Reporting Atrocities Archibald Reiss In

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Reporting Atrocities: Archibald Reissin Serbia, 19141918

BASTIAN MATTEO SCIANNAColumbia University

Archibald Reiss reporting on atrocities during World War I inSerbia contributed to the public perception of the role of civil-ians and the meaning of war crimes. His reports on Austrian andBulgarian wrong-doings perfectly show the changing interpreta-tion of laws of war from the traditionalist pre-1914 approach andthe new vulnerable, yet targeted civilian as a victim and not poten-tial source of rebellion. This article shows how situational aspectsand the new industrial war led to a totalization of war and whererestraining elements existed. The ethnic cleansing aspect of theBulgarian case will be analyzed and the case made for its differ-ent character in comparison to the Austrian actions in 1914 whichlacked a planned exterminatory character.

Devant la crime, personne ne doit rester neutre.

- Archibald Reiss

INTRODUCTION

When, in August 1914, hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia brokeout, the latters Chief of Staff, Radomir Putnik, was on holiday in an Austrianspa town.1 He had with him the keys to the safe containing Serbias war

1 I am indebted to Dennis Showalter for this anecdote, in the same, War in the Eastand Balkans, 191418 (pp. 6681) here p. 69, in J. Horne, A Companion to World War I ,Chichester, U.K., 2010.

Bastian Matteo Scianna is pursuing the M.A./MSc dual degree in International and WorldHistory at Columbia University and the London School of Economics and Political Science.His research interests are the development of strategic thought, irregularity in warfare and thecurrent European Defense Project.

Address correspondence to Bastian Matteo Scianna, Columbia University and LSE,Margaretehnhof 37, 67316 Carlsberg, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]

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plans. After a short imprisonment, the Austrians decided in an old chivalrousmove to let him go back to his country to fight the Habsburg Empire.So some old ideas of ancien rgime warfare seem to have been in place inEurope in 1914.

Shortly afterwards, a German-born Professor at the University ofLausanne prepared himself to go to Serbia to investigate war crimes com-mitted by the Habsburg army. Rudolf Archibald Reiss came from a Protestantfamily in Wilhelmine Germany, from which he escaped after an early ruptureto find open-mindedness in republican Switzerland.2 A man who was con-stantly in the search for an identity, he became a world renowned scholar,war reporter, soldier, honorary member of the Serbian reserve officer asso-ciation and transformer of the Serbian police after the war. He remainedfascinated by lhroisme quotidien et au courage que souligne surtout lafiert, la modestie et lnergie de simples combatants qui sont en majorit despaysans.3 His reports influenced the view of civilians in war and the limits tomilitary necessity and his legacy can be seen dans le fait quil symbolisaitet personnifiait rellement la conscience de lEurope libre.4

By analyzing his writings, this article will attempt to show the chang-ing nature of the civilian in World War I along the lines of atrocities, publicpropaganda, and the conduct of war. The Lieber Code and the Hague con-ventions characterized non-combatants as part of the enemy state who arein a democracy responsible for the actions of their government and there-fore targets that must bear the hardships and successes of their countries.It was stated that it was desirable to spare them, thus no concrete protec-tion clause was embedded, for example, in the Lieber Code.5 The HagueConvention 1907 retained this traditionalist approach, yet added the prohi-bition of shelling undefended settlements (Article 25), obligations to warnbesieged towns (Article 26) and the sparing of cultural heritage (Article 27).Most of the attention was concerned with the question of civilians as belliger-ents (Article 1 and 2) and the mix of law and customs that led to a situationthat:

. . . when the First World War began, the laws of war contained no con-cept of a civilian population distinguished from the military and deservingof protection on that ground alone . . . if they did remain passive and out-side the conflict then there would be no need to harm them, but if theywere caught in the theatre of operations then there was no need to pro-tect them. Finally, if they chose to fight outside the military they could

2 More details can be found in Z. Levental, Rodolphe Archibald Reiss, Lausanne, LAge dhomme,1992, p. 13f.3 Ibid., pp. 15, 161.4 Ibid., p. 110.5 B. Alexander, The Genesis of the Civilian, Leiden Journal of International Law, 20 (2007,pp. 359376, here p. 363. Best, G., Restraints on war by land before 1945 (1738), here p. 30, in Howard,M, Andreopoulos, G.J. & Shulman, M.R The Laws of War: Constraints on warfare in the Western World(New Haven: Yale University Press 1994).

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be treated ruthlessly for it was these treacherous, civilian belligerentswho were seen as the greatest threat to the laws of war and civilizedwarfare.6

Additionally, these rules and customs of war constituted a mix of innersocietal ethics, internal military discipline, the principle of self-sustainingarmies, and reciprocity of atrocities.7 All these principles could, in situa-tional aspects, lead to an escalatory process of violence, even more sowhen asymmetry came into play. The level of violence is always higherwhen both situational and structural aspects mix, such as high casualties andirregularity.8

In the following sections, the Austrian invasion and Reiss reports on theatrocities will be analyzed as well as how the holy enthusiasm9 turned intomass atrocities and blurred lines between combatants and non-combatants.Following, the biographical line of Reiss, the Serbian retreat in 1915 andthe public debates in Switzerland will be analyzed before returning with theProfessor to the Bulgarian experience which constitutes a further increasein total violence. The question of temperamentum belli (Howard, i.e., howwar can be controlled) will remain vital with its reciprocal influence oncontrolling war and the battlefield extension through modern warfare.

THE EXPERIENCE OF WAR: 1914/15

Nikola Petrovic, the Serbian consul in Geneva, happened to know Reisswork personally and was bound to him by friendship. Therefore, the invi-tation to be part of a commission to investigate crimes committed by theAustro-Hungarians, was only logical and had a personal character for Reiss.His reasoning to support the Entente stemmed from his belief in le droitet la libert.10 He also reasoned that his task would be to show that it isunacceptable to blame a whole army when the atrocities committed are onlythe wrong doings of a few individuals, by which he indirectly criticized theCarnegie report on the Balkans War.11

On his way to Serbia, he described the peacefulness of the landscapeand the desire for peace and neutrality in the minds of the Italian and Greekpeople. The war came during a bad moment for Serbia, as she was still ina process of assimilating the territories acquired in the Balkan Wars and the

6 Ibid., p. 365.7 S. Neitzel and D. Horath, Entfesselter Kampf oder gezhmte Kriegsfhrung?, p. 12, in S. Neitzel,S. D. Horath, Kriegsgreuel Paderborn, Schningh, 2008.8 Ibid., p.15.9 J. Verhey, The Spirit of 1914 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 11.10 Z. Levental, Rodolphe Archibald Reiss, p. 33.11 Ibid, p. 34.

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army was recovering from the hardships suffered in blood and treasure.12

After all, for towns like Valjevo, it was the third war in three years.13 Reissseems to be mainly driven by idealistic ideas of investigating on a largerscale and aspiring to communicate his findings to a global audience tobecome a public voice of reason and un figure historique de lhumanisme.14

Consequently, he was in contact with three newspapers before his departure.He was also driven by what Levental describes as haine contre lui-memein rejecting his own German identity and arguing against German militarism(and by this, against his two brothers who became decorated war heroes inImperial Germany). So one can see a certain personality split of the worldrenowned scholar: rejecting his original identity and looking for a mean-ing and a sense of belonging somewhere. This leads to the fact that heseems totally uninterested in strategy or tactics but focuses more on por-traying personal tragedies in war, mainly la mentalit des simples soldatswhose camaraderie fascinated him and created a long lasting passion andconnection to Serbia and its people.15

Arriving in Serbia, Reiss tried to visit as many front line sites as possible.By interrogating captured Austrian as well as Serbian soldiers and civilianshe tried to get as much information as possible. He is certainly in his elementwhen he describes the use of explosive bullets by the Austrians. He foundwhole boxes of them which had devastating effects on the human body, asa limb which has been struck by an explosive bullet is always lost.16 In total,there were 117 cases of wounds caused by explosive bullets at the sixthreserve hospital of Valievo in nine days and Austrian POWs testimoniesshowed that these explosives were only distributed in December after thedefeats of Iadar and Tzer and, additionally, the soldiers explained that theydid not have any knowledge of them before the war.17 This is an examplewhere Reiss used his professional background to show that the Austrianreasoning of using these explosives as artillery range marking was merely abad excuse. His own tests show that the marking function is inefficient as notenough smoke was produced; moreover, as most soldiers were hit directlyby these bullets, there was no smoke or any fire at all that could be used bythe Austrian artillery.18 Thereby, his professional analysis could debunk theexcuse of the Austrians for using banned ammunition.

In October, Reiss visited Belgrade, which by then had been subject to36 days and nights of bombardment. The Old Fortress is described by him

12 Showalter, War in the East and the Balkans 191418 (pp. 6681), here p. 69 in J. Horne, ACompanion to World War I13 R. A. Reiss, How Austria-Hungary Waged War in Serbia: Personal Investigations of a Neutral Paris,A. Colin, 1915, p. 47.14 Ibid., pp. 29, 42.15 Ibid., p. 46.16 Ibid., pp. 4, 7.17 Ibid., p. 8.18 Ibid., pp. 910.

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as being more of a museum than a real fortification. He adds that during thebombing the shells were aimed at private houses, Government buildingsand factories without any distinction and that over sixty state buildings and640 private houses were struck by the projectiles whereas the latter oftenwere not even close to any valuable targets.19 The arbitrary shelling of thetown included the University, the national museum and hospitals which Reisssaw as an outright violation of the Hague conventions and as a clear sign thatthe Austro-Hungarians sought to destroy the civil population of Belgrade.20

However, he himself gives the data that after this 36 day bombardment, only25 civilians had died and 126 wounded, which hardly a number that hints atexterminatory intents. However, he admired the courage of the people whocontinued to live their everyday lives under such conditions.21

Along the same line, he reported from Sabac22 and Lesnica onOctober 22, both open towns without any military installations that wereshelled without any necessity. They are mutually portrayed as rich townswith many beautiful houses now in ruins and with the population fleeing.The major of the town Petkovica, Pantelia Maric, is quoted in his reportas saying that the burning was deliberately organized by the invading army.He declare[d] that the Austro-Hungarian soldiers had with them little tin pots.They painted with the contents of these pots the houses which they wishedto set on fire and then set a light to them with matches.23 In general, allthe towns where troops passed had been destroyed and all objects of valueha[d] been carried away and safes broken open.24

Apart from bombarding the town, Sabac was also the site of manyatrocities against combatants and non-combatants. What Reiss described inhis pamphlet is mainly the killing of wounded or immediately capturedSerbian soldiers by the Austrians.25 The Hungarian soldiers under Lt. Nagjof the 37th Hungarian regiment were proven to have cut the throats of thewounded with their knives and bayonets and to have shot prisoners.26 TheSerbian soldier Mladen Simic reported that he was in the trenches with manyother killed and wounded when the Austrians arrived. They finished off thewounded.27 Reiss also manages to give a good sense of the chaotic situ-ation of attack and counter-attack around Sabac during this period. Citinga Serbian report from 13 October: Near the Schtipliane river, the Austrianstook prisoners about 10 wounded men of the 3rd supernumerary regiment.

19 Ibid., p. 11.20 Ibid., p. 12.21 Z. Levental, Rodolphe Archibald Reiss, p. 60.22 Also written Chabatz.23 Reiss, How Austria-Hungary Waged War in Serbia, p.13.24 Ibid., p. 39f, with more than a thousand safes only in Sabac.25 Ibid., p. 13, he used fictitious initials for the names of my Austro-Hungarian witnesses to avoidthe disagreeable consequences which would otherwise ensue when they return to their country.26 Ibid., p. 14.27 Ibid.

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The wounds of these men were dressed. When the Austrians found them-selves obliged to leave their positions in consequence of the attack of the2nd battalion of the 3rd Serbian regiment, they shot the wounded in ordernot to let them be retaken alive by the Serbs.28 This plays into the factor ofperceived military necessity and calculated number games.

Reports from Austrian sources show a similar picture of chaos, frustra-tion and slaughter. The unexpectedly strong resistance by the Serbs led toconfusion and aggravation which often resulted in friendly fire in the poorlyand hastily organized offensives.29 Especially during the hectic Austrianretreat, which Kisch described as witches Sabbath,

hundreds of injured and sick men were left by the river bank, some fight-ing to get across the pontoons, hundreds drowning.30 The inexperiencedAustrian troops, without a systematic organization, lack of officer initia-tive and poor training31, advanced into an unfavorable territory againsta battle-hardened enemy that was defending its home soil problemsof logistics and sustainability were neglected and became the key forthe military catastrophe in this terrain.32 The Austrian army devoted greatattention to morale and to willpower in their training and doctrine. Thisunrealistic belief in overcoming material or physical obstacles by sheerwillpower explains the spirit of the offensive33

Additionally, the Habsburg soldiers had in mind an expectation of cru-elty, irregularity, treason and barbarity awaiting them and reports show thismix of anxiety and tension in entering terra incognita.34 Where civilianstook up arms to defend themselves and turned into semi-combatants this

28 Ibid., p. 15.29 R. Jerbek, Potiorek: General im Schatten von Sarajevo Graz, Verlag Styria, 1991, pp. 121123, 142.30 Cited in A. Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World WarOxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 141.31 L. Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Htzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse Boston, Humanities Press,2000, p.200.32 G.E. Rothenberg, The Austro-Hungarian Campaign against Serbia in 1914, Journal of MilitaryHistory 53 (1989) pp.127146, 137, 144.33 Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Htzendorf , pp. 39, 5456 and also V. R. Berghahn, Europaim Zeitalter der Weltkriege : die Entfesselung und Entgrenzung der Gewalt Frankfurt am Main, FischerTaschenbuch Verlag, 2002, e.g., p. 119.34 See exemplary herefore the report in Jerabek, Potiorek, pp. 12728: Man hatte sich das langenicht so schwer vorgestellt. Die Truppe sah sich absonderlich neuen Elementen gegenber einer schierunertrglichen Hitze, einem durchaus fremdartigen Gelnde voller Fallstricke . . . dann einem immerunsichtbaren, beraschend und gespensterhaft auftretenden Feinde, der sich listig und sichtlich von derBevlkerung benachrichtigt und untersttzt, jedem Zugriffe entzog. Hier trug jeder Bauer ein Gewehroder die Soldaten Bauernkleider und selbst von Weibern und Kindern erzhlte man sich feindseligeoder grausame Akte gegen unsere liegengebliebenen Verwundeten. In jedes Unternhemen mischten sichberraschung und Verrat immer musste man auf Feuer, Hinterhalt und berfall gefasst sein, nie gab eseine ruhige Nacht. Diese seelische Spannung war schwerer zu ertragen, als Hunger und Durst. Das warkein ehrlicher Feind, der immer aus Verstecken schoss. Dazu schwere blutige Verluste . . . Vor allem fehlteein sichtbarer, positiver Erfolg . . . [eigene Truppen] 75% Nichtaktive . . . Besonders im Gefecht ging es nichtin dem Tempo, das man vom Manverfelde gewohnt war. Dazu gab es da und dort eine kleine Panik, beider man inne wurde, da es Grenzen fr vernunft, Fhrung und Kommandogewalt gab. . . . So hatte

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played in the Austrians mindset of facing a generally rebellious populationand providing new ground for slaughter narratives of mutilated corpses andtreachery.

Consequently, everyone who fell into Austro-Hungarian hands facedsevere punishments, which sometimes even included civilians suspected oftaking part in the fighting. The rights of prisoners were in general describedas being dlibrement violes et, en bien des occassions, ses hommes se sontmontrs aussi sauvages que les barbares de lancien temps.35 During theirtransport away from the battlefields, they were poorly fed, had to marchlong distances and suffered from hard labor, poor housing conditions andmalnutrition in the camps.36 There were attempts by the civilian populationnear Heinrichsgrn, the main camp in Austria, to help the POWs mais lesgardes en empechechaient et les battaient.37 Reiss does not contemplate anyeffort to improve the conditions and thus asks if this was an attempt exterminer autant de Serbes que possible? Pour ces gens-la, chaque homme,chaque femme, chaque enfant mort dans les camps de prisonniers ou internsconstitute un gain.38

The violations of the rights of the civilians and the atrocities committedupon them constitute the largest part of Reiss work and he offers numerousaccounts on these. Many Austrian soldiers stated that:

an order was read to the regiment, to kill and burn everybody and every-thing met with in the course of the campaign and to destroy everythingSerbian and name specifically that the officers of the 26th regiment,Commandant Stanzer and Captain Irketitch gave orders to attack theSerbian population.39 The punitive character is portrayed in a testimonythat describes an officers reasoning that it is necessary to show the Serbswhat Austrians are.40

This included even children of five to the oldest men, as in the massacre oftwelve primary school children in Dobric in August.41 Some of these atrocitieswere committed on Habsburg soil, e.g., in the village of Sirmia and othertowns in Bosnia; notably often the accused regiments were Hungarian.42

These testimonies from Austrian sources show the willingness to commitcrimes by some soldiers, and their obedience in following higher orders for

man sich das Debut in Serbien nicht vorgestellt. Die Stimmung war vielfach verdrossen und dster, dasVertrauen gegenseitig erschttert.35 R. A. Reiss, Le traitement des prisonniers et des blesss par les Austro-Germano-Bulgares; rsultatsde lenqute excute sur le front de Salonique Paris, B. Grasset, 1919, p. 5.36 Ibid., pp. 7, 8, 1718 (One of these prisoners was Ivo Andric.).37 Ibid., p. 11.38 Ibid., p. 28.39 Reiss, How Austria-Hungary Waged War, p. 16.40 Ibid.41 Ibid., pp. 17, 1920.42 Ibid., pp. 18, 20.

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such crimes, as Reiss laid out in the order by General Horststein, whichstated that:

in consequence of the hostile attitude of the population of Klenak[Hungarian territory] and Chabatz [Sabac], hostages will again be takenin all the Serbian villages, etc, even those situated on this side of thefrontier, which are or will be occupied by the troops. These hostagesare to be killed at once in case of any crime being committed by theinhabitants against the armed forces and the enemy villages are to beburnt. The Commander of the Army Corps reserves the power to burnthe villages on our own territory.43

This already constitutes a certain connectedness between situational aspectsof atrocities amidst the fog of war and higher orders for a plannedpacification.

Official Serbian reports show a similar picture of devastation, asLieutenant Stoiadinovic reports that:

on 7 and 8 August, being in command of the advance sentries, my roundstook me to the village of Zoulkovic and its neighborhood. I saw in aravine the bodies of 25 boys from 12 to 16 years of age, and two oldmen of more than 60 years, heaped one upon the other, mutilated withbayonet thrusts and pierced with bullets. In another house an old womenlay dead with her daughter. The bodies were in front the door, half naked,with the legs apart . . . in a courtyard I found a little boy of four yearsold who had been thrown after being killed. His body had been partiallyeaten by dogs. Near him lay a young woman, naked, between whoselegs had been placed her nursing child with its throat cut.44

Furthermore, the evidence provided by civilians shows again beatings,rape, and murder on a large scale in Sabac45, where around sixty civilianswere massacred near the church, many with bayonets in order to economiesammunition.46 Another account showed that the Austrians never drank water

43 K.u.K. 9 Korps Kommando. R. No 32. Ruma, 14th August 1914, Ibid., p. 21.44 Ibid., p. 21.45 Ibid., p. 26.46 Ibid., pp. 3031, also Jerabek, Potiorek, p. 164 cites this account from Austrian sources in the fol-lowing way: Im Garten der Kirche sah ich einen groen Haufen Leichen, circa 80 Stck. Auf meineFrage, was das sei, sagte mir Lt.Gf. Esterhazy, dass das erschossene Civilgefangene sind, die heuteVormittag niedergemacht wurden. Er kam gerade dazu, wie so gegen 11h v.M. die auf der Strasse vorder Kirche befindlichen Truppen auf diese Gefangenen ein wildes Feuer erffneten. Er kommandiertesofort das Feuer einstellen und zog einen das ganze Vorgehen passiv zusehenden Infanteriekadett zurVerantwortung, der sich damit entschuldigte, dass soeben ein ihm unbekannter General mit einem Autovorbeigefahren sei, der den Befehl erteilte, dass man von den Gefangenen, die auf die Nachricht, dassdie Serben in der Nhe seien und die Stadt beschiessen, unruhig geworden sinddie Bulgaren ausschei-den und die anderen niedermachen soll. Die Truppen hatten das gehrt und darauf sofort zu feuernangefangen.

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without first having it tasted, which gives an interesting insight into the sus-picious mind and the fear of treason on the Habsburg side.47 In Lesnica,Reiss discovered a pit with 109 dead peasants who were bound togetherwith a rope and encircled by wire, then shot and immediately buried withsome still alive.48 In Prnjavor, there were reports that people had to yellLong live Emperor Francis Josephus before their execution, and the peopleof this town erected a monument for Reiss after the war to honor his reportson their suffering.49

In total, he accounts for 1308 dead civilians where he had been and anadditional 2280 missing persons; consequently he argued that the numberof civilians killed in the invaded territory must amount to between three andfour thousand.50 This plays into the overall notion of high Serbian wartimecasualties given its relative small population. In comparison, Horne andKramer account for 6400 dead civilians in Belgium and France during theGerman invasion. Among these victims were plenty of women and children,(i.e., people who could hardly bear arms, but who were often tortured andmutilated and either).

shot, killed by the bayonet, their throats were cut with knives, they wereviolated and then killed, stoned to death, hanged, beaten to death withthe butt-end of rifles or sticks, disemboweled, burnt alive, or their legs orarms were cut or torn off, their ears or noses cut off, their eyes put out,their breasts cut off, their skin cut in strips or flesh torn from the bone;lastly a little girl of three months was thrown to the pigs.51

It is therefore not unreasonable to link these pictures that come up in onesmind with later atrocities as Levental does when he states that ces atroci-ties nous rappelent les Einsatz . . . pendant la Seconde guerre mondiale . . .comme par example Babi-Yar 52; however the scale and duration of theseatrocities remain two different categories.

About half of the victims were not even executed but otherwise killedand Reiss concludes that the worst that can be said against the civiliancombatants is that they were defending their country.53 This of course isa problematic statement as he did not analyze in detail their methods andcharacter of resistance. The Hague conventions obliged civilian resistance tobe under a unified command, a responsible officer, following the laws and

47 Reiss, How Austria-Hungary Waged War, p. 27.48 Ibid., p. 34.49 Levental, Rodolphe Archibalde Reiss, pp. 35, 48.50 Reiss, How Austria-Hungary Waged War, p. 37.51 Ibid., p. 38.52 Levental, Rodolphe Archibalde Reiss, p. 50.53 Reiss, How Austria-Hungary Waged War, p. 39.

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customs of war and wearing openly marked uniforms or other signias thatdefine the person as a combatant.

Reiss often linked the Austrian atrocities to the Rape of Belgium andstates that les Allemands en Belgique nont pas agi autrement.54 He com-pared the Austrian methods to Bethmann-Hollwegs dictum that necessityknows no law and criticized heavily this neglect of civilians rights.55 Similarpatterns of violence indeed evolved, as the trauma of combat and ideologicaland cultural predispositions56 were certainly a major cause in the Austriancase too. Additionally, the idea of countering any form of irregular resis-tance with the harshest means possible can be linked to Belgium, and theHabsburgs clearly showed the same fear of irregulars who viewed war-fare as an extension of politics, or worse, of revolution.57 This plays intothe argument of Jonathan Gumz who sees the Habsburgs waging a counter-revolutionary war between a nationalizing state and a national, bureaucratic,absolutist Empire.58

Even the Austrian high command realized that the treatment was tooharsh and the Army issued an order to conduct war in line with the Hagueconventions even though Serbia was not a signatory. Moreover, an out-right total war would undermine the jus publicum Europaem (Schmitt) andendanger the overthrow of the old order.59 However, in the same decreeit is also stated that in case of violations of the Hague conventions by theSerbians harsh reprisals (schrfste Repressalien) should be exercised. Somevillages, especially in Syrmia, had been pillaged and destroyed to such adegree that the Austrian troops could not find shelter in the villages duringtheir December retreat.60 These shortages often resulted in a fight for foodbetween soldiers and civilians.61

Apart from simply showing evidence, Reiss tried to answer the ques-tion of why this happened and if there was a certain plan to exterminatethe Serbian population. The main causes were portrayed in the fact thatthe idea of a greater Serbia and an independent Serbian state blocked theway of the Habsburgs to Salonika and undermined its stand and influencein the Balkans.62 Furthermore, the Serbian appeal attracted Slavs within the

54 R. A. Reiss, Rponses aux accusations austro-hongroises contreles Serbes contenues dans les deuxrecueils de tmoignages concernant les actes de violation du droit des gens commis par les tats en guerreavec lAutriche-Hongrie Lausanne, Payot & Co., 1918, p.10.55 R. A. Reiss, Infringements of the Rules and Laws of War Committed by the Austro-Bulgaro-Germans;Letters of a Criminologist on the Serbian Macedonian Front, London, G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1919, p. 5.56 J. Horne, and A. Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914 : A History of Denial, New Haven, YaleUniversity Press, 2001, p.419.57 Ibid., p. 421.58 J. E. Gumz, The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 19141918, Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.7.59 Ibid., p. 22f.60 Jerabek, Potiorek, p.163.61 Ibid., p. 165.62 Reiss, How Austria-Hungary Waged War, p. 44.

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Habsburg Empire and thus a propaganda of hatred became necessary toestablish a basis for future harsh measures. This was also useful to makethe Austrian-Hungarian soldier afraid of getting captured and when theyreached Serbian territory and found themselves in the presence of thesepeople, who had always been described to them as barbarians, they wereafraid, and they probably committed their first cruelties through fear, soas not to be massacred themselves.63 Reiss contemplates an escalation-ary process where violence then becomes legitimized and an everydayaspect:

the sight of blood produced the effect that I have often had occasionto observe; man becomes changed into a blood-thirsty animal. A realoutburst of collective sadism took possession of those troops sadismwhich those who have been present at a bull-fight have had an opportu-nity of observing on a small scale. Once the blood-thirsty and licentiousanimal was unloosed and set free by his superiors, the work of devas-tation was carried out by men who are fathers of families and probablygentle in their private life.64

Nonetheless he argued that the responsibility for these acts of crueltydoes not rest upon the soldiers in the ranks, victims of the wild beast instinctswhich lies dormant in every man, but on their superior officers, who madeno efforts to restrain these tendencies; I will go so far as to say they havearoused them and that there had been a systematic preparation [originalitalics] for the massacres by officers of superior rank.65 This can be found ina document, which Reiss did not specify closer. This document was issuedby the K.u.K 9 Korps Kommando and puts an emphasis on the hatred thesoldiers will encounter, where murder (Archduke) is glorified as heroismand towards such a population all humanity and all kindness of heart areout of place; they are even harmful, for any consideration, such as it issometimes possible to show in war, would in this case endanger our owntroops.66 The document goes on in a language of paranoia and of pre-emptive measures:

Consequently I order that during the whole course of the war the greatestseverity, the greatest harshness and the greatest mistrust be observedtowards everyone. In the first place I will not allow inhabitants of theenemys country, armed but not in uniform, who are met either aloneor in groups, to be taken prisoners. No consideration is to prevent theirexecution. In going through a village, they (i.e. the hostages) are to be

63 Ibid., p. 45.64 Ibid.65 Ibid., p. 46.66 Ibid.

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conducted if possible until the queue has passed through, and they willbe executed without any question if a single shot is fired on the troops inthe neighborhood. The officers and soldiers will keep a rigorous watchover every inhabitant and will not allow him to put his hand in his pocket,which probably conceals a weapon . . . No sermon is to be permittedon any condition . . . Every inhabitant who is found outside a village,especially in the woods, will be looked upon as a member of a band whohas hidden his weapons, which we have no time to look for. Such peopleare to be executed if they appear in the slightest degree suspicious.67

Reiss correctly noted that between a third and one half of some Serbianregiments never received any uniforms and that there was an idea of col-lective responsibility; thus the punishment of innocent bystanders is againstthe Hague conventions and he saw this as an incitement to murder. Thedocument shows also the lines between taking enemy soldiers captive andtaking arbitrarily civilians as hostages were already blurred.

Interestingly, he somehow justifies the animal like behavior of the rankand file as being brain-washed by propaganda and following higher orders.The encounter with the satanically portrayed unknown, in combination withno efforts on behalf of the officers to restrain the will or nature of men, led tothis vicious cycle of ever increasing violence and a normalizing process thatwent with it. The ordinary men, as they were mainly described as slaughter-ing persons on one side, fascinated him on the Serbian side. Particularly in areport from Valjevo he portrayed how the wounded were brave and showedgreat morale and how recovering soldiers would step out of the hospital tomake room and get up pour se retrouver au mileu de ses camarades.68 Thispassion for camaraderie has to be seen as the main reason for his decisionto stay with the Serbian army the following year. However, Reiss was notalone in supporting Serbia in its glorious fight, as many individuals devel-oped a fascination and attached to the struggle attributes of independence,ambition, and intrepidity.69

THE SERBIAN GOLGOTHA AND THE SWISS INTERLUDE

A new Austro-Hungarian offensive led to a breakthrough and the subse-quent exodus of Serbian forces towards the Albanian and Macedonia border:Serbias Golgotha.70 Reiss joined this retreat and for this period there is a

67 Ibid., pp. 4748.68 Levental, Rodolphe Archibald Reiss, pp. 5558, here p. 57.69 Mitrovic, Serbias Great War, 104105, names e.g., John Reed, J.D. Rockefeller Jr., andDAnnunzios Ode to Serbia.70 See A. Mitrovic, Serbias Great War, 19141918, West Lafayette, Ind., Purdue University Press,2007, p. 151f.

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noticeable silence in his writings and he did not cover this setback at all. Theretreat was harsh and costly for everyone. As the diary of the British Rear-Admiral Troubridge, who was a member of this retreat, shows, the treatmentof the POW did not always have priority in such chaotic circumstances wheneveryone was on his own. He accounted that the situation of the unfortu-nate Austrian prisoners is truly dreadful. Yesterday snow all day and to-day itfreezes. They are all half-starved, many with bare feet and wandering aboutin such a state of misery as makes ones heart bled for them, poor wretches they were so much better off before this second invasion.71 Many ofthese prisoners were handed over to the Italians who transported them tothe uninhabited island of Asinara, close to Sardinia, where the malnutrition,bad housing, and poor sanitary conditions led to the death of 1,50037,000.72

The episode shows a similar neglect of needs for POWs under which manySerbians also suffered in Austrian custody.

Reiss argued against slaughter narratives and cruelties committed bySerbian soldiers and civilians by hinting at the modern weapons that demol-ish corpses to an extent that had been simply unknown before.73 Therefore,he fits into the picture with other war reporters who were shocked bythe new means of mass killings and could not explain the results. Reissconducted interviews with numerous soldiers from both sides to prove theaccusations wrong and to show that the Central Powers never had testimonyfor their claims and most of the incidents were merely myths.74

However, he devoted most of his time to address in polemics the Swissand global audiences call for intervention and the lack of toleration for theAustrian-Hungarian practices of war. In a letter to the Consel Fdral in theGazette de Lausanne he wrote that,

Larme Potiorek a voulu faire une guerre dextermination et les troupesdinvasion daujourdhui suivent lexemple and therefore la voix de lapetite Suisse a encore une certain valeur dans le monde et elle sera encoreplus puissante quand on verra quelle defend courageusement les lois delhumanit et le droit international.75

His calls for more Swiss action spurred resistance in a country that wassplit internally between neutrality and regionally differing sympathy forthe different sides. Hence, the just naturalized citizen Reiss became sub-ject of numerous attacks in newspapers when he returned to Switzerland

71 Diary entry from November 18th 1915 in C. Fryer, The destruction of Serbia in 1915, New York,Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 171.72 Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction, p. 142 names the number of 1,5007,000, explains in hisappendix (p. 368) that Italian reports speak of up to 37,000 deaths.73 Reiss, Responses aux accusations Austro-Hongroises contre les Serbes, p.13.74 Reiss, Responses aux accusations Austro-Hongroises contre les Serbes, pp. 21, 23, 35, 45.75 Levental, Rodolphe Archibalde Reiss, p. 79.

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after the costly retreat. He was reminded that his brothers were fighting forWilhelmine Germany and his Teutonic call for action marked an insult toSwiss neutrality.76

This dont tell us what to do reaction is also embodied by the pamphletof Erwin Janischfeld (Kultur, ein Schreiben an die gesittete Welt und dreiBriefe an Professor Reiss in Lausanne, 1915) in which he accuses the Serbiansoldiers of similar war crimes, demands Reiss to return to Lausanne andwrite not only one-sided descriptions, as Janischfeld had seen the Russiansdoing even worse things in the East.77 Carl Spitteler stressed the fact thateven though the Serbs are viewed as heroic people of culture, nous nousplacerons au vritable point de vue neuter, au point de vue Suisse.78 To pre-vent a further internal division, Paul Seippel and Fernand Feyler presentedthe view that there should not be a special feeling of solidarity for smallcountries like Serbia, as strict neutrality should be upheld as a state but thata back door should be opened, and vice versa si un Etat est neutre, celane veut pas dire que ses citoyens doivent aussi etre neuters!.79 Reiss repliedto these critiques by stating that devant la crime, personne ne doit resterneutre.80

Another case Reiss portrayed was the Austrian attempts to reach out totheir nationals in Switzerland, as they sent summons for ethnic Serbian resi-dents and refugees to a military inspection.81 Thereby the Austrians neglectedtheir rights and almost the existence of a Serbian state simply because theyoccupied it at this point in time. The question for Reiss remained whatSwitzerland could do to stop these practices on their soil and whether therewas a willingness to do anything against this practice at all. Reiss how-ever continued his call for more protection of the rights of civilians anda stronger role to be played by Switzerland. Notably, expanding his viewbeyond Serbia, he had already called for protection of other nations thatviennent dexterminer dune facon que lesprit a peine concevoir, une autrepetite nation: celle des Armniens.82

In 1916 he remained a skeptic about the Serbian ability to rebuild herarmy quickly, but already in May he noted that 150,000 soldats serbes sebattront de nouveau pour reconqurir leur pays and the subsequent victoryof Kajmakcalan marked the reentry of Serbian troops on their home soil.83

Even though he arrived too late to be part of it, he described it again in veryheroic terms, depicting limage apocaliptique du champ de bataille with a

76 Ibid., pp. 8182, an anonymous reply to his writings.77 Ibid., p. 89.78 Ibid., p. 90.79 Ibid., pp. 9394.80 Ibid., p. 94.81 Reiss, Infringements of the Rules and Laws of War, p. 84f.82 Levental, Rodolphe Archibalde Reiss, pp. 9597.83 Ibid., pp. 101, 103.

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strong emphasis on morale, psychology and the internal life of an army.84

This speaks to his concern to portray the mentality of the Serbian peasantand his love for the home soil, thereby Reiss created international solidarityand sympathy with the Serbiann cause. His return to Serbia confronted himthis time more with an inter Balkan rivalry with Bulgaria.

THE ACTIVE FIGHTER AGAINST BULGARIZATION

The Balkan Wars have been described as the first phases of the First WorldWar and Hall goes so far as to state that they were the same war. In them,conscripted soldiers, motivated by nationalist ideologies, often fought to thepoint of material, moral and physical exhaustion.85 However, these warsremained more rooted in the 19th century tradition of European wars thanshowing tendencies towards modern slaughter, where modern technologywas mixed with ideas of total enmity. The Serbian conflict with Bulgaria hadnever really stopped. The Bulgarian comitadji (i.e., partisans) in the newSerbian territories preferred to continue fighting over accepting Serbian rulethat was manifested by a 90,000 men occupation army.86

The ideas of regular conscription-based standing armies were intro-duced relatively late in Serbia and Bulgaria where the war of 1885 markeda watershed. Yet, besides the conventional troops, there always remained alarge body of irregular troops in support of the main army. Modern technol-ogy led to an enlargement of the battlefield and hence the civilian populationbecame more and more directly targeted by the belligerents. Some of theterror directed against the civilian population was the reaction to the frustrat-ing and costly guerilla warfare that troops of the Balkan League encounteredas they entered Ottoman territories.87 Many of these slaughter narrativeswere used in Western Europe to back racial stereotypes about the barbaricBalkans and played a role during World War I.

The Danish reporter Fritz Magnussen, who was known for his pro-Serbian sympathies, reported that the

Serbian military activities in Macedonia have taken on the characterof an extermination of the Arnaut (Albanian) population. The armyis conducting an unspeakable war of atrocities. According to officersand soldiers, 3,000 Arnauts were slaughtered in the region betweenKumanova/Kumanovoo and Skolpje and 5,000 near Prishtina. The Arnautvillages were surrounded and set on fire. The inhabitants were then

84 Ibid., p. 105108.85 R.C. Hall,. The Balkan Wars, 19121913, London, Routledge, 2000, p.132.86 K. Boeckh, Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg : Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnischeSelbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan, Mnchen, R. Oldenbourg, 1996, pp. 160161.87 Ibid., p.137.

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chased from their homes and shot like rats. The Serb soldiers delightedin telling me of the manhunts they conducted.88

The young Trotsky reported from the war and interestingly also put anemphasis on Turkish suffering.89 He cites a young Serbian soldier account-ing that the killing of prisoners is due partly to desire for vengeance fordisappointed hopes . . . but mainly it is due to the simple calculation oneenemy less, one danger the less.90 Taking prisoners would have requiredextra guards and food, thus depriving an ill-fed army of additional resourcesand reducing the available manpower to sustain the military effort. Analyzingthe atrocities and the irregular forces, he concludes that the comitadjis wereworse than you can possibly imagine.91

The fact that the war remained mostly one of movement led to afrequent change in territory possession and it was often during retreatthat violence against civilians would erupt. After the war, different com-missions in the countries blamed the other side for committing atrocitiesand large reports and documentations were filed.92 Also, the internation-alization through the Carnegie report marked a new step in propagandawarfare. For the first time in Balkan history an international commission con-ducted research on war crimes and was at least able to conduct interviewsin Macedonia and Thrace. The Report of the International Commission toInquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars was published onlymonths before the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. It stressedthe equal responsibility and guilt of all states and also handles financial,social and moral aspects.93 Nonetheless, the crimes during the wars had thecharacter of a competition who is best at denationalizing his neighborbut stopped somewhere short of genocide94; yet, they were left unpun-ished, which Paul Mojzes described as a bad omen for the consequentdevelopment of the Balkans.95

Many of the atrocious policies of war returned during the First WorldWar when the enemies faced again after a short breathing space. In early1917, Reiss extensively covered the advance of the Serbian army; being anactive soldier himself now devoted to defend Serbia, he could report on

88 Ibid., p. 157.89 L. G. Trotsky, The Balkan Wars, 191213: The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky, New York,Monad Press, 1980, pp. 285287.90 Ibid., p. 119.91 Ibid., p. 120.92 See Zaimis, Atrocits Bulgares en Macdoine or Les Cruauts Bulgares en Macedone Orientale eten Thrace and the Subsequent Bulgarian Replies.93 For reports in The Times and Frankfurter Zeitung that also stress the mutual character of atrocities,see Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction, p. 137.94 Ibid., p. 139.95 P. Mojzes, Balkan Genocides : Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century, Lanham,Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 2011, p. 40.

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the former Bulgarian occupation zone. Sofias policies are portrayed as anattempt to Bulgarize Macedonia and replace all Majors with Macedoniancomitadjis and subordinate them to the Central Macedonian organizationin the capital.96 This aspect of Bulgarization is a factor largely missing inthe 1914/15 Austro-Hungarian case. These officials were infamous for theircorruption and self-enrichment and often decided to deport the wives andchildren of soldiers who had fought against the Bulgarians.97

This was also used as a practice for personal enrichment as Reissreported in an incident in Monastir where the citizens were summoned tothe police station and there they were told that they were on the list to bedeported. Still, for a pecuniary consideration, the matter might be arranged.The usual fee demanded for this service ranged from 350 to 500 Francs,payable in gold and not in Bulgarian paper currency.98 Hence, the shiftin local power allocation created a willing segment of collaborators whoexercised their new methods of control and power to the utmost. Anotherincident from Bor in October 1917 shows that the desire for plunder andenrichment could lead to mass killings. The inhabitants of an insurgent vil-lage were ordered to bring their money along with them, because they wereto be deported to Bulgaria. When all were ready to start, the soldiers killedthem and robbed the dead bodies of all the valuables upon them. Often theywould then set the village on fire.99

Monastir was bombed several times by the Central Powers, even thoughit was declared an open town. This led to a downfall of the sanitary system ofthe town and hospitals stopped working; hence, the civilian population wasleft to its fate.100 The bombing lasted from November until April, and Reissportrayed it as an attempt to completely destroy the city, as the Bulgariansrealized they could not hold on to it. He investigated the use of gas shellsthat helped kill 399 inhabitants whereupon most of the victims were thussurprised in their sleep with low noise explosion gas shrapnel.101 In October1917, he increased the casualty count to 1,500 killed or wounded, furiouslydescribed Wilhelm II and Ferdinand of Coburg as baby killers and portrayedthe heroic refusal of 35,000 inhabitants to leave the town.

Reiss also described the very interesting case of the open town ofVodena, on 30 April 1917. Even though he had described the use of airpower before102, this case demonstrates the new destruction potential ofaircrafts. The main target seems to have been the railroad station, but the

96 Reiss, Infringements of the Rules and Laws of War, p. 15f.97 Ibid., p. 22.98 Ibid., p. 24.99 Ibid., p. 65.100 Ibid., p. 27.101 Ibid., pp. 3032.102 Ibid., pp. 5152 and 103106 the bombing of a British hospital that was clearly marked with RedCross flags.

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other bombs were dropped at random on various quarters of the town.In the market place for instance, two projectiles killed and injured a num-ber of civilians.103 From spies, he then gathered the information that theBulgarian (i.e., often German) pilots were frustrated by French-Serbo aerialresistance that denied them access to their original operational target. Thus,they dropped their cargo of bombs on this town without any definite objectand solely for the sake of doing damage to their enemies, without anyregard to civilians.104 Reiss interprets this as an act of vandalism commit-ted with the object to terrorizing the civil population, perhaps even out ofrevenge because the Allied aviators had prevented the enemy squadron fromcarrying out destructive work of real military value, thus attributing a clearintent to their actions.105

This episode shows that the new methods of war blurred the linebetween the front and the hinterland. Reiss neglected to address the pooraiming tools and wide error margins in early aerial bombing which lasteduntil World War II. Nonetheless, he rightly noted that the new possibilities inspreading chaos and benignly terrorizing the population, here the psycho-logical factor that he always had in mind, played a great role too. In addition,irregular troops contributed strongly in brutalizing the war as it went on andmeans and goals became more radical. Notably, the Germans encouraged theuse of Bulgarian comitadji against Serbia: If 30,000 guerrillas could be armedand induced to attack eastern Serbia from Bulgaria, then Serbia would haveto deploy part of its forces against them, thus facilitating Austro-Hungarianoperations.106

The Austrian and Bulgarian soldiers are depicted as simply living off theland without paying any redistribution and also robbing and hitting civilians,whereas the peasants had to work for the occupational authorities withoutgetting any pay.107 This sometimes included working on defensive positionsand carrying ammunition for the Bulgarians, which Reiss described as an wareffort against ones own country which violates the Hague conventions.108

Article 23 outlines that it is likewise forbidden to a belligerent to compelnationals of the opposite party to take part in military operations dictatedagainst their own country.109 The Bulgarization attempt in the occupied terri-tories in southern and eastern Serbia went hand in hand with forced draftinginto the Bulgarian army and the shooting of those who resisted.110 Often,POWs were brutally hit and faced penalties if they resisted Bulgarization.111

103 Ibid., pp. 108109, in total 17 killed and 26 injured; he provides all the names and ages.104 Ibid., p. 114.105 Ibid.106 Falkenhayn in a report to the Chancellor, in Mitrovic, Serbias Great War, p. 126.107 Reiss, Infringements of the Rules and Laws of War, p. 17.108 Ibid., pp. 17, 75.109 Ibid., pp. 7071.110 Ibid., p. 21.111 Ibid., pp. 4849, as late as November 1917.

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In addition, he noted again the mania for execution picture postcardsthat also spread among the Bulgarians. He explained the pictures with manygibbets as a sign that there was probably a high use of them, and executionswere always public, to give them a daunting character.112 Reiss also describedin detail the suffering of the POWs as a systme dextermination of malnu-trition, and hard work under enemy (or friendly) fire.113 Muslim POWs werehanded over to the Ottomans to press them into military service besidestheir own attempts to Bulgarize Macedonian soldiers.114 In addition, beat-ings and not helping wounded soldiers and the shooting of 18,000 POWsare listed by Reiss and show a level of violence that massively exceededto the 1914 instances.115 On the other hand, Reiss tries to show a counter-development to this Bulgarian totalization of war, in the good treatmentGerman, Austrian and Bulgarian POWs received in Serbian custody. Still, onehas to bear in mind other reports, as for example in the diaries of Troubridgeand Josef Sramek.116

In the end, even Reiss admits that there was no clear order to massacreall POWs but that sometimes mid-level officers tolerated, encouraged, oreven ordered such violence.117 He also provided evidence from Bulgarianprisoners who stated, Officiellement on navait pas donn lordre de tuer lesprisonniers, mais on le faisait toujours and show that les officiers disaientque les Serbes maltraitaient les gens et quil fallait se venger. Le sous-lieutenantTopaloff a declare quil y avait un ordre disant quil ne faillait pas faire deprisonniers et quil fallait tuer tous les Serbes.118

Resettlements were also carried out to such an extent that even theBulgarian Bishop of Kicevo wrote a letter of protest to King Ferdinand I ofBulgaria.119 However, Reiss stated that no neutral country has protested andclaimed that the deportations did not happen because of labor shortages butout of the want to exterminate the Serbian nation.120 Here he comparedit again to Belgium and Northern France where protest by neutrals and anangry worldwide public opinion led to a change as Germany was impressedby this universal reprobation of her methods. She has begun to send backthese guiltless galley-slaves to their families.121 So Reiss again raised thequestion why no one did intervene in Serbia. Comparing the two cases heargued that the sufferings of Belgium are great, but they are far less thanwhat poor Serbia is called upon to endure under the yoke of her invaders,being surrounded by enemies and landlocked and cut off from help and

112 Ibid., p. 79f.113 Reiss, Traitement des prisonniers et des blesses par les Germano-Bulgares, p. 32.114 Ibid., pp. 3335.115 Ibid., pp. 41, 44, 47, 56, 58.116 Josef Sramek, Diary of a Prisoner in World War I , p.15f, 50.117 Reiss, Traitement des prisonniers et des blesses par les German-Bulgares, p. 84.118 Ibid., pp. 7778.119 Reiss, Infringements of the Rules and Laws of War, p. 20.120 Ibid., p. 90, he also states that the even the Turks maltreated better.121 Ibid., p. 89.

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supply from the Entente which did not permit food relief out of fear that theCentral powers could intercept it.122 So not even the famine resulted in anoutcry from the neutrals and Reiss blamed them:

long war has made the neutrals forget how to be roused. Coal, flour,sugar, etc., matter more to them than the unspeakable sufferings of awhole people. And yet I am certain that a vigorous act of protest on thepart of the neutrals would compel these barbarians to pay a little moreattention to the rules of modern civilization, since one cannot speak ofeven the most elementary rules of humanity to these soulless creatures.History will pass judgment upon this lack of courage.123

Before the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly, the Documents relatives auxviolations des Conventions de la haye et du droit international en general,comises da 19151918 par les Bulgares en Serbie ocupe stated that anyoneunwilling to submit him or herself to the occupiers and become Bulgarianwas tortured, raped, interned, and killed in particularly gruesome manners,some of which recorded photographically.124

The choice between Bulgarization or being subject to violence is furtheroutlined by US journalist William Dayton whose testimony affirms that he

brought to light that the Bulgarians indisputably carried out bestialitymost repugnant and of most inhumane nature. Barbarian attitude towardthe civilian population, male or female, old or young, torture, plunder,blackmail, brigandage, killings and sadism permeate the statements thatwe collected. We are especially stressing that nowhere was there evena trace of investigation. Bulgarians killed and tortured without mercywhomever they wanted whenever they wanted. . . . They did it system-atically and persistently throughout full three years. I am not saying thatevery crime was carried out by a command, but I assert that organizedmass killings took place and that this terror, as such was inspired byBulgarian leaders and approved by the entire nation, with the clear goalof Bulgarization of the land by exterminating the population.125

CONCLUSION: THE INVENTION OF THE MODERN CIVILIAN

Rudolf Archibald Reiss reporting did not lead to greater intervention by neu-tral states. Nonetheless, he was part of a greater development towards neutraljournalists reporting on war crimes and raising global awareness. He became

122 Ibid., p. 9495.123 Ibid., p. 66.124 Cited in Mojzes, Balkan Genocides, pp. 4142.125 Ibid., p. 43.

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involved in the fighting and found a new home in Serbia, changing his rolefrom observing as a neutral to reporting from the trenches as a member. Hiswritings show that in 191415, the Austrian army did commit atrocities on alarge scale. Based on the findings, the nature of this seems to be situational;excluding Bosnia, there was never an attempt at ethnic cleansing, high levelorders to exterminate the Serbian population, or a fight against Serbiannessper se. The violence was also spurred by mid-level orders and a pre-war,structural mindset of encountering barbarians and treason. The suspiciousfeelings were then combined with high casualties inflicted by a militarilysuperior enemy. Frustration and the ide fixe of irregular resistance domi-nated the causes for atrocities and brutal conduct of war. Certainly, therewas no violence for the sake of violence, where means would have over-thrown the ends and deprived war of any positive goal, as Hull argued forImperial Germanys evolution in conducting war.126 However, reports fromthe Serbian retreat in 1915 show that each side struggled when it came toproperly treating prisoners of war. Further, as Gumz has argued, after anearly phase of chaotic reprisals the Austrians attempted to wage a coun-terinsurgency campaign to prevent a fully fledged peoples war to savethe monarchical order and restrict the war in regard to its means and endsto a framework of the ancient rgime and prevent a war of annihilation.

The Bulgarian case is different. Taking into consideration the legacy ofthe Balkan Wars, the character of the war from 1915 on and the occupationhad a distinct feature of Bulgarization. Atrocities in regard to targets and tomethods lay along the same lines as in the Austrian case, yet the amountof victims and the intentions weigh different. Large scale deportations and adistinct Kulturkampf targeted the very soul of Serbianness and the treatmentof the residents of the occupation zones came close to genocidal actions.127

Leaving aside the question of guilt and reciprocal accusations, bothexamples show a change in the normative perception of the civilian andirregularity. The fact that unconventional troops manifested an immense partof the fighting capabilities besides the regular army certainly led to a greaterand faster blurring of the lines between combatants and non-combatants.Besides losing 210,000 men of its armed forces, Serbia suffered an additional300,000 civilian casualties out of a 3.1 million population.128 Reporters likeReiss did not strengthen the position or protection of civilians, as the slaugh-ter narratives often led to reciprocal violence. However, the civilian as aterm and legal subject underwent a change from the traditionalist approachbefore the war to the codified subject of international law in the inter-bellumperiod.

126 I. V. Hull, Absolute Destruction : Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany,Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 324325.127 Mojzes, Balkan Genocides, p. 41.128 Figures from Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction, p. 143.

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The propaganda battle and new technologies of war created debatesabout more protection of non-combatants but also made them more vulner-able. Thus, war indeed became more total as the barrier between militaryand civil society, destruction and production, was breaking down and newscales of mass mobilization in both spheres would irrevocably change socialparticipation and societal order.129 The order issued by the Belgian King, notto resist by irregular means, and the British and American news reports in1914 show the existing fear and likeliness of civilian resistance. The writingsof Reiss and others led to a change in interpreting the laws of war in amuch more protective manner than the traditionalist approach had outlinedthem and stronger than they had been understood to be by all Europeannations before the war.130 The civilian as a threat was reinterpreted in thelaws of war, becoming a main component that had to be protected; thus, theGerman actions were deemed illegitimate. Aerial developments, however,provided an option to focus on civilians as targets, besides the feminizingvulnerability aspect which created a certain paradox of civilians as desirabletargets and victims to be protected.131 In this respect, the Western front againis an anomaly in World War I where aircraft were mainly used for tacticalsupport of ground operations. An extension to bomb civilian conglomerates loutrage was not only prevented by fears of reciprocal reprisals and anobjection to bombing civilians, but also as simple calculation and doctrinalprocedures that saw airpower as not useful in strategic operations.132 Theincidents described by Reiss show no such restraint in the Serbian theatreof war.

The Totalization of war can be analyzed in comparing the two periodsexamined. Targeting the state, culture, and people as such swept aside allconsiderations of the jus publicum Europaeum (Schmitt). Terror was used asa tool that purposely threaten[ed] to breach a cardinal principle of just-warthinking, that of non-combatant immunity.133 The debates and the reeval-uation of jus ad bellum went hand in hand with a radical restructuring ofthe jus in bello and the characters taking place in it. Consequently, the def-inition of a justus hostis was redefined by transforming the civilian and theirregular character, which in many cases led to terror and counter-terror, upto annihilation.134 Herein lies the importance of Reiss in describing a vitalperiod that links the 19th and 20th centuries way of war in Europe.

129 Geyer, The Militarization of Europe 191445 (65110), here pp. 7475, in Gillis, The Militarizationof the Western World.130 Alexander, The Genesis of the Civilian, Leiden Journal of International Law, 20 (2007),pp. 359376, here p. 369.131 Ibid., p. 376.132 L. Barros, Strategic Bombing and Restraint in Total War, 19151918,The Historic Journal 52(2009), pp. 413431, here pp. 430431.133 H. Strachan, Essay and Reflection: On Total War and Modern War, The International HistoryReview 22 (June 2000), pp. 341370, here p. 356.134 C. Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political,New York, Telos Press Pub, 2007, p. 51.

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