REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBAYAN

Quezon City

Special Fifth Division

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

Case No. SB-06-CRM-0469

- versus -

ELENITA S. BINAY, et al.,Accused.

Promulgated:

4+etrlver 29( 20Fl pvJ{- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -J{

RESOLUTION

GOMEZ-ESTOESTA, J:

For the Court to have flexed its judicial discretion in favor of a motionfor reconsideration perceived as defective by accused Dr. Elenita S. Binay,the present Motion for Reconsideration has been filed to sway this Court todecide otherwise.

Accused again highlights the case of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan' whichcited Bacelonia v. Court of Appeals, 2 in reiterating that "x x x Sec. 5, Rule 153

of the Rules uses the mandatory term must in fixing the period within whichthe motion shall be scheduledfor hearing, so that a motion thatfails to complywith this mandatory provision is pro forma and does not merit the attentionand consideration of the court. x x x. " Accused insists that the mandatorytone of Section 5, Rule 15 cannot simply brush aside the serious objectionmade in her Motion to Expunge. Accused downplays the exceptionsenumerated in Vette Industrial Sales Co. v. Cheng' as not sufficient enough to

1G.R. No. 167103, August 31, 2006

2 G.R. No. 143440, February 11, 2003

3 Section S. Notice of hearing. - The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify

the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. (Sa)

4 G.R. No. 170232, December 5,2006, cited in page 3 of the Resolution dated August 3,2017

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disregard the objections she has made in her Motion to Expunge. Accusedthen proceeds to reproduce, verbatim, her objections to prosecution's motionto discharge accused Emesto A. Aspillaga.

In its Opposition, the Prosecution asseverates that accused's MotionforReconsideration is in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration whichshould be prohibited by the Court as it has already ruled on the matter ofdischarge of accused Emesto A. Aspillaga twice, if not thrice. At this time,the Prosecution should instead be allowed to present, at a hearing in supportof the discharge, whether said accused could qualify as a state witness underSection 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Despite accused's persistence on the matter, the questioned Resolutionstands. We cannot yield to accused's carping that it is a strict application ofthe Rules which should prevail.

The procedure flaw in Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration wasnever denied at the outset. Only, the same has been "disparaged to yield tothe more pressing issue at hand." This is in contemplation of the exceptionsenumerated in Vette Industrial Sales Co. v. Cheng,5 to wit:

In the instant case, we find that the purpose of a notice of hearinghad been served. In Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court ofAppeals." we enumerated the exceptions to the rule on notice of hearing, towit:

The Court has consistently held that a motion which does not meetthe requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court isconsidered a worthless piece of paper, which the clerk of court has no rightto receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copyof a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of thatmotion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to complywith these requirements renders their motions fatally defective. However,there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptionsare as follows:

x x x Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by thisCourt incases (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifestfailure or miscarriage of justice; especially if a party successfully showsthat the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is notapparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where theinterest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of themotion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court;and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate [to]the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedureprescribed. [Emphasis supplied]

15 supra, footnote # 46369 Phi!. 269 (1999)

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xxx xxx xxx xxx.

We cannot fixate our resolution on the perceived defect in the notice ofhearing on procedural grounds and blindly deny the motion. The pressingissue resolved inthe questioned Resolution substantially corrected an obviouserror in the application of Section 14, Rule 110 in the discharge of a statewitness when it should have been Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rulesof Criminal Procedure that should have governed the proceedings. Followingthe first exception to the rule on notice of hearing, therefore, or where a rigidapplication will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, theprocedural application was overtaken by what was a substantial remedy tocorrect the proceedings.

It has to be noted that the strict application of procedural rulesasseverated in Bacelonia v. Court of Appeals.' as cited in Garcia v.Sandiganbayan." significantly drew its basis from the parties' own proclivityto delay the proceedings. To quote:

It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the said motion forreconsideration was beyond the period specified by the Revised Rules ofCourt which was not later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion,or no later than February 10, 2000. Significantly, the above provision ofRule 15, Section 5 uses the mandatory term must in fixing the period withinwhich the motion shall be scheduled for hearing. A motion that fails toreligiously comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 15, Section 5is pro forma and presents no question which merits the attention andconsideration of the court.

The mandatory character of Rule 15, Section 5 of the RevisedRules of Court becomes specially significant in this case, consideringthe claim of the private respondents that the petitioners have beenengaging in dilatory tactics, an imputation not without factualbasis. As borne by the records, herein petitioners and their eo-defendants,Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cario, entered into a compromise agreementon April 27 , 1995 that led to the dismissal by the trial court of the complaintin Civil Case No. Q-95-23169 on April 28, 1995.

This compromise agreement was already interposed by thepetitioners as one of the special and affirmative defenses in their answer tothe complaint for damages in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149. Thus it was nolonger legally possible for the petitioners to file the Motion to Exclude onSeptember 24, 1999 in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149 (actually a motion todismiss the case against them), based on a compromise agreement that didnot even bind the complainants (herein private respondents) who were notparties thereto.l=! At such stage, the private respondents were alreadywinding up the presentation of their evidence in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149.

7 Supra, footnote # 28 Supra, footnote # 1

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Upon the denial of their Motion to Exclude on January 10,2000,the petitioners filed the subject motion for reconsideration on January 31,2000. In addition, they moved to cancel the scheduled hearing for the initialpresentation of their evidence already scheduled on February 3, 2000ostensibly to give way to oral arguments in support of their motion forreconsideration which, as above discussed, was pro forma. By theiractuations, it can be conclusively presumed that the petitioners had noother intention but to delay the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149. [Emphasis supplied]

The same cannot be said of the Prosecution in this case. Consideringthe context with which the cases were cited, accused does not even lift a fingerto castigate the Prosecution of any dilatory maneuvering, since there isconceivably none.

Being so, the strict and rigid application of the rules should be relaxedto remedy a wrong. As held in De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan:"

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forthguidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the handthat dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots oftechnical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts inrendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be,conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalitiestake a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.

While the questioned Resolution is in the nature of an interlocutoryorder, there lies a need to firmly settle the issue lest a vicious cycle of never-ending motions pervade.

Accused Emesto A. Aspillaga, therefore, should now be allowed to takethe witness stand in line with prosecution's motion to discharge him as a statewitness pursuant to Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure.

The reiteration of accused's objections to the same can no longer serveto reverse the ruling made. This puts an end to the disquisition of this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by accused Dr.Elenita S. Binay which seeks to (i) expunge from the records the Prosecution'sMotion for Reconsideration dated December 27, 2016; and (ii) consider theProsecution's Motion to Discharge Accused Ernesto A. Aspillaga to beUtillized as State Witness dated August 5, 2015 to be denied with finality, isDENIED for lack of merit.

The questioned Resolution dated August 3, 2017 STANDS.

1I f1 r9 G.R. No. 103276, April 11, 1996

People v. Elenita S. Binay, et al.Case No. SB-06-CRM-0469RESOLUTION

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The reception of evidence for the discharge of accused Emesto A.Aspillaga on October 4, 2017 at 8:30 in the morning shall PROCEED, asscheduled.

SO ORDERED.

MA. THERESADO~ C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTAAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

-~~ (Lu, 0ut~RDO M. CALDONA

'Associate Justice

ZA-ARCEGAMARIATHE

BAY AN ACINTOAss ciate Justice

I DISSENT: ~iz4 tMw ~/ t ~~w,f'«~~ ~~

~hM«~ ~~~GERALDINE FAITH A. 'l:CONG ~

Associate Justice