Republicanism and The Federalist

8/13/2019 Republicanism and The Federalist

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Republicanism and The Federalist

The first essay ofThe Federalistprovides a convenient point of de-

parture for exploring Publius's conception of republicanism and the

problems associated with it. Towards the end of this essay, he informs us

that among the"interesting particulars " he intends to take up in the sub-

sequent papers is "The conformity of the proposed Constitution to the

true principles of republican government" (36) .1

The word"true

"im-

mediately attracts our attention because it clearly suggests that mistaken

or distorted principles or notions of republicanism are abroad.

Moreover, though this is more debatable, we may also surmise that Pub-

lius wants to undertake this mission because the proposed constitution,

when"

measured" against these mistaken principles, turns out to be

something less than republican. We might also infer that he feels the

need to show that the character of the proposed Constitution is in fact re-publican because if it were otherwise the people would not and/or

should not ratify it. Indeed, at a later point, he does write that "if the

plan of the convention . . . be found to depart from the republican char-

acter, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible"

(39:240).

From the outset, then, we have good reason to believe that repub-

licanism, as well as the republican character of the regime, are going to

be important concerns for Publius. And this belief is confirmed when we

find that the conformity of the proposed system to the true principles ofrepublicanism is the first order of business in his

"candid survey of the

plan of government reported by the convention." He sets forth three

reasons for this priority, each of which stands on somewhat different

grounds: [a] "no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the

people of America; [b] with the fundamental principles of the Revolu-

tion; or [c] with that honorable determination which animates every vot-

ary of freedom to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of

mankind for self-government" (39:240).

From this first essay we also learn a little bit about what, in Publius's

view, the abiding principles of republicanism should not be-a matter of

some interest in light of certain contemporary notions of republicanism

1 . All parenthetical references toThe Federalistin the text are to the North American Li-brary Edition (1963) edited and with introduction by Clinton Rossiter. In these parenthet-

ical citations the essay number, save where it is clear from the discussion in the text, will befollowed by the page number. Hence, (27:176) is a reference to essay number 27, page176 .


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108 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

which stress the primacy of liberty and rights. Shortly before his refer-ence to the "true principles of republican government,

"he observes that

historically the"liberties of republics " have "more often"fallen victim to"a dangerous ambition [that] . . . lurks behind the specious mask of zeal

for the rights of the people than"

to the"zeal for ... firmness and effi-

ciency of government." "

An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to therights of the people,"he remarks, can be the

"stale bait for popularity at

the expense of the public good. " He cautions that in the debates overratification even "an enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of

government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of des-

potic power and hostile to the principles of liberty"

(35) .Now, whether Publius associated the unalloyed zeal for the protec-

tion or advancement of"rights"

or"liberty

"to be among the false princi-

ples of republicanism-or, perhaps, as derivatives therefrom-is prob-lematic. That they are not part of his "true " republican principles is,however, clear enough. But what is more important, we see at an early

stage that his brand of republicanism must be compatible with and capa-

ble of accommodating institutions and procesases that provide for "firm-ness, ""energy,

"and

"efficiency

"in government, as well as for identify-

ing and advancing the"public good. "

Real Republicanism

The "true principles " of republicanism emerge in their fullest form in

Federalist39 where Publius undertakes to discover "the distinctive

characters of the republican form"

(240). At the outset of his discussion

he notes that these characteristics are not to be derived from usage; that

is, by looking at the regimes which have been labeled "republican"

by"political writers. " While, he remarks, Holland, Venice, and Polandhave all been called republics, their governments-though different

from each other in form-lack any popular foundations. And, he con-

tinues, England, commonly referred to as a republic, "has one republi-can branch only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monar-chy" (240-41). He concludes:

"These examples, which are nearly as dis-

similar to each other as to a genuine republic, show the extreme inaccu-

racy with which the term has been used in political disquisitions"

(241).Publius proceeds to provide a stipulative definition:

"If we resort for a

criterion to the different principles on which different forms of govern-

ment are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may

bestow the name on, a government which derives all its powers directly

or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by

persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or dur-

ing good behavior."

He qualifies and expands upon this definition in the


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REPUBLICANISM AND THEFEDERALIST 109

passages that follow. "It is essential, " he maintains, "to such a govern-ment that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an in-

considerable proportion or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of

tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their

powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans and claim for their gov-

ernment the honorable title of republic " (241). This requirement would

also exclude "mixed" regimes such as Great Britain from the republican

fold.

To this Publius is quick to add another qualifier; namely, "

it issuffi-

cientfor such a government that the persons administering it be ap-

pointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they holdtheir appointments by either of the tenures just specified. " This is a par-

ticularly important caveat because, as he puts it, "otherwise every gov-

ernment in the United States, as well as every other popular govern-

ment that has been or can be well organized or well executed, would be

degraded from the republican character"(241). What is more, this stipu-

lation, we see at once, allows for flexibility and latitude in shaping in-

stitutions and procedures, within the confines of true republican princi-

ples, to provide for the attributes of good government includingthose noted in the first essay such as energy, efficiency, and firmness.

2

This is a matter to which we will have occasion to return shortly.

Publius has no difficulty in showing that the proposed Constitutionconforms with the `accountability' aspect of this conception of repub-

licanism:"The House of Representatives ... is elected by the great body

of the people. The Senate . . . derives its appointment indirectly from

the people. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the

people. . . Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will .. .

be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves. "If"any further proof be required of the republican complexion" of the pro-

posed Constitution, "the most decisive one," he maintains, "might be

found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the fed-

eral and State governments" (242) . 3 Later, in Federalist 57, when dis-

cussing the composition of the House of Representatives, he takes pains

to emphasize the republican ` openness ' of the system with respect to

2. In fact, as David Epstein points out, Publius

'

s definition of republican government

"

iscompatible with the plan of government that Alexander Hamilton proposed to the Con-stitution Convention"-a plan which provided that the indirectly-elected chief executiveand Senators and the appointed judiciary should serve during"good behavior. " The Politi-

cal Theory of"

The Federalist"(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 122.3. In discussing the clause which provides the national government shall guarantee eachstate"a republican form of government," Publius does not go very far in marking out thecharacteristics of republicanism. He does, however, specify that " the superintending gov-ernment ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic ormonarchical innovations" (43:274). Later in the essay he writes: "Whenever the States may


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who may vote and who may hold office. "Who,"he asks, "are to be the

electors of the federal representatives?" He answers: "Not the rich,

more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the

haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of

obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body

of the people of the United States. " And, "Who are to be the objects of

popular choice?"Again, stressing the system ' s conformity to republican

principles, he answers: "Every citizen whose merit may recommend

him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of

wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to

fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people"

(351).4

Indeed, without going into great detail on this point, the basic features

of Publius's republicanism as set forth in Federalist39 never seem to be

very far from his mind in his discussions of the institutions and processes

of the proposed system.Finally, though Publius does not mention majority rule as a republi-

can principle in Federalist39, he does so elsewhere. In Federalist 10,

for instance, he contends that"relief' from minority factions in the ex-

tended republic"

is supplied by the republican principle, which enablesthe majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote " (80). Indeed, vir-

tually the whole ofFederalist10 is concerned with the knotty problem of

how to control the effects of majority factions-unjust and oppressive

majorities-which can legitimately lay claim to rule in republics. In

Federalist 22, by way of pointing up the inadequacy of the Articles, we

gain a deeper appreciation of his commitment to the majority principle.

Here he declares that the "operation"

of the Articles "contradicts that

fundamental maxim of republican government, which requires that the

sense of the majority should prevail" (146) . Nor is this all. He railsagainst the Articles because it gives "a minority a negative upon the

majority" which, "in its tendency, " subjects "the sense of the greater

number to that of the lesser number." He laments that"a sixtieth part of

choose to substitute other republican forms [from what they presently have], they have aright to do so and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The only restriction imposedon them is that they shall not exchange republican for anti-republican Constitutions " (275).

Later, in Federalist 84, he is to say of this prohibition of titles of nobility:"

This maytruly be denominated the cornerstone of republican government; for so long as they areexcluded there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other thanthat of the people" (512).4. Though Publius believed that the electors would naturally turn to "proprietors of land... merchants, and members of the learned professions" to represent them, he goes on toremark:"There are strong minds in every walk of life that will rise superior to the disad-vantages of situation and will command the tribute due their merit, not only from the class-es to which they particularly belong, but from the society in general. The door ought to beequally open to all" (36:217).


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REPUBLICANISM AND THE FEDERALIST 111

the Union ... about the proportion of Delaware and Rhode Island," has

been able to bring the government under the Articles to a standstill, and

he compares this situation to that of the "Polish Diet, where a single veto

has been sufficient to put a stop to all their movements "(147).5This pro-cess of minority obstruction or rule, he contends, has produced "tedious

delays; continual negotiation and intrigue; [and] contemptible com-

promises of the public good"(148).

On the Nature of Majority Rule

Aside from giving his reader a pretty clear notion of the principal ele-ments of republicanism in Federalist 39, Publius also conveys, albeit in-directly, some idea of the character of the republicanism he envisions.

To begin with we see that his republicanism centers on popular control,

either direct or indirect, over the rulers; a form of accountability whose

chief end is to "maintain a proper responsibility to the people"on the

part of the rulers. As such the nature of his republicanism is congenial to

what Joseph Schumpeter's terms the ` competitive'or ` modern'model of

democracy wherein

"

the deciding of issues by the electorate

"-the es-

sence of what Schumpeter terms "classical democracy"-is subordi-

nated "to the election of the men who are to do the deciding. "6Certainly

Publius 's attention is fixed on a variety of matters surrounding the elec-

tion of office holders, not the least of these being the concern to secure

the election of"fit " characters. To put this somewhat otherwise, Publius

clearly does not paint a picture of republicanism in "classical" terms

wherein, to borrow from Schumpeter ' s analysis, "the people itself de-

cide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in

order to carry out its will. "7 Had he done so, his republicanism wouldhave centered on the requirement that institutions not only accuratelyreflect, but act upon, the preferences of popular majorities. Instead, he

emphasizes the popular foundations of government (that is, that it be"derived from the great body of the people ") and the periodic accounta-

bility, either direct or indirect, of the elected officials.

We may profitably pause here to note that the distinction between

these forms of republicanism is an important one given the modern

5. Federalist22 should be required reading for those who see a cousinly resemblance be-tween Calhoun's concurrent majority system and Publius's political thought. Moreover,this essay certainly is not couched in terms that would support the proposition, advancedby his critics since the turn of the century, that Publius looked upon the proposed Con-stitution with great favor because it would frustrate majorities. On this see below.6. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (3d ed.; New York andEvanston: Harper and Row, 1950), 269.7. Schumpeter, 250.


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critiques of Publius ' s republicanism, many of which proceed from this"classical " perspective. Without going into detail, these critiques point

up deviations in our system from the principles of majoritarian institu-tions and processes; deviations which, it is commonly charged, either

distort or thwart the popular or majority will. It is but a short step fromthis conclusion over to the proposition that Publius (and the Founders)

sought to protect entrenched minorities of one kind or another. Vernon

L. Parrington's commentary on the theory of republicanism underlying

the Constitution-important because it follows the lead of James AllenSmith (Parrington's intellectual forefather and the most prominent of

the early populist critics of the Constitution and the Founders) and pro-vides the grounds for the more modern and sophisticated critics (e.g.,Dahl, Schattschneider, Burns, and political party reformists) 8-illus-

trates how the classical assumptions are subtly brought to bear inevaluating the Framers ' handiwork. For instance, at one point Par-rington writes: "In a world moving inevitably towards manhood suf-

frage, a sharp alignment of parties with definite platforms was greatly

feared by the minority, for the organization of the rank and file of voters

must end in majority control. An honest appeal to the people was the last

thing desired by the Federalists, and the democratic machinery of re-

calls and referendums and rotation in office, which had developed dur-

ing the war, was stigmatized as factional devices which in the end must

destroy good government. "9 But, as we have intimated, the basic

8. See, for example, Robert A. Dahl 's widely acclaimed Preface to Democratic Theory(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), and James McGregor Burns ' s , The Dead-lock of Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963) and Uncommon

Sense (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). These critiques share the view that the Framerssought to frustrate the ` goals'of the Revolution. On this and other issues they also share thebasic outlook of Smith, Parrington and other populist critics, though they tend to wraptheir views in the language of modern pluralism. As Burns puts it, the system based on theFramers'principles "has ... exacted a fearful price. It has thwarted collective efforts torealize systematically and soon enough the goals implicit in our revolutionary tradition. Itfavors the groups-more affluent, knowledgeable groups-represented by the abler bro-kers. It discriminates cruelly against the unorganized or ill-represented masses of people,"

Uncommon Sense, 117-18 .

Since the early 1940s, at least, responsible and disciplined political parties have been

viewed by

`

reformers

'

as the chief vehicle for overcoming the difficulties and obstacles tothe translation of majority preferences into law. See in this regard ElmerSchattschneider' s Party Government(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1942). Onthe underlying assumptions and conceptions of the party reformists, such asSchattschneider, who embrace the key elements of the classical view of democracy see:Evron Kirkpatrick, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: Political Science,Policy Science, or Pseudo-science? "American Political Science Review 65 (December1971) .9. Vernon L. Parrington, The Colonial Mind: 1620-1900. Vol. I; Main Currents inAmeri-can Thought (3vols.; New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1927), 290.


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REPUBLICANISM ANDTHEFEDERALIST 113

shortcoming of such critiques stems from the fact that Publius-and wemust assume the Framers, as well-held to a republicanism of a differ-

ent character which necessarily must be "

measured " by different stan-dards or principles than those of the classical model. In other words,

these modern critiques are largely irrelevant to the Framers ' and Pub-

lius's undertaking which simply did not embrace the precepts of plebis-

citary democracy central to the classical conception.

What is relevant for our purposes are the reasons why Publius ' s re-

publicanism conforms with the ` competitive' model with its emphasis

upon the election of men who will do the deciding. We do not mean to

suggest that he was consciously offering up these reasons to justify histype of republicanism over the classical conception or even that he

thought in terms of these models. On the contrary, it may well have

been that his general approach to republicanism was not even a matter ofconscious choice. This is to say, the competitive view of repub-

licanism-at least as it pertained to the purposes and functions of the

electoral processes-may simply have been `accepted ' without question

largely because it was part of the political landscape with which he was so

familiar. In fact, he even formulates the overriding purposes of the polit-

ical order in a fashion that stresses the crucial role of representatives and

elections in securing the public good through responsible government."The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be," he writes,

"first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, andmost virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next

place, to take the most effectual precaution for keeping them virtuous

whilst they continue to hold their public trust. " "The elective mode of

obtaining rulers,"he continues, "is the characteristic policy of republi-

can government.""The most effectual means" for "

keeping them virtu-ous" while in office, for "maintain[ing] a proper responsibility to the

people," he contends, "i s a limitation of the terms of appointment"

(57:350-51).

This formulation-particularly given the functions which he ascribes

to the elected representatives-suggests another reason why the ele-

ments of his republicanism fit in so well with the competitive model:

namely, he may well have believed that, in the ordinary course of affairs,

the representatives were more likely to act in accordance with and ad-vance the common good than popular majorities.10 We do know that hebelieved that popular majorities, intending the public good, might well

be misguided. At one point he stresses that majorities "may call for

10. Publius suggests even more than this when he writes in Federalist10 that"it may wellhappen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, w ill bemore consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, con-vened for the purpose" (82).


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measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to la-ment and condemn " (63:384). At another place he observes "the people

commonly intendthe PUBLIC GOOD. This often applies to their veryerrors. But their good sense would despise the adulator who should pre-tend that they always reason right about the means of promoting it

"

(71:432).

We do know for certain that he regards the representatives as better

situated than popular majorities to formulate rational policies and to de-

termine how best to promote the public good. This is particularly true inthe extended republic.

"No man, " he holds,"can be a competent legis-

lator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment acertain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate."

He concedes that "a part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of

information which lie within the compass of men in private as well aspublic stations."But, he adds, "another part can only be attained, or atleast thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which re-

quires the use of it"

(53:332). As far as "a single state"

is concerned, Pub-lius maintains the "requisite knowledge" for sound legislation "relates tothe existing laws which are uniform throughout the State and with which

all the citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general affairs of

the State, which lie within a small compass, are not very diversified, and

occupy much of the attention and conversation of every class of people. "

He is quick to point out, however, that "the great theater of the UnitedStates presents a very different scene. " In this

"great theater,

"he writes,

" the laws are so far from being uniform that they vary in every State;

whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very exten-

sive region and are extremely diversified by the local affairs connected

with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learned in any other placethan in the central councils, to which a knowledge of them will be

brought by the representatives of every part of the empire" (53:333). Atanother point, he remarks,"on a comparison of the different States to-gether, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other cir-

cumstances connected with the objects of federal legislation, with all of

which the federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance.

Whilst a few representatives, therefore, from each State may bring with

them a due knowledge of their own State, every representativewillhavemuch information to acquire concerning all the other States " (56:348-49).

In this connection, and at a more general level, it may well be thatPublius did not envision the normal political processes in the extended

republic under the forms of the proposed Constitution in terms of a

grand march of popular majorities seeking to impose their preferencesor will through the legislature. While he was, to be sure, concerned


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about majorities that supported unjust or oppressive measures, we have

reason to believe that he thought the political processes would be less

tidy and more complicated than the classical model presupposes. For in-

stance, if"the principal task of modern legislation" comes down to the

regulation of"various and interfering interests " (10:79), then we can

readily imagine the legislature on any given issue being concerned, not

with a majority will or preference, but with the adjustment of conflict

between several minorities whose membership, taken as a whole,

amount to only a fraction of the total population.llIndeed, from what

Publius does tell us about the nature and dynamics of the political con-

flict he envisioned in the extended republic, he may very well have be-lieved that the legislature would ordinarily operate against the backdrop

of widespread popular apathy; a condition not unlike that we witness

today. In this case, of course, accountability through competitive pro-

cesses goes a long way towards assuring that the legislators will make de-

cisions that fall within the confines of or are compatible with the basic

and consensual beliefs and values of the people or, at least, a majority

thereof. By "setting" limits within which the decision-makers find it pru-

dent to operate, the majority can be said to "

rule"

in a`

passive'

sense.

12

11. There is no reason, for example, to believe that Publius would have been at all sur-prised at Robert Dahl 's conclusions regarding what he called the"American Hybrid. " Forinstance, Dahl writes that"it is important to notice how little a national election tells usabout the preferences of majorities. Strictly speaking, all an election reveals is the first pre-ferences of some citizens among the candidates standing for office. "At another place he re-marks:"If you examine carefully anypo licy decision, even a very important one, you willalways discover, I believe, that only a quite tiny proportion of the electorate is actively

bringing its influence to bear upon politicians. " For this reason, among others, he con-cludes, "we cannot correctly describe the actual operations of democratic societies interms of the contrasts between majorities and minorities. " Preface, 131, 130, 131.12. Dahl puts this process in the following terms: " If the majority rarely rules on matters ofspecific policy, nevertheless the specific policies selected by a process of

`

minority rule '

probably lie most of the time within the bounds of consensus set by the important values ofthe politically active members of the society, of whom the voters are a key group.... Formost politicians subject to elections must operate within the limits set both by their own

values, as indoctrinated [sic] members of society, and by their expectations about whatpolitics they can adopt and still be reelected. " Preface, 132 .

We cannot help but note in this connection that Publius, as we might expect, stressesthe communion that exists between the representatives and their constituents. "Duty,gratitude, interest, ambition itself, " he writes,"are the cords by which they [the repre-sentatives] will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people "

(57:353). In this respect, he notes the very special role of elections in securing this com-munion:"without the restraint of frequent elections, " the representative would not feel"compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of

it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised;there forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established theirtitle to a renewal of it" (57:352).


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On a related matter, Publius regards" the idea of an actual represen-

tation of all classes of the people by persons of each class [as] altogether

visionary" (35:214). But his arguments on this score go well beyond the

impracticality of the legislature mirroring all the interests of society. He

holds that any such provision to this effect would run counter to the im-

pulses and desires of the people; that the legislature would never reflect

society in this respect"under any arrangement that leaves the votes of

the people free"

(35:215). Moreover, he does not believe that it is neces-

sary for all interests to have their agents in the legislature for their views

to be duly considered. He illustrates these points by observing that

"mechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined, with few excep-tions, to give their votes to merchants in preference to persons of their

own profession or trades"

because"the merchant is their natural patron

and friend" and they know that he can promote their interests in the leg-islative chamber better than they (35:214). More generally, he holds

that most legislators will be"landholders, merchants, and men of the

learned profession"with sufficiently broad knowledge of and sympathies

with the wider variety of interests in society to handle their concerns and

affairs justly. Of some interest in this respect, he sees members of the"learned profession"

playing a very special role to which we will have oc-

casion to recur below:"Will not the man of the learned profession who

will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches of

industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them ready to

promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive to the general

interests of the society?" (35:218)

We shall see that Publius is concerned about the constitution of the

legislature because it is so central to his thinking about the operations ofrepublican government and the realization of the common good.

Nevertheless, the role of the legislature in Publius ' s theory differs sig-

nificantly from that it assumes in the classical model. Specifically, in

Publius's conception the legislature cannot rule supreme in the name of

the people because elements ofconstitutionalism come into the picture

which serve to channel or restrict legislative authority. This is to say, he

regarded the Constitution as"fundamental law

" whose provisions can-

not be changed by majorities through the processes of ordinary legisla-

tion; a position which he develops in Federalist 78to defend the practiceof judicial review. But his views on the status of the Constitution, as well

as the novelty of this"fundamental law"conception, are most succinctly

set forth in Federalist53 when inquiring into the origins of the shib-

boleth, "where annual elections end, tyranny begins"

(330). By way of

explaining its likely origins, he observes that"wherever the supreme

power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full

power to change the form of government"-a view which, we should


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note in passing, conforms with the logic of the classical model. "Even in

Great Britain, " he continues, "where the principles of political and civil

liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear most of the rights

of the Constitution, it is maintained that the authority of the Parliament

is transcendent and uncontrollable as well with regard to the Constitu-

tion as the ordinary objects of legislative provision." Thus, he notes,

there have been "several occasions"when the parliamentary terms of of-

fice have been lengthened by Parliament (331). In essence, he looks

upon the annual election doctrine to be a reflection of a"laudable zeal to

erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited gov-

ernment"

through an appeal"to some simple and familiar portion of timeas a standard for measuring the danger of innovations

" (332). But, he

takes pains to emphasize, however legitimate this concern may be in

Great Britain it is baseless in the American context. There is an"i mpor-

tant distinction,"he writes, "so well understood in America,"which"seems to have been little understood and less observed in any other

country, " "between a Constitution established by the people and unal-

terable by the government, " the situation in the United States, "and a

law established by the government and alterable by the government,

"

the state of affairs in Great Britain (331).Along with express constitutional prohibitions-e.g., that it pass no

expost facto laws or bills of attainder-Congress's authority is limited in

other less specific ways. As Publius informs us, the "republic of Ameri-

ca" is "compound" ; that is,"the power surrendered by the people is first

divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allot-

ted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments"

(51:323). Thus, the principles of federalism and the separation of powers

come into play. Whereas the separation of powers operates to confinethe Congress to what is commonly understood to be the legislative func-

tion or realm, 13 federalism serves to place certain matters or concerns

outside the realm of Congressional authority. In Federalist 39, for in-

stance, he draws the picture of the states possessing a "residuary and in-

violable sovereignty" over"objects " within their jurisdiction (39245).14

13. Publius recognized that it would be impossible to specify with exactness the precisedomains of each of the branches."Experience has instructed us, " he writes,"that no skill in

the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient cer-tainty, its three great provinces-the legislative, executive, and judiciary" (37:228).Nevertheless, as his treatment of the separation of powers clearly indicates, this did notmean that there was not a general understanding of what constituted the core or basic ele-ments of these three departments.14. In Federalist9, he provides virtually the same picture of this division of authority."The proposed Constitution,"he maintains,"so far from implying an abolition of the Stategovernments, makes them constituent part of the national sovereignty, by allowing them adirect representation in the Senates, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive andvery important portions of sovereign power " (76).


12/37


Suffice it to say in this regard that Publius realizes that problems sur-

round the definition of the two jurisdictions, and he does anticipate that

controversies will surround their resolution. Though he is less than clear

about precisely how jurisdictional conflicts should be resolved, he is

consistent throughout in maintaining that they can only be settled at the

national level. 15

Republicanism: Diseases and Remedies I

These observations concerning Publius's views on the status and

functions of majorities, as well as his conception of republicanism, areborne out in his treatment of difficulties and problems associated with

popular self-government. What is more, we gain further insight into histhinking about the processes of republican government by examining

his concerns and the cures which he identifies. In this respect, two es-

says, numbers 9 and 10, which in so many ways complement each other,

are highly significant.

Federalist 9, often completely overshadowed byFederalist 10, sets a`

clinical'

tone which permeates much of Publius'

s approach to the diffi-

15. It is far from our purpose here to explore this particular area. It should be noted, how-ever, that Publius is not entirely unambiguous about how disputes between the nationaland state governments should be resolved. In Federalist39, he writes of a

"tribunal "which"is to be established under the general government

"as the ultimate arbiter (39:245). Thiscan be taken to mean the Supreme Court. However, at other places he speaks of the " com-

mon constituents "drawing the lines between the two jurisdictions. The clearest statement

to this effect comes at the beginning ofFederalist46 where he maintains that the"ultimate

authority" for the resolution of disputes between the two jurisdictions "resides in the

people alone." "

Truth, no less than decency,

"

he adds,

"

requires that the event in everycase should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common con-

stituents " (46:294). (See also: 44:286; 33:203; 28:181).Publius suggests a different process of resolution in Federalist46 where he notes that

the states have it within their power to frustrate the measures of the federal governmentwhich are either unpopular or unwarranted. "The disquietude of the people; their repug-

nance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of theexecutive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices,

which would often be added on such occasion, would oppose, in any State, " he contends,

"difficulties not to be despised; would form in a very large State, very serious impedi-

ments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison,would present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to en-

counter" (46:297-98). As a consequence, we may assume, Publius felt that Congress wouldcontinually have to take into consideration the reception of its policies within the states indeciding whether or not to push ahead with them. This, again, suggests that Congress, asopposed to popular majorities or the common constituents, is in a far better position tojudge of the opposition that will be encountered. It is also to suggest that Congress wouldbe inclined to desist in pressing measures, even those backed by popular majorities, whichwould engender opposition because to do so might prove to be too costly or even counter-

productive.


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culties of republicanism.lsAt the outset he asserts that "it is impossible

to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without

feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which

they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolu-

tions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between

the extremes of anarchy and tyranny." Their occasional"intervals of

felicity,"

he observes, must be viewed"with a mixture of regret, arising

from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be over-

whelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. " From

these experiences, he maintains, "the advocates of despotism have

drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government,but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free

government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulgedthemselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans " (71-72) .

Publius ' s response to these advocates is noteworthy for understand-

ing the place of republicanism in his thinking and why the proposed

Constitution assumed the form it did. While remarking that"stupen-

dous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished forages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms, "

he concedes the thrust of their point. "It is not to be denied, " he writes,"that the portraits they have sketched of republican government were

too just copies of the originals from which they are taken."Indeed, he

goes so far as to declare"if it had been found impracticable to have de-

vised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friend to lib-

erty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of the species of gov-

ernment [republican] as indefensible"

(72) .

Publius's"enlightened friend of liberty, " we may assume, stands in

sharp contrast to the zealots he refers to in the first essay who wouldmaliciously extol liberty at the expense of public good and the requisitefirmness or energy in government. The "enlightened friend" under-

stands that, among other things,"the vigor of government is essential to

the security of liberty" (1:35). Thus, it would seem, that the liberty Pub-

lius has in mind takes the form of` ordered liberty'; that is, a liberty that is

protected and regulated by government in light of the common good.

We need not delve very far into Publius's conception of ordered liberty,

however, to see that he cherishes it more than republicanism. That is, toput this otherwise, if ordered liberty and republicanism cannot coexist,

16. In an important sense, The Federalist is a pathology of republicanism. One of thereasons, we surmise, why Publius is often interpreted as hostile to republican governmentis that he frankly acknowledges its shortcomings and the potential dangers associated withit. Yet, that he was a friend of republicanism and self-government is attested to by thisfrankness and his efforts to show how the proper operations of the proposed Constitution

would overcome these weaknesses and dangers.


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if the"

perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anar-

chy" cannot be curbed, then so much for republicanism. But, having

structured the choice in these stark terms, he immediately writes of the"great improvement"in the"science of politics, " of" the efficacy of vari-

ous principles . now well understood ... which were either not known

at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients." "

The regular distribution of

power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances

and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their of-fices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legis-

lature by deputies of their own election " are, he observes,"wholly new

discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection inmodern times " (72).

"They are means, and powerful means," he argues,

"by which the excellencies of republican government may be retained

and its imperfections lessened or avoided"

(72-73). To this list of princi-ples "that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil govern-

ment,"he adds "ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT, " thereby introducing

the notion that, contrary to traditional thinking, benefits for republican

government can flow from states confederated on proper principles over

an extended territory. His subsequent discussion of the"CONFEDER-

ATE REPUBLIC, " which allows "for extending the sphere of popular

government and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those ofrepublicanism," complements his argument concerning the advantagesof an extended republic in controlling the effects of faction presented in

the following essay.

While these principles are the product of an improved"science of

politics, " they do not constitute a"

new science of politics"in the sense of

a comprehensive, systematic, and interrelated set of principles, axioms,

or assumptions which explain or describe political behavior. Rather,though highly significant for reasons that are apparent, they are princi-

ples which render republicanism compatible with ordered liberty or

those conditions essential for its realization. What is noteworthy is that

three of them-the first three cited-relate directly to the separation

of powers. Though Publius does not address at any length the relation-

ship between liberty and the separation of powers, from what he does

say elsewhere we can piece together a fairly accurate picture of what he

thought it to be. In Federalist 47he declares that

"

no truth is certainly ofgreater intrinsic value or is stamped with the authority of more en-

lightened patrons of liberty " than that "accumulation " of the legislative,

executive, and judicial powers"in the same hands, whether of one, a

few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may

justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny"

(301). He quotes

from Montesquieu to give us some flavor of the tyranny to which he re-fers: " When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same


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person or body . . . there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may

arise lest the same monarch or senate should enacttyrannical laws to ex -

ecute them in a tyrannical manner. " Or should, he continues, still quot-ing from Montesquieu, the judicial power be united with the legislative,"`

the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control,

for the judge would then be the legislator"'

; joined with the executive,"

the judge might behave with all the violence ofan oppressor"' (303) .

The absence of separation, in other words, would allow for a totally arbi-

trary and capricious formulation, execution and interpretation of the

laws, a far cry from the uniform, equal, and predictable application of

the laws required by the rule of law.While it is beyond our purpose here to delve very far into Publius's

views on the separation of powers, we should note that he believed the

separation would insure the operation of the`reflexive

'principle; that is,

that the laws passed by the legislature, precisely because they would be

executed and interpreted by separate and independent departments,

would apply equally to the legislators, their family and friends, as well as

to the ordinary citizens. As he puts this, along with"frequent elections, "

duty, interest, or gratitude, another"circumstance" which serves to re-

strain representatives "from oppressive measures" is "that they can

make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and

their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society"

(57:352). So long

as this state of affairs exists, of course, the legislators would be unlikely to

pass oppressive laws.

The reflexive principle indicates the critical importance of maintain-ing the separation between the branches, a matter which deeply con-

cerns Publius throughout the essays. Indispensable to this maintenance,

he believes, are the " legislative balances and checks " to which he alludesin Federalist 9. Writing in Federalist 48, he points to a special problem

confronting republics in providing for adequate separation between the

branches; a separation which he holds to be highly instrumental in ob-

viating the difficulties which had overwhelmed the"petty republics. "In

this paper, he admonishes the American people because"they seem

never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger, to lib-

erty, from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary

magistrate, supported and fortified by an hereditary branch of the legis-lative authority. " This is all very well, he writes,

"where numerous and

extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary

monarch"

or even"

in a democracy"

where the people'

s"incapacity for

regular deliberation and concerted measures,"

render them vulnerable"to the ambitious intrigues of their executive magistrates.

""But, " he

continues, "in a representative republic where the executive magistracy

is carefully limited, both in the extent and duration of its power; and


16/37


where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is in-

spired by a supposed influence over the people with an intrepid confi-

dence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all thepassion which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapa-

ble of pursuing the objects of its passion by means which reason pre-

scribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this department thatthe people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all the precau-

tions" (309).

Looking at the political situations within the states, he could assert

that"the legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of

its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex"

(48:309). Healso recognizes that"it is not possible to give to each department an

equal power of self-defense"

because"in republican government, the

legislative authority necessarily predominates."

The answer to this"in-

conveniency," he contends,"is to divide the legislature into different

branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and differ-

ent principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature

of the common functions and their common dependence on the society

will admit"

(51:322) . But even this is not sufficient:"

As the weight of the

legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weak-

ness of the executive may require . . . that it should be fortified."

In this

regard, he sympathetically considers the alternative of an"absolute

negative " on the legislature, but concludes that, on balance, it might not

be"altogether safe" or "alone sufficient" (51:323). He holds out the pros-

pect that a"qualified connection" between the president and Senate

might develop which would compensate for the"defect of an absolute

veto,"

whereby the Senate or a sufficient portion of it would ally with the

president to uphold his authority against legislative encroachment.What is evident from this brief survey of Publius

's concern with main-

taining the separation of powers is that he emphasizes the need for in-

stitutions and procedures which, from the vantage point of classical de-

mocracy, can only serve to dilute or stymie the majority will. For in-

stance, in the classical model there is no need for two legislative cham-

bers, each capable of `

checking'the other; such a provision only opens

up the possibilities of distorting the majority will. Consequently, what

constitutes a deviation from republicanism from the classical view is, forPublius, necessary to rescue " this form of government . . . from the op-

probrium under which it has so long labored " (10:81).

Republicanism: Diseases and Remedies II

Two other principles of the improved "science of politics " mentioned

in Federalist9 , representation and "ENLARGEMENT ofthe ORBIT,"


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are best considered in conjunction with Publius's extended republic

theory set forth in Federalist10. A s noted above, Publius' s discussion of

the "CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC" complements the argument of

Federalist10 to the effect that republican government, contrary to tradi-

tional teachings, is possible over an extensive territory comprised of di-

verse and competing interests. In Federalist 9, he emphasizes how it is

possible to enjoy the benefits of republican government while, at the

same time, overcoming a weakness traditionally associated with them,namely, their incapacity to deal swiftly with sufficient force against ex-

ternal dangers. To this end he quotes approvingly from Montesquieu to

the effect that a confederate republic-a "

form of government ... bywhich several small states agree to become members of a larger one-

-

possesses the capability -to withstand an external force [and] may sup-

port itself without any internal corruption. " Quite simply, under this ar-

rangement, the number of states in the confederacy can be increased to

the point where the member states collectively possess " a degree of

power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body-(74) .

A s for internal matters, the member states could unite if any member

state "

should attempt to usurp the supreme authority-

(75). Likewise,in Montesquieu 's account, the states could unite to put down insurrec-

tions in members states.

In Federalist10, Publius may be said to turn to a problem common to

all regimes, but of a different and more specific character than those al-

luded to in Federalist 9; namely, how to prevent the sovereign-in this

case, the majority-from acting in an unjust or oppressive manner. His

concern, to put this in slightly different terms, is with majority "factions"

or majorities"united and actuated by some common impulse of passion,

or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent

and aggregate interests of the community"(78) . What is more, he seeks

to prevent rule by majority factions without violating or compromising

the republican principle of majority rule. In his words:"To secure the

public good and private rights against the danger of such a [majority] fac-

tion, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular

government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed "

(80). 17 He reiterates his position in somewhat different terms in

Federalist51, where he rejects the idea of"

creating a will independent

17. Testimony to Publius ' s belief in the republican character of the system is to be foundin the fact that he dismisses the possibility of rule by factious majorities in just two sen-tences, one of which we have had occasion to allude to. "If a faction consists of less than amajority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to de-feat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse thesociety; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Con-stitution " (10:80).


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of the majority-that is, of the society itself' to curb factious majorities

(323). This he deems "at best"only a "precarious security; because a

power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust viewsof the major as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly

be turned against both parties " (324). (Byway of anticipating a difficulty

we will deal with later, critics see a conundrum in the idea of restraining

majorities consistent with republican principles.) 18

Over the decades, Federalist10 has been examined with great care

from numerous points of view. 19 Here, for the most part, we will con-

centrate on those elements of the extended republic theory which bear

most directly on Publius's principal objective. We can profitably begin

by briefly looking at the remedies he rejects, as well as the reasons why,

because this will indicate the character and dimensions of the problems

he perceived in providing for popular government free from the ravages

of majority factions. We will gain, as well, an appreciation of his solution

to these problems.

Publius sees"two methods for curing the mischief of faction: the one,

by removing its causes; the other by controlling its effects. " The solu-

tions or remedies he rejects fit under the first of the methods, removing

the causes of faction. As he perceives it, removing the causes would in-volve either "destroying liberty which is essential

"to the existence of

faction, or"giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions,

and the same interests."As for destroying liberty, as we might expect,

he holds"the remedy worse than the disease. " "Liberty,"he writes, "is

to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly ex-

pires." And just as we would not do away with air, essential to life, be-

cause "it imparts to fire its destructive agency," so, too, he reasons, it

would be absurd "

to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life,because it nourishes faction"(78) .

18. Publius is to argue that the conditions of the extended republic, principally the multi-plicity and diversity of interest, will provide the remedy for majority factions on the termshe sets forth. But to this solution, Robert Dahl writes:

"Whether or not the majority is fac-tional is irrelevant to the operation of the restrictions imposed by the existence of a numer-ous, extended, and diverse electorate. Furthermore, so far as I am aware, no modernMadison has shown that the restraints on the effectiveness of majorities imposed by thefacts of a pluralistic society operate only to curtail 'bad' majorities and not ` good' majorities;

and I confess I see no way by which such an ingenious proposition could be satisfactorilyestablished." Preface, 29-30. For an extended discussion and analysis of Dahl 's contentionin this regard see: Gary Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist(New York: Doubledayand Co., 1981), chapters 23-31. See our discussion below.19. Douglas Adair points out Federalist10 assumed its position as the most widely readand analyzed of all the essays after the publication of Beard

'sAn Economic Interpretation .of the Constitution ofthe United States in 1913.

"That Politics May Be Reduced to a Sci-ence: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist," in Trevor Colburn, ed.,Fame and the FoundingFathers (New York: W.W. Norton, 1974).


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The second method for removing the causes-giving citizens the

same opinions, passions, and interests-he holds to be "impracticable."

"As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to

exercise it,"he contends, "different opinions will be formed. "And, he

continues,"as long as the connection subsists between his reason and hisself-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence

on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will at-

tach themselves." "Not less an insuperable obstacle to the uniformity of

interest, " he maintains, is "the diversity in the faculties of man, from

which the rights of property originate." He regards "the first object of

government"

to be"

the protection of-

the"

different and unequal facul-ties of acquiring property."This, we come to see, serves to fuel factions

because the "possession of different degrees and kinds of property"

which necessarily results from the diverse faculties of men "influence

. the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors " which be-gets"a division of the society into different interests and parties "(78). In-

deed, as he subsequently points out,"the regulation of these various and

interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation and

involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary op-

erations of government"(79) .

Thus, for Publius, "the latent causes of faction" are "sown in the na-

ture of man" and are a fact of political life. That Publius could see the reg-ulation of interfering interests to be the main task of modern govern-

ment, however, would seem to bear upon the ability of the system to re-

solve disputes without succumbing to "tempestuous waves of sedition

and party rage" that could be its undoing. Publius, drawing heavily from

Hume, was aware that opinion/passion factions would form on the basis

of principle or affection. Thus, he writes of divisions among men thathave "inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them muchmore disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for the

common good" which originate from "different opinions concerning

religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of

speculation as of practice, an attachment to different leaders . . . con-

tending for power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes

have been interesting to the human passions." In many cases, the opin-

ion/passion conflicts are simply irreconcilable; they cannot be resolvedthrough compromise or give and take. On the other hand, interest based

conflicts are normally tractable; differences between the contending in-

terests can be adjusted, in large part because of their nature which al-

lows for give and take, but also because the differences are infrequently

those of principle.20

20. Martin Diamond was among the first to stress this point. Of the " strategy" behind theextended republic theory, he writes: " if Americans can be made to divide themselves ac-


20/37


To the foregoing it is essential to add that Publius envisioned compli-

cated patterns of conflict between a wide variety of interests. While rec-

ognizing that the"most common and durable source of factions has beenthe various and unequal distribution of property "and that "those who

hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct in-terests in society,"he goes on to observe that there are a variety of inter-ests-

"landed, " "manufacturing,""mercantile," "moneyed, " and"manylesser interests "-which also compete in the political processes. The

rivalry between them, and even within them, would seem to assure that

the system would not be marked by an intense and potentially disrup-

tive conflict between the haves and have nots,

2l

Publius proceeds to compare the resolution of conflict between major

competing interests to "judicial determinations" in which none of the in-terested parties ought to be judge of its own cause (79). He argues that"justice ought to hold the balance" between contending interests-e.g.,

creditors and debtors, manufacturing and landed-in the resolution of

issues such as "the apportionment of taxes " which vitally affect them.

But-no doubt with the experiences in several of the state legislatures in

mind-he contends that this is not to be expected when one of the par-ties to the conflict has the number or means to prevail over the others."The most powerful faction, " he writes, "must be expected to prevail"

and"probably" without "a sole regard to justice and the public good. "

For instance, the "apportionment of taxes," in his judgment, "seems to

require the most exact impartiality." Nevertheless, he remarks,"perhaps, no legislative act"gives "greater opportunity and temptation

... to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice" (80) . Weshould note, in passing, that he certainly must have believed this `bi-po-

larity' would seldom, if ever, arise over like matters in the legislature of

cording to their narrow and particularized economic interests, they will avoid the fatal fac-tionalism that opinion and passion generate. By contrast, the relatively tranquil kind offac-tionalism resulting from economic interests makes possible a stable and decent democ-racy. ""Ethics and Politics: The American Way, " in Robert H. Horwitz, ed., The MoralFoundations of the American Republic (2d. ed.; Charlottesville, Virginia: University Pressof Virginia, 1979), 54.

Diamond writes as if Publius (Madison) sought to channel or direct political activityinto the realm of interest conflict. This does not seem warranted. Publius seems to take thepredominance of interest conflict as a given when he writes that it is the "principal task ofmodern legislation. "

21 . Quite pertinent here are Publius ' s remarks in Federalist36 in the context of pointingout the impracticality of representing all interests in the legislature. Here he observes:"What greater affinity or relation of interest can be conceived between the carpenter andblacksmith, and the linen manufacturer or stocking-weaver, than between the merchant

and either of them? It is notorious that there are often as great rivalships between differentbranches of the mechanic or manufacturing arts as there are between and of the depart-ments of labor and industry" (218).


21/37


the extended republic because of the multiplicity and diversity of inter-est. In this paragraph, as we shall emphasize later, he is picturing condi-

tions which must be avoided in the decision-making councils.Having identified this difficulty, Publius considers and rejects the no-

tion"that enlightened statesmen will be:able to adjust these clashing in-

terests and render them all subservient to the public good. " "En-

lightened statesmen," he observes, "will not always be at the helm." Buteven if they were, he seems to suggest, they would not always be able to

work their will because to do so would often require taking "indirect and

remote considerations"into account; considerations "which will rarely

prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disre-garding the rights of another or the good of the whole" (80). Here we can

clearly see one of the crucial assumptions that underlies Publius ' s gen-

eral approach that is reflected in discussion of the institutions and pro-

cesses set forth in the proposed Constitution; namely, individuals have adistinct propensity to pursue their immediate self-interest at the ex-

pense of the long term common good.22

His observations concerning the primacy of immediate self-inter-

est-both with regard to the possible role of enlightened statesmen and

the behavior of dominant interests in the `resolution ' of conflict in the

legislature-help us to understand the essential elements of his grandstrategy when he turns to the second method"for curing the mischiefs of

faction," which, at this juncture, comes down to "controlling" the "ef-

fects " of popular majority factions. If a popular majority is united around

some passion or interest which is factional, and if, furthermore, this

majority is in a position to carry out its will, then it will behave in the

same fashion as the "predominant" legislative parties and interests to

which Publius refers. Consequently, he argues that the control of fac-tious majorities must come about in one of two ways: "Either the exis-

tence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must

be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or inter-

est, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to

concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression." Otherwise, "if the

i mpulse and opportunity be suffered to coincide," he warns, "neither

22. Publius has recourse to this view in answering those who argue that the states would,if allowed to go their separate ways, as independent"commercial republics ... never bedisposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other." He asks rhetori-cally:"Has it not . . . invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate inter-ests, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remoteconsiderations of policy, utility, or justice? " (6:56)

For an excellent discussion of Publius ' s views and " theories" of human motivation seeJames B. Scanlan, "`The Federalist'and Human Nature,

"The Review of Politics 21 (Oc-

tober, 1959).


22/37


moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. " In-deed, he sees an inverse relationship between the need for controls or

checks on the behavior of factious majorities and the efficacy of such ap-peals: when most needed, they are the least effective.

In light of this argument concerning the need to prevent a coinci-

dence of impulse and opportunity, we can readily understand why Pub-lius can contend that a

"pure democracy, " where the people themselves

assemble to make decisions,"can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of

faction."

In such an arrangement there is nothing to prevent the union ofi mpulse and opportunity;"there is nothing to check the inducements to

sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual." To this lack of im-pediment to impulse and opportunity, he attributes the"spectacles ofturbulence and contention that have characterized "such democracies

"

which, he remarks, have been "as short in their lives as they have beenviolent in their deaths " (81). This language, reminiscent of that he usedin Federalist 9 to describe

"petty " republics, indicates that, for all in-

tents and purposes, he regards both pure democracies and small repub-

lics as being unsuitable for popular government.Publius ' s remarks on

"pure democracy" are interesting from other an-

gles. By implication, we can see in his line of reasoning a strong biasagainst the"classical " design of democracy whose end would be to reflect

as accurately as possible majority preferences. Certainly, he would

scarcely seem to be disposed to play up the plebiscitary potential of re-publican governments. Perhaps more significant in light of the context

in which he was writing, his conclusions represent an eversion of the

traditional argument for a small republic. He writes that the "theoreticpoliticians . . . who have patronized this species of government [pure de-

mocracy]"

believed that "reducing mankind to a perfect equality in theirpolitical rights, they would at the same time be perfectly equalized and

assimilated in their possession, their opinions, and their passions" (81).In other words, these theorists, according to Publius, have "erroneouslysupposed" that pure democracies would eliminate the causes of faction

via the "second expedient"

which he discusses at the beginning of theessay-i.e., reducing individuals to the same opinions, passions, and in-

terests. But, for the reasons he has spelled out showing the impractica-

bility of this alternative, he is free to summarily dismiss this suppositionas"erroneous.

"And this being the case, pure democracies and, we may

assume, small republics will be eternally plagued with factions with

which they have no hooks to grapple. Thus, the traditional theory, ad-

vanced by the Anti-Federalists, which stresses the connection between

republicanism and small size is, on Publius 's showing, `

wrong-headed':


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republicanism and "smallness " are basically incompatible with one

another.23

Majority Factions: The Remedy

Having noted the fatal shortcomings of pure democracies, Publius

sets forth the fundamental elements of his solution. He declares that "a

republic "-which at this stage he defines as "a government in which the

scheme of representation takes place "-"opens a different prospect

[than that offered by pure democracy] and promises the cure for which

we are seeking."

He then sets out to "

examine the points in which it [arepublic] varies from pure democracy" for an understanding of "both the

nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from Union"

(81). While his subsequent analysis is primarily concerned with pointing

up the advantages of the large or extended republic over a small republic

in controlling majority factions, he uses the republic/pure democracy

contrast initially to isolate the elements of his remedy that he will also

employ in his large/small republic comparisons. These elements are

two: representation ( "the delegation of government"in a republic "to a

small number of citizens elected by the rest") ; and "the greater number

of citizens and greater sphere of authority over which"a republican gov-

ernment"may be extended" (82).

Publius takes up these differences separately beginning with repre-

sentation. He offers up extremes concerning the possible effects of rep-

resentations. At one end, it could serve to"refine and enlarge the public

views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,

whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and

whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to

temporary or partial considerations." At the other, it might be that"men

of factious tempers, or of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by

intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages,

23. Publius recognizes the novelty of his teachings in this regard. In Federalist14, heturns this fact to his advantage:"Harken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that theform of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world;that is has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors; that it rashly at-

tempts what is impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears against thisunhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison which it conveys.... the mostalarming of all novelties, the most wild of all projects, the most rash of all attempts, is thatof rending us to pieces in order to preserve our liberties and promote our happiness. " Hegoes on to ask rhetorically: "But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be re-jected merely because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people ofAmerica that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times andother nations, they have not suffereda blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or fornames, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their ownsituation, and the lessons of their own experience" (104).


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and they betray the interests of the people. " He sees "two obvious con-

siderations" which "clearly " indicate that the "election of proper guar-

dians " is more likely in the"extensive,"rather than the "small," repub-

l ic . The first is that, since reason dictates there must be some upper limit

to the size of a legislative body, the voters in the large republic will have

more "fit characters " from which to choose for the limited number of leg-

islative seats. This position is, of course, predicated on certain unarticu-

lated assumptions-e.g., that "fit" individuals will choose to run for of-

fice, that the people possess the capacity to identify "fit" characters and

that, having identified them, they will vote them into office.

The second consideration is that the larger the size of the electorate,the "more difficult " it will be "for unworthy candidates to practise with

success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried " (83) .

[Later, Publius is to give us some idea of what he means by the "vicious

arts." "Reason, " he asserts, "assures us that" in a larger district, rather

than the small, "a fit representative would be most likely to be found, so

the choice would be less likely to be diverted from him by the intriguesof the ambitious or the bribes of the rich"(57:354).] In the absence of

these

"

vicious arts,

"

he goes on to maintain,

"

the suffrages of the people

"

will be freer and "more likely to center on the men who possess the most

attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters (83-

84).24 In this connection, Publius is aware that an electoral district can

be so large that the representative may be "too little acquainted with .. .

local circumstances and lesser interests, " or so small that local concernsand interests will blur his vision of national problems and goals. By way

of indicating what he conceives the division of authority between the

states and national government to be, he finds that the "federal Con-

stitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggre-

gate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to

the State legislatures" (83).With this said, Publius comes to the second of the great differences

between pure democracy and a republic, namely, "the greater number

of citizens and the extent of territory "which can be embraced under the

republican form. He maintains that "it is this difference principally

which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded " in extensive re-

publics than in democracies or small republics. In showing this, he hasrecourse to his impulse/opportunity strategy: "The smaller the society,

24. Aside from bribery which would be more difficult and expensive in a large district, it isnot unlikely that Publius felt that larger districts would compel the candidates to confrontdifferent audiences under avariety of circumstances which would serve to 'filter out ' the

weaker candidates. Certainly in the small districts, the defects of pure democracy couldcome into playi n the selection of representatives; not the least of these being momentarypassions dictating the choice of a representative.


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REPUBLICANISM AND THE FEDERALIST ' 131

the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composingit; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a

majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of indi-

viduals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which

they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their

plans of oppression. "The opposite is true in the extended republic

where the multiplicity of distinct interests renders "it less probable that

a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of

other citizens," or, if perchance it does, "it will be more difficult for all

who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each

other. " At this point, he refers to "

other impediments," presumably tothe formation of factious majorities and/or execution of their will, but

cites only one: that the communication among those bent upon "unjust

or dishonorable purposes"will be inhibited by a "distrust in proportion

to the number whose concurrence is necessary. This impediment, he

recognizes, depends upon a "consciousness"on the part of those seeking

these ends; that is,arecognition on their part that the ends are"unjust

and dishonorable" (83).25

In the latter third ofFederalist51, Publius sets forth in slightly differ-ent form why he believes multiplicity and diversity of interest will serve

as an impediment to the formation of factious majorities. The alternative

to controlling majority factions "by creating a will independent of soci-

ety"-which, as we have remarked, he regards as both a dangerous and

ineffective solution-is, he contends, "comprehending in the society so

many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combina-

tion of the majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable"

(324-25). Or, again,"whilst all authority in it ["the federal republic of the

United States"] will be derived from and dependent on the society, the

society itself will be broken into so many part, interests and classes ofcitizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little

25. Why Publius should cite this and not other obvious impediments such as communica-tion, geographical considerations, and the like, is an interesting question. Interest-basedfactions as he depicts them, for example, would certainly seem to lack a"consciousness

"

thatwou ld operate as an impediment in the fashion he describes. He has told us above that

moral and religious motives will not deter passion- or interest-based majorities from pur-suing their factious ends if given the opportunity. We must assume, it seems, that there isa category of"unjust and dishonorable" ends that are acknowledged and accepted as suchby the general population. His remarks in Federalist55 indicate that within this generalcategory would fit " a scheme of tyrannyor treachery" carried out by representatives whoare supported by the people. What is more, he writes, "I am ... unable to conceive thatthere are at this time, or can be in any short time, in the United States, any sixty-five or ahundred men capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the people at large,who would either desire or dare, within the short space of two years, to betray the solemntrust committed to them " (344).


26/37


danger from interested combinations of the majority " (324). He sees aparallel between the "security for civil rights

"and

"that for religious

rights "; the former depends on the "multiplicity of interests, " the latteron the

"multiplicity of sects. " Not only, it seems, does he perceive multi-

plicity operating to prevent the formation of interestedand factiousmajorities, he even affirms that given this multiplicity "a coalition of a

majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other prin-

ciples than those of justice and the general good"

(325).

By way of concluding this outline of Publius ' s remedy for"the dis-

eases most incident to republican government,"majority factions, we

should note that he exhibits a theoretical consistency by arguing em-phatically that the states will be more vulnerable to factious rule than the

national government. He sees only dim prospects for a Rhode Island"separated from the confederacy" :

"left to itself, the insecurity of rights

under the popular form of government within such narrow limits wouldbe displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that

some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called

for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the neces-sity of it"

(51:325). Even within the Union, Publius does not regard thestates to be safe from the ravages of faction. But factious movements that

might enjoy success at the state level would not pose a danger to the na-tional government; particularly, it would appear, those factions based

upon principle or affection. Towards the end ofFederalist10, he claimsthat the deleterious effects of

"factious leaders" will be confined to the

confines of"their particular states,"as will the impact of"a religious sect

[that] may degenerate into a political faction."

He is less sanguine aboutthe prospect of confining interest factions. "A rage for paper money, for

an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property"-all of these, inhis view, factious ends-is only "less apt to pervade the whole body ofthe Union than a particular member of it " (84) .

Questions and Problems: Fitting the Pieces Together

We have already had occasion to allude to the modern critiques of thetheory embodied in The Federalist; a theory which, it is generally as-

sumed, reflects the basic assumptions and broad goals of our FoundingFathers. We have also remarked that the harshest criticisms of Publius ' stheory, in large part, issue from the perspective of the classical concep-

tion of democracy whose central concern is the faithful execution of the"will " or preference of the majority. A common theme in these criticisms

is that while our system, operating pretty much along the lines Publius

anticipated, may serve to prevent majority factions from coalescing, it

also makes the formation of non-factious majorities extremely difficult.


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In other words, as we have already remarked, the charge is that condi-

tions of the extended republic operate equally upon both the forces of"good " and"bad"; that, off at the end, Publius ' s theory, while paying

homage to the majority rule principle, in fact sacrifices this principle in

order to con

Documents

Republicanism and The Federalist