REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES ~anoiBanha~ansb.judiciary.gov.ph/RESOLUTIONS/2017/H_Crim_SB-17-CRM...RESOLUTION People. vs. Misuari, et al. Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-1017 to 1022 Sandiganbayan,8

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

~anoiBanha~anQuezon City

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SB-17-CRM-1017 to 1019Plaintiff, For: Violation of Sec. 3(e)

of R.A. No. 3019

SB-17-CRM-1020 to 1022For: Malversation through Falsification

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,ChairpersonFERNANDEZ, SJ, J. and

NUR P. MISUARI, ET AL. FERNANDEZ, B, J.Accused.

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1) Most Respectful Omnibus Motion for 1. Independent JudicialDetermination of Probable Cause 2. Deferment of Issuance ofWarrants of Arrest 3. Deferment of Further Proceedings 1 of accusedLeovigilda P. Cinches; and

2) Urgent Omnibus Motion for Judicial Determination of ProbableCause and Motion to Quash Information(s) [With Prayer to Hold inAbeyance the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and to Stay FurtherProceedings? of accused Nader M. MaCag~ j1

Ii1Dated June 4,2017; pp. 20-29, Record, Vol. 42 Dated June 14, 2017; pp. 36-63, Record, Vol. 4

RESOLUTIONPeople. vs. Misuari, et al.Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-1017 to 1022

In her Omnibus Motion, accused Cinches prays for the dismissalof the present cases for lack of probable cause. She likewise praysthat the issuance of warrants of arrest be held in abeyance pendingthe resolution of her Motion. She argues: .

1. Her participation in the subject transactions was limited to signingthe Lists of Due and Demandable Accounts and Schedules ofAccounts Payable. Her signatures in other documents may havebeen forged. Thus, there is a need for a handwriting examinationto be conducted by NBI/PNP experts.

2. The Office of the Ombudsman failed to establish any conspiracyamong the accused. Even assuming that such conspiracyexisted, the Office of the Ombudsman still failed to show herparticipation therein, aside from her act of signing theaforementioned documents.

3. The Office of the Ombudsman should have considered that shewas not appointed by accused Misuari. Because she was not aclose associate of accused Misuari, she was placed on floatingstatus.

4. She had no part in the preparation of the documents she signed.After the same were presented to her, it was her ministerial dutyto sign the same.

5. The alleged irregular transactions took place sometime in 2001.She approved the Lists of Due and Demandable Accounts andthe Schedule of Accounts Payable sometime in early 2004. Sheassumed, in good faith, that the DepEd personnel who processedsaid documents regularly performed their functions.

6. In the case of Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan,3 it was held that theruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan4 applies when there is no clearcase of conspiracy and the infraction consists in the reliance ingood faith by a head of office on a subordinate upon whom theprimary responsibility rests.

7. If she would be required to examine every detail of the allegedirregular transactions prior to approving the Lists of Due andDemandable Accounts and Schedules of Accounts Payable, shewould have to devote all her time and energy for the same.

8. The documents she signed were complete and regular on theirface, as they were signed by the other responsible OffiCial:;tfsndemployees. Moreover, said documents were submitted to th (J

3 G.R. No. L-101545, January 3, 19954 G.R. Nos. 81563 and 82512, December 19, 1989


Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Consideringthat the DBM released the funds, there is no other conclusionother than that the supporting documents were complete andappeared to be regular on their face.

9. The concerned DBM officials should have been included in thecases because they were ultimately responsible for releasing thefunds.

In its Opposition (Re: Most Respectful Motion for (1) IndependentJudicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) Deferment of Issuanceof Warrants of Arrest; and (3) Deferment of Further Proceedings ofaccused Leovigilda P. Cinches dated June 4, 2017),5 the prosecutioncounters:

1. As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with theOmbudsman's determination of the existence of probable cause,the only exception being, when there is grave abuse of discretionon the part of the Ombudsman. Absent such grave abuse ofdiscretion, the dismissal of the present cases is unwarranted.

2. All the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.3019 (R.A. No. 3019) and malversation through falsification weresufficiently alleged in the Information in the present cases. TheResolution of the Office of the Ombudsman already expoundedon its basis for concluding that there are sufficient facts toengender a well-founded belief that crimes were committed andthat the accused are probably guilty thereof.

a. In Crim. Cases No. SB-17-CRM-1017 and 1020, payment would nothave been made if not for the indispensable cooperation of accusedCinches and Maniri, who signed the Schedule of Accounts Payableand List of Due and Demandable Accounts Payable, both indicatingMBJ as one of the creditors of DepEd-ARMM.

b. Accused Cinches' claim that she did not find any irregularities in thesupporting documents cannot be given credence. She could not havefailed to notice the lack of public bidding and the number of missingsupporting documents.

c. In Crim. Cases No. SB-17-CRM-1018 and 1021, payment would nothave been made if not for accused Cinches' approval of the Scheduleof Accounts Payable and List of Due and Demandable AccountsPayable-External Creditors, both indicating DepEd-ARMM'sobligation to CPR.

d. In Crim. Cases No. SB-17-CRM-1019 and 1022, payment would nothave been made if not for accused Cinches and Mutilan's approval of .jthe Schedule of Accounfs Payable and List of Due and Deman~ ~ Y (I

5 Dated June 19, 2017; pp. 64-77, Record, Vol. 4

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RESOLUTIONPeople. VS. Misuari, et a/.Crimina/ Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-1017 to 1022

Accounts Payable-External Creditors, both indicating DepEd-ARMM'sobligation to White Orchids.

3. That accused Cinches' signatures in the documents were forgedand that she did not know that the supporting documents werefalsified are matters of defense which the Court will appreciateand rule on after a full-blown trial.

4. Conspiracy among the accused was clearly shown in theOmbudsman's Resolution. It is not necessary to show anyprevious plan, or that the accused actually agreed in expressterms in pursuing a common design. It is sufficient to show unityin purpose and unity in the execution of an unlawful object.

5. Accused Cinches' reliance on Arias v. Sandiganbayan ismisplaced. The present cases involve huge amounts of publicfunds which should have led her to do more than a cursoryexamination of the supporting documents to ensure thatgovernment resources will not be put to waste.

In her Reply,6 accused Cinches insists that her ministerial act ofsigning the Schedules of Accounts Payable and Lists of Due andDemandable Accounts cannot be considered as overt acts done infurtherance of the conspiracy with the other accused. Furthermore,she reiterates that the DBM officials directly involved in the release ofpublic funds should also be included in the criminal charges.

Accused Macagaan, in his Omnibus Motion, similarly prays thatthe Court determine the existence of probable cause for the issuanceof the warrant of arrest, and that the case be dismissed upon findingthat no probable cause exists. He also prays that the issuance of thewarrant of arrest be held in abeyance pending resolution of his Motion.He further prays that the Information in the present cases be quashedon the ground of violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases.He avers:

1. The Office of the Ombudsman's conclusion of conspiracy isbaseless. At the time material to the present cases, he wasResident Auditor of DepEd-ARMM. He was neither an employeeof the implementing agency nor was he a member of the Bids andAwards Committee (BAC). He did not approve, endorse orotherwise perform any act required in the processing andpayment of the SUbjecttransae;( (7

6 Dated June 29, 2017; pp. 113-121, Record, Vol. 4 ~


2. He participated in the procurement process in the capacity of anobserver, in accordance with Section 13.1 of the RevisedImplementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9184(R.A. No. 9184).

3. As an observer, his only role was to certify the correctness of theAbstract of Canvass after making sure that the amounts listed inthe Abstract of Canvass were the same as those in the actualcanvass forms. His certification was not required for the validityor for the payment of the resulting liability.

4. Under Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 2009-001 datedFebruary 12, 2009, the most he could have done was to note hisobservations for the future review of the contract after itsexecution, which he actually did by informing the members of theBAC that the transaction may be "doubtful," in view of the amountinvolved.

5. The complainants admitted that the signatures were forged. Hedid not issue a certification to the effect that the obligation to CPRPublishing was reported in the book of accounts payable ofDepEd-ARMM. His alleged signatures in both the inspection andacceptance documents and in said certification were falsified.

6. He was already reassigned to DENR-ARMM at the time ofpayment. Hence, he could not have made said certification.

7. His right to speedy disposition of cases was violated due to theinordinate delay in completing the fact-finding and preliminaryinvestigations.

a. The Special Audit Team of the COA submitted its report to the Officeof the Ombudsman as early as December 7,2007.

b. The Complaint dated September 5,2014 was filed by the Fact-FindingInvestigation Bureau through the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman forMilitary and Other Law Enforcement Offices (FFIB-MOLEO) only onSeptember 26,2014.

c. The Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probablecause against the accused was issued on July 17, 2016 - almost nine(9) years from the time the COA submitted its report.

d. The Informations charging the accused were approved on April 5,2017, and filed on May 22,2017.

8. In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,7 it was held that the delay of close tothree (3) years in terminating the preliminary investigation cannotbe deemed reasonable, and is violative of the right to speedydisposition of cases. On the other hand, in People v.


Sandiganbayan,8 it was held that a delay of nearly five (5) yearsis an unusually long period of time just to determine ifrespondents should be criminally charged.

9. In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan 9 and Corpuz v.Sandiganbayan,10 the Supreme Court ruled that the prejudicecaused by inordinate delay in the conduct and termination of thepreliminary investigation warrants the finding of a violation of theright to speedy disposition of cases.

In its Opposition (Re: Urgent Omnibus Motion for JudicialDetermination of Probable Cause and Motion to Quash Information(s)[with urgent prayer to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant ofarrest and to stay further proceedings] of accused Macagaan datedJune 14, 2017),11 the prosecution counters:

1. The Information in the present cases sufficiently alleged theelements of the crimes charged and the conspiracy among theaccused. The Office of the Ombudsman's Resolution sufficientlyexpounded on the basis of its finding that there are sufficient factsto engender a well-founded belief that crimes were committedand the accused are probably guilty thereof.

2. In Crim. Cases No. SB-17-CRM-1018 and 1021, accusedMacagaan conspired with the other accused by certifying that theobligation to CPR was reported in the book of accounts payableof DepEd-ARMM to ensure the completion of the subjecttransaction.

3. Accused Macagaan merely denied the charges by alleging thathe merely acted as an observer in the procurement process.

4. That his signature appearing in the certification that the obligationto CPR Publishing was reported in the book of accounts payableof DepEd-ARMM was falsified, and that he merely acted as anobserver in the procurement process, are matters of defensewhich will be ruled upon after a full-blown trial.

5. Direct proof of conspiracy is not essential. The existence ofconspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the conspirators inthe commission of the offense.

6. As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with theOmbudsman's determination of the existence of probable causer)

8 G.R. Nos. 188165 and 189063, December 11, 2013 ;-6~9 G.R. Nos. 191411 and 191871, July 15, 201310 G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 200411 Dated June 23, 2017; pp. 95-111, Record, Vol. 4


except if there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of theOmbudsman. Outright dismissal of the present cases isunjustified in the absence of such grave abuse of discretion.

7. Accused Macagaan failed to show that his right to speedydisposition of cases was violated.

a. Accused Macagaan's claim that the COA Special Audit Teamsubmitted its audit report to the Office of the Ombudsman onDecember 7, 2007 is misleading. Said date was the date when itrendered said report, and not the date the fact-finding investigationcommenced.

b. The audit investigation of the COA is separate from the fact-findingand/or preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of theOmbudsman, and thus, should not be included in the computation ofthe period for purposes of determining if there is violation of theaccused' right to speedy disposition of cases.

c. The time spent for the fact-finding investigation should not beconsidered in determining if the right to speedy disposition of caseswas violated.

d. Assuming that the fact-finding investigation is included, it does notchange the fact that accused Macagaan's right to speedy dispositionof cases was not violated. The fact-finding team of the Office of theOmbudsman was created only on November 6, 2013. The Complaintfor the preliminary investigation proper was filed on September 26,2014 and the Ombudsman's Resolution was approved on June 17,2016. From the filing of the Complaint, it took only 2 years and 7months to terminate the preliminary investigation.

8. In Dela Pefla v. Sandiganbayan,12 the Supreme Court sitting enbane ruled that the right to speedy disposition of cases is violatedonly when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capriciousand oppressive delays. The factors in determining if said rightwas violated are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons forthe delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert the right by theaccused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

9. The time it took to complete the fact-finding and preliminaryinvestigations is reasonable, considering the large volume ofdocuments that had to be reviewed and the number of agenciesand/or private entities that had to be subpoenaed and/orinvestigated by the Office of the Ombudsman.

10.Accused Macagaan did not assert his right to speedy dispositionof cases during the preliminary investigation. His silence a dinaction during that period amounts to a waiver of his right. ~

~

" G.R.No. 144542, J"e 29, 2001 ~

RESOLUTIONPeople. vs. Misuari, et at.Crimina/ Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-1017 to 1022

In his Reply,13 accused Macagaan contends:

1. The prosecution attempts to hide the inordinate delay in the fact-finding and preliminary investigations by showing that the Officeof the Ombudsman began its investigation in 2013. In truth, theOffice of the Ombudsman began investigating the present casessometime in 2005 - around twelve (12) years prior to the filing ofthe Informations.

a. The Complaint-Affidavit dated December 13, 2004 of Datu MalikAmpuan and Sultan Mangacop Umpa Saud was filed with the Officeof the Ombudsman on January 5, 2005.

b. On February 3, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman Mindanaorequested the COA to conduct a special audit investigation on thematter.

c. The COA Special Audit Team submitted its report to the Office of theOmbudsman on December 7,2007.

d. The Complaint dated September 5,2014 was filed only on September26,2014.

e. The Ombudsman's Resolution was issued only on July 17, 2016 andthe Informations were filed only on May 22,2017.

2. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, it was held that the evil sought tobe prevented by the rule against inordinate delay is the possibilitythat the accused' defense will be impaired.

3. From the foregoing, it is clear that the quashal of the Informationsagainst accused Macagaan on the ground of violation of his rightto speedy disposition of cases is warranted.

The Court resolves to deny the separate Motions of accusedCinches and Macagaan.

A. Judicial determination ofprobable cause

The two kinds of determination of probable cause are executiveand judicial, each separate from the other, and each with its ownpurpose. The difference between these two was discussed by theSupreme Court in Mendoza v. People.14 V',.b'z.: /713 Dated July 4,2017; pp. 122-130, Record, Vol. 4 ( ,14 G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014

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RESOLUTIONPeople. VS. Misuari, et al.Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-1017 to 1022

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:executive and judicial. The executive determination of probablecause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a functionthat properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broaddiscretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to chargethose whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined bylaw and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such officialhas the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminalcase must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has beencorrectly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not hehas made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable causein a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may notbe compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the otherhand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant ofarrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfyhimself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity forplacing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the endsof justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot beforced to issue the arrest warrant.

The difference is clear: The executive determination ofprobable cause concerns itself with whether there is enoughevidence to support an Information being filed. The judicialdetermination of probable cause, on the other hand, determineswhether a warrant of arrest should be issued. x x x

The procedure for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is laid downin Rule 112, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court. Under said provision, theCourt is duty-bound to determine the existence of probable causewhen an Information is filed. If the Court finds that there is probablecause, a warrant of arrest shall be issued. On the other hand, the Courtmay dismiss the case outright if it finds that the evidence on record failsto establish probable cause. Lastly, if the Court has doubt as to theexistence of probable cause, the prosecution may be ordered topresent additional evidence. The aforementioned provision reads:

Sec. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By theRegional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of thecomplaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate theresolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He mayimmediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failsto establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shallissue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaintor information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case ofdoubt on the existence of robable cause the 'ud e ma order the


prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days fromnotice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)days from the filing of the complaint or information.

Because the Court is mandated to determine the existence ofprobable cause for the purpose of the issuance of a warrant of arrest,a motion asking the Court to do so is nothing but a superfluity. As theSupreme Court held in Leviste v. Alameda:15

To move the court to conduct a judicial determination ofprobable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or without such motion,the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution of thepublic prosecutor and the supporting evidence. In fact, the task ofthe presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is firstand foremost to determine the existence or non-existence ofprobable cause for the arrest of the accused.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personalresponsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence ofprobable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine thecomplainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine andprocedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supportingdocuments submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence ofprobable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personaldetermination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is notsatisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor'sreport and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses toaid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

The Court will proceed to determine if probable cause exists forthe issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused.

The following documents, among others, were attached to theOmbudsman's Resolution:16

DocumentComplaint dated September 5, 2014,filed by the Fact-Finding InvestigationBureau, Office of the DeputyOmbudsman for the Milita and Other

15 G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 201016 Dated June 17,2016; pp. 28-57, Record, Vol. 1


Law Enforcement Offices (FFIB-MOLEO)17

Report on the Conduct of SpecialAudit/I nvestigation on SelectedTransactions of the Department ofEducation Autonomous Region inMuslim Mindana018

Counter-Affidavit dated February 25,2015 of Sittie Asia P. Usman withannexes19

Counter-Affidavit dated March 22,2015 of Nader M. Macagaan20

Counter-Affidavit dated May 5,2015 ofLolita P. Sambeli with annexes21

Cou nter-Affidavit dated March 26,2015 of Leovigilda P. Cinches22

Schedule of Accounts Payable as of • White Orchids Printing & PublishingDecember 31, 200223 is indicated as a creditor

• Certified correct by Pangalian M.Maniri

Schedule of Accounts Payable As of • MBJ, CPR Publishing House andDecember 31, 2003 (Revised)24 White Orchids Printing are

indicated as creditors• Certified correct by Pangalian M.

Maniri and approved by LeovigildaP. Cinches

Schedule of Accounts Payable As of • MBJ, CPR Publishing House andDecember 31, 200425 White Orchids Printing are

indicated as creditors• . Certified correct by Pangalian M.

Maniri and apPjVed by LeovigildaP. Cinches ""~r

17 pp. 149-163, Record, Vol. 118 pp. 166-242, Record, Vol. 119 pp. 67-73, Record, Vol. 120 pp. 74-80, Record, Vol. 121 pp. 82-101, Record, Vol. 122 pp. 133-147, Record, Vol. 123 pp. 247-248, Record, Vol. 124 p. 249, Record, Vol. 125 p. 250, Record, Vol. 1

RESOLUTIONPeople. vs. Misuari, et a/.Crimina/ Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-1017 to 1022

List of Due and Demandable Accounts • MBJ Learning Tools is indicated asPayable26 submitted to the DBM a creditor

• Certified correct by Pangalian M.Maniri

List of Due and Demandable Accounts • White Orchids Printing &Payable27 submitted to the DBM Publishing House, Inc. is indicated

as a creditor• Certified correct by Pangalian M.

Maniri

List of Due and Demandable Accounts • CPR Publishing House and WhitePayable28 submitted to the DBM Orchids Printing & Publishing

House are indicated as creditors• Certified correct by Pangalian M.

Maniri and approved by LeovigildaP. Cinches

SB-17-CRM-1017 and 1020

Document Descri tionRequisition and Issue Voucher. dated • Approved by Nur. P. MisuariDecember 21, 200029 • Received by Sitti Aisa P. Usman

Purchase Order dated December 23, • Approved by Nur P. Misuari200030 • Received by a representative of

MBJ Learning Tools

MBJ Learning Tools Sales InvoiceNos. 0184 and 0185 dated August 16,200131

Disbursement Voucher NO.1 01-01-08- •319032

Availability of funds/budgetaryallotment and completeness ofsupporting documents certified byAlladin D. Usi

• Approved by Nur P. Misuari

Canvass forms of MBJ Learning Toolsdated November 9, 2000, Bren's

26 p. 272, Record, Vol. 127 p. 274, Record, Vol. 128 p. 276, Record, Vol. 129 p. 466, Record, Vol. 130 p. 459, Record, Vol. 131 pp. 460-461, Record, Vol. 132 p. 472, Record, Vol. 1


Enterprises dated November 6, 2000,and Wishing Star Enterprises datedNovember 10, 200033

SB-17-CRM-1018 and 1021

Document DescriptionRequisition and Issue Voucher dated • Approved by Nur. P. MisuariJuly 24, 200135 • Received by Sitti Aisa P. Usman

Abstract of Canvass dated July 24, • Certified correct by Nader M.200136 Macagaan, Alladin D. Usi and

Pangalian M. Maniri• Requisitioner: Sitti Aisa P. Usman• Approved by Nur P. Misuari

Canvass forms of DynamicEnterprises, Hi-Con Publishing andCPR Publishing37

Purchase Order dated July 30, 200138 • Approved by Nur P. Misuari• Received by Cristeta D. Ramirez

CPR Publishing House DeliveryReceipt Nos. 03122 and 03123 datedAugust 8,200139

Disbursement Voucher4° • Availability of funds/budgetaryallotment and completeness ofsupporting documents certified byAlladin D. Usi

• Approved by Nur P. Misuari

CPR Publishing House Sales InvoiceNos. 1248 dated August 8, 200ivj

;b \-33 pp. 462-464, Record, Vol. 134 pp. 467-471, Record, Vol. 135 p. 456, Record, Vol. 136 p. 280, Record, Vol. 137 pp. 281-283, Record, Vol. 138 p. 445, Record, Vol. 139 pp. 447-448, Record, Vol. 140 p. 446, Record, Vol. 141 p. 449, Record, Vol. 1


Inspection Report dated August 16,200142

Receipt & Acceptance dated August16,200143

Certification dated September 8, Issued by Nader M. Macagaan200344

The Court finds that there is probable cause for the issuance ofwarrants of arrest against all accused in Crim. Cases No. SB-17-CRM-1017,1018,1020 and 1021; and against accused Cinches, PangalianM. Maniri and Lolita P. Sambeli in Crim. Cases No. SB-17-CRM-1019and 1022.

In Crim. Cases No. SB-17-CRM-1019 and 1022, however, withrespect to accused Nur P. Misuari and Sittie Aisa P. Usman, althoughthe Office of the Ombudsman stated in its Resolution that accusedMisuari approved the Purchase Order, and that accused Usman issuedan Inspection Report,45 said documents containing the respectivesignatures of said accused could not be found among the documentson record. No other document, insofar as SB-17-CRM-1019 and 1022are concerned, shows the participation of accused Misuari and Usmanin the alleged commission of the crime.

Thus, the Court will give the prosecution the opportunity topresent additional evidence to support a finding of existence ofprobable cause against accused Misuari and Usman in SB-17-CRM-1019 and 1022. In the event that the evidence submitted still fails tosupport the existence of probable cause, the Court may then dismissthe pertinent cases against them.

The other issues raised by accused Cinches and Macagaan intheir respective motions are matte s of defense which will be passedupon after the trial on the merit. ~

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42 p. 450, Record, Vol. 143 p. 451, Record, Vol. 144 P. 566, Record, Vol. 145 p. 42, Record (p. 15, Resolution dated June 17, 2016)


B. Violation of right to speedydisposition of cases

As provided in Art. III, Sec. 16 of the Constitution, all personsshall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before alljudicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,46 the Supreme Court explainedthat this right was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen byholding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time.Such right is violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,capricious and oppressive delays. Viz. :

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedydisposition of the case against him was designed to prevent theoppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspendedover him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in theadministration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed withreasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to aspeedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only whenthe proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressivedelays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been deniedsuch right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept ofa speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be aflexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essentialingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot bedefinitely said how long is too long in a system where justice issupposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays anddepends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, butit does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be bornein mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution andthe Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are togive meaning to that intent.

The factors to consid.er in determining whether or not the right tospeedy disposition of cases is violated are the following: (a) length ofdelay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of hisright;and(d) prejudiceto the defendtJ /'746 G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 200447 Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, ibid.


From the records, it appears that Sultan Mangacop Umpa Saudand Datu Malik A. Ampuan filed their Complaint-Affidavit 48 datedDecember 13, 2004 with the Office of the Ombudsman on January 5,2005 against certain public officers including the accused. The casewas referred to the COA, which conducted a special audit/investigationof selected transactions of DepEd-ARMM. The audit team issued areport49 sometime in 2007.

In Office Order No. 41650 dated November 6, 2013, theOmbudsman created a Panel of Investigators to conduct a further fact-finding investigation on the alleged ghost purchases of textbooks andprojects in the DepEd-ARMM. The Panel of Investigators filed theComplaint51 dated September 5, 2014 and the Resolution52 findingprobable cause to charge the accused in the present cases wasapproved by the Ombudsman on August 15, 2016. The Informationscharging the accused with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 301953andMalversation through Falsification54 were filed on May 22, 2017.

A period of more than eleven (11) years passed from the timeSaud and Ampuan filed their Complaint-Affidavit. However, it took onlyaround two (2) years and nine (9) months to terminate the preliminaryinvestigation from the time the Ombudsman created the Panel ofInvestigators, with the preliminary investigation proper taking onlyaround one (1) year and eleven (11) months.

A period of 1 year and 11 months to conduct the preliminaryinvestigation cannot be said to be unreasonable. Assuming that thecounting of the period will start from the time of the COA's audit reportin 2007, the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation willnot necessarily be inordinate because length of time is but one of thefactors that must be considered in determining if the right to speedydisposition of cases was violated. A mere mathematical reckoning ofthe time involved is not sufficient.55 The Supreme Court's disquisitionin Corpuz is apropos: ~

~48 pp. 28-38, Record, Vol. 349 pp. 166-242, Record, Vol. 1 (Report on the Conduct of Special Audit/Investigation on SelectedTransactions of the Department of Education Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao)50 p. 165, Record, Vol. 151 pp. 149-164, Record, Vol. 152 Dated June 17, 2016; pp. 28-57, Record, Vol. 153 Crim. Cases No. SB-17-CRM-1017 to 101954 Crim. Cases No. SB-17-CRM-1020 to 102155 Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154155, August 6, 2008

RESOLUTIONPeople. VS. Misuari, et a/.Crimina/ Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-1017 to 1022

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason orjustification of the State for such delay. Different weights should beassigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State.For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamperor prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily against theState. also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay togain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass orprejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of theprosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavilyagainst the State. x x x

From an examination of the records, it can be gleaned that thepresent cases are part of what is known as the "textbook scam," whichinvolves transactions not only those subject of the present cases, butalso other related transactions. Due to the number of transactionsinvolved, the investigation, which entailed scrutinizing voluminousrecords and determining who among the numerous persons involvedshould be held liable, necessarily took some time. Add to this thesteady stream of cases being filed with the Office of the Ombudsman.56

Given the circumstances surrounding the present cases, the Courtfinds that the time it took to terminate the preliminary investigation isnot unreasonable.

Accused Macagaan failed to show how he was prejudiced by thedelay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. That hisdefense will be impaired is a possibility that can be brought about bymere passage of time. However, the effect of passage of time doesnot, by itself, cause the violation of right to speedy disposition of cases.Absent circumstances showing that the delay is unreasonable,dismissal of the present cases on the ground of violation of right tospeedy disposition of cases is unwarranted.

WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion of accused Cinches and theOmnibus Motion of accused Macagaan are hereby DENIED.

In Crim. Cases No. SB-17-CRM-1017 and 1020, the Court findsthat there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrestagainst the accused. Let warrants of arrest be issued against accusedNUR P. MISUARI, LEOVIGILDA P. CINCHES, PANGALIAN M.MANIRI, SITTIE AISA P. USMAN and ALLADIN D. U~ (1


In Crim. Cases No. 5B-17 -CRM-1 018 and 1021, the Court findsthat there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrestagainst the accused. Let warrants of arrest be issued against accusedNUR P. MISUARI, LEOVIGILDA P. CINCHES, PANGALIAN M.MANIRI, SITTIE AISA P. USMAN, ALLADIN D. USI, NADER M.MACAGAAN and CRISTETA D. RAMIREZ.

In Crim. Cases No. 5B-17-CRM-1019 and 1022, the Court findsthat there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrestagainst the accused Cinches, Maniri and Sambeli. Let warrants ofarrest be issued against accused LEOVIGILDA P. CINCHES,PANGALIAN M. MANIRI and LOLITA P. SAMBELI.

The prosecution is hereby DIRECTED, within five (5) days fromreceipt of this resolution, to present additional evidence to establishaccused Misuari and Usman's participation in the alleged commissionof the crimes in Crim. Cases No. SB-17-CRM-1019 and 1022.

o R. FERNANDEZAs ociate Justice

Documents

REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES ~anoiBanha~ansb.judiciary.gov.ph/RESOLUTIONS/2017/H_Crim_SB-17-CRM...RESOLUTION People. vs. Misuari, et al. Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-1017 to 1022 Sandiganbayan,8