthem to supply more effort. The paper also shows that enterprises’ participation in crowdsourcing community innovation caneffectively improve their innovative ability and that it is necessary for enterprises to construct an effective and cooperative innovativesystem combining crowdsourcing community innovation and their own internal innovation.

1. Introduction

Rising competition forces enterprises to continuously exploreways to improve production. Furthermore, the developmentof the Internet has offered enterprises tools that encourageinnovation more broadly (open innovation based on theInternet is very popular inmany enterprises; e.g., IBMbuilt itsown innovation platform, Innovation Jam, in 2001; Dell builtthe Dell Online Community covering the functions of ideas-tom, directdell, dellforums, and studiodell in 2002; Inno-Centive, the global third-party Internet innovative platform,built in 2001, appealed to the world’s top 500 companies).In 2006, Howe defined the cooperative innovative model ofmass participation based on the Internet as crowdsourcing[1], wherein a company or an organization subcontractsassignments normally done by internal staff to online con-tractors. These assignments can include the development ofnew technology, completeness of a new design, improvementof a calculation method, and analysis of mass data, which areperformed by crowdsourcing communities such as Innova-tion Jam, Dell Online Community, InnoCentive, Starbucks,andWitkey. For such a crowdsourcingmodel to be successful,it is imperative that online contractors find it in their best

interest to participate. Therefore, it is important to designa motivation system for the crowdsourcing community thateffectively increases the initiative of participants and therebyenhance the quality of the output.

This paper analyzes incentive mechanisms on commu-nity-based crowdsourcing and studies how to best carryout the design of these incentive mechanisms. Through theanalysis of the enterprise, the community-based crowdsourc-ing business innovation scheme can obtain higher qualityand can bring about higher expected utility for enterprises.Contract-issuing party that participates in the crowdsourc-ing community process, using linear variable compensationincentive strategy, can get higher level network public partic-ipation and at the same time can generate general technicallevel network public participation but it needs to give up onputting a lot of effort on it and better enhance the innovationquality, putting forward linear crowdsourcing communityinnovation incentive mechanism design. Based on the con-clusions, putting forward enterprises to participate in thecrowdsourcing community innovation can be more effectivethan enhancing the innovation ability of the enterprises; atthe same time, the enterprises should establish innovationsystem based on crowdsourcing community innovation and

Hindawi Publishing CorporationMathematical Problems in EngineeringVolume 2016, Article ID 8306950, 8 pageshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/8306950

2 Mathematical Problems in Engineering

(Upstream)Outsourcer

(Downstream)

(Platform)Crowdsourcing

community

(Midstream)Outsourcee

(Online users)

Release tasks Accept tasks

Selection of solution Offer solutions

Figure 1: Crowdsourcing community supply chain.

enterprise innovation effective coordination. Before proceed-ing further, we define and clarify the jargon we use in thispaper.

1.1. Crowdsourcing Community Participants. In existingcrowdsourcing communities, the participants includeoutsourcers, the enterprises that need outsourcing services,and outsourcees, the solvers of problems (solvers ofproblems: in crowdsourcing community, participants mainlyinclude outsourcer (enterprises in need), crowdsourcingcommunity (crowdsourcing platform), and outsourcee(problem solvers, principally, are a mass participating crowd-sourcing community); the solvers of problems are the mainparticipant).

Outsourcers. The outsourcers are the enterprises or indi-viduals that need the outsourcing service. There are twoways in which the outsourcer releases tasks. One way is bybuilding a crowdsourcing community to attract outsourceesto solve problems by offering rewards. The other way is topartner with a third-party crowdsourcing community, suchas help.zhubajie.com and InnoCentive.

Outsourcees. The outsourcee refers to crowdsourcing userswho could be both professionals and nonprofessionals orteams who have an interest in and capability of studying tasksfrom all over the world. They can register via the third-partycrowdsourcing community and accept such agreements asthe selection of superior solutions, the fulfillment of offeringrewards, and disposal methods of intellectual property andthen serve as problem solvers who execute the activities ofsolving problems and submit solutions through the crowd-sourcing community.

Crowdsourcing Community. A crowdsourcing community isthe platform that connects outsourcers and outsourcees bydeveloping either a crowdsourcing community (e.g., Ama-zon, the online retail giant, provides crowdsourcing serviceplatform, Mechanical Turk) or a third-party crowdsourcingcommunity, such as help.zhubajie.com and InnoCentive.

1.2. Crowdsourcing Community Supply Chain. According tothe role and function of the participation body in the crowd-sourcing community, solving problems is the productionprocess of a crowdsourcing community, which builds thesupply chain of the crowdsourcing community, as shown inFigure 1.

In the crowdsourcing community supply chain, the out-sourcer who sits upstream subcontracts some internal tasksto online users through the crowdsourcing community andoffers them rewards; meanwhile, the outsourcer downstreamconsumes the innovative solution produced by themidstreamof the supply chain named outsourcee. The outsourcee isrewarded upon completion of tasks. The crowdsourcingcommunity is a link in the supply chain, providing theplatform that connects outsourcers and outsourcees. Thevalue of the entire supply chain rises with the participationof users.

It is apparent that the key to guaranteeing orderly oper-ation in the entire supply chain is keeping outsourcers andoutsourcees motivated so that they take a positive role inthe crowdsourcing community; therefore, it is significant andpractical to explore the motivation system of crowdsourcingcommunities.

1.3. Summary of CurrentMotivation Systems of CrowdsourcingCommunities. The current motivation systems of crowd-sourcing communities fall into three categories. In the first,the outsourcer offers fixed bonuses, which is what mostcrowdsourcing communities do. In the second way, theoutsourcers offer such awards as patents and accumulatedpoints according to outsourcee’s efforts. Participants pro-viding innovative ideas to the crowdsourcing platform canobtain patent grade points which can be exchanged forcash. In the third way, the crowdsourcing community offersawards; http://www.chinavalue.net/ offers one such example.This platform sends half its share to registered users, whocan accumulate by joining in innovative projects, such as thenumber of projects they participate in, the number of timesof winning the bidding, and the number of published articles,to obtain shares and bonus.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Outsourcees

2.1.1. Meeting the Psychological Needs. The research of Teresafrom the Business College at Harvard and Robert J. Stenbergfrom Yale University showed that creative people are goodself-motivators and are willing to listen to their psychologicalneeds. Therefore, many people participate in crowdsourcingfor entertainment, self-expression, self-test, and so forth [2,3]. Qiuyan showed that people pay the most attention toaspects such as fun, self-approval, and sense of belongingin a virtual community [4]. Most participants would like

Mathematical Problems in Engineering 3

to express their value proposition, to show their uniquelifestyle, to meet their psychological needs, and to gain theconveniences the products bring them.

2.1.2. Financial Returns. Crowdsourcing is growing in pop-ularity because people who offer creative solutions can getpaid [5]. Lakhani and Wolf investigated the participants ofSourceForge and found that one-third of interviewees indi-cated that receiving payment was their main motivation forjoining SourceForge [6]. In addition, Lakhani and vonHippelinvestigated outsourcees who have solved tasks and receivedpayment. The results of the investigation show that 65.8% ofthe interviewees have doctorate degrees and are engaging inscientific research and themain purpose of their participationis to get paid [7]. Organisciak tried to explain the participa-tion motives of users through Maslow’s hierarchy of needsand suggested that the purpose of participants is to meet theneeds of society and growth. However, the investigation of13 crowdsourcing websites showed that offering rewards canattract users to participate in crowdsourcing actively [8].

2.1.3. Learning New Knowledge and Skills. Brabham alsoinvestigated 651 participants of iStockphoto and the resultsshowed that learning new knowledge and skills is the primarymotivation for participation [9]. Through the Uses andGratifications Theory, Brabham explained that users wouldlike to take part in the creativity of the product because theycan learn from the community and get more benefits thanthe manufacturer [10]. Crowdsourcing community providesa platform for like-minded people to publish their creativityfreely which comprises sharing sources [11].

According to the summary and analysis of existingresearch, financial returns are themainmotivation for crowd-sourcing participants.

2.2. Outsourcers

2.2.1. Cost Reduction. Some researchers indicated thatcrowdsourcing released tasks online and did not requirerecruiting employees or setting up offices, which couldreduce great costs. Crowdsourcing offers a way to reducecosts [12–14].

2.2.2. Making Use of Collective Wisdom. Some online usershave the ability to solve specific problems. Under a similarlevel of knowledge and skills, the collective wisdom is betterthan a single wise person. A company can let volunteers fromall over the world and internal staff work together to solveproblems rather than forcing inner staff to learn continuously[15], which was supported by Xiao et al. who considered that,in a business economy, one problem cannot be solved by asingle person but requires people with different knowledge,information, and skills. Crowdsourcing makes full use of thiscollective wisdom using a network of people to solve complexproblems [16–18].

2.2.3. Producing Products More in Line with Consumers’Demand. Crowdsourcing is an example of the culture of

mass participation; that is, universal participation of crowd-sourcing enables many hobbyists to develop their talentsduring participation and interaction [19]. In many crowd-sourcing models, users will meet the requirements of moreaudiences and spread the information needed by themselves[20]. This production can better meet consumer needs, canshorten the distance between the brand and the users, and canestablish brand trust and strengthen customer loyalty. Usingsports television programs as an example, Shi pointed outthat sports game television programs are almost all the same.However, after adopting crowdsourcing, the programs havebeen diversified, which also stimulates the awareness of massparticipation. Using news media as an example, Wei pointedout that users can participate in a news release that made “mynews, I decide” come true [21].

The main purpose of outsourcers is to collect wisdomandfindhigher-quality solutions including better technology,more adaption to market, and lower costs.

From this discussion, we can see that a crowdsourc-ing community can exist and run effectively because theupstream, midstream, and downstream gains benefit fromthe supply chain.

3. Model Assumption

Themotivation system design of the supply chain in a crowd-sourcing community is the contract design between theoutsourcer and the outsourcee; that is, the outsourcer entrustsoutsourcees to finish innovative tasks through crowdsourcingcommunity expecting to get innovative solutions with ahigher quality while the outsourcees complete the tasksaccording to the requirements and get paid accordingly.

(1) Enterprises that release tasks are called outsourcer.Those enterprises are mutually independent and risk neutral.The outsourcer’s expected utility is equal to expected profit.

(2) Users who accept tasks are called the outsourcee.These users are mutually independent.

(3) 𝑤 is the regular fee the outsourcer pays, 𝑏 refersto the incentive pay factor, and 𝑤 is the regular paymentthe outsourcee gets. The incentive pay factor is the sharingproportion of the benefits the outsourcee gets from theoutsourcer.

(4) 𝑖 is the technical level of the outsourcee, where 𝑖 equalto 1 means the technical level is very high and 𝑖 equal to 2means the technical level is low.

(5) 𝑝𝑖is the probability the outsourcer chooses the

outsourcees. 𝑖 = 1 is the high technical level outsourcee. 𝑖 = 2

is the low technical level outsourcee. Therefore, 𝑝1+ 𝑝2= 1.

(6) 𝑎 is the quality of the innovative solution offered bythe outsourcee. Because the quality of the solution has a directimpact on the product or service offered by the outsourcer, itwill affect income; then income is an increasing function ofquality. We assume the function of the outsourcer’s income isa linear function, which can be expressed as

𝑅 (𝑎) = 𝑎 + 𝜔, (1)

where 𝜔 is the random variable from 0 to 𝛿2, which is the

exogenous uncertainty affecting the income.


(7)The outsourcer can affect the outsourcee’s decision byadjusting payments. We assume the payoff function is linearand can be expressed as

𝑇 (𝑅 (𝑎)) = 𝑤 + 𝑏𝑅 (𝑎) . (2)

(8) Outsourcee’s cost is a function of his/her innovationplan’s quality and technology level, denoted by 𝐶(𝑎, 𝑖). Forthe outsourcee at the same level, that is, on the conditionthat the value of 𝑖 is definite, the higher the quality of theprovided plan, the bigger the cost 𝐶. On the condition thatthe quality 𝑎 of the provided plan is definite, themarginal costof outsourcee, whose 𝑖 = 1, is lower than that of outsourcee,whose 𝑖 = 2; according to theoretical model of supply chainanalysis, set the cost function of outsourcee as 𝐶(𝑎, 𝑖) = 𝜃

𝑖𝑎2,

wherein 𝜃𝑖is outsourcers’ cost coefficient, according to the

difference of technology level of outsourcee, 𝜃1< 𝜃2.

(9) The maximum utility is recorded as 𝑢 when theoutsourcee does not perform any tasks.

According to the assumption, the expected income func-tion of the outsourcer can be expressed as

𝐸 (𝑅 (𝑎)) = 𝐸 (𝑎 + 𝜔) = 𝑎 Var (𝑅 (𝑎)) = 𝛿2. (3)

The expected utility is equal to the expected incomeminus the payment to the outsourcee; that is,

𝐸𝑈 = 𝐸 (𝑅 (𝑎) − 𝑇 (𝑅 (𝑎))) = 𝐸 (𝑎 + 𝜔 − 𝑤 − 𝑏𝑅 (𝑎))

= 𝑎 − 𝑤 − 𝑏𝑎.

(4)

Because the outsourcee is risk averse, the expected profit ofthe outsourcee is equal to the expected income minus thecost of payment and risk. Urban considered the risk costas (1/2)𝑟𝑏2𝛿2 [22], where 𝑟 is the risk measurement of theoutsourcee and 𝑟 ≥ 0. The expected income is the paymentby the outsourcer, given by𝑤+ 𝑏𝑅(𝑎). The cost of payment is𝜃𝑎2. The expected profit can be written as

𝐶𝐸 = 𝐸(𝑇 (𝑅 (𝑎)) − 𝐶 (𝑎, 𝑖) −

1

2

𝑟𝑏2𝛿2)

= 𝑤 + 𝑏𝑎 − 𝜃𝑎2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏2𝛿2.

(5)

The equivalent utility of the outsourcee is equal to theexpected profit. Therefore, to motivate the outsourcee totake part in the crowdsourcing community, the design ofmotivation system must meet the outsourcee’s participationconstraint and incentive compatible constraint.

The outsourcee’s participation constraint is

𝑤𝑖+ 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑖− 𝜃𝑖𝑎𝑖

2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏𝑖

2𝛿2≥ 𝑢 𝑖 = 1, 2. (6)

The outsourcee’s incentive compatible constraint is

𝑤1+ 𝑏1𝑎1− 𝜃1𝑎1

2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏1

2𝛿2

≥ 𝑤2+ 𝑏2𝑎2− 𝜃2𝑎2

2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏2

2𝛿2.

(7)

And the maximum value is max𝐶𝐸. Supposing 𝜕𝐶𝐸/𝜕𝑎 = 0,then

𝑎𝑖=

𝑏𝑖

2𝜃𝑖

𝑖 = 1, 2. (8)

Based on the above analysis, the model of the motivationsystem is

max ∑

𝑖

𝑝𝑖(𝑎𝑖− 𝑤𝑖− 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑖) 𝑖 = 1, 2

s.t. (𝐼𝑅) 𝑤𝑖+ 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑖− 𝜃𝑖𝑎𝑖

2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏𝑖

2𝛿2≥ 𝑢 𝑖 = 1, 2

(𝐼𝐶)𝑤1+ 𝑏1𝑎1− 𝜃1𝑎1

2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏1

2𝛿2

≥ 𝑤2+ 𝑏2𝑎2− 𝜃2𝑎2

2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏2

2𝛿2

𝑖 = 1, 2

𝑎𝑖=

𝑏𝑖

2𝜃𝑖

𝑖 = 1, 2.

(9)

4. Model Analysis

4.1. Outsourcer Adopts the Same Fixed Payment and IncentiveCoefficient for All Outsourcees. Assuming the fixed paymentand incentive coefficient offered by the outsourcer are (��, 𝑏),then the model of motivation system should be

max ∑

𝑖

𝑝𝑖(𝑎𝑖− �� −

𝑏𝑎𝑖) 𝑖 = 1, 2 (10)

s.t. (𝐼𝑅) �� +𝑏𝑎𝑖− 𝜃𝑖𝑎𝑖

2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏

2

𝛿2≥ 𝑢 𝑖 = 1, 2 (11)

(𝐼𝐶) �� +𝑏𝑎1− 𝜃1𝑎1

2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏

2

𝛿2

≥ �� +𝑏𝑎2− 𝜃2𝑎2

2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏

2

𝛿2

𝑖 = 1, 2

(12)

𝑎𝑖=

𝑏

2𝜃𝑖

𝑖 = 1, 2. (13)

Putting (13) into (10) and (11), the Lagrange equation can bebuilt as

Γ = max∑𝑖

𝑝𝑖(

𝑏

2𝜃𝑖

− �� −𝑏

𝑏

2𝜃𝑖

)

+∑

𝑖

𝜆𝑖(�� +

𝑏

𝑏

2𝜃𝑖

− 𝜃𝑖(

𝑏

2𝜃𝑖

)

2

−

1

2

𝑟𝑏

2

𝛿2− 𝑢) .

(14)


When 𝜆1= 0, 𝜆

2= 1, the optimal first-order condition can

be solved as

𝑏 =

𝑝1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1

2𝜃1𝜃2𝑟𝛿2+ 2 (𝑝

1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1) − 𝜃1

. (15)

Putting 𝑏 into (13), we get

��1=


2𝜃1[2𝜃1𝜃2𝑟𝛿2+ 2 (𝑝

1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1) − 𝜃1]

��2=


2𝜃2[2𝜃1𝜃2𝑟𝛿2+ 2 (𝑝

1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1) − 𝜃1]

.

(16)

��1, ��2are the quality of innovation plan provided by

outsourcee with high-level technology and outsourcee withaverage-level technology, when outsourcers provide the sameregular compensation and incentive coefficient.

Putting the result of 𝑏, ��2into (11), we get

�� = 𝑢 +

(2𝜃2𝑟𝛿2− 1) (𝑝

1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1)2

4𝜃2[2𝜃1𝜃2𝑟𝛿2+ 2 (𝑝

1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1) − 𝜃1]2. (17)

Putting ��, 𝑏 into (10) and (5), we get

𝐸�� =

(𝑝1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1)2

4𝜃1𝜃2[2𝜃1𝜃2𝑟𝛿2+ 2 (𝑝

1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1) − 𝜃1]

− 𝑢

𝐶��1=

(𝑝1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1)2(𝜃2− 𝜃1)

4𝜃1𝜃2[2𝜃1𝜃2𝑟𝛿2+ 2 (𝑝

1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1) − 𝜃1]2+ 𝑢

𝐶��2= 𝑢.

(18)

4.2. Outsourcer Adopts Different Fixed Payment and IncentiveCoefficient to All Outsourcees. Assuming the fixed paymentand incentive coefficient offered by the outsourcer are (𝑤

𝑖, 𝑏𝑖),

𝑖 = 1, 2, then the model of motivation system is

max ∑

𝑖

𝑝𝑖(𝑎𝑖− 𝑤𝑖− 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑖) 𝑖 = 1, 2 (19)

s.t. (𝐼𝑅) 𝑤𝑖+ 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑖− 𝜃𝑖𝑎𝑖

2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏𝑖

2𝛿2≥ 𝑢 𝑖 = 1, 2 (20)

(𝐼𝐶)𝑤1+ 𝑏1𝑎1− 𝜃1𝑎1

2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏1

2𝛿2

≥ 𝑤2+ 𝑏2𝑎2− 𝜃2𝑎2

2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏2

2𝛿2

𝑖 = 1, 2

(21)

𝑎𝑖=

𝑏𝑖

2𝜃𝑖

𝑖 = 1, 2. (22)

Putting (22) into (19), (20), and (21), the Lagrange equationcan be built as

Γ = max∑𝑖

𝑝𝑖(

𝑏𝑖

2𝜃𝑖

− 𝑤𝑖−

𝑏𝑖

2

2𝜃𝑖

)

+∑

𝑖

𝜆𝑖(𝑤𝑖+

𝑏𝑖

2

4𝜃𝑖

−

1

2

𝑟𝑏𝑖

2𝛿2− 𝑢)

+ 𝜏 [(𝑤1+

𝑏1

2

4𝜃1

−

1

2

𝑟𝑏1

2𝛿2)

− (𝑤2+

𝑏2

2

2𝜃2

−

𝜃1𝑏2

2

4𝜃2

2−

1

2

𝑟𝑏2

2𝛿2)] .

(23)

The optimal first-order condition can be calculated as 𝜆1= 0,

𝜆2= 1, 𝜏 = 𝑝

1:

𝑏1=

1

1 + 2𝜃1𝑟𝛿2

𝑏2=

𝑝2𝜃2

2𝑝2𝜃2

2𝑟𝛿2+ 𝜃2− 𝑝1𝜃1

𝑤1= 𝑢 +

𝑝2

2(𝜃2− 𝜃1)

4 (2𝑝2𝜃2

2𝑟𝛿2+ 𝜃2− 𝑝1𝜃1)

2

+

2𝜃1𝑟𝛿2− 1

4𝜃1(1 + 2𝜃

1𝑟𝛿2)2

𝑤2= 𝑢 +

𝜃2𝑝2

2(2𝜃2𝑟𝛿2− 1)

4 (2𝑝2𝜃2

2𝑟𝛿2+ 𝜃2− 𝑝1𝜃1)

2.

(24)

Putting 𝑏1, 𝑏2into (22), we get

𝑎1=

1

2𝜃1(1 + 2𝜃

1𝑟𝛿2)

𝑎2=

𝑝2

4𝑝2𝜃2

2𝑟𝛿2+ 2𝜃2− 2𝑝1𝜃1

.

(25)

Putting 𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑏1, and 𝑏

2into (19) and (5), we get

𝐸𝑈 =

2𝑝2𝑟𝛿2(𝑝1𝜃2

2+ 𝑝2𝜃1

2) + 𝑝1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1− 𝑝1𝜃1

4𝜃1(1 + 2𝜃

1𝑟𝛿2) (2𝑝2𝜃2

2𝑟𝛿2+ 𝜃2− 𝑝1𝜃1)

− 𝑢

𝐶𝐸1= 𝑢 +

(𝜃2− 𝜃1) 𝑝2

2

4 (2𝑝2𝜃2

2𝑟𝛿2+ 𝜃2− 𝑝1𝜃1)

2

𝐶𝐸2= 𝑢.

(26)

Proposition 1. On the condition that outsourcers providethe same regular compensation and incentive coefficient, out-sourcee with high-level technology will provide higher-levelinnovation plan. That is, on the condition that outsourcersprovide the single regular compensation, crowdsourcing com-munity can select outsourcee with higher-level outsourcee foroutsourcers.


Comparing ��1with ��

2, we get ��

1/��2= 𝜃2/𝜃1; since 𝜃

2>

𝜃1, therefore ��

1> ��2.

Proposition 2. When the outsourcer offers a different fixedpayment and incentive coefficient, the outsourcee with ahigher technical level will also offer a higher-quality solution.Therefore, the crowdsourcing community can also select theoutsourcee with a higher technical level when offering varioussystems of payment.

Because 𝜃2> 𝜃1,

𝑎2=

𝑝2

4𝑝2𝜃2

2𝑟𝛿2+ 2𝜃2− 2𝑝1𝜃1

<

𝑝2

4𝑝2𝜃2

2𝑟𝛿2+ 2𝜃2− 2𝑝1𝜃2

.

(27)

According to the assumption, 𝑝1+ 𝑝2= 1. Then, we get

𝑝2

4𝑝2𝜃2

2𝑟𝛿2+ 2𝜃2− 2𝑝1𝜃2

=

𝑝2

2𝜃2(2𝑝2𝜃2𝑟𝛿2+ 1 − 𝑝

1)

=

𝑝2

2𝜃2(2𝑝2𝜃2𝑟𝛿2+ 𝑝2)

=

1

2𝜃2(1 + 2𝜃

2𝑟𝛿2)

<

1

2𝜃1(1 + 2𝜃

1𝑟𝛿2)

= 𝑎1.

(28)

Therefore, 𝑎1> 𝑎2.

Corollary 3. No matter what kind of incentive measurementis adopted by outsourcers, the crowdsourcing community canselect outsourcee with higher-level outsourcee for outsourcers.Crowdsourcing innovation can bring innovation plan withhigher-tech quality for enterprises and benefit enterprises’innovation.

Proposition 4. On the condition that outsourcers provide lin-ear variable compensation, outsourcee with high-level technol-ogywill provide higher-level innovation plan. It is in accordancewith practical state. Because of the innovation planwith higher-tech quality provided by outsourcee, the outsourcers’ income aswell as outsourcee’s income can be increased, so outsourcees arewilling to provide innovation plan with higher quality. In fact,they are obtaining a future option income.

First, let us compare ��1with 𝑎

1. Hence,

��1=


2𝜃1[2𝜃1𝜃2𝑟𝛿2+ 2 (𝑝

1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1) − 𝜃1]

𝑎1=

1

2𝜃1(1 + 2𝜃

1𝑟𝛿2)

.

(29)

The result is ��1< 𝑎1.

Second, let us compare ��2with 𝑎

2. Hence,

��2=


2𝜃2[2𝜃1𝜃2𝑟𝛿2+ 2 (𝑝

1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1) − 𝜃1]

𝑎2=

𝑝2

4𝑝2𝜃2

2𝑟𝛿2+ 2𝜃2− 2𝑝1𝜃1

.

(30)

When 𝑝1𝜃2− 𝑝2𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1> 0, the result is ��

2> 𝑎2.

Corollary 5. When the outsourcer offers the differentiatedpayment, the outsourcee with a normal technical level will offera lower-quality solution compared with the offer of a fixedpayment. Because the outsourcee with a normal technical levelis pessimistic about future earnings, he will not try his best tooffer a high-quality solution.

Proposition 6. No matter what payment strategy is adopted,the expected utility of an outsourcee with high technical levelwill be higher than that of an outsourcee with a normaltechnical level. Therefore, rewarding those outsourcees with ahigher technical level is an effective way for motivation.

Comparing 𝐶��1, 𝐶𝐸1, 𝐶��2, 𝐶𝐸2

𝐶��1=

(𝑝1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1)2(𝜃2− 𝜃1)

4𝜃1𝜃2[2𝜃1𝜃2𝑟𝛿2+ 2 (𝑝

1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1) − 𝜃1]2+ 𝑢

𝐶��2= 𝑢

𝐶𝐸1= 𝑢 +

(𝜃2− 𝜃1) 𝑝2

2

4 (2𝑝2𝜃2

2𝑟𝛿2+ 𝜃2− 𝑝1𝜃1)

2

𝐶𝐸2= 𝑢.

(31)

Because (𝑝1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1)2(𝜃2− 𝜃1)/4𝜃1𝜃2[2𝜃1𝜃2𝑟𝛿2+ 2(𝑝

1𝜃2+

𝑝2𝜃1) − 𝜃1]2> 0, we can get 𝐶��

1> 𝐶��2.

And because (𝜃2− 𝜃1)𝑝2

2/4(2𝑝

2𝜃2

2𝑟𝛿2+ 𝜃2− 𝑝1𝜃1)2> 0,

then 𝐶𝐸1> 𝐶𝐸2.

We get 𝐶��1

< 𝐶𝐸1, 𝐶��2

= 𝐶𝐸2by calculating the

differences.

Proposition 7. On the condition that outsourcers providelinear variable compensation, outsourcee with high-level tech-nology will obtain higher expected utility than that on thecondition of single compensation. Outsourcee with average-level technology will obtain the same expected utility undertwo circumstances. Linear variable compensation incentivecan stimulate outsourcee with high-level technology ratherthan outsourcee with average-level technology. Outsourcers uselinear variable compensation strategy that can attract moreoutsourcees with high-level technology.

Proposition 8. According to Proposition 6, the outsourcer willget a higher-quality solution, which brings about increasedincome when adopting the diversified payment strategy. There-fore, the outsourcer can get a higher expected utility whenadopting the diversified payment strategy.

Comparing 𝐸��, 𝐸𝑈

𝐸�� =

(𝑝1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1)2

4𝜃1𝜃2[2𝜃1𝜃2𝑟𝛿2+ 2 (𝑝

1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1) − 𝜃1]

− 𝑢

𝐸𝑈 =

2𝑝2𝑟𝛿2(𝑝1𝜃2

2+ 𝑝2𝜃1

2) + 𝑝1𝜃2+ 𝑝2𝜃1− 𝑝1𝜃1

4𝜃1(1 + 2𝜃

1𝑟𝛿2) (2𝑝2𝜃2

2𝑟𝛿2+ 𝜃2− 𝑝1𝜃1)

− 𝑢.

(32)

Then, we can find 𝐸�� < 𝐸𝑈 through calculation.


a

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

𝜃1

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

a1

a2

a1

1

a1

2

Figure 2: Trend of quality under various conditions.

𝜃1

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

CE

10.15

10.1

10.05

10

9.95

9.9

CE1

CE2

CE1

1

CE1

2

Figure 3: Trends of expected utilities.

4.3. Numerical Analysis. This part is to carry out exampleanalysis in MATLAB, to concretely test the results from themodels. The parameters in examples are the concrete valuesin the following parts. ��

1and ��2will be represented as 𝑎

1

1 and𝑎2

1 in the MATLAB input. 𝐶��1and 𝐶��

2will be represented

as 𝐶��1

1 and 𝐶��2

1 in the MATLAB input.When 𝜃

2= 1, the abscissa is 𝜃

1increasing (from 0.1 to 1),

as shown in Figures 2 and 3.It is shown in Figure 2 that (1) ��

1> ��2, 𝑎1> 𝑎2. That

is, no matter what kind of incentive mechanism is adopted,outsourcee with high-level technology can provide plan withhigher quality. It is in accordance with the conclusions ofPropositions 1 and 2 and Corollary 3. (2) One has 𝑎

1> ��1,

��2> 𝑎2. That is, when linear variable compensation is used,

outsourcee with high-level technology can provide plan withhigher quality, and outsourcee with average-level technologycan provide plan with lower quality. It is in accordance withthe conclusions of Proposition 4 and Corollary 5.

It is shown in Figure 3 that (1) 𝐶��1> 𝐶��

2, 𝐶𝐸1> 𝐶𝐸2.

Nomatter what kind of incentivemechanism is used, the out-sourcee with high-level technology will have higher expectedutility, in accordance with the conclusion of Proposition 6.(2) One has 𝐶��

1< 𝐶𝐸

1, 𝐶��2= 𝐶𝐸

2; that is, under the

linear variable compensation strategy, outsourcee with high-level technology will obtain higher expected utility than thaton the condition of single compensation, and outsourceewith average-level technology will obtain the same expectedutility under two circumstances. It is in accordance with theconclusion of Proposition 7.

5. Results and Discussion

The model results have strong practical significance forcrowdsourcing community design.

Firstly, no matter which kind of incentive mechanism isadopted, outsourcers can select the best innovation plan toimprove innovation efficiency. The development of the Inter-net helped to develop open innovation and mass productionand to release collective intelligence. Meanwhile, customers’needs becomemore various. Only when products sufficientlymeet customers’ need can they be sold on the market.Users innovation becomes the best way for enterprises tomerge customers’ needs. Outsourcees, as the online mass incrowdsourcing community, are the designers of innovationplans and customers. In fact, they are the users’ innovation.They have a better idea about customers’ needs, so theinnovation plans are more attuned to customers’ willingness.Therefore, crowdsourcing community can select the optimalinnovation plan for enterprises. Meanwhile, because of thelow cost of operating on the Internet, the selecting process isof low cost.Therefore, it is a beneficial strategy for enterprisesto participate in crowdsourcing. In reality, it is the reasonwhy the global top 500 companies actively take part incrowdsourcing.

Secondly, linear variable compensation strategy is out-sourcers’ better bid strategy choice. This conclusion providesbasis for outsourcers’ bid. In reality, there is a “lemon effect”(lemon effect: the most famous Akeerluofu thought is theso-called lemon market theory; ripe lemon is sweet, buta man says the green lemon is sweet, because he onlyhas green lemon; this is a kind of negative psychologicaldefense; there is a serious problem of information asym-metry between enterprises and IT enterprises; in an ITgame between enterprises and enterprise customers, the finalresult is often a suboptimal choice, that is, the so-called“lemon effect”) in crowdsourcing community innovation.Single regular compensation strategy makes online mass ofoutsourcees select simple crowdsourcing projects, and theyare unwilling to invest more spare time in crowdsourcingprojects. At the same time, because of simplifying tasks,outsourcers are unwilling to pay more, so the “lemon effect”comes into being.Weneed to extend the contract relationshipbetween the outsourcer and the outsourcee. One strategyis that outsourcers provide longer-term compensation tostimulate outsourcee to participate in innovation continually.Just like continually upgrading software, outsourcers makeoutsourcees optimize their project design again and again.

6. Conclusions

This paper analyzed the motivation system of a crowdsourc-ing community from the perspective of the supply chainand designed a motivation system. The analysis showed thatthe outsourcer of an enterprise will get a higher-qualitysolution through the crowdsourcing community. Duringparticipation in a crowdsourcing community, the outsourcerwill encourage more outsourcees with high technical level tojoin and force some of the outsourcees with normal technicallevel to quit in order to improve the quality of the solution


as long as the outsourcer adopts a diversified paymentstrategy.

However, this work has at least the following limitation,which will be studied in the future. In this motivation systemdesign, we assume the users (the outsourcees) are mutuallyindependent. However, users influence each other by mutuallearning and interaction, which will be the focus of the nextstudy.

Competing Interests

The authors declare that there are no competing interestsregarding the publication of this paper.

Acknowledgments

Thiswork is supported by theNational Natural Science Foun-dation of China (no. 71472172), Social Science Foundation ofSichuan (no. SC13E012), Soft Science Foundation of Sichuan(no. 2015ZR0167), and Foundation of Sichuan Library andIntelligence Research Center (no. SCTQ2016YB15).

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Research Article Motivation System of Crowdsourcing ...downloads.hindawi.com/journals/mpe/2016/8306950.pdf · Crowdsourcing Community .Acrowdsourcingcommunityis the platform that