Reproducing Difference? Schooling, Jobs, and Empowerment in Uttar Pradesh, India

World DevelopmentVol. 33,No. 12, pp. 2085–2101, 2005� 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

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doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.07.006www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

Reproducing Difference? Schooling, Jobs, and

Empowerment in Uttar Pradesh, India

CRAIG JEFFREYUniversity of Washington, USA

PATRICIA JEFFERY and ROGER JEFFERY *

University of Edinburgh, UK

Summary. — This article examines the role of school education in reproducing caste and classinequalities in rural Bijnor district, Uttar Pradesh, India. Drawing on Bourdieu’s work, the articleshows that a rural elite has used its superior wealth, connections, and social status to ensure thattheir sons receive privileged access to schooling credentials and government employment. Thegreater availability of formal educational opportunities allied to the political rise of lower casteshas allowed a small group of Dalits to raise their social standing, but has failed to alter historicalrelationships of dependence and exploitation.
� 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Key words — Asia, caste, class, education, employment, India

* This article is based on research focusing on household

strategies, schooling regimes, and social exclusion in

western UP. We are grateful to the Economic and Social

Research Council [grant number R000238495], Ford

Foundation and Royal Geographical Society for fund-

ing aspects of this research, and to the Institute of

Economic Growth, New Delhi, for our attachment there

in 2000–02. None bears any responsibility for what we

have written here. We are also grateful to our research

assistants, Swaleha Begum, Shaila Rais, Chhaya Shar-

ma, and Manjula Sharma. Final revision accepted: July22, 2005.

1. INTRODUCTION

Rural north Indians are increasingly seekingprolonged schooling for their sons with a viewto obtaining off-farm incomes. A rising ruralmiddle class has been in the vanguard of thischange, but the expansion of rural schoolingis also affecting substantial sections of the poor.In large parts of rural north India, a shift isoccurring from a direct mode of reproduction,wherein resources are passed on within house-holds through the transfer of property at inheri-tance, to mediated reproduction, in which theprovision of educational credentials and socialnetworking skills is increasingly significant(Bourdieu, 1996).In spite of the importance of these dynamics

and their implications for understandings ofdevelopment, there has been rather little re-search conducted on the impact of schoolingon processes of social differentiation in SouthAsia. Much development research has consid-ered the role of education in generating ‘‘hu-man capital’’ (e.g., Krueger & Mikael, 2001)often through focusing on children’s access to

208

lower primary schooling (Grades I–V) (e.g.,Dreze & Sen, 1995; Govinda, 2002; WorldBank, 1998). But issues of power, social change,and the meanings attached to education havenot been adequately explored (see also Heyne-man, 1980). This article addresses this researchgap through exploring how schooling beyondGrade V (upper primary and secondary school-ing) 1 reproduces, transforms or underminespatterns and processes of social inequality ina single village in rural Bijnor district, western

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2086 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Uttar Pradesh (UP). Drawing on field researchconducted by the three authors in 2000–02, weargue that the expansion of upper primary andsecondary education is reinforcing inequalitiesbased upon caste and class in western UP whilealso allowing some Dalits (ex-Untouchables) tochallenge established structures of power. 2

The next two sections outline the politicaleconomy of schooling and employment in UPand the theoretical basis of our enquiry. Section4 introduces the setting of our research andmethodology. In Section 5, we explore theschooling and employment strategies of thelocally dominant Jat caste and relatively mar-ginalized Chamars (a Dalit caste) in Nangalvillage. We uncover the role of secondaryschooling in entrenching rural inequalitiesbased upon caste and class. Jats have beenmore successful than Chamars in the searchfor educational credentials and salariedemployment. Section 6 focuses on the occa-sional success of educated Chamars in thesearch for government employment and the so-cial implications of this mobility. Section 7summarizes our argument and draws out thewider implications of our study for an under-standing of social reproduction and develop-ment.

2. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OFUTTAR PRADESH

Economic neo-liberal reform has sharpenedtensions between educational aspirations andemployment outcomes for parents and youngpeople in UP, as it has in many other parts ofIndia (Harriss-White, 2003) and the developingworld (Bryceson, 2002; Miles, 2002; Silbersch-midt, 2001). The liberalization of the Indianeconomy from 1991 has had a negative impacton rural employment generation in many partsof north India (Chandrashekhar & Ghosh,2002). Economic reforms have reduced oppor-tunities for government employment, histori-cally an important source of salaried work inrural areas. In 2001, the World Bank made anannual 2% cut in the number of governmentemployees, a condition of its continuing aid inUP. Outside metropolitan areas, liberalizationhas often failed to generate private sector jobs(Sen, 1997). Simultaneously, economic reformhas frequently reduced the availability of ruralcredit and therefore possibilities for entrepre-neurialism (Chandrashekhar & Ghosh, 2002).As positions in salaried employment have

dwindled, recruitment to these posts has beenpoliticized through the extension of caste-basedpositive discrimination to ‘‘Other BackwardClasses (OBCs)’’ in 1990. 3

UP literacy rates are below national levels; in2001, 70% of males and 43% of females over theage of seven were literate, and only 68% and38%, respectively, in rural areas (ORG, 2001).Until about 1990, the public sector was becom-ing increasingly important within secondaryschooling in UP; the Government establishedsubstantial numbers of secondary schools andextended financial aid to privately managedinstitutions. From the early 1990s, however,there was a shift in patterns of schooling provi-sion in many parts of the state (Mooij & Dev,2002). The fiscal crisis of the UP Government,allied to neo-liberal economic reforms intro-duced in the early 1990s, has eroded Govern-ment secondary schooling provision. Sinceabout 1990, the only dynamic element in thepublic secondary schooling sector has been ingirls schooling, under the influence of donorpressure. Government secondary schools typi-cally lack teaching aids and equipment, cater-ing facilities, and basic amenities (The ProbeTeam, 1999). The political power of govern-ment teachers appears to have prevented theState from diverting money allocated for teach-ers’ salaries into developing educational facili-ties and monitoring curriculum delivery(Kingdon & Muzammil, 2003). In this context,secondary education is increasingly providedwithin non-state schools and extra-school tuto-rials in UP. Organizations promoting class,caste, or religious goals have capitalized onState neglect of schooling by establishing an ar-ray of privately managed educational institu-tions (Jeffery, Jeffery, & Jeffrey, in press). Thisprivatization has coincided with the politiciza-tion of schooling through the efforts of the rul-ing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party(BJP) to ensure that government school curric-ula reflect the ideological concerns of politi-cized Hinduism. 4

The neglect of employment creation and edu-cational provision is connected to the en-trenched nature of caste and class inequalitiesin UP (Jeffery & Lerche, 2003). Three catego-ries of household may be identified in ruralUP based upon their position in relation tothe fourfold Hindu varna hierarchy. Accordingto the 1931 Census of India, the last census forwhich caste figures are available, upper castes(principally Brahmins and Thakurs) comprisedroughly 20% of the population of UP. As sub-

SCHOOLING, JOBS, AND EMPOWERMENT IN UTTAR PRADESH, INDIA 2087

stantial landowners, these castes have domi-nated lucrative salaried employment, local gov-ernment bureaucracies, and landownership inmany parts of UP (Hasan, 1998), but they arerelatively unimportant in many areas of ruralwestern UP (Lerche, 1999).A second category of households in UP com-

prises a stratum of ‘‘intermediate castes,’’including the Jats, together with upper sectionsof the OBCs, such as the Yadavs. The Jats com-prise just over 2% of the total population ofUP, but often act as local ‘‘dominant castes’’in western parts of the State (Srinivas, 1955);they control landownership, non-agriculturalsources of wealth and influence within localstate institutions (Jeffrey & Lerche, 2000). Sincethe mid-1960s, this ‘‘new rural elite’’ has beenpowerfully represented within State and cen-tral government (Corbridge & Harriss, 2000;Hasan, 1998). Between the mid-1960s and early1990s, this political power allowed the prosper-ous peasantry to benefit from high agriculturalsupport prices and large subsidies on agricul-tural inputs. Recent evidence suggests that richpeasants have invested much of this agrarianwealth in seeking out educational opportunitiesand good marriages for their children (Jeffrey,2001). In some areas, this elite has also bene-fited from the move of Brahmin and Thakurlandlords out of agriculture into business andservice employment.The remainder of UP’s population mainly

comprises Muslims, poorer castes within theOBC category, often called ‘‘Most BackwardCastes’’ (MBCs), and Dalits, who are locatedoutside the fourfold varna caste hierarchy.Rural households among Muslims, Dalits,and MBCs typically possess little or no agricul-tural land and work in exploitative, poorlypaid, and insecure conditions.Dalits in UP historically suffered from the

stigma and subordination associated with beingclassed as ‘‘Untouchable’’ (Mandelbaum,1970). In the 1930s, the British created lists offormerly Untouchable castes deemed eligiblefor special government assistance, the so-called‘‘Scheduled Castes’’ (SCs). The 1950 IndianConstitution offered the SCs legal equalityand reserved places in public-sector employ-ment, educational institutions, and governmentrepresentative bodies (Galanter, 1991). Positivediscrimination has failed to alter relationshipsof dominance and subordination based uponcaste and class in UP (Hasan, 1998), particu-larly in the western areas of the State (Jeffrey& Lerche, 2000). 5 Dalits in UP continue to

be concentrated among the poor and confinedto manual wage labor, skilled artisanal work,or small-scale entrepreneurship in the informaleconomy (Lerche, 1999; Mendelsohn & Viczi-any, 1998).Nevertheless, between 1970 and the early

1990s, most Dalits in rural UP gained slightlyfrom an expansion in off-farm employment fol-lowing the ‘‘Green Revolution’’ (Lerche, 1999).Building on a small improvement in real wages,rural Dalits in UP increasingly sought formaleducation and salaried employment for theirsons (Dube, 1998; Nambissan & Sedwal,2002). These efforts at social mobility are re-lated to the emergence of the Bahujan SamajParty (BSP) as a political force in UP. Estab-lished in 1984, the BSP held power at the Statelevel four times during 1993–2003. It has fo-cused on raising the economic and social posi-tion of Dalits, particularly members of themost populous and politically organized Dalitcaste in UP, the Chamars. The BSP has at-tempted to place Dalits in key positions withinthe UP bureaucracy, speed up the flow of devel-opment funds and educational opportunities tothis community, and improve Dalits’ access topolice protection and judicial redress (Jaffrelot,2003). Drawing on the vision of upward mobil-ity based upon education and entry into white-collar employment promoted by the Dalit lea-der, Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar, the BSP madeparticular efforts to encourage Dalits to acquireformal schooling. This drive was visibly mani-fest in a symbolic program founded on theestablishment of educational institutions, li-braries, and parks dedicated to Ambedkarand on the construction of statues across thestate depicting this Dalit hero.The efforts of the BSP to improve Dalits’ ac-

cess to power at the local level intersected withchanges in the formal system of the local gov-ernment in India. In 1992, the 73rd Amend-ment Act aimed to increase the power of localgovernment in India. The Act implemented athree-tier system of local government in allstates of India with populations of over 2 mil-lion people. The Act also provided a 33% reser-vation of seats for Scheduled Castes, ScheduledTribes, and women, increased the financialpowers of local village councils (panchayats),and made provision for five-yearly panchayatelections.The political economy of UP is therefore

characterized by considerable change. Sincethe mid-1960s, a new rural elite has increas-ingly looked outside rural areas for sources of


political and economic power. Nevertheless,Dalits are beginning to challenge this elite foraccess to secure government employment andpolitical largesse at the local and regional lev-els. These changes are occurring against a back-ground of a rapid privatization in educationalservices and a collapse in salaried employmentopportunities.

3. OUR APPROACH

Within much development research, educa-tion is perceived to provide marginalized peoplewith skills, autonomy, confidence, and freedom(Dreze & Sen, 1995; Sen, 2000). By contrast,many educational sociologists have emphasizedthe common tendency for schooling to rein-force social inequalities. Schools may inculcatesocial prejudices, instill notions of failure, orconfer advantage on individuals based on theirsuperior position with class, caste, race, gender,or religious hierarchies (Apple, 1982; Bourdieu,1984; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Giroux,2001). Among the most influential studies,Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) demonstratedthat, rather than being ‘‘neutral’’ institutionsselecting students of particular merit, schoolstend to legitimize historical inequalities in ac-cess to wealth and status. During their earlylives, children from richer households absorbmiddle/upper class norms of behavior. Superiorschools positively select and reward childrenexhibiting these cultural traits. On leaving edu-cation, upper and middle class young peoplefind that their demeanor and educational qual-ifications, allied to their parents’ financial andsocial support, confer advantages in the searchfor secure salaried jobs.Bourdieu (1986) built on these empirical

observations to stress the importance of eco-nomic, social, and cultural capital in the repro-duction of upper/middle class advantage withinWestern capitalist societies. Economic capital re-fers to material assets and income. Social capitalindicates social bonds useful in the efforts of indi-vidual households to acquire money, power, orstatus. 6 Cultural capital denotes a range ofgoods, titles, and forms of behavior that providedistinction in social situations, including aca-demic qualifications (institutionalized culturalcapital), a person’s comportment (embodied cul-tural capital), and material possessions (objecti-fied cultural capital).Our research points to the usefulness of

Bourdieu’s analysis in understanding contem-

porary social reproduction in rural north India.In emphasizing the importance of connectionsand symbolic resources in the processes ofsocial competition, Bourdieu’s work widensunderstandings of agrarian power relationsbeyond a focus on agricultural productionand landownership. Bourdieu’s framework alsohighlights the everyday social practices throughwhich the power of dominant classes is exer-cised, transformed, and resisted in north India.We also identify signs of emerging social

change in rural Bijnor district. The inabilityof some wealthy households to find secureemployment for their sons, and the success ofa few among the poor, is beginning to under-mine the legitimacy of established relationshipsof dominance. Occasional Jat failure to obtainsecure employment exposes the arbitrary nat-ure of caste as an index of respect. Such failure,combined with the success of some Chamars inobtaining upper primary and secondary schoolqualifications, offers Chamars opportunities toestablish education as a marker of status dis-tinct from caste. Moreover, the ability of afew educated Chamars to obtain governmentjobs has created a class of Chamar brokers(dalal), who assist other members of their castesocially and politically. Thus, while the numberof Chamar young men able to obtain upper pri-mary/secondary school qualifications remainssmall, this minority may play an important so-cial and political role in rural Bijnor district.We point to the need for further research whichcombines Bourdieu’s analysis of social repro-duction through education with attention topossibilities for social change.Our article explores issues of inequality and

education with primary reference to boys andyoung men. The focus on young men reflectsthe article’s concern with the link between edu-cation and opportunities for households to ob-tain salaried work. In line with broaderpatriarchal notions, the few young women edu-cated beyond junior high school (Eighthclass) 7 were not expected to enter paid employ-ment in rural Bijnor district. The schooling lev-els of girls affect the marriage market, however,and therefore expectations of the educationwhich young men should possess. It is thereforeimportant to note that the levels of female edu-cation are rising among all social groups. Par-ents viewed girls’ education to be importantfor creating good wives and mothers, instillingchildcare skills, and preparing young womenfor their role as civilized home makers. Butgirls’ formal education continues to lag behind


that of boys, as in many other areas of India(Ramachandran, 2004). Parents typically with-drew young women from formal educationafter puberty out of a concern for young wo-men’s safety on journeys to and from schoolor in response to financial crises within thehousehold.Our analysis is particularly concerned with

the relationship between upper primary/sec-ondary schooling and patterns and processesof social inequality. In contemporary rural Bij-nor district, schooling beyond Grade V has be-come central to patterns of social reproductionand change. Parents and children considerexperience of formal education beyond lowerprimary school to be crucial in improving a per-son’s skills, knowledge, employment chances,and social standing. Rural people usually re-gard an ‘‘educated’’ (parhe likhe) person assomeone with at least an Eighth Class passand someone with just a Grade V pass as‘‘uneducated’’ (unparh). These perceptions re-flect the low standard of primary education inNangal village. After Grade V, children’s read-ing, writing, and mathematical skills are poorlydeveloped; it is usually in Grades VI–VIII thatthey become competent in written Hindi (cf.Ramachandran, 2004). Moreover, possessionof a Grade V pass rarely improves a person’semployment prospects. People typically requireat least a Grade VIII pass to enter low-rankingprivate salaried employment, while a Grade Xpass is a minimum prerequisite for most formsof government work.

4. SETTING AND METHODOLOGY

Our research in 2000–02 was based in ruralBijnor district, western UP. Bijnor district’seconomy is based on sugarcane, wheat and ricecultivation. 8 During 1960–90, the introductionof new agricultural technologies and high gov-ernment agricultural support prices increasedagricultural profits and the demand for labor.The construction of a new road across the Gan-ges in 1984 opened up direct links between Bij-nor and Delhi and promoted commercialgrowth. Bijnor district lacks a substantial man-ufacturing base, however, and is situated out-side the area of rapid industrial expansionoccurring in contiguous UP districts furtherwest. The liberalization of the Indian economyhas undermined opportunities for secure serviceemployment within the government sector inthe district.

Bijnor district’s literacy rates were slightlyhigher than the state average at 71% of its ruralmales and 45% of its rural females. But govern-ment schooling deteriorated rapidly in the dis-trict during 1991–2001, as evident in the risingproportion of students attending privatelymanaged schools. The state schooling sectorin Bijnor district is increasingly divided into asmall number of high quality Government-funded secondary schools used by rural andurban elites and a mass of poorly funded pri-mary, upper primary and secondary schoolscatering for the poor. 9 Government failurehas encouraged the growth of a variety ofnon-state educational institutions linked tothe identity projects of diverse groups. This in-cludes well-funded English-medium schoolscatering for the urban middle class, schoolstargeted toward Dalits, and madrasahs (Islamiceducational institutions) serving Muslim stu-dents. 10 The government is simultaneouslyretreating from its commitment to pay full-timeteachers within schools receiving State aid, andeducational services formerly provided withinschools are increasingly sold to students, asevident in a vibrant private tutorial market.Our rural research was concentrated in the

villages of Qaziwala and Nangal. This articlefocuses on Nangal, which lies about 15 kilome-ters south-east of Bijnor town. In 2001, Nan-gal’s population was about 5,300 of which48% were Chamars, 26% Jats, and 12% Mus-lim. The remaining population mainly com-prised MBCs, but included a small number ofBrahmin households.This article is concerned with the Jats, repre-

senting a relatively elite class, and Chamars,who represent a marginalized class. The Jatsin Nangal claimed warrior caste (kshatriya) sta-tus, though since 2000 they have belonged tothe legal category of OBCs in UP. The Jatsowned 83% of the agricultural land in Nangalin 2001. Landownership was not the only basisfor rural power in western UP, but it remainedcrucial in defining a household’s economic andsocial position. Jats’ numerical dominance,muscle power, economic strength, and connec-tions to the local state rendered them morepowerful than other castes in the village.In line with local understandings of what

constitutes a relatively ‘‘rich farmer’’ (amirkisan), we define rich households as those pos-sessing over 1.6 ha (20 kachcha bıghas) ofland. 11 Of the 239 Jat households, 54% pos-sessed more than 1.6 ha in 2001. Rich Jathouseholds had reinvested agricultural surplus


in small businesses. They managed a woodyard, two sugarcane processing units, and sev-eral shops and schools.The Chamars in Nangal were mainly em-

ployed as local manual wage laborers, oftenon the farms or in the small industrial unitsowned by Jats. Within agriculture, Chamarsworked as temporary daily wage laborers paidbetween Rs. 25 and Rs. 50 per day, 12 but wereoften unable to obtain regular work or timelypayment for their labor. In 2001, the Chamarspossessed 8% of the agricultural land in Nan-gal. Of the 457 Chamar households in the vil-lage, only 1% owned more than 1.6 ha and77% were landless. Social inequalities in land-ownership were reflected in the fixed assets ofChamars and Jats: 56% of Chamars lived inbrick built (pakka) houses compared to 89%of Jats. Only 10% of Chamar households hadtelevisions compared to 70% of Jats. Chamarsdepended upon the Jats for fodder for their cat-tle and access to their fields to defecate. 13 Inaddition, Chamars lacked urban social contactsand frequently relied on Jats in negotiationswithin local government officials.Like the Jats, Brahmins typically own rela-

tively sizeable portions of agricultural land,have diversified out of agriculture, and employlocal lower caste laborers in their farms andsmall businesses. Brahmins entered the searchfor upper primary and secondary school quali-fications slightly earlier than Jats and manycaptured salaried work outside the village. Veryfew Muslim and MBC households possess land,and they typically depend on local wage laboror poorly paid local artisanal activity. Muslimsand MBCs have been less successful than haveChamars in obtaining educational qualifica-tions and salaried employment. This is largelydue to Muslims’ and MBCs’ relative lack ofpolitical representation at the State level.Nangal contained two Government primary

schools and three private primary schools runby local Brahmins. Jats dominated the manage-ment committee of the Nangal Junior HighSchool, which was the larger and better fundedof the village’s two middle schools and offeredGrades I–IX in 2001. The Ambedkar JuniorHigh School catered mainly to Dalits and ranclasses up to Grade VIII. The facilities andstandards of teaching at the government pri-mary schools and Ambedkar School were par-ticularly poor, but all the schools in Nangalwere underfunded, badly maintained, and suf-fered from teacher neglect. Moreover, theschools in and close to Nangal were of a lower

quality than most schools in Bijnor. There wereinadequate amenities attached to villageschools, and children often sat on matting inthe open air during lessons.Our research combined survey work with

ethnographic interviews. We began by under-taking household surveys in Nangal as an up-date to an identical census carried out in1990. 14 We then interviewed parents and theirchildren in households with young people agedbetween 15 and 34. Our discussions were semi-structured in the sense that we had a set of top-ics we wanted to address with specific people.These topics related primarily to perceptionsof school education; schooling, employment,and marriage strategies; child rearing; andpolitical affiliations and activity. Our conversa-tions typically centered on parents’ reflectionson their educational strategies. Since some par-ents had grown up children, our conversationsregarding educational strategies often con-cerned events which occurred between themid-1970s and early 1990s, but many parentsalso discussed current schooling dilemmas withreference to younger children. The interviewswere written up in Roman Hindi by one ofour research assistants within 24 hours of theconversation, and we then translated these ac-counts into English. Our conversations withparents and young people were supplementedby interviews with politicians, state officials,and teachers within schools and madrasahs.

5. SCHOOLING, EMPLOYMENT, ANDINEQUALITY

(a) Jat schooling strategies for boys

When we asked Jat parents about why theyhad provided their sons with education (par-ha’ı), the most common response was that edu-cation offers opportunities for boys to obtainnaukrı (salaried employment). In this sense,education was central to parental ambitions.In discussing men’s employment opportunities,Jats commonly made a three-way distinctionbetween secure, well-paid, and prestigious jobswithin government service (sarkarı naukrı),insecure, temporary, and poorly paid privateservice (private naukrı) and grueling manual la-bor either on daily wages for an employer (maz-durı) or within farming (khetı). A governmentjob provided a regular salary, pension, ‘‘over-income’’ based on the collection of bribes andkick-backs, and subsidized access to welfare


services. In the face of the subdivision of agri-cultural holdings associated with the prevailingsystem of partible inheritance, investment inboys’ secondary schooling was also seen as ameans of diversifying risk. In addition, Jat par-ents spoke of boys’ education beyond primaryschool as providing skills, knowledge, and valu-able cultural distinction. Jats regarded a personwho had achieved a Grade VIII pass as ‘‘edu-cated’’ (parhe likhe) and therefore in possessionof refinement, discretion, confidence, and goodtaste (cf. Levinson, Foley, & Holland, 1996).Most Jats had invested large sums of money

in the pursuit of upper primary and secondaryschool qualifications for their sons in the hopethat they would enter secure salaried work.

Table 1. Percentage of Jat and Chamar boys aged between

Chamar

Landless Landed

Government 43.1 50.7Private 32.4 35.2Not attending 24.5 14.1Total (N) 102 71

Source: Village census conducted by authors, 2001.Notes: This table includes children who are not residents ovillage. Rich households are those owning over 1.6 ha (20 knumbers in some cells are very small, the percentages shou

Table 2. Percentage of Jat and Chamar boys aged between

Chamar

Landless Landed

Government/aided 30.9 28.8Private 46.3 42.4Not attending 22.8 28.8Total (N) 123 66

Source: Village census conducted by authors, 2001.Notes: See notes to Table 1. ‘‘Aided’’ schools are those recewhich are managed by private individuals.

Table 3. Percentage of Jat and Chamar boys aged between 16

Chama

Landless Land

Government/aided schools 7.5 7.9Private schools 10.0 22.2Higher education 1.3 1.6Not in formal education 81.3 68.3Total (N) 80 63

Source: Village census conducted by authors, 2001.Notes: See notes to Tables 1 and 2.

As substantial landowners, Jats typically hada reliable source of income, could obtain loansfrom relatives or financial institutions, and, inrare cases, sold land to pay for education.Landownership, or close kinship links withprosperous landowners, allowed most Jathouseholds to manage financial crises withouthaving to remove sons from school. This is re-flected in the high numbers of Jat boys andyoung men in formal education (Tables 1–3).According to our household surveys, in 2001,57.6% of the 66 Jat young men in Nangal wereenrolled in school compared to 45.6% of the 79Jat young men in this cohort in 1990.In spite of intra-caste class differences, there

were many similarities between the schooling

6 and 10 enrolled in formal schooling in 2001 in Nangal

Jat

Total Poor Rich Total

46.2 30.4 8.1 15.333.5 65.2 89.8 81.920.2 4.3 2.0 2.8173 23 49 72

f Nangal but whose parents continue to be based in theuchcha bıghas). Percentages have been rounded. Since theld be used with caution.

11 and 15 enrolled in formal schooling in 2001 in Nangal

Jat

Total Poor Rich Total

30.2 28.1 23.1 25.045.0 68.8 75.0 72.624.9 5.6 1.9 2.4189 54 52 84

iving financial assistance from the State government but

and 20 enrolled in formal education in 2001 in Nangal Jat

r Jat

ed Total Poor Rich Total

7.7 20.0 26.1 21.215.4 10.0 26.1 24.21.4 10.0 13.0 12.175.5 60.0 34.8 42.4143 20 46 66


strategies of rich and poor Jats that markedthem out from Chamars. Jats began to usemodern forms of contraception much earlierthan most other caste groups in the area andtherefore had fewer children than Chamars.Thus, Jats were able to invest greater resourceson each son. Jats were usually able to send theirsons to the more expensive but relatively well-provisioned, private primary schools in Nangaland then to the privately run Nangal JuniorHigh School (Tables 1 and 2). Many Jats im-proved the chances of their children’s successin school through arranging private tuition inpreparation for secondary school examina-tions. Private tutorials typically cost betweenRs. 50 and 150 a month in Nangal and betweenRs. 200 and 300 a month in local urban centers.Since Jat parents were generally more educatedthan Chamar parents, they were betterequipped to monitor children’s homework,liaise with teachers, and instill in their sonsthe urbane good manners that are valued insecondary schools. Jats often criticized ruralschools for their dilapidated infrastructureand lack of facilities. They said that teachersin these schools fail to instill in children a con-templative, critical attitude and were over-reli-ant on rote learning and the use of physicalpunishments.Jat parents had relatively good access to so-

cial contacts outside the local area. These con-tacts could assist in their sons’ schooling orprovide advice about urban educational oppor-tunities. Of the 66 Jat boys aged between 16and 20 in 2001, 28.8% (19) studied in schoolsoutside a five kilometer radius of the villageand 10.6% (7) lived outside Nangal in orderto be educated. Several rich Jat householdshad paid a substantial entrance fee and used ur-ban social contacts to negotiate their sons’ en-try into the Government Inter College (GIC)in Bijnor. Notwithstanding the general declinein state education, GIC had a reputation forparticularly good examination results and disci-pline. Jat parents educating their children inBijnor, or more distantly, often sent their sonsto stay with close relatives. These relatives tookon responsibility for supervising boys’ educa-tion during term time. Adopting a differentstrategy, parents in six of the richest Jat house-holds had sent their sons to the regional educa-tional centers of Dehra Dun, Meerut, orMoradabad for prestigious English-mediumeducation within private boarding schools.While Jats had commonly obtained privi-

leged access to upper primary or secondary

school education for their sons, not all youngmen have been successful in the educationalsphere. Table 3 shows that by their late teensmany Jat young men, particularly but notexclusively those from poor households, hadleft formal education. Poor Jats and some par-ents within richer households were occasionallyforced to remove children from school in re-sponse to financial pressures, such as those aris-ing out of the illness of a family member. Inaddition, some Jat parents complained thattheir sons had dropped out of school of theirown accord.

(b) Educated Jat employment strategies

The employment status of young men agedbetween 25 and 34 reflects the outcome of edu-cational decisions taken between the mid-1970sand early 1990s, when secure governmentemployment for high school graduates was rel-atively available and the system for obtainingpositions less corrupt. Parents and young menin Nangal argued that the nature of competi-tion for government employment changedmarkedly in the 1980s from a system in whichsuccess rested on individual talent to one inwhich access to government employment de-pended upon the payment of a large bribeand personal considerations. Many believedthat it was necessary to pay between Rs.40,000 and Rs. 100,000 for even a low-rankinggovernment job. Moreover, in the quest forgovernment employment, young people usuallyhad to finance extensive travel, forego paidwork for long periods, and fund specialistcoaching for examinations. The significance ofthese financial considerations placed Jats atan advantage over Chamars, and also put richJats in a better position than poorer membersof their caste in the search for secure salariedwork. This is reflected in the figures providedin Table 4, which relate to young men educatedin the 1980s or early 1990s. Nevertheless, theseinequalities should not be overdrawn. Table 4shows that landowning Chamars had beenmore successful than poor Jats in obtaining ser-vice employment, and government work in par-ticular.Jats were often aware of reliable urban bro-

kers, who assisted applicants within govern-ment employment markets. Drawing oncontacts in government service, Jats could alsoacquire the personal recommendations impor-tant in the competition for secure posts. SomeJats had used their contacts within government

Table 4. Percentage of educated Chamar and educated Jat men in Nangal aged between 25 and 34 in 2001 by principaloccupation

Chamar Jat

Landless Landed Total Poor Rich Total

Govt. service 3.8 7.7 5.1 9.4 2.2 6.9Private clerical 1.9 11.5 5.1 7.1 17.8 10.8Farming 0 3.8 1.3 67.1 44.4 59.2Business 3.8 15.4 7.7 8.2 15.6 10.8Skilled manual Bijnor district 3.8 0 2.6 0 6.7 2.3Skilled manual outside Bijnor D. 0 3.8 1.3 0 0 0Unskilled manual Bijnor district 80.8 30.1 64.1 0 0 0Unskilled manual outside Bijnor D. 0 7.7 2.6 0 0 0Unemployed/student/other 5.8 19.2 10.3 8.2 13.3 10.0Total (N) 52 26 78 85 45 130

Source: Village census conducted by authors, 2001.Notes: This table includes children who are not residents of Nangal but whose parents continue to be based in thevillage. Rich Jat households are those owning over 1.6 ha (20 kuchcha bıghas). Educated young men refers to thosewith at least an Eighth Class pass. Percentages have been rounded. Since the numbers in some cells are very small, thepercentages should be used with caution.


to occupy posts formally reserved for Dalits. Inthese cases, Jats claimed that there were no suit-ably qualified Dalits to fill the quota and usedtheir connections within the police and judi-ciary to avoid prosecution.The collapse of secure government employ-

ment opportunities was elevating the impor-tance of migrating in search of private-sectorwork. In contrast to the general view thatgovernment employment is superior to privatework, a few very rich Jats advised their sonsagainst applying for a government job anddirected them instead toward highly paid pri-vate positions outside Bijnor district, often inmultinational companies. These households’relative wealth, access to suitable social con-tacts outside Bijnor district, and cultural cap-ital had allowed them to obtain secureprivate-sector work for their sons, often inteaching or computing. Within one of therichest Jat households, a son had been sentoutside Bijnor district for specialist medicaltraining with a view to entering private prac-tice. Another of the richest households hadenrolled a son in an MBA course close toDelhi in the expectation that he would entera multinational corporation involved in adver-tising.Outside the richest households, Jat young

men usually began their efforts at obtainingoff-farm employment through applying for gov-ernment posts. Young men unable to find gov-ernment work occasionally obtained less secureprivate-sector salaried employment in the infor-

mal economy, most frequently within Bijnordistrict. These ‘‘fallback jobs’’ were often inagricultural processing, an area in which Jatshave historically exerted influence in Bijnor dis-trict, or in relatively new employment sectors,which provide scope for projecting an imageof being in ‘‘good salaried work.’’ These fall-back jobs included work as teachers in privatecoaching institutes, contractors on governmentdevelopment projects, and posts as marketingagents for large pharmaceutical firms. Jatyoung men negotiated entry to these jobsthrough cultivating a mobile, ‘‘urban’’ uppercaste image commonly communicated throughownership of a motorcycle, dark glasses, andpleated Western-style trousers.Many educated Jats aged between 25 and 34

were not in service employment (Table 4). Jatsunable to obtain secure salaried work fre-quently entered farming or, more rarely, estab-lished small businesses within the informal orblack economy. Other Jats preferred to remainunemployed. In spite of the present employ-ment crisis, Jats had largely avoided enteringmanual wage labor. The relative success of Jatsin finding appropriate employment for youngmen educated in the late 1980s and early1990s partly explains why the Jat parents weinterviewed in 2000–02 emphasized the valueof upper primary and secondary education forboys.The scale of the present employment crisis

and changes in the nature of recruitment tosalaried occupations was creating marked


indeterminacies in Jat employment strategies,however. The high likelihood of repeated frus-tration within corrupt markets for salariedwork increased the risk of young men becomingdisillusioned with job searches. Moreover, therising importance of social networking withinemployment competitions placed charismaticyoung people at an advantage over their peers.These considerations made it increasingly likelythat the fortunes of individual families andbrothers would vary according to the individualresolve, personality, and flexibility of Jat youngmen and their parents. Young men who werecompelled to watch their brothers and kinsmensucceed while finding it impossible themselvesto obtain salaried work often engaged inaggressive and abusive forms of behavior. Jatparents reported an increase in the incidenceamong young men of addiction to alcoholand drugs and a related rise in crimes such asassault, sexual harassment, and rape (cf. Sil-berschmidt, 2001). In the 1990s, two Jat youngmen from relatively wealthy households com-mitted suicide after repeatedly failing to obtaingovernment jobs.As Bourdieu (1984) observed, sporadic exam-

ples of elite ‘‘failure’’ cannot be taken as evi-dence of radical social change. Rapidprocesses of agricultural subdivision pushedmany Jat households into poverty in Bijnor dis-trict and neighboring districts during the laterhalf of the 20th century (Jeffery & Jeffery,1997), and these processes of downward mobil-ity often gave rise to substantial inequalities inwealth within the Jat caste (Jeffrey, 2000).Rather, our evidence points to indeterminaciesin the patterns of social reproduction and sug-gests as to how the expansion of middle andhigh school education may be changing the nat-ure of Jat ‘‘failure.’’

(c) Chamar schooling strategies for boys

The rise of Ambedkarite ideology and thepromise held out by the reservation of govern-ment jobs for SCs had convinced Chamars ofthe value of prolonged formal education. 15

Many Chamars perceived upper primary andsecondary school education to open up the pos-sibilities for their sons to obtain salariedemployment and thereby escape manual wagelabor. Parents also stressed the capacity of edu-cation in general, and post Grade V schoolingin particular, to provide skills, knowledge, con-fidence, and cultural distinction (see Jeffrey,Jeffery, & Jeffery, 2005).

Nevertheless, the costs of formal educationhad compelled many Chamars, particularlywithin landless households, to remove sonsfrom schools, most commonly after Grade Vor Grade VIII. Moreover, some boys werenot enrolled in school at all (Tables 1–3). 16

Many Chamar parents spoke of the constantfinancial struggle they faced in ensuring thattheir sons remain in school. Chamars were for-mally entitled to receive annual governmentscholarships for Scheduled Castes of Rs. 350per child in primary school and Rs. 480 per sec-ondary school pupil. But Chamar parents com-plained that teachers embezzled this money orthat the scholarships arrived late. Chamarswere frequently unable to meet regular school-ing costs because of sudden demands for cashwithin the household. The requirement to payfor a dowry or expensive medical treatmentwas a particularly common reason for a son’swithdrawal from formal education. In addition,Chamars argued that the poor standard of localeducation made it difficult to persuade errantand disinterested sons to remain in school.Chamar parents said that teachers in upper pri-mary secondary schools fail to teach or super-vise students and turn a blind eye to truancy.Financial difficulties, and associated problemsof ensuring that sons remained in poorlyfunded local schools became particularlyapparent after Class VIII. At the primary andupper primary levels, there was a sharp increasein school enrollment rates during the 1990s. Ofthe 362 Chamar boys aged between 6 and 15 in2001, 77.3% were in school compared to 43.9%of the 246 boys in this cohort in 1990. By con-trast, in the 16–20 cohort the number in schoolactually declined very slightly during 1990–2001: of the 143 Chamar young men aged be-tween 16 and 20 in 2001, 24.5% were in schoolcompared to 25.4% of the 126 boys in this co-hort in 1990.Economic necessity and a lack of the urban

social contacts required to enter private pri-mary and upper primary schools compelledmost Chamar parents to send their children tolocal educational institutions. Chamar childrenmost commonly studied at the Nangal govern-ment primary school or Ambedkar School andmoved on to a government-aided secondaryschool near Nangal. For financial reasons,few Chamar children studied at the Jat-runNangal Jat Junior High School and still fewerattended the Brahmin-run private primaryschools. But Chamars were not excluded fromJat and Brahmin-run schools, and several Cha-


mar parents expressed their desire to send theirchildren to these institutions.Relatively unfamiliar with formal schooling,

Chamar parents were less adept than the Jatsat supervising their sons’ educational careers.Chamar parents often said that as illiterate peo-ple, they are unable to plan, monitor, and eval-uate their children’s schooling effectively. Thesense of being illiterate also undermined Cha-mar parents’ confidence and limited their abil-ity to evaluate local school curricula criticallyand instill the cultural capital that confers sta-tus within secondary schools. Relatively bereftof urban contacts, Chamars were also less capa-ble than were the Jats of seeking schoolingopportunities outside the local area. Only3.5% (5) of the 143 Chamar boys aged between16 and 20 studied outside a five kilometer ra-dius of Nangal and none resided outside the vil-lage for their education. Lacking the requisitesocial contacts, no Chamar parents had beenable to enroll their son(s) in GIC in Bijnor.While there were more Jat boys than Chamarsin private primary/upper primary schools, thepopularity of GIC at secondary level meantthat a higher proportion of Jat students agedbetween 16 and 20 were in Government schoolsthan Chamars (Table 3).Continued caste discrimination compounded

Chamars’ difficulties in the educational sphere,acting as a type of negative cultural capital.Chamars said that open caste discriminationinvolving the formal segregation of lower castestudents in classes and maintenance of separateeating arrangements ended within schools in the1960s. Nevertheless, Chamar young men andwomen reported that teachers in many localschools marked them down in examinations,preventing them from progressing throughschool, making demands for bribe money, andsingling them out for humiliating punishmentson account of their caste. Other young peoplereferred to higher caste students directing intim-idating language, taunts, and sexual harassmenttoward Chamars. Chamar young women wereespecially vulnerable to higher caste maleharassment and the climate of fear and recrim-ination that this generated. Many Chamar stu-dents said that they had partially counteredthe effects of casteism by strategically mention-ing or concealing their caste identity; publicizingacts of discrimination; seeking allegiances withsympathetic teachers; or forming close friend-ship networks within school. Chamars rarelydifferentiated between the scale and nature ofcasteism in various local schools, but said that

they do not face discrimination in the Ambed-kar School, in which the vast majority of pupilsand teachers were Dalits.

(d) Educated Chamar employment strategies

Of the Chamar young men who secured sec-ondary schooling qualifications, very few ob-tained permanent salaried employment (Table4). In 1990, 29% of Chamars with more thaneight years of schooling were in service employ-ment; in 2001 this figure dropped to 9% (Jeffreyet al., 2004b). Nevertheless, during 1960–80, 14Chamar men in Nangal obtained permanentgovernment employment and a further six se-cured such jobs during 1980–2001. Of these 20men, seven worked as clerks in government offi-ces in Bijnor district, three in the Survey ofIndia, three in a Government irrigation project,two in government schools, two in governmentsugar mills, and one each in the jail service, po-lice, and a government hospital. The wives andchildren of 15 of these 20 men continued to livein Nangal.Chamar parents and young men argued that

reservations made little difference to theirchances of obtaining government work becausethe competition for posts in the reserved quotawas as fierce and corrupt as within the non-re-served sector. Chamars’ less prestigious educa-tion, relative exclusion from social networkscentered on government, and lack of moneyfor bribes marginalized them in competitionfor government jobs relative to urban membersof their caste. Landless Chamars were particu-larly poorly placed in the struggle for govern-ment jobs (Table 4). Chamars’ relativeinability to develop social contacts in urbanareas prevented them from gaining effective ac-cess to information about the current state ofmarkets in government employment. This re-duced the confidence of these households andallowed unscrupulous brokers to extract moneyfrom Chamars on the pretence that a govern-ment post would follow.Chamars’ relative exclusion from prestigious

schools, higher caste Hindu social networks,and appropriate urban cultural capital placedthem at a similar disadvantage in competitionsfor secure service jobs within the private sector.Chamars said that they lacked knowledgeabout the type of jobs available within the pri-vate sector. The few educated Chamar youngmen who had sought out secure private sala-ried employment remembered having feltuncomfortable in interviews and found that


their educational qualifications failed toimpress potential employers. Several men alsoreferred to casteism in the processes of recruit-ment to secure private-sector posts, which arenot subject to a quota system.The majority of educated Chamar young

men excluded from secure salaried work main-tained that as educated people they would beashamed to enter all forms of ‘‘hand work’’(hath ka kam), including artisanal occupations,such as tailoring, metalwork, or embroidery.Instead, educated Chamar young men typicallysought temporary clerical employment in thelocal area: jobs that allowed them to projectan image of having entered secure salariedwork. Lacking the urban social contacts avail-able to Jats, Chamars were usually unable tonegotiate long-term positions in private service,and they did not possess the capital requiredfor establishing successful business enterprises.Very few educated Chamar young men hadmigrated to cities outside Bijnor district insearch of work. Young men said that in theabsence of social connections in urban areas,they faced multiple difficulties in obtainingemployment. 17 Consequently, educated Cha-mar young men were usually forced to entermanual wage labor in the village (Table 4).Chamars could not usually afford to remainunemployed. Chamar parents commonly saidthat they had been forced to re-evaluate theireducational strategies in the face of poor occu-pational outcomes for educated Chamar youngmen. Many parents told us that they now fa-vored educating their sons up to Grade VIIIor Grade X but not beyond this level (seeJeffrey et al., 2004b). For educated Chamars,a ‘‘window of opportunity’’ opened during1970–80, when employment for high schooleducated SCs was relatively available, but thiswindow closed during the 1990s, and rural peo-ple were slowly adjusting to this changed sce-nario in 2001.Our analysis broadly supports Bourdieu’s

discussion of the role of secondary and tertiaryschooling in reproducing inequalities in societyand his emphasis on economic capital, socialcapital, and cultural capital as axes of socialdifferentiation. In as far as change has oc-curred, it is evident in the struggles of a sectionof the Jat elite to diversify successfully out ofagriculture, and in the emergence of a smallgroup of educated Chamars, some of whomhave obtained secure salaried work. The penul-timate section of the paper explores the rolesthat educationally successful Chamars may

play in improving the political, social, and eco-nomic standing of their wider community.

6. BIJNOR’S ‘‘ORGANICINTELLECTUALS’’

Chamars who had obtained at least a GradeVIII pass sought to emphasize their status asurbane ‘‘educated’’ (parhe likhe) people andcontrast their behavior with that of the disillu-sioned Jat young men who had failed to remainin school or obtain salaried work. For example,educated Chamars praised the hygiene and self-presentation characteristic of educated Dalits,‘‘whose homes are so clean that the flies slipoff the surfaces,’’ and contrasted this withschool drop-outs among the Jats, who were ac-cused of not washing, dressing untidily, andusing bad language. One educated Chamaryoung man asked: ‘‘How can the Jats claim tobe respectful when they wander around the vil-lage shouting and swearing?’’ These moral nar-ratives therefore sought to communicate thecontemporary irrelevance of caste as a basisfor social ranking and the importance insteadof educated behavior as a basis for establishingrespect. Educated Chamar young men pro-jected an image of civility through discussingthe discretion, moral strength, and equanimitythat education had instilled in them andemphasizing that, as educated people, theywear clean stylish clothes and speak grammati-cal, polite, and polished Hindi. Some educatedChamar young men used these conceptions ofpersonal civility to construct identities as‘‘new leaders’’ (naye neta). Chamar naye netaswere the most vocal proponents of the idea thatcaste could no longer act as a basis for orderingsociety when Jat young men behave in a slo-venly, unclean, and antisocial fashion.Chamars without experience of formal

schooling tended to concur with the educatednetas that ‘‘education’’ provides an importantbasis for claiming parity with upper castes. Sev-eral uneducated Chamar parents and youngpeople said that caste is becoming irrelevantas a social identity in the face of the importanceof education, particularly middle and highschool education, as a sign of cultural distinc-tion. We did not hear Chamars making suchcomments during earlier research in NangalJat conducted in 1990–91. 18 The emergenceof education as a basis for social ranking dis-tinct from caste amounts to a significant changein rural social relations (Jeffrey et al., 2004b).


Educated Chamar young men who hadobtained secure salaried employment weresometimes able to play other roles in theempowerment of their caste (see Parry, 1999),acting as ‘‘organic intellectuals’’ (Gramsci,1971). These men provided advice on off-farmemployment opportunities, assisted in improv-ing Chamars’ access to information about jobmarkets, and occasionally arranged accommo-dation for villagers in urban areas while theysought work. Two Chamar men in governmentemployment were particularly important sym-bolically and also played key social and politi-cal functions in Nangal.Educated up to Twelfth Class, Birendra ob-

tained a reserved position as an office assistantin the Survey of India in 1971 and was posted inDelhi in 2001, where he lived with his wife andchildren. In 1978, Birendra established theAmbedkar School in Nangal. By 2001 theschool had 311 pupils, about 90% of whomwere Chamars. In spite of living outside the vil-lage, Birendra continued to play an advisoryrole in the development of the school andplanned to improve the institution further whenhe retired and moved back to Nangal. In con-trast to the schools studied by Pai (2000), wedid not find that the Ambedkar School playeda major role in instilling Dalit pride in Chamarchildren or inculcating Ambedkarite ideas. Theschool lacked any Dalit iconography, and theDalit teachers at the school said that theyfound it impossible to make time to discuss is-sues which were not part of the core curricula.But the Ambedkar School offered rudimentaryinstruction in principal school subjects to thechildren of parents who would have otherwisefound it difficult to provide their offspring withformal education. Moreover, it offered a spaceof instruction relatively free of the casteismwhich existed in many other local schoolinginstitutions. Birendra had also established anAmbedkar Youth Organization (AYO) in thelate 1970s. The AYO had sought to spreadknowledge of Ambedkar’s teachings throughorganizing debates and dramas concerningAmbedkar’s life. The AYO had also raisedfunds for the Ambedkar School and was build-ing a function room for Chamars in Nangal in2001. Large numbers of Chamars were involvedin the AYO, and many said that they had de-rived confidence and pride from its activities.Another government-employed Chamar man

from Nangal, Nandu Lal, had been similarlyinfluential. In 1997, Nandu Lal obtained a per-

manent job of cleaning and repairing shoes inthe Bijnor police force. In this post, he cameinto daily contact with senior figures in the po-lice. On the basis of the social relationship, hehad developed with the Superintendent of Po-lice, Nandu Lal was able to mediate betweenthe police and Chamars in the village. He as-sisted in the resolution of disputes involvingNangal Chamars and police officers, andhelped individual Chamars who he felt had alegitimate basis for complaining about policemaltreatment. Police harassment and discrimi-nation was a major cause for complaint amongChamars in Nangal who told us several storiesin which the police had acted illegally againstthem, often in collusion with local Jats. NanduLal’s role as a local broker provided a source ofleverage for Chamars historically excludedfrom influence over the local state.As a government servant, Nandu Lal was not

permitted to campaign actively for the BahujanSamaj Party, but he contributed to the politici-zation of Chamars through circulating positiveimages of the BSP and advertising its potentialto empower Chamars. In 1997, Nandu Lal hadalso assisted a female relative in obtaining thepost of leader (pradhan) of the local villagecouncil (panchayat), which in that year was re-served for an SC woman. Nandu Lal cam-paigned vigorously against the Jat candidatein the panchayat elections. Most Chamarsmaintained that their power and access to Gov-ernment development resources in Nangal hadnot improved as a result of a Chamar occupy-ing the post of pradhan. The success of the can-didate sponsored by Nandu Lal, however,represented the first time that a Jat, or Jat-sponsored, candidate had failed to occupy thepradhanship in Nangal. The election of a Cha-mar instilled in Chamars a sense of the possibil-ity of obtaining local political office in the faceof Jat opposition and raised awareness withinthis community of the provisions of the 73rdAmendment. The Chamar victory also in-creased Chamars’ notions of entitlement tostate assistance and their confidence in com-plaining in the face of state inaction and cor-ruption.It is important to recognize the limits to the

role of government-employed Chamars. Thesemen had not been able to provide many Cha-mars with jobs or radically alter relationshipsof domination and subordination in Nangalrooted in landownership and access to extra-vil-lage social networks. Jats continued to withhold


payment for laboring tasks from Chamars androutinely abused them verbally and physically.Moreover, Chamars who had obtained govern-ment employment were all men, and theAmbedkar School and AYO primarily benefitedmale Chamars, who were more likely to attendschool or play active roles in youth organiza-tions. Few Chamar women spoke of govern-ment-employed men with pride or identifiedwith their achievements. Chamar women saidthat they continued to live in daily fear of Jatexploitation and harassment and spoke of theirenduring dependence on Jats for work and ac-cess to land. Chamars who had benefited fromthe expansion of formal education and acquiredgovernment jobs moderated rather than trans-formed relationships of rural dominance.

7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A rapidly liberalizing educational market innorth India and routine corruption in the com-petition for secure salaried employment had al-lowed a rural elite in western UP to obtainprivileged access to mainstream schooling andsecure salaried employment. Jats had been rela-tively, but not wholly successful in obtainingvalued secondary school qualifications for theirsons. Most Chamars were either excluded fromsecondary school education altogether or re-ceived devalued credentials. There was there-fore a mutually reinforcing relationshipbetween forms of social advantage based uponaccess to educational facilities and salariedwork and older forms of dominance rooted incontrol over land, access to urban social net-works, and privileged position within theHindu caste hierarchy. The greater availabilityof formal educational opportunities allied tothe political rise of lower castes has allowed asmall group of Dalits to raise their social stand-ing, but has failed to alter historical relation-ships of dependence and exploitation.These points bear on wider debates on

schooling and social reproduction and shouldbe of broader interest to critical developmentscholars interested in understanding the socialimpact of education. The Bijnor case study pro-vides a vivid example of education’s role inentrenching social inequalities (Bourdieu &Passeron, 1977) and questions accounts of edu-cation that blandly identify schooling as a ‘‘so-cial good.’’ We have emphasized the key role ofsocial networks and cultural capital, in addition

to wealth, in shaping young people’s access tocredentials and secure salaried work. Our re-search draws particular attention to the linksbetween social and geographical mobility. Jats’superior economic, social, and cultural capitalin the fields of mainstream schooling and sala-ried employment competition is most clearlymanifest in their capacity to develop social net-works outside the village.The article has highlighted the need for fur-

ther research into the roles played by educatedDalit elites, particularly those within govern-ment employment, in improving the standingof their community. We have suggested thateducated Chamars used discussions of Jat ‘‘fail-ure’’ as a basis for critiquing caste as an orga-nizing principle in society and stressinginstead the importance of education as a mar-ker of status. Moreover, a few educated Cha-mar men within government employmentsought to improve the standing of their castethrough circulating images of Dalit political ad-vance, establishing social organizations, andplaying brokerage roles in people’s relation-ships with the local state (see also Krishna,2002). Further research might explore the limitsto these processes of social change, higher casteefforts to counter such advances, and the linksbetween local political strategies and regionalcultures of resistance.The article raises several issues that are of

policy concern globally and more specificallywithin India. 19 First, in stressing the impor-tance of secondary schooling in access toemployment, our research suggests that policymakers should seek to ensure higher schoolcompletion rates among subordinate socialgroups in addition to improving access to pri-mary/elementary education. Second, our articleunderlines the need to integrate attempts to im-prove school enrollment with analysis of thequality of schooling and rural people’s percep-tions of the value of education. Third, our ac-count points to the potential value of linkingprograms aimed at raising educational stan-dards to efforts at improving the employmentopportunities of educated young people inIndia. Rapid changes in the structure of educa-tion and employment markets and the frequentgap between parental and young people’s expe-riences combine to prevent large sections ofrural youth from acquiring knowledge offeasible career options, particularly withinmarginalized communities. More broadly, indemonstrating the inability of contemporary


schooling to address equity issues, this articleadds to calls for governmental and donor agen-cies to foreground issues of power and inequal-

ity in the design, implementation, andevaluation of educational initiatives.

NOTES

1. In the Indian school system, Grades I–V are termedprimary school or lower primary, Grades VI–VIII upperprimary, Grades IX–X junior secondary, and GradesXI–XII senior secondary or ‘‘inter.’’ The most commontype of schools in rural western UP are primary schoolsenrolling children from Grades I–V, ‘‘junior highschools’’ catering for pupils from Grades I–VIII and‘‘inter colleges’’ providing Grades XI–XII.

2. Dalit means ‘‘broken and oppressed’’ in the Marathilanguage.

3. In 1990, the then Prime Minister of India, V.P. Singhextended reservations in government employment toOBCs: castes above the Dalits in the Indian castehierarchy but identified as socially and economically‘‘backward’’.

4. For example, organizations representing the HinduRight have promoted Astrology and Vedic Mathematicswithin formal curricula and rewritten history textbooksto celebrate a glorified Hindu past.

5. For a dissenting view, see Pai (2000).

6. Bourdieu stressed that social capital is a privateresource inhering in individuals or households and thatpeople consciously construct such capital through acts ofreciprocity, friendship, and networking. Bourdieu’s(1986) notion of social capital pre-dates the popularapproaches advocated by Coleman (1990) and Putnam(1993) and arguably offers a more refined and coherentbasis for critical social enquiry (see also Fine, 1999;Harriss, 2001). Bourdieu’s definition of social capitalanticipates recent social scientific critiques of the term inseveral ways: it avoids circularity, pays attention to therole of the state and other forces in shaping social capitalformation, and does not put a positive or negativevaluation on the possession of social capital.

7. In UP classes one to five correspond to primaryschool, six to eight to junior high school, nine and ten tohigh school and 11 and 12 to senior high school.Students take public examinations in 8th, 10th, and 12thclasses.

8. For more on Bijnor district, see Jeffery and Jeffery(1997).

9. For a more detailed account of government andprivate schooling in Bijnor district, see Jeffery et al. (inpress).

10. The nature of Islamic education in rural Bijnordistrict is explored in Jeffery, Jeffery, and Jeffery (forth-coming).

11. Patnaik (1971) has objected to the use of landown-ership as a proxy for class. Patnaik argued that there isno necessary relationship between the size of a land-holding and propensity to practice capitalist agricultureand hire in agricultural labor (Patnaik, 1971, A-128).Nevertheless, this does not apply to rural Bijnor districtwhere almost all Jat households are engaged in capitalistagriculture and there is a close relationship between landsize and propensity to hire in labor.

12. In 2001, US$1 was equivalent to about Rs. 40.

13. Jats had either built latrines or they could defecateon their own land.

14. Roger Jeffery and Patricia Jeffery conducted thesesurveys during a previous round of research in Bijnordistrict. The authors are grateful to the UK’s OverseasDevelopment Administration for funding this research.

15. Chamar schooling and employment strategies andthe reactions of educated young men to exclusion fromsecure salaried work are explored in more detail inJeffrey, Jeffery, and Jeffery (2004b).

16. By contrast, substantial numbers of Muslim par-ents in Qaziwala had reacted to the costs and deficienciesof mainstream government schooling by sending theirchildren to local madrasahs for religious education.Muslim parents pointed out that local madrasahs arecheaper and better provisioned than mainstreamschools, teachers in madrasahs do not discriminateagainst their children and the curriculum containseffective moral instruction.

17. By contrast, educated Muslim young men inQaziwala reacted to their failure to obtain local white-collar occupations by entering skilled manual work inurban centers (see Jeffrey, Jeffery, & Jeffery, 2004a).There is a high population of Muslims in provincial


cities and many rural families have relatives, friends, oracquaintances in nearby urban areas. Among Muslims,artisanal activity was often considered clean, skilled, andgenteel work, appropriate for educated people. More-over, some educated Muslim young men sought outreligious occupations, an option not available to Cha-mars.

18. This research, conducted by two of the authors,was funded by the Overseas Development Administra-tion.

19. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer forhighlighting this point and urging us to outline the keycontributions of the paper in the policy field.

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Documents

Reproducing Difference? Schooling, Jobs, and Empowerment in Uttar Pradesh, India