Republic vs. Bobiles

356 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

G.R.No.92326.January24,1992.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES,respondents.

Civil Law; Family Code; Vested right defined; A vested right isone whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend uponevents foreign to the will of the holder.—Avestedrightisonewhoseexistence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon eventsforeigntothewillof theholder.Thetermexpressestheconceptofpresent fixed interest which in right reason and natural justiceshould be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innatelyjustandimperativerightwhichenlightenedfreesociety,sensitivetoinherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. Vestedrightsincludenotonlylegalorequitabletitletotheenforcementofademand,butalsoanexemptionfromnewobligationscreatedaftertherighthasvested.

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*SECONDDIVISION.

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Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Jurisdiction; Jurisdictionof the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of thecommencement of the action.—When private respondent filed herpetition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquiredjurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law.Jurisdictionbeingamatterofsubstantivelaw,theestablishedruleis that the jurisdictionof the court isdeterminedby thestatute inforceatthetimeofthecommencementoftheaction.Wedonotfindinthepresentcasesuchfactsaswouldconstituteitasanexceptiontotherule.

Same; Same; Adoption; It is a settled rule that adoptionstatutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption,should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes ofthe adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in therights and privileges coming to it as a result of adoption.—We seenoreasonwhythe followingdoctrines inAmerican lawshouldnotapply to this case and, for thatmatter, in our jurisdiction. It is a

settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters ofprocedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed tocarryoutthebeneficentpurposesoftheadoptioninstitutionandtoprotecttheadoptedchildintherightsandprivilegescomingtoitasa result of the adoption. Themodern tendency of the courts is tohold that there need not be more than a substantial compliancewith statutory requirements to sustain the validity of theproceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow andtechnical construction of the statute as to defeat its intention andbeneficialresultsortoinvalidateproceedingswhereeverymaterialrequirementofthestatutewascompliedwith.

Same; Same; Same; Rule that technical rules of pleadingshould not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings.—Insupportofthisruleit issaidthatit isnotthedutyofthecourtstobring the judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order thateveryslightdefectmaybeenlargedandmagnifiedsothatareasonmay be found for declaring invalid an act consummated yearsbefore, but rather to approach the case with the inclination touphold such acts if it is found that there was a substantialcompliancewiththestatute.Thetechnicalrulesofpleadingshouldnotbestringentlyappliedtoadoptionproceedings,anditisdeemedmoreimportantthatthepetitionshouldcontainfactsrelatingtothechild and its parents, which may give information to thoseinterested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading.Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will conferjurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute,allegingallfactsnecessarytogivethecourtjurisdiction.

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Same; Same; Same; Discretion; Case at bar; The trial court andrespondent court acted correctly in granting the petition foradoption.—Indeterminingwhetherornottosetasidethedecreeofadoption the interestsandwelfareof the childareofprimaryandparamount consideration. The welfare of a child is of paramountconsiderationinproceedingsinvolvingitscustodyandtheproprietyof itsadoptionbyanother,andthecourtstowhichtheapplicationforadoptionismadeischargedwiththedutyofprotectingthechildand its interestsand, tobring those interests fullybefore it, ithasauthority to make rules to accomplish that end. Ordinarily, theapprovalof theadoptionrests in thesounddiscretionof thecourt.This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the bestinterests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parentsover thechildarenotdisregarded. In theabsenceofashowingofgraveabuse,theexerciseofthisdiscretionbytheapprovingofficialwillnotbedisturbed. In thecaseatbar, therightsconcomitant toandconferredbythedecreeofadoptionwillbeforthebestinterestsofthechild.Hisadoptioniswiththeconsentofhisnaturalparents.The representative of the Department of Social Welfare andDevelopment unqualifiedly recommended the approval of thepetition for adoption and the trial court dispensed with the trialcustodyforseveralcommendatoryreasons,especiallysincethechildhadbeen livingwith the adoptingparents since infancy.Further,thesaidpetitionwaswiththeswornwrittenconsentofthechildren

oftheadopters.Thetrialcourtandrespondentcourtactedcorrectlyin granting the petition for adoption and we find no reason todisturb the same. As found and aptly stated by respondent court:"Giventhefactsandcircumstancesofthecaseandconsideredinthelight of the foregoing doctrine,We are of the opinion and so holdthatthedecreeofadoptionissuedbythecourta quowouldgoalongway towards promoting the welfare of the child and theenhancementofhisopportunitiesforausefulandhappylife."

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.The Solicitor Generalforpetitioner.Mariano B. Mirandaforprivaterespondent.

REGALADO,J.:

Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court ofAppeals

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promulgated onFebruary20,19901 which affirmed in toto

the decision of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court ofLegaspi City

2 granting the petition of herein private

respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitionerseeksthereversalthereofinthepresentpetitionforreviewoncertiorari.

On February 2,1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed apetition toadoptJasonCondat, thensix (6)yearsoldandwhohadbeen livingwithher familysincehewas four (4)monthsold,beforetheRegionalTrialCourtofLegaspiCity,docketedthereinasSpecialProceedingNo.1386.

3

Thecourta quo, finding thepetition to be sufficient inform and substance, issued an order dated February 15,1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28,1988.

4

The order was duly published, with copies thereofseasonably served on the Solicitor General; AssistantProvincialFiscalMediavillo,Jr.ofAlbay;SalvadorCondat,father of the child; and the social worker assigned to thecourt.Acopyofsaidorderwaspostedonthebulletinboardofthecourtandintheotherplacesithadrequiredforthatpurpose.Nobodyappearedtoopposethepetition.

5

Compliancewiththejurisdictionalrequirementshavingbeen proved at the hearing, the testimonies of hereinprivate respondent, together with that of her husband,Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of theDepartmentofSocialWelfareandDevelopmentweretakenandadmittedintheproceedings.

On March 20,1988, the trial court rendered judgmentdisposingasfollows:

ACCORDINGLY, it is declared that henceforth, the minor child,JASONCCNDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedienceandmaintenancewithrespecttohisnaturalparents,andbe,toall

1.

intentsandpurposes,thechildofthespousesDioscoroandZenaidaBobiles,

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1PennedbyJusticeOscarM.Herrera,withJusticesJoseC.Campos,Jr.and

AsaaliS.Isnaniconcurring,inCAG.R.CVNo.17911.

2PerJudgeAngelM.AlegreinSp.Proc.No.1386.

3Rollo,15.

4OriginalRecord,8.

5Rollo,18.

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andthesurnameof thechildbechanged to "Bobiles"which is thesurnameofthepetitioner.

Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, theDepartment of Social Welfare and Development, Regional Office,RegionV,LegaspiCity,andtheLocalCivilRegistrarofTiwi,Albay,withcopiesofthisdecision.

6

HereinpetitionerappealedtotheCourtofAppealswhich,asearlier stated, affirmed the aforesaid decision of the courtbelow. Hence, this present petition with the followingassignmentoferrors:

TheHonorableCourtofAppealserredinrulingthattheFamilyCodecannotbeappliedretroactivelytothepetitionforadoptionfiledbyZenaidaC.Bobiles;and2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred inaffirmingthetrialcourt'sdecisionwhichgrantedthepetition to adopt JasonCondat in favor of spousesDioscoroBobilesandZenaidaC.Bobiles.

7

The petition for adoption was filed by private respondentZenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the lawapplicablewasPresidentialDecreeNo.603, theChildandYouth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition foradoptionmaybefiledbyeitherofthespousesorbybothofthem. However, after the trial court rendered its decisionandwhile thecasewaspendingonappeal intheCourtofAppeals, ExecutiveOrderNo. 209, the Family Code, tookeffect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, jointadoptionbyhusbandandwifeismandatory.

Ontheforegoingconsideration,petitionercontendsthatthepetitionforadoptionshouldbedismissedoutrightasitwas filed solelybyprivate respondentwithout joiningherhusband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Codewhichrequiresjointadoptionbythespouses.Itarguesthatthe Family Code must be applied retroactively to thepetitionfiledbyMrs.Bobiles,asthelatterdidnotacquireavestedrighttoadoptJasonCondatbythemerefilingofherpetitionforadoption.Wearenotpersuaded.

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6Ibid.,2526.7Ibid.,6.

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Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory impliesthatthenoninclusionofDioscoroBobilesasacopetitioneris a jurisdictional defect, hence its prayer for an outrightdismissalonthatscore.Itcouldnotbetakingexceptiononlyonthegroundofnonjoindersincepetitionermustbeawarethatnonjoinderisnotagroundforthedismissalofanactionor a special proceeding.

8 We further apprehend that this

objection has been raised for the first time on appeal inrespondent court.Nonetheless,weshall clarifypetitioner'smisgivings as postulated in its aforestated assignment oferrors.

Article 246 of theFamilyCode provides for retroactiveeffectofappropriate relevantprovisions thereof, subject tothequalificationthatsuchretrospectiveapplicationwillnotprejudiceorimpairvestedoracquiredrightsinaccordancewiththeCivilCodeorotherlaws.

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity andextentdoesnotdependuponeventsforeigntothewilloftheholder.

9 The term expresses the concept of present fixed

interestwhichinrightreasonandnaturaljusticeshouldbeprotectedagainstarbitraryStateaction,oraninnatelyjustand imperative right which enlightened free society,sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights,cannot deny.

10 Vested rights include not only legal or

equitabletitletotheenforcementofademand,butalsoanexemptionfromnewobligationscreatedaftertherighthasvested.

11

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, privaterespondenthad the right to fileapetition foradoptionbyherself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs.Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicitand unconditional right under said law. Upon her filingthereof,herrighttofilesuchpetitionaloneandtohavethesameproceed to finaladjudication, inaccordancewith thelawinforceatthetime,wasalreadyvestedandcannotbeprejudicedorimpairedbythe

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8Sec.11,Rule3,inrelationtoSec.2,Rule72,RulesofCourt.9 J.B.L. Reyes and R. C. Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, 15

(1964).10Ayog,etal.,vs.Cusi,etc.,etal.,118SCRA492,499(1982).1116AAmJur2d,ConstitutionalLaw,651.

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enactmentofanewlaw.When private respondent filed her petition in Special

Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired jurisdictionthereover in accordance with the governing law.Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, theestablished rule is that the jurisdiction of the court isdetermined by the statute in force at the time of thecommencementoftheaction.

12Wedonotfindinthepresent

casesuchfactsaswouldconstituteitasanexceptiontotherule.

Thefirsterrorassignedbypetitionerwarrantsareviewof applicable local and foreign jurisprudence. For thatpurpose,westartwith thepremise thatArticle185of theFamilyCodeisremedialinnature.Proceduralstatutesareordinarilyaccordedaretrospectiveconstructioninthesensethat they may be applied to pending actions andproceedings,aswellastofutureactions.However,theywillnot be so applied as to defeat procedural steps completedbeforetheirenactment.

13

Procedural matters are governed by the law in forcewhen they arise, and procedural statutes are generallyretroactive in that theyapply topendingproceedingsandare not confined to those begun after their enactmentalthough, with respect to such pending proceedings, theyaffectonlyproceduralstepstakenaftertheirenactment.

14

Therulethatastatutorychangeinmattersofprocedurewill affect pending actions and proceedings, unless thelanguageoftheactexcludesthemfromitsoperation,isnotso extensive that itmay beused to validate or invalidateproceedingstakenbeforeitgoesintoeffect,sinceproceduremustbegovernedbythelawregulatingitatthetimethequestionofprocedurearises.

15

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12Peoplevs.Paderna,22SCRA273(1968);Peoplevs.Mariano,etal.,

71 SCRA 600 (1976); Lee, et al. vs. Presiding Judge, etc., et al., 145

SCRA 408 (1986); Atlas Fertilizer Corp. vs. Navarro, etc., et al., 149

SCRA432(1987).1382C.J.S.,Statutes,998.14Cohenvs.Reckseit,53N.Y.S.2d365,184Misc.107.15 People ex rel. Central New England Ry. Co. vs. State Tax

Commission, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 425, 261 App. Div. 416; Mich.Clugston vs.

Rogers,169N.W.9,10,203Mich.339.

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The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purelyprocedural,aspectofacaseissubstantiveinnatureandissubject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot bedismissedbyreasonof failure to complywitha lawwhichwasnotyet in forceandeffectat the time.As longas thepetitionforadoptionwassufficientinformandsubstanceinaccordancewith the law in governanceat the time itwas

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

filed, the court acquires jurisdictionand retains ituntil itfullydisposesofthecase.

16Torepeat,thejurisdictionofthe

courtisdeterminedbythestatuteinforceatthetimeofthecommencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court,whetherincriminalorcivilcases,onceitattachescannotbeoustedbysubsequenthappeningsorevents,althoughofacharacter which would have prevented jurisdiction fromattachinginthefirstinstance.

17

On the second issue, petitioner argues that, evenassuming that the Family Code should not applyretroactively,theCourtofAppealsshouldhavemodifiedthetrial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor ofprivate respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husbandnotbeingapetitioner.Wedonotconsiderthisasatenablepositionand,accordingly,rejectthesame.

AlthoughDioscoroBobileswasnotnamedasoneofthepetitionersinthepetitionforadoptionfiledbyhiswife,hisaffidavit of consent,attached to thepetitionasAnnex "B"andexpresslymadeanintegralpartthereof,showsthathehimselfactually joinedhiswife inadopting thechild.Thepertinentpartsofhiswrittenconsentreadasfollows:

xxx

That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and Imutually desire to adopt as our child,aboynamedJASONCONDAT, still a minor being six (6) years old, likewiseresidingat18C. ImperialStreet,LegaspiCity,Albay,alsointhePhilippines;

Thatwe are filingthecorrespondingPetitionforAdoptionofsaidminorchild,JASONCONDAT,beforetheJuvenileandDomestic Relations court, now the Regional Trial Court inLegaspiCity,Albay

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16Republicvs.Pielago,G.R.No.72218,Resolution,July21,1986.

17Ramos,etal.,vs.CentralBankofthePhilippines,41SCRA565 (1971),

andcasesthereincited.

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inthePhilippines;

ThatI,DioscoroC.Bobilesas thehusbandand father,amgiving my lawful consent to this adoption of said minorchild,JASONCONDAT;

That further,mywife ZENAIDAO.CORTEZABOBILES,and I have continuously reared and cared for this minorchild,JASONCONDATsincebirth;

That as a result thereof,mywife and I have developed akindofmaternalandpaternallovefortheboyasourveryown,exercisingthereinthecare,concernanddiligenceofagoodfathertowardhim;

That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OFCONSENTforwhateveritisworthinthepremisesastothe

matterofadoptionofthisminorchild,JASONCONDAT,bymy wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and by me,DIOSCOROC.BOBILES,inanycourtofjustice;(Emphasissupplied.)

18

xxx

The foregoing declarations, and his subsequentconfirmatorytestimonyinopencourt,aresufficienttomakehim a copetitioner. Under the circumstances thenobtaining,andbyreasonofhis foreignresidence,hemusthaveyieldedtothelegaladvicethatanaffidavitofconsentonhispartsufficedtomakehimapartytothepetition.Thisisevident fromthetextofhisaffidavit.Punctiliousness inlanguageandpedantry intheformalrequirementsshouldyield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations ofsubstantialjustice.Thefutureofaninnocentchildmustnotbecompromisedbyarbitraryinsistenceofrigidadherencetoproceduralrulesontheformofpleadings.

We see no reason why the following doctrines inAmerican law should not apply to this case and, for thatmatter, inour jurisdiction.It isasettledrulethereinthatadoptionstatutes,aswellasmattersofprocedureleadinguptoadoption, shouldbe liberally construed to carryout thebeneficent purposes of the adoption institution and toprotecttheadoptedchildintherightsandprivilegescomingtoitasaresultoftheadoption.

19

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18 Original Record, 4. This was executed on October 17, 1987 in

Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. where he was then residing due to his

employment in the Saint Francis Hospital there, and was duly

authenticatedinthePhilippineConsulateGeneralinthatcity.192AmJur2d,Adoption,865.

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Themoderntendencyofthecourtsistoholdthatthereneednot bemore thana substantial compliancewith statutoryrequirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding; torefusewouldbetoindulgeinsuchanarrowandtechnicalconstruction of the statute as to defeat its intention andbeneficialresultsor to invalidateproceedingswhereeverymaterialrequirementofthestatutewascompliedwith.

Insupportofthisruleitissaidthatitisnotthedutyofthecourtstobringthejudicialmicroscopetobearuponthecaseinorderthateveryslightdefectmaybeenlargedandmagnified so that a reason may be found for declaringinvalid an act consummated years before, but rather toapproachthecasewiththeinclinationtoupholdsuchactsifitisfoundthattherewasasubstantialcompliancewiththestatute.

20 The technical rules of pleading should not be

stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it isdeemed more important that the petition should contain

factsrelatingtothechildanditsparents,whichmaygiveinformation to those interested, than that it should beformally correctasapleading.Accordingly, it isgenerallyheldthatapetitionwillconferjurisdictionifitsubstantiallycomplies with the adoption statute, alleging all factsnecessarytogivethecourtjurisdiction.

21

Indeterminingwhetherornottosetasidethedecreeofadoption the interests and welfare of the child are ofprimary and paramount consideration.

22 The welfare of a

childisofparamountconsiderationinproceedingsinvolvingitscustodyandtheproprietyofitsadoptionbyanother,andthecourtstowhichtheapplicationforadoptionismadeischarged with the duty of protecting the child and itsinterestsand,tobringthoseinterestsfullybeforeit,ithasauthoritytomakerulestoaccomplishthatend.

23Ordinarily,

theapprovaloftheadoptionrestsinthesounddiscretionofthecourt.Thisdiscretionshouldbeexercisedinaccordancewith thebest interestsof thechild,as longas thenaturalrightsoftheparentsoverthechildarenot

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20Ibid., id.,900.212C.J.S.,AdoptionofChildren,418.222AmJur2d,Adoption,910.23Ibid., id.,907.

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disregarded.Intheabsenceofashowingofgraveabuse,theexerciseofthisdiscretionbytheapprovingofficialwillnotbedisturbed.

24

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to andconferred by the decree of adoption will be for the bestinterestsofthechild.Hisadoptioniswiththeconsentofhisnaturalparents.

25TherepresentativeoftheDepartmentof

Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedlyrecommendedtheapprovalofthepetitionforadoption

26and

the trial courtdispensedwith the trial custody for severalcommendatoryreasons,especiallysincethechildhadbeenliving with the adopting parents since infancy.

27 Further,

thesaidpetitionwaswiththeswornwrittenconsentofthechildrenoftheadopters.

The trial court and respondent court acted correctly ingrantingthepetitionforadoptionandwefindnoreasontodisturbthesame.Asfoundandaptlystatedbyrespondentcourt: "Given the facts and circumstances of the case andconsideredinthelightoftheforegoingdoctrine,

28Weareof

theopinionandsoholdthatthedecreeofadoptionissuedbythecourta quowouldgoalongwaytowardspromotingthewelfare of the child and the enhancement of hisopportunitiesforausefulandhappylife."

29

Adoptionstatutes,beinghumaneandsalutary,holdtheinterests and welfare of the child to be of paramountconsideration.Theyaredesignedtoprovidehomes,parental

care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphanedchildrenandgivethemtheprotectionofsocietyandfamilyin the person of the adopted, aswell as to allow childlesscouplesorpersonstoexperiencethejoysofparenthoodandgivethemlegallyachildinthepersonoftheadoptedforthemanifestation of their natural parental instincts. Everyreasonableintendmentshouldbesustainedtopromoteandfulfillthesenobleandcompassion

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242C.J.S.,AdoptionofChildren,412.25OriginalRecord,3.26TSN,March28,1988,7.27Rollo,2122.28 Citing Daoang vs.Municipal Judge of SanNicolas, Ilocos Norte,

159SCRA369(1988).29Rollo,29.

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ateobjectivesofthelaw.30

WHEREFORE,theinstantpetitionisherebyDENIED.SOORDERED.

MelencioHerrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla andNocon, JJ.,concur.

Petition denied.

Note.—Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost uponinstance of the parties, and continues until the case isterminated. (Robles vs. House of Representatives ElectoralTribunal,181SCRA780.)

——o0o——

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30Bobanovic,etal.vs.Montes,etc.,etal.,142SCRA485(1986).

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