Republic of the Philippines

Supreme CourtBaguio City

 

SECOND DIVISION

 CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR.,EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ, and ROSEMARIE DICHOSO PE BENITO,Petitioners, - versus -    PATROCINIO L. MARCOS,Respondent.

G.R. No. 180282 Present: CARPIO, J.,Chairperson,NACHURA,PERALTA,ABAD, andMENDOZA, JJ.Promulgated:April 11, 2011 

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DECISION 

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the

Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated January 31, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated October 23, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV

No. 85471. The assailed Decision reversed and set aside the July 15, 2005 decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 12581-14; while the assailed Resolution denied the Motion for

Reconsideration filed by petitioners Crispin Dichoso, Jr., Evelyn Dichoso Valdez, and Rosemarie Dichoso Pe

Benito.

 

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

 

On August 2, 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way [4] against respondent Patrocinio L.

Marcos. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the owners of Lot No. 21553 of the Cadastral Survey of

Laoag City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31219; while respondent is the owner of Lot No. 1. As

petitioners had no access to a public road to and from their property, they claimed to have used a portion of Lot No.

1 in accessing the road since 1970. Respondent, however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand. Though

petitioners have been granted another passageway by the spouses Benjamin and Sylvia Arce (Spouses Arce), the

owners of another adjacent lot, designated as Lot No. 21559-B, the former instituted the complaint before the RTC

and prayed that:

 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered: 1. Granting the plaintiffs right of way over an area of 54 square meters more or less of Lot 01 by paying the defendant the amount of P54,000.00, and that the right be annotated on defendants title; 2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 as damages for attorneys fees and costs of suit; Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise sought.[5]

 

Instead of filing an Answer, respondent moved[6] for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of

action and noncompliance with the requisite certificate of non-forum shopping.

 

During the hearing on respondents motion to dismiss, the parties agreed that an ocular inspection of the subject

properties be conducted. After the inspection, the RTC directed the parties to submit their respective position papers.

 

In a resolution[7] dated May 12, 2004, the RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss and required the latter to

answer petitioners complaint.

In his Answer,[8] respondent denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot No. 1 as passageway. He stated that

petitioners claim of right of way is only due to expediency and not necessity. He also maintained that there is an

existing easement of right of way available to petitioners granted by the Spouses Arce. Thus, there is no need to

establish another easement over respondents property.

 

In an Order[9] dated July 6, 2005, the RTC declared that respondents answer failed to tender an issue, and opted to

render judgment on the pleadings and thus deemed the case submitted for decision.

 

On July 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a decision[10] in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads, as

follows:

 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows: 

1.      granting plaintiffs a right of way over an area of 54 square meters more or less over Lot 01 owned by defendant Patrocinio L. [Marcos] appearing in the Laoag City Assessors sketch (Annex A) found on page 28 of the record of the case;

 2.      ordering plaintiffs to pay defendant the amount of P54,000.00 as proper indemnity;

and

 3.      ordering the Register of Deeds of Laoag City to duly annotate this right of way on

defendants title to the property. 

SO ORDERED.[11]

The RTC found that petitioners adequately established the requisites to justify an easement of right of way

in accordance with Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise declared petitioners in good faith

as they expressed their willingness to pay proper indemnity.[12]

 

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and consequently dismissed petitioners

complaint. Considering that a right of way had already been granted by the (other) servient estate, designated as Lot

No. 21559-B and owned by the Spouses Arce, the appellate court concluded that there is no need to establish an

easement over respondents property. The CA explained that, while the alternative route through the property of the

Spouses Arce is longer and circuitous, said access road is adequate. It emphasized that the convenience of the

dominant estate is never the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. Thus, the opening of another

passageway is unjustified.[13]

 

Aggrieved, petitioners come before this Court, raising the following issues:

 I.

CAN PETITIONERS BE ENTITLED TO A GRANT OF LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY FROM THEIR LANDLOCKED PROPERTY THROUGH THE PROPERTY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHICH IS THE SHORTEST ROUTE IN GOING TO AND FROM THEIR PROPERTY TO THE PUBLIC STREET AND WHERE THEY USED TO PASS?

 II.

CAN RESPONDENT REFUSE TO GRANT A RIGHT OF WAY ON THE DESIRED PASSAGEWAY WHICH HE CLOSED SINCE THERE IS ANOTHER PASSAGEWAY WHICH IS MORE CIRCUITOUS AND BURDENSOME AND IS BELATEDLY OFFERED UNTO PETITIONERS?

 III.

CAN PETITIONERS BE COMPELLED TO AVAIL OF A LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY THROUGH THE PROPERTY OF ARCE WHICH WAS BELATEDLY OFFERED BUT HAS BEEN FORECLOSED BY THE BANK AND WHEREIN THE LATTER IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE?[14]

The petition is without merit.

 

It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA by

virtue of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the CA are

conclusive upon this Court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule, namely:

 (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; 

(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case,

or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they

are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner's main and reply

briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and

contradicted by the evidence on record.[15]

The present case falls under the 7 th exception, as the RTC and the CA arrived at conflicting findings of fact

and conclusions of law.

 

The conferment of a legal easement of right of way is governed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code,

quoted below for easy reference:[16]

 Article 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use

any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity. Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate. In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damages caused by such encumbrance. This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietors own acts. Article 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

 

To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met:

 

1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;

 2. There is payment of proper indemnity; 3.   The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and

 4.   The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and

insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.[17]

Petitioners may be correct in the theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, but they

nevertheless failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the above-enumerated requirements.[18]

 

It must be stressed that, by its very nature, and when considered with reference to the obligations imposed

on the servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and

is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate

to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of

right of way may be granted.[19] Petitioners failed in this regard.

 

Admittedly, petitioners had been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot owned by the

Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners use the said outlet in going to and coming from the public highway. Clearly,

there is an existing outlet to and from the public road.

 

However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, and they have to pass through other lots

owned by different owners before they could get to the highway. We find petitioners concept of what is adequate

outlet a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of

right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate

is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it

can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.[20]

 

 

 

We quote with approval the CAs observations in this wise:

 As it shows, [petitioners] had been granted a right of way through the adjacent estate of

Spouses Arce before the complaint below was even filed. [Respondent] alleged that this right of way is being used by the other estates which are similarly situated as [petitioners]. [Petitioners] do not dispute this fact. There is also a reason to believe that this right of way is Spouses Arces outlet to a public road since their property, as it appears from the Sketch Map, is also surrounded by other estates. The fact that Spouses Arce are not insisting on a right of way through respondents property, although an opening on the latters property is undoubtedly the most direct and shortest

distance to P. Gomez St. from the formers property, bolsters our conviction that they have adequate outlet to the highway which they are now likewise making available to [petitioners].

 

The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way.

To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is adequacy. Hence, when there is already an existing

adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one

reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.[21]

 

Thus, in Cristobal v. CA,[22] the Court disallowed the easement prayed for because an outlet already exists

which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners property and which is connected to a private road about

five hundred (500) meters long. The private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street, which is about 2.5 meters wide,

and finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was determined by the Court to be sufficient for the needs of the

dominant estate.

 

Also in Floro v. Llenado,[23] we refused to impose a right of way over petitioners property although private

respondents alternative route was admittedly inconvenient because he had to traverse several ricelands and rice

paddies belonging to different persons, not to mention that said passage is impassable during the rainy season.

 

And in Ramos v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.,[24] this Court refused to grant the easement prayed for even if

petitioner had to pass through lots belonging to other owners, as temporary ingress and egress, which lots were

grassy, cogonal, and greatly inconvenient due to flood and mud because such grant would run counter to the

prevailing jurisprudence that mere convenience for the dominant estate does not suffice to serve as basis for the

easement.[25]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated

January 31, 2007 and Resolution dated October 23, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 85471 are AFFIRMED.

 SO ORDERED. 

  

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme CourtManila

 

SECOND DIVISION

 MARGARITA F. CASTRO,

Petitioner,    

- versus -     NAPOLEON A. MONSOD,

Respondent. 

G.R. No. 183719 Present: CARPIO, J.,Chairperson,NACHURA,PERALTA,ABAD, andMENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: February 2, 2011 

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DECISION

 NACHURA, J.:

 

 Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the

Decision[1] dated May 25, 2007 and the Resolution[2] dated July 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.

CV No. 83973.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

 

Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located on Garnet Street, Manuela Homes, Pamplona, Las Pias

City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-36071, with an area of one hundred thirty (130)

square meters (sq.m.). Respondent, on the other hand, is the owner of the property adjoining the lot of petitioner,

located on Lyra Street, MoonwalkVillage, Phase 2, Las Pias City. There is a concrete fence, more or less two (2)

meters high, dividing Manuela Homes from Moonwalk Village.[3]

 

On February 29, 2000, respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim against sixty-five (65) sq.m. of the

property of petitioner covered by TCT No. T-36071. The adverse claim was filed without any claim of ownership

over the property. Respondent was merely asserting the existing legal easement of lateral and subjacent support at

the rear portion of his estate to prevent the property from collapsing, since his property is located at an elevated

plateau of fifteen (15) feet, more or less, above the level of petitioners property. [4] Respondent also filed a complaint

for malicious mischief and malicious destruction before the office of the barangay chairman.[5]

 

In defiance, petitioner filed a complaint for damages with temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction

before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. Petitioner also prayed that the Register of Deeds of Las Pias

City be ordered to cancel the annotation of the adverse claim on TCT No. T-36071.[6]

Prior to the filing of the case before the RTC, there were deposits of soil and rocks about two (2) meters away from

the front door of the house of

petitioner. As such, petitioner was not able to park her vehicle at the dead-end portion of  Garnet Street. When

petitioner noticed a leak that caused the front portion of her house to be slippery, she hired construction workers to

see where the leak was coming from. The workers had already started digging when police officers sent by

respondent came and stopped the workers from finishing their job.[7]

 

Petitioner averred that when she bought the property from Manuela Homes in 1994, there was no annotation or

existence of any easement over the property. Respondent neither asked permission nor talked to her with regard to

the use of 65 sq.m. of her property as easement. Upon learning of the adverse claim, she felt disturbed and

experienced sleepless nights for fear that she would not be able to sell her property.  Petitioner admitted that TCT

No. 36071 does not cover the open space at the dead-end portion of Garnet Street.[8]

 

For his part, respondent claimed that he and his family had been residing in Moonwalk Village since June 1984.

Adjacent to his property is the land of petitioner in Manuela Homes. When he bought the property in 1983, the land

elevation of Moonwalk Village was almost on the same level as Manuela Homes. However, sometime in 1985 and

1986, Pilar Development Corporation, the developer of Manuela Homes, bulldozed, excavated, and transferred

portions of the elevated land to the lower portions of Manuela Homes. Thus, Manuela Homes became lower

than Moonwalk Village.[9]

Before the said excavation, respondent personally complained to Pilar

Development Corporation and was assured that, as provided by the National Building Code, an embankment will be

retained at the boundary of Manuela Homes and Moonwalk Village, which is more or less fifteen (15) feet higher

than Manuela Homes.[10]

 

Manuela Homes retained the embankment consisting of soil and rocks. Respondent had the open space riprapped

with stones as reinforcement against any potential soil erosion, earthquake, and possible digging by any person.

 

Respondent asserted that the affidavit of adverse claim was for the annotation of the lateral and subjacent easement

of his property over the property of petitioner, in view of the latters manifest determination to remove the

embankment left by the developer of Manuela Homes.

On October 11, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision,[11] the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby renders judgment: (1) ordering the cancellation of [respondents] adverse claim at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-36071 at the expense of [respondent] Napoleon Monsod; (2) ordering the said [respondent] to pay the herein [petitioner] the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) dismissing [petitioners] claim for actual damages, attorneys fees, litigation costs and costs of suit and [respondents] compulsory counterclaim for lack of merit. 

SO ORDERED.[12]

 

The trial court ratiocinated that the adverse claim of respondent was non-registrable considering that the basis of his

claim was an easement and not an interest adverse to the registered owner, and neither did he contest the title of

petitioner. Furthermore, the adverse claim of respondent failed to comply with the requisites provided under Section

70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.[13]

 

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court in a Decision[14] dated May 25, 2007, the fallo of which

reads:

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 198, Las Pias City dated October 11, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court hereby orders the retention of the annotation at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-36071, not as an adverse claim, but a recognition of the existence of a legal easement of subjacent and lateral support constituted on the lengthwise or horizontal land support/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square meters, more or less, of the property of [petitioner] Margarita Castro. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on April 18, 2006 is hereby made permanent. [Petitioners] claim for damages is likewise DISMISSED. 

SO ORDERED.[15]

 

The CA ruled that while respondents adverse claim could not be sanctioned because it did not fall under the

requisites for registering an adverse claim, the same might be duly annotated in the title as recognition of the

existence of a legal easement of subjacent and lateral support. The purpose of the annotation was to prevent

petitioner from making injurious excavations on the subject embankment as to deprive the residential house and lot

of respondent of its natural support and cause it to collapse. Respondent only asked that petitioner respect the legal

easement already existing thereon.[16]

 

On June 15, 2007, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the CA denied the same in a

Resolution[17] dated July 14, 2008.

 

Hence, this petition.

 

The issue in this case is whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support exists on the subject adjacent

properties and, if it does, whether the same may be annotated at the back of the title of the servient estate.

 

Article 437 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything

under it, and he can construct thereon any works, or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem

proper. However, such right of the owner is not absolute and is subject to the following limitations: (1) servitudes or

easements,[18] (2)special laws,[19] (3) ordinances,[20] (4) reasonable requirements of aerial navigation,[21] and (5) rights

of third persons.[22]

 

Respondent filed before the RTC an affidavit of adverse claim, the pertinent portions of which read:

 5. That our adverse claim consists of rights of legal or compulsory easement of lateral and subjacent support (under the Civil Code) over a portion of the above-described property of owner Margarita F. Castro, that is, covering the lengthwise or horizontal land support/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square meters, more or less. 6. That said registered owner has attempted to destroy and/or remove portions of the existing lateral/subjacent land and cement supports adjoining the said two properties. In fact, a portion of the easement was already destroyed/removed, to the continuing prejudice of herein adverse claimant, and that a formal complaint against said registered owner was filed by the herein adverse claimant before the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Talon V, Las Pias City and the same proved futile.[23]

 

Respondents assertion that he has an adverse claim over the 65 sq.m. property of petitioner is misplaced since he

does not have a claim over the ownership of the land. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under

Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529[24] requires a claim on the title of the disputed land. Annotation is done to

apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right

of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction

regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.[25]

 

In reality, what respondent is claiming is a judicial recognition of the existence of the easement of subjacent and

lateral support over the 65 sq. m. portion of petitioners property covering the land support/embankment area. His

reason for the annotation is only to prevent petitioner from removing the embankment or from digging on the

property for fear of soil erosion that might weaken the foundation of the rear portion of his property which is

adjacent to the property of petitioner.

 An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable

belonging to a different owner.[26] There are two kinds of easements according to source. An easement is established

either by law or by will of the owners.[27] The courts cannot impose or constitute any servitude where none existed.

They can only declare its existence if in reality it exists by law or by the will of the owners. There are therefore no

judicial easements.[28]

 

Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive

any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may

make excavations on his land, but his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or

building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two adjacent landowners, each has an absolute property

right to have his land laterally supported by the soil of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own premises,

he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbors land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own

weight, to fall away or slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable.[29]

In the instant case, an easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of respondent. It was established that

the properties of petitioner and respondent adjoin each other. The residential house and lot of respondent is located

on an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet above the level of petitioners property. The embankment and the riprapped

stones have been in existence even before petitioner became the owner of the property. It was proven that petitioner

has been making excavations and diggings on the subject embankment and, unless restrained, the continued

excavation of the embankment could cause the foundation of the rear portion of the house of respondent to collapse,

resulting in the destruction of a huge part of the family dwelling.[30]

 

We sustain the CA in declaring that a permanent injunction on the part of petitioner from making injurious

excavations is necessary in order to protect the interest of respondent. However, an annotation of the existence of the

subjacent and lateral support is no longer necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the

registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and the owner of the same,

including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come to court or have the

easement of subjacent and lateral support registered in order for it to be recognized and respected.

 

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated May 25, 2007 and the Resolution dated July 14, 2008

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83973 are herebyAFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the

annotation at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-36071, recognizing the existence of the legal easement

of subjacent and lateral support constituted on the lengthwise or horizontal land support/embankment area of sixty-

five (65) square meters, more or less, of the property of petitioner Margarita F. Castro, is hereby ordered removed.

 SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 194336               March 11, 2013

PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.RAMON DUMADAG, EMMA BACABAC, RONALDO NAVARRO, JIMMY PAGDALIAN, PAY DELOS SANTOS, ARMANDO TRILLOS, FELICISIMO TRILLOS, ARCANGEL FLORES, EDDIE MARTIN, PRESILLA LAYOG, CONRADO CAGUYONG, GINA GONZALES, ARLENE PEDROSA, JOCELYN ABELINO, ROQUE VILLARAZA, ROLANDO VILLARAZA, CAMILO GENOVE, NILDA ROAYANA, SUSAN ROAYANA, JUANCHO PANGANIBAN, BONG DE GUZMAN, ARNOLD ENVERSO, DONNA DELA RAZA, EMELYN HAGNAYA, FREDDIE DE LEON, RONILLO DE LEON, MARIO MARTINEZ, and PRECY LOPEZ, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure are the March 5, 2010 Decision1 and October 29, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90254, which affirmed the May 30, 2007 Decision3 of the Las Piñas Regional Trial Court, Branch 197 (trial court) dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner.

On July 1, 2002, petitioner filed a Complaint4 for accion publiciana with damages against respondents for allegedly building their shanties, without its knowledge and consent, in its 5,613-square-meter property located at Daisy Road, Phase V, Pilar Village Subdivision, Almanza, Las

Piñas City. It claims that said parcel of land, which is duly registered in its name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 481436 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, was designated as an open space of Pilar Village Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and amenities for subdivision residents.5 In their Answer with Counterclaim,6 respondents denied the material allegations of the Complaint and briefly asserted that it is the local government, not petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority over them.

Trial ensued. Both parties presented their respective witnesses and the trial court additionally conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property.

On May 30, 2007, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint, finding that the land being occupied by respondents are situated on the sloping area going down and leading towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek, and within the three-meter legal easement; thus, considered as public property and part of public

dominion under Article 5027 of the New Civil Code (Code), which could not be owned by petitioner. The court held:

x x x The land title of [petitioner] only proves that it is the owner in fee simple of the respective real properties described therein, free from all liens and encumbrances, except such as may be expressly noted thereon or otherwise reserved by law x x x. And in the present case, what is expressly reserved is what is written in TCT No. T-481436, to wit "that the 3.00 meter strip of the lot described herein along the Mahabang Ilog Creek is reserved for public easement purposes. (From OCT 1873/A-50) and to the limitations imposed by Republic Act No. 440. x x x"8

The trial court opined that respondents have a better right to possess the occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved for public easement purposes and that only the local government of Las Piñas City could institute an action for recovery of possession or ownership.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated August 21, 2007.9 Consequently, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, on March 5, 2010, sustained the dismissal of the case.

Referring to Section 210 of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 99-21 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the appellate court ruled that the 3-meter area being disputed is located along the creek which, in turn, is a form of a stream; therefore, belonging to the public dominion. It said that petitioner could not close its eyes or ignore the fact, which is glaring in its own title, that the 3-meter strip was indeed reserved for public easement. By relying on the TCT, it is then estopped from claiming ownership and enforcing its supposed right. Unlike the trial court, however, the CA noted that the proper party entitled to seek recovery of possession of the contested portion is not the City of Las Piñas, but the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), pursuant to Section 10111 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 (otherwise known as The Public Land Act).

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the CA per Resolution dated October 29, 2010, hence, this petition.

Anchoring its pleadings on Article 63012 of the Code, petitioner argues that although the portion of the subject property occupied by respondents is within the 3-meter strip reserved for public easement, it still retains ownership thereof since the strip does not form part of the public dominion. As the owner of the subject parcel of land, it is entitled to its lawful possession, hence, the proper party to file an action for recovery of possession against respondents conformably with Articles 42813 and 53914 of Code.

We deny.

An easement or servitude is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his or her property, for the benefit of another person or tenement; it is jus in re aliena, inseparable from the estate to which it actively or passively belongs, indivisible, perpetual, and a continuing property right, unless extinguished by causes provided by law.15 The Code defines easement as an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.16 There are two kinds of easement according to source: by law or by will of the owners – the former are called legal and the latter voluntary easement.17 A legal easement or compulsory easement, or an easement by necessity constituted by law has for its object either public use or the interest of private persons.18

While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that "the owner of the servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement," Article 635 thereof is specific in saying that "all

matters concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this Title Title VII on Easements or Servitudes."

In the case at bar, the applicability of DENR A.O. No. 99-21 dated June 11, 1999, which superseded DENR A.O. No. 97-0519 dated March 6, 1997 and prescribed the revised guidelines in the implementation of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1273 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 705 and 1067, cannot be doubted. Inter alia, it was issued to further the government’s program of biodiversity preservation. Aside from Section 2.1 above-quoted, Section 2.3 of which further mandates:

2.3 Survey of Titled Lands:

2.3.1 Administratively Titled Lands:

The provisions of item 2.1.a and 2.1.b shall be observed as the above. However, when these lands are to be subdivided, consolidated or consolidated-subdivided, the strip of three (3) meters which falls within urban areas shall be demarcated and marked on the plan for easement and bank protection.

The purpose of these strips of land shall be noted in the technical description and annotated in the title.

x x x x

2.3.3 Complex Subdivision or Consolidation Subdivision Surveys for Housing/Residential, Commercial or Industrial Purposes:

When titled lands are subdivided or consolidated-subdivided into lots for residential, commercial or industrial purposes the segregation of the three (3) meter wide strip along the banks of rivers or streams shall be observed and be made part of the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216.

The strip shall be preserved and shall not be subject to subsequent subdivision. (Underscoring supplied)

Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is required and shall be considered as forming part of the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216 dated October 14, 1977.20 Said law is explicit: open spaces are "for public use and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men" and that "[the] areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable."

Running in same vein is P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of the Philippines21 which provides:

Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, the above prove that petitioner’s right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the Court cannot agree with the trial court’s opinion, as to which the CA did not pass upon, that respondents have a better right to possess the subject portion of the land because they are occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes. Similar to petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is public land. Likewise, we repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded

upon.22 The length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same character throughout their occupancy.23

As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone, We find and so hold that both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local government of Las Piñas City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).24 Under R.A. 7279, which was enacted to uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections of the communities in urban areas and was envisioned to be the antidote to the pernicious problem of squatting in the metropolis,25 all local government units (LGUs) are mandated to evict and demolish persons or entities occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds.26 Moreover, under pain of administrative and criminal liability in case of non-compliance,27 it obliges LGUs to strictly observe the following:

Section 29. Resettlement. - Within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, the local government units, in coordination with the National Housing Authority, shall implement the relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and in other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds. The local government unit, in coordination with the National Housing Authority, shall provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and facilities and access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet the basic needs of the affected families.1âwphi1

Section 30. Prohibition Against New Illegal Structures. - It shall be unlawful for any person to construct any structure in areas mentioned in the preceding section. After the effectivity of this Act, the barangay, municipal or city government units shall prevent the construction of any kind or illegal dwelling units or structures within their respective localities. The head of any local government unit concerned who allows, abets or otherwise tolerates the construction of any structure in violation of this section shall be liable to administrative sanctions under existing laws and to penal sanctions provided for in this Act.

Yet all is not lost for petitioner. It may properly file an action for mandamus to compel the local government of Las Piñas City to enforce with reasonable dispatch the eviction, demolition, and relocation of respondents and any other persons similarly situated in order to give flesh to one of the avowed policies of R.A. 7279, which is to reduce urban dysfunctions, particularly those that adversely affect public health, safety, and ecology.28

Indeed, as one of the basic human needs, housing is a matter of state concern as it directly and significantly affects the general welfare.29

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 5, 2010 Decision and October 29, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90254, which affirmed the May 30, 2007 Decision of the Las Piñas RTC, Branch 197, dismissing petitioner's complaint, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.