REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

~ anbiBanha1JanQuezon City

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ,Plaintiff,

- versus- CRIM. CASES NOS. SB-16-CRM-0094to SB-16-CRM-0098; SB-16-CRM-0548;

SB-17 -CRM-0285 to SB-17 -CRM-0286For: Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019

ALEJANDRO N. ABARRATIGUE,Accused.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

- versus - CRIM. CASE NO. SB-17 -CRM-0475For Violation of Sec. 3 (f) of RA 3019

ALEJANDRO N. ABARRATIGUE,ET AL.

Accused.

Present:

DE LA CRUZ, J., ChairpersonECONG, J.CALDONA, J.

Promulgated on:JUL 0 4 2011

x----------------------------------------------xRESOLUTION

DE LA CRUZ, J.:

This resolves the following:

1. Accused Abarratigue's Motion for Reconsideration (ofthe Decision promulgated April 26, 2019), dated May 7, 2019, inCriminal Case Nos, S8-16-CRM-0094 to SB-16-CRM-0098;

RESOLUTIONpp vs. Alejandro N. Abarratigue, et al.Crim. Cases Nos. S8-16-CRM-0094 to -0098;

-0548; S8-17-0285 to -0286; -0475

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2. The prosecution's Comment/Opposition to the Motionfor Reconsideration of the Accused, dated May 30, 2019;

3. Accused Abarratigue's Motion for PartialReconsideration (of the Decision promulgated April 26, 2019),dated May 9,2019, in Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-0548;

4. The prosecution's Comment/Opposition [on Accused'sMotion for Partial Reconsideration dated 9 May 2019}, dated May23,2019;

5. Accused Abarratigue's Motion for PartialReconsideration (of the Decision promulgated April 26, 2019),dated May 9,2019, in Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-0285 to SB-17-CRM-0286;

6. The prosecution's Comment/Opposition [to Accused'sMotion for Partial Reconsideration (of the Decision PromulgatedApril 26, 2019)}, dated June 3,2019;

7. The accused's Motion for Partial Reconsideration (ofthe Decision promulgated April 26, 2019), dated May 9, 2019, inCriminal Case No. SB-17 -CRM-04 75; and

8. The prosecution's Opposition (to the Motion for PartialReconsideration dated 9 May 2019), dated June 3, 2019.

In Criminal Case Nos. SB-16-CRM-0094 to SB-16-CRM-0098, accused Abarratigue contends that the decision andresolution, which have attained finality, of the Civil ServiceCommission (CSC) and the Commission on Audit (COA) areentitled to great weight. .The CSC, as the sole arbiter ofcontroversies relating to civil service, has exclusive jurisdiction overcases involving personnel actions such as reassignments. Whilethe CSC decision and resolution did not discuss the propriety of thereassignments made by accused Abarratigue, that the CSCaffirmed the memoranda signed by him impliedly means that thereassignments were regular and within the bounds of law. Inaddition, Section 2(a), Rule XII of the CSC Memorandum CircularNo. 15, series of 1999 provides that a civil service officer oremployee continuously on AWOL for at least thirty (30) workingdays shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls

RESOLUTIONpp vs. Alejandro N. Abarratigue, et al.Crim. CasesNos. S8-16-CRM-0094 to -0098;

-0548; S8-17-0285 to -0286; -0475

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without need of any prior notice." Moreover, since accusedAbarratigue was able to inform the private complainants throughmemorandum orders signed in November 2010 that they aredropped from the rolls, means good faith on his part. Also, thereassignments were made in good faith by accused Abarratigue inan effort to bring development to the municipality by making thegovernment services available to the constituents.

As to the money claims, accused Abarratigue maintains thatit is the COA which exercises exclusive jurisdiction thereon. COAhas already ruled that since the CSC affirmed the memorandadropping private complainants from the rolls, it in effect operates toremove the basis for the grant of the money claims. AccusedAbarratigue further claims that the COA Resolution is his ultimatelegal basis in withholding the salaries of the private complainants.Moreover, even assuming arguendo that he is indeed liable for thewithholding of the alleged unpaid salaries, the money has beenearned and accrued and is treated as a trust fund. It is judicialnotice that the salaries of all government employees were alreadyallocated in a specific annual budget year. Thus, accusedAbarratigue asserts that he should not be made personally liableover the money claims. Further, as there is no concrete proof thatprivate complainants reported for work until October 2010 basedon the official logbook, they should not then be awarded theiralleged unpaid salaries. Accused Abarratigue also finds fault in theaward made to private complainant Miguel P. Aban, arguing thatthe latter's testimony, which he failed to provide owing to his death,is essential as his complaint constitutes the Information against theaccused.

In its comment/opposition, the prosecution avers that thepronouncements of the CSC and the COA are not binding on theCourt. The matters decided by the said commissions dealt on theadministrative aspect while the matters before the Court delve onthe legality of the acts of the accused. The prosecution maintainsthat the private complainants were made to undergo hardships dueto the accused reassigning them to a far-flung area. They had tospend their own money, and had to suffer the daily task oftravelling thereto. Later, they were even deprived of their income.Hence, it is just, fair and equitable for the Court to order theaccused to pay the private 'complainants their unpaid salaries. Thesame applies to Miguel Aban, who also underwent injustice andwhose heirs deserve the fruits of his labor. Moreover, the

RESOLUTIONpp vs. Alejandro N. Abarratigue, et al.Crim. Cases Nos. S8-16-CRM-0094 to -0098;

-0548; S8-17-0285 to -0286; -0475

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prosecution belies the· accused's contention of good faith on hispart.

In Criminal Case Nos. SB-16-CRM-0548, SB-17-CRM-0285to SB-17-CRM-0286, and SB-17-CRM-0475, the accused filedseparate similarly worded motions seeking reconsideration of theCourt's order for the accused to pay civil liabilities to the respectiveprivate complainants. The accused echo the argument that theCOA has primary jurisdiction over money claims, and evenassuming arguendo that the accused are liable for the withholdingof the salaries, the money is treated as a trust fund. Hence, theaccused maintain that they should not be made personally liabletherefor.

By way of opposition, the prosecution maintains that theacquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude ajudgment of civil liability, as in the case when the acquittal wasbased on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.

In Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-0548, the prosecutionfurther argues that while the Court may not have found thereassignment of private complainant Jovita Mabansag to havebeen done with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence,the withholding of her salaries and the procedure of dropping herfrom the rolls were found to be unlawful and illegal. Mabansagsuffered undue injury caused by the said acts of accusedAbarratigue who should be liable therefor. Also, the case is not apetition for money claim but a criminal action with the civil action forrecovery of civil liability deemed instituted therewith, which is wellwithin the jurisdiction of the Court. As to the claim that the money istreated as a trust fund, the prosecution points out that no testimonyor evidence was presented to show that the amount was placed ina trust fund or is still intact, or how such amount was treated in thebooks of the municipality. On the other hand, the prosecution hassufficiently established that Mabansag was included in the payrollfor the months of January 2010 to October 2010, and that shesubmitted her DTRs for said months. As the accused illegallywithheld Mabansag's salaries and allowances, he should be civillyliable therefor.

In Criminal Case Nos. SB-17 -CRM-0285 to SB-17 -CRM-0286, the prosecution clarifies that the reassignments and droppingfrom the rolls of Abina and Abarracoso were both nullified by the

RESOLUTIONpp vs. Alejandro N. Abarratigue, et al.Crim. Cases Nos. S8-16-CRM-0094 to -0098;

-0548; S8-17-0285 to -0286; -0475

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CSC and sustained by the CA. Hence, COA Decision No. 2014-371 did not affect the validity of the respective money claims ofAbina and Abarracoso. The prosecution asserts that the Courtfound the accused to have committed the following actscomplained of: (1) reassigning Abina and Abarracoso to far-flungbarangays; (2) not paying them their salaries, allowances andbenefits in the amount of P114,952.00, more or less; and (3)eventually dropping them from the rolls without any justification.Considering that the acquittal of the accused is based onreasonable doubt, he should be held personally liable for theunpaid .salaries, allowances and benefits of the privatecomplainants.

In Criminal Case No. S8-17 -CRM-04 75, the prosecutionavers that Tacad was deprived of her salaries from July 1, 2010 toFebruary 28, 2012 because of the refusal of the accused to signher DTRs and release her salaries despite the inclusion of hername in the payrolls. When the Court acquitted the accused, it didnot categorically say that the accused are not to be blamed for thenon-release of Tacad's salaries. The prosecution further arguesthat the accused made a sweeping statement in saying thatTacad's salaries is treated as a trust fund. PO 1445 or theGovernment Auditing Code of the Philippines provides for a legalrestriction that a trust fund be used exclusively for the purpose itwas created or for which the funds were received, except uponexpress authorization by Congress or by the head of a governmentagency in control of the funds. Hence, an appropriation byCongress is required before judgment for the payment of Tacad'ssalaries can be directed against the local government ofHinabangan, Samar.

The motions are partly meritorious.

In Criminal Case Nos. S8-16-CRM-0094 to S8-16-CRM-0098, the Court found accused Abarratigue guilty beyondreasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Theaccused contends that the CSC decision and resolution should berespected as they have already attained finality. Such argument ismisplaced. A reading of the assailed decision will show that theCourt did not encroach upon the powers of the CSC. There was nodiscussion on the validity of the memoranda dropping privatecomplainants from the rolls as the CSC has already ruled on them,being the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.

RESOLUTIONpp vs. Alejandro N. Abarratigue,et al.Crim. Cases Nos. S8-16-CRM-0094 to -0098;

-0548; S8-17-0285 to -0286; -0475

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Rather, what the Court looked into and decided upon is whether ornot the totality of the acts of accused Abarratigue-in ordering thereassignment, refusing to sign the DTRs, withholding the salariesand allowances, and dropping private complainants from the rolls-were committed with evident bad faith or gross inexcusablenegligence, in violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. As the accusedhimself admits, the CSC decision and resolution did not discuss thepropriety of the reassignments made by him. Moreover, as hasbeen aptly held, the findings in administrative cases are not bindingupon the court trying a criminal case, even if the criminalproceedings are based on the same facts and incidents which gaverise to the administrative matter.'

The Court also fails to see how accused Abarratigue canclaim good faith allegedly on account of his having issued thememorandum orders informing private complainants that they aredropped from the rolls. The accused conveniently left out thecrucial detail that while the memorandum orders were indeedissued by him in November 2010, the effectivity dates of separationfrom service of private complainants range from March 2010 toJune 2010, or five (5) to eight (8) months retroactively. Such actreeks of evident bad faith as it is in total disregard of the time thatthe private complainants have worked prior to receiving the noticeof dropping them from the rolls, especially since they are entitled tothe salaries and allowances corresponding to the days they haveworked. The accused contends that the attendance of the privatecomplainants for the whole duration of January 2010 to October2010 was not listed down in the official logbook thereby allegedlyjustifying his refusal to sign their DTRs. However, the Court findsmore credible the corroborative testimonies of the prosecutionwitnesses, strengthened by the documentary evidence, that they infact reported for work but was not always able to log in the officiallogbook, hence the need to provide their own logbook.Interestingly, even defense witness Charita Abaigar, thedesignated logbook supervisor, admitted that the reassignedemployees go to the sub-office, but they do not log theirattendance in the sub-office loqbook."

With respect to the case of Miguel Aban, the Court also findsand holds that his death prior to the presentation of evidence does

1Catacutan v. People, August 31, 2011, 656 SeRA 524Z TSN dated July 9,2018 (P.M.)

RESOLUTIONpp vs. Alejandro N. Abarratigue, et al.Crim. Cases Nos. S8-16-CRM-0094 to -0098;

-0548; S8-17-0285 to -0286; -0475

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not operate to absolve accused Abarratigue of criminal and civilliabilities. It is a truism that a criminal offense is prosecuted notbecause of the injury or harm inflicted on the offended party, butbecause a crime is supposed to be an outrage to the sovereignty ofthe State." Besides, under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, itis "the death of the offender" which "occurs before final judgment"that extinguishes his criminal and civil liabilities.

As to the civil liability of accused Abarratiguein CriminalCase Nos. SB-16-CRM-0094 to SB-16-CRM-0098, it must benoted that municipal officers are liable for damages if they actmaliciously or wantonly, and if the work which they perform is doneto injure an individual rather than to discharge a public duty." It isonly in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted withmalice or bad faith that he should not be charged with personalliability for damages that may result from the performance of anofficial duty." The same is not availing in the instant cases, asaccused Abarratigue acted in evident bad faith. The municipalityshould, therefore, not suffer the burden of paying for the undueinjury caused to private complainants by the accused's ownmalicious acts. Hence, the civil liability adjudged against accusedAbarratigue is proper.

In Criminal Case Nos. SB-16-CRM-0548, SB-17 -CRM-0285to SB-17-CRM-0286, and SB-17-CRM-0475, in view of theacquittal of the accused and the lack of finding of evident bad faithon their part, the Court is inclined to reconsider its order holdingthem civilly liable for the unpaid salaries of private complainants.Instead, the Municipality of Hinabangan, Samar should be the oneto release the unpaid salaries of the following: Php154,096.00 toJovita Mabansag; Php114,952.00 to Maribeth Abina;Php114,952.00 to Marita Abarracoso; and Php 48,095.91 to GloriaTacad.

As to the other arguments of the accused, this Court findsthat they are mere reiteration and rehashed versions of itsarguments during trial, and the same have already been judiciouslyconsidered by this Court in its assailed Decision. Hence, there isno cogent and compelling reason to discuss the same.

3 People v. Bundalian, October 23, 1982, 203 Phi!. 834 Underscoring supplied5 Yulo v. Civil Service Commission, March 3,1993,219 SeRA 470

~Dimapilis-Baldoz v. COA, July Hi, 2013, 701 SeRA 318

RESOLUTIONpp vs. Alejandro N. Abarratigue, et al.Crim. Cases Nos. S8-16-CRM-0094 to -0098;

-0548; S8-17-0285 to -0286; -0475

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In Komatsu Industries (Phils.) Inc. v. Court of Appeals,? theSupreme Court held:

In the same manner, we readily found that, despite thelengthy and repetitious submissions of petitioner in its pleadingsfiled with this Court as earlier enumerated, all the argumentstherein are also mere rehashed versions of what it posited beforerespondent court. We have patiently given petitioner's postulatesthe corresponding thorough and objective review but, on the realand proper issues so completely and competently discussed andresolved by respondent court, petitioner's obvious convolutions ofthe same arguments are evidently unavailing. xxx

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, accusedAbarratigue's Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decisionpromulgated April 26, 2019), dated May 7, 2019, in Criminal CaseNos. S8-16-CRM-0094 to 88-16-CRM-0098 is hereby DENIED forlack of merit.

The accused's Motions for Partial Reconsideration (of theDecision promulgated April 26, 2019), all dated May 9, 2019, inCriminal Case Nos. 88-16-CRM-0548, S8-17 -CRM-0285 to S8-17-CRM-0286, and 88-17 -CRM-04 75 are hereby GRANTED.

The Municipality of Hinabangan, Samar is hereby ORDEREDto release the unpaid salaries of the following: Php154,096.00 toJovita Mabansag; Php114,952.00 to Maribeth Abina;Php114,952.00 to Marita Abarracoso; and Php 48,095.91 to GloriaTacad.

50 ORDERED.

EFREN rI~E LA CRUZAssociateIJ~:ce/chairperson

. ~ ~t$J(GER~ FAIIH A. ~CONG

Associate Justice

r-(~~"":~rb l~~,('y-~J(~',,-----c:.-t:lUI-\RDOM. CALDONA

Associate Justice

7April 24, 1998, 289 seRA 604, 620