Requisite of Judicial Review

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner, vs.SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS,respondents.

Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V. Gallego and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon forrespondents.

BENGZON, J.:

The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 andCommonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners ofschools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process oflaw; B. They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency;and C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion toprescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.

A printed memorandum explaining their positionin extenso is attached to the record.

The Government's legal representative submitted a mimeographed memorandum contending that,(1) the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding theconstitutional questions; (2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; and

(3) the Acts are constitutionally valid.

Petitioners submitted a lengthy reply to the above arguments.

Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection and recognition of privateschools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction." Under its provisions, theDepartment of Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated all private schools inthis country apparently without audible protest, nay, with the general acquiescence of the generalpublic and the parties concerned.

It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider petitioner'sdemand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as respondents assert, petitioners

suffered no wrongnor allege anyfrom the enforcement of the criticized statute.

It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is onewhich the judge, conscious of the fallability of the human judgment, will shrink fromexercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and officialoath decline the responsibility. (Cooley Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 332.)


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When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have becomedependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. (C. J. S. 16, p.204.)

As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extentthat, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the

protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.)

In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate aschool is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval orpermit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, apractice abhorent to our system of law and government. Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of

Act No. 2706 as amended which provides that before a private school may be opened to the public itmust first obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education. The Solicitor General on the other handpoints out that none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them havepermits to operate and areactually operating by virtue of their permits.1And they do not assert thatthe respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have sufferedno wrong under the terms of lawand, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain.

It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger ofsustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merelya general to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislativeaction he must show that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of thepublic. (Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 82 L. Ed. 493.)

Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails toshow that he is injured by its operation. (Tylervs. Judges, 179 U. S. 405;Hendrickvs. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Coffmanvs.Breeze Corp., 323 U. S. 316-325.)

The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigantrequire the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, ahypothetical threat being insufficient. (United Public Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U .S. 75; 91 L.Ed. 754.)

Bona fide suit.Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies.The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such caseswhere conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed ascontrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessityin the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. (Taada andFernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 1138.)

Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of oneof petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. (Cf. Com.ex rel Watkinsvs. Winchester

Waterworks (Ky.) 197 S. W. 2d. 771.)

And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief.(Salongavs. Warner Barnes, L-2245, January, 1951.) Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academicquestions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may be. Thisis specially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into playregard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomesevasion." (Ricevs. Sioux City, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Rep., May 23, 1995, Law Ed., Vol. 99, p. 511.)


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The above notwithstanding, in view of the several decisions of the United States Supreme Courtquoted by petitioners, apparently outlawing censorship of the kind objected to by them, we havedecided to look into the matter, lest they may allege we refuse to act even in the face of clearviolation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property.

Petitioners complain thatbefore opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the

Secretary of Education. Such requirement was not originally included in Act No. 2706. It wasintroduced by Commonwealth Act No. 180 approved in 1936. Why?

In March 1924 the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 3162 creating a Board of EducationalSurvey to make a study and survey of education in the Philippines and of all educational institutions,facilities and agencies thereof. A Board chairmaned by Dr. Paul Munroe, Columbia University,assisted by a staff of carefully selected technical members performed the task, made a five-monththorough and impartial examination of the local educational system, and submitted a report withrecommendations, printed as a book of 671 pages. The following paragraphs are taken from suchreport:

PRIVATE-ADVENTURE SCHOOLS

There is no law or regulation in the Philippine Islands today to prevent a person, howeverdisqualified by ignorance, greed, or even immoral character, from opening a school to teachthe young. It it true that in order to post over the door "Recognized by the Government," aprivate adventure school must first be inspected by the proper Government official, but arefusal to grant such recognition does not by any means result in such a school ceasing toexist. As a matter of fact, there are more such unrecognized private schools than of therecognized variety. How many, no one knows, as the Division of Private Schools keepsrecords only of the recognized type.

Conclusion.An unprejudiced consideration of the fact presented under the caption PrivateAdventure Schools leads but to one conclusion, viz.: the great majority of them from primarygrade to university are money-making devices for the profit of those who organize andadminister them. The people whose children and youth attend them are not getting what theypay for. It is obvious that the system constitutes a great evil. That it should be permitted toexist with almost no supervision is indefensible. The suggestion has been made with thereference to the private institutions of university grade that some board of control beorganized under legislative control to supervise their administration. The Commissionbelieves that the recommendations it offers at the end of this chapter are more likely to bringabout the needed reforms.

Recommendations.The Commission recommends that legislation be enacted to prohibitthe opening of any school by an individual or organization without the permission of theSecretary of Public Instruction. That before granting such permission the Secretary assurehimself that such school measures up to proper standards in the following respects, and that

the continued existence of the school be dependent upon its continuing to conform to theseconditions:

(1) The location and construction of the buildings, the lighting and ventilation of the rooms,the nature of the lavatories, closets, water supply, school furniture and apparatus, andmethods of cleaning shall be such as to insure hygienic conditions for both pupils andteachers.


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(2) The library and laboratory facilities shall be adequate to the needs of instruction in thesubjects taught.

(3) The classes shall not show an excessive number of pupils per teacher. The Commissionrecommends 40 as a maximum.

(4) The teachers shall meet qualifications equal to those of teachers in the public schools ofthe same grade.

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In view of these findings and recommendations, can there be any doubt that the Government in theexercise of its police power to correct "a great evil" could validly establish the "previous permit"system objected to by petitioners? This is what differentiates our law from the other statutesdeclared invalid in other jurisdictions. And if any doubt still exists, recoursemay now be had to theprovision of our Constitution that "All educational institutions shall be under the supervision andsubject to regulation by the State." (Art. XIV, sec. 5.) The power to regulate establishments orbusiness occupations implies the power to require a permit or license. (53 C. J. S. 4.)

What goes for the "previous permit" naturally goes for the power to revoke such permit on account ofviolation of rules or regulations of the Department.

II. This brings us to the petitioners' third proposition that the questioned statutes "conferring on theSecretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute anunlawful delegation of legislative power."

This attack is specifically aimed at section 1 of Act No. 2706 which, as amended, provides:

It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard ofefficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish

adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction givenin them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall haveauthority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine theefficiency of instruction given in the same,

"Nowhere in this Act" petitioners argue "can one find any description, either general or specific, ofwhat constitutes a 'general standard of efficiency.' Nowhere in this Act is there any indication of anybasis or condition to ascertain what is 'adequate instruction to the public.' Nowhere in this Act isthere any statement of conditions, acts, or factors, which the Secretary of Education must take intoaccount to determine the 'efficiency of instruction.'"

The attack on this score is also extended to section 6 which provides:

The Department of Education shall from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet formthe minimum standards required of primary, intermediate, and high schools, and collegesgranting the degrees of Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science, or any other academicdegree. It shall also from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimumstandards required of law, medical, dental, pharmaceutical, engineering, agricultural andother medical or vocational schools or colleges giving instruction of a technical, vocational orprofessional character.


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Petitioners reason out, "this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretaryof Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. Inplain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive authority of thelegislature to formulate standard. . . .."

It is quite clear the two sections empower and require the Secretary of Education to prescribe rules

fixing minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction to be observed by all such privateschools and colleges as may be permitted to operate. The petitioners contend that as the legislaturehas not fixed the standards, "the provision is extremely vague, indefinite and uncertain"and for thatreason constitutionality objectionable. The best answer is that despite such alleged vagueness theSecretary of Educationhas fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, as shownby the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school calendars, entrance and finalexaminations, admission and accreditation of students etc.; and the system of private education has,in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. Which only shows that the Legislature didand could, validly rely upon the educational experience and training of those in charge of theDepartment of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate instructionas the basis of government recognition of any private school.

At any rate, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered withtheir operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail the validity of the power nor theexercise of the power by the Secretary of Education.

True, the petitioners assert that, the Secretary has issued rules and regulations "whimsical andcapricious" and that such discretionary power has produced arrogant inspectors who "bully headsand teachers of private schools." Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those regulationsspecifically, and/or to ring those inspectors to book, in proper administrative or judicialproceedingsnot to invalidate the law. For it needs no argument, to show that abuse by the officialsentrusted with the execution of a statute does notper se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of suchstatute.

Anyway, we find the defendants' position to be sufficiently sustained by the decision inAlegra vs.

Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394 upon holding the statute that authorized the Director ofAgriculture to"designate standards for the commercial grades of abaca, maguey and sisal" againstvigorous attacks on the ground of invalid delegation of legislative power.

Indeed "adequate and efficient instruction" should be considered sufficient, in the same way as"public welfare" "necessary in the interest of law and order" "public interest" and "justice and equityand substantial merits of the case" have been held sufficient as legislative standards justifyingdelegation of authority to regulate. (See Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p.793, citing Philippine cases.)

On this phase of the litigation we conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislativepower.

In this connection, and to support their position that the law and the Secretary of Education havetranscended the governmental power of supervision and regulation, the petitioners appended a listof circulars and memoranda issued by the said Department. However they failed to indicate which ofsuch official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being "capricious," or pain "nuisance";and it is one of our decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised,insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will not consider it. (Santiago vs. Far Eastern, 73Phil., 408.)


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We are told that such list will give an idea of how the statute has placed in the hands of theSecretary of Education complete control of the various activities of private schools, and why thestatute should be struck down as unconstitutional. It is clear in our opinion that the statute does notin express terms give the Secretarycompletecontrol. It gives him powers to inspect private schools,to regulate their activities, to give them official permits to operate under certain conditions, and torevoke such permits for cause. This does not amount tocomplete control. If any of such Department

circulars or memoranda issued by the Secretary go beyond the bounds of regulation and seeks toestablishcomplete control, it would surely be invalid. Conceivably some of them are of this nature,but besides not having before us the text of such circulars, the petitioners have omitted to specify. Inany event with the recent approval of Republic Act No. 1124 creating the National Board ofEducation, opportunity for administrative correction of the supposed anomalies or encroachments isamply afforded herein petitioners. A more expeditious and perhaps more technically competentforum exists, wherein to discuss the necessity, convenience or relevancy of the measures criticizedby them. (See also Republic Act No. 176.)

If however the statutes in question actually give the Secretary control over private schools, thequestion arises whether the power of supervision and regulation granted to the State by section 5

Article XIV was meant to include control of private educational institutions. It is enough to point outthat local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for control of Education by the State.(See Tolentino, Government of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. II, p. 615; Benitez, Philippine SocialLife and Progress, p. 335.)

The Constitution (it) "provides for state control of all educational institutions" even as it enumeratescertain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personaldiscipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship.(Malcolm & Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1936.)

The Solicitor General cities many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power tocontrol, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State controlof private education was intended by the organic law. It is significant to note that the Constitutiongrants power to supervise and to regulate. Which may mean greater power than mere regulation.

III. Another grievance of petitionersprobably the most significantis the assessment of 1 per centlevied on gross receipts of all private schools for additional Government expenses in connection withtheir supervision and regulation. The statute is section 11-A of Act No. 2706 as amended byRepublic Act No. 74 which reads as follows:

SEC. 11-A. The total annual expense of the Office of Private Education shall be met by theregular amount appropriated in the annual Appropriation Act:Provided, however, That foradditional expenses in the supervision and regulation of private schools, colleges anduniversities and in the purchase of textbook to be sold to student of said schools, collegesand universities and President of the Philippines may authorize the Secretary of Instructionto levy an equitable assessment from each private educational institution equivalent to one

percent of the total amount accruing from tuition and other fees: . . . and non-payment of theassessment herein provided by any private school, college or university shall be sufficientcause for the cancellation by the Secretary of Instruction of the permit for recognition grantedto it.

Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional rightthe right to open aschool, the liberty to teach etc. They claim this is unconstitutional, in the same way that taxes on theprivilege of selling religious literature or of publishing a newspaperboth constitutional privilegeshave been held, in the United States, to be invalid as taxes on the exercise of a constitutional right.


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The Solicitor General on the other hand argues that insofar as petitioners' action attempts to restrainthe further collection of the assessment, courts have no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of taxesby injunction, and in so far as they seek to recover fees already paid the suit, it is one against theState without its consent. Anyway he concludes, the action involving "the legality of any tax impost orassessment" falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.

There are good grounds in support of Government's position. If this levy of 1 per cent is truly a merefeeand not a taxto finance the cost of the Department's duty and power to regulate andsupervise private schools, the exaction may be upheld; but such point involves investigation andexamination of relevant data, which should best be carried out in the lower courts. If on the otherhand it is a tax, petitioners' issue would still be within the original jurisdiction of the Courts of FirstInstance.

The last grievance of petitioners relates to the validity of Republic Act No. 139 which in its section 1provides:

The textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the governmentshall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit

the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend thedignity and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to beagainst the general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogicallyunsuitable.

This power of the Board, petitioners aver, is censorship in "its baldest form". They cite two U. S.cases (Miss. and Minnesota) outlawing statutes that impose previous restraints upon publication ofnewspapers, or curtail the right of individuals to disseminate teachings critical of governmentinstitutions or policies.

Herein lies another important issue submitted in the cause. The question is really whether the lawmay be enacted in the exercise of the State's constitutional power (Art. XIV, sec. 5) to supervise andregulate private schools. If that power amounts to control of private schools, as some think it is,maybe the law is valid. In this connection we do not share the belief that section 5 has addednew

power to what the State inherently possesses by virtue of the police power. An express power isnecessarily more extensive than a mere implied power. For instance, if there is conflict between anexpress individual right and the express power to control private education it cannot off-hand be saidthat the latter must yield to the formerconflict of two express powers. But if the power to controleducation ismerely implied from the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express individual right,as was probably the situation in the two decisions brought to our attention, of Mississippi andMinnesota, states where constitutional control of private schools is not expressly produced.

However, as herein previously noted, no justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We arenot informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitionersrefused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial

privileges or rights for so refusing.

The average lawyer who reads the above quoted section of Republic Act 139 will fail to perceiveanything objectionable. Why should not the State prohibit the use of textbooks that are illegal, oroffensive to the Filipinos or adverse to governmental policies or educationally improper? What's thepower of regulation and supervision for? But those trained to the investigation of constitutionalissues are likely to apprehend the danger to civil liberties, of possible educational dictatorship orthought control, as petitioners' counsel foresee with obvious alarm. Much depends, however, uponthe execution and implementation of the statute. Not that constitutionality depends necessarily upon


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the law's effects. But if the Board on Textbooks in its actuations strictly adheres to the letter of thesection and wisely steers a middle course between the Scylla of "dictatorship" and the Charybdis of"thought control", no cause for complaint will arise and no occasion for judicial review will develop.

Anyway, and again, petitioners now have a more expeditious remedy thru an administrative appealto the National Board of Education created by Republic Act 1124.

Of course it is necessary to assure herein petitioners, that when and if, the dangers they apprehendmaterialize and judicial intervention is suitably invoked, after all administrative remedies areexhausted, the courts will not shrink from their duty to delimit constitutional boundaries and protectindividual liberties.

IV. For all the foregoing considerations, reserving to the petitioners the right to institute in the propercourt, and at the proper time, such actions as may call for decision of the issue herein presented bythem, this petition for prohibition will be denied. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Jugo, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995

JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J .:

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 asunconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting theMunicipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1

G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners

Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, RicardoPascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Ofthe petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan,Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 ofR.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:

1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorialjurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of


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Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the LocalGovernment Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutiveterm" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7,

Article VI of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law(the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring ageneral reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three(3) years following the return of every census;

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title ofthe bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord

with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latestsurvey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only450,000.

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concernedcitizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds asaforestated.

We find no merit in the petitions.

I

Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into ahighly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as theCity, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati inMetropolitan Manila Areaover which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast byPasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; onthe southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by theCity of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City ofManila.

The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate

agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions ofterritorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local governmentunits. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the LocalGovernment Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metesand bounds with technical descriptions.2


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The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit ofgovernment cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits ofthe territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers ofgovernment only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in theboundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powerswhich ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local

Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out inmetes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by thedescription made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that thedelineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered byMakati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land areaof Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shallcomprise thepresentterritory of the municipality."

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of theproposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At thetime of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makatiand Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts todecide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which coulddecide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by itsexact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.3We take judicial notice of the fact that Congresshas also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local governmentunits with unsettled boundary disputes.4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per sepresent an insurmountabledifficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial

jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing

boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to theultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared tohold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the SolicitorGeneral in this regard, viz.:

Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavilthat the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created orconverted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technicaldescriptions" was made in order to provide a means by which the area of saidcities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes andbounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It isnot an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may bereasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboringmunicipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intentbehind the law has been sufficiently served.

Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain thereindetailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, aspetitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sinequa non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the LocalGovernment Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower


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local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make localgovernments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the sametime serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 onthe mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law wouldserve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of themaster serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the

intendment of the law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although itmay not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow theletter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislatureor would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.(Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v.Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which,for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutesshould be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes(Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to thecase at bar.

II

Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No.7854. Section 51 states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of theMunicipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shallexercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held andthe duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume theiroffices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. Theappointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising theirfunctions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government

of the City of Makati.

They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of theConstitution which provide:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, whichshall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve formore than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any lengthof time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service forthe full term for which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term ofthree years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on thethirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than threeconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall notbe considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term forwhich he was elected.


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Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of theHouse of Representative, have a term of three (3)years and are prohibited from serving for morethan three (3)consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a newcorporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal electiveofficials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners pointthat section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already

served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run andeventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive termas municipal mayorwould not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has beenconveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before alitigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be anactual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) thedecision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on theoccurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoraltyelections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for thesame position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise thisabstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which thisCourt has no jurisdiction.

III

Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X ofR.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:

Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city,Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districtsthat shall initiallycorrespond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic

Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at thenext national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieuof Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasissupplied)

They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)reapportionment 6cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed

in the title of the bill7

and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fiftythousand (450,000).

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v.Abalos.8In said case, we ruledthat reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of anew city. The Constitution9clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than twohundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did notpreclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a generalreapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and


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providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can onlybe made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to eachlocal government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or provincecreated by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10Theintolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of theirsovereignty. 11Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be foreverwhole or it is not sovereignty.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord withsection 5(3), Article VI 12of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population ofMakati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13Said section provides, inter alia, that a citywith a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand(250,000) shall have at least one representative.Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum populationrequirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to theConstitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14

Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative

district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobiasv.Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not commandthat the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence,we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all theprovisions are germane to such general subject."

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug,

Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to add a fewobservations.

I.

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or barangaymay be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in


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accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval bya majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." These criteria arenow set forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these isthat the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit to be created or converted should beproperly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.

The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly UrbanizedCity to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe the territorial boundaries of the city by metes andbounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution does not providefor a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua nonfor the creation of a localgovernment unit or its conversion from one level to another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 ofR.A. No. 7854 are not absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause "as ageneral rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is unavailing Said sectiononly applies to the conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY,not a highly urbanized city. It pertinently reads as follows:

Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays maybe converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certifiedby the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) forthe last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has eitherof the following requisites:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly identified bymetes and bounds. . . .

The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component. Section 12 of Article Xthereof provides:

Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component citieswhose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shallbe independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province,whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to votefor elective provincial officials.

And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:

Sec. 451. Cities Classified. A city may either be component or highlyurbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code shall notaffect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.

Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit

their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component citiesshall be independent of the province.

II.

Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for inR.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1,


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Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates of the reapportionment mentionedin the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as follows:

Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make areapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in thissection.

In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.

The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of theOrdinance appended to the Constitution which reads:

Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives ofthe First Congress of the Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the 1986Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise providedby law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportionedamong the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:

METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA

xxx xxx xxx

MAKATI one (1)

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose populationmay hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled inthe immediately following election to at least one Member or such number ofMembers as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and

according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of theConstitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which suchnew province was created, or where the city, whose population has so increased, isgeographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission onElections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty daysbefore the election. (Emphases supplied)

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to add a fewobservations.

I.


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Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or barangaymay be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except inaccordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval bya majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." These criteria arenow set forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these isthat the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit to be created or converted should be

properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.

The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly UrbanizedCity to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe the territorial boundaries of the city by metes andbounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution does not providefor a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua nonfor the creation of a localgovernment unit or its conversion from one level to another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 ofR.A. No. 7854 are not absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause "as ageneral rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is unavailing Said sectiononly applies to the conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY,not a highly urbanized city. It pertinently reads as follows:

Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays maybe converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certifiedby the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) forthe last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has eitherof the following requisites:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly identified bymetes and bounds. . . .

The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component. Section 12 of Article Xthereof provides:

Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component citieswhose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shallbe independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province,whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to votefor elective provincial officials.

And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:

Sec. 451. Cities Classified. A city may either be component or highlyurbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code shall notaffect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.

Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibittheir voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component citiesshall be independent of the province.

II.


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Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for inR.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1,Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates of the reapportionment mentionedin the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as follows:

Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a

reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in thissection.

In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.

The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of theOrdinance appended to the Constitution which reads:

Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives ofthe First Congress of the Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the 1986Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise providedby law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned

among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:

METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA

xxx xxx xxx

MAKATI one (1)

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose populationmay hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in

the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number ofMembers as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants andaccording to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of theConstitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which suchnew province was created, or where the city, whose population has so increased, isgeographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission onElections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty daysbefore the election. (Emphases supplied)

Footnotes

1 R.A. No. 7854 is a consolidation of House Bill No. 12240 sponsored by

Congressman Joker Arroyo and Senate Bill No. 1244 sponsored by Senator VicenteSotto III.

2 Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a localgovernment unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based onverifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx


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(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islandsor is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properlyidentified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions and sufficient to providefor such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of

Finance the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau(LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation. . . .

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified bymetes and bounds. . . .

3 August 18, 1994, Senate Deliberations on H.B. No. 12240, pp. 23-28.

4 Ibid, citingas example the City of Mandaluyong.

5 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (19180); Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 ed.,p. 24.

6 Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall makea reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in thissection.

7 Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 26 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, embrace only one subject whichshall be expressed in the title thereof.

8 G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994.

9 Section 5(1), Article VI.

10 In this connection, we take judicial notice of the fact that since 1986 up to thistime, Congress has yet to pass a general reapportionment law.

11 Section 1, Article II provides that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican

state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority from them."

12 Sec. 5. . . .

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundredfifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative .


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xxx xxx xxx

13 As per the certificate issued by Administration Tomas Africa of the NationalCensus and Statistics Office, the population of Makati as of 1994 stood at 508,174;

August 4, 1994, Senate Deliberations on House Bill No. 12240 (converting Makatiinto a highly urbanized city), p. 15.

14 Sec. 3 provides: "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whosepopulation may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall beentitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such numberof Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants andaccording to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of theConstitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which suchnew province was created or where the city, whose population has so increased, isgeographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission onElections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred, and twentydays before the election."

ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL CARANZO,JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD ATANGAN and CLARIZADECENA, and OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLYSITUATED, petit ioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVESECRETARY of the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATORFRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Senate President and

SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL in his capacity as MinorityLeader of the Senate of the Philippines, CONGRESSMAN JOSEDE VENECIA in his capacity as Speaker, CONGRESSMANAGUSTO L. SYJOCO in his capacity as Chairman of theCommittee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, andCONGRESSMAN EMILIO C. MACIAS II in his capacity asChairman of the Committee on Local Government of the Houseof Representatives, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANGKATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN, AND ALLTHEIR AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case


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Before us is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for atemporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to prevent thepostponement of the Sangguniang Kabataan(SK for brevity) elections originallyscheduled last May 6, 2002. The petition also seeks to prevent the reduction of the agerequirement for membership in the SK.

Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a taxpayers and class suit,on their own behalf and on behalf of other youths similarly situated. Petitioners claimthat they are in danger of being disqualified to vote and be voted for in the SK electionsshould the SK elections on May 6, 2002 be postponed to a later date. Under the LocalGovernment Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), membership in the SK is limited to youthsat least 15 but not more than 21 years old.

Petitioners allege that public respondents connived, confederated and conspiredto postpone the May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the membership age in the SKto at least 15 but less than 18 years of age. Petitioners assail the alleged conspiracybecause youths at least 18 but not more than 21 years old will be summarily and

unduly dismembered, unfairly discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustlydisassociated and obnoxiously disqualified from the SK organization.[1]

Thus, petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order orpreliminary injunction -

a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law, decree, Comelecresolution/directive and other respondents issuances, orders and actions andthe like in postponing the May 6, 2002 SK elections.

b) To command the respondents to continue the May 6, 2002 SK elections set

by the present law and in accordance with Comelec Resolutions No. 4713 and4714 and to expedite the funding of the SK elections.

c) In the alternative, if the SK elections will be postponed for whatever reason,there must be a definite date for said elections, for example, July 15, 2002,and the present SK membership, except those incumbent SK officers whowere elected on May 6, 1996, shall be allowed to run for any SK electiveposition even if they are more than 21 years old.

d) To direct the incumbent SK officers who are presently representing the SK

in every sanggunian and the NYC to vacate their post after the barangayelections.[2]

The Facts
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The SK is a youth organization originally established by Presidential Decree No.684 as the Kabataang Barangay(KB for brevity). The KB was composed of allbarangay residents who were less than 18 years old, without specifying the minimumage. The KB was organized to provide its members with the opportunity to express theirviews and opinions on issues of transcendental importance.[3]

The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK and limited SKmembership to those youths at least 15 but not more than 21 years of age.[4]The SKremains as a youth organization in every barangay tasked to initiate programs toenhance the social, political, economic, cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, andphysical development of the youth.[5]The SK in every barangay is composed of achairperson and seven members, all elected by the Katipunan ngKabataan. The Katipunan ng Kabataan in every barangay is composed of all citizensactually residing in the barangay for at least six months and who meet the membershipage requirement.

The first SK elections took place on December 4, 1992. RA No. 7808 reset the SK

elections to the first Monday of May of 1996 and every three years thereafter. RA No.7808 mandated the Comelec to supervise the conduct of the SK elections under rulesthe Comelec shall promulgate. Accordingly, the Comelec on December 4, 2001 issuedResolution Nos. 4713[6]and 4714[7]to govern the SK elections on May 6, 2002.

On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros (Montesclaros forbrevity) sent a letter[8]to the Comelec, demanding that the SK elections be held asscheduled on May 6, 2002. Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to herletter within 10 days upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will seek judicial relief.

On February 20, 2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo (Chairman Benipayo for brevity), thenComelec Chairman, wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the House [9]and the Senate

President

[10]

about the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. In hisletters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that it was operationally very difficult to holdboth elections simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the Comelec Chairman expressedsupport for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangayelections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November 2002.

Ten days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter ofMontesclaros. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy of Comelec EnBancResolution No. 4763[11]dated February 5, 2002 recommending to Congress thepostponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but holding the Barangayelections in May 2002 as scheduled.[12]

On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed theirrespective bills postponing the SK elections. On March 11, 2002, the BicameralConference Committee (Bicameral Committee for brevity) of the Senate and theHouse came out with a Report[13]recommending approval of the reconciled billconsolidating Senate Bill No. 2050 [14]and House Bill No. 4456.[15]The BicameralCommittees consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 andlowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age.

On March 11, 2002, petitioners filed the instant petition.
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On March 11, 2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committees consolidatedbill and on March 13, 2002, the House of Representatives approved the same. ThePresident signed the approved bill into law on March 19, 2002.

The Issues

Petitioners[16]raise the following grounds in support of their petition:

I.

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY ANDUNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OFJURISDICTION WHEN THEY INTENDED TO POSTPONE THE SKELECTIONS.

II.


ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OFJURISDICTION WHEN THEY INTENDED TO DISCRIMINATE,DISENFRANCHISE, SINGLE OUT AND DISMEMBER THE SK MEMBERSWHO ARE 18 BUT NOT LESS[17](SIC) THAN 21 YEARS OLD COMPOSEDOF ABOUT 7 MILLION YOUTH.

III.


ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OFJURISDICTION WHEN THEY WILLFULLY FAILED TO FUND THE SKELECTION PURPORTEDLY TO POSTPONE THE SAME IN ORDER TOIMPLEMENT THEIR ILLEGAL SCHEME AND MACHINATION IN SPITE OFTHE FACT THAT THERE ARE AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR THE PURPOSE.

IV.

THE INCUMBENT SK OFFICERS WANTED TO PERPETUALLY SIT ONTHEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES CONTRARY TO THE ENVISION (SIC) OFTHE CREATION OF THE SK ORGANIZATION, HENCE, IN VIOLATION OFLAW AND CONSTITUTION.[18]
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The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, the Court takes judicial notice of the following events that have

transpired since petitioners filed this petition:1. The May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay elections were not held

as scheduled.

2. Congress enacted RA No. 9164[19]which provides that voters and candidates for theSK elections must be at least 15 but less than 18 years of age on the day of theelection.[20]RA No. 9164 also provides that there shall be a synchronized SK andBarangay elections on July 15, 2002.

3. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 4846, the rules and regulations for theconduct of the July 15, 2002 synchronized SK and Barangay elections.

Petitioners, who all claim to be 20 years old, argue that the postponement of the

May 6, 2002 SK elections disenfranchises them, preventing them from voting and beingvoted for in the SK elections. Petitioners theory is that if the SK elections werepostponed to a date later than May 6, 2002, the postponement would disqualify from SKmembership youths who will turn 21 years old between May 6, 2002 and the date of thenew SK elections. Petitioners claim that a reduction in the SK membership age to 15but less than 18 years of age from the then membership age of 15 but not more than 21years of age would disqualify about seven million youths. The public respondentsfailure to hold the elections on May 6, 2002 would prejudice petitioners and other youthssimilarly situated.

Thus, petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public respondents to hold the

SK elections on May 6, 2002 and should it be postponed, the SK elections should beheld not later than July 15, 2002; (2) prevent public respondents from passing laws andissuing resolutions and orders that would lower the membership age in the SK; and (3)compel public respondents to allow petitioners and those who have turned more than 21years old on May 6, 2002 to participate in any re-scheduled SK elections.

The Courts power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only ifall the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual andappropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the partyraising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at theearliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis motaof the case.[21]

In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of thepower of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections toany date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections,there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention.

Petitioners prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed billlowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable
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controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. Aproposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. Aproposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Courthas no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because thatwould be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of

Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised invacuo.[22]

The secondparagraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actualcontro vers ies involv ing r ights w hich are legal ly demandable and

enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuseof discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of anybranch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of aproposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is

enacted, not before.

Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passingany law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internalrules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers arenot subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approvalof bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee ofapproved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by eachchamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or ofconstitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicialreview over the internal processes or procedures of Congress.[23]

The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills thatCongress should enact into law. The judicial power to review the constitutionality oflaws does not include the power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. TheCourt has no power to compel Congress by mandamus to enact a law allowingpetitioners, regardless of their age, to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SKelections. To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finelycrafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branchesof government.

Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684,the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK

to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to thepermanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Codeof 1991. Every law passed by Congress is always subject to amendment or repeal byCongress. The Court cannot restrain Congress from amending or repealing laws, forthe power to make laws includes the power to change the laws.[24]

The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to vote or bevoted for in an election that is limited under RA No. 9164 to youths at least 15 but lessthan 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all those who have turned more than 21
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years old on or after May 6, 2002 to participate in the July 15, 2002 SKelections. Youths from 18 to 21 years old as of May 6, 2002 are also no longer SKmembers, and cannot participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Congress will haveto decide whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners remedy is legislation, not

judicial intervention.

Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. Aparty must show that he has been, or is about to be denied some personal right orprivilege to which he is lawfully entitled.[25]A party must also show that he has a realinterest in the suit. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, asdistinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, orinconsequential interest.[26]

In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law onthose who were at least 15 but not more than 21 years old. Now, with the passage ofRA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who on the date of the SK elections are atleast 15 but less than 18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to this

specific age group. Not falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased to bemembers of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SKelections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial interest in theSK elections.

This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time petitioners filed thispetition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK elections and reduced the age requirementfor SK membership, was not yet enacted into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164,petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could beunconstitutional. To grant petitioners prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for inthe July 15, 2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No.9164. This, petitioners have not done. The Court will not strike down a law unless its

constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and adequately argued.[27]

The only semblance of a constitutional issue, albeit erroneous, that petitioners raiseis their claim that SK membership is a property right within the meaning of theConstitution.[28]Since certain public offices are reserved for SK officers, petitioners alsoclaim a constitutionally protected opportunity to occupy these public offices. Inpetitioners own words, they and others similarly situated stand to lose their opportuni tyto work in the government positions reserved for SK members or officers. [29]Under theLocal Government Code of 1991, the president of the federation of SK organizations ina municipality, city or province is an ex-officio member of the municipal council, citycouncil or provincial board, respectively.[30]The chairperson of the SK in the barangay isan ex-officiomember of the Sangguniang Barangay.[31]The president of the nationalfederation of SK organizations is an ex-officiomember of the National YouthCommission, with rank of a Department Assistant Secretary.[32]

Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SKmembership. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment in the lawcannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only thosewho qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any actdisqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK
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membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution because it is a merestatutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change oreven withdraw the statutory right.

A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a[P]ublic office is a public trust.[33]No one has a vested right to any public office, much

less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v.Gabriel,[34]decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, itwould be necessary to consider an office a property. It is, however, wellsett ledx x x that a publ ic of f ice is not prop erty with in the sense of thecon st i tut ional guarant ies of due p rocess of law, but is a public trust oragency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popularrepresentative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers ofthe people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or

contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant tothe provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people herepresents. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the verystart that no one has a proprietary right to public office. While the law makes an SKofficer an ex-officiomember of a local government legislative council, the law does notconfer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in locallegislative councils. The constitutional principle of a public office as a public trustprecludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy directing equalaccess to opportunities for public service[35]cannot bestow on petitioners a proprietary

right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officiopublic offices.

Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youths involvement in publicaffairs,[36]this policy refers to those who belong to the class of people defined as theyouth. Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK,which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are pastthe age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. Ingovernment service, once an employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannotinvoke any property right to cling to his office. In the same manner, since petitionersare now past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they cannot invoke anyproperty right to cling to their SK membership.

The petition must also fail because no grave abuse of discretion attended thepostponement of the SK elections. RA No. 9164 is now the law that prescribes thequalifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections. This law also fixes the dateof the SK elections. Petitioners are not even assailing the constitutionality of RA No.9164. RA No. 9164 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and will apply to the July15, 2002 SK elections.
ht

Documents

Requisite of Judicial Review