Report Q175 The role of equivalents and prosecution ...aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/committees/175/GR175all_reports.pdf · The role of equivalents and prosecution history in defining

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ArgentinaArgentine

Argentinien

Report Q175

in the name of the Argentinean Group

The role of equivalents and prosecution history in definingthe scope of patent protection

Questions

1. If your country has a doctrine of "equivalents", what is it and how are equivalents as-sessed? Is it provided for by statute or case law?

The doctrine of "equivalents" is not provided for by statute.

Section 11 of the Patent Law provides that "the right granted by the patent shall be de-termined by the first claim approved; the claims define the invention and establish thescope of the right. The description and the drawings or plans, or, when applicable, the de-posit of biological material, shall be used to interpret them".

The doctrine of "equivalents" has, however, been accepted by Argentine Courts, with onesingle exception in a criminal law case. Yet there are only few and old cases in which thatdoctrine was applied, mainly because patent litigation in Argentina in the last decadeshas not been extensive.

The Argentine Supreme Court adhered to the Doctrine of Equivalents in 1890 in re: Cha-vanne. The Supreme Court held that there was an infringement of the patent because theinfringing device used a "similar fundamental principle" than the patented invention.

In 1967 that doctrine was applied again by the Federal Court of Bahia Blanca City in re:Nopco. The Court held that "alteration of details" could not impede infringement of thepatent if the same "fundamental principles" of the invention were used.

Also in 1967 the Federal Court of Buenos Aires City in re: Lavandera applied the func-tion-way-result test in holding that there was an infringement by equivalents.

Later on, however, the Criminal Court of Buenos Aires City in 1971 in re: Travesaro v.Hermida refused to apply that doctrine. The Court found that the alleged infringingprocess used a substitute step different but equivalent to one of the claimed steps. Nev-ertheless, it decided that the language of the claim had been patentee's choice andtherefore the claim was not infringe by defendants process.

Those cases were decided under the old Patent Law No. 111 enacted in 1864. There isno case law concerning the Doctrine of Equivalents under the new Patent Law No.24,481, as amended, enacted in 1995.

In any event, considering that the principles are the same, the Argentine Group is of theopinion that the case law rendered under the old law should be considered applicable un-der the new law.

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It may be useful to have in mind that Argentina does not follow the stare decisis system,and therefore case law is persuasive for the Courts, but not necessarily binding for futurecases where the facts are substantially the same.

2. Can the scope of patent protection change with time, or is it fixed at a particular date? Ifit is fixed, at what date (e.g. priority, application date or date of alleged infringement)?

The scope of patent protection is determined upon the grant of the patent. Afterwards,the scope of protection is interpreted by the Court looking into the granted claims at theinfringement date, but taking into account the situation existing at the filing date.

The scope of protection can be reduced if one or more claims are declared cancelled ata judicial proceeding. The cancellation of one or more claims is allowed by the ArgentinePatent Law, and the remaining claims remain valid.

During prosecution it is not possible to add "new matter", that is, subject matter that hadnot been disclosed at the filing date.

3. Does the prosecution history play a role in determining the scope of patent protection? Ifso, how does it work? In particular:

a) Is there "file wrapper estoppel" and if so in what circumstances does it arise?

There are no precedents of "file wrapper estoppel" in Argentine practice. Howev-er, estoppel ("venire contra factum proprium") is applied by the courts as a gen-eral principle of law. Under that principle, patentee may not adopt one position toenforce the patent that is contradictory with a former position adopted during theprosecution of the patent application.

b) Is there a difference between formal (e.g. oppositions) and informal (e.g. discus-sions with examiners) actions in the patent office?

There are no oppositions by third parties in Argentine proceedings. The ArgentinePatent Law does not foresee informal discussions with examiners, although thatdiscussions sometimes occur in practice. The normal procedure is that the PatentOffice issues office actions in writing that must be answered by applicant.

c) Is there a difference between actions taken by the patent office and by third par-ties?

Third parties may only file objections, which are not binding for the examiner, in-dicating that the application allegedly does not comply with the patentability re-quirements (novelty, inventive step and industrial application).

Upon issuing the substantive examination office action, the Patent Office must in-clude in its report the objections lodged by third parties.

There exists a relatively recent (September 14, 2000) decision from the compe-tent court of appeals in Buenos Aires, Argentina, preventing the court challengeby a third party of a still pending patent application, all the more so when the sameparty entered its objections against the grant of the application before the Argen-tine Patent Office using similar arguments and grounds as those stated in thecourt case ("Gador v. INPI and Eli Lilly"). After grant, patents may be subject to acancellation claim in court by any interested third party.

4. Is there any way the scope of claims can be limited outside prosecution, e.g. by estoppelor admissions?

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The patent can be rendered partially cancelled when one or more claims are declared in-valid, as explained above. The remaining claims of the patent remain valid.

Estoppel may render one or more claim invalid. It may also be a useful element of inter-pretation when the court has to determine the scope of the claims in infringement pro-ceedings. There are, however, no concrete precedents on that issue.

5. Do you have recommendations for harmonisation in this area?

Estoppel is usually accepted world-wide as a general principle of law. It seems logical toapply that principle to patent prosecution and enforcement.

Summary

The Argentine Patent Law does not contain any provision regarding infringement by equivalents.However, the doctrine of equivalents has been accepted and applied by the Argentine Courts.

There are no precedents regarding 'file wrapper estoppel' in Argentina. Nevertheless, estoppel("venire contra factum proprium") is a generally applied principle in Argentine Law, and it wouldbe doubtless applied in patent prosecution and enforcement if the case arises.

Résumé

La loi des brevets ne contient aucune provision sur la violation par équivalents.- Cependant, la" doctrine des équivalents " est accepté et utilisé par les tribunaux argentins.

Il n'y a pas de précédents au sujet du " file wrapper estoppel " en Argentine. Cependant, " estop-pel ", c'est a dire contredire une partie ses propres actes (venire contra factum proprium) est unprincipe juridique accepté en Argentine, et serait sans doute utilisé en cas de procédure ou exé-cution d'un jugement sur un brevet.

Zusammenfassung

Das argentinische Patentgesetz enthält keine Bestimmungen hinsichtlich der Schutzrechtsver-letzung durch gleichwirkende Mittel (Äquivalenzen). Die Theorie der gleichwirkenden Mittel wirdjedoch von den argentinischen Gerichten anerkannt und angewandt.

In Argentinien gibt es keine Präzedenzfälle hinsichtlich des 'file wrapper estoppel'. Nichts-destotrotz ist das 'estoppel' ("venire contra factum proprium") ein in Argentinien allgemein an-erkanntes Rechtsprinzip und beim Auftreten eines solchen Falles würde es zweifellos in einemPatentanmeldeverfahren oder bei Patentschadensersatzansprüchen seine Anwendung finden.

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AustraliaAustralie

Australien

Report Q175

in the name of the Australian Groupby Andrew MASSIE, Ross MCFARLANE, Grant FISHER


Questions


The general positionThe position in Australia in relation to non-literal infringement of patent claims is that Aus-tralia does not have a US-style doctrine of equivalents, but case law has developed toprovide for non-literal infringement. In particular, the courts have accepted that non-liter-al infringement can be found in favour of the patentee and the courts have historicallyadopted one of two approaches when considering the issue of such infringement. Thoseapproaches are embodied in case law, and neither is provided for by statute.

Each of the approaches is discussed below and from that discussion it will be apparentthat Australian courts provide for non-literal infringement by ascribing a meaning to wordsand phrases in a claim in the context of the invention described in the patent specifica-tion. Whilst Australian courts do recognise a doctrine of mechanical equivalents, thedoctrine is now rarely applied, and only to elements of an invention which are found bythe courts to be non-essential to the invention.

The two approaches which have been adopted by Australian courts over the years in re-lation to non-literal infringement are:

1. the pith and marrow approach; and

2. the purposive construction approach.

The "pith and marrow" approachThe "pith and marrow" approach was first raised in a British case decided in 18771. Atthat time, patent specifications typically did not include claims and it was up to the courtto read the specification and to determine for itself the "pith and marrow" of the invention,or in other words, the substance or essence of the invention. The court would do this byidentifying what it considered to be the essential features of the invention, gleaned fromits own reading of the patent specification, after which it would then consider whether thealleged infringer had taken each of those essential features. If so, infringement was gen-erally established.

1 Clark v Adie [1877] 2 AC 315.

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The pith and marrow approach allowed a finding of non-literal infringement, by permittingthe infringing product or process to omit non-essential, unsubstantial or immaterial ele-ments of the invention, or to replace such elements with a mechanically equivalent ele-ment which performed the same function.

Accordingly, by the application of the pith and marrow approach, an infringer who hadtaken the substance or essence of an invention, by taking each of the essential featuresof the invention, could not avoid a finding of infringement on the basis that the infringe-ment did not include one or more non-essential features.

The purposive construction approachFollowing a further UK decision, Catnic Components Ltd., -v- Hill & Smith Ltd.2 in 1981,the "purposive construction" approach evolved. In that decision, the court indicated that,"a patent specification should be given a purposive construction rather than a purely lit-eral one……". Using that approach, the court would consider whether a person withpractical knowledge in the relevant field would understand that terms or phrases em-ployed in the specification were to be understood as having their purely literal meaning,or whether they could instead embody some variation.

In the Catnic case, critical deliberation took place in relation to the term "vertical" as it re-lated to the disposition of a support member. The infringer had disposed its support mem-ber at 6o to 8o from literal or true vertical (90o), but there was no material difference in theoperation or effectiveness of a support member so disposed nor was there any advan-tage provided. The court decided that in the context of the specification, as understoodby the person having practical knowledge, the term "vertical" was not limited to 90o, butcould encompass deviations from true vertical to the extent that the operation of the sup-port member remained unchanged.

The present positionAustralian courts now tend to favour the purposive approach over the pith and marrowapproach. See for example the "Old Digger"3 trial and appeal decisions. The courtsmoreover favour an approach to claim interpretation, that claim wording deliberately cho-sen by the patentee cannot be disregarded, or in other words, that the patentee is boundby that wording. Accordingly, if the patentee elects to limit its patent by the inclusion of aparticular element in a claim, even though subsequently it is found that infringement canbe avoided by omission or replacement of that element, access of the patentee to thedoctrine of mechanical equivalents must be balanced by the requirement that the pat-entee be bound by its choice of wording. The courts in Australia appear now to assumethat all claim elements are essential, and so beyond application of the doctrine of me-chanical equivalents, unless clear statements in the specification, or evidence to the con-trary exists.

In favouring the purposive construction approach, the courts now rarely permit a claimfeature to be replaced by a mechanical equivalent (as was permitted in the pith and mar-row approach), but rather they permit the words or phrases of the claim to be given an in-terpretation appropriate for the context of the invention, so as to establish the propermeaning of a claim. In other words, the purposive construction approach rarely now re-sults in the patentee being able to broaden the scope of its claims by permitting the omis-sion or replacement of claim elements to capture an alleged infringement. Rather, the re-sult is that the purposive construction approach permits broadening of the scope or mea-

2 [1981] FSR 60.3 Old Digger P/L v Azuko P/L [2000] FCA 676; Azuko P/L v Old Digger P/L [2001] 52 IPR 75.

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ning of particular words or phrases, in keeping with the context of the invention describedin the patent specification, to capture infringements that do not fall within the literal mean-ing of those words or phrases.

However, despite the fact that the doctrine of mechanical equivalents is now very rarelyapplied by the courts, it is still available to be applied at the courts' discretion. If the courtchooses to apply the doctrine, the court will assess if any of the claim elements are non-essential and if so, whether they have been replaced with a mechanically equivalent el-ement that performs the same function. The assessment includes:

1. consideration of the patent specification and of expert evidence as towhether the claim element is essential or non-essential;

2. if non-essential, further consideration as to whether the feature of the in-fringement performs the same function as the claim element; and

3. consideration as to whether the feature of the infringement operates in thesame manner as the claim element and whether any differences in opera-tion provide material advantages not realised by the claim element.

It will be appreciated that the requirement that a mechanical equivalent can only apply tonon-essential features, significantly distinguishes the Australian position from the USand the European positions.


Once a patent has been granted, the scope of a patent does not change with time, un-less it is subject to post-grant amendments (either at the request of the patentee, or asordered by the court). While the court is necessarily engaging in interpretation of theclaims at a later date, in the context of proceedings, the court must interpret the claims ofthe patent with reference to the understanding of the skilled addressee at the prioritydate, rather than the date of infringement or opposition.

The words of the claims, and therefore the scope of claims, should be interpreted as atthe priority date. When interpreting the claims, the court considers the ordinary meaningwhich a person skilled in the art would have understood at the priority date.4 The as-sumption is that the words of the claims have been chosen by the draftsperson in orderto convey a particular meaning to the relevant skilled addressee at that date. Where it ap-pears that words have been chosen carefully, there is generally no scope for subsequentwidening of the claim.5

When determining whether a variant falls within the scope of a claim for the purposes ofinfringement, the court determines whether, at the date of publication of the patentapplication, it would be obvious to a person skilled in the art that the variant had no ma-terial effect on the way the invention works.6

Although the court can refer to the specification, the boundaries of the monopoly (asfixed by the words of the claim) cannot be narrowed or expanded by reference to limita-tions in the body of the specification which are not express or by proper inference repro-

4 Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc. (1988) 13 IPR 385; Patents, Trade Marks & Related Rights, Lahore(2001) ("Lahore"), 18,130; Note the Australian Patent Office Manual of Practice and Procedure at paragraph10.8.7 states that the reference to "priority date" ... "ought to more correctly refer to 'filing date'".

5 E Street Enterprises Inc v CPS Housewares Pty Ltd (1996) 36 IPR 431, 436.6 Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd [1981] FSR 60, 66 (Lord Diplock); Root Quality Pty Ltd v Root Control

Technologies Pty Ltd (2000) 177 ALR 231, 247 (Finkelstein J); Lahore, 18,145.

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duced in the claims themselves. That is, the meaning of the claims cannot be "glosseddown" from the specification. The court may refer to the specification and expert evi-dence for guidance, however, it cannot narrow or expand the claims by reference to thespecification, nor can it leave construction of the claims to an expert witness. Expert ev-idence should only be given as to the meaning of technical and scientific terms.7

The proper construction of the specification is a matter of law. The specification is to beread in light of the common knowledge in the art at the priority date, bearing in mind thatit is public document which defines a monopoly and must be able to be understood.8



i) File wrapper estoppelAustralian courts have not found it necessary to reach a decision as towhether the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel exists in Australia. However,an obiter dictum view has been expressed by the Federal Court of Aus-tralia that it is unlikely that such a doctrine will be found to exist in thiscountry.9

In the United States, the doctrine of equivalents is relied upon by the pat-entee in infringement proceedings to expand the scope of a patent claimto include integers that perform substantially the same function in sub-stantially the same way to obtain the same result. The doctrine of file wrap-per estoppel applies where a narrowing amendment has been made dur-ing prosecution of the patent application for any reason related topatentability. The doctrine of file wrapper estoppel prevents the patenteefrom expanding the scope of a claim under the doctrine of equivalents toinclude integers that were abandoned by that narrowing amendment.

The Federal Court of Australia has indicated that the doctrine of equiva-lents embraces concepts to which analogies can be found in Australianlaw.10 It referred specifically to "the distinction drawn in infringement suitsbetween "essential" and "inessential" integers in claims for a combination,to the "pith and marrow" doctrine, to the substitution of "inessential fea-tures" by "mechanical equivalents" and to the ... notion of "purposive con-struction"". However, the provisional view of the Federal Court of Australiais that, in spite of these analogies, the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel willbe unlikely to be found to exist in Australia. This view is based upon threegrounds.

Firstly, the emphasis in Australian law is on the principles of constructionapplicable generally to patent claims, and "the concept of mechanicalequivalents ... is applicable not to all the integers in patent claims, but onlyto what can be construed as 'inessential features'; the doctrine of equiva-lents does not appear to be so limited."11 The doctrine of file wrapper es-

7 Flexible Steel Lacing Co v Beltreco Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 331, 81 (Hely J); Lahore, 18,130.8 Welch Perrin & Co Pty Ltd v Worrel (1961) 106 CLR 588, 610.9 Prestige Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Incorporated (1990) 26 FCR 197, 212 (Gummow J).10 ibid., 208 (Gummow J).11 ibid., 209 (Gummow J).

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toppel was created in the United States as a counter-balance to the inter-pretation of specifications in accordance with the doctrine of equivalents.Since the doctrine of equivalents has no immediate counterpart in Aus-tralian decisions, there is unlikely to be a need for a corresponding doc-trine of file wrapper estoppel.

Secondly, the patent specification is "much more that a document settingdown a commercial bargain.12 It is not a written instrument operating interpartes, but is a public instrument".13 The granting of a modern standardpatent in Australia is not a contractual activity but rather an activity that isquasi-legislative in character. Hence, the restrictions which apply to theadmission of negotiations prior to contract as aids to construction wouldapply a fortiori to dealings and procedures preceding the grant of patentprotection.

Finally, the meaning of claims is a matter of law, or at least fact and law.14

Admissions made by the patentee against their interest in Patent Officeproceedings are generally of little weight, being founded on opinion, un-less they amount to an estoppel.15 But it would usually be required of arepresentation founding an estoppel that it has been directed to the otherparty in the cause or to his privy or at least that the other party has reliedupon it.16 Representations made to the Patent Office do not meet thesecriteria, and therefore do not amount to an estoppel.

Whilst indicating its view that there are significant difficulties in founding"file wrapper estoppel" in the law as it is understood in Australia, the Fed-eral Court of Australia did not, however, regard the issue of the role of filewrapper estoppel in Australia "as other than still open for decision."

ii) Role of prosecution history in interpreting amended specificationsLegislative encouragement to consider prosecution history in the interpre-tation of a patent specification is provided by section 116 and subsections138(3)(d) and (e) of the Australian Patents Act 1990. Section 116 providesthat the Commissioner of Patents or a court may, in interpreting a com-plete specification as amended, refer to the specification without amend-ment. However, it has been held that it is neither useful nor legitimate to doso where the amended specification is clear.17 This is an invitation, ratherthan an obligation.18

It was in the context of such examination that the Deputy Commissioner ofPatents considered the fact that there had been an amendment to a spec-ification (during the prosecution stage) was relevant to the decision in alater proceeding.19 The patent in question was under consideration be-cause the patentee had applied for an extension of term. When the patent

12 ibid., 211 (Gummow J).13 Welch Perrin and Co Pty Ltd v Worrel, above n 8, 610.14 Prestige Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Incorporated, above n 9, 212 (Gummow J).15 Phipson on Evidence, 13th ed, 1982, s19-19.16 Wigmore on Evidence, Chadbourn Revision, vol IV, s1057.17 Martin and Biro Swan Ltd v H Millwood Ltd [1956] RPC 125, 135.18 Emory University v Biochem Pharma Inc [1999] APO 50 (5 August 1999).19 Merck & Co., Inc v Arrow Pharmaceuticals Limited [2002] APO 13 (17 April 2002).

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application was originally filed, it included claims to a substance, unlimitedto any particular use or environment. During examination, the claims wereamended to remove any explicit reference to the substance, because ofan objection raised by the Examiner based on the prior claims of anotherpatent. The patentee by way of the amendment gave up express monop-oly rights.

The Deputy Commissioner, when examining the eligibility of the patent forextension of term, noted that given the substance was not within the scopeof the claims when the patent was originally filed, there was no need toform a concluded view on the issue of file-wrapper estoppel. However, hisview was that it would be appropriate to have regard to the deletion thatoccurred. In particular, he thought that it would be inappropriate to assesssuch overtly deleted monopoly rights as in fact continuing by reason ofwhat is "in substance" within the scope of other claims - absent clear in-tention. In this case, there was no such intention evident - only a desire toconstrue the claims in this manner such that there was a basis to extendthe term of the patent. This could be viewed as a type of "estoppel", alongthe lines of the approbate and reprobate doctrine, which is discussed be-low.

This example can be confined though to the facts of the particular applica-tion - that is, satisfying the requirements under section 70 of the AustralianPatents Act 1990 for extensions of the term of a patent for a pharmaceuti-cal substance.

iii) Role of prosecution history in patent invalidityIt is a ground for revocation of a patent under subsection 138(3)(d) that apatent was obtained by fraud, false suggestion or misrepresentation. It isalso a ground for revocation under subsection 138(3)(e) that an amend-ment of the patent request or the complete specification was similarly ob-tained.

"Fraud" implies that there has been moral culpability on the part of the pat-entee, by an intentional act of wrongdoing, or at the minimum, a statementmade by the patentee in circumstances where the patentee is recklesslycareless as to whether the statement is true or false.20 Revocation of apatent on the basis of fraud is not common, as alternative bases of revo-cation are usually available, such as lack of entitlement to the patent.

The words "false suggestion'' or "misrepresentation'' are "based on equi-table notions of good faith, fairness, conscionable conduct and honesty''.21

The Federal Court has stressed that false suggestion or misrepresentationis a developing concept which should not be narrowed or circumscribed byjudicial decision.22

One of the general categories of types of conduct that may amount to falsesuggestion or misrepresentation relates to the conduct of the patentee

20 See further Dwyer J and Dufty A (eds), Patents, Trade Marks and Related Rights (Sydney: Butt, 1996), [12,980],[12,985].

21 Prestige Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Incorporated, above n 9, 198 (Lockhart J).22 ibid., 198-199 (Lockhart J).

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during the process of applying for the grant of the patent. This is an areaincreasingly being employed as a basis for alleging invalidity, althoughusually unsuccessfully.23

In establishing false suggestion or misrepresentation in the prosecutionhistory of a patent, the Federal Court of Australia has stated that there isno requirement to prove deliberate intent to deceive.24 It is also not nec-essary to prove that the conduct constituting the false suggestion or mis-representation is such that in its absence the patent would not have beengranted.25 The real question is whether the conduct constituting the falsesuggestion or misrepresentation materially contributed to the Commis-sioner of Patents' decision to grant the patent.26 It has been held that ifstatements are made in correspondence with the Commissioner ofPatents claiming that the invention is an advance on the prior art becauseof certain features, but that these features are not included in the completespecification when it is filed at a later date, it is possible that the patentmay be invalid for false suggestion.27


Upon completion of the examination process and grant of a patent, there is no dif-ference between the role of formal and informal actions in the Australian PatentOffice during prosecution of the patent application in determining the scope ofpatent protection.


Similarly, actions taken by the Patent Office and by third parties during patentprosecution are treated no differently from each other in determining the scope ofpatent protection.


As outlined above, the court construes the claims of a patent with reference to the spec-ification and with the assistance of expert evidence, if required, but presently without ref-erence to the conduct of a patentee and without recourse to the doctrine of "file-wrapper"estoppel. While the equitable doctrines of approbate and reprobate, res judicata and is-sue estoppel (discussed below) could be applied by Australian courts in the context ofclaim construction, they have not been applied in this way to date. Patent claim scopemay also be limited by admissions made during an Australian court proceeding.

23 ibid.; Yamazaki Mazak Corporation v Interact Machine Tools (NSW) Pty Ltd (1991) 22 IPR 79, 97 (Gummow J);Winner v Ammar Holdings Pty Ltd (1993) 41 FCR 205, 219-220 (Davies J); Atlantis Corporation Pty Ltd v Schindler(1997) 39 IPR 29, 54 (Wilcox and Lindgren JJ).

24 Prestige Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Incorporated, above n 9, 199-200 (Lockhart J); Re KromschroderAG's Patent Revocation [1960] RPC 75, 83.

25 Prestige Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Incorporated, above n 9, 218 (Gummow J), 200-201 (Lockhart J).26 ibid.; Nesbit Evans Group Australia Pty Ltd v Impro Ltd (1997) 39 IPR 56, 98 (Lindgren J); Cooper v Sten-Crete

Pty Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 546, 552 (Delegate Haggar).27 Prestige Group (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Incorporated, above n 25.

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Approbate and reprobate doctrineThe doctrine of approbate and reprobate means that a party cannot choose between twoinconsistent courses of conduct, and having chosen a course from which the party hasbenefited, resile from that position. In other words, a party cannot adopt two inconsistentstances, once benefit has been derived from one. A party cannot "blow hot and cold inthe attitude" they adopt.28 The doctrine has been recognised in Australia.29

The doctrine of approbate and reprobate has not been explicitly applied in Australia in thecontext of patent cases. The Commissioner of Patents has applied this type of argumentin refusing an application for an extension of term of a patent.30

Res judicataThe principle of res judicata provides that no other proceedings may be maintained onthe same cause of action if judgment has previously been entered in that action. Thisprinciple has been applied by an Australia Court in the context of a granted patent (butnot specifically in relation to the scope of the claims) in refusing leave to re-open a cross-claim or to file and serve a second cross-claim, seeking revocation of a patent. The Courtheld that as the previous action between the parties had been dismissed and no issue inthe cross-claim had been left undetermined, the issue of the validity of the patent wasconsidered res judicata.31

It would seem that where a party seeks to revoke a patent based on invalidity of thepatent, and the court determines that the claims are not invalid (for example, are fairlybased on the specification), the applicant is subsequently prevented from mounting anidentical cause of action ie, a party is not able to continue to assert the same invalidity ar-gument in relation to the patent. In the same way, a patentee may be prevented from con-tinuing to tend for a broader construction of a claim in a subsequent proceeding.

Res judicata is limited in that both the cause of action and the parties must be the same.Accordingly, any determination made as to the scope of the claims of a patent will onlybe relevant where the same cause of action is argued as between the same parties. Thiscould arise where a foreign jurisdiction has considered the same cause of action be-tween the same parties. However, this is limited, as the foreign court must be recognisedas a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, given the different requirements under thepatent laws of different countries, it could be argued that the relevant questions and rel-evant considerations in relation to the cause of action would be sufficiently different toprevent res judicata from operating.

Issue estoppelIssue estoppel arises to prevent a party in a subsequent proceeding from asserting to thecontrary any issue fundamental to the initial judgment. In this way, a patentee could beprecluded from asserting, for example, a broader or a different construction of a claim ofa patent where a court has previously determined its construction. For issue estoppel toarise, the parties in two proceedings must be the same. Although the cause of action canbe different, the issue to be argued between the parties must be the same and there musthave been final determination of this issue in the prior proceeding. It should be noted that

28 Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd & Ors [1990] 1 WLR 1320 (Browne-Wilkinson J).29 Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 421-2 (Brennan J); Fried v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000]

FCA 911; VACC Insurance v BP Australia (1999) 47 NSWLR 716.30 Merck & Co., Inc v Arrow Pharmaceuticals Limited, above n 19 (discussed above).31 Old Digger Pty Ltd v Azuko Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1158.

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issue estoppel arises in regard to the final determination of the judge, and does not arisein relation to submissions made by either party during the course of the proceedings.

Issue estoppel has been discussed in Australia in the context of patent cases. However,according to recent judicial consideration by the Federal Court, issue estoppel does notnecessarily arise in subsequent proceedings in relation to the same patent specification.The question which may be under consideration by a judge in a first proceeding, for ex-ample during a pre-grant opposition, may differ from the question which is before anoth-er judge, for example, during a post-grant revocation proceeding, even though the samespecification is being scrutinised in each instance on virtually identical grounds.32 Thissame concern may not apply in relation to the issue of the scope of the claims.

There are no Australian decisions which discuss whether or not issue estoppel can beapplied to foreign judgments in relation to patent cases. It would seem that issue estop-pel in relation to foreign cases would only be relevant to questions of fact, as the exactquestion for determination before a judge in a different jurisdiction would be differentwhere the laws are not homogenous.

AdmissionsIt might be possible to limit the scope of claims by reference to admissions made by oneparty by notice served on the other party or made in Court pleadings. Admissions areonly available during the proceeding (and any appeal), and are not admissible in evi-dence in any subsequent proceeding.33 There are no Australian cases which discuss us-ing admissions made in correspondence between the parties or otherwise made outsidethe scope of a proceeding, to limit the scope of claims.


Any patent system endeavours to achieve a compromise between the need to providefair protection for the patentee and the need for the patentee's competitors to have rea-sonable legal certainty in their understanding of the scope of protection afforded to thepatentee. The positions adopted by various countries range from the purposive con-struction approach in Australia, the US doctrine of equivalents approach and the evenbroader equivalents doctrine applied in some European countries, such as Germany.

The Australian purposive approach to claim interpretation relies upon ascribing a mean-ing to words and phrases in a claim in the context of the invention described in the patentspecification, but rarely allows the substitution or omission of claim features or steps.This almost-literal approach to claim interpretation arguably errs on the side of providinglegal certainty to third parties.

In an increasingly globalised marketplace, both patentees and their competitors areseeking greater conformity between countries in the interpretation of the scope of pro-tection provided by patent claims. In the opinion of the Australian group, a middle posi-tion between the Australian position on the one hand and the German position on the oth-er, merits consideration for harmonisation. Accordingly, we recommend moving towardsan approach that enables infringement to be found when an alleged infringement con-tains one or more equivalent elements, and that this approach be tempered by taking intoaccount matter excluded from the scope of the claims during the prosecution of thepatent application in Australia. The Australian group acknowledges that this needs to be

32 Genetic Institute Inc v Kirin-Amgen Inc (1999) 44 IPR 257, 262 (Black CJ, Merkel and Goldberg JJ).33 British Thompson-Houston Co v British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd [1924] 1 Ch 203, 210.

10

achieved by legislative changes and that there are inherent drafting difficulties in en-shrining such doctrines in legislation.

Summary

The present Australian position provides a very narrow approach to non-literal infringement. Theposition is that only on very rare occasions can a claim element be substituted by an equivalentelement to find non-literal infringement and only where the claim element is found to be non-es-sential.

The courts generally favour a "purposive" construction in interpreting the meaning of claim ele-ments, so that the meaning of those elements can be interpreted not necessarily in accordancewith their strict literal meaning, but with some flexibility or variation according to the context ofthe invention and the understanding of the skilled addressee.

The scope of patent protection can only change over time, if post-grant claim amendments aremade. However, regardless of whether or not post-grant amendments take place, the courts arerequired to interpret the claims with reference to the understanding of the skilled addressee atthe priority date of the claims of the patent.

There is presently no doctrine of file wrapper estoppel in Australia. Although the courts have notruled out the possibility of the doctrine being applied in future cases, to date the doctrine has notbeen applied in any Australian court decisions. The Australian Patents Act 1990 does include aspecific provision which permits reference to the prosecution history of a patent, but to date thatprovision has only been applied in a single Patent Office case, relating to an application of anextension of term for a pharmaceutical substance.

There is the possibility that the scope of the claims can be limited outside prosecution, throughthe doctrine of approbate and reprobate, the principle of res judicata and issue estoppel. Todate, there have been no Australian decisions that have applied these principles in relation toclaim scope. It is possible that claim scope could be limited in court proceedings through ad-missions made by the patentee in the proceeding. Accordingly, to date, claim limitation outsideprosecution (excluding post-grant amendments) has not occurred in Australia, and there is noindication that it will occur in the future.

The Australian group favours a harmonised position in which non-literal infringement can befound by substitution of one or more equivalent claim elements, but with reference to the prose-cution history to ensure that the patentee has not made comments that should preclude suchsubstitution.

Résumé

La position australienne actuelle se caractérise par une approche très étroite de la contrefaçonnon littérale. Cette position dispose qu'un élément de revendication ne peut être remplacé quetrès rarement par un élément équivalent pour conclure à une contrefaçon non littérale, etuniquement si l'élément de revendication s'avère être non essentiel.

Les tribunaux privilégient généralement une interprétation "utilitaire" du sens des éléments derevendication, de sorte qu'il est possible de ne pas automatiquement interpréter ces élémentsen fonction de leur signification strictement littérale, mais avec une certaine souplesse ou lati-tude selon le contexte de l'invention et l'idée que s'en fait l'homme de métier.

La portée de la protection des brevets ne peut changer qu'avec le temps, si tant est que l'on ap-porte des modifications de revendication après la délivrance des brevets. Toutefois, indépen-

11

damment d'éventuelles modifications intervenant après la délivrance des brevets, les tribunauxsont tenus d'interpréter les revendications en se référant à l'idée que s'en fait l'homme de méti-er à la date d'antériorité des revendications du brevet.

À l'heure actuelle, il n'existe pas de doctrine dite de "file wrapper estoppel1" en Australie. Bienque les tribunaux n'en aient pas exclu l'application éventuelle lors de futures actions, jusqu'icicette doctrine n'a été appliquée dans aucune décision judiciaire australienne. La loi australiennede 1990 sur les brevets (Australian Patents Act 1990) contient une disposition particulière quipermet de faire référence aux antécédents juridictionnels d'un brevet, à ce jour cette dispositionn'a été appliquée que dans une seule action de l'Office des brevets concernant une demandede prorogation pour une substance pharmaceutique.

Il est possible que la portée des revendications puisse être limitée sans poursuites judiciaires,par le biais de la doctrine de l' "approbate and reprobate2", le principe de la "res judicata3" et l' "issue estoppel4". Jusqu'ici, aucune décision n'a été prise en Australie qui appliquait cesprincipes en matière de portée des revendications. Il est possible que la portée des revendica-tions puisse être limitée lors d'actions en justice par des admissions faites par le titulaire dubrevet au cours de l'action. En conséquence, à ce jour, aucun cas de limitation des revendica-tions sans poursuites judiciaires (à l'exclusion des modifications réalisées après la délivrance dubrevet) ne s'est présenté en Australie, et rien ne laisse présager qu'un tel cas se présente àl'avenir.

Le groupe australien privilégie une position harmonisée aux termes de laquelle la contrefaçonnon littérale peut être prouvée par la substitution d'un ou de plusieurs éléments de revendicationéquivalents, mais en se référant aux antécédents juridictionnels afin de s'assurer que le titulaired'un brevet n'a pas fait de commentaires susceptibles d'empêcher une telle substitution.

Zusammenfassung

Der aktuelle australische Standpunkt gibt ein sehr enges Herangehen an nicht-buchstabenge-treue Patentverletzungen vor. Der Standpunkt ist, dass ein Anspruchselement nur in sehr selte-nen Fällen von einem entsprechenden Element ersetzt werden kann, um eine nicht-buch-stabengetreue Patentverletzung festzustellen und nur dann, wenn das Anspruchselement alsnicht unbedingt erforderlich erachtet wurde.

Im allgemeinen ziehen die Gerichte eine "zweckorientierte" Auslegung bei der Interpretation derBedeutung von Anspruchselementen vor, so dass die Bedeutung dieser Elemente nicht unbed-ingt entsprechend ihrer strengen buchstäblichen Bedeutung interpretiert wird, sondern miteinem dem Kontext der Erfindung und dem Verständnis der fachlichen Zielgruppe entsprechen-den Maß an Flexibilität und Abweichungen.

Der Gültigkeitsbereich des Patentschutzes kann sich nur über Zeit ändern, wenn nach derErteilung Änderungen vorgenommen werden. Unabhängig davon, ob nach der Erteilung Än-derungen vorgenommen wurden oder nicht, haben die Gerichte die Ansprüche jedoch in Bezugauf das Verständnis der fachlichen Zielgruppe zum Prioritätsdatum der Patentansprücheauszulegen.

NOTES DU TRADUCTEUR (sous toutes réserves) :1 Doctrine du droit des brevets qui interdit à une partie de revenir par la suite sur la portée des revendications faite

dans sa demande originale.2 Doctrine du choix entre l'acceptation et le refus.3 Principe de l'effet de chose jugée.4 Forclusion, non-recevabilité, fin de non-recevoir

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Der Grundsatz der Einschränkung des Erteilungsverfahrens gilt in Australien derzeit nicht. Ob-gleich die Gerichte die Möglichkeit nicht ausschließen, dass dieser Grundsatz in künftigenFällen Anwendung finden mag, ist er bislang in keiner Entscheidung eines australischenGerichts angewendet worden. Das australische Patentgesetz von 1990 enthält eine spezielleKlausel, die die Bezugnahme auf die Geschichte der Anklageerhebung eines Patents zulässt,allerdings wurde diese Klausel bislang nur in einem einzigen Fall des Patentamtes angewendetund zwar im Zusammenhang mit der Verlängerung der Patentfrist einer pharmazeutischen Sub-stanz.

Es besteht die Möglichkeit, dass der Gültigkeitsbereich der Ansprüche beschränkte Klageerhe-bung von außen durch den Grundsatz, Vorrechte in Anspruch zu nehmen, aber Verpflichtungenabzulehnen, das Prinzip res judicata und die Abgabe einer prozessbehindernden Einrede seinkann. Bislang hat es keine australischen Urteile gegeben, bei denen diese Prinzipien bezüglichdes Gültigkeitsbereichs eines Patents angewendet wurden. Es ist möglich, dass der Gültigkeits-bereich des Anspruchs während der Gerichtsverhandlung aufgrund von Zugeständnissen desPatentinhabers in der Verhandlung beschränkt werden könnte. Dementsprechend hat es bis-lang in Australien keine Anspruchsbeschränkungen außerhalb des Einklagens einer Forderung(nachträgliche Änderungen nach der Patenterteilung sind ausgeschlossen) gegeben und es gibtkeine Anzeichen, dass dies in Zukunft der Fall sein wird.

Die australische Gruppe zieht eine ausgleichende Stellung vor, in der nicht-buchstabengetreuePatentverletzungen durch Ersatz eines oder mehrerer entsprechender Anspruchselemente fest-gestellt werden können. Dies geschieht jedoch unter Bezugnahme auf die Geschichte der An-klageerhebung, um sicherzustellen, dass der Patentinhaber keine Äußerungen gemacht hat,die einen solchen Ersatz ausschließen würde.

1

BelgiumBelgiqueBelgien

Rapport Q175

au nom du Groupe belgepar B. VAN REEPINGEN, C. QUINTELIER, P. CLAEYS, F. DE VISSCHER

Le rôle des équivalents et de la procédure de délivrance du brevetdans la détermination de la portée de la protection

Questions

1. Si votre pays connaît une doctrine des "équivalents", en quoi consiste-t-elle et commentles équivalents sont-ils déterminés? Cette disposition est-elle fixée par la loi ou la ju-risprudence?

La loi belge est silencieuse quant à la doctrine des équivalents. Toutefois, la jurispru-dence a admis l'équivalence dans une certaine mesure. Elle admet notamment le faitque des moyens équivalents puissent être utilisés pour obtenir la même fonction tech-nique et qu'il y a contrefaçon dans ce cas. Les tribunaux belges sont toutefois relative-ment réticents à admettre une trop large interprétation de l'équivalence.

2. La portée de la protection conférée par un brevet peut-elle changer dans le temps ou est-elle fixée à une date déterminée? Si elle est fixée, à quelle date (par exemple date de priorité, date de dépôt, date de la contrefaçon alléguée)?

Ni la jurisprudence ni la doctrine belges ne résolvent clairement la question posée. D'unemanière générale, c'est le brevet tel qu'il est délivré qui détermine l'étendue de la pro-tection. C'est donc à cette période qu'il faut se placer pour apprécier exactement cetteétendue. Plus précisément, il paraît logique de retenir la date de priorité puisque c'est àcette date que par un premier dépôt, l'on entend se réserver une technique particulièreque l'on délimite par rapport à une technique antérieure. Mais cela ne devrait pas em-pêcher le breveté de bénéficier d'une protection équitable en incluant dans la protectiondes développements techniques même si ceux-ci n'étaient pas prévisibles à la date depriorité, mais à condition qu'à cette date et compte tenu de l'exacte interprétation desrevendications, de tels développements apparaissent comme réalisant la revendication.La date de délivrance proprement dite paraît par contre moins pertinente parce qu'elle sesitue plus tard et qu'en toute hypothèse, il n'est pas permis d'étendre la portée du brevetau-delà du contenu de la demande initiale. Ceci vaut tant pour des brevets belgesobtenus par la voie nationale que pour les brevets européens. Toutefois, la portée de laprotection reste déterminée jusqu'à la preuve du contraire. En effet, qu'il s'agisse d'unbrevet belge ou d'un brevet belge obtenu par la voie européenne, il peut à tout momentfaire l'objet d'une action en nullité devant les tribunaux ou, conformément à l'Article 42 dela loi belge, le titulaire du brevet belge peut renoncer par une déclaration écrite et signéeadressée au Ministre, la renonciation étant limitée à une ou plusieurs revendications dubrevet. La déclaration de renonciation est inscrite au registre. En ce qui concerne lebrevet européen, ce dernier peut faire l'objet d'une opposition dans un délai de neuf moisà compter de la date de délivrance, laquelle opposition, éventuellement suivie d'un re-

2

cours, peut également apporter une limitation à la portée de la protection conférée par lebrevet. Toutefois, en cas de contrefaçon et lorsque il n'y a pas d'action en nullité intro-duite simultanément à l'action en contrefaçon le juge devra considérer le droit tel quedéfini par les revendications du brevet comme étant un droit valable.

3. Le dossier de délivrance joue-t-il un rôle lorsqu'il s'agit de déterminer la portée de la pro-tection conférée par le brevet? Dans l'affirmative, comment cela est-il mis en œuvre? Enparticulier:

a) Existe-t-il une notion de "file wrapper estoppel" et dans l'affirmative dans quellescirconstances est-elle appliquée?

b) Existe-t-il une différence entre des procédures formelles devant l'Office desBrevets (par exemple oppositions) et des procédures informelles (discussionsavec les examinateurs)?

c) Existe-t-il une différence entre les démarches effectuées par l'Office des Brevetset par des tiers?

Il faut ici clairement distinguer les brevets obtenus par la voie nationale et ceux obtenuspar la voie européenne. En effet, étant donné que le brevet national belge est délivrésans examen sur le fond, il n'existe pas un dossier d'examen pour les demandes belges.Bien entendu, dans le cas d'une demande de brevet européen, il y a le dossier de ladélivrance.

En ce qui concerne les brevets nationaux belges, certains ont fait l'objet d'un rapport derecherche ce qui a permis au demandeur de modifier les revendications à la lumière durapport de recherche. Dans ce dernier cas, le brevet peut être délivré avec des revendi-cations modifiées et on trouvera dans le dossier de délivrance le texte tel que déposéainsi que les revendications modifiées. Bien entendu, dans ce dernier cas, si le deman-deur a ainsi réduit la portée de ses revendications, ceci peut être pris en compte dansune procédure en justice traitant d'une éventuelle contrefaçon. En ce qui concerne lesdemandes européennes, le dossier de la délivrance contenant la correspondance entrel'Office Européen des Brevets et le demandeur est accessible et peut être pris en comptepar le juge. Ainsi le juge peut-il tenir compte des limitations que le demandeur a intro-duites ou d'explications qui ont été données par l'Office Européen des Brevets ainsi quepar le demandeur tant dans la procédure en examen que dans des procédures en oppo-sition et dans les recours.

Pour les brevets belges il n'existe pas de procédures informelles étant donné qu'il n'y apas d'examen sur le fond. Pour les brevets européens, de telles procédures informellespeuvent avoir lieu et en général on retrouve dans le dossier de délivrance des compte-rendus d'entretiens. Toutefois ces "minutes" ne reprennent pas l'ensemble des discus-sions menées entre le demandeur et l'examinateur. En général, ces minutes reprennentseulement ce qui a été décidé entre les parties en question. Bien entendu, il sera laisséà l'appréciation du juge de tenir compte d'éventuelles remarques ou limitations qui au-raient été faites dans la procédure en délivrance. Il est clair que si durant la procédure endélivrance, le demandeur a clairement exclu certaines alternatives, ne fût-ce que pour sedémarquer d'un art antérieur pertinent, le juge acceptera difficilement que cette alterna-tive soit plus tard prise en considération comme une solution équivalente.

Etant donné que le brevet belge n'est en général pas accessible au public avant ladélivrance du brevet, des démarches effectuées par des tiers sont quasiment impossi-bles en Belgique. Par contre, l'Office Européen des Brevets connaît en vertu de l'article

3

115 de la C.B.E. la possibilité d'observations de la part de tiers. Comme ces tiers ne de-viennent pas parties à la procédure en délivrance du brevet, il est toutefois rare que cetarticle soit utilisé.

4. La portée des revendications peut-elle être limitée de quelque façon que ce soit en de-hors de la procédure de délivrance, par exemple par "estoppel" ou admission?

Comme mentionné ci-dessus, l'article 42 de la loi belge prévoit la renonciation volontairepar le titulaire du brevet. Toutefois, cet article est en pratique très peu utilisé puisqu'il nepermet au titulaire que de renoncer à une ou plusieurs revendications. Durant la procé-dure en nullité, le titulaire peut en revanche, de sa propre initiative, proposer des reven-dications modifiées qui limitent la portée de son droit, d'une manière plus souple que parla simple renonciation à une ou plusieurs revendications.

Le groupe de travail s'est également penché sur la question de savoir s'il est possiblepour le titulaire du brevet d'engager une procédure en nullité contre son propre brevet.En effet, le titulaire du brevet belge pourrait avoir un intérêt légitime à vouloir volontaire-ment limiter la portée de son brevet, par exemple lorsqu'il a connaissance d'un état del'art antérieur qui met en danger la validité d'une ou de plusieurs revendications de sonbrevet. Il pourrait alors éventuellement introduire une procédure en nullité, ce qui lui per-mettrait d'introduire des revendications modifiées et veiller ainsi à avoir un brevet dont lavalidité serait plus forte. Le débat à ce sujet n'a pas permis de dégager une unanimitéquant à savoir si une telle procédure serait effectivement acceptée par les tribunauxbelges; sur le plan procédural, cette question se heurte à la difficulté que le défendeur àl'action en nullité doit être le titulaire même du brevet

5. Avez-vous des recommandations à formuler en vue d'une harmonisation dans ce do-maine?

Une recommandation pourrait consister à considérer que dans le domaine de la questionposée, chaque cas de figure est différent. Il semblerait plutôt dommageable pour une jus-tice équitable d'encadrer le Juge dans des règles trop strictes qui limiteraient sa libertéd'interprétation.

Quant à la question de savoir à quel moment il faut considérer l'équivalence, le groupede travail est d'avis qu'il faut tenir compte tant de la date de dépôt (ou de priorité) dubrevet que du moment où la contrefaçon doit être jugée. S'il s'agit d'une évolution qui, sielle avait été envisagée lors du dépôt, aurait été reconnue comme réalisant l'invention,elle devrait raisonnablement être prise en considération pour admettre qu'il y a contre-façon.

Résumé

La jurisprudence belge admet l'équivalence dans une certaine mesure, mais les tribunaux sontprudents. La portée de la protection peut changer dans le temps mais les possibilités pour le tit-ulaire de changer par sa propre initiative sont très restreintes. Dans le cas d'un brevet européenvalidé en Belgique, le dossier peut être pris en compte pour déterminer la portée des revendi-cations.

Summary

The Belgian case law admits within certain limits the principle of equivalence, but the Courts arecautious. The scope of protection may change in time but the proprietor has very limited possi-

4

bilities to change on his own initiative. For European patents validated in Belgium the file couldbe taken into account for determining the scope of protection.

1

BrazilBrésil

Brasilien

Report Q175

in the name of the Brazilian Groupby José Antonio B.L. FARIA CORREA, Lélio D. SCHMIDT, Antonio Mauricio P. ARNAUD,

Gustavo J. F. BARBOSA (chairman), Maria Lavínia L. MAURELL


Questions


The Brazilian Industrial Property Law, Law 9279/96 effective as of May 15, 1997, ex-pressly provides for infringement by equivalency as follows:

"Article 186 - The crimes of this Chapter are committed even if the viola-tion does not affect all the claims of the patent or if it is restricted to the useof means equivalent to the subject matter of the patent."

The Brazilian Group is unaware of any court decision issued on the basis of the aboveprovision.

The concept of non-literal infringement is nevertheless inferred from at least one decisionissued on May 17, 1988, i.e. under the previous law, by the 6th. Civil Chamber of PortoAlegre concerning the Appeal n. 588003582 (Taurus Blindagens Ltda. x Pier Luigi Nava).However this decision was based on the now obsolete concept of the "basic inventiveidea" rather than on the doctrine of equivalents as extracted from the following passage:

"It is regarded as a violation, in the sense that the patent is infringed, themanufacturing of a product using the protected basic inventive idea, eventhough not corresponding completely and absolutely with the patented de-scription, which is subjected to alterations that, although unfamiliar to it, donot discharacterize it."


Brazilian Law does not foresee the moment at which equivalence is to be assessed. Al-though no court decisions have approached the matter, the position of most practitionersis that the scope of protection may change with time and may encompass any equivalentmean that did not exist either at the time when the patent was granted or when the ap-plication itself was filed.



2

Although, neither the Brazilian law, nor any court decision seems to have touchedthis issue, the Brazilian examination proceedings are public and, for this reason,any act or statement recorded in the files, specially any amendment of the claimsnarrowing their scope, might be used in a court action. If the patentee formallystates that protection is not intended for a given characteristic, then said charac-teristic would not be granted protection.


In principle, only formal acts would have any legal value. Mere informal discus-sions with the Examiner would have no influence in a court action.


In what concerns the file wrapper estoppel, only the acts of the applicant and ofthe Patent Office are truly relevant.


It would be possible to limit the scope of a patent if the patentee expressly renounces toone or more claims in order to maintain the validity of the patent. The law also gives tothe potential infringer the possibility of alleging the total or partial invalidity of a patent asa defense argument. The court is obliged to consider the matter and may declare the in-validity before issuing the final decision.


The Brazilian Group would endorse any harmonization effort in the same line adopted bythe SCP, which is based on the three fold test used in the US or on the "obviously equiv-alent element" concept adopted in Europe. Document SCP/8/3, of October 16, 2002)reads as follows:

"For the purposes of Article 11(4)(b), an element ("the equivalent ele-ment") shall generally be considered as being equivalent to an element asexpressed in a claim ("the claimed element") if, at the option of a Con-tracting Party:

(i) it performs substantially the same function in substantially thesame way and produces substantially the same result as theclaimed element;

or

(ii) it is obvious to a person skilled in the art that substantially the sameresult as that achieved by means of the claimed element can beachieved by means of the equivalent element;

at the time of the alleged infringement."

1

BulgariaBulgarie

Bulgarien

Report Q175

in the name of the Bulgarian Groupby Violeta SHENTOVA and Tatyana LEKOVA


Questions


Yes, it is provided by statute. The Patent Law provides a definition of equivalent elementas an element having in essence one and the same function realized in one and thesame manner and giving essentially one and the same result.


The scope of patent protection is defined by the claims formulated at the time of issuingof the patent, but the element should be considered as an equivalent if "it is quite obvi-ous for those skilled in the art that, by the priority date, the result reached by the element,as expressed in the claims, could be attained through the equivalent element". The in-terpretation of the claims is not limited to the embodiments of the invention included inthe description.


Yes, the prosecution history plays a role in determining the scope of patent protection, asdue account is taken of the statement limiting the scope of the claims made by the appli-cant or by the owner of the patent in the process of examination for grant of the patent orin cases of nullity actions.


Yes, in infringement actions. The scope of protection does not cover the limita-tions made by the applicant or by the owner of the patent in the process of exam-ination for grant of the patent or in cases of nullity actions.


Yes, only the formal actions are taken into account in the file prosecution.

c) Is there a difference between actions taken by the patent office and by third par-ties?No, as the Patent Office and the third parties should observe one and the samerules.

2


The scope of claims can be limited outside the Patent Office prosecution by the Courtand this is a part of entire file prosecution.

It is our opinion that further harmonization on this matter is necessary.

We hold the opinion that a definition of equivalent element as an element having inessence one and the same function realized in one and the same manner and giving es-sentially one and the same result would lead to more greater legal security, as well as toless costs and less lengthening of patent infringement trials.

As for the date of equivalents and for the "file wrapper estoppel" we have not a clear po-sition, since there is not enough court practice on infringements in Bulgaria. In any eventthe future issue must guarantee a fair protection for the patent proprietor with a reason-able degree of legal certainty for third parties. It seems that the prosecution history isnecessary to be taken into account in determining the scope of patent protection, sincethe amendments made by the applicant or patent owner, which narrowed the scope ofclaims is a voluntary action of premeditated refusal from a part of his rights. Once estab-lished by the claims the patent rights would not be needed to be broadened, since suchaction will confuse the fair third parties.

1

CanadaCanadaKanada

Report Q175

in the name of the Canadian Groupby Donald H. MACODRUM


Questions


In Canada, section 27(4) of the Patent Act provides: "The specification is to end with aclaim or claims defining distinctly and in explicit terms the subject-matter of the inventionfor which an exclusive privilege or property is claimed."

There is no other statutory provision governing the scope of protection afforded by theclaims of a patent and, in particular, no statutory provision expressly providing for a doc-trine of equivalents as such.

However, case law has established that the claims may extend to cover some equiva-lents beyond a literal interpretation of the claim language. The leading cases in Canadaare Free World Trust v. Électro Santé [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024 (S.C.C.) and Camco Inc. v.Whirlpool Corporation et al [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067 (S.C.C.), decisions of the SupremeCourt of Canada which were released together.

In Free World Trust v. Électro Santé, Binnie J. for the Supreme Court summarized theapplicable principles as follows:

a) The Patent Act promotes adherence to the language of the claims.

b) Adherence to the language of the claims in turn promotes both fairness and pre-dictability.

c) The claim language must, however, be read in an informed and purposive way.

d) The language of the claims thus construed defines the monopoly. There is no re-course to such vague notions as the "spirit of the invention" to expand it further.

e) The claims language will, on a purposive construction, show that some elementsof the claimed invention are essential while others are non-essential. The identifi-cation of elements as essential or non-essential is made:

(i) on the basis of the common knowledge of the worker skilled in the art towhich the patent relates;

(ii) as of the date the patent is published;

(iii) having regard to whether or not it was obvious to the skilled reader at thetime the patent was published that a variant of a particular element wouldnot make a difference to the way in which the invention works; or

2

(iv) according to the intent of the inventor, expressed or inferred from theclaims, that a particular element is essential irrespective of its practical ef-fect;

(v) without, however, resort to extrinsic evidence of the inventor's intention.

(f) There is no infringement if an essential element is different or omitted. There maystill be infringement, however, if non-essential elements are substituted or omit-ted.


The claims may be amended during patent prosecution and hence the scope of protec-tion may change during that period, although an amendment cannot be made after theCanadian filing date to add new matter not reasonably to be inferred from the applicationas originally filed.

Once issued, the patent claims are to be construed in light of the understanding of a per-son skilled in the art as at the date of publication of the patent application: Free WorldTrust v. Électro Santé (supra) and Camco Inc. v. Whirlpool Corporation et al (supra). Forpatents issued under our old legislation (those filed pre-October 1989), the date of publi-cation was the date of grant; for all other patents, the publication date is the date the ap-plication was laid open.





The prosecution history is irrelevant and inadmissible for the purpose of determining thescope of the protection granted by a patent: Free World Trust v. Électro Santé (supra)and Camco Inc. v. Whirlpool Corporation et al (supra)

In Free World Trust v. Électro Santé (supra), Binnie J. for the Supreme Court said:

"In my view, those references to the inventor's intention refer to an objec-tive manifestation of that intent in the patent claims, as interpreted by theperson skilled in the art, and do not contemplate extrinsic evidence suchas statements or admissions made in the course of patent prosecution. Toallow such extrinsic evidence for the purpose of defining the monopolywould undermine the public notice function of the claims, and increase un-certainty as well as fuelling the already overheated engines of patent liti-gation. The current emphasis on purposive construction, which keeps thefocus on the language of the claims, seems also to be inconsistent withopening the Pandora's box of file wrapper estoppel. If significant repre-sentations are made to the Patent Office touching the scope of the claims,the Patent Office should insist where necessary on an amendment to theclaims to reflect the representation."

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No


In our view, the resolution adopted by the Rio de Janeiro Congress of 1998 with respectto Q142 (Breadth of Claims, support by disclosure and scope of protection of patents)struck an appropriate balance, namely, that:

"5. Material filed during examination or in the course of inter partes pro-ceedings to justify any generalisation in the claims of specific disclosuresin the description shall not:

(a) have any effect on the scope of the disclosure of the patent appli-cation as filed:

(b) form part of the patent;

(c) serve to remedy any inadequacy in the description as filed.

…

7. The scope of protection provided by a patent for an invention is deter-mined by the claims. However, the description as a whole serves to inter-pret the claims.

8. Where an alleged infringement achieves substantially the same resultas that claimed in a patent by means that differ from the language of aclaim, in deciding the issue of infringement a reasonable balance must bemaintained between ensuring:

(a) fair reward to the patentee; and

(b) sufficient predictability for the public as to the scope of the claims."

Summary

In Canada, the scope of protection of a patent claim may extend to equivalents where a claimlimitation is not an essential feature of the claimed invention on a purposive construction of thepatent. The prosecution history is not admissible for the purposes of claim construction, includ-ing issues relating to equivalents. It is the view of the Canadian Group that the resolution adopt-ed by AIPPI to Q142 provides an appropriate balance in relation to these issues.

Résumé

Au Canada,l'étendue de la protection conférée par une revendication ne peut s'étendre auxéquivalents que dans la mesure où, suivant une interprétation téléologique du brevet, il ressortqu'un élément de la revendication n'est pas essentiel à la réalisation de l'inventionrevendiquée.Cependant, le dossier de poursuite ne peut pas être utilisé pour interpréter lesrevendications, incluant les questions relatives aux équivalents. En ce qui concerne ces ques-tions, le Groupe Canadien est d'avis que la résolution adoptée par l'AIPPI eu égard à Q142 of-fre un bon équilibre.

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Zusammenfassung

In Kanada kann sich der Schutzumfang eines Patentanspruchs auf Äquivalente ausweiten, beidenen die Anspruchsbeschränkung kein wesentliches Merkmal der beanspruchten Erfindung inBezug auf eine gezielte Patentauslegung ist. Die Strafverfahrenshistorie ist für den Zweck derAnspruchsauslegung, einschließlich Streitpunkten hinsichtlich Äquivalenten, nicht zulässig.Nach Meinung der Canadian Group bietet die von AIPPI hinsichtlich Q142 angenommene Lö-sung ein angemessenes Gleichgewicht in Bezug auf diese Streitpunkte.

1

ChinaChineChina

Report Q175

in the name of the Chinese Group


Questions


China has adopted the patent system since April 1, 1985. By now there haven't been def-inite regulations about "equivalents" or "file wrapper estoppel" in the Patent Law of Chi-na.

On August 25, 2000, China amended the Patent Law for the second time, after which theSupreme Court of China published the juridical interpretation of " Several Provisions ofApplication of Laws in Inquisition of Patent Dispute Cases". Article 17 of this juridical in-terpretation reads: The saying that "the extent of protection of the patent right for inven-tion or utility model shall be determined by the terms of the claims. The description andthe appended drawings may be used to interpret the claims" prescribed in the first para-graph of Article 56 of the Patent Law means that the scope of protection should be de-fined by the necessary technical features clearly recorded in the claims, including thescope decided by means that are equivalent to these necessary technical features.Equivalent features refer to those that are able to realize substantially the same functionand achieve substantially the same result as the recorded technical features by meansof same fundamental method, and the normal technical people in this field can associatethe features without any creative work". This judicial interpretation for the first time de-fines that the People's Court is entitled to the application of equivalents to determine in-fringement of patent rights.

In China, equivalents means that in comparison the infringing object's technical featurewith the necessary technical feature recorded in the claims of the patent right, apparent-ly one or several of features are different, however, essentially the former one has re-placed, by using the same method or technical means, one or several necessary techni-cal features belonging to the patent and got substantially same effect as the patent. Asfar as this situation is concerned, the infringing object should be considered that it hasnot been out of the scope of protection provided by the patent. Therefore, it should stillbe judged as an infringement of patent right.

The technical feature of the infringing object which is in appearance different from thepatent technique, or the technical feature that replaces the technical feature in the patenttechnical plan, is viewed as the equivalent of the necessary technical feature of patenttechnical plan.

When judging infringements of patent rights, the People's Court mainly considers the fol-lowing points:

2

1.1. The "equivalency" in equivalents refers to the equivalency of technical functionand role in the technical plan's specific features, not the two patent plans of the in-fringing object and the patent. However, when judging infringements, we mustcompare as a whole the infringing object that has used equivalent with the patentto decide whether their technical results and effects are identical. Suppose a fea-ture of some necessary technique of the substituting technical means and thesubstituted patent technique proves that they have the same technical effect,however, the invention's whole technical effect is different from the patent due tothe substitution of some technical feature, then we still can't judge the inventionas an equivalent.

1.2. The technical competence of the personnel skilled in the art should be wellconsidered in judging whether the alleged invention's technical feature is theequivalent of the necessary technical feature of the patent technique. If the formerhas adopted equivalent means or has used equivalent that is obvious and can beeasily thought of by a person skilled in the art, it should be judged as having usedequivalent. And only by now can we pronounce infringement according to equiv-alents and vice versa.

1.3. The accused alleged invention's object and technical effect are substantially thesame to the patent technique after it substitutes the necessary technical featureof patent by the equivalent means. The objective of invention and technical effectare indispensable parts of the invention's content. When determining the scope ofprotection of patent, we should at the same time consider the invention's objectiveand technical effect other than its technical features only. If the accused has usedequivalent means that has resulted in substantially the same objective of inven-tion and technical effect of the accused alleged invention and the patent tech-nique, we should pronounce infringement according to equivalents.


In China, currently there is not any regulations concerning the scope of patent protectionchange with time or not.





As for the file wrapper estoppel, it is the principal of honesty and credibility of the Gener-al Rule of the Civil Law of the PRC in patent judicature. In the process of patent protec-tion, it is very frequent that the court applies the rule of "file wrapper estoppel" to judgewhether the defendant's activity constitutes an infringement or not.

Patentee's explanation for the claim should be constantly the same when judging thepatent claim's validity and the constitution of infringement of patent claims. The patenteeis prohibited to ask for a narrower explanation or an explanation of the patent claim innarrow sense in order to get the patent, however, a broader explanation or an explana-tion of the claim in broader sense in order to testify other's infringement in infringementlitigation. In other words, a patentee is not allowed to go back on his words about the

3

commitments, approvals or desertions in the documents coming and going between himand the Patent Office. This is the principal of "file wrapper estoppel" in the patent judica-ture of China. It is one of the important principals in litigation of infringement of patentclaims.

Any inventor that applies for a patent tries to get a relatively broader scope of protection.However, it would encroach the interests for the public if the scope of protection fixed bythe claim is too broad. Therefore, sometimes the patent applicants have to follow theopinion of the examiners in the Patent Office and make descriptions on the over-extend-ed scope of protection some vague technical features and similar technical plans andfeatures in claims in order to get a patent right. Sometimes they have to desert or amendsome technical content as well as make some commitments, otherwise they are likely tofail in getting the patent. A patentee is not allowed to reuse the content he has desertedduring the application process. That means, a patentee should keep his promise and notto break it.

Put it more detailed, in China file wrapper estoppel means that in the prosecution of ap-plying, examining, canceling or invalidating a patent, the patentee gets a patent right bymaking a commitment of limitation or partly disclaiming the protection through literal an-nouncements or amending the documents in order to ensure the patent is new and cre-ative. The court should prohibit bringing the excluded or deserted content again into thescope of protection of the patent right when applying the rule of equivalents to determinethe scope of protection of patent.

In practice, file wrapper estoppel can be used only when the following conditions are ful-filled:

(1). The commitment of limitation or the desertion made on the technical feature shouldbe clearly presented and recorded in the patent files; (2). The limited or deserted techni-cal content has already functioned in essence on conferring the patent or on maintainingits validity.

The posing of a request by the defendant is the precondition of the application of filewrapper estoppel in judgment of infringement of patent claims. The defendant is respon-sible for offering the corresponding testimony testifying the plaintiff has gone back on hiswords. In case that contradiction exists between application of equivalents and file wrap-per estoppel, meaning that the plaintiff insists on the defendant's infringement of patentrights based on equivalents while the defendant maintains that his activity didn't consti-tute infringement of patent rights based on file wrapper estoppel, priority should be en-joyed by file wrapper estoppel.


In China, when a patent is conferred by the Patent Office after examination of its appli-cation, the scope of protection provided by the claim is fixed accordingly. The prosecu-tion of invalidation is the major way to limit the scope of patent protection. In cases ofpatent infringement proceedings, the same result can be achieved through explanationsof the claim, the file wrapper estoppel and the principal of refuting by prior art known tothe public.

5. Do you have recommendations for harmonization in this area?

It is worth and necessary to discuss the issue of harmonization in this area. This is be-cause, at this time, different courts in the same country may make different judgments onthe same patent infringement case and different countries may apply different standards

4

I the judgment of patent infringement cases. Further, in most occasions, it is quite difficultto apply the doctrine of equivalents. There are many issues that need to be solved. Be-fore harmonization, there should be a common understanding with respect to the defini-tion of the following: (1) what are the purposes of applying the doctrine of equivalents; (2)what are the pre-conditions of applying the doctrine of equivalents; (3) who is entitles toassess the equivalents, the persons skilled in the art, the ordinary technical person, thetechnical expert or somebody else; (4) how to evaluate the "balance between the pat-entee and public" or equity when applying the doctrine of equivalents; (5) what elementsshould be considered before applying the doctrine of equivalents; (6) what is the effect ofapplying the doctrine of equivalents, enlarging the scope of the claims or the scope of thepatent right; (7) what are function, way and result and the relations therebetween; (8)what is pioneer invention and improved invention; (9) how to consider the differences oflevel of technology between developing and developed countries; and many others.

1

ColombiaColombieKolumbien

Report Q175

in the name of the Colombian Group


Questions


No our country has no doctrine of "equivalents".


The scope of the patent protection can change up until the contents administrative ex-amination. From thereon the matter would be fixed.





Prosecution history would not play a role in determining the scope of patent protection.


There is no way on limitation of claims outside of prosecutions.


We have no harmonization recommendation issues in this area.

1

Czech RepublicRépublique Tchèque

Tschechische Republik

Report Q175

in the name of the Czech Group


Questions


In the Czech Republic the question of "equivalents" is based on the § (section) 26 of thePatent Act No. 527/1990 Coll.

According to this provision

"An application shall relate to one invention only or to a group of inventionsso linked as to form a single general inventive concept. Where a group ofinventions is claimed in one and the same patent application, the require-ment of unity of invention shall be fulfilled only when there is a technical re-lationship among those inventions involving one or more of the same orcorresponding special technical features. The expression "special techni-cal features" shall mean those features, which define a contribution, whicheach of the claimed inventions considered as a whole makes the prior art."


The scope of patent protection (limitation of the claims) can be changed in the frameworkof patent examination or after grant of the patent.


The prosecution history does play a role in determining the scope of patent protection inparticular in a revocation of the patent protection.


The scope of claims can be limited outside prosecution on the ground of the relinquish-ment by proprietor of the patent.


We are in favor for harmonisation in this area in the framework of the European patenttreaty.

1

DenmarkDanemarkDänemark

Report Q175

in the name of the Danish Groupby Peter-Ulrik PLESNER, Ejvind CHRISTIANSEN, Torsten NØRGAARD


Introduction

In Denmark a new Patents Act was enacted as of 1968. This Patent Act was more or less iden-tical with the acts in Norway, Sweden and Finland. The Patent Act introduced a new section 39concerning the scope of protection. Section 39 in the Nordic patent acts has the following word-ing:

"The extent of the protection conferred by a patent shall be determined bythe claims. For the interpretation of the claims the description may serveas a guide."

This section has in fact the same meaning as Art. 69 EPC. It was in fact inspired by a draft EPC.In 1978 the Patents Act was changed in order to prepare Denmark for joining the EPC. Howev-er, Denmark did not join the EPC until 1990. At least since 1990 Denmark is obliged to follow theProtocol on the Interpretation of Art. 69 EPC in relation to validated European patents. It is thegeneral opinion that the protocol can today also be used to interpret national Danish patents.Danish courts has for many years - at least from the middle of the 1930'ies - awarded patent pro-tection beyond the strict literal meaning of the wording used in the claims. It is probably fair tosay that Danish courts have followed what could be described as the middle way in the protocol,last sentence.

Danish courts usually give rather short reasons for their decisions and these decisions are usu-ally rather limited to the fact of the case in question. Danish courts will consequently not word astrict rule that can be used in later cases.

Questions


A doctrine of equivalents is not mentioned in the Danish Patent Act. Danish courts havewith one very new exception never used the word "equivalents" in any decisions eventhough equivalents has been argued by the lawyers. The leading Danish scholar MogensKoktvedgaard's position in relation to the doctrine of equivalents is expressed in his text-book "Lærebog i immaterialret", 6th edition, 2002, page 246:

"Therefore, the doctrine of equivalence is merely a convenient terminolog-ical tool used when you want to express that phenomena are consideredtechnically similar by an expert skilled in the art."

Mogens Koktvedgaard's main point of view is expressed in the following sentences(pages 240 and 245):

2

"In that connection a certain "extension" of the invention is normally madeby trying to assess the legal protection in such a manner that all changes,improvements or other modifications obvious to a person skilled in the artwho knows the invention are assumed to be within the scope of protection.

...

If it is subsequently considered that the patent holder's starting position isto be found through an overall evaluation of the patent document, and thatthe question of infringement is to be decided on the basis of an expertopinion, the question as to whether it is possible to lay down guidelines inrespect of assessment of the scope of protection remains."

In a landmark decision from 1941 (U 1941, page 484 H) the Supreme Court gave the fol-lowing reason:

"The slow solubility in blood and tissue fluid arisen in connection with thecombination of insulin and protamine constituting the core of the patent isfound again as the principal purpose of the defendant's preparation men-tioned above under C."

Based on this sentence, it is a very sound argument for infringement that the core of theinvention is used by the accused defendant. The concept was reconfirmed by theSupreme Court in a later landmark decision from 1979 (U 1979, page 533 H). The patent-in-suit described the process for production of the pharmaceutical Clopoxid. The centralpart of the process was the enlargement of a six-membered pyrimidine ring to a seven-membered 1.4 diazepine ring. Even though the defendant has used another substituentin a position on the six-membered ring and had to replace it at a later stage with the cor-rect substituent this was deemed to be an infringement.

It is the opinion of the Danish Group that the concept of "the core of the invention" usedin Danish decisions is in accordance with the Art. 69 Protocol if the core of the inventioncan be understood by reading the patent.

Another argument which can justify a broader extent of protection is that the patent in suitdescribes a pioneer invention.

The new article 2 to the protocol will probably cause Danish courts to use the concept"equivalents" in the future because it has now been incorporated into official rules whichinterpret the Danish Patents Act, section 39. It is difficult to say whether this will actuallycause any change in the decisions.


The Supreme Court has actually dealt with this question in a decision from 1964 (U 1964,page 498 H). One of the Supreme Court judges wrote in an article (U 1964 B, page 265)after the decision:

"In this case, six of the seven judges in the Supreme Court considered itimportant to the relevant interpretation of Geigy's patent to find the essen-tial elements of it. A patent should probably be interpreted narrowly in re-lation to later developments when it comes to the core of the patent, sincethe state of the art at the date of priority should be important, while outsidethis area it may be possible to grant a wider scope of protection. "

As can be seen from the above, the Supreme Court here again refers to the core of theinvention.

3

When the variation is outside the core of the invention, it is possible that the scope ofpatent protection can change with time. It is the opinion of the Danish Group that this isimportant in order for the patent to be secured for the future. After all, the duration of thepatent is up to 20 years. To the extent that the development concerns the core of the in-vention it is the opinion of the Danish Group that the relevant time must be the prioritydate.





The correspondence with the Patent Office, both formal and informal, is very often reliedupon by the parties in infringement litigation. This kind of evidence is in other words ad-missible. However, Denmark does not have a "doctrine" of file wrapper estoppel.

In several cases, the court has referred to this correspondence in its decisions. The cor-respondence can be used to narrow or confirm the scope of protection, but not to broad-en the scope of protection.

Statements from the applicant to the effect that a certain embodiment is not covered bythe protection will usually be binding. The same is the case if the applicant has charac-terised certain features as being "essential" or "critical".

A special problem is the consequence of adding further features to the patent claim dur-ing prosecution. Case law on this question is ambiguous but at least in two cases addingof further features did not narrow the scope of protection.

The answer to question a) is that the correspondence with the Patent Office can be usedto determine the scope of protection but no formal rules can be applied.

The answer to question b) is that both formal and informal actions in the Patent Office isof relevance.

The answer to question c) is based on case law that it is not possible to see the impor-tance of any difference between official and unofficial actions. However, it is the opinionof the Danish Group that a specific statement by the patentee in relation to an oppositionwill have a strong influence on a possible later infringement case against the same par-ty.


This question has only been raised in a very old Supreme Court decision from 1927.

Of course, it cannot be excluded that a statement to a third party can be binding in rela-tion to this third party based on ordinary contractual points of view. However, it must bethe main rule that general statements about the scope of protection outside the prosecu-tion cannot be of importance.

The Danish Group wishes to emphasise that prior art can be used to interpret patents.This is especially the case in relation to prior art which has been described in the patentsuits.

4

Statements in previous litigation or foreign litigation about a patent can also have an ef-fect in a Danish litigation on determining the scope of protection.


It is the opinion of the Danish Group that the new wording of the protocol to Art. 69 EPCwith the new article 2 could form the basis for harmonisation. The Danish Group does notfavour the phrasing of a formal "doctrine of equivalents". It is the opinion of the DanishGroup that the prosecution history (both formal and informal statements such as duringopposition and discussions with examiners, respectively) from case to case shall play arole in determining the extent of patent protection. However, prosecution history shouldnot be used to broaden the extent of protection. The Danish Group does not favour a for-mal "doctrine of file wrapper estoppel" (i.e. a "Festo" situation).

Summary

In Denmark the Patents Act, section 39, has the same meaning as Art. 69 EPC. Denmark is amember of EPC and Danish courts are obliged to follow the Art. 69 protocol. Danish courts donot apply a doctrine of equivalents but have frequently found infringement if the defendant used"the core of the invention". The prosecution history is often used by the courts in order to deter-mine the scope of patent protection.

Résumé

Au Danemark, l'Article 39 de la Loi sur les Brevets a la même signification que l'Article 69 de laCBE. Le Danemark est un membre de la CBE et les tribunaux danois sont obligés de suivre leprotocole de l'Article 69. Les tribunaux danois n'appliquent pas une "doctrine des équivalents"proprement dite, mais ils ont fréquemment trouvé qu'il y avait contrefaçon dans les cas où ledéfendeur utilisait "le noyau de l'invention". L'historique de la procédure de délivrance d'unbrevet est souvent utilisé par les tribunaux afin de déterminer l'étendue de la protection conféréepar le brevet.

Zusammenfassung

In Dänemark hat das Patentgesetz, Paragraph 39, dieselbe Bedeutung als Artikel 69, EPÜ.Dänemark ist ein Vertragsstaat dieses Übereinkommen, und die dänischen Gerichte sind dazuverplichtet, dem Protokoll des Artikel 69 nachzukommen. Die dänischen Gerichte folgen nichteine doktrinäre "Äquivalenzlehre", haben jedoch häufig Verletzungen gefunden, falls derBeklagte "den Kern der Erfindung" benutzt habe. Die Amtsakten werden oft von den Gerichtenbenutzt, um der Patentschutzbereich feststellen zu können.

1

EcuadorEquateurEcuador

Report Q175

in the name of the Ecuadorian Groupby César GUERRERO VILLAGÓMEZ (President)


Allow me to make a brief history of the "Doctrine of Equivalents" which dates from early last cen-tury.

Argentinean author P.C. Breuer Moreno teaches us that: "when the inventor conceives the in-ventive idea and the means to carry it out, he/she refers in general to certain specific meansand when he/she files for the patent he/she specifies which these are or describes them. How-ever, this does not mean that his/her right is limited solely to their use. The form specified by theinventor is the "prototype" of all possible forms, because his/her invention embraces all equiva-lent elements. It is precisely due to the fact that the means the inventor found have known tech-nical equivalents, he/she may substitute the original means by the latter without leaving the lim-its of his/her invention. By using the equivalents the inventor has simple made a constructivevariant. For this same reason, once the patent is granted, no third party can make that inventionby substituting the means specified by the inventor with its equivalents.

Hence, the inventive idea continues and does not refer to a sole construction, but to all possibleconstructions. All forms of performing one same invention are accordingly, equivalents. Ofcourse, the invention covers all equivalent means that lead to a same result. But it may occurthat one mean be substituted by another one that carries out the same function but with a dif-ferent result. In this case, there would be a new invention, dependent on the first."

This theory of doctrine may be fully applied when we confront forgeries and violations to a grant-ed patent.

German author Köhler, says Breuer Moreno, was who identified and made us know of this prin-ciple, when he spoke of the "Theory of the equivalents". This author identified such doctrine inthe field of patent forgeries by telling us that forgery existed when the means used by the forgerwere technical equivalents of those used by the patent owner to obtain the sought functional re-sult.

This concept was expanded by Vander Haeghen when he said that the application of the princi-ple of the equivalents allows to state there is forgery in any industrial product that solves thesame problem than that confronted by the patent, by executing the same technical functionscombined in the same way. In summary, he says "The following practical rules can be extractedfrom the principle of the equivalents:

1. Firstly, determine, the patent's exact object;

2. Later on, determine the combination of technical functions used to obtain the evident re-sult;

3. Examine if that same combination of functions is used by the alleged forger. If so, thereis no doubt there is forgery."

2

Regardless of the above concepts, authors such as Pauillet, Vander Haeghen, Roubier, and A.Casalonga, agree when they say that the rules or criteria, even those based on the concept ofequivalents, present one problem: incite the judge to enforce a juridical thesis that some timesleads to absurd decisions when applied without precaution.

In conclusion, the "Doctrine of the equivalents" has followers and retractors among the expertauthors.

With the above background, I will proceed to answer the questions and to do so, in Ecuador wehave four main national laws in what concerns Intellectual Property:

- Intellectual Property Law, 1998 (Law 83).

- Decision 486 of the Andean Community Commission, 2000 (Decision 486).

- "Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights", 1996, of the World Trade Or-ganization (WTO) (TRIPS)

- Paris Convention for Industrial Property Protection, 1883 (adopted in Stockholm in 1967)(Paris Convention).

We also have secondary laws such as the 1911 Bolivarian Convention and several Inter-Amer-ican conventions that Ecuador has adopted.

None of the above laws effective in our country has provided for the "doctrine of the equiva-lents". Nevertheless, from the explanation container in the "work guide" submitted by the AIPPI'sSecretary General, we find this principle is closely linked to interpretations on claims. Accord-ingly, we refer to the mentioned questions based on our knowledge and understanding thereof.

Questions


Art. 51 of Decision 486, 148 of Law 83, 29 of TRIPS, and Art. 44 of the Paris Conventionclearly provide that:

"the scope of the protection granted by the patent shall be determined bythe contents of the claims. The description and drawings or, as the casemay be, the biological material deposited, shall be used to interpret them."

In this sense, the Andean Community Court of Justice, in its Prejudicial Interpretation hassaid:

"…juridically speaking, claims constitute the most significant element of apatent's application since in them the technical examiner will find the ele-ments required to determine what is sought to be patented, the invention'sscope, and the definition to the ends of carrying out a comparative analy-sis regarding the state of the art." (Process 12-IP-98, R.O. No. 226, June 5, 1999)

In this way, consistent with Art. 30 of Decision 486 and 148 of Law 83, as well as with thecriteria reiterated in the mentioned Court's sentences, our regime demands that claimsbe sufficiently clear and accurate, although, at the time of their interpretation, the de-scription and drawings can be resorted to.

The protection's scope, hence, is obviously conferred by the claim's contents and what isexplained by the Community court as the invention's comparison with the state of the artseems applicable to an eventual comparison of the patented invention and the obtain-ment of the same result by a third party.

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Claims cannot be extended to aspects not subject to protection; thus, consequently, wecould add that equivalent means are not included either. The following abstract from theaforementioned Prejudicial Interpretation abstract guides us somehow:

"The inventor tends to excessively expand industrial protection to his/herproduct or procedure; for this reason claims are relevant regarding the de-scription because they are precisely these that limit such protection'sscope."

Accordingly, I believe a discussion on the use of substitutive means to those contained inthe invention in a judicial proceeding would be quite interesting. As far as I know, this hasnot occurred yet in Ecuador, so we are unable to state if there is any jurisprudence in thisregard.


Patent protection is restricted by the contents of claims, and the latter must be construedby their literal contents, at the most, resorting, to the descriptive memoir. This is why, inmy opinion, we cannot believe that the patent tacitly includes or extends to means ig-nored at the time when the patent was filed.

In definitive, while there is no rule referred to this aspect, I believe that protection's scopeis fixed in time, when the patent is granted. Prior to this occurring, the application can bemodified without expanding the protection, as well as the claim's text can be substituted(Art. 34 Decision 486 and 137 of Law 83).

Arts. 70 and 71 of this Decision set forth the possibility of modifying the patent once it isgranted, but solely to limit its scope, i.e., one or several claims can be waived. Theserules allow me to assert - by the way of contraries - that a protection's scope cannot beextended to something not container at the time of granting the patent.

I also deem pertinent to refer to Art. 55 of Decision 486 and 151 d) of Law 83, which al-low the invention's exploitation to a "third party who, in good faith and before the priorityor application's filing date ... had been using or exploiting the invention or had performedeffective or serious preparations to do so."





Pursuant to Art. 30 of Decision 486, claims shall define the matter sought for pro-tection; in its turn, Art. 51 of the Decision and 148 of the Law provide: "the scopeof the protection granted by the patent shall be determined by the contents of theclaims. The description and drawings or, as the case may be, the biological ma-terial deposited, shall be used to interpret them." From this we deduce that, in ac-cordance with our legislation, the description, the drawings, the biological materi-al of a given application can be used to interpret claims and, thus, their protection.There is no reference whatsoever to who or what the applicant shall resort duringthe patent granting procedure to determine the scope of the claims' protection.

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Regardless of the above, we must underline that in accordance with Art. 34 of theDecision and 137 of the Law we are referring to, the applicant may modify his/herapplication at any time. This would include the possibility of waiving certain claimsor to rewrite them to the end of attaining favorable results; particularly in the caseof observations made by the State office in charge of patent granting.

In this alleged case, a voluntary and express waiver would lead the patent's grant-ing, but limiting it to a given number of claims whose scope, in case of doubts,shall be construed with the description.

In conclusion, our law makes no express mention to resort during a procedure todetermine a patent's protection scope. From our knowledge, jurisprudence hasnot elucidated this problem either. However, in my opinion, it would be unfair andillegitimate for a patent's protection to implicitly or explicitly attain waived claimsmade by the applicant's statements or expressions during the granting procedureand then try to make such protection valid in front of third parties.


Art. 71 of Decision 486 provides the possibility of modifying a granted patent, and evenamend or limit the scope of the claims. Likewise, it also allows the waiver to one or moreclaims or the whole patent. Additionally, Art. 53 of Decision 486 and 150 of the Law, pro-vide several situations in which regard the patent's holder is unable to exercise his/herrights, i.e.:

a) acts carried out in the private sector and with non profit purposes;

b) acts carried out exclusively with experimentation purposes related to the patent-ed invention subject matter;

c) acts carried out exclusively with teaching or scientific or academia purposes;

d) acts referred in Art. 5ter of the Paris Convention for Industrial Property Protection;

e) whenever a patent protects a biological material, excepting plants, capable of re-producing, using it as an initial basis to obtain new viable material, unless suchobtainment requires the repeated use of the patented entity.

Patent-derive rights cannot be used against third parties who, in good faith, priorto filing the application or the claim, had been exploiting or using the invention.

Besides these situations and any other similar one, which are exceptions dulyprovided in the Law, there are no other express motives to limit the protectionscope of a patent's claim.


In our country, the matter is not ruled or discussed. Therefore, it would seem reasonableto establish and rule the possibility that implicit and explicit expressions made by the ap-plicant during a patent's granting process be taken into consideration to interpret thescope of claims. In this way, it would not solely and exclusively be based on the literalcontents of the claims and the description, but his would also avoid possible abuse by thepatent's holder who, independently from having denoted and limited the scope of one orseveral claims, may later try to ignore such actions to keep third parties from using im-portant technical means. On the other hand, claims would be granted major certainty andclarity if the description were not sufficient to any third party, including the holder, to at-tain an adequate juridical security on the matter.

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EgyptEgypte

Ägypten

Report Q175

in the name of the Egyptian Groupby Karim EL-HELALY


IntroductionDue to the controverisial debate evolving around the balance between fair protection for the pat-entee and the reasonable degree of certainty for third parties" arising from the application of thedoctrine of equivalents, it became one of the most important topic on the agenda for Patent lawharmonization (WIPO has a Standing Committee on the Law of Patents which meets regularlyto work towards a new treaty to further harmonize patent law throughout the world). This papershall seek a breif-focus on the role of equivalents and prosecution history in defining the scopeof patent protection played in the three major patent markets (US, Europe, and Japan) and therule of law for this doctrine uder the new Egyptian Intellectual Property Law No. 82/2002.

I. In the US

The doctrine of equivalents is a rule of a claim interpretation under which an accusedproduct or a process, althought not a literal infringement if it performs substaintially thesame function in substantialy the same way to obtain substantially the same result as theclaimed product or process. The doctrine of equivalents gives a degree of flexibility un-der which a court may expand the narrow and literal language of a patent claim. MilesLabs. Inc. V. Shandon Inc. 997 F. 2d 870, 876, 27 USPZ2d 1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993).However, courts must be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled ex-pectations of the inventing community. (the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in the caseof Warner-Jenkinson v Hilton Davis Chemical). US practice favours bright-line tests thatgive certainty to the public Currently, as in the case of Festo v Shoketsu Kinzoku KogyoKabushiki. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has heard arguments in theFesto case for the second time, after the case had been remanded back to it by theSupreme Court. In the February 6 hearing, the two sides once again presented their ar-guments in Festo v SMC, this time in light of the Supreme Court's ruling. The appealscourt held the hearing en banc, with all 13 judges present.. According to several ob-servers at the hearing, it is also likely that the court will decide that rebuttal of presump-tion is an issue that should be decided on by a judge and not a jury. There is no set timefor when the court must reach a decision, and observers were reluctant to offer even arough estimate. Sam Mamudi, Court rehears Festo arguments, visited 9th February,2003

<http://www.legalmediagroup.com/default.asp?Page=1&SID=9421>

II. In Europe

Unlike the estoppels approach adopted by the US, European practice favors that thepatent is interpreted only from its contents as read by the person skilled in the art. (Ciba-

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Geigy v Oté Optics, Dutch Supreme Court and Rohm & Haas v Collag, English Court ofAppeal). The French courts may allow the scope of the claim to cover equivalents to itsessential features if the equivalents have the same function and give a result of the samenature (sometimes referred to as a same-function-result-although-not-necessarily-the-same-way test). In the United Kingdom the doctrine of equivalents is contemplatedwhereby the meaning of a word or phrase can be stretched beyond its strict, literal mean-ing. The test is formulated by the Catnic questions as set out by House of Lords in Cat-nic Components v Hill & Smith. The German courts focus on the underlying technicalproblem and the achievement of the result which, sometimes referred to as an obvious-ness test, whereby it addresses the fair protection for the patentee and the interests ofthird parties. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands, in January 27 1989 adopted the an-tithesis of an element-by-element analysis approach, extending protection to all embod-iments which are in the essence of the matter the same as the invention.

III. In Japan

Japan recognizes a doctrine of equivalents following a decision of the JapaneseSupreme Court in February 1998 (Case 1994 (0) No 1083 Ball Spline Shaft) setting outfive requirements for the doctrine to apply. Japanese law simply recognizes prosecutionhistory as a special case of conscious limitation, which is one of the possible reasonswhy the patent proprietor might have deliberately excluded the alleged infringement.

IV. In Egypt

Albeit, Egypt's recent enactment of Law No. 82/2002 for the protection of intellectualproperty in Egypt, the doctrine of equivalents debate is not yet introduced to EgyptianCourts, Article 34 of said law stipulates that:

"…The identical product shall be deemed to be obtained by the patentedprocess, if the plaintiff could prove in his civil proceedings that: a) the iden-tical product was made by the direct use of the patented process; or b) thathe has exerted reasonable efforts to determine the process actually usedin the production. In such a case, the court may require the defendant toprovide evidence that the identical product was made by a process otherthan the patented process owned by the plaintiff...".

It is not clear yet, whether the above provisions contemplates the concept of equivalentsor not? Accordingly, the executive and implementing regulations to be issued, and mostimportantly the interpretation and application of the Egyptian courts to said provisionsshould shed more light on the provisions above in general and the definition of "Identicalproduct". The approach to be adopted by the Egyptian courts on the test sought toachieve the balance between a fair protection for the patentee and the reasonable de-gree of certainty for third parties yet remain unforseen.

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EstoniaEstonieEstland

Report Q175

in the name of the Estonian Groupby Jaak G. OSTRAT


Questions


The Estonian current patent law does not include any indication to the equivalents. Withregard to the scope of patent protection, the Section 1 of the Article 10 stipulates that

the extent of patent protection shall be defined by the terms of the patentclaims. The description of the invention, the drawing and other illustrativematerials shall be used to interpret the patent claims.

The case law with regard to the equivalents is missing. No one court case in patent andutility model matters has affected this problem so far.


No cases, no practice in this matter. From the legal aspect, pursuant to our Patent Act,the scope of the patent protection is defined by the patent claims included into the Let-ters Patent (i.e. by the date of issuance of the Letters Patent). The further amendmentsin patent claims are possible, e.g. as a result of court proceedings, where the validity ofthe patent was contested, but only towards the restriction of the scope of patent protec-tion. The patentee himself is also entitled to apply for changes in the patent protection butonly towards the limitation of the scope of protection.





The scope of the patent protection as applied for can be amended in the course of theexamination procedure at the Patent Office. The scope of protection as determined in thepublished patent application can be during the subsequent substantial examinationprocess be amended only towards to the restriction of the subject scope. The subject re-

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striction can be introduced on the initiative either of the applicant or the Examiner, in thelatter case the consent of the applicant is required.

So far we do not have any practice in implementing of the prosecution history in the sub-sequent possible actions. But from the legal point of view, according to our Civil Law, thesubject history is available and will be considered as an evidence for any court and ap-peal proceeding where the validity of the patent protection has been put under the sus-picion.


The scope of patent claims can be limited while processing the application at the PatentOffice, after issuance of the Letters Patent the limitation is possible through a court ac-tion or on the base of the patentee's voluntary amendments.


The use of the doctrine of equivalents in determining the real scope of patent protectionin cases when the object realized does not fall directly within the literal wording of patentclaims is necessary without any doubts. In this respect:

i) the new versions of the Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on Interpretation of Article69 of EPC are an important step toward to the itemizing of the term "equivalent",but not sufficient to grant the uniform practice of their implementation in differentcountries;

ii) it seems to be reasonable to stipulate expressis verbis that equivalency can beimplemented with regard to the features (integers) of the invention, not for thewhole invention;

iii) it seems that the US approach to the equivalents (substantially the same func-tion, in substantially the same way, with the same result) is the most appropri-ate with regard to granting the reasonable balance between the patentee's rightsand the public interest. Focusing only to the result achieved (Working Guide-lines, page 3, section 6) broadens essentially the accepted playground for thepatentee and unjustifiedly limits the possibilities of the counterpart (first of all,competitors);

iv) in my opinion the equivalents have to be assessed at the date of issuance of theLetters Patent. Of course, while drafting the claim language, the patentee can nottake into consideration the equivalents which will "born" after issuance of thepatent, but excluding them from the process of determining the scope of patentprotection seems to be a less loss than the possibility of the unpredictable ex-pansion of the scope of patent protection in the contrary case. In other words, thedate of issuance of the Letters Patent seems to be the most satisfactory compro-mise between the patentee's and public interest;

v) as to the "file wrapper estoppel", then in principle use of it in determining thescope of patent protection should be reasonable, first of all from the aspect of rec-titude. If the applicant has restricted his demands in the process of the examina-tion, the "abandoned territory" cannot be subsequently fully "reimbursed" withhelp of equivalents. In other words, if the applicant limits the claims in order to geta patent, the disclaimed parts may be subject to equivalency but in a restrictedscope. Otherwise the restrictions made during the examination will have no prac-tical sense.

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As to the notorious Festo case, then it seems that the final decision of the US SupremeCourt in the matter refers inter alia to the above- mentioned approach.

1

FinlandFinlandeFinnland

Report Q175

in the name of the Finnish Groupby Pia HJELT (chairman), Kim FINNILÄ, Eva GREW, Annika HAKKILA, Keijo HEINONEN,

Juha KAUKONEN, Antti PELTONEN, Ben RAPINOJA, Raili RINKINEN,Timo VUORIMIES, Arja WECKMAN, Veli-Matti KÄRKKÄINEN


Questions


A "Doctrine of Equivalents" is not provided for in Finnish statutory law, nor by case law

In Finland court decisions, even by the Supreme Court, are not binding, only guiding, al-though courts will rarely deviate from a prolonged and consistent legal praxis, which forpractical purposes may be called "case law".

During the last 40 years or so, the terms "equivalent" or "equivalence" have not beenused by the Helsinki Court of Appeals, the sole court for appeals in patent cases, nor bythe Supreme Court to clarify the reasons for a decision rendered in a patent matter. Thus,a doctrine of equivalence cannot be said to be included in Finnish case law.

However, the equivalence theory has been discussed to a large extent in Finnish patentliterature. Moreover, in litigations where non-literal infringement has been claimed, theterm "equivalent" has frequently been used by the patentee to describe a feature replac-ing a feature of the claim.

How is non-literal infringement assessed in Finland?

Based on a prolonged and consistent legal praxis in Finland, the scope of patent protec-tion may, based on the facts of the case, be interpreted as being broader than the actualwording of the claims. So far no decisions on infringement of European patents havebeen made in Finland. Nevertheless, the courts have generally applied the basic princi-ples on claim interpretation included in the Protocol on the Interpretation of Art. 69 of theEPC. In many decisions where non-literal infringement has been deemed to occur, thecourt has reasoned that inessential differences from that which is literally expressed inthe claims must not prevent a decision in favour of the patentee.

The facts in a case may also call for a very strict literal interpretation or even a more nar-row interpretation than the literal wording of the patent claims. Everything, which is partof the prior art, is outside the scope of protection of a patent.


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The scope of patent protection may change with time. No statute or case law is providedfor fixing the date for interpreting the scope of patent protection.


The patent office prosecution history forms part of the material, which may be used in de-termining the scope of patent protection. All the files of patents and publicly availablepatent applications are open for public inspection and may be referred to by any of theparties, including the patent office.


No, there is no formal "file wrapper estoppel" in Finland. However, as statedabove, any statements in the prosecution history may be used for interpreting theclaims. Limiting statements may, and have been used in many cases to narrowthe scope of protection.


No, there is no difference between formal and informal actions in the patent officeregarding statements in the prosecution history. However, oral communicationswith the examiners are generally not documented and are thus not a part of theactual prosecution history file, wherefore they seldom can be used.


No, there is no difference between actions taken by the patent office and by thirdparties regarding statements in the prosecution history.


Any statement or admission made by the patentee may be taken into account in the in-terpretation of the scope of the claims.

There is no administrative re-examination or limitation procedure available for the pat-entee in Finland. A claim may, however, be limited by partial invalidation in an invalidationsuit in court.


The present situation regarding the interpretation of the scope of protection conferred bypatent claims as regards non-literal infringement is unsatisfactory on a global level.

There is a substantial difference in interpretation between the U.S., Japan and Europe,and despite the Protocol on the Interpretation of Art. 69 EPC, identically worded claimsare interpreted differently in European courts. The amended Protocol requires that dueaccount should be taken of equivalents, but since this does not define what is meant byan equivalent, it seems no real harmonisation will be provided in Europe even when theamended EPC is ratified and applied to patents granted by the EPO.

The Finnish AIPPI Group considers that a worldwide harmonisation of claim interpreta-tion is highly desirable and, in fact, in 1999 the Group arranged an international Sympo-sium called "Equivalents in patents". The lectures by Joseph Straus, Justice Jacob, Cata-rina Holz and Bengt Domeij are published in English in NIR, Nordiskt ImmaterielltRättsskydd, issue 3/1999.

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The Group considers that the harmonisation should aim at providing clear, unambiguous,meaningful and comprehensive guidelines on how to interpret claims. These guidelinesshould be globally acceptable and adequately applicable also on the everyday level sothat they would be suitable for solving not only legal issues but also practical disputes re-lating to non-literal infringement. A person skilled in the art should be able to understandthe technical information and the scope of protection provided by a patent so as to beable to avoid unauthorized utilization of the patented invention.

The term "equivalence" is frequently used for describing non-literal infringement. How-ever, the term has such a wide and inconsistent variety of meanings in the world that itmight be preferable to formulate common guidelines without explicit reference to saidterm. It seems that it might be easier to reach agreement on the interpretation of non-lit-eral infringement, if the issue is not confused by the existing variety of doctrines. In casethe term is retained, it should be given a consistent and universally accepted meaning.

It seems that the harmonisation work previously performed by the WIPO in its DraftTreaty of 1990 could suitably be used as a starting point for further discussions. TheTreaty suggested that infringement interpretation should take into account equivalentswhere

(i) the equivalent element performs substantially the same function in sub-stantially the same way and produces substantially the same result as theelement as expressed in the claim, or

(ii) it is obvious to a person skilled in the art that the same result as thatachieved by means of the element as expressed in the claims can beachieved by means of the equivalent element.

The harmonisation process should be conducted very carefully in Europe as well asamong the PCT Contracting States. The harmonisation should also reflect the harmoni-sation in examination and granting procedures in these areas.

The above mentioned WIPO Draft Treaty also suggested that due account should be tak-en of any statement limiting the scope of the claims made by the applicant or the ownerof the patent during procedures concerning the grant or validity of the patent. This ap-proach corresponds to the present Finnish interpretation on statements in the prosecu-tion history and it is supported by the Finnish AIPPI Group as a basis for common rules.However, prosecution history should not be used for broadening the scope of protection.

Summary

A "Doctrine of Equivalents" is not provided for in Finnish statutory law, nor by case law. Legalpraxis in Finland accepts that claims may be interpreted as being broader than the literal scope.The courts have generally applied the basic principles on claim interpretation included in theProtocol on the Interpretation of Art. 69 of the EPC. No statute or case law is provided for fixingthe date for interpreting the scope of patent protection. There is no formal "file wrapper estop-pel" in Finland. The patent office prosecution history, including actions taken by the patent officeand by third parties, forms part of the material, which may be used for interpreting the claims indetermining the scope of patent protection.

The Finnish AIPPI Group considers that the present situation regarding the interpretation of thescope of protection conferred by patent claims as regards non-literal infringement is unsatisfac-tory on a global level. Harmonisation is needed and it should aim at providing comprehensive,globally acceptable and adequately applicable guidelines on how to interpret claims. The term"equivalence", if retained, should be given a consistent and universally accepted meaning. The

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harmonisation work previously performed by the WIPO in its Draft Treaty of 1990 could suitablybe used as a starting point for further discussions.

Résumé

"Doctrine des équivalents" n'est prévue ni par la législation ni par la jurisprudence finlandaise.En Finlande, la pratique judiciaire permet d'interpréter les revendications au sens plus large quel'étendue littérale. En général, les cours de justice appliquent les principes fondamentaux d'in-terprétation des revendications exprimés dans le Protocole sur l'Interprétation de l'Article 69 dela Convention sur le brevet européen. Aucun statut ou jurisprudence n'est prévu pour fixer unedate pour interpréter l'étendue de protection d'un brevet. Il n'existe aucun "file wrapper estoppel"formel en Finlande. L'histoire des poursuites de l'office des brevets, y compris les mesures prispar l'office des brevets et par des tiers, constitue une partie de matériel qui peut être utilisé pourl'interprétation des revendications en déterminant l'étendue de protection d'un brevet.

Le groupe finlandais de l'AIPPI est d'avis que la situation actuelle concernant l'interprétation del'étendue de protection conférée par les revendications, en ce qui concerne la violation non-lit-térale, est peu satisfaisante au niveau global. L'harmonisation est nécessaire et elle devrait vis-er à prévoir des directives de grande portée, globalement acceptables et applicables de façonadéquate sur l'interprétation des revendications. Il faut que le terme "équivalence", si gardé, aieun sens logique et universellement accepté. Le travail d'harmonisation fait auparavant par l'OM-PI, dans le projet de traité de 1990, peut être utilisé comme un point de départ convenable pourles discussions à suivre.

Zusammenfassung

Eine "Doktrine der Äquivalenz" ist weder im Finnischen Gesetzesrecht noch in der Recht-sprechung niedergelegt. Laut der Rechtspraxis ist es möglich, Ansprüche in einem weiterenSinne auszulegen als was der Buchstabe besagt. Die Gerichte haben normalerweise die Grund-prinzipien der Auslegung von Ansprüchen, die im Protokoll über die Auslegung des Artikels 69der EPC beinhaltet sind, angewandt. Es gibt weder Statuten noch Rechtsprechung für die Fes-tlegung des Datums für die Auslegung des Umfangs eines Patentschutzrechts. In Finnland gibtes keinen formellen "file wrapper estoppel". Die bisherige Verfahrensweise des Patentamtes,einschließlich Maßnahmen durch das Patentamt und durch Dritte, stellt einen Teil des Materialsdar, das für die Auslegung von Ansprüchen angewandt werden könnte, wenn es darum geht,den Umfang des Patentschutzrechts zu bestimmen.

Die finnische AIPPI-Gruppe ist der Meinung, dass die derzeitige Lage hinsichtlich der Auslegungdes Umfangs eines Schutzrechts, wie in den Patentansprüchen niedergelegt, im Hinblick aufnichtwörtliche Verletzung auf einer globalen Ebene unzufriedenstellend ist. Eine Harmon-isierung ist notwendig, deren Ziel es sein sollte, umfassende, global akzeptable und adäquatverwendbare Richtlinien der Auslegung von Ansprüchen festzulegen. Dem Terminus "Äquiv-alenz", falls beibehalten, sollte eine folgerichtige und universal akzeptierte Bedeutung verliehenwerden. Die Harmonisierungsarbeit, bisher durchgeführt von WIPO in dem Abkommensentwurfvon 1990, würde sich sehr gut als einen Ausgangspunkt für weitere Diskussionen eignen.

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FranceFrance

Frankreich

Rapport Q175

au nom du Groupe françaispar Michel DE BEAUMONT (Président), Jean-Philippe DELSART (Rapporteur),

Barbara BERTHOLLET, Jean-Pierre ESSON, Eric HESSANT, Hubert KIEHL,Michel MONCHENY, Denis MONÉGIER DU SORBIER,

Stéphane PALIX, Isabelle ROMET, Franck TETAZ


Questions


La FRANCE connaît une doctrine des équivalents.

Le terme de doctrine peut prêter à confusion: en droit français, la doctrine est constituéepar la pensée des auteurs et constitue, au même titre que la loi ou la jurisprudence, unedes sources du droit. L'expression "doctrine des équivalents" ne se réfère pas seulementà l'opinion des auteurs, mais également aux règles dégagées par la jurisprudence pourl'appréciation des contrefaçons non littérales.

La doctrine des équivalents trouve application en cas de contrefaçon non littérale d'unmoyen essentiel d'un brevet.

Les dispositions de cette doctrine des équivalents ne sont pas fixées par la loi. (Néan-moins, l'existence de cette théorie peut trouver un support dans la rédaction de l'articleL.613-2 du Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle, qui correspond à l'article 69-1 CBE: "l'é-tendue de la protection conférée par le brevet est déterminée par la teneur des revendi-cations. Toutefois, la description et les dessins servent à interpréter les revendications").

Les règles relatives aux équivalents ont été fixées par la doctrine (1).

Elles sont appliquées par la jurisprudence (2).

L'examen de la jurisprudence fait apparaître un certain nombre de points particuliers quipermettent de mieux définir la théorie générale telle que définie par la doctrine (3).

1.1 - La doctrine

Selon Paul ROUBIER: "la substitution possible d'un élément ou d'un organe à un autreélément ou à un autre organe est une chose trop aisée pour le technicien, pour qu'onpuisse laisser le breveté à la merci de changements de cette sorte (…). Il y a au point devue de la technique un "équivalent" toutes les fois qu'un appareil réalise le même résul-tat que celui du brevet, par des moyens analogues remplissant la même fonction et ten-dant au même but".

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Selon Paul MATHELY: "sont équivalents des moyens qui, bien qu'étant de formes dif-férentes, exercent la même fonction en vue d'un résultat semblable".Le résultat peut être d'une qualité différente (soit meilleure, soit moindre) du résultatobtenu par le moyen breveté.

"C'est donc l'identité de fonction qui caractérise l'équivalence" (Paul MATHELY).

1.2 - La jurisprudence

La jurisprudence fait une application fréquente de la doctrine des équivalents.

A tout le moins, de nombreuses décisions, posent, en exergue de leur motivation, qu'il ya contrefaçon lorsque le moyen (du dispositif allégué de contrefaçon) exerce la mêmefonction pour atteindre le même résultat que celui du brevet litigieux.

Par exemple: Cass.Com. 26/10/1993 (n°91-20417) "malgré la différence de la forme dumoyen protégé et du moyen argué de contrefaçon il y avait identité de leur fonction envue d'un même résultat, ce dont il résultait que les moyens étaient équivalents"

CA Paris 15/3/1996 (PIBD n°613-III-339) "la contrefaçon par équivalence ne peut êtreretenue que si le système argué de contrefaçon présente, malgré ses différences destructure, une fonction identique pour un résultat technique de même nature, sinon demême degré"

TGI Paris 5/10/1999 (PIBD n°698-III-247) "il est constant qu'il y a contrefaçon par équiv-alence dès lors que l'objet argué de contrefaçon réalise le même résultat que celui dubrevet par des moyens analogues remplissant la même fonction et tendant au mêmebut"

Mais, au-delà de cette affirmation générale, il est difficile de discerner dans la jurispru-dence française les limites précises de la doctrine des équivalents.

Certains points apparaissent cependant suffisamment clairs pour qu'ils soient relevés:

1.2.1 - La fonction

L'identité de fonction est l'élément déterminant de la doctrine française des équivalents.

On parle de fonction ou d'effet technique premier (CA PARIS 4ème chambre - 11 sep-tembre 1996, PIBD n° 621-III-577) "sont équivalents deux moyens de forme différentemais qui, exerçant la même fonction, c'est-à-dire le même effet technique premier, pro-curent un résultat semblable"

Cet effet technique premier ne doit pas être confondu avec le résultat qu'il permetd'obtenir et qui lui n'est pas protégeable.

1.2.1.1 - Cas d'un moyen unique

Il se peut que le brevet n'ait revendiqué qu'un moyen unique.

Si ce moyen unique assure une fonction qui n'est pas nouvelle, alors la protection con-férée se limitera à ce moyen particulier.

Dès lors, un dispositif concurrent ne pourrait être contrefaisant du seul fait qu'il reproduitla fonction, s'il ne reproduit pas la structure du moyen.

Au contraire, si le brevet revendique un moyen unique qui assure une fonction nouvelle,celle-ci sera protégée alors même que le moyen du dispositif allégué de contrefaçon quipermet de la remplir est de structure différente.

La doctrine des équivalents va donc trouver à s'appliquer dans le cas suivant: le brevetrevendique un moyen unique, mais le tribunal estime que la fonction remplie par ce

3

moyen particulier est nouvelle. Le juge décide alors de sanctionner l'utilisation de toutmoyen même de structure différente, qui assure la même fonction.

Par exemple: Cass. Com. 15.07.87 (Bull. civ. n° 180): "une société ne saurait faire griefà un arrêt de l'avoir déclarée contrefactrice d'un brevet dès lors que, tout en relevant desdifférences de structure entre le dispositif protégé par le brevet et le sien, la Cour d'Ap-pel a, par une appréciation souveraine, retenu que le brevet protégeait également desfonctions et que celles-ci étaient identiques ou similaires à celles produites par le dis-positif litigieu".

Le juge va, dans ce cas, au-delà du libellé précis de la revendication en admettantl'équivalence et donc la contrefaçon de la fonction, alors même qu'en tant que telle, saprotection n'était pas revendiquée.

Il ressort de ce qui précède, que pour qu'un moyen soit déclaré équivalent et donc con-trefaisant, il faut:

- qu'il remplisse une fonction identique à celle du moyen du brevet,

- que cette fonction soit nouvelle.

1.2.1.2 - Cas d'une combinaison de moyen

Il n'est pas discutable, que le caractère nouveau de la fonction est nécessaire pour l'ap-plication de la doctrine des équivalents.

Mais cela n'est vrai que lorsque la revendication porte sur un moyen unique.

Lorsqu'on est en présence d'une invention de combinaison, la situation est différente.

On sait qu'une invention de combinaison peut protéger l'association, en vue d'un résul-tat d'ensemble, de moyens déjà connus.

Une invention de combinaison est donc très exposée à la contrefaçon non littérale: il suf-firait de remplacer l'un des moyens de la combinaison revendiquée par un moyen simi-laire pour échapper au grief de contrefaçon.

C'est la raison pour laquelle, dans le cas d'une invention de combinaison, la doctrine deséquivalents doit recevoir application sans qu'il soit exigé que la fonction remplie par lemoyen revendiqué et par le moyen argué de contrefaçon soit nouvelle, pour autant quece dernier remplisse, dans la combinaison, la même fonction que le moyen revendiqué.

Par exemple: CA Paris 28.05.99 (BIPD n° 687-3-501): "L'invention consiste dans unecomposition comprenant du lactose et un complément particulier, moyens qui coopèrentpour procurer un résultat d'ensemble autre que l'addition des résultats qu'ils procur-eraient chacun isolément; que l'argumentation tenant à la fonction connue du complé-ment pris isolément est donc dénuée de pertinence, les appelants observant pertinem-ment qu'elle reviendrait à empêcher pratiquement la protection des inventions dites decombinaison qui réunissent le plus souvent des moyens dont certains au moins sontconnus isolément… Considérant que les anions chlorure et citrate… assurent ainsi lamême fonction en combinaison avec le lactose pour aboutir à des résultats sem-blables…".

1.2.2 - Absence de la notion d'évidence en droit français

La question de savoir si l'équivalent était évident pour l'homme du métier, est étrangèreà l'application de la doctrine des équivalents en droit français.

Le droit français distingue en effet les critères de brevetabilité (nouveauté, activité in-ventive - ou non-évidence) des critères de contrefaçon (dont l'équivalence).

4

Dès lors, on comprend que la notion d'évidence ne joue aucun rôle dans la doctrinefrançaise des équivalents.

En effet, admettre qu'un moyen équivalent ne serait pas contrefaisant au seul motif qu'iln'aurait pas été évident, pourrait aboutir à permettre au contrefacteur d'échapper à toutepoursuite en déposant un brevet second qui ne serait qu'une variante, voire un perfec-tionnement du précédent (voir affaire AESCULAP - CA Colmar 15.01.96 IV.3 et Cass.Com. 20.10.98 dossier brevets 98.IV.3).

1.2.3 - Absence d'examen de l'intention

Les tribunaux français ne prennent en compte, dans leur application de la théorie deséquivalents, ni l'intention du présumé contrefacteur, ni celle du breveté (quant à sa volon-té ou non de protéger les équivalents).

CA Paris 11.10.90 (ann. Propriété Industrielle 1990.235): "Que le juge qui doit se mettre,par la pensée, à la place de l'homme du métier, ne doit chercher d'élément d'interpréta-tion que dans la description et les dessins, étant précisé que la règle 29-7 prescrit de nepas tenir les signes de référence comme des limitations à l'étendue de la protection, maisseulement comme des repères destinés à faciliter la compréhension. Qu'en particulier, iln'y a pas lieu de retenir l'interprétation de l'inventeur ou le dossier d'examen, le brevetétant un titre qui doit se suffire à lui-même";


La protection conférée par un brevet est appréciée, pour une contrefaçon donnée, par ledroit français, à la date de la contrefaçon.

Cette règle est indispensable si l'on veut éviter de voir la portée d'un brevet diminueravec le temps (en permettant la mise en œuvre de ses enseignements nouveaux et in-ventifs avec des moyens qui n'existaient pas à la date de son dépôt), ou encore si l'onveut tenir compte de l'apport fait par le brevet à l'état de la technique.

La portée d'un brevet serait considérablement limitée si un équivalent qui n'aurait pas ex-isté au moment de la délivrance du brevet ne tombait pas sous le coup de la doctrine deséquivalents.

Par ailleurs, le breveté, par son invention, a fait un apport à l'état de la technique: c'estcet apport qu'il convient de protéger



Le droit français ne connaît pas de notion d'estoppel.

Néanmoins, l'attitude du breveté, lors de la procédure de délivrance du brevet eu-ropéen ou en réponse au rapport de recherche français, peut lui être opposéecomme un argument de fait pour apprécier la portée des revendications lors deleur interprétation par le juge.

Par exemple: TGI Paris 26.04.00 "Elle ne peut soutenir que, du seul fait de l'incli-naison des dents, quelle que soit son importance, cette fonction serait exercée,alors qu'elle a elle-même considéré, lors de la procédure de délivrance, que c'é-

5

tait la réunion et la combinaison des diverses caractéristiques relatives à la dis-position et à l'orientation des dents qui leur permettait d'exercer la fonctionrevendiquée".


On rappellera qu'il n'existe pas de procédure d'opposition devant l'Institut Nation-al de la Propriété Industrielle, mais seulement une procédure d'observations detiers. La question pourrait donc uniquement se poser en présence d'une procé-dure d'opposition devant l'Office Européen des Brevets. En droit français, laquestion se pose de la même façon qu'au a) ci-dessus.


Même réponse que a) et b) ci-dessus.

On peut noter que des positions qui pourraient être prises dans des correspon-dances adressées à des tiers par le breveté, pourraient lui être opposées à titrede simple fait.


Le droit français ne connaît pas ces notions d'estoppel ou d'admission.

Le droit français connaît seulement la notion d'aveu judiciaire ou d'aveu extra-judiciaire.

Mais cet aveu ne peut porter que sur des questions de fait.

Le juge peut toujours requalifier la qualification juridique donnée par une partie.

Les déclarations faites par une partie en dehors de la procédure ou au cours de la procé-dure, ne semblent donc pas pouvoir être considérées autrement que comme un élémentde fait soumis, comme les autres preuves, à l'appréciation du juge.


5.1 - Position française

La première recommandation est de maintenir l'existence de la doctrine des équivalents.

Elle permet d'assurer un équilibre nécessaire entre la protection du breveté et la sécuritéjuridique des tiers, pour autant qu'un critère d'application suffisamment clair soit défini.

Le critère retenu par la jurisprudence française apparaît satisfaisant dans son principe.

Il aboutit à se poser la question de savoir si le moyen de structure différente dans le pro-duit argué de contrefaçon remplit la même fonction ou a le même effet technique premierque le moyen breveté.

5.2 - Points à harmoniser

L'intérêt de la doctrine des équivalents ayant été démontré, différents points doivent êtreabordés en vue d'une harmonisation dans ce domaine:

5.2.1 - Critère

S'agissant du critère à appliquer, celui retenu par la jurisprudence française, l'identité defonction, apparaît satisfaisant dans son principe.

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5.2.2 - Evidence

Le critère de l'évidence doit être écarté dès lors qu'il aboutit à réduire la portée de l'in-vention. Il conduit à restreindre excessivement, voire à supprimer la notion de brevetsdépendants et irait à l'encontre de la protection de la contribution d'un brevet à l'état dela technique.

5.2.3 - Test

Il est proposé d'utiliser un test d'application de la doctrine des équivalents qui serait lesuivant.

Etant donné un moyen revendiqué et un moyen similaire dans un produit argué de con-trefaçon, il y aurait contrefaçon si une revendication modifiée pour englober

- soit le moyen du brevet décrit dans sa fonctionnalité,

- soit le moyen du brevet et le moyen argué de contrefaçon

aurait été brevetable à la date du dépôt de brevet.

5.2.4 - Estoppel

Il n'apparaît pas souhaitable d'introduire une notion d' "estoppel" dans la doctrine deséquivalents, mais le juge doit apprécier la portée de la revendication en tenant comptedes réponses faites par le breveté aux observations de l'examinateur ou lors d'uneprocédure d'opposition.

5.2.5 - Description du brevet

Faut-il que la description du brevet permette de soutenir l'existence de la fonction?

Le groupe français est partagé sur ce point.

Les conseils, libéraux et de l'industrie, plus souvent confrontés que les avocats à desproblèmes de droit d'exploiter, étaient prêts à envisager une telle limitation de la doctrinedes équivalents qui simplifie l'analyse des droits des tiers. Toutefois, les chimistes ont faitremarquer que chez eux la fonction d'un moyen ou d'un produit est bien souvent difficileà cerner au moment de la rédaction du brevet.

Résumé


La FRANCE connaît une doctrine des équivalents. Elle trouve application en cas de con-trefaçon non littérale d'un moyen essentiel d'un brevet.

Les dispositions de cette doctrine des équivalents ne sont pas fixées par la loi, mais ontété définies par la doctrine (au sens de la pensée des auteurs) et sont appliquéesfréquemment par la jurisprudence.

1.1 -

Selon Paul MATHELY: "sont équivalents des moyens qui, bien qu'étant de formes dif-férentes, exercent la même fonction en vue d'un résultat semblable".

Et encore:

"C'est donc l'identité de fonction qui caractérise l'équivalence"

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1.2 -

La jurisprudence fait une application fréquente de la doctrine des équivalents: "Il est con-stant qu'il y a contrefaçon par équivalence dès lors que l'objet argué de contrefaçonréalise le même résultat que celui du brevet par des moyens analogues remplissant lamême fonction et tendant au même but".

L'examen de la jurisprudence fait ressortir les principaux points suivants:

1.2.1 -

L'identité de fonction est l'élément déterminant de la doctrine des équivalents.

1.2.1.1 -

Si un moyen unique est breveté, le tribunal peut estimer que la fonction remplie par cemoyen unique est nouvelle. Dans ce cas, il décide de sanctionner l'utilisation de toutmoyen, même de structure différente, qui assure la même fonction.

Le juge va donc, dans ce cas, au-delà du libellé précis de la revendication en admettantl'équivalence et donc la contrefaçon de la fonction, alors même qu'en tant que telle, saprotection n'était pas revendiquée.

1.2.1.2 -

Dans le cas d'une invention de combinaison, la doctrine des équivalents doit recevoir ap-plication sans qu'il soit exigé que la fonction remplie par le moyen revendiqué et par lemoyen argué de contrefaçon soit nouvelle, pour autant que ce dernier remplisse, dans lacombinaison, la même fonction que le moyen revendiqué.

1.2.2 -

La notion d'évidence ne joue aucun rôle dans la doctrine française des équivalents.

Admettre qu'un moyen équivalent ne serait pas contrefaisant au seul motif qu'il n'auraitpas été évident pourrait aboutir à permettre au contrefacteur d'échapper à toutes pour-suites en déposant un brevet second qui ne serait qu'une variante, voire un perfection-nement du précédent.

1.2.3 -

Les tribunaux français ne prennent en compte, dans leur application de la théorie deséquivalents, ni l'intention du présumé contrefacteur, ni celle du breveté.


En droit français, la protection conférée par un brevet est appréciée, pour une contre-façon donnée, à la date de la contrefaçon.

En effet, la portée d'un brevet serait considérablement limitée si un équivalent qui n'au-rait pas existé au moment de la délivrance du brevet ne tombait pas sous le coup de ladoctrine des équivalents.



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Le droit français ne connaît pas de notion d'estoppel.

Néanmoins, l'attitude du breveté, lors de la procédure de délivrance du brevet eu-ropéen ou en réponse au rapport de recherche français, peut lui être opposéecomme un argument de fait pour apprécier la portée des revendications lors deleur interprétation par le juge.


On rappellera qu'il n'existe pas de procédure d'opposition devant l'Institut Nation-al de la Propriété Industrielle, mais seulement une procédure d'observations detiers. La question pourrait donc uniquement se poser en présence d'une procé-dure d'opposition devant l'Office Européen des Brevets. En droit français, laquestion se pose de la même façon qu'au a) ci-dessus.


Le droit français ne connaît pas ces notions d'estoppel ou d'admission.

Néanmoins, les déclarations faites par une partie en dehors de la procédure ou au coursde la procédure peuvent être considérées comme un élément de fait soumis, comme lesautres preuves, à l'appréciation du juge.


5.1 - Position française

La première recommandation est de maintenir l'existence de la doctrine des équivalents.

Elle permet d'assurer un équilibre nécessaire entre la protection du breveté et la sécuritéjuridique des tiers, pour autant qu'un critère d'application suffisamment clair soit défini.

Le critère retenu par la jurisprudence française apparaît satisfaisant dans son principe.

Il aboutit à se poser la question de savoir si le moyen de structure différente dans le pro-duit argué de contrefaçon remplit la même fonction ou a le même effet technique premierque le moyen breveté.

5.2 - Points à harmoniser

L'intérêt de la doctrine des équivalents ayant été démontré, différents points doivent êtreabordés en vue d'une harmonisation dans ce domaine:

5.2.1 - Critère

S'agissant du critère à appliquer, celui retenu par la jurisprudence française, l'identité defonction, apparaît satisfaisant dans son principe.

5.2.2 - Evidence

Le critère de l'évidence doit être écarté dès lors qu'il aboutit à réduire la portée de l'in-vention. Il conduit à restreindre excessivement, voire à supprimer la notion de brevetsdépendants et irait à l'encontre de la protection de la contribution d'un brevet à l'état dela technique.

9

5.2.3 - Test

Il est proposé d'utiliser un test d'application de la doctrine des équivalents qui serait lesuivant.

Etant donné un moyen revendiqué et un moyen similaire dans un produit argué de con-trefaçon, il y aurait contrefaçon si une revendication modifiée pour englober

- soit le moyen du brevet décrit dans sa fonctionnalité,

- soit le moyen du brevet et le moyen argué de contrefaçon

aurait été brevetable à la date du dépôt de brevet.

5.2.4 - Estoppel

Il n'apparaît pas souhaitable d'introduire une notion d' " estoppel " dans la doctrine deséquivalents, mais le juge doit apprécier la portée de la revendication en tenant comptedes réponses faites par le breveté aux observations de l'examinateur ou lors d'uneprocédure d'opposition.

5.2.5 - Description du brevet

Faut-il que la description du brevet permette de soutenir l'existence de la fonction?

Le groupe français est partagé sur ce point.

Les conseils, libéraux et de l'industrie, plus souvent confrontés que les avocats à desproblèmes de droit d'exploiter, étaient prêts à envisager une telle limitation de la doctrinedes équivalents qui simplifie l'analyse des droits des tiers. Toutefois, les chimistes ont faitremarquer que chez eux la fonction d'un moyen ou d'un produit est bien souvent difficileà cerner au moment de la rédaction du brevet.

English translation


Questions


There is a doctrine of equivalents in France. It applies in the event of non-literal infringe-ment of the essential means of a patent.

The doctrine of equivalents is not set by law, but defined by doctrine (to be understoodas the authors' opinion), and is applied frequently by case law.

1.1-

According to Paul MATHELY: "means having a different structure are equivalent whenthey perform the same function to achieve the same result"

In addition:

"It is therefore the identity of function which characterises the equivalence"

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1.2-

Case law applies frequently the doctrine of equivalents: "It is constant that there is in-fringement by equivalence when an infringing object achieves the same result as the oneof the patent, by similar means performing the same function, and aiming at the same ob-jective"

The review of case law brings out the following key points:

1.2.1-

The identity of function is the key element of the doctrine of equivalents.

1.2.1.1-

If a specific means is patented, the court may assess that the function performed by thisspecific means is new. In this case, the court decides to condemn the use of any means,even if different in its structure, which performs the same function.

In admitting the equivalence, and thus the infringement of the function, the judge there-fore extends the scope of the claim to any other structure performing the same function.

1.2.1.2-

In the event of an invention of combination, the doctrine of equivalents must apply, with-out requiring that the function performed by the means claimed and the alleged infring-ing means be new, as long as the latter performs within the combination the same func-tion as the means claimed.

1.2.2-

Under the French doctrine of equivalents, obviousness is not to be taken into account.

Admitting that an equivalent means would not be infringing on the sole ground that itwould not have been obvious, would allow an infringer not to be prosecuted in filing asecond patent which would be either a variant or an improvement of the first one.

1.2.3-

In applying the theory of equivalents French courts do not take into account neither theintention of the alleged infringer nor the intention of the patentee.


According to French law, with respect to a given infringement, the protection granted bya patent is assessed on the day when the infringement occurs.

Indeed, the scope of a patent would be considerably limited if an equivalent, which wouldnot have existed on the day when the patent has been granted, did not fall within the doc-trine of equivalents.



Estoppel does not exist as such under French law.

Nevertheless, the behaviour of the patentee, during either the grant of a Euro-pean patent or the reply to the French search report, may be opposed to him as afactual argument, in order to assess the scope of the claims when those are in-terpreted by the judge.

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There is no opposition procedure before the Institut National de la Propriété In-dustrielle (French PTO), but only a procedure of observations for third parties.Therefore, this issue could be only raised in the event of opposition proceedingsbefore the European Patent Office. According to French law, the question arisesin the same manner as already above mentioned in a).


Estoppel or admission do not exist as such under French law.

Nevertheless, statements made by a party outside the prosecution proceedings may bedeemed as factual elements subject to, as other pieces of evidence, the assessment ofthe judge.


5.1- The French stance

The first recommendation is to maintain the doctrine of equivalents.

It enables to ensure a necessary balance between the protection of the patentee and thelegal certainty of third parties, with the provision that a clear enough criterion of applica-tion is defined.

The criterion provided for by French case law seems to be satisfactory.

It leads us to ask the question to know whether the means with different structure in thealleged infringing item, performs the same function or has the same primary technical ef-fect as the patented means.

5.2- Harmonisation

The interest of the doctrine of equivalents having been established, many points must bepointed out for the purpose of harmonisation in this field:

5.2.1- Criterion

As to the criterion provided for by French case law, the identity of function seems to besatisfactory in its principle.

5.2.2- Obviousness

The criterion of obviousness must be dismissed as it leads to reduce the scope of the in-vention. It leads to excessively restrict, and even to remove the notion of dependentpatents, and it would run against the protection of the contribution of the patent to thestate of art.

5.2.3- Test

It is suggested using an application test of the doctrine of equivalents, which could be thefollowing:

Given a claimed means and similar means in an alleged infringing item, there would beinfringement if a claim modified in order to encompass:- either the patent means described in its functionality,- or both the patent means and the infringing meanswould have been patentable at the filing date.

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5.2.4- Estoppel

The introduction of estoppel in the doctrine of equivalents is not desirable. However, thejudge must assess the scope of the claim in taking into account replies made by the pat-entee to the examiner's observations or during opposition proceedings.

5.2.5- Patent description

Does the patent description need to support the existence of the function?The French group is not unanimous in this respect.

Liberal patent attorneys and corporate (patent) attorneys, who encountered issues relat-ing to the right to use more often than lawyers, were ready to consider such limitation ofthe doctrine of equivalents, which facilitates the analysis of third parties rights. Neverthe-less, chemists have pointed out that in their field, the function of a means or product is of-ten difficult to stress at the time at which the patent has been drafted.

Deutsche Übersetzung

Die Rolle der Äquivalente und des Erteilungsverfahrens bei derBestimmung des Schutzbereichs von Patenten

Fragen

1. Wenn Ihr Land eine Doktrin der "Äquivalente" hat, was ist sie und wie werden Äquiva-lente geprüft? Gibt es hierfür gesetzliche Grundlagen oder Rechtsprechung?

Frankreich kennt eine Äquivalenzlehre. Sie wird im Falle einer nicht wörtlichen Verlet-zung eines wesentlichen Mittels des Patents angewendet.

Die Dispositionen dieser Äquivalenzlehre sind nicht vom Gesetz bestimmt, aber sind vonder herrschenden Lehre (im Sinne der Meinung der Autoren) definiert worden und siewerden regelmäßig von der Rechtsprechung angewendet.

1.1 - Die herrschende Lehre

Nach Paul MATHELY: "sind äquivalente Mitteln, obgleich sie verschiedene Formenhaben, solche die dieselbe Funktion, in der Verfolgung eines vergleichbaren Ergebniss-es, erfüllen."

Und auch:

"Es ist also die Funktionsgleichheit, die die Äquivalenz charakterisiert."

1.2 - Die Rechtsprechung

Die Rechtsprechung wendet die Äquivalenzlehre regelmäßig an: "Es ist standhaft, dasseine Verletzung durch Äquivalenz vorliegt, sobald das angeführte Verletzungsobjekt, dasgleiche Ergebnis wie das Patent realisiert, wobei es nach analogen Mitteln dieselbeFunktion erfüllt und dasselbe Ziel anstrebt."

Die Prüfung der Rechtsprechung lässt die folgenden Punkte herausragen:

1.2.1 - Die Funktion

Die Funktionsgleichheit ist das entscheidende Element der Äquivalenzlehre.

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1.2.1.1 - Der Fall des "einzigen Mittels"

Wenn ein einziges Mittel patentiert ist, kann das Gericht der Ansicht sein, dass die Funk-tion, die von diesem einzigen Mitteln erfüllt wird, neu ist. In diesem Fall, wird das Gerichtentscheiden die Benutzung sämtlicher Mittel, die dieselbe Funktion erfüllen, zu be-strafen, selbst wenn sie verschiedener Strukturen sind.

Der Richter wird also in diesem Fall, über den genauen Wortlaut des Patentanspruchshinaus gehen, indem er die Äquivalenz und somit die Verletzung der Funktion, alssolche, gelten lässt, obwohl ihr Schutz nicht als solches beansprucht wurde.

1.2.1.2 - Der Fall eines bestimmten Mittels einer Kombinationserfindung

Im Falle einer Kombinationserfindung muss die Äquivalenzlehre Anwendung finden,sobald die Kombination dieselbe Funktion erfüllt wie das beanspruchte Mittel, und diesohne dass die Neuheit der Funktion, die durch das beanspruchte Mittel und die ange-führte Verletzung erfüllt wird, erwartet wird.

1.2.2 - Abwesenheit des Begriffes der Gewissheit im französischenRecht

Der Begriff der Gewissheit spielt keine Rolle im Rahmen der französischen Äquivalenz-lehre.

Zuzulassen, dass ein äquivalentes Mittel nicht verletzend ist, aus dem einfachen Grund,dass es nicht evident ist, würde der Person (die genannten Verletzungen unternommenhat) ermöglichen jeglichen juristischen Verfolgungen aus dem Weg zu gehen, indem sieein zweites Patent einreicht, dass nur eine Variante, oder eine Perfektion des erstenwäre.

1.2.3 - Abwesenheit der Prüfung des Vorsatzes

Bei der Anwendung der Äquivalenzlehre ziehen die französischen Gerichte weder denVorsatz des mutmaßlichen Fälschers noch dessen des Patentinhabers in Betracht.

2. Kann sich der Schutzbereich eines Patents im Laufe der Zeit ändern, oder ist er zu einemspeziellen Datum festgelegt? Wenn er festgelegt ist, zu welchem Datum (z.B. Prioritäts-datum, Anmeldetag oder Tag der angeblichen Verletzung)?

Im französischen Recht wird der von einem Patent geleistete Schutz bezüglich einer Ver-letzung, zum Zeitpunkt dieser Verletzung bewertet.

In der Tat wäre die Geltung eines Patents beachtlich beschränkt, falls eine Äquivalenz,die im Moment der Erteilung des Patentes nicht existierte, nicht unter die Theorie derÄquivalenzlehre fallen würde.

3. Spielt die Erteilungsgeschichte eine Rolle bei der Bestimmung des Schutzbereichs einesPatents? Wenn ja, in welcher Weise? Insbesondere:

a) Gibt es ein 'file wrapper estoppel'? Und wenn ja, unter welchen Umständen?

Das französische Recht kennt den Begriff "estoppel" nicht.

Nichts desto trotz kann dem Patentnehmer sein Verhalten während des eu-ropäischen Erteilungsverfahrens, oder im Rahmen der Antwort auf den französis-chen Recherchenbericht, als ein Tatsachenargument entgegengehalten werden,um die Geltung der Forderungen, im Rahmen der Auslegung des Richters, zubeurteilen.

b) Gibt es einen Unterschied zwischen formellen Handlungen (z.B. Einsprüche) undinformellen Handlungen (z.B. Diskussionen mit Prüfern) im Patentamt?

14

Wir erinnern daran, dass kein Einspruchsverfahren vor dem Institut National de laPropriété Industrielle (INPI, das französische Patent- und Markensamt) existiert,sondern lediglich die Möglichkeit besteht die Anmerkungen Dritter anzuhören.Diese Frage kann sich also lediglich im Rahmen eines Einspruchsverfahrens vordem Europäischen Patentamt stellen. Im französischen Recht stellt sich dieselbeFrage wie unter a) bereits erwähnt wurde.

4. Gibt es irgendeinen Weg, auf dem der Schutzbereich von Ansprüchen ausserhalb desErteilungsverfahrens beschränkt werden kann, z. B. durch estoppel oder Zugeständ-nisse?

Das französische Recht kennt die Begriffe "estoppel" und Zulassung nicht.

Nichts desto trotz können Deklarierungen einer Partei, die außerhalb des Verfahrensoder während dessen gemacht wurden, als Tatsachenelemente, wie andere Beweise,dem Richter zur Auslegung vorgelegt werden.

5. Haben Sie Vorschläge zur Harmonisierung auf diesem Gebiet?

5.1 - Französische Position

Die erste Empfehlung ist die Äquivalenzlehre zu erhalten.

Soweit ein ausreichend genaues Anwendungskriterium definiert ist, ermöglicht sie dasnotwendige Gleichgewicht zwischen dem Schutz des Patentinhabers und der Recht-sicherheit von Dritten zu gewährleisten.

Im Prinzip erscheint das von der französischen Rechtsprechung festgehaltene Kriteriumzufriedenstellend.

Es führt dazu sich die Frage zu stellen, ob das verschiedenartige Strukturmittel des Pro-duktes, welches in der Verletzung angeführt ist, dieselbe Funktion oder denselben tech-nischen Effekt erfüllt wie das patentierte Mittel.

5.2 - Anzugleichende Punkte

Nachdem wir den Nutzen der Äquivalenzlehre dargelegt haben, müssen, im Hinblick aufeine Angleichung dieses Gebietes, verschiedene Punkte angesprochen werden:

5.2.1 - Kriterien

Was das Anwendungskriterium betrifft, scheint das von der französischen Recht-sprechung festgehaltene - die Funktionsidentität - im Prinzip zufriedenstellend.

5.2.2 - Gewissheit

Das Gewissheitskriterium muss abgelehnt werden, zumal es den Geltungsbereich derErfindung reduziert. Es führt dazu den Begriff der abhängigen Patente übermäßigeinzuschränken, ja sogar abzuschaffen und ginge gegen den Schutz des Patent-beitrages an den Stand der Technik.

5.2.3 - Test

Es wird vorgeschlagen einen Anwendungstest der Äquivalenzlehre, so wie folgt, zu be-nutzen.

Angenommen, dass es ein gefordertes Mittel und eines diesem ähnliches, welches inder Verletzung angeführt ist, gibt, so handelt es sich um eine Verletzung, wenn ein verän-derter Anspruch, der entweder das beschriebene Patentmittel bezüglich seiner Funk-tionalität, oder das Patentmittel und das Mittel, welches in der Verletzung angeführt ist,umfasst, im Moment der Patenthinterlegung, patentierbar war.

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5.2.4 - "Estoppel"

Es scheint nicht wünschenswert den Begriff "estoppel" in die Äquivalenzlehreeinzuführen, statt dessen sollte der Richter die Anspruchsgeltung beurteilen, indem erdie Anmerkungen des Patentinhabers, die dieser den Patentprüfern gegenüber oder imRahmen eines Einspruchsverfahrens gemacht hat, in Betracht zieht.

5.2.5 - Beschreibung des Patents

Muss die Beschreibung des Patents es ermöglichen die Existenz der Funktion zu unter-stützen?

Die französische Gruppe ist sich uneinig auf diesem Gebiet.

Die freien und industriellen Berater, die öfters mit dem Problem des Ausübungsrechtskonfrontiert sind als die Anwälte, waren bereit eine solche Einschränkung der Äquiv-alenzlehre ins Auge zu fassen, da sie die Analyse der Rechte Dritter vereinfacht. Gleich-wohl haben die Chemiker darauf hingewiesen, dass bei ihnen die Funktion eines Mittelsoder eines Produktes, im Moment der Patentformulierung, oft schwer abzugrenzen ist.

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GermanyAllemagne

Deutschland

Bericht Q175

im Namen der Deutschen Landesgruppevon Heinz BARDEHLE*


Fragen


Die in Deutschland ständig angewendete Äquivalenzlehre soll dem Patentinhaber einenangemessenen Schutz auch dann geben, wenn ein als Patentverletzung angegriffenerGegenstand sich von dem durch den genauen Wortlaut des Patentanspruchs durch eineAbwandlung unterscheidet, jedoch bei vernünftiger Betrachtungsweise von der durchden Patentanspruch gegebenen Lehre Gebrauch gemacht wird. Es handelt sich dabeium eine Auslegung (Interpretation) des Patentanspruchs, für die natürlich aus Gründender Rechtssicherheit für Dritte eine Grenze bestehen muss. Diese Grenze wird durch dieÄquivalenzlehre bestimmt, gemäß der nur dann Abwandlungen von Merkmalen desPatentanspruchs dessen Schutzumfang erweitern, wenn im Wesentlichen durch die Ab-wandlung das gleiche Ergebnis erzielt wird wie durch das betreffende Merkmal desPatentanspruchs, also Äquivalenz gegeben ist.

Die Äquivalenzlehre beruht auf der Erkenntnis, dass ein Patentanmelder häufig nicht inder Lage ist, bei der Formulierung des Patentanspruchs alle denkbaren Varianten bes-timmter Merkmale des Patentanspruchs durch eine geeignete Wortwahl zu erfassen,weil er häufig spätere Abwandlungen nicht erkennen konnte (Erfindung des Transistorsals Ersatz der Verstärkerröhre) oder weil im Patentanspruch verwendete verallgemein-ernde Formulierungen im Prüfungsverfahren von einem prüfenden Patentamt nichtzugestanden werden. Solche verallgemeinernden Formulierungen müssen sich in einerWortwahl niederschlagen, für die häufig, weil mit einer Erfindung immer irgendwie Neu-land betreten wird, noch keine entsprechend verallgemeinernde Terminologie existiert.Zunächst verwendete verallgemeinernde Formulierungen werden daher häufig als un-zureichende technische Lehre oder im Prüfungsverfahren als zu aufgabenmässigabgelehnt, so dass in dem Bewusstsein einer solchen Praxis des prüfenden Paten-tamtes den Ansprüchen von vornherein eine präzisierte Fassung gegeben wird, umentsprechende Beanstandungen im Prüfungsverfahren vor vorneherein zu vermeiden.

Diese Zwangslage des Anmelders ist von den Gerichten derjenigen Länder, in denenVerletzungsprozesse eine wichtige Rolle spielen, seit langer Zeit anerkannt worden undhat in den betreffenden Ländern zur ständigen Anwendung der Äquivalenzlehre in Ver-

* Patentanwalt in München

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letzungsprozessen geführt. Dabei sind zwar Unterschiede hinsichtlich der Definition derÄquivalenz von Land zu Land entstanden, die durch die nunmehr angestellte Unter-suchung in den Landesgruppen der AIPPI sicher deutlich werden. Hier sei nur auf die inDeutschland angewendete Definition der Äquivalenz eingegangen, die in jüngster Zeiteine Präzisierung erhalten hat.

Ausgehend von dem Vorliegen des gleichen Ergebnisses wurde in der grundliegendenEntscheidung des Patentsenats des Deutschen Bundesgerichtshofes als Grenze derschutzumfangserweiternden Wirkung der Äquivalenz festgestellt, dass ein ein äquiva-lentes Merkmal enthaltender (fiktiver) Patentanspruch nicht dem Stand der Technik sonahe gerückt werden dürfe, dass dieser Patentanspruch einen nicht patentfähigen, alsoinsbesondere naheliegenden Gegenstand beschreiben würde (BGH "Formstein", GRUR1986, 803).

In einer weiteren grundlegenden Entscheidung des Patentsenats des Bundesgericht-shofs (BGH "Kunststoffrohrteil", Mitt. 2002, 228) wird ausdrücklich auf Art. 2 Nr. 1 derMünchner Revisionsakte zum Europäischen Patentübereinkommen vom 29.11.2000Bezug genommen, wonach "bei der Bestimmung des Schutzbereichs des europäischenPatents solchen Elementen gebührend Rechnung zu tragen ist, die Äquivalente der inden Patentansprüchen genannten Elemente sind". Im Einklang mit dieser gesetzlichenVorschrift wird für die Bestimmung des über den Wortlaut des Patentanspruchs hinaus-gehenden Schutzumfangs folgende Vorgehensweise festgelegt:

1. Die vom Wortsinn des Patentanspruchs abweichende Ausführung muss das derErfindung zugrundeliegende Problem mit objektiv gleichwirkenden Mitteln lösen.

2. Der Fachmann muss durch seine Fachkenntnisse befähigt sein, die abgewandel-ten Mittel als gleichwirkend aufzufinden.

3. Der Fachmann muss seine diesbezüglichen Überlegungen derart am Sinngehaltdes Patentanspruchs anknüpfen, dass er die abweichende Ausführung mit ihrenabgewandelten Mitteln als der gegenständlichen (wortlautgemäßen) gleichwer-tige Lösung auch in Betracht zieht.

Äquivalenz im Sinne der Feststellung eines über den Wortlaut des Patentanspruchs hin-ausgehenden Schutzumfangs liegt also dann vor, wenn neben objektiver Gleichwirkungder abgewandelten Mittel der Fachmann diese Mittel als gleichwirkend auffinden unddiese Mittel, anknüpfend am Sinngehalt des Patentanspruchs, auch in Betracht ziehenkonnte.

Patentansprüche enthalten häufig durch Zahlenangaben begrenzte Bereiche. Auchsolche Zahlenangaben sind grundsätzlich der Auslegung fähig. Dies hat der Patentsen-at des Bundesgerichtshofs ebenfalls bestätigt (BGH "Schneidmesser I", Mitt. 2002, 212).Dabei ist jedoch zu berücksichtigen, dass Zahlenangaben in aller Regel einen höherenGrad an Eindeutigkeit und Klarheit besitzen, als dies bei verbal umschriebenen Ele-menten des Patentanspruchs der Fall ist. Eine Abweichung von einer Zahlenangabe imPatentanspruch verlässt jedoch die vom Patentanspruch geschützte Lehre dann nicht,wenn der Fachmann diese Abweichung als mit dem technischen Sinngehalt der Zahle-nangabe vereinbar ansieht, wie dies beispielsweise im Bereich üblicher Toleranzen derFall ist.

Der Bundesgerichtshof, also die Rechtsprechung, hat damit für die Feststellung derÄquivalenz Denkrichtlinien vorgegeben, deren Anwendung die Rechtssicherheit auch fürdiejenigen erhöht, die sich einem durch das Patent geschützten Gegenstand annähernwollen.

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In der Rechtslehre wird der Standpunkt vertreten, dass ein gleichwirkendes (äquiva-lentes) Mittel auch dann in den Schutzumfang einzubeziehen ist, wenn es erst im Verlet-zungszeitpunkt dem Fachmann geläufig ist (siehe Ersatz der Verstärkerröhre durch denspäter erfundenen Transistor). Eine eindeutige Rechtsprechung hierzu gibt es zur Zeitnicht, jedoch stellt der in der Diskussion befindliche WIPO-Harmonisierungsvertrag aufden Verletzungszeitpunkt für das Vorliegen von Äquivalenz ab.

3. Spielt die Erteilungsgeschichte eine Rolle bei der Bestimmung des Schutzbereichs einesPatents? Wenn ja, in welcher Weise?

Zu der Frage der Bedeutung von Vorgängen im Patenterteilungsverfahren gilt inDeutschland nach wie vor die Regelung, dass für die Auslegung des Patentanspruchsund damit die Schutzumfangsbestimmung ausschließlich an die Patentansprüche, dieBeschreibung und die Zeichnungen anzuknüpfen ist. Es kommt also grundsätzlich nichtauf die Vorgänge im Patenterteilungsverfahren an. Soweit diese Vorgänge insbesonderedurch beschränkte Aufrechterhaltung in der Patentschrift ihren Niederschlag gefundenhaben, ergibt sich ihre Beachtlichkeit unmittelbar aus der Regelung in § 14 PatG bzw.Art. 69 EPÜ, wonach der Schutzbereich des Patents durch den Inhalt der Paten-tansprüche bestimmt wird, zu deren Auslegung die Beschreibung und die Zeichnungenheranzuziehen sind. Hierbei ist das allgemeine Fachwissen und der in der Patentschrifterwähnte Stand der Technik zu berücksichtigen.

Diese Auffassung steht im Einklang mit dem Ergebnis der Diplomatischen Konferenz zurRevision des EPÜ vom November 2000, in der der Vorschlag abgelehnt worden war,früheren Angaben, die der Anmelder im Erteilungsverfahren gemacht hat und die denSchutzbereich eindeutig beschränken, gebührend Rechnung zu tragen. Angenommenwurde nur die allgemeine Bestimmung, dass bei der Bestimmung des Schutzbereichsdes europäischen Patents solchen Elementen gebührend Rechnung zu tragen ist, dieÄquivalente der in den Patentansprüchen genannten Elemente sind.


Es gibt keinen "file wrapper estoppel".


Nur die aufgrund eines Einspruchs im Patent vorgenommenen Änderungen desPatentanspruchs und eindeutige Verzichtserklärungen sind bei der Bemessungdes Schutzumfangs zu berücksichtigen.

c) Gibt es einen Unterschied zwischen Handlungen des Patentamts und Dritter?

Nur die Handlungen, die in der Patentschrift einen Niederschlag gefunden haben,sind bei der Bemessung des Schutzumfanges zu berücksichtigen.


Eine vom Patentinhaber vorgenommene Beschränkung des Schutzbereichs vonAnsprüchen kann nur durch das beim Patentamt durchgeführte Beschränkungsver-fahren vorgenommen werden. Hierzu existiert auch ein Vorschlag der WIPO im Patent-

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harmonisierungsvertrag (Art. 7 bis/1 und Art. 105a des Revisionsdokumentes des EPÜvom November 2000).


Annahme des WIPO-Patentharmonisierungsvertrages.

Zusammenfassung

Gemäß der in Deutschland angewendeten Äquivalenzlehre müssen nach der Rechtsprechungdes Bundesgerichtshofs folgende Bedingungen für das Vorliegen einer äquivalenten Patentver-letzung erfüllt sein:

1. Die vom Wortsinn des Patentanspruchs abweichende Ausführung muss das derErfindung zugrundeliegende Problem mit objektiv gleichwirkenden Mitteln lösen.

2. Der Fachmann muss durch seine Fachkenntnisse befähigt sein, die abgewandel-ten Mittel als gleichwirkend aufzufinden.

3. Der Fachmann muss seine diesbezüglichen Überlegungen derart am Sinngehaltdes Patentanspruchs anknüpfen, dass er die abweichende Ausführung mit ihrenabgewandelten Mitteln als der gegenständlichen (wortlautgemäßen) gleichwer-tige Lösung auch in Betracht zieht.

Ein gleichwirkendes (äquivalentes) Mittel ist in den Schutzumfang auch einzubeziehen, wenndieses Mittel erst im Verletzungszeitpunkt dem Fachmann geläufig ist. Somit kann sich derSchutzbereich eines Patents im Laufe der Zeit ändern.

Die Erteilungsgeschichte spielt bei der Bestimmung des Schutzbereichs eines Patents keineRolle. Der Schutzbereich des Patents wird durch den Inhalt der Patentansprüche bestimmt, zuderen Auslegung die Beschreibung und die Zeichnungen heranzuziehen sind.

Es gibt keinen "file wrapper estoppel". Änderungen und Beschränkungen des Schutzbereichsvon Ansprüchen außerhalb des Erteilungsverfahrens (z.B. im Einspruchsverfahren, Beschrän-kungsverfahren oder Nichtigkeitsverfahren) können durch Änderungen in der Patentschrift be-wirkt werden.

Summary

According to the doctrine of equivalence applied in Germany and following the jurisdiction of theGerman Federal Supreme Court, the following conditions must be fulfilled for the presence of anequivalent patent infringement:

1. The embodiment deviating from the meaning of the wording of the claim mustsolve the problem of the invention with means having objectively identical effects.

2. The skilled person must be able, due to his expert skills to discover the modifiedmeans as having identical effects.

3. The skilled person must base his reflections in relation therewith on the meaningof the wording of the claim in a manner to take the deviating embodiment with itsmodified means into consideration as a solution equivalent to that (literally) pro-posed by the claim.

A means having identical effects (equivalent) also has to be included in the scope of patent pro-tection if this means is known to the skilled person at the moment of infringement only. Thus, thescope of patent protection may change with time.

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The prosecution history does not play a role in determining the scope of patent protection. Thescope of patent protection is determined by the terms of the claims, which shall be interpretedby use of the description and drawings.

There is no "file wrapper estoppel". Changes and limitations of the scope of protection of claimsoutside prosecution may be achieved by amending the patent document itself (opposition pro-ceedings, limitation proceedings or revocation proceedings).

Résumé

Selon la doctrine des équivalences appliquée en Allemagne et suivant la jurisdiction de la CourFédérale de cassation allemande, les trois conditions suivantes doivent être remplies pourdéterminer une contrefaçon d'un brevet équivalente:

1. La forme d'exécution différente du sens du texte de la revendication doit résoudrele problème à la base de l'invention à l'aide de moyens à effet objectivement iden-tique.

2. L'homme du métier doit être capable de découvrir les moyens modifiés commemoyens équivalents à la base de ses connaissances générales dans le domaineconsidéré.

3. L'homme du métier doit baser ses réflexions à cet effet sur le sens de la revendi-cation de sorte qu'il prenne la forme d'exécution différente avec les moyens mod-ifiés en considération comme solution équivalente à celle constituant l'objet (lit-téral) de la revendication.

Un moyen ayant le même effet (équivalent) doit être inclus dans la portée de la protection,même si le moyen n'est connu de l'homme du métier qu'à la date de la contrefaçon alléguée.Partant, la portée de la protection conférée par un brevet peut changer dans le temps.

Le dossier de délivrance ne joue aucun rôle lorsqu'il s'agit de déterminer la portée de la protec-tion conférée par un brevet. La portée de la protection conférée par un brevet est déterminée parla teneur des revendications, qui doivent être interprétées en s'appuyant sur la description et lesdessins.

Il n'y a pas de "file wrapper estoppel". Les modifications et limitations de la portée de la protec-tion conférée par des revendications effectuées en dehors de la procédure de délivrance (parexemple, dans des procédures d'opposition, de limitation ou de révocation), peuvent être at-teintes en modifiant le document du brevet.

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HungaryHongrieUngarn

Report Q175

in the name of the Hungarian Groupby E. BARANYI, E. FRIEDMANN, J. KERÉNY, Dr. D. MACHYTKA-FRANK,

Dr. A. MÁNDI (Chair), K. MÁRMAROSI, I. MOLNÁR, L. NÉMETH, Zs. NÉMETH, Dr. T. PALÁGYI, Dr. I. POLGÁR, A. WEICHINGER


IntroductionThe Hungarian Group greets the inclusion of Q175 into the agenda of AIPPI because it is ourfirm opinion that strong, valid and enforceable patents constitute an efficient driving force oftechnical progress, research and development. The reasonable use of the doctrine of equiva-lents and prosecution history enables a proper enforcement of patent rights.

We express our opinion to the questions in the order set forth in the Working Guidelines.

Questions


The doctrine of equivalents has been gradually introduced into the Hungarian patent law.

Prior to 1970 the scope conferred by a patent was practically limited to the wording of theclaims. The legislator attributed outstanding importance to legal certainty.

In Patents Act of 1969, which came into force on January 1, 1970, the scope of patentprotection was defined in Art. 13 as follows:

"The scope of protection conferred by a patent shall be determined by theclaims. The claims can be interpreted only on the basis of the descriptionand the drawings."

However, the Enacting Clause of the Patents Act contained the following provision:

"Patent protection extends only to a product or process which realizes allcharacteristics of the claim. However, the rights for compensation deriv-able from the patent are not affected by the substitution of one or morecharacteristic features defined in the claim by equivalent features, or byimproved features put at the disposal of the company who makes use ofthe invention by the patentee or the inventor, respectively."

The above provision was applied to the remuneration of inventors. It happened namelythat some companies tried to avoid the payment of inventors' remuneration by carryingout immaterial changes in the process or product as defined by the claims. Thus the doc-trine of equivalents was clearly inserted into the legislation, although in a restricted man-ner by limiting it to the rights for compensation.

2

Act No. XXXIII of 1995 on the Protection of Invention by Patents which came into effecton January 1, 1996 was harmonized with the Protocol to Art. 69 of the EPC. The scopeof patent protection is regulated by Art. 24 reading as follows:

"(1) The scope of protection conferred by a patent shall be determined by the claims.The claims shall be interpreted on the basis of the description and the drawings.

(2) Patent protection shall cover any product or process in which all the characteris-tics of the claim are embodied.

(3) The terms of the claims shall not be confined to their strict literal wording; neithershall the claims be considered as mere guidelines for a person skilled in the art todetermine the claimed invention."

Due to the accession of Hungary to the European Patent Convention, the Patents Act of1995 was modified by Act No. XXXIX of 2002 effective as of January 1, 2003. However,the Article 24 relating to the scope of patent protection remained unchanged.

It appears from the afore said that the "doctrine of equivalents" is nowincorporated into the statute and is in full accordance with the EPC.

Case law is, however, rather scarce in this respect. Moreover, all the reported cases weredecided on the basis of the Patents Act of 1969 while there is no jurisprudence yet whichwould be established under the Patents Act of 1995. It is also noteworthy that the ban onthe patentability of chemical products, medicines and foodstuffs per se (i.e. by prod-uct claims) has been abolished in Hungary in 1994 and all Court decisions in chemicaland pharmaceutical cases were rendered on the infringement of chemical process (i.e.not product) patents.

In Hungary patent infringement suits are heard exclusively by the Metropolitan Court ofBudapest and the decisions are appealable to the Supreme Court.

Jurisprudence

a) In a case directed to a mechanical invention in 1980 the Supreme Court did notfind infringement but made the following interesting statement:

"The characteristic features of a claim cannot be interpreted in a formalway. It is not the wording of the claim which is important but the technicalsolution expressed by said characteristics claimed."(Decision of the Supreme Court No. Pf. IV. 20 368/1980)

b) In 1982 the Supreme Court decided upon the infringement of a chemical processpatent. Also here infringement was denied but the Court made the following re-mark on claim construction:

"The technical solution protected by the patent is defined by the preambleand the characteristic part of the claim in their unity. For this reason on de-termining the scope of protection the main claim is to be considered in itscomplete unity."(Decision of the Supreme Court No. Pf. IV. 20 162/1982)

c) A similar definition can be found in the decision of the Supreme Court No. Pf. IV.20 415/1983. Here the Court stated expressis verbis that the patent is only in-fringed if all the characteristic features defined in the preamble and the charac-teristic part are put into practice.

d) In a recent decision the Supreme Court took a restrictive view in applying the doc-trine of equivalents. The Court case referred to was not rendered in an infringe-ment suit but in a negative declaratory judgement case. In the patent in caption a

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chemical process was protected and in the process referred to by petitioner oneof the reaction partners was replaced by a different compound. The Court cameto the conclusion that in the process of petitioner other compounds were reactedthan those defined in the claim and therefore this process did not fall under thescope of the patent.(Decision of the Supreme Court No. Pf. IV. 20.904/1998)

e) A further decision rendered by the Supreme Court in a negative declaratoryjudgement case is of importance. Similarly to the case discussed above, petition-er referred to a process which differed from that defined in the main claim of thepatent. Both in the process of petitioner and in that of patentee two compoundswere reacted to give the same end-product. The chemical reaction claimed in thepatent can be illustrated as follows:

A + B = C.

The chemical reaction performed by petitioner can be shown by the followingequation:

E + B = C.

Petitioner alleged non-infringement by stating that compound E differed fromcompound A. On the other hand, patentee argued that compound E was just aprecursor of compound A, i.e. it was converted into compound A in the reactionmixture and therefore in practice the following chemical reaction took place:

+BE � A � = C.

Patentee tried to prove the existence of the above reaction scheme in a theoreti-cal way by molecular chemistry. However, patentee failed to provide evidence ofthe actual formation and presence of compound A in the process of petitioner.

The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the patent was not infringed. TheCourt made the following statement:

"The main claim of the patent protects a specific technical measure ratherthan the chemical reaction per se which takes place as a result of saidtechnical measure. Petitioner uses a different compound and patenteecould not prove the existence and presence of the compound defined inthe claim of the patent. For this reason the process of petitioner does notutilize the characteristic features of the claim."(Decision of the Supreme Court No. Pfv. IV. 22 523/2001)

f) Finally we take reference to a case in which the Supreme Court clearly acknowl-edged the doctrine of equivalents. This decision was made in a negative declara-tory judgement case. The patent in caption related to a composition characterizedby the presence of component X in an amount of 1-10% by weight. The composi-tion manufactured and marketed by petitioner contained 0.71% by weight of com-ponent X. There was no literal infringement because 0.71% by weight was out-side the interval claimed of 1-10% by weight. However, the Supreme Court de-clared there would be an infringement based on the doctrine of equivalents. It wasundisputed that the active ingredient content of the allegedly infringing composi-tion was beyond the interval defined in the claim. However, both the claimed com-position and the product marketed by petitioner were concentrates used afterhaving been diluted. Therefore only a small portion of active component X wasutilized during the application in practice of the diluted composition. Thus the nu-merical interval of 1-10% by weight did not limit the scope of protection conferred

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by the patent. The difference between 0.71% by weight used by petitioner and 1% being the lower limit of the interval claimed was so insignificant that taking intoconsideration the merits of the technical solution petitioner's request to declarenon-infringement had to be rejected.(Decision of the Supreme Court No. Pkf. IV.21 599/1993)

Summarizing it can be stated that in Hungary the "doctrine of equivalents" is providedby the statute. Since the Patents Act of 1995 actually in force came into effect only a fewyears ago, there is no well-established case law yet. The Hungarian Group is confidentthat in view of the political-economical changes which took place in Hungary in the lastdecade and with regard to the imminent accession of Hungary to the EU the HungarianCourts will have abundant opportunity to develop a suitable jurisprudence which takesinto account both the interests of patentees for fair protection and the requirement of le-gal certainty for third parties.







Unfortunately, the above questions 2 to 4 are neither regulated by statute nor explainedby case law in this country. For this reason only the recommendations of the HungarianGroup concerning a satisfactory solution and interpretation of these issues can be ex-pressed.


A) The Hungarian Group is of the opinion that the scope of patent protection shouldnot change in time. If the protection of equivalents by the patent was decidedupon at different points of time, inventions and developments elaborated by par-ties other than the patentee could have been included into the scope of protectionconferred by the patent. This would be unfair. Moreover, the change of the scopeof patent protection with time would create legal uncertainty which would be clear-ly unequitable and against legitimate interests of third parties.

B) The question, whether a solution being different from that defined in the claims isan equivalent or not, should be decided upon on the basis of the state of the artat the filing date of the patent. This seems to be a justified and well-bal-anced solution. Moreover, in Hungary many important obligations and rights be-come effective as of the filing date of the patent. On this date the invention mustbe described in a complete and full manner, while the introduction of "new mat-ter", which was not incorporated into the original text filed on the filing date, isclearly forbidden or can invalidate the patent, respectively. The term of patent pro-tection is also computed from the filing date. The Hungarian Group favours the fil-

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ing date of the patent as a cut-off date for the determination of the equivalent ofnon-equivalent character of the allegedly infringing solution.

C) In the opinion of the Hungarian Group the prosecution history should be taken intoconsideration in the infringement suits. However, the "file wrapper estoppel"should apply under well-defined conditions. Only limitations carried out by patent-ee in order to avoid prior art and to prove novelty and/or inventive level should bea bar to the use of the doctrine of equivalents. It is important that the Court shouldcarefully examine the reason why patentee abandoned a portion of the invention.Restrictions carried out for other reasons (e.g. too broad definition, clarification ofobscure or ambiguous terms etc.) should not bar an equivalent from being takenup into the scope of protection of the patent.

D) As outlined under paragraph C) it is always the merit and reason of the aban-donment which is to be taken into consideration. Therefore it is irrelevant whethersuch limitation was carried out by patentee during prosecution or in course of anopposition or nullification procedure. Accordingly, it is also irrelevant whether suchabandonment was performed in course of action with the Patent Office or thirdparties.

Summary

The "doctrine of equivalents" has been incorporated into the Hungarian Patents Act of 1995which came into force on January 1, 1996. The relevant Art. 24 is reading as follows:

"(1) The scope of protection conferred by a patent shall be determined bythe claims. The claims shall be interpreted on the basis of the descriptionand the drawings.

(2) Patent protection shall cover any product or process in which all thecharacteristics of the claim are embodied.

(3) The terms of the claims shall not be confined to their strict literal word-ing; neither shall the claims be considered as mere guidelines for a personskilled in the art to determine the claimed invention."

However, Hungarian jurisprudence is rather scarce in this respect. Moreover, the majority of theCourt decisions rather denies the protection of equivalents. This is due to the fact that the re-ported Court cases were rendered on the basis of the previous Patents Act of 1969 which did notacknowledge the doctrine of equivalents. However, in view of the political-economical changeswhich took place in Hungary in the last decade and with regard to the imminent accession ofHungary to the EU the Hungarian Courts will have abundant opportunity to develop a suitablejurisprudence which takes into account both the interests of patentees for fair protection and therequirement of legal certainty for third parties.

The "file wrapper estoppel" is neither regulated by statute nor explained by case law in our coun-try.

The Hungarian Group is of the opinion that the scope of patent protection should not change intime. In our view the question, whether a solution being different from that defined in the claimsis an equivalent or not, should be decided on the basis of the state of the art at the filing date ofthe patent. The Hungarian Group is of the view that prosecution history should be taken into con-sideration in the infringement suits under well-defined conditions. Thus, only limitations carriedout by patentee in order to avoid prior art and to prove novelty and/or inventive level should bea bar to the use of the doctrine of equivalents. Since in our opinion always the merit and reasonof the limitation are to be taken into consideration, it is irrelevant whether such a restriction was

6

carried out by the patentee during prosecution or in course of an opposition or nullification pro-cedure.

Résumé

La "doctrine de l'équivalence" a été incorporée dans la loi hongroise sur les brevets de l'année1995 entrée en vigueur le 1er janvier 1996. L'article 24 en question est formulé de la manièresuivante:

"(1) La protection conférée par le brevet est déteminée par les revendica-tions. Les revendications sont à interpréter d'après la description et lesdessins.

(2) La protection par brevet couvre tout produit ou procédé dansle(s)quel(s) l'ensemble des caractéristiques de la revendication est réal-isé.

(3) Le sens des termes des revendications n'est pas limité à leur formula-tion littérale; cependant, les revendications ne doivent pas être non plusconsidérées comme de simples lignes directrices destinées à un expertafin de déterminer l'invention revendiquée."

Néanmoins, la jurisprudence hongroise est plutôt laconique à cet égard. De plus, la plupart desdécisions du tribunal tendent à nier l'application de la doctrine de l'équivalence. Cela est motivépar le fait que les décisions du tribunal publiées dans la littérature ont été prononcées en se fon-dant sur l'ancienne loi sur les brevets de l'année 1969 qui ne reconnaissait pas la doctrine del'équivalence. Vu les changements politiques et économiques intervenus en Hongrie depuis unedécennie ainsi que l'adhésion imminente de la Hongrie à la CEE, les tribunaux hongrois aurontsuffisamment l'occasion de développer une jurisprudence adéquate qui tienne compte aussibien des intérêts du titulaire du brevet pour une protection appropriée que des exigences destiers en matière de sûreté légale.

Le "file wrapper estoppel" n'est réglé en Hongrie ni par la loi sur les brevets ni par la pratique ju-ridique.

Le Groupe hongrois est d'avis que l'étendue de la protection des brevets ne doit pas changerdans le temps. Nous considérons que la question de savoir si une solution différente de celledéfinie dans les revendications est équivalente ou non, doit être tranchée en se fondant sur l'é-tat de l'art à la date de la demande. Le Groupe hongrois est d'avis que l'historique de ladélivrance du brevet (prosecution history) doit être pris en considération dans des conditionsbien définies en cas de litiges de contrefaçon. Ainsi, seules les limitations imposées par le titu-laire d'un brevet afin d'éviter l'état de la technique et afin de prouver la nouveauté et/ou le niveauinventif doivent constituer une barrière à l'usage de la doctrine de l'équivalence. Puisqu'à notreavis on doit toujours prendre en considération le mérite et la raison de la limitation, la questionde savoir si une telle restriction a été imposée par le titulaire du brevet pendant la délivrance dubrevet ou au cours d'une procédure d'opposition ou d'annulation n'a aucune pertinence.

Zusammenfassung

Die "Doktrin der Äquivalenz" wurde in das am 1. Januar 1996 in Kraft getretene ungarischePatentgesetz vom Jahre 1995 eingefügt. Der relevante Artikel 24 lautet wie folgt:

7

"(1) Der durch das Patent gewährte Schutz wird durch die Ansprüche bes-timmt. Die Ansprüche sollen aufgrund der Beschreibung und der Zeich-nungen interpretiert werden.

(2) Der Patentschutz erstreckt sich auf Produkte und Verfahren, inwelchen sämtliche charakteristischen Merkmale des Anspruches verwirk-licht sind.

(3) Die in den Ansprüchen verwendeten Ausdrücke sind nicht so zu ver-stehen, daß deren Bedeutung auf den genauen Wortlaut einzuschränkenist. Ebenso wenig sollen die Patentansprüche so ausgelegt werden, daßsie dem Fachmann nur als Richtlinie zur Bestimmung der beanspruchtenErfindung dienen."

Leider ist die ungarische Rechtspraxis in dieser Hinsicht ziemlich knapp. Der große Teil derveröffentlichten Gerichtsentscheidungen verneint die Anwendung der "Doktrin der Äquivalenz".Dies ist hauptsächlich der Tatsache zuzuschreiben, daß die in der Fachliteratur publiziertengerichtlichen Entscheidungen aufgrund des alten Patentgesetzes vom Jahre 1969 verkündigtwurden, gemäß welchem der Schutz von Äquivalenten noch nicht anerkannt wurde. UnterBerücksichtigung der in Ungarn im letzten Jahrzehnt stattgefundenen politisch-ökonomischenÄnderungen und im Hinblick auf den bevorstehenden Beitritt unseres Landes zu der Europäis-chen Union kann mit Sicherheit damit gerechnet werden, daß die ungarischen Gerichte aus-giebige Möglichkeit haben werden, eine geeignete Rechtspraxis zu entwickeln, welche demPatentinhaber einen angemessenen Schutz gewährleistet und für Dritte ausreichendeRechtssicherheit gewährt.

In Ungarn wird das "file wrapper estoppel" weder durch das Patentgesetz noch mit derRechtssprechung geregelt.

Die Ungarische Landesgruppe ist der Ansicht, daß sich der Schutzumfang von Patenten in derZeit nicht ändern soll. Unserer Meinung nach sollte die Frage, ob eine äquivalente Lösung unterden Bereich der Ansprüche fällt oder nicht, aufgrund des am Anmeldetag des Patentes zur Ver-fügung stehenden Standes der Technik beurteilt werden. Der Ansicht der Ungarischen Landes-gruppe nach sollte in Patentverletzungsklagen die Geschichte der Patenterteilung (prosecutionhistory) unter bestimmten Bedingungen berücksichtigt werden. Die Anwendung der "Doktrin derÄquivalenz" sollte nur durch Einschränkungen verhindert werden, welche von der Patentinhab-erin ausschließlich zwecks Abgrenzung der Erfindung vom Stande der Technik, bzw. zum Nach-weis der Neuheit und der Erfindungshöhe durchgeführt wurden. Es sollte immer das Wesen unddie Ursache der Einschränkung in Betracht genommen werden und es ist dementsprechend ir-relevant, ob die Einschränkung im Laufe des Prüfungsverfahrens oder während eines Ein-spruchs- oder Nichtigkeitsverfahrens vollzogen wurde.

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IndiaInde

Indien

Report Q175

in the name of the Indian Groupby Samaresh CHAKRABORTY


Questions


There is no statutory provision under the prevailing Indian Patents Act, 1970 or even inthe amended version thereof [The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999], which is going to beimplemented shortly, for construing a claimed invention, as interpreted by the pre-ceding description and/or accompanying drawings, if any. The Law provides that theclaim or claims shall be "fairly based" on the matter disclosed in the specification. Al-though there is no specific "Ruling" by any Indian Court for the yardstick to assess whatought to considered as "fairly based", in typical circumstances, Indian Courts follow uni-versally accepted proposition of Law on Patents on any particular issue. Hence, to as-sess whether the claimed invention is "fairly based" on the matter disclosed in the speci-fication, "three fold investigation" as laid down by Lloyd-Jacob, J. in (1956) RPC 189 at192 (Mond Nickel Co. Ltd.'s Application) and also in (1971) RPC 23 (United-Carr Incor-porated's Application), ought to be acceptable to Indian Courts. Moreover, there are in-stances, where Indian Courts have accepted the concept of "purposive construction"rather than a purely literal one, in construing an invention, as claimed, based on the ap-proach established by the House of Lords in Catnic v Hill & Smith (1982) RPC 183. Thatbeing the case, although there is no statutory provision to adjudicate any patent pro-ceeding for the doctrine of "equivalents", the possibility of giving due consideration by theIndian Courts to the "protocol" on interpretation of Article 69 of the European Patent Con-vention (EPC), for the purpose of interpreting a claimed invention, - cannot be ruled out.

In a few cases for adjudication of "patent infringement" Indian Courts have consideredthe "doctrine of equivalents", and the basic proposition which has been relied upon is:"One cannot avoid infringement by substituting an obvious equivalent for an unessentialinteger. On the other hand, one cannot be held to have taken the substance of an inven-tion if one omits or substitutes something else for an essential integer." It is strongly con-sidered that what is not claimed is disclaimed, but "a person is held guilty of infringementif he makes what is in substance the equivalent of the patented article. He cannot get outof it by some trifling or unessential variation", as enunciated in (1967) RPC 406(Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Ltd).

While adjudicating patent infringement in mechanical cases, the doctrine of mecha-nical equivalents applies only to unessential features and not to essential features of theinvention. If there are genuine differences between the elements of one machine and

2

the other, there will be no infringement. The question is whether the mechanism said toinfringe consists of substantially (that is to say, in essentials) the same parts operating insubstantially the same way as in the patented invention.

However, in the case of chemical equivalents, the specification must be read as aperson acquainted with the subject would read it at the time it was made; and if it couldbe construed as containing any chemical equivalent it must be such as are known tosuch persons at that time; but those which are not known at the time as equivalents, andafterwards are found to answer the same purpose, but are not included in the specifica-tion; they are new inventions.

Nevertheless, the objective to the exercise is to determine that the true scope of theclaims as they could have been read by persons skilled in the art, without knowledge ofparticular allegedly infringing acts. Judicial Rulings of Indian Courts have not restrictedthe patentee's monopoly to the strict language of the claims so as to enable a potentialinfringer to avoid infringement by incorporating immaterial variations. In this regard, thequestion which is resolved is: whether persons with practical knowledge and experienceof the kind of work in which the invention was intended to be used, would understand thatstrict compliance with a particular descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was in-tended by the patentee to be an essential requirement of the invention so that any vari-ant would fall outside the monopoly claimed, even though it could have no material effectupon the way the invention worked. As a result, mere colourable evasions of the strictlanguage of the claims will not avoid infringement. The question whether an evasion iscolourable or material will be a question of fact in each case. The evidence of a skilledman can therefore be received as to the materiality of any variant and as to his under-standing of the meaning to be given to various words or phrases appearing in the claim.

In deciding whether what the alleged infringer is doing amounts to an infringement of aparticular patent, three questions are generally considered by the Indian Courts:

(a) the extent of monopoly right conferred by the patent, which is ascertained by con-struction of the specification;

(b) whether the alleged acts amount to making, using, exercising, selling or distribut-ing a product; or using or exercising a method or process in the case of a processpatent; and

(c) whether what the alleged infringer is doing amounts to an infringement of the mo-nopoly conferred by the patent grant.

Moreover, Indian Courts strictly considered the following circumstances:

(i) Although the patentee need not warn the infringer, his conduct should notamount to acquiescence. In order to prove acquiescence it must be es-tablished that the plaintiff stood by and knowingly allowed the defendant toproceed and to expend money in ignorance of the fact that he had rights,and failed to assert such rights.

(ii) In order to make out infringement, it must be established, to the satisfac-tion of the court, that the alleged infringer, dealing with what he is doing asa matter of substance, is taking the invention claimed by the patent; not theinvention which the patentee might have claimed if he had been well ad-vised or bolder, but that which he has in fact and substance claimed ona fair construction of the specification.

(iii) Delay on the part of the plaintiff in applying to the court will bar its right toan interlocutory injunction, although it may not bar its right to an injunctionat the trial.

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The scope of patent protection does not change in time.

Although under the statutory provision of the prevailing Indian Patent Law, date of apatent is the date on which the complete specification was filed, the novelty of theclaimed invention is determined from the application date (if filed with Provisional Speci-fication) OR from the priority date, if any, claimed from a basic application in any con-vention country.


Yes, prosecution history plays important role in determining the scope of patent protec-tion, and Indian Court of Law has inherent power to call for the same, if an appropriatecase is pleaded in support of OR against such "protection".


There is no specific doctrine of "file wrapper estoppel" in Indian Patent Law, or inthe Civil Procedure Code, governing civil litigations before the Indian Courts ofLaw. There are instances where "prosecution details" of corresponding patent ap-plication(s) in one or more countries outside India, have been considered by theIndian Courts, by way of guidance, particularly to determine the question of valid-ity of the Indian patent, as and when the alleged infringer has taken such defence,in the event of being attacked by the plaintiff/patentee based on the "doctrine ofequivalents".


In general, Indian Courts rely the following propositions:

i) Whether a plaintiff is debarred from bringing the action by virtue of a decision inan earlier action will depend upon the form of the order in the earlier action.

ii) A defendant who has submitted to an injunction in one case is estopped fromquestioning either the validity of the patent or the fact of the previous infringementin a subsequent action relating to the same patent.

iii) Where a specification in a patent has been amended after it has been held invalidin an infringement action, the former decision will not operate as an estoppel in afresh action.

iv) If the defendant is able to prove that on the date of infringement he was notaware, and had no reasonable grounds for believing, that the patent existed, hewill not be liable for damages or account of profits.


5.1. Approach to Claim ConstructionHaving regard to the Rulings of Indian Courts in patent proceedings, particularly in con-struction of patent claims, it is believed that the general principle laid down in the "proto-col" on interpretation of Article 69 of EPC, is sensible, and can be useful model to adoptinternationally. However, it is desirable that guidance ought to be there so that Courts cantake correct and consistent approach to apply the protocol. However, any guide-lines adopted need to be applied with some flexibility, while retaining sufficient certaintyfor third parties, with due consideration to the fact that guides like the Protocol questions

4

are mere aids and not decisive. There are cases (as the English Court of Appeal has nowdemonstrated) where the Protocol questions do not give the right answer and the courtmust substitute its own.

It is also believed, the requirement which ought to be satisfied is that an immaterial vari-ant is "obviously" so if it would have been apparent that it was highly likely that the par-ticular variant would have no material effect on the way the invention works and simpletests could have been performed to confirm this.

5.2. Date for assessing infringement In India, infringement is assessed on the date of the alleged infringement, following theIndian procedure, governing civil litigations, which prescribes the date when the "causeof action" arises.

However, it is believed that like the Law of United Kingdom and some other countries, thedate of assessing infringement ought to be the publication date of the concerned patent.That would reduce the burden of the plaintiff/patentee for adducing appropriate evidencefor establishing the actual date of infringement, being the "cause of action" for the in-fringement suit.

Summary

Indian Patent System provides for protection of "equivalents" on the basis of interpretation ofclaims, as fairly disclosed in the specification. Indian Judiciary accepts the proposition of "pur-posive construction", rather than literal construction of claims. It is, therefore, believed that theprotocol on interpretation of Article 69 of EPC could be a useful model to adopt internationally.Of course, guidance is desirable on the correct approach to apply the protocol. Instead of the ac-tual date of infringement, the publication date of the patent ought to be considered for assess-ment of infringement. India does not favour introduction of a formal doctrine to file wrapperestoppel.

1

IndonesiaIndonésie

Indonesien

Report Q175

in the name of the Indonesian Group


Questions


The Indonesian Patent Law No. 14 year 2001 does not recognize the doctrine of equiv-alents. Article 118 of the Indonesian Patent Law only stipulates that a lawsuit for dam-ages against any parties suspected to violate patent rights may only be accepted if theproduct or process is proven to have been made by the patented invention. Althoughthere are so many cases being brought to court, there is no case explicitly using the doc-trine of equivalents.


Article 35 stipulates that a patent application may be amended by revising the descrip-tion and/or the claims, provided that such amendments do not expand the scope ofinvention applied for the original application. In view of this, the scope of invention of anapplication may be changed by amending the application as long as the changed scopebecomes narrower. Narrowing the scope of invention of an application is sometimes re-quired to make the application more specific and thus overcome obviousness by the pri-or arts.

There is no provision clearly stipulating if the scope of patent protection can furtherchange with time. It is very likely that the scope of patent protection is fixed at the date ofits grant. Therefore, if an application were made narrower to avoid obviousness by priorarts, the scope of patent protection given would be based on the last amendment.





It is not clear whether or not prosecution history plays an important role in determiningthe scope of patent protection. No case has been brought to court in which any parties

2

presented "file wrapper" as evidence for determining scope of protection. However, theuse of file wrapper will most likely be left to the sole discretion of the judge in court in alawsuit.


There is no precedent case on this matter. We believe that it will be very difficult to limitthe scope of claims outside prosecution. Using estoppel or admissions as evidence willbe very weak. It is most likely that the court will waive such evidence.


To determine the scope of protection in certainty, the criteria to which the doctrine ofequivalent could apply should be made more tangible, clear and concise. This criteriacan be then be used as guidance to any parties in need of it.

1

IsraelIsraëlIsrael

Report Q175

in the name of the Israeli Group


Questions


Section 49 of the Israeli Patent Law provides (in translation from the Hebrew) as follows:

"A patentee is entitled to prevent any other person from exploiting, withouthis permission or unlawfully, the invention for which the patent has beengranted, whether in the manner defined in the claims or in a manner simi-lar thereto and involving the main features, as defined in the claims, of theinvention which is the subject-matter of the patent (exploitation as afore-said hereinafter referred to as "infringement")."

The above underlined provision concerning the taking of "the main features as defined inthe claims" was construed by the Israeli courts to include both the English doctrine of "thevariants" and the U.S. doctrine of equivalents.

The doctrine of equivalents developed in the U.S. has been accepted by the Israelicourts. There are only a very few precedents on this subject in Israel. These precedentsmay be summed up by saying that the whole doctrine of equivalents adopted in the U.S.has been accepted here, i.e. if the equivalent integer taken by the infringer has the samefunction and obtains the same result by the same methods provided for in the patent,there will be an infringement of the patent.


There is no specific provision in the statutory law concerning this question, neither isthere a precedent of an Israeli court in this respect.

It is to be assumed that if and when the question arises, the Israeli courts will follow theU.S. jurisprudence in this respect.



There is no file wrapper estoppel in Israeli law. However, the prosecution historyof the patent will be taken into account in construing the patent claims. A patent-ee will be held to his statements and declarations during the prosecution of his ap-plication.

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There is no difference between the two and anything said or done during the pro-suection of the application, which is on record, may be relied upon in the inter-pretation of the claims.


Any statement by the patentee, whether given during the examination stage of theapplication or during an inter partes proceeding in the Patent Office, may be re-lied upon.


The general legal rules of estoppel and admissions apply in patent matters as in any oth-er matter. In other words, if it can be proved that a patentee admitted a certain matterconcerning the scope of his patent, such an admission may certainly be taken into con-sideration.


Any harmonization may be done by statutory law. Statutory provisions are subject to in-terpretation by the courts and experience shows that identical provisions in laws adopt-ed in various countries are being interpreted differently by the courts of each country. Itseems therefore that the matter should be left to the courts to develop the law by decid-ing on a case to case basis.

1

ItalyItalie

Italien

Report Q175

in the name of the Italian Group


Questions


The inventions law in our country does not appear to contain explicit provisions concern-ing non-literal infringement by equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents is neverthelessadmitted by legal practice, in line with the widely accepted theory according to which thepatent covers a solution idea that can be expressed via different modes of implementa-tion whereas the copyright safeguards the individual expressive form, not the generalidea. This is also coherent with the law on utility models [Art. 2 (3)], according to whichthe patent protection extends to solutions that achieve the same utility, on condition thatthey implement the same innovative concept.


There is no consolidated legal practice or theoretical guidelines on this point. It is the pre-vailing opinion of the Italian Group that it is possible and advisable to describe and claimthe components of the inventive solution in functional terms (e.g. "means for fixing com-ponent A to component B"). In this case evolution of the art subsequent to the patentingcan lead to the creation of further and different means that perform, in the context of theinventive idea, the same function as the one described and claimed in the patent; in thiscase replacement of the old means with the new ones does not exclude infringement (itbeing understood, obviously, that replacement of the old means with the new ones maybe eligible for protection as a dependent patent).

Naturally the claim thus expressed in functional terms of the components of the inventionalways presupposes that these elements operate according to laws or principles that areknown or described in the patent application. If unknown properties of the components ofthe invention emerge only after the patenting, and it also emerges that these propertiespermit replacement of the original components with alternative solutions that perform thesame function, the protection of the invention should not extend to the solutions that areex post equivalent. Thus, for example, in the pharmaceutical field a second patent (2)may claim a new synthetic molecule B, featuring distinctive structural characteristics withrespect to the synthetic molecule A, protected by a prior patent (1). Subsequently it mayemerge that said molecule B is, in fact, the metabolite of molecule A, i.e. a substance thatis the immediate and obvious (a posteriori) transformation of A once it has been taken bythe patient. Consequently, from this moment the therapeutic effect of B and its use to re-

2

place A is obvious. In the same way the second patent (2) does not depend on the first(1), and can be implemented without the consent of the holder of the prior rights.

In the light of the latter considerations it is also the prevailing opinion of this Group thatthe knowledge that permits "generalisation" of the scope of the inventive idea must be re-ferred to the date of priority and not the date of patenting in the individual countries. Ifknowledge on the date of priority did not permit generalisation of the function performedby the components of the patent, and this generalisation was not within reach of the av-erage knowledge of a person skilled in the art, it appears reasonable that extension ofthe patent on the basis of the knowledge acquired subsequently to the date of priorityshould occur on the basis of a new and independent application. If, on the other hand,the generalisation of the inventive idea is within the capacity of said person skilled in theart at the date of priority, yet the first patent application limits the claims to one single spe-cific solution, the problem concerns the possibility of the subsequent patent applicationsbeing modified and generalised to the equivalent solutions without losing the benefit ofthe priority. Upon a more attentive study, however, the problem concerns the limits of ad-missibility of modifications to the applications that claim priority. This possible modifica-tion does not affect the principle according to which the equivalence must be evaluatedin the light of the knowledge available to one skilled in the art at the priority date.





The Italian Group must firstly point out that the question presupposes the existence of a(serious) preliminary examination of the patent application, and therefore does not applyto national patenting procedures in Italy, where there is no preliminary examination onthe merits. In the Italian system the question may arise in the case of national effects ofpatenting through the European Patent Office. In this regard, it is expedient to distinguishcases in which the findings of the European Patents Office have influenced the draftingof the final application admitted from cases in which the findings of the patents officehave led to informal clarifications by the applicant, not followed by a reformulation of thedescription or claims. In the first case it is undoubtedly reasonable to exclude the possi-bility of the theory of equivalents bringing within the scope of the patent solutions which(following the findings of the office) the applicant has excluded from the claims. In thesecond case the events concerning the patenting that have not led to reformulation of theclaims must not be overestimated in determining the extent of the protection. In any casethese events (which can never permit interpretation of the patent by widening its subjectwith respect to what can be deduced from the claims) can at the most serve to illustratethe significance of expressions with objectively "ambiguous" content. This kind of situa-tion should be rare in principle, however: it is the job of the examiners to avoid all typesof ambiguity, and make sure that the applicant includes in the text of the patent all indi-cations necessary to eliminate all possible uncertainties that have emerged in the courseof the procedure.


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Art. 59 quater of the Italian patents law explicitly establishes that the patent holder canlimit the content of the patent. This limitation is always subject, however, to a procedurebefore the UIBM (Italian patents and trademarks office), which can therefore perhaps al-ways fall within the notion of "prosecution" to which the question refers. The questionalso raises the interesting prospect of the possibility of a limitation of the patent followingjudicial decrees and, for example, sentences that redefine the claims. On this point theredo not appear to be any consolidated legal practice guidelines. Although the most recentabstracts of sentences published concern cases in which the reformulation has been ex-cluded (see. App. Milano 19-1-2001 in GADI 2001/4259; Trib. Torino 9-6-1999, ibidem2000/4011; App. Milano 6-12-1996, in IDI 1997, p. 379), there are also several instancesof legal practice (less evident from the files) in which the judge, without even posing theproblem (or taking it for granted) agrees to reformulate the patent according to the indi-cations of the court-appointed expert.


This national Group points out that the above replies reflect what is considered to be themost reasonable and preferable interpretation of the Italian system, in the absence of ex-plicit provisions and consolidated legal practice. The previous replies therefore alsoserve as suggestions, looking to the future prospect of harmonisation of the various sys-tems.

1

JapanJaponJapan

Report Q175

in the name of the Japanese Group


Questions


In Japan, the doctrine of equivalents (DoE) is defined as a legal concept that allows acourt to declare patent infringement in the event that certain requirements are satisfied,even when the accused product or process is in part different from the claimed invention.This concept was created under the rationale that patent protection should be appliedagainst a product or process which is substantially identical to the patented inventionfrom viewpoints of the object of the Patent Law such as protection of invention and equi-ty between the parties.

In order for an accused product or process to be deemed as an equivalent to the patent-ed invention, the accused product or process should satisfy the following five require-ments:

(1) the portion of the claimed invention that is different from the accusedproduct is not a substantial part of the claimed invention;

(2) the purpose of the invention is still performed by the accused productwhich replaces that portion by another thing or process, and the same op-eration and effect as those of the invention are attained by the accusedproduct;

(3) the above replacement could have been easily conceived by a personskilled in the art at the time of manufacture of the accused product;

(4) the accused product was not part of any publicly known technology orknowledge at the time of the filing of the application, and could not havebeen easily conceived by a person skilled in the art based on existingknowledge of the art at the time of filing; and

(5) there are no special circumstances, such as where the accused productwas intentionally excluded from the claim by the patentee during the pros-ecution of the patent (file wrapper estoppel).

In Japan, there is no statutory provision regarding DoE. The above-mentioned policy andfive requirements for application of DoE were set by a decision of the Japanese SupremeCourt on February 24, 1998. Courts in Japan have applied DoE based on the SupremeCourt's decision ever since. Although case law does not play a major role in the Japan-ese legal system, this Supreme Court's decision has played the role of de facto bidingauthority.

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In Japan, it can be said that the scope of patent protection changes with time.

The aforementioned February 24, 1998 Supreme Court decision, which was handeddown for a patent dispute in the field of mechanical technology, has a portion that reads,"Even if there are constituent elements described in a patented claim that differ from theaccused product [i.e. when there is no literal infringement], when …the …replacementcould have been easily conceived by a person skilled in the art at the time of manufac-ture of the accused product" (emphasis added).

This means that the state of the art at the time of manufacture of the accused product isto be made the relevant criterion for determining infringement by equivalent. Therefore,the scope of the relevant state of the art would change depending on when the accusedproduct is manufactured. Generally, the technical level of any area of technology is ex-pected to advance as time goes by, and therefore, the scope of patent protection is alsoexpected to expand with time.

It should be noted that, before this Supreme Court decision, the scope of patent protec-tion in Japan had been fixed because courts in Japan at that time had used the time offiling as the reference time for their DoE assessment.


In determining scope of patent protection in Japan, prosecution history is taken into ac-count, among other factors.

Regarding application of DoE, the Supreme Court decision in Ball Spline Shaft Bearingcase held that "once a patentee excludes a technology from the technical scope of apatented invention by intentionally excluding it from the scope of the claim during patentprosecution or otherwise, or a patentee commits another act that can be outwardly inter-preted as doing so, the patentee cannot make assertions that would contradict such anexclusion, since such a contradiction would not be permitted in view of the legal doctrineof estoppel." Ever since this decision, prosecution history has been taken account of alsoin a DoE case.


In Japan, doctrine of estoppel has been adopted as a general principle of civil law(see Article 1(2) of the Civil Code and Article 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure).When this doctrine is applied under the Patent Law, it is called "file wrapper estop-pel." So, there is file wrapper estoppel in Japan.

When a patent is granted as a result that the JPO examiner accepted an argu-ment made by the applicant during prosecution, the file wrapper is consideredwhen the patentee alleges diferently from the applicant's statement in the prose-cution.

In DoE infringement cases, file wrapper estoppel will be applied in accordancewith the principle of the Supreme Court's Ball Spline decision. In the case that theapplicant narrowed down a claim during prosecution, for example, in order toavoid the cited prior art in order to overcome the rejection made by reason of thelack of novelty or inventive step or to overcome the rejection made by reason ofinsufficient description, file wrapper estoppel is applied. Furthermore, from theaforementioned decision, we can also conclude that file wrapper estoppel will bealso applied to a matter that the applicant had once acknowledged that it did not

3

belong to technical scope of the claimed invention, despite of whether or not suchan acknowledgment influenced the decision to grant a patent.


In Japan, oral discussions made between the applicant and the examiner havealso been recorded in file wrapper as an interview record. As long as it is main-tained in the record, an interview record will not be regarded differently from anaction made in the opposition procedure and will be taken account of in the claiminterpretation.


In Japan, only matters stated by the applicant in the prosecution or the court pro-ceedings will be used as a basis for claim interpretation. Any action made by thePatent Office or a third party will not affect claim interpretation. Also, whomeverthe applicant made the statement has no relation to the estoppel effect, and aslong as it is maintained in the record, a statement made by the applicant beforethe Patent Office or a court will be taken into account.


In certain environments, an action made outside prosecution may also limit the scope ofclaims. For example, the following may be taken into account for the purpose of claim in-terpretation and may be subject to estoppel: the description of the prior art cited in the ap-plication of the disputed patent (Tokyo District Court decision, December 22, 1986); anallegation made during the prosecution of the original application in the case of a divi-sional application; statements made in a corresponding foreign patent application; state-ments made during negotiations for licensing; and statements made during actions for aninjunction or actions for a declaratory judgement for no right to demand compensation fordamages. There have been court decisions in Japan that adopted statements made in alecture the inventor made fifteen years after the invention was made as a evidence fordeciding technical scope of that invention (Tokyo District Court decision, June 16, 1989),and that adopted the description of the prior art cited in the application of the disputedpatent as a material for deciding the technical scope of that invention (Tokyo DistrictCourt decision, December 22, 1986).


We believe that the Japanese Supreme Court decision mentioned above should serve asa good starting point toward the harmonization. For your review, we are attaching anEnglish translation of the decision in its entirety.

While this decision is probably not a perfect solution for everyone, it has so far servedJapan very well. We believe that the doctrine of equivalents should not be overly used asit may harm businesses and even research and developments due to the fact that itbrings in some legal unpredictability. Therefore, the doctrine should be available undercourts' discretion to a limited number of cases. The statistics which have been compiledby the Institute of Intellectual Property, Tokyo, Japan show that between August 1998, af-ter the February 1998 Supreme Court decision, and November 2002, 121 lower courtdecisions were rendered in which the applicability of the doctrine was considered. Ofthose decisions, the doctrine of equivalents infringement was found in ten (10) cases. Inthe face of these decisions, the committee preparing this report is unaware of any major

4

and specific dissatisfaction among the public and IP practitioners and academics con-cerning the courts' application of the doctrine thus far. Basically all lower court decisionsconsidered the five conditions the Supreme Court set forth.

To that extent, we believe that the five conditions for the doctrine of equivalents have agood standing in Japan and give reasonably clear guidance as to the question of thescope of infringement. Also, we believe that the opinion of the Japanese Supreme Courtas a whole, while it is relative short, provides a well-balanced exposition of what the doc-trine should be.

As discussed above, this law set by the Supreme Court of Japan has two major charac-teristics: one is that the ease of replacement is considered based on technology avail-able at the time of infringement, and the other that the prosecution history estoppel isconsidered by the court and, according to the fair reading of the decision, any narrowingamendments to a patent claim would preclude the use of the doctrine by the patentee forthe narrowed portion of the claim.

Having noted that the Japanese law should serve a good starting point for discussions byAIPPI, the Japanese Group would like to point out some possible problems concerningthe Supreme Court law discussed above.

Because the ease of replacement is considered at the time of infringement (according tothe language of the Supreme Court decision, "at the time of manufacture etc."), thescope of equivalents keeps expanding in time because of continuing technological de-velopments. This may unreasonably inhibit technological or business developments be-yond the reasonable scope of an existing patent. For example, a patent was granted ona new process P to company A, and three years later, company B itself invented andused process P', which is somewhat different from P, under secrecy. The patentee A suedcompany B for patent infringement, but the court found no infringement because the re-placement between P and P' was not easy at the time of infringement. Further threeyears later, however, another company C also invented and started using the sameprocess P' without knowing what happened to company B. Company A then sued com-pany C and the court found the same replacement easy due to technological develop-ments which occurred in the intervening three years. This is entirely possible under theabove-mentioned Supreme Court decision. What about company B, which was still usingthe same invention A'? If the patentee sues company B again, does it have any defense?These situations may pose some questions about the propriety of the time referenceused to consider the ease of replacement.

Also, the doctrine does introduce uncertainty in claim interpretation. There should besome mechanisms to its frivolous use.

The Japanese group believes that AIPPI should consider such issues as the one dis-cussed above in drafting a resolution.

Summary

In Japan, the Patent Law does not prescribe the doctrine of equivalents. The Supreme Court, forthe first time, explicitly confirmed the existence of the doctrine of equivalents in judging patentinfringement issues (THK Co. v. Tsubakimoto Seiko Co. decided 24 February, 1998, the "BallSpline Bearing" case). The Supreme Court held that when an accused device is partly differentfrom a patent claim, the device is deemed to be equivalent to the elements of the claim andtherefore be within the scope of the claim, if the specific requirements are satisfied.

The specific requirements follow:

5

1) in a case where there exists a portion in the claim which is different from the accused de-vice, that portion is not a substantial part of the patented invention;

2) even if that portion is interchanged with a part of the accused device, the object of the in-vention is achieved by the accused device, and the same operation and effect as thoseof the invention are attained (interchangeability);

3) the above interchange could have been easily conceived by a person skilled in the art atthe time of manufacture of the accused device (ease of interchangeability);

4) the accused device cannot be the same as art publicity known at the time of the filing ofthe application, or could not have been easily conceived by a person skilled in the artbased on the publicly known art at the time of filing; and

5) there are no special circumstances, such as where the accused device was intentionallyexcluded from the claim by the patentee during the prosecution of the patent application(file wrapper estoppel).

The Supreme Court held that ease of interchangeability should be determined at the time of in-fringement (e.g. at the time of manufacture of the accused device). As for the proper time for de-termining ease of interchange, the filing date of the patent application used to be used as theproper time. However, the Supreme Court instead held that the proper time for determining easeof interchange is at the time of infringement.

The exclusion of the accused device from the scope of the patent claim was also discussed. TheSupreme Court stated that art which was already publicly known at the time of filing or couldhave been easily conceived by a person skilled in the art based on such publicly known art atthe time of filing, can never be patented to anybody, and, therefore, such art cannot be said tobe within the scope of a patent claim. Based on this reasoning, the Supreme Court stated thatthe doctrine of equivalents is not applicable under such circumstances.

The Supreme Court, again for the first time, clearly held that file wrapper estoppel applied inJapan. Up until February 1998, there had been no clear precedent in Japan as to the applicabil-ity of file wrapper estoppel. However, it was thought that this type of estoppel was certainly ap-plicable to claim interpretation in order to restrict claim interpretation. The Supreme Court, how-ever, stated in its Decision that if the applicant intentionally excluded the accused device fromthe claims during the prosecution of the patent application, or the patentee acknowledged thatthe accused device was not within the scope of the claims, or conducted itself as if it acquiescedin such an interpretation but then later asserted the claims in a manner contrary to what was ac-knowledged earlier, such a contrary assertion should not be permitted in light of file wrapperestoppel.

Since the Supreme Court decision, the doctrine of equivalents infringement was affirmed in 10decisions out of 121 lower court decisions.

Résumé

Au Japon, la Loi sur les brevets ne prescrit pas la doctrine des équivalents. La Cour suprême,pour la première fois, a explicitement confirmé l'existence de la doctrine des équivalents enjugeant de la contrefaçon de brevet. (THK Co. contre Tsubakimoto Seiko Co., décision du 24février 1998, affaire "Ball Spline Bearings"). La Cour suprême a considéré que lorsqu'un dis-positif en accusation est en partie différent d'une revendication de brevet, ce dispositif est con-sidéré comme équivalent aux éléments de la revendication et se trouve donc sous la portée dubrevet, si des conditions spécifiques sont remplies.

Ces conditions spécifiques sont les suivantes:

6

1) s'il existe une partie de la revendication qui est différente du dispositif en accusation,cette partie n'est pas une partie substantielle de l'invention brevetée;

2) même si cette partie et une partie du dispositif en accusation sont interchangées, le butde l'invention est atteint par le dispositif en accusation, et la même opération et lesmêmes effets que ceux de l'invention sont atteints (interchangeabilité);

3) ce remplacement aurait pu aisément être conçu par un homme du métier au moment dela fabrication du dispositif en accusation (facilité d'interchangeabilité);

4) le dispositif en accusation ne peut pas être identique à l'art de notoriété publique au mo-ment du depôt de la demande, ou n'aurait pas pu être conçu aisément par un homme dumétier se fondant sur l'art de notoriété publique au moment du depôt; et

5) il n'existe pas de circonstances particulières comme par exemple lorsque le dispositif enaccusation a été intentionnellement exclu de la revendication par le breveté durant laprocédure de délivrance du brevet (file wrapper estoppel).

La Cour suprême a jugé que la facilité d'interchangeabilité devait être déterminée au moment dela contrefaçon (c'est-à-dire au moment de la fabrication du dispositif en accusation). En ce quiconcerne le moment approprié pour déterminer la facilité d'interchangeabilité, l'usage était d'u-tiliser la date de dépôt de la demande de brevet. La Cour suprême, au contraire, a considéréque le moment où doit être déterminé la facilité d'interchangeabilité est celui de la contrefaçon.

L'exclusion du dispositif en accusation de la portée du brevet a également été discutée. La Coursuprême a déclaré que l'art de notoriété publique au moment du dépôt de la demande, ou ayantaisément pu être conçu par un homme du métier s'appuyant sur un tel art de notoriété publiqueau moment du dépôt de la demande, ne peut être attribué sous forme de brevet à personne, etque donc un tel art ne peut pas être considéré comme se trouvant sous la portée d'une reven-dication de brevet. Se fondant sur ce raisonnement, la Cour suprême a déclaré que la doctrinedes équivalents n'était pas applicable en de telles circonstances.

La Cour suprême, pour la première fois encore, a clairement considéré que l'irrecevabilité ouempêchement tiré du dossier de délivrance (file wrapper estoppel) s'appliquait au Japon.Jusqu'en février 1998, il n'y avait pas eu de précédent au Japon concernant l'applicabilité de l'ir-recevabilité ou empêchement tiré du dossier de délivrance. Il était cependant considéré que cetype d'irrecevabilité ou empêchement était tout à fait applicable à l'interprétation des revendica-tions dans le but de restreindre l'interprétation des revendications. La Cour suprême a cepen-dant stipulé dans sa décision que si le demandeur a intentionnellement exclu des revendica-tions le dispositif en accusation durant la procédure de demande de brevet, ou que si le brevetéa reconnu que le dispositif en accusation ne se trouvait pas sous la portée de la revendication,ou s'est conduit comme s'il admettait une telle interprétation, mais qu'il a ensuite soutenu sarevendication en opposition avec ce qui avait été reconnu auparavant, une telle affirmation con-traire ne devait pas être acceptée dans le contexte de l'irrecevabilité ou empêchement tiré dudossier de délivrance.

Depuis la décision de la Cour suprême, la contrefaçon par la doctrine des équivalents a été af-firmée dans 10 décisions parmi 121 décisions de tribunaux inférieurs.

Zusammenfassung

In Japan, das Patentgesetz vorschreibt nicht die Doktrin der Äquivalente. Das höchste Gerichthat zum ersten Mal ausdrücklich die Existenz der Doktrin der Äquivalente bei der Beurteilungder Verletzungsfrage von Patenten bestätigt (der "Ball Spline Bearing" Fall: THK Co. gegenTsubakimoto Seiko Co., entschieden am 24.02.1998). Das höchste Gericht hat entschieden,dass wenn sich ein beschuldigtes Gerät teilweise von den Patentansprüchen unterscheidet, ist

7

das Gerät äquivalent als das Element der Ansprüche erachtet und daher im Anspruchsbereich,wenn die speziellen Auflagen erfüllt sind.

Diese speziellen Auflagen sind:

1) Im Falle, dass sich ein Teil der Ansprüche von dem beschuldigten Gerät unterscheidet,ist dieser Teil nicht ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der patentierten Erfindung.

2) Auch wenn dieses Teil mit dem Teil des beschuldigtem Gerätes ausgetauscht wird, istdas Ziel der Erfindung bei dem beschuldigtem Gerät erreicht und der gleiche Ar-beitsablauf und Auswirkung bleiben erhalten (Austauschbarkeit).

3) Der oben beschriebene Austausch hätte der Fachmann sich zum Zeitpunkt der Fabrika-tion des beschuldigtem Gerätes leicht ausdenken können (Leichtigkeit der Aus-tauschbarkeit).

4) Das beschuldigte Gerät kann nicht dasselbe sein wie die öffentliche bekannte Kunst zumZeitpunkt der Einreichung der Anmeldung, oder der Fachmann hätte nicht leicht,basierend auf der öffentliche bekannte Kunst zum Zeitpunkt der Einreichung der Anmel-dung ausdenken können.

5) Es gibt keine besonderen Umstände, wie zum Beispiel wo das beschuldigte Gerät mitAbsicht von der Ansprüche des Patentinhabers während des Erteilungsverfahrens beider Patentanmeldung ausgelassen worden ist ("file wrapper estoppel").

Das höchste Gericht hat entschieden, dass die Leichtigkeit des Austausches zum Zeitpunkt derPatentverletzung (zum Beispiel zum Zeitpunkt der Fabrikation des beschuldigten Gerätes)angesetzt werden soll. Das Datum der Patentanmeldung wurde zuvor als angemessener Zeit-punkt zum Ansetzen der Leichtigkeit des Austausches benutzt. Das höchste Gericht hat allerd-ings entschieden, dass der angemessene Zeitpunkt zum Ansetzen der Leichtigkeit des Aus-tausches den Zeitpunkt der Patentverletzung ist.

Die Ausscheidung des beschuldigten Gerätes von dem Schutzbereich der Patentansprüchewurde auch diskutiert. Das höchste Gericht verkündigte, dass die Kunst, die schon öffentlichbekannt zum Zeitpunkt der Bewerbung war, oder die der Fachmann basierend auf solch öf-fentlich bekannte Kunst zum Zeitpunkt der Bewerbung sich hätte leicht ausdenken können,kann niemals zu irgendwehm patentiert werden und daher kann solch eine Kunst nicht als in-nerhalb des Schutzbereiches der Patentansprüche bezeichnet werden. Aufgrund dieser Argum-mentation hat das höchste Gericht entschieden, dass die Doktrin der Äquivalente nicht unterdiesen Umständen anwendbar ist.

Das höchste Gericht, wieder zum ersten Mal, hat klar beschlossen, dass die Einschränkungdurch die Erteilungsakte in Japan anwendbar ist. Bis Februar 1998 gab es keinen klaren Präze-denzfall in Japan für die Anwendbarkeit von Einschränkung durch die Erteilungsakte. Jedochwurde es angenommen, dass dieser Typ von Einschränkung sicherlich anwendbar für dieAuslegung von Ansprüche ist, um die Auslegung von Ansprüche zu begrenzen. Das höchsteGericht hat aber mit den Entscheidungen verkündet, dass die Einschränkung durch dieErteilungsakte nicht erlaubt sein soll, wenn der Anmelder absichtlich das beschuldigte Gerätwährend des Erteilungsverfahrens der Patentanmeldung ausgeschlossen hat, oder wenn derPatentinhaber anerkannt hat, dass das beschuldigte Gerät nicht innerhalb des Anspruchsbere-ich war, oder sich so benommen hat als ob solch eine Auslegung hinnehmen würde, sich dannaber später umgekehrt verhält.

Seit dieser Entscheidung vom höchsten Gericht wurde die Verletzung der Doktrin der Äquiva-lente in 10 von 121 unteren Gerichtshöfe bestätigt.

1

LithuaniaLituanieLitauen

Report Q175

in the name of the Lithuanian Group


Questions


According Patent Law of the Republic of Lithuania (1994 01 18 No I-372), article 28:

The patent claims shall be considered to cover not only all the elements as expressed inthe claims but also their equivalents.

An element shall be considered as being equivalent to an element as expressed in aclaim if:

- it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way and pro-duces substantially the same result as the element expressed in the claim;

- it is obvious to a person skilled in the art that the same result as that achieved bymeans of the element as expressed in the claim, can be achieved by means of theequivalent element.

If the patent description contains examples of the embodiment of the invention or exam-ples of the functions or results of the invention, the claims shall not be interpreted as lim-ited to such examples


According Patent Law of the Republic of Lithuania (1994 01 18 No I-372), Article 28:

The State Patent Bureau shall take into consideration any statement of the applicant orthe owner of the patent to limit the scope of the claims filed before the patent grant orwithin the patent validity term.

According Article 43 of Patent Law, the owner of the patent shall have the rightto request the State Patent Bureau to make changes in the patent in order to limit the ex-tent of the protection conferred by it.

The State Patent Bureau must comply with lawful requirements of the owner of thepatent.

No changes in the patent shall be permitted which would result in the extension of thescope of the invention set forth in the patent application.

2


No





According Article 45, on the request of any persons concerned the court may inval-idate a patent, in whole or in part.

If the patent is recognized invalid in part, the corresponding limitation of the rights con-ferred by the patent, the reduction of the number of claims, and corresponding amend-ments to description and drawings shall be made.

1

MalaysiaMalaisieMalaysia

Report Q175

in the name of the Malaysian Group


Questions

1. If your country has a doctrine of "equivalents", what is it and how are equivalents as-sessed?

Yes, Malaysia has a doctrine of equivalent infringement.

Is it provided for by statute or case law?

Case law - the doctrine would apply if an inessential integer of a patented invention issubstituted or omitted without affecting the manner of working of the invention or the ef-fects from the working of the invention.

2. Can the scope of patent protection change with time, or is it fixed at a particular date?

Fixed.

If it is fixed, at what date (e.g. priority, application date or date of alleged infringement)?

Validity is as of priority date.



Yes - when ascertaining infringement or invalidity of patent.


Yes.


Yes.


Any documents or irrebutted acts of admission outside prosecution limiting the scope ofthe claims would be admissible as relevant evidence. Such documents and acts must bedirectly referable to the invention.

2


No. There is no need for harmonisation. Relevant evidence in whatsoever nature andsubject to the rules of evidence as to asmissibility can be admitted into evidence.

1

MexicoMexiqueMexiko

Report Q175

in the name of the Mexican Groupby Javier UHTHOFF


Questions


Mexico does not have a doctrine of "equivalents" per se stated in the law, there are nospecifically defined laws that provide guidelines on the handling of equivalents, usually,equivalents may fall within the provisions of the Articles of the Mexican law that refer tonovelty of invention (Articles 16 and 17 of the Mexican Law of Industrial Property -citedbelow-) and therefore the "equivalent" cases may be handled by applying the regulationsestablished by such Articles. "Equivalents" are usually analyzed during prosecution in or-der to establish the differences between the prior art and the invention that is beingpatented. It is important to mention that patent litigation in Mexico is not as abundant asin other countries, and therefore case law is scarce, however, as time passes on, thiskind of cases are becoming more common.

Article 16 Patentable inventions are those which are new, result from an inventive activi-ty, and which are capable of an industrial application within the terms of this law... Article17 In determining whether an invention is new or results from inventive activity, consid-eration shall be given to the current state of technology on the date the patent request ispresented or, as the case may be, on which its priority is recognized. In addition, in de-termining whether an invention is new, the current state of technology shall include allpending patent requests presented in Mexico prior to the date of presentation of the re-quest under consideration although the notice referred to article 52 of this law occurs ata later date.

In the cases where claim interpretation is involved, the Mexican Law of Industrial Prop-erty provides that the conferred right of a patent is determined by the allowed claims andthat the specification, drawings, biologic material deposits, etc... must be used if inter-pretation is needed.


As stated by Article 55 Bis of the Mexican law, the scope of patent protection is estab-lished when the application is first filed before the Mexican Patent Office and therefore,from then on, all actions must fall within that scope. The patent protection scope, that is,the claims, may be limited in order to narrow their scope at any time during prosecution(e.g. to overcome a prior art objection) but it is terminally forbidden to broaden the scope

2

of the patent/patent application beyond the scope that was originally sought at the dateof filing. You can say then, that the scope of patent protection in Mexico is fixed at thedate of filing of the application.





There is no particular role of the prosecution history in determining the scope of patentprotection in Mexico, as mentioned before, the scope of patent protection is establishedin the original filing and all actions taken afterwards must fall within that "original" scope,this scope may be narrowed-down, when required, during prosecution.

a) However, 'file wrapper estoppel' is not contemplated by the Mexican Law and theclaims may be narrowed and afterwards, reasserted with a broader scope as longas this scope still falls within the "original" scope of the patent application.

b) There is a difference between formal actions and informal actions, while formalactions go on record, infromal actions such as discussions with the examiners donot and hence, informal actions do not constitute part of the recorded prosecutionhistory.

c) The Mexican Patent Office handles patent applications in secrecy and third par-ties are not allowed access to the whole prosecution record, due to this, no ac-tions can be taken by third parties during prosecution of a patent application.Once the patent is granted, third parties may request the right to challenge apatent's validity.


The scope of the claims cannot be limited outside prosecution, current Mexican practicedictates that the scope of protection is established when a patent application is filed andactions taken inside or outside prosecution do not alter the original "entitled" scope of theapplication.


As mentioned before, the number of patent infringment/validity litigations in Mexico is re-duced in comparison with other countries (e.g. European countries, U.S. or Japan) andtherefore, current laws and regulations do not refer to the matters of "equivalents" andprosecution history as specifically as the laws in other countries, nevertheless it would beimportant to harmonize certain aspects of the current Mexican law with that of othercountries in order to reach certain consensus that provides a more complete way to prac-tice patent law. Just as there are treaties for the filing of patents internationally, thereshould be certain identity in the laws for patent prosecution and litigation internationally,it is important to point out that such harmonization should always be done by taking intoconsideration the fundamental concepts of the existing law in each country, this, in orderto respect each country's own legal principles.

1

NetherlandsPays-Bas

Niederlande

Report Q175

in the name of the Dutch Groupby K.A.J. BISSCHOP, R.E. EBBINK (chair), A.E. HEEZIUS, M.H.J. VAN DEN HORST,

A. KILLAN, A.A.G. LAND, C.S.M. MOREL


Questions


Short Answer

In the Netherlands the concept of infringement by equivalence does exist. There is nostatutory basis, however, and there is no Supreme Court case law which clearly definesthe concept. In the event that one or more features of the patent claim is/are not literallypresent in the variant, the lower court will establish whether or not use has been made ofequivalent measures. If the latter is established, the variant may be considered as an in-fringement. The so-called "function-way-result test1" has been upheld2 as a means to es-tablish equivalence. In lower decisions3 mention has been made that in chemical casesuse may also be made of the so-called "insubstantial differences test4" or the test that itmust be assessed whether it is "obvious to a person skilled in the art that substantiallythe same result as that achieved by means of the element as expressed in the claim canbe achieved by means of the equivalent element5". Furthermore, it has been held in re-cent lower court decisions that so-called inventive variants do not qualify as an equiva-lent.

Answer

Since 1930 the Dutch Supreme Court has applied the so-called "essence of the inven-tion" doctrine to the interpretation of the scope of protection of a patent6 . According tothis doctrine, the scope of protection of a patent was not so much found in the claims, butrather by interpreting the claims in the light of that which constituted the "essence of the

1 I.e. equivalent measures are measures which perform essentially the same function, in essentially the same wayto lead to essentially the same result.

2 Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) 13 January 1995, NJ 1995, 392 re Dreizler vs. Remeha.3 E.g. District Court of The Hague, 28 October 1998, docket no. 98/0398 re Yamanouchi vs. Biogen.4 The District Court refers to Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit in Hilton Davis Chem. Co. vs. Warner Jenkin-

son Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 43 USPQ2d 1152 (CAFC 1997).5 The District Court refers to article 21 (2) of the WIPO Harmonisation proposal.6 Dutch Supreme Court 20 June 1930, NJ 1930, 1217 re Philips vs. Tasseron.

2

invention" as revealed in the document as a whole. The application of this doctrine usu-ally led to a quite broad scope of protection.

The "essence" doctrine came to be criticised both in decisions by the lower Courts and inthe literature after the ratification of the EPC in the Netherlands in 1978 as it was consid-ered not to be in conformity with article 69 and the Protocol. The Dutch Supreme Courtfinally responded to this criticism in 1995 in the decision re Ciba Geigy vs. Ote Optics7.In this decision the "essence of the invention" is still taken as a starting point but nolonger as the only decisive factor. The Supreme Court held as follows:

"The aforementioned point of view, developed in Dutch case law, appliedwith consideration of Article 30(2) of the Dutch Patents Act 1910, comesdown to that when the claims are interpreted, also against the backgroundof the description and the drawings, also now that which is essential to theinvention for which protection is sought must be taken into account - in oth-er words: the inventive idea underlying the wording of the claims - in orderto avoid an interpretation which would be based exclusively on the literalmeaning of the wording and which would therefore be too narrow (or un-necessarily wide) to provide indications as to how, in that interpretation,the middle as meant in the Protocol can be found between a fair protectionfor the patentee and a reasonable degree of certainly for third parties. Thejudge called to interpret the claims of the patent will therefore also have toconsider whether the result of his research sufficiently does justice to areasonable degree of certainly for third parties. This last point of view mayjustify a restrictive interpretation, i.e. an interpretation which follows moreclosely the wording of the claims, in the sense that lack of clarity for the av-erage person skilled in the art wanting to asses the limits of the protectionafforded by the patent shall, in principle, operate to the detriment of thepatentee. All of this should, however, be regarded in the light of the natureof the case at hand, including also the extent to which the patented inven-tion brought about innovation."

In its recent decision re Van Bentum vs. Kool8 the Supreme Court reinforced its CibaGeigy decision.

The Ciba Geigy decision has to some extent been criticised in the literature9. One of thepoints of criticism was that the Supreme Court did not make a proper distinction betweenliteral infringement and infringement by equivalence. This would lead to a lack of pre-dictability.

Whilst it is true that the Supreme Court has never made a clear distinction between liter-al infringement and infringement by equivalence, it has upheld lower Court's decisionswhere that distinction had been made, by putting these decisions within the context of the"essence" doctrine (as in Ciba Geigy). In fact, this happened on the very same day asCeiba Geigy was rendered, in the decision re Dreizler vs. Remeha10. In Dreizler vs. Re-meha the Court of Appeal had considered that when there is no literal infringement the

7 Dutch Supreme Court 13 January 1995, NJ 1995, 391.8 Dutch Supreme Court 29 March 2002, NJ 2002, 530.9 Inter alia J.H.J. den Hartog, De beschermingsomvang van octrooien, BIE 1996, pages 83-85. A very nice

overview of literature and case law can be found in the thesis of H. Bertrams, Equivalentie in het octrooirecht,Utrecht 1998.

10 Dutch Supreme Court 13 January 1995, NJ 1995, 392.

3

question of whether there is infringement under the doctrine of equivalence has to be an-swered. According to the Court of Appeal equivalent measures are measures which per-form essentially the same function, in essentially the same way to lead to essentially thesame result (the so-called "function-way-result" test). According to the Supreme Courtthis approach was in conformity with the "essence" doctrine given in Ciba Geigy. In its de-cision re Stamicarbon vs. Dow11 the Supreme Court also upheld a Court of Appeal deci-sion where the Court of Appeal had made a distinction between literal infringement andinfringement by equivalence. As to the latter the Court of Appeal had applied the function-way-result test. The Supreme Court in addition held that a measure that leads to a muchless than optimal result (less than intended by the invention) is not an equivalent meas-ure.

A question which has been considered by the District Court in The Hague was whetherthe "function-way-result" test is an appropriate test for judging equivalence when thepatent protects a chemical compound. In its decision re Yamanouchi vs. Biogen12 theDistrict Court held that in these cases instead of the "function-way-result" test use maybe made of the so-called "insubstantial differences test13" or the test that it must be as-sessed whether it is "obvious to a person skilled in the art that substantially the same re-sult as that achieved by means of the element as expressed in the claim can be achievedby means of the equivalent element14".

A topic on which no final answer has yet been given is that of the so-called "inventiveequivalents". An inventive equivalent has been defined as a variant at which the skilledperson could only arrive by using inventive activity, to such an extent that the variant ap-pears to be patentable. The Court of Appeal in The Hague has held that these variants,although perhaps equivalents, must not be considered as an infringement, as that wouldbe contrary to the certainty for third parties as required by article 69 EPC and the Proto-col15. This approach has been criticised in the literature16 and so far the Supreme Courthas not ruled on it.


Short Answer

Dutch case law is not clear about which point in time should be the reference time for theskilled reader to assess the scope of protection and, consequently, to assess the equiv-alence of an alleged variant. In a case by case approach lower Dutch Courts have ap-plied both fixed and variable assessment dates, although there seems a tendency to pre-fer the (variable) date of (preparation for) the alleged infringement. The Supreme Court,which recently had the opportunity to rule on the issue, chose not to do so.

11 Dutch Supreme Court 5 September 1997, NJ 1999, 410.12 District Court of The Hague, 28 October 1998, docket no. 98/0398.13 The District Court refers to Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit in Hilton Davis Chem. Co. vs. Warner Jenkin-

son Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 43 USPQ2d 1152 (CAFC 1997).14 The District Court refers to article 21 (2) of the WIPO Harmonisation proposal.15 Court of Appeal of The Hague 12 September 1996, BIE 1997, 319 re Hoffmann LaRoche vs. Organon, see also

Court of Appeal of The Hague 5 September 2002, docket no. 02/8 re Nannings van Loen/Van Vuuren.16 Bertrams, page 271. See also E.A. van Nieuwenhoven Helbach, Industriele Eigendom, Deel 1, Deventer 2002,

page 215.

4

Answer

What an equivalent is and how it is to be assessed is in essence no other question thanthe question what extent of protection is conferred by the patent when literal infringementof the patent can not be established. Scope of protection is assessed via the generallyaccepted person skilled in the art-concept. A concept whereby a certain degree of knowl-edge is assumed to be available for an average person skilled in the art when assess-ment (interpretation) of the claims and assessment of the question whether or not an el-ement is equivalent to an element specified in the claims is made.

The Court of Appeal the Hague has repeatedly admitted that it is not possible to definethe scope of protection forever "as the scope will depend on the specific infringement atstake and a selection of prior art"17/18. Although one has to be reticent at this point, thismight indicate that the Court of Appeal The Hague confirms that knowledge will change(usually increase) as time goes by and that assessment by the "reference man" at differ-ent points in times might result in different scopes of protection

However, Dutch case law is not at all clear at what precise point in time the reader skilledin the art should assess the patent claims and consequently assess at what time whetheror not an equivalent falls within the scope of protection. In assessing the scope of pro-tection, decisions of lower Dutch Courts do apply sometimes a fixed date similar to Ger-many (knowledge at the filing or priority date) or the UK (knowledge at the publicationdate). Quantity wise more decisions have been rendered by the Dutch Courts that applya variable date, in most cases the alleged infringement date.

The Dutch Supreme Court has not decided to date on the question what date is the rel-evant reference date in determining the scope of protection. The last known opportunityto decide on this question was brought before the Supreme Court in 200019. An opinionwas rendered by the Advocate-General who after careful consideration chose for thevariable date (i.e. date of the infringement). The Supreme Court, however, did not deemnecessary to render a judgment on the issue.





Short Answer

In the Netherlands the prosecution history in theory plays a role in determining the scopeof patent protection only if, after consideration of the description and the drawings, rea-sonable doubt exists as to the interpretation of the claims. A notion similar to the commonlaw "File wrapper estoppel" only applies when it appears from the public record that thepatentee had good cause to relinquish part of the scope of protection. Both answers arelaid down in Supreme Court case law.

17 Court of Appeal, The Hague, February 20, 1992, BIE 1992, 70 (Epilady/Improver).18 Court of Appeal, The Hague, January 30, 2001, BIE 2001/62 (Epenhuysen/Diversey).19 Supreme Court, November 2, 2001, NJ 2001/686 (BT vs. KPN and Plumettaz).

5

Answer

In principle, third parties should consult the file history to assess the scope of the claims.The Dutch Supreme Court has ruled in 1989 that third parties only may assume that thepatentee has wanted to limit himself by the chosen wording of the claims if therefore,based upon the content of the patent and possible other known facts, like e.g. the grant-ing file, good reasons do exist20.

However, in 1995 the Supreme Court considered that the file history need not be con-sulted by a third party if he has, based upon the description of the patent and the claims,no reasonable doubt as to the (limited) scope of the claims21.

The Supreme Court has confirmed this approach in 199722. It was decided that if it wasclear from a claim how its contents should be explained, the Court of Appeal was notobliged to investigate the contents of the file history to determine the closest state of theart (although the parties had referred to the file history) to arrive at a possible broaderscope of the claims.

In 2002 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the general rules given in Ciba Geigy andMeyn Stork are (both) still applicable, i.e. that the average person skilled in the art mustdetermine what is the essence of the invention, and that he may only assume that thepatentee has limited himself to a certain part of that "essence", if therefore, taking into ac-count the patent (description) in the light of possible other known facts, and also the factsknown to the skilled person from the public part of the file history, good grounds exist, un-less no reasonable doubt can exist as to the limited scope of the claims23.

a) There is in the Netherlands no principle as "file wrapper estoppel" as such, as thisis a common law principle.Based upon case law (which has been outlined above) the scope of a patent doesnot extend to equivalents if

1) a third party has no reasonable doubt to assume a broader scope of pro-tection based upon the claims and the patent itself, or

2) if a third party can demonstrate that, based upon the patent and upon oth-er facts known to the third party, "good grounds" do exist to assume thatpatentee had limited himself to a certain variant of the essence of it's in-vention.

b) There is no difference in the value of arguments of formal or "informal" actions24.When minutes are made public (e.g. nullity advices before the BIE) these couldequally well be used to assess the scope of protection.

c) Likewise, there is no formal difference between actions taken by third parties orby the Patent Office. What counts is what the Patent Office decides in the end andwhat the patentee states during examination of the patent. In general, moreweight is likely put towards the remarks of the Examiner than to those of a thirdparty.

20 Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), 27 January 1989, NJ 1989, 506, re Meyn vs. Stork.21 Dutch Supreme Court, 13 January 1995, NJ 1995, 391, re Ciba Geigy vs. Oté Optics.22 Dutch Supreme Court, 5 September 1997, NJ 1999, 410, re Dow vs. Stamicarbon.23 Dutch Supreme Court, 29 March 2002, RvdW 2002, 64, re Van Bentum vs. Kool.24 Under the Dutch Patent Act 1995 no material examination of patent applications takes place, but patentees still

have the opportunity to amend their claims after the search report; such amendments could be considered aswaiver of protection.

6


Short Answer

Estoppel or admissions during prosecution (unfortunately the working guidelines do notprovide a definition of either term) may constitute arguments to be considered by thecourt to limit the scope of claims. Outside prosecution, the scope of claims can only belimited in a legally binding manner by court decision or by (partial) statutory abandon-ment by the patentee.

Answer

Court decision

In the Netherlands, the court has the authority to limit the scope of claims after granting.

In an infringement case, the court will determine the scope (of protection) of the claims.In doing so the court can de facto and inter partes limit the scope of the claims as a re-sult of its interpretation of the claims. In subsequent cases regarding the same patent thecourt will, in principle, follow the interpretation given in the earlier decision, unless newarguments and facts convince the court to deviate form its earlier interpretation.

In an invalidation case, however, the court may nullify the patent in part, amending andso limiting (the scope of) one or more claims. Such a decision is binding and works ergaomnes.

When the court is asked to limit the scope (of protection) of claims, it may take into con-sideration, but is not bound by, e.g. arguments based on prosecution history estoppel,statements or representations by or on behalf of the patentee in or outside court, foreigndecisions regarding the national patents deriving from the same European patent or par-allel patents.

Abandonment

According to article 63 of the Patent Act of the Realm 1995 a patent may cease to existin whole or in part as a result of the patentee's formal abandonment of the patent in wholeor in part. Partial abandonment may constitute a limitation of the scope of the claims.Abandonment is effected by registration of a written statement of the patentee to that ef-fect in the public register.


Recommendations

1. Equivalence

When determining whether a variant may be considered an equivalent - andtherefore an infringement - it does not always do justice to a fair protection of thepatentee to perform a strict "feature by feature" analysis. Rather, the invention aslaid down in the relevant claim should be taken into account when assessingequivalence.

2. Time of assessment

From a legal certainty point of view there is a need for clarity as to the date of ref-erence. In order to avoid that the patentee can not protect his invention againstvariants he could not have anticipated during prosecution, there is a preferencefor a reference date at the time of the alleged infringement.

7

3. Proscecution history

It may in theory be desirable to disregard the file history when assessing thescope of protection of claims granted by the EPO. The reality is, however, that theEPO, when granting amended claims, often disregards its duty to make sure thatthe applicant amends the description accordingly. Thus, claims are granted whichcan not or not easily be interpreted with the help of description and drawings, asArticle 69 requires.

As long as this EPO practice persists, to rule out the relevance of the file historyof a patent when interpretating its scope would not do justice; probably more of-ten to a reasonable certainty, but possibly also to a fair protection; both as men-tioned in the Protocol to Article 69 EPC. Consultation of the file history is a natu-ral and practical way of finding the context the applicant and the patent office in-tended for the interpretation of the claims.

4. Scope Limitation

When interpreting claims of European patents, national courts of EPC countriesare well advised not only to take into consideration, but also to refer in their deci-sions to any decisions - if brought to their attention - by courts of other EPC coun-tries limiting or not limiting the scope of protection of national patents derivingfrom the same European Patent.

1

NorwayNorvège

Norwegen

Report Q175

in the name of the Norwegian Groupby Amund Brede SVENDSEN and Felix REIMERS


Questions


The legal basis for defining the scope of the patent protection is the Norwegian PatentAct section 39 which reads as follows: "The extent of the protection conferred by a patentshall be determined by the patent claims. The description may serve as a guide to the un-derstanding of the patent claims."

The Doctrine of Equivalents is not provided for by law, and there are no precedents withexpress references to a Doctrine of Equivalents. However, there are several court deci-sions in which the patentee has obtained protection for embodiments outside the literalwording of the claims1, and thus indicating the existence of said Doctrine.

Due to the above, as well as the standing of said Doctrine in Europe and in our neigh-bouring countries, it is an accepted principle that a patent gives protection for equivalentembodiments. This understanding is confirmed by several decisions from the lowercourts and legal theory2. Furthermore, as a supportive argument, reference is made to adecision in the Supreme Court of Sweden3. This is the first recent decision from a Scan-dinavian Supreme Court which clearly states that the Doctrine of Equivalents applies.

The purpose of the Doctrine of Equivalents is to ensure that the patentee gets a fair pro-tection, and to prevent unuseful attempts to circumvent the patent. Traditionally, thequestion raised was whether the infringing embodiment was substantially the same asthe patented invention.

The Doctrine of Equivalents applies with the exclusion of known technique (the patenteemay not rely on the Doctrine to prevent third parties to use embodiments known in theart), and new inventions. With these limitations, the Doctrine of Equivalents applieswhen:

1) the infringement product or process solves the same problem. This criteri-on is part of the test in most countries in which the Doctrine is applied, buta more precise definition is quite difficult to outline.

1 Supreme Court of Norway - Rt. 1957, p. 11232 Are Stenvik - Patenters beskyttelsesomfang, p. 6703 Ö 2667-02 - 20.12.2002

2

2) the modification that distinguishes the two products or processes madewould be obvious for the person skilled in the art.

The above mentioned elements are the basis of the Doctrine of Equivalents, but they arenot decisive. Additional factors may have a bearing on the applicability of the Doctrine,such as inventive merit. Pioneer inventions will most likely be found to be worthy of abroader protection than those with a minimum of inventive merit. Furthermore, the pros-ecution history may limit the range of the Doctrine, see below.

The question is also raised in respect of partial protection and whether the wording in thepatent claim as such may exclude the Doctrine of Equivalents. Legal theory4 tends to as-sume that these mentioned circumstances do not exclude protection based on the Doc-trine as such.

In the absence of a precedent on the Doctrine of Equivalents, there are several uncer-tainties as to the Doctrine's content.


With reference to question 1, one of the main factors in respect of the Doctrine of Equiv-alents is whether the contested modification would be obvious to the person skilled in theart. This implies that the answer to the question raised is depending on whether said as-sessment refers to the priority date or the time of the alleged infringement. Given that thetime of the alleged infringement is decisive, the scope of protection may change withtime.

Well founded arguments may be raised in respect of both the priority date and the timeof the alleged infringement. The latter would be of advantage to the patentee, while thepriority date probably would be advantageous regarding legal administration. In legal the-ory5, it is suggested that the date of the alleged infringement should be decisive.

This question is yet to be answered by the courts. Until then, there will be uncertaintyconcerning this issue.



In the preliminary works to the Norwegian Patent Act (NU 1963:6, page 186) it isstated that the prosecution history may play a role in determining the scope ofpatent protection. In respect of unclear patent claims it is stated that "the docu-ments of prosecution …may be of relevance". Accordingly, it is quite clear that thefile history may be used when interpreting the patent.

As regards the File Wrapper Estoppel, court practice is rather sparse. However, itis assumed that the prosecution history in some cases may limit the extent of theDoctrine of Equivalents6.

The Swedish decision referred to under question 1 does also indicate that theprosecution history may "employ to interpret uncertainties in respect of the patent

4 Are Stenvik - Patenters beskyttelsesomfang, p. 7435 Are Stenvik - Patenters beskyttelsesomfang, p. 7136 Are Stenvik - Patenters beskyttelsesomfang, p. 713

3

claims and description as far as a limitation of the scope of protection is con-cerned".

In order to define the content of the File Wrapper Estoppel reference is made tothe following:

The patent system is based on contradiction between the Patent Office and theapplicant. Said contradiction implies that large or small alterations or adjustmentsare made in the great majority of the applications processed by the Patent Office.

It is assumed that not all alterations and/or adjustments can result in limiting thescope of the Doctrine of Equivalence. That would be a rigid and formalistic sys-tem that would not give the holder of the patent the intended protection, and itwould prevent a continuance of the established practice for granting patents ac-cording to which the application is modified and amplified through a dialog be be-tween the applicant and the Patent Office. In this respect, it is assumed that thereis, in principle, no difference in the scope of the patent protection, whether theclaim is granted as originally filed or amended during examination.

A limitation in the grounds for applying the equivalence principle resulting from theapplication history would have to be based on relations with a third party. Consid-eration of the third party does not mean that every alteration would imply a limita-tion, but only those alterations that give the impression that they are made in or-der to exclude other specific solutions.

A third party must be able to relate to such alterations. A typical case would be ifan alteration was made for the purpose of avoiding known technology, for exam-ple by altering the patent claims in consequence of citations raised. The limitationmay have effect on the specific technical solution excluded, but not on the issueof equivalence in the specific case.

The main criteria should therefore be that the extent of the Doctrine of Equivalentsmay be limited if the third party, on the basis of the prosecution history, has rea-son to believe that a limitation was introduced in order to exclude certain alterna-tives7.

As previously indicated, the case law concerning this issue is rather sparse.


As indicated above, the Estoppel applies when any third party is given the im-pression that the amendments made is done in order to exclude specific variantsfrom the patent's scope of protection, for example to overcome a citation raised.A third party must be able to rely on such amendments.

Accordingly, the main focus should be put on what is said, and not whether it isbased on a formal or informal discussions with the Patent Office.


With reference to the previous question the main issue is the impression that therelevant amendment gives to any third party. Third parties should be able to relyon such amendments.

7 Are Stenvik - Patenters beskyttelsesomfang, p. 722

4

Accordingly, there should be no difference between actions taken by the PatentOffice and third parties. This is offered as the authors' opinion. No precedentsclarify this issue.


It is assumed that the question relates to a granted patent. The scope of claims may belimited according to the Patents Act, or by the courts.

As regards the first option, the patent holder may request that the patent claims or the de-scription be amended in order to limit the scope of the patent protection, see the Norwe-gian Patents Act, section 39a.

Such request should be filed in writing with the Patent Office by the patentee. This courseof action may be used in connection with a proceeding concerning the validity of thepatent. The validity proceedings will be stayed until the patent limitation with the PatentOffice is finalized, as a recent decision from the Borgarting Court of Appeal confirms8.

In addition, the courts may also limit the scope of patents in connection with a validity pro-ceeding. The court can declare that individual claims are invalid. It is agreed that thecourt may also combine one or more claims.9 On the other hand, it is assumed that thecourt is not in the position to rewrite the patent claims. This is due to the roles attributedto the courts and the Patent Office, respectively10.

The court may also limit the claims by a restrictive interpretation.


Norway is in a special position due to the fact that we are not a member of the EPC. Ef-forts should be made to ensure harmonisation in respect of this importan

8 Borgarting Court of Appeal judgement of 23 December 20029 Are Stenvik “Patentrett, p. 25010 Supreme Court of Norway - Rt. 1971, s. 714

1

ParaguayParaguayParaguay

Report Q175

in the name of the Paraguayan Group


Questions


There is no legislative rule or jurisprudential precedent known in the matter of doctrine ofequivalents in our country.


No. In our legal system, claims provide the scope of patent protection, which is notchanged by the course of time and is determined by the filing date.


Yes, it could have an implication.


The application of the concept of file wrapper estoppel is not contemplated In ourpatent law. However, through the principle of own act stipulated in our civil lawlegislation, it could be interpreted that any statement performed during the appli-cation proceedings could have ulterior implication in determining the scope of theprotection of the patent.


No. There are only formal actions in our proceedings. Any informal or oral discus-sion that the applicant or its representative holds with the examiners does nothave any legal relevance.


No. As long as the pertinent actions have become sound and final.


Yes. The scope of the claims can be limited even after the granting of the patent by thepatent owner itself.

2


a) In our opinion, it would be desirable to legislatively insert and harmonize the doc-trine of equivalents in the patent area, not only at the national level, but at a re-gional level. This concept has had a very heterogeneous treatment particularly inour region.

b) On the other hand, the "estoppel" has had great acceptance globally, as a gener-al principle of law and, thus, we consider its application to issues of patent prose-cution and enforcement to be very appropriate, especially considering that suchprinciple is the fair counter-balance of the doctrine of equivalents. Consequently,we also endorse a legislative harmonization of the concept.

1

PhilippinesPhilippinesPhilippinen

Report Q175

in the name of the Philippine Group


Questions


The doctrine of "equivalents" is provided for by Philippine statute, as follows:

"SEC. 75. Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims. - 75.1 Theextent of protection conferred by the patent shall be determined by theclaims, which are to be interpreted in the light of the description and draw-ings.

75.2. For the purpose of determining the extent of protection conferred bythe patent, due account shall be taken of elements which are equivalent tothe elements expressed in the claims, so that a claim shall be consideredto cover not only all the elements as expressed therein, but also equiva-lents." (emphasis supplied)

Equivalents are assessed by considering substantial identity in performing specific func-tions. By way of example, in a cancellation case, United Laboratories v. Merck Co. Inc.Decision 4No. 802. June 10, 1974, the Director of Patents held the patent for isomers ofPhenyl Alanine Derivatives invalid for lack of novelty in view of the disclosure in Pfisterand Stern patents teaching recemic mixtures, the resolution of which may be effected byconventional process to produce the L-isomers, which L-isomers possess the same util-ity as the substances from which it had been isolated, differing therefrom only in degreeof activity.

In another cancellation case, Samson Jr. v. Tarroza. Decision No. 222. April 13, 1962, theDirector of Patents, in applying the doctrine of equivalents for utility model patents con-sidered the following tests of equivalency:

a) substantial identity of a spatially defined technological idea; and

b) substantial identity of a definite form or embodiment defining said technologicalidea.

It was held that "the technological idea embodied by the petitioner's model is simply thatof a receptacle rotatable at its front edge, to dump any load on it at only one position, i.e., the forward end" and this differs from the concept embodied in the respondent"swheelbarrow which is provided with "a receptacle rotatable at its bottom center, to dumpany load on said tray or receptacle to either of its sides." The doctrine of equivalents isthen of no help in this case and the Director denied this for lack of merit.

2


There is no provision in the law as well as in the rules fixing the cut off date for assess-ing equivalents in relation to the scope of patent protection. Section 75.2 of Republic Act8293, otherwise known as the new Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IPCode) simply states that "for the purpose of determining the extent of protection con-ferred by the patent, due account shall be taken of elements which are equivalent to theelements expressed in the claims, so that a claim shall be considered to cover not onlyall the elements as expressed therein, but also equivalents" without specifying areckoning date.



Prosecution history appears to be vital in establishing the standard for determin-ing the scope of protection afforded to the inventor with reference to what he hasrelinquished during patent prosecution. "File wrapper estoppel" may significantlyserve as valid basis in preventing the inventor from unduly expanding the scopeof a particular range of equivalents. Debatable as it may be, it seems reasonableto infer that amendments by the inventors narrowing the subject matter duringpatent prosecution with or without citing any reasons for doing so, precludes re-tainment of such subject matter and therefore can be used as an asserted limita-tion on the applicability of the doctrine of equivalents. It could also be said thatnarrowing the subject matter may also serve as a valid and reasonable basis indetermining the real intent of the inventor as regard the actual scope encom-passed by the invention and provide some relief to the competitor with regard tothe ambiguities in the scope of protection the patentee intends to cover in deter-mining possible infringing act and liability under the doctrine of equivalents.

However, the position of the Philippines on this matter is not clear. The provisionsunder Philippine law as explicitly stated under Section 75.2 of the IP Code1 aswell as the interpretation under Section 1.3, Chapter III of the Manual of Substan-tive Examination Practice2 released by the Bureau of Patents of the IntellectualProperty of Office of the Philippines in May, 2002, fail to clearly define the positionof the Philippines with respect to the extent of patent protection in relation to "filewrapper estoppel" or prosecution history.

Moreover, there are no decided cases in the Philippines to date relying on thedoctrine of equivalents in determining the scope of protection granted to the pat-entee with reference to what has been relinquished during prosecution of thepatent application.

1 "For the purpose of determining the extent of protection conferred by the patent, due account shall be taken of el-ements which are equivalent to the elements expressed in the claims, so that a claim shall be considered to cov-er not only all the elements as expressed therein, but also equivalents."

2 "A generally accepted approach is to interpret the claims having regard to the description and any drawings in sucha way that fair protection to the patentee for his contribution to the art is combined with a reasonable degree of cer-tainty for third parties. Thus the area of protection should not, in one extreme be interpreted as that defined by thestrict literal meaning of the wording of the claims with the description and drawings being used only to resolve anyambiguity in the claims, nor in the other extreme, as what might be deduced from the description and drawings bya person skilled in the art, with the claims serving only as guide."

3


There are no opposition proceedings before the Bureau of Patents of the Philip-pines. These are neither embodied in the new Intellectual Property Code of thePhilippines (IP Code) nor in the Implementing Rules and Regulations on Inven-tions.

Section 47 of the new IP Code provides however that any person may present ob-servations concerning the patentability of the invention following the publication(laying-open) of the patent application.

Under existing patent practice in the Philippines, informal actions (e.g. discus-sions with examiners) shall not be considered. The law requires that observationsby third parties be in writing. Such observations are communicated to the appli-cant who may comment on them. Both the observation and the comment formpart of the file of the application to which they relate.


The actions taken by third parties as embodied under Sec. 47 of the new IP Codeare limited to the submission of observations questioning the patentability of theinvention. While the patent office shall acknowledge receipt of such observations,the patent office will not inform the third party of any further action taken by the of-fice in relation to such observations. The third party shall not take part in such pro-ceedings before the patent office. If a request for examination has not been filedsuch observations are not taken into account. The patent office shall only take intoaccount the observations by third parties in the examination proceedings.

A third party may also choose to take an action by way of filing a petition for can-cellation of patent pursuant to Section 61 of the IP Code which states:

"Sec. 61. Cancellation of Patents. Any interested person may, upon pay-ment of the required fee, petition to cancel the patent or any claim thereof,or parts of the claim, on any of the following grounds:

a) That what is claimed as the invention is not new or patentable:

b) That the patent does not disclose the invention in a manner suffi-ciently clear and complete for it to be carried out by any personskilled in the art; or

c) That the patent is contrary to public order or morality.

Where the grounds for cancellation relate to some of the claims or parts ofthe claim, cancellation may be effected to such extent only."

Philippine law provides further that a third party, more particularly a defendant inan action for infringement, may show the invalidity of the patent, or any claimthereof, on the grounds on which petition for cancellation can be brought underSection 61 of the IP Code.


Yes, scope of the claims can be limited outside prosecution. Under Sec. 59 of the IPCode, the patentee has the right to request the Bureau of Patents of the Philippines tolimit the extent of the protection conferred by it.

4

Admissions brought to the attention of the Examiner after the issuance of the Notice ofAllowability of a patent application declaring that the prosecution on the merits is closedare also taken into account by the patent office. In such case, the prosecution is resumedand substantive amendments limiting the scope of the claims are made to resolve theproblem subject of the admissions before the final decision to grant is taken.


The rationale of the doctrine of equivalents is to prevent limitation of the scope of patentprotection to the literal scope of the claims such that the inventor will not be placed at themercy of literalism or verbalism, which subordinates substance to form. The basic test forapplicability of the doctrine is whether the infringing product performs substantially thesame function, in substantially the same way, to accomplish substantially the same resultas the patented product. In determining the applicability of the doctrine of equivalents, itis recommended that the following factors be considered:

(a) the purpose for which an ingredient or an element is used in a patent;

(b) the qualities of the ingredient or element when combined with other elements;

(c) the function the ingredient or element is intended to perform;

(d) determination whether persons skilled in the art would have known of the inter-changeability of an ingredient or element not contained in the patent with one thatwas; and

(e) whether the differences and/or similarities between the patented and infringingproducts are the result of independent research by the alleged infringer, and suchresult being supported by evidences.

Various recommendations in addition to the foregoing may be considered and adoptedfor harmonization in relation to the doctrine of equivalents. However, the dilemma lies inthe significant differences in the application and interpretation of practically similar testson equivalency since boundaries in this regard cannot be drawn with accuracy or preci-sion.

1

PolandPologne

Polen

Report Q175

in the name of the Polish Groupby Janusz FIOLKA


Introduction

Since 1990 Poland is transferring its economy from a central planned into marked economy sys-tem and is modernising its laws, especially civil law, civil procedure law and industrial propertyprotection laws. To understand the current situation with regards to modernising Polish law oneshould take into account that since 1990 the aim of the Polish successive Governments was toprepare Poland for joining to European Union and related with this joining to European PatentConvention. A lot has been done and a lot still remains to be done. Polish law system is in thestage of rapid changes and this is true especially to industrial property laws.

On June 30, 2000 the Polish Parliament (Sejm) passed new industrial property law, which en-tered into force in place of the Law on inventive activity of 19721, the trademark law of 19852, thelaw on protection of integrated circuts of 19923 and the law concerning the Patent Office of19624. The aim was to regulate in one bill all aspects of industrial property. This goal was not ful-ly achieved. Outside the bill remains the unfair competition law, which is regulated by the sepa-rate law of 19935.

It is expected that Poland will join EPO by April 2003. That is why patent professionals are ob-serving with the great interest the latest revision of the European Patent Convention as well asrecent court decisions in Germany, the Netherlands, UK and US and especially the question ofrole of equivalents and prosecution history in defining the scope of patent protection attract lotof attention.

Hovewer, talking on the Polish law one general observation should be made.

On October 17th, 1997 in Poland the new Constitution6 entered into force replacing the Consti-tution of 1952. The new Constitution brought of course a lot of changes into the Polish legal sys-tem. For regulation of industrial property laws the provision of the Article 91 seems to be ofgreatens importance. This Article provides for in Subsection 1 that international convention after

1 Dziennik Ustaw (Official Gazzette later cited as Dz.U.) from 1993, No 26, item 117.2 Dz.U. No 5, item 16.3 Dz. U. No 100, item 498.4 Dz.U. from 1993, No 26, item 118.5 Dz.U. Nr 47, item 211. 6 Dz. U. No 78, item 483. The Constitution was passed by National Assembly on April 2nd, 1997 and accepted by the

Polish Nation in constitutional referendum on May 25th, 1997.

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its publication in the Official Gazette of Polish Republic constitute part of Polish domestic legalsystem and shall be directly executed, unless its execution depends on passing a bill. So, thisprovision is transferring international conventions ratified by Poland into Polish domestic legalsystem and establishes presumption of self-execution of them7. It creates constitutional basis forexecuting ratified and published international conventions by courts and other Polish institutionslike for instance the Patent Office, without a need for legislative intervention. Moreover, accord-ing to the Article 91.2 international conventions ratified after previous consent of the Polish Par-liament expressed in a statute8 are prevailing over a domestic statute, if this statute cannot bereconciled with this convention. Also, if Poland ratify international convention establishing inter-national organisation, the laws passed by this organisation are directly executed in Poland andhave priority in a case of collision with Polish domestic statutes (Article 91. 3).

So when Poland join EPO convention Article 69 and the protocol of its interpretation, they will be-come a part of Polish domestic legislation and a person wanting enforce its patent in Poland maycall on them.

The Article 91 establishes clear rules in relation between ratified agreements and Polish do-mestic law. This issue was not expressly regulated before, through under prevailing opinion ex-pressed in legal literature international treaties were part of the Polish domestic legislation andwere enforceable in Poland9. However prominent legal authors were split on the answer to thequestion, who could rely on protection emerging from international treaties, or conventions. Ma-jority of authors presented the view, that for instance only foreigners, not Polish subjects couldclaim on protection emerging from international convention in a case of conflict with domesticlegislation, while Polish subjects could ask only for protection emerging from domestic law10.There are authors, who even now are representing such point of view11, however it is not rightposition taking into account the contents of Articel 91 of the Constitution.

7 Wójtowicz (in:)Boc, Konstytucje Rzeczypospolitej oraz komentarz do Konstytucji RP z 1997 r. (Constitutions ofPolish Republic and a commentary to Constitution of Polish Republic of 1997), Wroclaw 1998, 162, Echard (in:)Zieba-Zalucka, Prawo konstytucyjne, wybrane zagadnienia (Constitutional law selected issues), Rzeszów 1998,31, see also Skrzydlo, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Komentarz (Constitution of the Polish RepublicCommentary), Kraków Zakamycze, 2000, 109 - 110.

8 According to the Article 89 in a case among others when international agreement creates significant financial bur-den for the State, or relates to the matters, which are regulated by statutes, or which should be regulated in astatute, ratification requires previous consent of the Parliament expressed in a statute.

9 Fiolka, Traktaty a prawo wewnetrzne w zakresie ochrony wlasnosci przemyslowej (Treaties and Domestic Law inthe Field of Industrial Property Protection), Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego Prace z wynalazczoscii ochrony wlasnosci intlektualnej (ZNUJ), z. 41, 37 - 47, [1987].

10 This point of view was presented by Kopff, (in:) Prawo wynalazcze, zagadnienia wybrane (Law on Inventive Activ-ity, Selected Problems), Warszawa 1978, 497, Gawlik, Licencje przymusowe w prawie wynalazczym (Compulso-ry Licences in Law on Inventive Activity), Studia Cywilistyczne (SC) issuesXXIII, 91 et subs. [1974], Tabor, Traple,Konwencja paryska o ochronie wlasnosci przemyslowej w swietle tekstu sztokholmskiego (Paris Convention forthe Protection of Industrial Property as Revised in Stokholm), ZNUJ, issue 10, 36 [1977], Skubisz, Pierszenstwozgloszenia wynalazku w swietle konwencji paryskiej (Priority for application of an Invention in Paris Conventionand in Article 71 of the Law on Inventive Activity), Panstwo i Prawo (PiP), issue 12, 102, [1977], Kepinski, Roz-porzadzanie prawem z rejestracji znaku towarowego (Transferring Registered Trade Mark), Poznan 1979, 17,Bleszynski, Konwencja bernenska a polskie prawo autorskie (Bern Convention and Polish Domestic Copyright),Warszawa 1979, 77, Serda, (in:) Zagadnenia prawa autorskiego (Problems of Copyright), Warszawa 1973, 394.The opposite view, that convention protection covers Polish subjects too, represented Soltysinski, Prawowynalazcze. Komentarz (Law on Inventive Activity. Commentary), Warszawa 1975, 94 - 95, Staszków, Instytucjeprawa patentowego (Institutions of Patent Law), Katowice 1972, 21 - 22, Fiolka, (above fn. 11), 44.

11 Czajkowska-Dabrowska, Ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych. Komentarz (Copyright and RelatedRights. Commentary), Barta, Markiewicz ed., Warszawa 2001, 142 - 145, with very strange justification that provi-sions of Bern Convention, Universal Conventions and even TRIPS do not apply to citizens of a given country, butto foreigners. This lead the author to a conclusion, that Article 7 of Copyright and Related Rights law of 1994, whichprovides for the same regulation as the Article 91 of the Constitution should be deleted during the future amend-ment of Copyright law; see also similar views of the author in System Prawa Prywatnego, Tom 13, Prawo Autorskie(System of Private Law, Volume 13, Copyright), Barta ed., Warszawa 2003, p. 692.

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This question is very important as it happened before that Poland was not able to harmonise itsdomestic law with international convention ratified by Poland. The best example are TRIPS,which Poland has ratified in 199512, deferring execution of its provisions under Article 65.3 till1.01.200013. Nevertheless, the industrial property law, which was aimed to harmonise Polish do-mestic law with TRIPS was passed by Parliament on 30 June 2000 and entered into force in 22August 2001, what constitutes a long delay in implementing provisions of TRIPS by Poland. Inattempt to fulfill obligations arising from TRIPS the President of Polish Patent Office in his in-struction of 3 January, 200114 ordered that Polish Patent Office will apply TRIPS directly andamong others will approve patent applications from all fields of technics, what was a clear refer-ence to Article 27 of TRIPS. However this instruction was only repeatetition of the rules, whichare emerging from the Article 91 of the Constitution.

That is why the person intending to enforce his industrial property rights in Poland should alwayshave in mind that he can rely on protection emerging from international conventions ratified byPoland, as these conventions have priority in execution over domestic legislation. It is a situa-tion quite different from the one existing for instance in Germany, were transformation of the in-ternational agreement into domestic legislation is needed15. In fact, after entry into force theConstitution of 1997 in the field of protection of industrial property the term "Polish law" means"international conventions ratified by Poland plus domestic legislation".

It should be noted that this fundamental change, which the Art. 91 of the Constitution broughtinto the Polish domestic legal system is not fully recognised even by Polish lawyers. In publica-tions, even published recently, on the protection of industrial property, it is usually not even men-tioned that in a given case there is a provision of international agreement, which due to lack ofappropriate regulation in Poland should be directly executed16. As courts have a little experiencein cases of enforcement of the industrial property rights, it is the task of a party legal represen-tative to call for protection emerging form international agreements and this will force the courtto at least justify in the decision, why given argument was not taken into account17.

The characteristic feature of the Polish civil procedure in case of enforcing of industrial property laws is splitting to same extend the competencies between courts and the Patent Office. In thisrespect Poland, which followed Germany solution, belogns to minority of countries in whichcourt deciding on intringement of a patent has no authority to nullify the patent. The nullificationod a patent may be made only by the Patent Office of Polish Republic.

12 Dz.U. No 98, item 483.13 Notification on reservation under Article 65. 3 Polish Government made 5 month after ratification of TRIPS. De-

spite the reservation Article 3, 4 and 5 TRIPS entered into force in relation to Poland on the day of Publication ofTRIPS in the Official Gazzette, it is form 19 March 1996, Barta, Markiewicz, Prawo Autorskie w Swiatowej Orga-nizacji Handlu, (Copyright in World Trade Organisation), Kraków 1996, 75 - 78.

14 Zarzadzenie nr 1 Prezesa Urzedu Patentowego Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Instruction No 1 of the President of thePatent Office of Polish Republic) of 3.01.2001, which however was published in March (3) issue of WiadomosciUrzedu Patentowego (WUP), 1 [2000].

15 See remarks on enforcement of Art. 50(6) of TRIPS in Germany by Marshall, "Enforcement of Patent Rights inGermany", 31 IIC 658 (2000).

16 See for instance Jakubecki: Postepowanie zabezpieczajace w sprawach z zakresu wlasnosci intelektualnej (Pre-serving procedure in cases of intellectual property), 2000, who does not even mention TRIPS.

17 The best example of this can be the Supreme Court decision of 7.X.1999, I CKN 126/98, published in Prawowlasnosci intelektualnej (Intellectual Property Law), ed. Barta, Markiewicz, Grzeszak, Korpala, Bukowski,www.profinfo.pl, in which the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff protection of the name of his company not underthe Art. 8 of the Paris Convention, but under Art. 5 of Polish law on repression of unfair competition with the justi-fication, that the Art. 8 is to general to be considered as self-executing provision.

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The courts are hearing civil cases18, which are not transferred by provisions of a statute to com-petencies of other organs (Art. 2 § 3 of Civil Procedure Code). The problem is that under provi-sions of the previous Law on inventive activity of 1972 and Trademarks law of 1985 not onlygranting of a right, patent, trademark etc., but also its nullification, and declaratory decisions,stating that given production does not infringe a patent or that there is no similarity between theused mark and the registered mark belonged to the competency of the Polish Patent Office19. Inthese matters courts were not competent and for instance the court in a case could not find thatthe plaintiff patent was invalid. In cases, where the invalidity of the plaintiff patent was raised bythe defendant, the court should suspended the court procedure and obliged the defendant tolaunch invalidation action before the Patent Office. The decision of the Patent Office in nullifica-tion case was prejudicial for the court, that is, the court was obliged to follow the Patent Officedecision.

This is why in the past many patent infringement cases was decided not before the court, but be-fore the Patent Office, as parties preferred to have non-infringement decision of the Patent Of-fice.

However in case of trademarks this rule was overruled by the Supreme Court decisions, name-ly in Interagra I20 and Cogito21 case. In Interagra I the Supreme Court avoided declaration of in-fringement of a trademark by accepting the view that the name of a company and a registeredtrademark are two different rights and use the trademark in name of company does not violaterights of trademark owner. In Cogito decision the Supreme court went even further and said thatregistration of a word trademark identical as the name of a company, which existed on marketearlier, is irrelevant to evaluation if a person, who registered such trademark, has right to use it,because a trademark is only a formal right. However the Supreme Court did not explain whatdoes mean that a trademark is a formal right22. Saying it simply in the mentioned casesSupreme Court refused to enforce valid trademark and ruled that the owner of these trademarkshad no right to use them, because it would violate unfair competition law provisions.

In practice some lawyers try to justify the view that patent right is "a formal right" too and courtshave the right to find infringement even in cases when the defendant claims that he uses its ownpatented invention, which was not nullified by the plaintiff23. In the new industrial property lawthe nullification of the patent or trademark is still within the competence of the Patent Office.However the Patent Office has no longer a competence to decide if a given production does notinfringe given patent24.

It should be mentioned that in the past in enforcement of industrial property matters extraordi-nary appeals played a very important role. Both patent and trademark act gave to the Presidentof the Patent Office, the First President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice theright to launch an extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Court form the decisions of the Patent

18 Civil matters are matters in which parties of a legal relation have equal status, Jodlowski: Postepowanie cy-wilne(Civil Procedure), 1997, 72.

19 See Articles 19, 37 and Art. 68 of the patent act and Art. 10 and 49 of trademark act.20 Supreme Court decision of 14.06.1988, file No. II CR 367/87, Orzecznictwo Sadów Polskich i Komisji Arbitra-

zowych (OSPiKA), item 328, [9/1990] with positive comments by Kepinski.21 Supreme Court decision of 30.09.1994, file No. 109/94, Orzecznictwo Sadów Polskich (OSNC), item 18, [1995].22 More on these dicisions see Fiolka, The Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights in Poland, IIC 8/2001, p. 925. 23 Such view is representing Traple: Naruszenie patentu a teoria ekwiwalentów (Patent Infringement and Theory of

Equivalents), Ksiega pamiatkowa z okazji 80-lecia rzecznictwa patentowego w Polsce (Memoirs Book commem-orating 80 Anniversary of Patent Agents in Poland), 2001, 111, however without mentioning Cogito case.

24 Besler: Sprawy o ustalenie, ze wskazana produkcja nie jest objeta okreslonym patentem (Cases for Determinationif given Production is not covered by the given Patent), Ksiega pamiatkowa ...., 287.

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Office and the Board of Appeal by the Patent Office, which ended the proceeding in a case andwere substantially violating the law in force25. This possibility was frequently used, what onlydemonstrates that jurisprudence of these organs was at least controversial.

Questions


The problem of literal infringement and infringement by equivalents in case of a patent isdiscussed in the legal writing. According to Art. 63.2 of the new industrial property law thescope of a patent is determined by patent claims, while the patent description and draw-ing(s) may be used for interpretation of patent claims. In the Polish jurisprudence there isno positive court precedent relating to the application of the theory of equivalents in en-forcing of a patent. In one of few published decisions relating to interpretation of thescope of claims the Supreme Court in 1970 accepted the theory of partial protection ofthe solution presented in the claim26. According to that decision the fact, that in the al-leged infringement product only one of a few elements presented in the patent claim isembodied does not exclude patent infringement, because finding the infringement de-pends on the importance of the given element to the invention and if and how this ele-ment was used in the production. If the element is so important to whole invention that itcan be regarded as the essence of the invention, than according to the Supreme Courtthere is the infringement of the patent. Interpretation of patent claims by Polish courtswere made from time to time in cases connected with remuneration for the inventor of theemployee invention27. In such cases the court had to evaluate, if patented invention wasused, or not. The court practice in these cases was restrictive and courts accepted onlyliteral interpretation of patent claims, namely that the invention was used only in suchcases, when all items covered by patent claims were used. If only some items or techni-cal operation presented in the claims were used than the patented invention according tothe court was not used and the inventor had no right to remuneration28. Also, in a notpublished decision in fluconazole patent infringement case the district court in Cracowdeclared that the doctrine of equivalents was not accepted in the Polish patent law29. Ofcourse, after joining EPO Poland will have to adopt Article 69 and the protocol to its in-terpretation. The parties in the case may recall on them and the court will have to applythem. It should be mentioned that courts should have no problem with adopting the Arti-cle 69 and the protocol.

To some extend rules provided for in the Article 69 and the protocol are similar to gener-al rules of interpretation of a person statements contained in the Polish Civil Code of196430. Namely, according to the Article 65 §1 of the Civil Code a statemt of a person

25 Art. 117 of patent act of 1972, extended the right to launch extraordinary appeal also to the Spokesmen of CivilRights (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich), Art. 52 of trademark act of 1985.

26 The Supreme Court decision of 3.02.1970, file No. 615/69, Gazeta Sadowa i Penitencjarna, [20/1970]. Fragmentsof this decision are cited in Szwaja, Prawo wynalazcze. Przepisy, orzecznictwo, pismiennictwo, objasnienia (Lawon Inventive Activity. Provisions, Jurisprudence, Literature, Comments), Warszawa 1978, s. 276-277.

27 The Polish patent law adopted system similar to German employee inventions. The inventor of patented invention,which was used had a right to inventors remuneration, which amount was fixed in the law.

28 See Resolution of Panel of Seven Judges of Supreme Court of 23.VI.1977, file No. V PZP 1/77, decision ofSupreme court of 24.XI.1978, file No. IV PR 288/78, OSPIKA 1979, issue 11, item 193, Decision of Panel of Sev-en Judges of Supreme Court of 12.03.1987, file No. III PRN 5/86, OSPIKA 1988, issue 3, item 47,

29 Decision of District Court in Cracow of 30.I.1998, file No. IX GC 536/96.30 The Civil Code of 23 April, 1964, Official Gazette No 16, item 93, many times admended since that time.

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shall be so interpreted, how it is requiered, taking into account circumstances, in whichthe statement was made, by good morals and established customs. According to the Ar-ticle 65 § 2 of the Civil Code in case of the agreements one should look for common in-tention of the parties and the goal of the agreemnt rather than rely on the literal meaningof the agreement. So both subsections of the Article 65 are providing for flexible rules ofinterpretation of a person statement, not focusing on literal meaning of a statement.


The scope of the protection emerging from a patent should be determined at the prioritydate, not at the application or infringement date. The priority date is relevant to determinethe novelty of the invention so it should be taken into account in determining the scope ofa patent. Accepting later date than priority date, e.g. the infringement date as the daterelevant to determine the scope of equivalents can lead to legal uncertainty as to scopeof granted patent. The best illustration of this problem is German Bundesgerichtshof de-cision in Metronidazol case31, in which finding of the patent infringement by equivalentprocess to the patented process was based on application of a compound discovered af-ter priority date of the Metronidazol patent.



There is no published precedent in Poland regarding this issue. But in the in-fringement proceeding a party may present any evidence to the court, includingdocuments justifying limitation of the claims scope under file wrapper estoppeldoctrine.


Through there is no court precedent it seems that the court may admit any actionregarding the patent as the evidence of the scope of the patent as allowed by thePatent Office. Especially declarations of the applicant that claim does not cover avariant of the invention objected by the Patent Office may be used in patent in-fringement case as the evidence against finding infringement.


According to the current Polish law only the applicant has a status of a party, sodiscussion on the merits of the application is taking place between him and thePatent Office. The third parties actions, like for instance objections made afterpublication of the application, has only informative character to the Patent Office.The Patent Office may take into consideration remarks of a third party regardingthe patentability, but is not forced to apply them.


During the filing procedure applicants have the opportunity to enter into a dialogue withthe Patent Office, which may result in amendments to the claims, as well as changing

31 Bundesgerichtshof decision of 18.II.1976, IIC 3/1976, p. 407-408 with critical comments by E.Beil.

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opinions of the Patent Office and the applicant on the invention and its place in the art.Of course, the matters discussed in the prosecution of a patent application should be tak-en into account during the opposition or during an infringement or validity action. Anoth-er solution seems to have little sense. Under the Polish code of civil procedure a party ina patent infringement case may deliver certified excerpts from the Patent Office files re-garding to given patent as the evidence and the court should admit such an evidence.The Polish Group is of the opinion that the file wrapper doctrine of the patent is a goodsolution regarding patent claim interpretation.


The Polish Group is of the opinion that the question of the scope of protection conferredby a patent should be harmonised as much as possible. However the Epilady casedemonstrate that perhaps 100% harmonisation in the field of patents interpretation is notpossible.

Different approach in a case of pioneer inventions, where the protection should bestronger should be made. For inventions constituting small advances in well-know areasthe possibility of applying doctrine of equivalence should be limited, as in such casesthere is a danger, that equivalent solution may cover something old, belonging to thestate of art regarding this invention.

Summary

In April 2003 Poland will join European Patent Convention.

According to Article 91 of the Polish Constitution international conventions ratified and publishedin Poland constitute part of internal law and may be directly executed. Thus, there will be noproblem with executing Article 69 EPO and the protocol for its interpretation.

Till now the problem of the scope of a patent was discussed very rarely and the courts accept-ed literary interpretation of patent claims. According to the Polish Group point of view the scopeof protection emerging from a patent should be harmonised as far as possible. However the Epi-lady case demonstrates that 100% harmonisation seems to be not possible. The scope of ap-plication of equivalents should be diversified. In a case of pioneering inventions it should bebroader, than in a case of inventions constituting only small advances in well-know areas. Thescope of patent protection should not change in the time.

Résumé

En avril 2003 la Pologne fera son adhésion à la convention sur le brevet européen.

Conformément à l'art. 91 de la constitution, les conventions internationales ratifiées et déclaréesen Pologne font partie du droit national, et peuvent être appliquées directement. Pour cela il n'yaura pas de problème à mettre en application en Pologne l'article 69 de la convention sur lebrevet européen, ainsi que le protocole de son interprétation.

Jusqu'à présent, la question de l'étendue objective de la loi et du brevet dans la jurisprudencejudiciaire ne s'est posée que très rarement, et les tribunaux adaptaient l'interprétation littéraledes revendications du brevet. Selon le Groupe National Polonais, la question de l'étendue de laprotection par brevet devra être harmonisée de la manière optimale possible. Cependant, l'af-faire Epilady démontre qu'une harmonisation totale de ce problème n'est pas possible. Lechamps d'application des équivalents doit être différencié. Dans les cas des inventions primor-diales il devrait être plus large que pour les inventions consistant uniquement en une améliora-

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tion menue dans un domaine de la technique déjà bien connu. L'étendue de la protection parbrevet ne doit pas varier dans le temps.

Zusammenfassung

Im April 2003 wird Polen der Konvention zum Europäischen Patent beitreten.

Gemäß Art. 91 der Verfassung bilden die in Polen ratifizierten und bekannt gemachten interna-tionalen Konventionen einen Teil des einheimischen Rechts und können direkt angewandt wer-den. Deshalb wird es in Polen bestimmt keine Probleme mit der Anwendung des Art. 69 derKonvention zum Europäischen Patent und des Protokolls zu seiner Auslegung geben.

Die Frage des Sachbereichs des Rechts und des Patents ist in der gerichtlichen Recht-sprechung bis jetzt sehr selten aufgetreten und die Gerichte haben eine wörtliche Auslegung derPatentvorbehalte angenommen.

Die Polnische Nationalgruppe ist der Meinung, dass die Frage des Patentschutzbereichs, sovieles möglich ist, in Einklang gebracht werden sollte. Die Angelegenheit mit Epilady zeigt jedoch,dass das Problem zu 100 Prozent nicht harmonisch erledigt werden kann. Der Bereich der An-wendung von Äquivalenten sollte differenziert werden. Im Fall von innovativen Erfindungensollte er breiter sein als im Fall von Erfindungen, die lediglich eine kleine Verbesserung aufeinem bekannten Gebiet der Technik sind. Der Patentschutzbereich sollte sich zeitlich nicht än-dern.

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PortugalPortugalPortugal

Report Q175

in the name of the Portuguese Groupby Pedro Alves MOREIRA


Questions


According to Article 93 of the Portuguese Industrial Property Code of 1995,

The scope of the protection conferred by the patent shall be determined by the contentsof the claims and the description and drawings shall serve for the interpretation thereof.

Such a rule was adopted by the Portuguese Law based on the Article 69 of the EuropeanPatent Convention of which Portugal is a member.

However, neither on such an Article, nor on other provisions of the Portuguese Law isclarified whether the extent of the protection conferred by the patent is to be understoodas that defined by the strict literal meaning of the wording used in the claims, or whetherthey serve as a mere guideline and the actual protection conferred may extend to any"equivalents".

Article 261 of the Portuguese Industrial Property Code of 1995 provides that, in what theinfringement of an exclusive right to an invention is concerned,

Whoever, with the intention of causing damage to another party or of obtaining for him-self or third parties an unlawful benefit, injures a patent owner in the exercise of his rightby:

a) Manufacturing, without a licence, the artefacts or products which are thesubject matter of the patent;

b) Employing or applying, without a licence, the means or processes whichare the subject-matter of the patent;

c) Importing, selling, offering for sale, putting in circulation or concealing inbad faith the products obtained by any of the ways referred to,

shall be punished with imprisonment of up to 3 years or a fine of up to 360 days.

Neither said article which is the main provision in what infringement of patents is con-cerned, nor the other provisions of the Portuguese Industrial Property Code, foresee the"equivalents" for determining the extent of protection by a patent.

However, when the previous Industrial Property Code of 1940 was still in force, the Por-tuguese Courts have applied the doctrine of "equivalent means".

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A judgement rendered by the Court of Appeals of Lisbon on May 24, 1974 consideredthat the theory of the equivalent means, as a consequence of the novelty principle, canbe applied in the Portuguese system of law. (Bulletin of the Ministry of Justice No. 238,p. 277)

Another judgement rendered by the same Court on June 26, 1974 decided that the In-dustrial Property Code in force at that time (the Code of 1940) considered that the text ofthe law did not exclude the application of the equivalent means, provided that three con-ditions are observed for the existence of said equivalent means:

1. that such means derive from the same pater-idea;

2. that such means have the same function; and

3. that such means aim to the same results.

We are not aware of any recent decisions rendered by the Portuguese Courts where thedoctrine of the equivalent means has been applied.

However, as Portugal is member of the European Patent Convention, the Article 69 ofsuch convention and the Protocol of the Article 69 should be applied by the Courts as le-gal framework for the interpretation of the patent claims and determination of the scopeof protection of the patent claims.


The scope of protection of the patent can be considered as provisionally fixed from theapplication date, since according to No. 6 of Article 62 of the Portuguese Industrial Prop-erty Code of 1995,

The filing of a patent application shall grant, from the date of publication (…) to the appli-cant, provisionally, that protection which would be conferred by the grant of the right.

The scope of patent protection can change from the application date until the grant of thepatent by amendments introduced by the patent applicant by his own initiative or upon re-quest of the Patent Office.

The scope of patent protection can still be limited after the grant of the patent by requestof the patent owner or by a court decision.



The Portuguese jurisprudence considers that whenever a party invokes a right ina way contrary to a position assumed before by the same party, he commits aform of venire contra factum proprium deemed as abuse of right.

The invocation by the patent owner of any equivalent means in an infringement le-gal action in order to obtain a broader scope for his patent, whenever the exis-tence of such means is contrary to the position assumed by the patent owner, forexample during the prosecution phase, shall be deemed as abuse of right andprohibited by the law.


There is a difference between formal and informal actions in the Patent Office. In-formal actions only take place in exceptional cases, for example whenever the

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patent agent desires to discuss the question previously with the patent examiner,in order to foresee whether he will be receptive to the acceptance of a certain re-quest or ascertain what the practice of the office is in respect of a certain question.

Consequently, an informal discussion can be followed by a formal action. When-ever this will not be the case, the informal discussion will not play a role in deter-mining the scope of patent protection.

A formal action can play however an important role in determining the scope ofprotection of the patent.

According to Article 66 of the Portuguese Industrial Property Code of 1995,

1. The notices that the patent may be accepted shall be published in the In-dustrial Property Bulletin for opposition purposes by any person who mayfeel jeopardized thereby.

2. The time limit for filing oppositions shall be of three months running fromthe date of publication of the Bulletin in which the notice is inserted.

If there are oppositions, the applicant shall be notified to reply within the time lim-it of two months as from the date of the notification thereof.

Additional submissions may be filed either by the applicant or the opponent when-ever they appear to be necessary for a better understanding of the case, until adecision is given by the Patent Office. Whenever submissions are filed, the otherparty will have the right to reply to them according to the general contradictoryprinciple.

The contents of the opposition, the reply and of any possible additional submis-sions filed by the parties, as well as the documents appended to them, are exam-ined and evaluated by the Patent Office and taken into account for the decision tobe issued.

Consequently, the contents of said documents can play a very important role indetermining the scope of the patent protection.

As a matter of fact, as the total or partial grant of the patent will be the result of theprosecution of that same patent, in case of an infringement action the judge may,by request of one of the parties or by its own initiative, ask the Patent Office to fur-nish him a copy of any documents of the prosecution file which may be relevantand helpful to determine the exact scope of the patent protection.

For example, if during the prosecution a claim has been deleted because it wasconsidered that the object thereof did not involve any novelty, such a circum-stance could contribute to the determination of the scope of protection of saidpatent, leading the judge to conclude that the referred object cannot be deemedas included in the scope of another claim of the same patent.


Both actions taken by the patent office or by third parties can originate amend-ments to the claims of the invention (Article 65 of the Industrial Property Code).

Whenever from the examination it is concluded that the application does not fulfilthe conditions for grant, the examination report shall be sent to the applicant to-gether with a notification for the applicant to answer the comments made by theexaminer.

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Once the patent application is published in the Industrial Property Bulletin, anyperson who may feel jeopardized thereby may file opposition against the applica-tion within three months running from the date of publication.

Such an opposition may have as an object any of the legal requirements for thepatent to be granted, including novelty, inventive step and industrial application ofthe invention.

If an opposition is accepted by the examiner who agrees, for example, that the ob-ject of one of the claims of the patent application lacks an inventive step and thepatent is consequently only partially granted, the original scope of the patent pro-tection will be reduced in consequence.

In that case, the prosecution history may play an important role in the definition ofthe patent protection.

As the patent office is not a party to the infringement legal proceedings, whenev-er it is of the interest of the plaintiff or the defendants to bring to the court pro-ceedings any elements concerning the exact definition of the scope of the patentprotection, they will have to obtain certified copies of the opposition, of the reply,or of any additional submissions or interlocutory decisions the contents of whichmay be helpful to determine the scope of the protection of the patent. The judgesmay themselves, whenever they deem it as necessary or useful, send official let-ters to the Patent Office ordering them to supply any documents of the prosecu-tion that may be considered as helpful for the case.


The scope of claims can still be limited by initiative of the patent owner who may partial-ly renounce to his rights provided that he expressly declares so before the National Insti-tute of Industrial Property.

The scope of claims can still be limited outside prosecution by a decision rendered in anappeal filed before the Court of Commerce against the grant decision.

Such an appeal can be filed by the opposing party or by any person who may be direct-ly harmed by the grant decision within a time limit of three months running from the dateof publication of the decision in the Industrial Property Bulletin.The scope of the claims can also be limited in a nullity or revocation legal action filed be-fore the competent court.

In any of the referred legal proceedings the prosecution history can play an important rolehelping to determine the contents of the claims for instance preventing the patent ownerfrom denying or asserting facts contrary to the ones he had admitted during the prose-cution. The invocation by the patent owner of any argument contrary to a position as-sumed by himself during the prosecution should be considered as a form of venire con-tra factum proprium and prohibited by the law as an abuse of right.


The Protocol on the interpretation of Article 69 of the European Patent Convention at-tempts to provide a European wide common approach regarding the interpretation ofclaims.

Nevertheless, what can be seen is that different European countries take diverse ap-proaches and define different scopes within the provisions of Article 69 of the EuropeanPatent Convention.

5

In order to establish uniform procedures it would be useful that as many countries as pos-sible would adopt, expressly in the text of their laws, provisions equivalent to Article 69 ofthe European Patent Convention and the Protocol on the interpretation of such conven-tion. Thus, it would be also advisable to establish in the law of those countries that thedoctrine of equivalents should be applicable although limited by prosecution historyestoppel, according to the principle nemo contra factum suum proprium venire potest.

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Republic of KoreaRepublique de Corée

Republik Korea

Report Q175

in the name of the Korean Groupby Kook-Chan AHN


Questions


A Doctrine of Equivalents has been developed by case law in Korea. Korean courts havefound infringement in cases where there is no literal infringement. In many of these deci-sions, the rationale was that the accused device or process could have been the result ofa "simple design change" to the patented invention. In some cases, the courts stated thatif an element of the patented invention was substituted by an element of the accused de-vice or process, the substituting element of the accused device or process could beviewed as an equivalent to the substituted element of the patented invention.

In 1998, the Korean Patent Court rendered a decision in a confirmation-of-scope caseand outlined a five-prong equivalency test (Won-Ho Choi et al. v. Samin Co. Ltd., PatentCourt Case No. 98 Heo 2160, decided September 17, 1998). In 2000, the KoreanSupreme Court adopted the same five-prong equivalency test (Bayer Aktiengesellschaftv. Union Quimico Famaceutica, S.A., Supreme Court Case No. 97 Hu 2200, decided July28, 2000). Since then, most non-literal infringement actions or confirmation-of-scopecases are decided on this 5-prong test.

According to the test, when an element of an invention is substituted in an accused de-vice/process, the substituting element of the accused device/process shall be equivalentto the substituted element of the patented invention, if:

a. The problem solving principles are the same in the patented invention andthe accused device/process;

b. The substituting element of the accused device/process provides sub-stantially the same operational effects as the substituted element of thepatented invention;

c. The substitution is obvious to one having ordinary skill in the relevant art;

d. The accused device/process was not known or could not have been easi-ly conceived from known techniques by those having ordinary skill in theart at the time of filing the application for the patent; and

e. There are no special circumstances such as intentional exclusion of thesubstituting element of the accused device/process from the claimedscope during the prosecution of the patent.

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In the Won-Ho Choi et al. case, the Patent Court stated, in dicta, that the substitutionshould have been obvious when the accused device/process was made. This appearsclosest to time of infringement. There have been no further explicit rulings on this specif-ic issue.



Korea recognizes file wrapper estoppel. In order for estoppel to apply, the substi-tuting element of the accused device/process should have been "intentionally" ex-cluded from the claimed scope of the patent during patent prosecution. Whetherthere was such an intentional exclusion is determined in view of amendmentsmade to the claims and specification, and in view of the opinions of the examinerexpressed during prosecution, the intent of the applicant as indicated in amend-ments and remarks made during prosecution, and the like. When there is morethan one claim at issue, the prosecution history of each claim is independently re-viewed to decide whether certain features were intentionally deleted from thescope of the claim, unless special circumstances indicate otherwise.


There is no substantial difference between formal and informal actions as long asboth are made part of the record (file history). More or less weight is not given tothe form of the submitted document or hearing as the estoppel analysis seeks toinvestigate the intent of the applicant/patentee as reflected in the file wrapper.Such intent can be established, for example, with a record of an interview be-tween the applicant and the examiner during prosecution.


There should be no difference between the instigating actions of the patent officeor third parties. Again, the key is the intent of the applicant/patentee that deter-mines applicability of file wrapper estoppel. It does not matter whose actioncaused the applicant/patentee to amend the claims or make a statement effec-tively narrowing the claimed scope of the invention.


There appears to be no precedents on this issue. As in most other countries, the logicalreasoning should be that the analysis be confined to the file wrapper prosecution history.

But, it is unclear whether a patentee's statements outside the file wrapper and relating tothe scope of the patented invention may be admissions against interests and which couldlimit the scope of equivalents.


There have been a large amount of recent discussions on the U.S. Festo decisions. Thekey questions have been whether any changes made during prosecution or only thosechanges narrowing the scope of invention to facilitate allowance and overcome a rejec-

3

tion should be considered file wrapper estoppel. The latter appears to have been theoriginal intent as adopted by other countries. Harmonization should be on limiting thescope of equivalents by file history estoppel only in situations where an applicant narrowsthe scope of the claims by amendment in order to overcome a prior art rejection. Further,harmonization should limit statements made by the applicant which are used as estop-pel, to those statements associated with narrowing the scope of the claims by amend-ment in order to overcome a prior art rejection.

Traduction française


Questions


Une doctrine des équivalents a été dévelopée par la jurisprudence en Corée. Lorsquequ'un élément est remplacé dans une procedure en contrefaçon d'un dispositif ou d'unprocédé, l'élément " remplaçant "doit être équivalent à l'élément " remplacé " de l'inven-tion délivrée, si :

a. Les principes pour résourdre un problème appliqués dans l'invention sontles mêmes que ceux appliqués dans la contrefaçon alleguée;

b. L'élément remplaçant de la contrafaçon alleguée procure en grande paritele même effet opérationnel que l'élément remplacé de l'invention brevetée;

c. Le remplacement est évident pour un homme du métier dans le domainede technique concerné;

d. Les dispositif/procédé n'étaient pas connus ou ils n'étaient pas possiblespour l'homme moyen de les concevoir facilement au moment du dépôt dela demande de brevet à partir des techniques connues ; et

e. Il n'y a pas de circonstance spéciale telle qu'une exclusion intentionelled'un élément remplaçant de la contrefaçon alleguée au cour de la procé-dure de la délivrance de la demande de brevet.


Dans Won-Ho Choi et al., le tribunal des Brevets a mentionné que le remplacement de-vait être évident lorsque les dispositif/procede allegués ont été réalisés. Aucune décisionplus explicite sur ce sujet spécifique n'a pas été rendue depuis.


4


Oui. Afin que "estoppel" soit appliqué, l'élément remplaçant de la contrefaçon al-leguée devait être exclu intentionellement de la portée des revendications aucours de la procédure de la délivrance de brevet.


Non.


Non.


Il semble qu'il y a pas de précédents sur ce sujet.


" File history estoppel " devra être appliqué seulement dans les situations où un deman-deur réduit la portée des revendications par une modification afin d'éviter le rejet en rai-son de l'art antérieur.

Deutsche Übersetzung


Fragen


Ein Doktrin der "Äquivalente" wurde in Korea auf Grundlage des Präzedenzrechts en-twickelt. Wird ein Element einer Erfindung in einer / einem streitgegenständlichen Vor-richtung/Verfahren (hinfort nur: streitgegenständliche Vorrichtung) ersetzt, wird das er-setzende Element der streitgegenständlichen Vorrichtung als äquivalent zum ersetztenElement der patentierten Erfindung angesehen, wenn:

a. Die Prinzipien der Problemlösung der patentierten Erfindung und der stre-itgegenständlichen Vorrichtung gleich sind;

b. Das ersetzende Element der streitgegenständlichen Vorrichtung imWesentlichen die gleichen operativen Effekte erzielt wie das ersetzte Ele-ment der patentierten Erfindung;

c. Die Ersetzung für den Fachmann offenkundig ist;

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d. Die streitgegenständliche Vorrichtung unbekannt war oder zum Zeitpunktder Patentanmeldung nicht leicht durch den Fachmann von bekanntenTechniken hätte abgeleitet werden können; und

e. Keine besonderen Umstände, wie z.B. die vorsätzliche Auslassung desersetzenden Elements der streitgegenständlichen Vorrichtung aus dembeanspruchten Umfang des Patents, vorliegen.


Im Fall Won-Ho Choi et al. hat das Patentgericht zu erkennen gegeben, dass die Erset-zung zum Zeitpunkt der Herstellung der streitgegenständlichen Vorrichtung bereits hätteoffenkundig gewesen sein sollen. Eindeutigere Entscheidungen wurden in diesemZusammenhang noch nicht getroffen.



Ja. Um sich auf ein estoppel berufen zu können, sollte das ersetzende Elementder streitgegenständlichen Vorrichtung während des Anmeldeverfahrens "vorsät-zlich" aus dem beanspruchten Umfang des Patents ausgeklammert worden sein.


Nein.


Nein.

4. Gibt es irgendeinen Weg, auf dem der Schutzbereich von Ansprüchen ausserhalb desErteilungsverfahrens beschränkt werden kann, z.B. durch estoppel oder Zugeständnisse?

Hinsichtlich dieser Frage ist uns kein Präzedenzfall bekannt.


Auf 'prosecution history estoppel' sollte sich nur in Situationen berufen werden, in denenein Anmelder den Umfang der Ansprüche durch Änderungen einschränkt, um einevorhergehende Zurückweisung zu überwinden.

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RomaniaRoumanieRumänien

Report Q175

in the name of the Romanian Groupby Mihaela TEODORESCU and Daniella NICOLAESCU


Questions


The Romanian Patent Law No.64/1991, republished as amended and completed by theLaw No.203/2002, introduces the concept of "equivalents" when determining the scopeof patent protection.

Thus, Art.33, paragraphs 3 and 4, stipulate that:

"The extent of protection conferred by a patent shall be determined by thecontent of claims. In the same time, the description and drawings of the in-vention shall be used to interpret the claims".

"In order to determine the scope of protection conferred by a patent, itshould be taken into account any element equivalent to an element recit-ed in the claims".

Further details are expected to be provided by the Regulations for Implementing saidnew amended Patent Law. In this respect, we expect a harmonization with the generalprinciples stipulated by Art.1 of the new text of the Protocol on the EPC.

According to a draft of the Regulations, "Art.33, paragraph 3, should not be interpretedas meaning that the extent of the protection conferred by a patent of invention is to be un-derstood as that defined by the strict, literal meaning of the words used in the claimsand, that the description and drawings being used only for the purpose of resolving anambiguity found in the claims; nor should it be taken to mean that the claims only serveas a guideline and that the protection conferred extends to what, from a consideration ofthe description and drawings by a person skill in the art, the patent proprietor has con-templated to protect. These provisions must be interpreted as defining a position be-tween these extremes which assures both a fair protection for the patentee and a rea-sonable degree of certainty for third parties".

Also, said draft stipulates that "an element is equivalent if, for a person skilled in the art itis obvious that by using said element the same result is substantially obtained as that ob-tained by using the element recited in the claims".

Further on, the same draft tries to meet the harmonization idea by providing that "for de-termining the extent of protection, it should be taken into account any statement, thus li-

2

miting the extent of claims protection, made by the applicant or the proprietor of thepatent during the proceedings concerning the grant or the validity of the patent".

2, 3, 4 and 5

There are no additional provisions in the Romanian legislation and there is no jurispru-dence in this matter, yet.

Therefore, no reasonable opinion can be formulated concerning Questions 2 - 5.

Conclusions

Since March 1, 2003 Romania becomes full member of EPC, the Romanian Group isconfident that our country will try to harmonize its practice and legislation with the Euro-pean ones.

1

RussiaRussie

Russland

Report Q175

in the name of the Russian Group


Questions


The theory of equivalents exists in the Russian patent practice. The Russian Patent Lawestablishes the use of the equivalents to determine if the patent has been used in theproduct or method.

According to the Russian Patent Law (Article 10-2) the patent is considered to be used inthe product or in the method if all the features of the independent patent claim have beenused or the features equivalent to them have been used in those product or method.The amendments to the Russian Patent Law to come into force soon (the amendmentsin question have been adopted already by the Russian Parliament and are waiting nowto be signed and promulgated by the President) stipulate that the equivalent featureshould become known in the field of invention prior to the actions considered to be theuse of the patent.

The Russian Patent Law does not provide the definition of the equivalent feature. Sucha definition is given in the instruction of the Russian Patent Office. The Experts in theCourt cases use that instruction if there is a dispute over the equivalent features of theinvention. According to the instruction the feature is considered equivalent if the replace-ment of the actual feature in the invention

1) does not change the essence of the invention,

2) provides the same technical effect,

3) the means of the replacement are known in the field of invention.


According to the Russian Patent Law the scope of patent protection is determined by theclaims. The claims should be based on the specification of the invention. During the pros-ecution of the patent application the claims could be changed within the scope of the orig-inally filed specification with the priority date (no new matter can be added). So the scopeof protection during the prosecution can change but it is limited by the originally filedspecification.

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The prosecution of the patent application plays an important role in determining thescope of patent protection in Russia.


The applicant can make a file wrapper estoppel upon the request of the Examin-er or he can reduce the scope of protection by including the features from the de-pendent claims to the independent claim.


The Examiner can issue the Official Opposition or the Request for additional ma-terials to specify the invention. The report on the discussion of the applicant withthe Examiner (duly signed) has the same juridical force as the formal oppositionsof the Examiner.


After the patent publication is made the interested third parties can ask for thesubstantive examination (if the applicant did not ask for it till that time himself).The third parties can provide the Examination reference materials to be used inthe Examination. When the patent is granted the third parties can file the Opposi-tions against the patent to the Appeal Chamber of the Russian Patent Office.


The patent granted can be opposed in the Appeal Chamber of the Russian Patent Office.During the prosecution of the Opposition the Appeal Board can propose to the patentowner to amend the claims to bring the claims in accordance with the references provid-ed by the Opposition. If the patent owner make such an admission - the Appeal Chambermakes a decision to grant a patent with the amended claims and thus to reduce thescope of protection. So the scope of protection can be limited outside the prosecution ofthe patent application.

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SingaporeSingapourSingapur

Report Q175

in the name of the Singapore Groupby Jason CHAN and Winnie THAM


Questions



1. Under section 66 Patents Act of Singapore, a person infringes a patent for an in-vention if he does any of the following things in Singapore in relation to the inven-tion without the consent of the proprietor of the patent:

(a) where the invention is a product, he makes, disposes of, offers to disposeof, uses or imports the product or keeps it whether for disposal or other-wise;

(b) where the invention is a process, he uses the process or he offers it for usein Singapore when he knows, or it is obvious to a reasonable person in thecircumstances, that its use without the consent of the proprietor would bean infringement of the patent;

(c) where the invention is a process, he disposes of, offers to dispose of, usesor imports any product obtained directly by means of that process or keepsany such product whether for disposal or otherwise.

2. In order to determine whether a patent has been infringed, the court will:

2.1 determine the scope of the monopoly granted under the patent; and

2.2 determine whether the alleged infringement embodies every feature (orlimitation) of the claims of the patent.

These are separately discussed.

Claim construction to determine scope of monopoly

3. In interpreting a patent for the purpose of determining the scope of the patent mo-nopoly, the overall principle of the process of interpretation is to combine fair pro-tection for the patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties. Thepatent is to be construed purposively (rather than strictly or literally and thoughthe eyes and mind of those skilled in the art, without applying an over-meticulousverbal analysis. Specifications and drawings are to provide the necessary back-ground and may affect or define the meaning of the words used in the claim.

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4. Where claims gave a plain meaning in themselves, it is not permissible to use thespecifications to change their meaning nor to confine the scope of the claims byreference to some limitation found in the specifications or drawings but not ex-pressly (or by proper inference) reproduced in the claims themselves. Where anypart of the claim is ambiguous, then what is said in the specifications can be re-ferred to in order to resolve the ambiguity. Reference is made to section 113Patents Act (which is similar to Article 69 European Patent Convention):

"113. For the purposes of this Act, an invention for a patent for which anapplication has been made or for which a patent has been granted shall,unless the context otherwise requires, be taken to be that specified in aclaim of the specification of the application or patent, as the case may be,as interpretated by the description and any drawings contained in thatspecification, and the extent of the protection conferred by a patent or ap-plication for a patent shall be determined accordingly."

5. Given that the function of a patent claim is to generalise the invention, a patentclaim can cover versions or embodiments of the invention devised later in date bya third party, even if further ingenuity was required to devise the that version orembodiment. But the court will not write words into a claim that are not there orgive a meaning to a term of a claim that is contrary to its language, although it mayarguably be permissible to ignore an integer where no contribution, purpose orsignificance for the integer can be found.

6. In summary, the purposive approach to claim construction requires that the mean-ing of the claim be construed reasonably and objectively to conform with the pur-pose of the inventor, the purpose being judged from the entire patent and sur-rounding circumstances. After this is done, if strict compliance was not intended,different embodiments or variations may be covered by the claim.

Determination of infringement

7. After the claim is properly construed, in determining infringement, it will be nec-essary to compare the claims against the alleged infringing product/process anddetermine whether the latter falls within or outside of the scope of the claims.

8. Literal or textual infringement requires that every integer of the asserted claims beembodied in the alleged infringing product or process. Where literal infringementis not in issue or cannot be established, infringement will nonetheless arise if theintegers embodied in the alleged infringing product or process are regarded asobvious, non-material variants of the essential integers of the invention.

9. The test of whether a variant of an integer or feature falls within or outside of aproperly-construed claim will consist of three questions:

(i) Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the inventionworks? If yes, the variant is outside the claim.

(ii) If the answer is no, would this (i.e. that the variant would have no materialeffect) have been obvious at the date of publication of the patent to areader skilled in the art? If no, the variant is outside the claim.

(iii) If yes, would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understoodfrom the language of the claim that the patentee intended that strict com-pliance with the primary meaning was an essential requirement of the in-vention. If "yes", the variant is outside the claim. But if the answer is "no",the patentee would then be regarded as having intended that the word orphrase used not to have a literal meaning but a figurative one, denoting a

3

class of things which included the variant as well as the literal meaning,the latter being only the "most perfect, best known or striking example ofthe class."

10. The series of questions raises the following observations:

- The test of a variant is whether it has a material effect upon the waythe invention works.

- The time to assess this materiality is the time of the publication of thepatent.

Any doctrine of equivalents?

11. Singapore does not have a doctrine of equivalence whether by statute of caselaw. Having said that, it would have been reasonable to suppose that the combi-nation of the purposive approach to claim construction and the aforesaid Improverapproach to non-literal infringement should sufficiently in most cases address in-fringements by equivalence.

12. However, there is one commentary in the UK which opined that that cases thatfound infringement on non-literal interpretation had stretched descriptive adjec-tives or adjectival phrases to encompass the features in the infringing article andthese cases do not establish that the doctrine subsists under UK law. This wasconfirmed In Amersham v Amicon [2001] EWCA Civ 1042, where the Courtof Appeal clarified that the Protocol has not introduced the doctrine of infringe-ment by equivalent effect. There is no Singapore jurisprudence on this doctrinebut the Amersham case would be persuasive if the issue does arise for consid-eration.

13. It is further observed that the Improver test of "material effect" appears largelyconsistent with the EPC draft which defined equivalency as being that whichachieves "substantially the same result" as that achieved through the meansspecified in the claim. The difference is that the time to assess equivalency is op-posed to the EPC draft, being the time of the publication, rather than the time ofthe alleged infringement.





14. Under Section 108 of the Patents Act, it is provided that after publication of an ap-plication for a patent, the Registrar shall upon request being made, give a personmaking a request such information and permit him to inspect such documents re-lating to the application or to any patent granted, subject however to any pre-scribed restriction. As such, the Patents Act allows a third party to inspect docu-ments relating to the prosecution of the application. This potentially allows its usein a patent litigation dispute.

15. However, the issue arises as to how such documents are regarded by the Reg-istry and the court in an infringement action. In the US, prosecution history estop-pel is the counter-balance to the doctrine of equivalents, to prevent a patentee

4

from amending claims or presenting arguments in favour of one position, and thensubsequently making an inconsistent argument when enforcing claims against athird party.

16. Singapore does not recognise a formal doctrine of "prosecution history estoppel"or "file wrapper estoppel", but the courts have been prepared to consider prose-cution history to aid in construction of patent claims (see paragraph 18 below).

17. In a UK case, one judge commented that "although the prosecution process maysometimes superficially resemble a process of negotiation between the applicantand its advisors and the officials who scrutinise the file, it is of the sort of com-mercial negotiation which is still rigidly excluded in the construction of a writtencontract". However, it did accept that it "could be of assistance in resolving somepuzzling features of a specification", and "had it been necessary for the judge totake account of the letter in order to resolve the construction", the court wouldhave been entitled to do so.

18. As the Patents Act in Singapore is somewhat similar to that of UK, it is likely thatthe UK position will be persuasive. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Singapore in apatent infringement case involving the HIV-2 virus did consider the contents of aletter from the patentee to the European Patent Office. The patentees in the casewere proprietors of a European patent which cover the HIV-2 virus, and thatpatent was subsequently re-registered in Singapore. It may be helpful to add atthis juncture that the patent, being granted under the re-registration system in Sin-gapore, did not undergo any process of examination. This has since changed withthe new law introduced in 1995 which abolished the re-registration system.

19. In deciding the issue of whether the appellants' diagnostic kits infringed thepatent, the court had to determine the scope of the monopoly claimed in thepatent. The contention of the appellants was that Claim 19 was drafted so broad-ly that it would encompass not only HIV-2 antigens, but also the antigens of theSimian Immunodeficiency Virus (SIV). Reliance was placed on a letter of EPOdated 22 April 19888, where it was stated that it would be appropriate to specifythe antibodies which can be used to recognize the portions of sequences claimedand to exclude any polypeptide or peptide presenting homologiesof sequences with those of the known HIV or SIV viruses are li-able to be recognised by the same antibodies. Reference was thenmade to the reply of the Respondents where they stated that there was no needto emphasise that nothing of the sort had been contemplated in the previous doc-uments because these do not describe the poly peptides or peptides of an SIVretrovirus corresponding to the definitions given in Claims 15 to 18. The Courttook into account the correspondence with the EPO and concluded upon exami-nation of the whole letter, that there was nothing in the letter of the Respondentswhich narrowed down their entitlement to only HIV-2 antigens and excluding SIVantigens.

20. It should be noted that the Court made no distinction in the above case as to howthe EPO documents were brought before the court i.e. whether it was submittedby the Plaintiffs or Defendants. In conclusion, it appears that the Court would beprepared to take prosecution history into account. However, further elucidationand guidelines as to the admissibility, relevancy and weight which should be ac-corded to prosecution history would be welcomed.

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21. Thus far, there is no difference between formal and informal actions in the patentoffice. There is no difference between the actions taken by the patent office andby third parties.

22. It may also be of interest to note that a patent can be revoked in Singapore on thebasis that a patent was obtained on a mispresentation or that the Applicant hasfurnished information which in any material particular was false. This allows thecourts to consider the past history of the file in determining the validity of a patent.


23. Whilst Singapore law recognized the general common law principle of estoppeland admissions in context of evidence law, these principles of law are not usedapplied specifically in the construction of patent claims. Under the law of estoppel,there must be an assurance or representation which is relied upon by the repre-sentee to its detriment. Arguably, the prosecution history constitutes "notice" tothe public which may be construed as such a representation. Further, there mustbe reliance by the promisee on the representation making it inequitable for thepromisor to go back on the promise.

24. An admission made by the patentee in a lawsuit as to certain facts or circum-stances may well have an effect on how the court will construe claims.

1

SpainEspagneSpanien

Report Q175

in the name of the Spanish Groupby Pacual SEGURA CÁMARA, Vicente HUARTE SALVATIERRA,

Marta PONS DE VALL ALOMAR, Javier HUARTE, Miquel VIDAL-QUADRAS, David PELLISÉ URQUIZA, Carme FRIGOLA, Eduard FERREGÜELA COLON,

Anna AUTÓ CASSASSAS, Antoni ROMANÍ


Questions


It cannot be asserted that Spain has an elaborated doctrine of equivalents. However, thedoctrine of equivalents has been dealt with in the Spanish specialist literature and is gen-erally considered applicable in patent infringement cases heard by Spanish courts.

In 1986 there began in Spain a new patent system based on the European Patent Con-vention (EPC) and a new Spanish Patent Law (PL), the latter ruling the granting of na-tional patents and utility models (hereinafter jointly referred as "national patents"). Sincethen, "equivalents" have been mentioned only in very few patent infringement decisions(none from the Supreme Court), and always without reference to the Protocol on the In-terpretation of Article 69 EPC, which is the only legal text in force in Spain which providesthe guidelines for a non-literal interpretation of claims.

Currently, European patents represent about 70% of the approximately 17,000 new in-dustrial property titles granted every year to protect inventions in Spain. Concerningscope (or extent) of protection, the PL is also applicable to national patents granted un-der the previous law, the Industrial Property Statue (IPS). Since Article 60.1 PL parallelsArticle 69.1 EPC, by statute the scope of protection of all Spanish patents, both nationaland European, is determined by the claims, and description and drawings must usedwhen interpreting said claims. Besides, Article 26 PL parallels Article 84 EPC, both stat-ing that the claims define the matter for which protection is sought. Finally, according toRule 29.1 EPC and Article 7.1 of the PL Implementing Regulations, the claims define thematter for which protection is sought in terms of a combination of technical features or el-ements (simply "elements" hereinafter). Although the Spanish PL has not explicitly incor-porated the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC, all specialists who have pub-lished on the doctrine of equivalents agree that the Protocol should be considered appli-cable also to national patents, because it would be natural that the scope of protection ofall Spanish patents was determined in the same way regardless of the granting office.

As Spanish courts are bound by the legal texts summarised in the previous paragraph,the wording of the claims -including all their elementsshould be not only the starting

2

point but also the decisive basis to determine the scope of protection. However, in mostjudicial practice this is not the case, partially because of the lack of specialisation amongSpanish courts dealing with patent infringement at any instance. Among the relativelysmall number of post-1986 judicial decisions on patent infringement in Spain, very fewmention Article 60.1 PL, and virtually none determines the infringement by assessmentof the scope of protection through an element-by-element analysis of the claims, and acomparison with the elements in the alleged infringing embodiment, in order to decidewhether this embodiment falls within that assessed scope. Actually, most Spanish judicialdecisions are still based on some sort of "doctrine of essence"; i.e. the presence or ab-sence of "essential differences" between the patented invention and the accused em-bodiment. This is understood to imply that there is an essential difference when the mod-ification/elimination affects an element of the patent that is essential rather than one thatis secondary or complementary. The presence or absence of essential differences is de-cided by the judge taking into account the (often contradictory) opinions of expert wit-nesses as to which elements of the invention would have been considered essential bya person skilled in the art, and which would have been considered secondary, withoutneeding to abide by the wording of the claims. Judgements based on such a doctrine ofessence, with different formulations, have been made in Spanish case law, mainly in thecontext of patentability cases, but rarely in patent infringement cases. Besides, in mostdecisions on infringement, only classical (literal) infringement has been considered. It isonly a short time ago that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents has been ar-gued before Spanish courts.

The doctrine of essence was mainly based on two articles about patentability in theSpanish Industrial Property Statute (IPS) of 1929, namely: Article 46 IPS, which states:"Any improvement to modify the essential conditions of a process can be patented…";and Article 48.3 IPS: "Changes in shape, size, proportion and materials of the patentedobject cannot be patented, unless said change essentially modifies the quality of the ob-ject, or its use involves a new result." The patent-related part of this Law, including thesetwo articles, was repealed in 1986. Thus, it is not surprising that, despite being an every-day judicial practice, some Spanish commentators have recently considered that thedoctrine of essence is contrary to the Spanish and the European patent systems and thatit stands against the general trend (in EPC countries and in the US), according to whichclaims are to be interpreted on an element-by-element basis, and all elements (as suchor as equivalents) must be present in the infringing embodiment. Besides, it is difficult tounderstand how the doctrine of essence could be compatible with the incoming principlethat "for the purpose of determining the extent of protection conferred by a patent, dueaccount shall be taken of any element which is equivalent to an element specified in theclaims" (new Article 2 -Equivalents- of the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69EPC; not yet in force).

Equivalents defined as "variants of shape, material, size, element position and even re-placement of elements by others, when it is not altered the fundamental principle of theinvention disclosed, claimed and protected by the patent or the utility model" were men-tioned in a Supreme Court decision of 1968 (Third Section, 10.06.1968), in the context ofassessing the patentability of a utility model in an ex parte case (note that the wording ofthe decision was very similar to that of the old Article 48.3 IPS mentioned above). One ofthe very few Spanish courts that is partially specialised in patent cases, Section 15 of theBarcelona Court of Second Instance, issued on 18.09.2000 a decision in which the ab-sence of literal infringement was decided on the basis of an essential difference betweenthe patented process and the questioned one. However, judges cited obiter dictum theabove-mentioned Supreme Court decision of 1968 as well as the concept of "equivalentmeans" as "means that, despite having different embodiments, fulfilled the same function

3

with regard to the same result", a definition taken from a fragment of a Boards of Appeal(BA) decision (T 697/92, unpublished in the Official Journal), cited under the heading"Equivalents" in the chapter "Patentability-Inventive step" of the last three editions of thebook "Case Law of the BA of the EPO". It is worth noting that such unpublished BA deci-sion mentioned obiter dictum the definition of "equivalent means" taken from the chapteron patentability of a 1974 book by the French author Paul Mathely ("Le droit français desbrevets d'invention", p. 63), in the context of assessing the inventive step of an invention.

Given the scarcity of Spanish case law and tradition on the doctrine of equivalent for in-fringement purposes, the above-mentioned 2000 decision of the Barcelona Court of Sec-ond Instance has been cited since then in several judicial decisions of first and secondinstance, and in some specialist writings, despite the fact that the two cited definitions ofequivalents refer to patentability and not to infringement. Several commentators consid-er that the important conclusion derived from all these decisions is that the doctrine ofequivalents is applicable in Spain. But it cannot be said that there is any basis to justifyeither an approach to equivalents based on a double identity (bearing in mind functionand result) similar to that traditionally adopted in France, or an approach based on atriple identity (bearing in mind function, way and result) similar to that traditionally adopt-ed in the USA.

Very recently a series of lawsuits based on the same chemical patents have begun inseveral courts, arguing patent infringement only under the doctrine of equivalents, andnot literal infringement. Up to this day, only judicial decisions of first instance have beenissued. One of them (Barcelona Court of First Instance nº 37, 10.09.2002) addresses theissue of the doctrine of equivalents in a modern way, and refers to the new Article 2 of theProtocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC. This decision is in favour of an obviousequivalents approach, similar to the current one in German courts, and against an ap-proach based on a triple identity (function, way, result).


The first instance decision referred to at the end of the previous paragraph is the only de-cision addressing this issue so far. In that specific case the court considered that the rel-evant date for the skilled person to assess the issue of equivalents was the applicationdate; but to this day no general consensus on this matter has emerged in Spain.



In Spain there are no patent infringement judicial decisions in which a "prosecu-tion history" or "file wrapper" has explicitly been crucial for the decision. However,most Spanish specialists believe that all waivers and limitations made beforepatent offices, as well as any other act made by the applicant, can be alleged be-fore a Spanish court in order to assess the scope of patent protection. This is sobecause in Spain there is a principle of law known as "doctrine of own acts", ac-cording to which no one can contradict his or her own acts (venire contra factumproprium); i.e. no one is allowed to ignore or deny his own acts, or the conse-quences thereof, and claim a right in opposition to such acts or consequences. Infact, this doctrine (hereinafter "doctrine of estoppel") is very similar to the "estop-pel" common-law principle.

As a general legal principle, the doctrine of estoppel can and should be taken intoaccount in industrial property proceedings. In fact, said principle has been applied

4

in proceedings related to industrial property, and the Supreme Court has had theopportunity of making pronouncements on its acceptance or dismissal in severalof its judgements related to trademarks and trade names.

The Supreme Court has construed the estoppel stating that the rule "nemine licetadversus sua facta venire" is based on the good faith and the protection of thetrustfulness that the actions produce. Because of this, such actions must be bind-ing, having legal status and intended to create, define, modify, extinguish or clar-ify a right, and they cannot be ambiguous, but formal acts.

None of the Supreme Court decisions has explicitly referred to the prosecutionhistory of a patent. However, in view of the legal principle that prevents someonefrom acting against his own acts, it is understood that the prosecution history of apatent should be taken into account to assess the scope of its protection.

According to this doctrine, if the applicant for a patent made any statement capa-ble of limiting the scope of the claimed subject-matter of such a patent during itsprosecution, either expressly excluding some of the features initially claimed orspecifying the elements specially claimed, for the purpose of avoiding possibleobjections to the granting of the patent, in principle the applicant should not be al-lowed to allege, at a later date, that those elements that he or she specially dis-claimed or waived constitute an infringement of such patent.

According to the above, although a concept of "file wrapper estoppel" as legal andautomatic preclusion based on the prosecution history does not exist, it can bestated that, on the basis of the doctrine of estoppel, one could argue that the pat-entee has no right to extend the claimed subject-matter to elements that, beingpotentially equivalent to those claimed in the patent, were (either explicitly or im-plicitly) excluded from the patent scope during prosecution in order to overcomeobstacles of lack of novelty or inventive step.

Therefore, for the purpose of assessing the protection scope of a Spanish patent,an applicant's actions made before foreign patent offices and referred to patentswith the same priority may be important, especially when made before patent of-fices of countries with a similar patent system.


Spanish law does not recognise the notion of "informal actions", and all the docu-ments in the file are considered to be "formal". For the purpose of application ofthe doctrine of estoppel, the documents within the file, as formal actions made bythe applicant, can be used to oppose a claim for patent infringement.

For that purpose it will be necessary that such actions fulfil the requirements es-tablished by case law for the doctrine of estoppel; i.e. said actions must be un-equivocal in the sense of creating, defining, modifying, extinguishing or clarifyingwithout any doubt a specific legal situation which affects their author, and alsothere must be a contradiction between the prior action and the subsequent de-mand of the patentee. The application of this doctrine would be consistent withthe patent case law in countries like Germany.


Although there is no case law about this in Spain, for the purpose of the doctrineof estoppel it should be irrelevant whether the statements were made as a con-sequence of objections raised by the patent office or by any third party. It is only

5

required that the actions are unequivocal and that the subsequent claim of thepatentee against any third party is inconsistent with said prior actions. The justifi-cation for this is that the aim of the Law is not only to guarantee fair protection forthe patentee but also to offer a reasonable certainty for third parties as to thescope of patent protection, in accordance with the principle of legal certainty, as itis reflected in the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC.


According to the principle by virtue of which nobody can contradict his own acts, it can bestated that any unequivocal admission made by the patentee in the sense of limiting thescope of the patent could be taken into account when assessing the protection scope ofsaid patent, even if such admission is not reflected in its prosecution. For example, state-ments or admissions by the patentee could be taken into account when made to limit thepatent scope in order to overcome a nullity objection.


We recommend that the AIPPI supports the following ideas or actions:

- No additional legislation is necessary to interpret the scope of patent protection bycourts. However, it would be convenient for the Spanish parliament to modify theSpanish Patent Law (PL) by including a direct reference to the applicability of theProtocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC to national patents and utility mod-els. For as long as this modification of the Spanish PL does not occur, it would behighly desirable for Spanish case law to recognise such applicability of the Proto-col to the above-mentioned national industrial property titles.

- All EPC member states should ratify as soon as possible the Revision of the EPCapproved in the Diplomatic Conference of 2000, so that the amendments of Arti-cle 69 and the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 may come into force.

- Both in relation to European patents and to national patents, it would be conven-ient to establish a uniform approach to the non-literal (i.e. by equivalency) con-struction of patent claims for all EPC countries.

- As it is recognised in several judicial decisions of German and British courts, deepdown the obvious equivalents approach as currently applied by German courts(according to the teaching of the patent, according to his common general knowl-edge, and according to his interpretation of applicant's purposes at claim drafting,the person skilled in the art would have considered that the equivalent elementwas an obvious alternative to the claimed element, to obtain a similar result to thesame technical problem) and the approach as currently applied by British courts(based on the answers to the famous three Catnic/Improver questions, now re-ferred to as the "Protocol questions"), are consistent with the Protocol on Inter-pretation of Article 69 EPC, including its recently added Article 2. Therefore, thesetwo deep down coincident approaches should form the basis for reaching uniformstandards of claim interpretation by equivalency in all EPC countries.

- An applicant-accepted limitation derived from a suggestion made by any patentoffice (PCT, European, or national) that participates in the granting proceedings ofa patent, or an unambiguous waiver made by the applicant during the correspon-ding proceedings, should be taken into account by the court when assessing theprotective scope of the patent.

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Résumé

On ne peut pas affirmer que l'Espagne ait une doctrine des équivalents élaborée. Cependant, ladoctrine des équivalents a été traitée par la doctrine scientifique espagnole et elle est consid-érée applicable en Espagne, étant donné que les articles pertinents de la Loi de Brevets (LB) es-pagnole sont parallèles à ceux correspondants à la Convention sur le Brevet Européen (CBE)et, bien que la LB n'en fasse pas mention, le Protocole Interprétatif de l'Art. 69 CBE est consid-éré applicable aux brevets et aux modèles d'utilité nationaux.

L'approche aux équivalents par évidence telle qu'elle est appliquée actuellement dans les tri-bunaux allemands est très proche dans le fond à celle appliquée dans les tribunaux britan-niques. Les deux sont cohérentes avec le Protocole et doivent être prises comme un standardd'interprétation des revendications par équivalence dans tous les pays de la CBE. Il doit êtreainsi particulièrement en Espagne, où encore aujourd'hui on utilise une espèce de "doctrine del'essence" que les commentaires les plus récents considèrent contraire au système de brevetsactuel.

En Espagne il n'y a pas de sentences sur la contrefaçon de brevet dans lesquelles l'historiquede la procédure de délivrance du brevet ("prosecution history" ou "file wrapper") ait été ex-plicitement déterminant en leur résolution. Néanmoins, on croit que tous les renoncements etlimitations faits devant les offices de brevets, ainsi que n'importe quel acte propre fait par le de-mandeur, peuvent être allégués devant un tribunal espagnol pour déterminer la portée de la pro-tection conférée par un brevet. C'est parce qu'en Espagne il existe le principe général connusous le nom de "doctrine des propres actes" (venire contra factum propium), selon laquelle per-sonne ne peut ignorer ou nier ses propres actes, ou leurs conséquences, et revendiquer un droitqui s'oppose a tels actes ou à telles conséquences.

Zusammenfassung

Es kann nicht behauptet werden, dass es in Spanien eine ausgearbeitete Doktrin der Äquiv-alenzen gibt. Die Äquivalenzdoktrin wurde nichtsdestotrotz von der wissenschaftlichen spanis-chen Doktrin behandelt, die als in Spanien anwendbar gilt, da die entsprechenden Artikel desspanischen Patentgesetzes (LP) parallel zu den entsprechenden Artikeln des EuropäischenPatentübereinkommens (EPÜ) gestaltet sind. Und auch wenn das LP dies nicht erwähnt, sokann doch auch das Protokoll zur Auslegung des Art. 69 EPÜ als für Patente und nationalen Ge-brauchsmustern als anwendbar gelten.

Die Annäherung an die Äquivalenten durch Offensichtlichkeit, so wie sie derzeit von dendeutschen Gerichten angewandt wird ist im Grunde der von den britischen Gerichten ange-wandten Annäherung sehr nahe. Beide sind kohärent zu dem Protokoll und sollten zum Inter-pretationsmuster für die Patentansprüche aufgrund von Äquivalenz in allen Ländern des EPÜwerden. Dies sollte vor allem in Spanien so sein, wo auch heute noch die so genannte"Wesentlichkeitstheorie" zur Anwendung kommt, das von jüngsten Kommentaren als dem ak-tuellen Patentsystem widersprechend angesehen wird.

In Spanien gibt es keine Gerichtsentscheidungen aufgrund von Patentverletzungen, in denendie Gesichichte des Erteiliungsverfahrens ausdrücklich entscheidend in der Urteilsfindung wäre.Trotzdem ist man der Auffassung, dass alle Verzichte und Beschränkungen, die vor den Paten-tämtern getätigt werden, sowie jede weitere eigene Handlung des Antragstellers, bei einemspanischen Gericht angeführt werden kann, um den Umfang des Patentschutzes festzulegen.Dies ist deshalb so, weil es in Spanien das allgemeine Prinzip, das unter dem Namen "Doktrindes eigenen Verhaltens" (venire contra factum proprium) gibt, gemäss welchem es niemanden

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gestattet ist, seine eigenes Verhalten bzw. die Konsequenzen desselben zu ignorieren oder zuverleugnen, und ein Recht zu beanspruchen, das diesem Verhalten bzw. den Konsequenzenwiderspricht.

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SwedenSuède

Schweden

Report Q175

in the name of the Swedish Groupby Bengt DOMEIJ, Jonas GULLIKSSON, Ivan HJERTMAN,

Bo JOHANSSON, Margareta LINDEROTH, Ragnar LUNDGREN, Hans Anders ODH, Rune NÄSMAN, Peter SANDE


Questions


Swedish courts apply the doctrine of equivalence. It is provided for by case law and is notexpressly included in the Swedish Patents Act (Patents Act).

Section 39 Patents Act deals with the scope of patent protection. This section corre-sponds to Article 69 of the European Patent Convention (EPC).Thus, the Interpretation Protocol to Article 69 is used in Swedish courts as a tool in theevaluation of the scope of the patent protection also in infringement cases.

For evaluation whether the doctrine of equivalence can be applied, a number of circum-stances have been identified according to Swedish doctrine and court practice as beingof interest:

- Whether the contested embodiment, or the infringing act, solves the same prob-lem or has the same function as the patented invention.

- Whether the contested embodiment provides a solution of the problem similar tothe solution as represented in the patent, and whether the similarity between thesolutions would be obvious for a person skilled in the art. If differences prevail inrespect of more than one feature it indicates that the contested embodiment com-prises a solution essentially different from that of the patent.

- Whether the solution of the defendant's embodiment leads to a result, substi-tutable to the result obtained by the solution according to the patent. If the differ-ence between the contested embodiment and the claims has a material addition-al effect on the technical solutions, the doctrine of equivalence does not apply.

- The kind of invention affects the application of the doctrine of equivalence. If theinvention is a pioneering invention the scope of using the doctrine of equivalenceis wider than would otherwise have been the case.

- The state of the art and actions taken by the applicant can affect the interpretationof equivalence, as stated below in the answer to question 3.

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The person skilled in the art is used in Swedish law when measuring the available rangeof equivalents for a patent. A modification reaching beyond the capabilities of the skilledperson is not considered an equivalent. But it is not clear from case law at what time thecapabilities of the skilled person shall be measured. However, it has in the legal doctrinebeen suggested that the priority date should be used to determine the capacity of theskilled person to find equivalents. In addition it has been discussed that also later arisingalternatives to features in the claims can be equivalents, if the technical capacity of theskilled person on the priority date would have been sufficient to make him realise theequivalence of such later arising alternative, assuming such alternative would have ex-isted on the priority date.



It is quite clear from Swedish case law and legal doctrine that the prosecution his-tory can play a role in determining the scope of protection. For example, it is stat-ed in the preparatory document behind the joint Nordic patent legislation, NU1963:6 p. 186, that "the documents of the prosecution … may be of relevance"when interpreting unclear claims. It is also mentioned that if the applicant "himselfinterpreted expressions used in the claims in a restrictive manner it is reasonablethat this restrictive interpretation also is considered in subsequent court proceed-ings". The importance of the information in the patent prosecution file will ofcourse vary from case to case.

The number of Swedish court decisions in this area is quite limited. The subjecthas, however, to some extent been dealt with in the legal doctrine of the Nordiccountries. In these cases the authors frequently rely on statements made in theco-Nordic preparatory works dating back to the 1960's. It is unclear to what extentone should rely on these statements bearing in mind that they were made beforeSweden became a party to the EPC and the European Union.

The Swedish Supreme Court has on December 20, 2002, rendered a decisionconcerning a claim for preliminary injunction. In this case (No Ö 2667-02) most ofthe arguments put forward by the parties concerned the importance of what hadhappened during the prosecution stage. The Court did not, however, find it nec-essary to rely on the prosecution history for its decision. Even so, the questionwas brought up in an obiter dictum where the Court made some remarks as to theuse of the prosecution history for interpreting the scope of protection. TheSupreme Court hereby seems to confirm the view earlier expressed in thepreparatory documents and the legal doctrine by stating that it should be permis-sible to use also material from the prosecution stage "to interpret unclear points inthe patent claims and the specification as far as a limitation of the scope of pro-tection is concerned". The Court noted that a different view previously had beenexpressed in decisions rendered by Bundesgerichtshof, Karlsruhe, on 12 March2002, in the case X ZR 43-01, and Patents Court, London, on 11 April 2001, in thecase Kirin-Amgen Inc. et al versus Transkaryotic Therapies Inc. et al.

Thus, under Swedish case law, information from the patent prosecution file canbe used not only to resolve questions of equivalence but also to interpret unclearpoints in the claims or the specification in court proceedings where no equiva-

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lence is claimed. Accordingly, there is something similar to "file wrapper estoppel"under Swedish law even if it remains unclear to what extent this principle shouldbe applied. It should, however, be mentioned that some of the statements madein the legal doctrine on which the Supreme Court relied could indicate that an ab-solute estoppel should be applied in cases where the patentee has overcome areference by arguing that a feature in the claim should be interpreted in a restric-tive manner.


What really matters is how the applicant or, where applicable, the patentee, ac-cording to the file has argued or otherwise acted during the prosecution stage. Ac-cording to the literature in question, only arguments or actions that a third partywould understand as intentionally limiting the scope of protection are of relevancein subsequent infringement proceedings.


A similar answer as in the preceding paragraph can be given also to the questionwhether there is a difference between actions taken by the patent office or thirdparties. Thus, the relevance of the patent prosecution history more depends onhow the applicant argued and acted. This is in accordance with the general prin-ciple in Swedish law that there are no restrictions to the sources for the evidencea party may use (free presentation of evidence) and that the Swedish Courts in-dependently have the right to freely evaluate the strength of the evidence (free ex-amination of evidence).


The Swedish Group has identified the following situations where the scope of claims in agranted patent for Sweden can be limited outside prosecution of the underlying patentapplication.

On basis of court practice by:

1. Swedish court decision to formally amend one or more claims at least by combin-ing two or more claims, on request by the patentee. Such request can be made inconnection with an invalidation action against the patent. This is standard courtpractice, confirmed on Appeal Court level.

2. Interpretation of the scope of claims by the patentee in an action for invalidationor for infringement concerning the patent in the Swedish Court, even though theclaims may not have been formally amended.

On basis of the Patent Law:

3. Swedish Patent Office decision to formally delete one or more claims, on requestby the patentee, under Section 54 of the Patents Act. It is clearly stated in the doc-trine that this section can be applied for individual claims.


In the opinion of the Swedish Group it is desirable with harmonisation how to apply a doc-trine of equivalence.

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This is a most important question which should be studied further by the national groups.And the related work within WIPO in the context of the SPLT needs to be followed close-ly. AIPPI Special Committee Q170 has an important task here.

Within the European framework the Swedish Group notes the amendment of the Proto-col on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC decided at the diplomatic conference in Munichin November 2000. Developments in court practice under this revised Protocol will needto be followed.

Summary

Swedish courts apply the doctrine of equivalence. It is provided for by case law and is not ex-pressly included in the Swedish Patents Act.

It is clear from Swedish case law and legal doctrine that the prosecution history can play a rolein determining the scope of protection. Under Swedish case law, information from the patentprosecution file can be used not only to resolve questions of equivalence but also to interpret un-clear points in the claims or the specification in court proceedings where no equivalence isclaimed.

Swedish courts, the patentee and the Swedish Patent Office may under certain circumstanceslimit the scope of claims outside prosecution in the Patent Office.

Résumé

Les tribunaux suédois appliques la doctrine d'équivalents. Elle découle de la jurisprudence etelle n'est pas explicitement comprise dans la loi suédoise de brevets.

Il est claire qu'après la jurisprudence suédoise et la doctrine juridique suédoise, le dossier dedélivrance peut jouer un rôle en déterminant la portée de la protection. Selon la jurisprudencesuédoise d'information tiré du dossier de délivrance du brevet peut être utilisé non seulementpour résoudre des questions d'équivalence, mais aussi pour interpréter des parties obscuresdes revendications ou de la description aux procédures judiciaires où l'équivalence n'est pas in-voqué.

Les tribunaux suédois, le breveté et l'office de brevets suédois peuvent, sous des circonstancesparticuliers, limiter la portée des revendications en dehors de la procédure de délivrance.

Zusammenfassung

Schwedische Gerichte erkennen eine Patentverletzung unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Äquiv-alenz an. Sie basiert auf Richterrecht (Rechtsprechung) und ist nicht ausdrücklich im Schwedis-chen Patentgesetz erwähnt.

Aus Schwedischer Rechtsprechung und Rechtsauslegung ist klar, dass der Inhalt derErteilungsakte zur Bestimmung des Schutzumfanges gemäß Schwedischer Rechtsprechungeine Rolle spielen kann. Aus der Erteilungsakte gewonnene Information kann nicht nur dazu be-nutzt werden, um Fragen der Äquivalenz zu lösen, sondern können auch dazu verwendet wer-den, Unklarheiten in den Ansprüchen oder der Beschreibung im Gerichtsverfahren zu inter-pretieren, in denen nicht auf Äquivalenz abgestellt wird.Schwedische Gerichte, der Patentinhaber und das Schwedische Patentamt können unter bes-timmten Umständen den Schutzumfang von Ansprüchen außerhalb des Verfahrens vor demPatentamt beschränken.

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SwitzerlandSuisse

Schweiz

Bericht Q175

im Namen der Schweizer Gruppevon Konrad BECKER, Axel BRAUN, Manfred GRONER, Peter HEINRICH,

Sava KULHAVY, Michael LIEBETANZ, Paul PLISKA, Christoph WILLI und Marco ZARDI


Fragen


Ja, das Schweizer Patentrecht kennt eine Äquivalenzdoktrin. Hierfür gibt es gesetzlicheGrundlagen und Rechtsprechung. In Lehre und Rechtsprechung wird allgemein ausge-sagt, dass sich zwar der Erfindungsgegenstand durch Auslegung der Patentansprücheabschliessend festlegen lässt, jedoch eine allgemein gültige Umschreibung desSchutzbereichs nicht möglich sein wird, woraus sich die Notwendigkeit zu Äquivalen-züberlegungen ergibt.

Gemäss Artikel 66(a) Schweizerisches Patentgesetz gilt neben der wörtlichen Erfüllungder Patentansprüche ("Nachmachung") auch die "Nachahmung" als widerrechtlicheBenützung einer unter Schutz gestellten Erfindung. Es wäre nun unbefriedigend, wennsich aus dieser schweizerischen Bestimmung zur Nachahmung, die in die Richtung desBegriffs des "allgemeinen Erfindungsgedankens" geht, durch einen Gegensatz zu Art. 69EPÜ und das Auslegungsprotokoll eine unterschiedliche Schutzumfangsbestimmung fürSchweizer und Europäische Patente in der Schweiz ergäbe. Die heutigeRechtssprechung löst sich zunehmend von der früheren Interpretation der Nachahmung.Die neuesten Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts und eines dermassgebenden erstinstanzlichen Gerichte, des Handelsgerichtes Zürich, betonen stärk-er die durch den Anspruchswortlaut und dessen Auslegung gegebenen Schranken desSchutzbereichs.

Daher ist es heutige Erkenntnis, dass jeder Patentanspruch objektiv ausgelegt wird undin Bezug auf eine Vorrichtung oder Verfahren des Patentgegners geprüft wird, ob für denFachmann zur Verfügung stehende Äquivalente der einzelnen Merkmale verwendet wer-den und/oder ob allenfalls fehlende Merkmale des ausgelegten Patentanspruchs für denFachmann erkennbar überflüssig sind. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass die Bemessung desSchutzumfangs in Bezug auf die naheliegenden Äquivalente dadurch beschränkt ist,dass sich die Wirkung des Patents nicht auf Ausführungen erstrecken kann, die im Standder Technik liegen oder sich in naheliegender Weise aus diesem ergeben.

Aus der Rechtsprechung geht derzeit hervor, dass Ersatzmittel, die sehr viel besser odersehr viel schlechter als das im Anspruch genannte Merkmal sind, nicht vom Schutzbere-ich des Anspruchs umfasst sein sollen.

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Die Auslegung des Sinngehalts eines Patentanspruchs ist auf das Wissen des Fach-manns und den Stand der Technik zu beschränken, der in der Patentschrift genannt ist,wirkt somit auf den Prioritätszeitpunkt und steht fest. Der Schutzbereich eines Patenteskann sich aber nach bestehender Rechtsprechung und Äusserungen in der Lehre imLaufe der Zeit ändern. Der bei der Beurteilung der Äquivalenz zu Rate gezogene Standder Technik ist der gesamte Stand der Technik und nicht derjenige, der in derPatentschrift erwähnt worden ist oder dem Fachmann am Prioritätstag hätte bekanntsein können. Es bestehen aber zu dieser Auffassung in der Lehre teilweise Bedenkenhinsichtlich der Rechtssicherheit. Eine höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung steht nochaus.





Nein, die Erteilungsgeschichte spielt, mit Ausnahmen, keine Rolle bei der Bestimmungdes Schutzbereichs eines Patents.

Die Schweizer Lehre betont, dass aus dem Erteilungsverfahren zumindest dann keineTatsachen zu verwerten seien, sofern die dortigen Umstände nicht zu Änderungen derPatentansprüche geführt haben. Dies bedeutet nicht, dass nicht Erteilungsakten zu Rategezogen werden dürfen, um Merkmale der Patentansprüche auszulegen, wenn dieseAkten Aussagen des Patentanmelders enthalten, die für die Patenterteilung durch dieBehörde entscheidend waren. Allerdings sind Tatsachen aus Nichtigkeitsverfahren nichtzur Auslegung der (verbliebenen) Ansprüche heranzuziehen. Eine direkt in die Beschrei-bung aufgenommene Angabe, dass bestimmte Ausführungsformen vom Patentschutzausgenommen sein sollen, führt zu einer Beschränkung des Schutzbereichs.

Eine widersprüchliche Verhaltensweise eines Patentinhabers im Erteilungsverfahrenoder Einspruchsverfahren und bei der Geltendmachung eines Anspruchs wegenPatentverletzung ist aus zivilrechtlichen Bestimmungen unbeachtlich.


Inter partes kann durch ein Vertrag, ein ausserprozessuales Zugeständnis, ferner durchsehr lange dauernde Untätigkeit des Patentinhabers gegenüber einer Verletzung (sog.Verwirkung der patentrechtlichen Ansprüche) der Schutzbereich eines Patentanspruchsbeschränkt werden. Ferner kann ein Dritter in einem Verfahren eine widersprüchlicheVerhaltensweise eines Patentinhabers generell nach dem Grundsatz von Treu undGlauben geltend machen.


Die Schweizer Gruppe ist der Überzeugung, dass die Harmonisierung in der Frage derÄquivalenz notwendig ist, um das Patentsystem zu stärken. Aus der Erfahrung zeigt sich,

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dass Fragen der Äquivalenz in umstrittenen Fällen der Patentdurchsetzung entschei-dend sind. Eine rein wörtliche Auslegung der Patentansprüche wird häufig dem Erfinderund Patentinhaber nicht gerecht, obwohl sie dafür Rechtssicherheit garantiert. Problememit der Anwendung der Äquivalenzlehre kommen daher, dass keine allseits akzeptierteDefinition und kein allseits akzeptierter Umfang gegeben ist.

Das internationale Harmonisierungsabkommen, das 1991 in der Regierungskonferenzscheiterte, machte einen Versuch, die Äquivalenz zu definieren. Diese Arbeiten bildetenden Ausgangspunkt für den Basisvorschlag für die Revisionskonferenz 2000 des Eu-ropäischen Patentübereinkommens. Aus Sicht der Schweizer Gruppe ist der (in der Re-visionskonferenz nicht akzeptierte) Text für ein Protokoll Art. 69 EPÜ sachgerecht, durchsolide Argumente untermauert, die Stellung des Patentinhabers gegen Umgehungsver-suche stärkend und mit der schweizerischen Praxis im Einklang. Er wird daher in derSubstanz unterstützt und soll als Ausgangspunkt für weitere Harmonisierung dienen.

Im Einzelnen heisst dies:

(1) Die Schweizer Gruppe unterstützt die Äquivalenzlehre und betrachtetgenerell eine Anwendung dieser Doktrin bei der Beurteilung desSchutzumfanges eines Patentes als wesentlich.

(2) Die Schweizer Gruppe ist der Ansicht, dass die Äquivalenz im Zeitpunktder Verletzung beurteilt werden soll. Dies gibt generell dem Patentinhabereine starke Position, weil damit Weiterentwicklungen von neuen Hilfsmit-teln zur Ausführung der patentierten Erfindung von den Ansprüchen um-fasst werden können, obwohl sie zum Zeitpunkt der Erfindung gar nochnicht zur Verfügung standen und damit vom Erfinder auch nicht als äquiv-alent in Betracht gezogen werden konnten. Eine solche Interpretation gibtGrundlagenerfindungen in sich schnell weiterentwickelnden Technikgebi-eten einen zwar breiten, aber fairen Schutzumfang. Die SchweizerGruppe ist sich bewusst, dass diese Sichtweise neben Vorteilen auchNachteile aufweist, weil sich der Bereich der Äquivalente allein aus denPatentansprüchen und dem Stand der Technik heraus nicht klar definierenlässt und sich während der Gültigkeitsdauer des Patents laufend verän-dert. Diese Beeinträchtigung der Rechtssicherheit wird in Kauf genom-men, um den Patentinhaber vor ungerechtfertigter Umgehung desAnspruchsumfanges zu schützen.

(3) Die Schweizer Gruppe ist der Meinung, dass bei der Beurteilung desSchutzumfanges vom Patentinhaber im Erteilungsverfahren und im Ein-spruchsverfahren gemachte Angaben zur Bedeutung des Wortlautes derAnsprüche angesichts des Standes der Technik bei der Beurteilung derVerletzung im Verfahren gegenüber Dritten durch die Gerichte in Betrachtzu ziehen sind. Allerdings soll dieser Rückgriff auf Aussagen imErteilungsverfahren nicht in einer Art und Weise vorgenommen werden,der Äquivalente generell ausschliesst, sondern die Relevanz im Einzelfallabwägen. Damit soll insbesondere verhindert werden, dass der Patentan-melder im Erteilungsverfahren eine enge Interpretation des Schutzum-fanges vertritt, um die Erteilung zu erreichen, dann aber das erteilte Patentbreit interpretiert sehen will, um einen Patentverletzter zu fassen. Gle-ichermassen soll verhindert werden, dass der Patentanmelder imErteilungsverfahren gewisse Erfindungsaspekte als wesentlich darstellt,im Verletzungsverfahren bei einer Äquivalenzbetrachtung dann aber diewesentlichen Aspekte der Erfindung als von untergeordneter Bedeutungbezeichnen kann.

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(4) Die Schweizer Gruppe ist der Meinung, dass Aussagen des Patentinhab-ers zum Gegenstand der Erfindung ausserhalb des Erteilungsverfahrensoder des Einspruchsverfahrens keinen Einfluss auf die Interpretation desPatentes haben sollen. Obwohl ein Miteinbezug solcher Aussagen z.B.aus wissenschaftlichen Publikationen oder aus Registrierverfahren vorBehörden eine gerechtere Beurteilung der Grenzen der Erfindung er-möglichen könnte, wäre die praktische Folge einer solchen Ausdehnung,dass die Kosten eines Verletzungsverfahrens wegen der Zahl und Vielfaltder zu Rate zu ziehenden Dokumente und Fakten ins Unermesslichestiegen.

Zusammenfassung

Gemäss Schweizer Patentgesetz gilt neben der wörtlichen Erfüllung der Patentansprüche("Nachmachung") auch die "Nachahmung" als widerrechtliche Benützung einer unter Schutzgestellten Erfindung. Die heutige Rechtssprechung hat sich den Entwicklungen im Europäis-chen Patentrecht (Art. 69 EPÜ und Protokoll dazu) angepasst und prüft in Bezug auf einePatentverletzung gegebenenfalls, ob für den Fachmann zur Verfügung stehende Äquivalenteder einzelnen Merkmale der Erfindung verwendet werden. Der Schutzbereich eines Patenteskann sich nach Rechtsprechung und Lehre im Laufe der Zeit ändern. Die Erteilungsgeschichteeines Patentes spielt, abgesehen von Ausnahmen, keine Rolle bei der Bestimmung desSchutzbereichs. Unter anderem kann durch sehr lange dauernde Untätigkeit des Patentinhab-ers gegenüber einer Verletzung der Schutzbereich eines Patentanspruchs beschränkt werden.

Die Schweizer Gruppe ist der Überzeugung, dass die Harmonisierung in der Frage der Äquiv-alenz notwendig ist, um das Patentsystem zu stärken. Aus Sicht der Schweizer Gruppe ist der(in der Regierungskonferenz 2000 zur Revision des Europäischen Patentübereinkommensnicht akzeptierte) Basisvorschlag für einen Text des Protokolls zu Art. 69 EPÜ sachgerecht,durch solide Argumente untermauert, die Stellung des Patentinhabers gegen Umgehungsver-suche stärkend und mit der schweizerischen Praxis im Einklang.

Résumé

La Loi sur les Brevets prévoit que l'"imitation" est, outre une contrefaçon littérale des revendica-tions, aussi une utilisation illicite d'une invention protégée. La jurisprudence actuelle s'estalignée sur les évolutions du droit européen des brevets (art. 69 CBE et protocole explicatif) etexamine, le cas échéant, eu égard à une contrefaçon du brevet, si des équivalents des dif-férentes caractéristiques de l'invention dont dispose l'expert sont utilisées. L'étendue de protec-tion d'un brevet peut changer au cours du temps selon la jurisprudence et l'enseignement. Leprocessus de délivrance d'un brevet n'a pas d'incidence - excepté quelques exceptions - lors dela détermination de l'étendue du brevet. Une inactivité de très longue durée de la part du pro-priétaire du brevet face à une contrefaçon entre autres peut conduire à ce que l'étendue de laprotection d'une revendication d'un brevet soit réduite.

Le groupe suisse est convaincu que l'harmonisation dans la question de l'équivalence estnécessaire pour renforcer le système des brevets. Du point de vue de ce groupe, la propositionde base (non admise lors de la conférence gouvernementale de 2000 pour la révision de la con-vention Européenne des brevets) pour un texte du Protocole à l'art. 69 CBE est adéquate,fondée sur des arguments solides, un renforcement de la position du propriétaire du brevet con-tre les tentatives de contournements et en harmonie avec la pratique suisse.

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Summary

According to Swiss Patent Law imitation ("Nachahmung") is also regarded as unlawful use of aprotected invention apart from literal infringement of patent claims. Judicial practice of today isadapted to the developments in European Patent Law (Art. 69 and protocol to this article). Withreference to patent infringement it is examined, if required, whether equivalents of single fea-tures of an invention available to the person in the art have been used. According to dogma andpractice, the scope of patent claims may change during time. The history of patent grant doesnot play a role in the determination of the scope of claims, apart from exceptional cases. Long-lasting inactivity of the patent owner towards an infringement may, among others, limit the scopeof the patent.

The Swiss Group is convinced that harmonisation in the question of equivalence is necessary inorder to strengthen the patent system. The Swiss Group views the basic proposal for a text ofthe protocol to Art. 67 EPC (which was not accepted in the governmental conference 2000 con-cerning the revision of the European Patent Convention) as appropriate, supported by solid ar-guments, strengthening the position of the patentee against patent circumvention, and in linewith Swiss practice.

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United KingdomRoyaume-Uni

Vereinigtes Königreich

Report Q175

in the name of the UK Groupby Geoffrey BAYLISS, Jeremy BROWN, Trevor COOK, Paul ENGLAND,

David HARRISON, Neil JENKINS, Ian JUDGE, Edward LYNDON-STANFORD,Sebastian MOORE, John REID, Tony ROLLINS, Robert WATSON


Questions


Under UK patent law, the scope of protection afforded by a claim is a matter of statute asinterpreted by the courts.

Section 125(1) of the Patents Act 1977 (which is the counterpart to Article 69 of the Eu-ropean Patent Convention (the EPC)) provides that "for the purposes of this Act an in-vention for a patent … shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be taken to be thatspecified in a claim of the specification … as interpreted by the description and any draw-ings contained in that specification …".

Section 125(3) requires that the claim be interpreted in accordance with the Protocol oninterpretation of Article 69 of the EPC. The Protocol provides as follows:

Article 69 should not be interpreted in the sense that the extent of the pro-tection conferred by a European patent is to be understood as that definedby the strict, literal meaning of the wording used in the claims, the de-scription and drawings being employed only for the purpose of resolvingan ambiguity found in the claims. Neither should it be interpreted in thesense that the claims serve only as a guideline and that the actual protec-tion conferred may extend to what, from a consideration of the descriptionand drawings by a person skilled in the art, the patentee has contemplat-ed. On the contrary, it is to be interpreted as defining a position betweenthese extremes which combines a fair protection for the patentee with areasonable degree of certainty for third parties.

In applying the Protocol the English courts recognise that the Protocol outlaws both astrict literal interpretation and a liberal interpretation using the claims merely as a guide-line. They consider that the correct approach is to achieve a position between those ex-tremes, but the language of the claims cannot be disregarded. The terms of a claim mustbe interpreted through the eyes of the skilled addressee. The court must ascertain whatmeaning the words were intended to convey.

As an aid to this exercise the Court of Appeal relies heavily on the approach establishedby the House of Lords in Catnic v Hill & Smith [1982] RPC 183. The Court emphasised

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that in a patent specification the patentee addresses those skilled in the art and informsthem of what he claims to be the essential features of the new product or process con-cerned. In determining what these essential features are, the specification must be giv-en a "purposive" construction, rather than a purely literal one. It must be asked whetherthe skilled addressee would understand that the patentee intended as an essential re-quirement of the invention that there must be strict compliance with a particular descrip-tive word or phrase appearing in a claim such that any variant would fall outside the mo-nopoly claimed, even though it would have no material effect on the way the inventionworked.

The Court said that the question did not arise where the variant would in fact have a ma-terial effect on the way the invention worked.

Nor would it arise unless at the date of publication of the specification it would be obvi-ous to the skilled reader that this was so. Where it would not have been obvious in thelight of the existing knowledge the reader is entitled to assume that the patentee intend-ed to limit his monopoly.

This was later formulated into 3 separate questions by the Patents Court in Improver vRemington [1990] FSR 181. Although based on a decision under the UK Patents Act1949, pre-dating the Patents Act 1977 and the incorporation of the Protocol, these so-called "Improver questions" have been adopted by the Court of Appeal as an aid to theapplication of the Protocol. It now calls them the "Protocol questions" (Wheatley (Davina)v. Drillsafe Ltd [2001] RPC 7).

To put this approach and the questions in context, the English courts have said that thereis no independent "doctrine of equivalents" in UK patent law but that "in the end the ques-tion is always whether the alleged infringement is covered by the language of the claim"(Improver v Remington (supra)). The scope of protection must be based on the languageof the claims. The question to be asked is whether the alleged infringement is one whichthe skilled man would have regarded as being "within the ambit of the language" of theclaim. (Anchor Building Products v. Redland Roof Tiles [1990] RPC 283).

The "Improver" or "Protocol" questions are formulated as follows:

1.1 Does the variant have a material effect on the way the invention works? If yes, thevariant is outside the claim. If no -

1.2 Would this (i.e. the fact that the variant has no material effect) have been obviousat the date of publication of the patent to a person skilled in the art? If no, the vari-ant is outside the claim. If yes -

1.3 Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understood from the lan-guage of the claim that the patentee intended that strict compliance with the pri-mary meaning was an essential requirement of the invention? If yes, the variantis outside the claims. If no, the variant infringes.

The first two questions are questions of fact. Note in relation to the second question thatit is not whether the variant is an obvious alternative to the thing denoted by the literalmeaning. The question presupposes that the skilled man is told of both the invention andthe variant and asked whether the variant would obviously work in the same way. Thelevel of "obviousness" in this context as applied by the Courts goes far beyond what weare used to in the context of assessing inventiveness. The Courts require that it be clearor apparent, just by looking at the variant, that it will work in the same way as the inven-tion. It is not enough even for it to be highly likely that it will work if the variant needs tobe tested to make sure (see American Home Products v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals UKLtd [2002] RPC 8). The Court of Appeal has also held that all the skilled man is entitled

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to know is what the variant is. He cannot be told that the variant works. This very strictapproach limits the application of the rules for chemical and biological inventions. It isvery seldom that it will be immediately apparent simply by looking at, say, a chemical orbiological material, that it will work. There will always be a chance that even a slightchange will result in a loss of activity.

There is some controversy as to what is the relevant date for assessing question 2. In theCatnic case the House of Lords said it is the date of publication and this was confirmedrelatively recently by the Court of Appeal (Sarah Lee v. Johnson Wax (CA 20/11/2001,unreported). However, in McGhan Medical UK Ltd v. Nagor Ltd & Anor. (Patents Court,28/02/2001, unreported) Fysh QC sitting as deputy judge suggested that the patent asgranted should be construed as at the application date (since that is also the date for as-sessing sufficiency).

Question 3 is a question of construction and is the key question. What would the skilledreader have understood to be the patentee's intention from the words used? Although thecourt has said that it must adopt the mantle of the skilled person in coming to this deci-sion it has traditionally jealously guarded for itself the prerogative of construing the claim.It will commonly reject as inadmissible evidence by an expert witness as to how a skilledperson would have read the claim (although it is nevertheless sensible in practice to leadevidence by an expert explaining how the skilled addressee would have understood thewords used and the patentee's intention and why).

Although the Protocol predominates and the "Protocol Questions" have been describedby the Court of Appeal as an "aid", they have in a series of cases come to be treated asdecisive. See for example:

Wheatley (Davina) v. Drillsafe Ltd [2001] RPC 7

American Home Products Corp. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd[2002] RPC 8

Amersham Pharmacia Biotech AB v. Amicon Ltd [2001] IPD 24078

Dyson Appliances Ltd v. Hoover Ltd [2002] RPC 26

Sara Lee Household & Body Care Ltd v. Johnson Wax Ltd [2002] IPD25008

Kirin Amgen Inc. v. Transkaryotic Therapies Inc (previously Roche Diag-nostics GmbH) [2002] RPC 1 (Neuberger J), [2003] RPC 3 (CA)

Macaferri v. Hesco Bastion (CA, 7 March 2002, unreported)

City Technology v. Alphasense Limited (2002) 25(6) IPD (CA)

In one recent pharmaceutical case (Pharmacia Corporation and Others v. Merck [2002]RPC 41) the Court of Appeal did however relax this approach. It recognised that althoughthe Protocol questions "are normally a useful tool to arrive at the middle ground requiredby the Protocol", this was a case where "the difficulties in application outweigh the ad-vantages" and the Protocol questions could not be used "without modification". Thewording used in the claim was clear and unambiguous - it had a "precise chemical mean-ing". Its meaning could not under the Improver tests be "stretched" to cover the allegedinfringement. So the tests failed. Nevertheless, the Court considered the "effect" of thewords on the skilled person, and applying the balancing act required of the Protocol byconsideration of the respective positions of the patentee and third parties found infringe-ment. It decided that it would in all the circumstances be unfair to deprive the patentee ofprotection and there was sufficient certainty for third parties.

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The scope of patent protection does not change in time. According to our courts' currentapproach (see above) the assessment of infringement is at the publication date (Catnic).



There is no recognised doctrine of "file wrapper estoppel" in UK patent law. Fur-thermore, the current English patent judges, at least, are strongly opposed to anysuch doctrine. However (as observed in the working guidelines to this question)the English Court of Appeal has recently suggested that there is no reason why inprinciple statements made in the prosecution history could not be helpful to re-solve an ambiguity (Rohm & Haas Co v Collag [2002] FSR 28).


In the absence of any doctrine generally, this is not an issue.


It is not clear what is meant here. What sort of actions by third parties? In anycase once again in the absence of any English doctrine of "file wrapper estoppel",no issue arises.


The UK recognises a general concept of estoppel. The courts will deny relief where in allthe circumstances it is "unconscionable" that the claimant should be entitled to the reliefsought. For example mere delay in instituting infringement proceedings would not nor-mally prejudice the patentee. However, if by his words or action the patentee led the al-leged infringer to believe that he would not be sued the court could well later decide torefuse relief on the ground that it would be "unconscionable" to allow the patentee relief.This however would of course only apply inter partes and would not affect the scope ingeneral of any claim (unless perhaps the patentee had adopted a public position andlulled third parties into believing that they were safe, and later sought relief).


5.1 Approach to Claim Construction

The purpose of the Protocol is to achieve in Europe a harmonised middle groundfor determining the scope of patent protection between a strict literal reading ofthe wording used in the claims (a caricature of the traditional UK approach) and abroader inquiry as to what the patentee must have contemplated, the claims serv-ing only as a guideline (a caricature of the traditional German approach). Whilethere is still some way to go, the Protocol has indeed achieved some conver-gence in the approach of the different European national courts and the trendcontinues. AIPPI UK believes that the general principle (of seeking the "middleground") laid down in the Protocol is sensible and could be a useful model toadopt internationally.

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Guidance is desirable, however, as to the correct approach courts should take toapply the Protocol and this should be consistent. Currently in Europe, differentapproaches are still sometimes taken by the different courts, and this may lead todifferent results. Indeed, different judges in the same court sometimes reach dif-ferent findings, even when purporting to apply the same approach.

It is not obvious that any one approach is better than another. However, AIPPI UKbelieves that the UK "Protocol questions" have served as useful guidelines, andcould provide useful models for harmonisation provided that they are not too rigid-ly applied and subject to some refinements (discussed below). Approaches simi-lar to the third Protocol question have recently been adopted in other Europeanjurisdictions, for example by the Court of Appeal of Milan in its judgment in June2000 (Forel Spa v. Lisec) and, more recently, by the German Federal SupremeCourt in its combined judgments of 12 March 2002 (IIC Vol 33 p 873 at p 876-7).The availability of guides like the Protocol questions assists parties and their legaladvisers to assess without recourse to the courts whether a product or process islikely to infringe.

Any guidelines adopted need to be applied with some flexibility, while retainingsufficient certainty for third parties. It must not be forgotten that the Protocol dom-inates and that guides like the Protocol questions are mere aids and not decisive.There are cases (as the English Court of Appeal has now demonstrated) wherethe Protocol questions do not give the right answer and the court must substituteits own.

Furthermore, some refinement of the way in which the questions have been ap-plied so far in the UK is required.

In particular, in relation to the second question, AIPPI UK believes that it shouldbe enough to satisfy the requirement that an immaterial variant is "obviously" soif it would have been apparent that it was highly likely that the particular variantwould have no material effect on the way the invention works and simple testscould have been performed to confirm this. To put the test higher requires cer-tainty and potentially excludes variants from protection in most chemical and bio-logical cases. The Protocol after all requires reasonable certainty for third parties,not absolute certainty.

In applying the third Protocol question, AIPPI believes that it should be assumedthat the patentee intended to cover obviously immaterial variants unless it is clearfrom the specification that he did not. The UK courts currently tend to require thatthe relevant term or terms in a claim must be descriptive or otherwise capable ofbeing "stretched" in meaning to cover the obviously immaterial variant concerned.

5.2 Date for assessing infringement

The UK Protocol questions presuppose that the date for assessing infringementis the publication date. In the second Protocol question, the skilled person is giv-en the variant and asked whether, in the light of the common general knowledgeat the publication date, it would have been obvious that the variant would not ma-terially effect the way the invention works. This therefore allows for future devel-opments not contemplated at the publication date to be covered. If (as has beensuggested as discussed above) the date were the filing date the Protocol ques-tions would work equally well. If, as in the US, infringement were assessed at thedate of infringement the Protocol questions would need appropriate modification(without detracting from the application generally of the approach dictated by theProtocol).

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5.3 File Wrapper Estoppel

AIPPI UK does not favour introduction of a formal doctrine of file wrapper estop-pel. The patent specification and claims should be read as they stand and con-strued accordingly.

Complete harmonisation of the law in this area can and will however not be achievedthrough application of a strict statutory formula. Harmonisation can only be achievedthrough a consistent approach of the judiciary which retains some flexibility to ensure thatthe fair balance is achieved in each case. Such a consistent approach may in Europe beachieved one day through the creation of a single court (e.g. the CPC). Meanwhilejudges should be encouraged to continue to consult with one another, and to take into ac-count the need for harmonisation and consistency in Europe in their approaches. Seek-ing harmony internationally beyond Europe will require moves to greater harmony inclaim drafting, examination and judicial practices generally.

Summary

UK patent law provides for protection of "equivalents" by requiring claims to be interpreted in ac-cordance with the Protocol on interpretation of Article 69 of the EPC. As an aid, the UK courtsask three "Protocol questions", derived from the House of Lords case, Catnic v. Hill & Smith.AIPPI UK believes that the Protocol could be a useful model to adopt internationally. Guidanceis desirable on the correct approach to applying the Protocol. AIPPI UK believes that the UK'sProtocol questions could provide useful models for harmonisation provided that they are not toorigidly applied and subject to some refinements. The Protocol questions presuppose that thedate for assessment is the publication date, possibly the filing date. AIPPI UK does not favourintroduction of a formal doctrine of file wrapper estoppel.

Résumé

Le droit des brevets du Royaume Uni prévoit une protection des "équivalents" en exigeant queles brevets soient interprétés en accord avec le Protocole sur l'interprétation de l'Article 69 de laCBE. Pour y aider, les tribunaux du Royaume Uni posent trois "questions de Protocole",provenant de l'affaire 'Catnic v. Hill & Smith' de la Chambre des Communes. Au Royaume Uni,l'AIPPI estime que le Protocole pourrait représenter un modèle utile qu'il serait bon d'adopter auniveau international. Il est désirable que des conseils soient offerts quant à la manière exacted'appliquer le Protocole. Au Royaume Uni, l'AIPPI pense que les questions de Protocole duRoyaume Uni pourraient fournir un modèle d'harmonisation utile, pourvu qu'elles ne soient pasappliquées trop rigoureusement et qu'elles fassent l'objet de quelques perfectionnements. Lesquestions de Protocole présupposent que la date d'évaluation est la date de publication, ouéventuellement, la date de dépôt. Au Royaume Uni, l'AIPPI n'est pas en faveur de l'introductiond'une doctrine formelle de l'estoppel.

Zusammenfassung

Das britische Patentrecht sieht einen Schutzbereich für Äquivalente vor, indem es vorschreibt,daß Ansprüche nach dem Protokoll zur Auslegung von Artikel 69 EPÜ zu interpretieren sind. AlsHilfestellung stellen die britischen Gerichte drei "Protokollfragen", die aus dem Fall des Houseof Lords, Catnic gegen Hill & Smith abgeleitet sind. Die AIPPI UK ist der Ansicht, daß diesesProtokoll ein nützliches Modell sein könnte, dessen internationale Einführung erwogen werdensollte. Eine Anleitung zur richtigen Anwendung des Protokolls wäre wünschenswert. Die AIPPI

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UK meint, daß die britischen Protokollfragen bei der Harmonisierung als nützliches Modell gel-ten könnten, sofern sie nicht zu eng angewendet und an einigen Stellen ausgefeilt werden. DieProtokollfragen gehen davon aus, daß das Datum der Veröffentlichung, oder das Datum derErteilung bei der Prüfung ausschlaggebend ist. Die AIPPI UK ist nicht für die Einführung einerformellen Doktrin des "File Wrapper Estoppel".

1

United States of AmericaEtats-Unis d’ Amérique

Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika

Report Q175

in the name of the US Groupby Philip C. SWAIN


Questions

The United States Group hereby responds to the following questions and expresses its opinionsas to the current situation in the United States.


United States law does include a "doctrine of equivalents" as a means of proving liabilityfor patent infringement. It provides that an accused infringer can be liable for patent in-fringement, even if the accused device falls outside the literal scope of the written patentclaims. It developed to prevent "unscrupulous copyists" from imitating a patented inven-tion, but making minor, unimportant or insubstantial changes or substitutions to theclaims to avoid infringement. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S.605, 607 (1950).

Assessment of the doctrine of equivalentsAssessment of infringement begins with comparing the accused device or process to theinvention described in the literal words of the patent claims, as the claims have been con-strued by the judge or court, to determine whether there is literal infringement. Literal in-fringement occurs when every limitation recited in the claim is found in the accused de-vice. Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

Equivalents are assessed after the accused device is compared to the literal words of theclaims. If the accused device "performs substantially the same function in substantiallythe same way to obtain the same result" as the device recited in the claims, it infringesthe patent under the doctrine of equivalents. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). This has been called a "triple identity" test (substantiallysame function, same way, and same result). Another way of describing the doctrine ofequivalents under American law is that, even if there is no literal infringement, the patentmay be infringed if there are only "insubstantial differences" between the accused deviceor process and the device or process described in the literal words of the claims. HiltonDavis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521-22 (Fed. Cir. 1995),rev'd and remanded, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).

The patent owner has the burden of proving infringement by a preponderance of the ev-idence. While the interpretation of the claims is the duty of the judge, the task of assess-ing infringement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, is an issue of fact, to bedecided by a jury (if either party has asked that the case be tried before a jury) or the

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judge (if both parties consent to trial before a judge). Markman v. Westview Instruments,Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).

The assessment of equivalents is decided on an element-by-element basis. Each ele-ment, or limitation, in a patent claim is considered to be material to defining the scope ofthe patent rights. Thus, to prove infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, thepatent owner must prove that each and every element, or its equivalent, of the inventiondescribed in the claims is found in the accused device or process. Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 29; Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir.1987).

Generally, "pioneer" inventions, early or principal inventions in a field, are accorded aspecial status and a wider scope of equivalents than mere improvement patents. Warn-er-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27 n. 4.

However, the doctrine of equivalents cannot be used to expand the scope of a patent toencompass a product or process that is within the prior art, or is an obvious variation ofthe prior art. Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1992); WilsonSporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 679 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

Source of the doctrine of equivalentsThe doctrine of equivalents is a common law doctrine, based on case law, going back toat least 1853, when the United States Supreme Court decided that [an "octagonal andpyramidal" railroad car was equivalent to a "cylindrical and conical" railroad car for pur-poses of infringement]. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853). The Supreme Courtconsidered the doctrine of equivalents a balance against the requirement of formalpatent claims. The doctrine of equivalents has been consistently reaffirmed since then,by both the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the SupremeCourt. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558(Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated and remanded, 535 U.S. ___ , 122 S.Ct. 1831 (2002) ("Festo");Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Graver Tank &Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).


A patent's written disclosure is fixed as of the earliest effective filing date of the applica-tion; any additional description of the invention, or variations of the invention, that areadded after the original effective filing date, are considered "new matter." Gentry Gallery,Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Benno, 768 F.2d 1340, 1346(Fed. Cir. 1985). Thus, the possible scope of the patent owner's protection, or right to ex-clude, is theoretically fixed at the time of the application. The scope of the patent's claimsis then usually narrowed by amendment during prosecution. Therefore, the scope of pro-tection is arguably fixed at the time the claims are allowed and the patent is issued: atthat time, the patent owner has the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, oroffering to sell the invention described within the claims of the patent (35 U.S.C. § 154),and equivalents thereof (within the meaning of the doctrine of equivalents).

However, as a result of recent United States Supreme Court and Federal Circuit deci-sions, "foreseeable" equivalents, equivalent elements of an invention that were known atthe time of the original application are generally not considered to be within the scope ofa patent owner's rights, even under the doctrine of equivalents. See Festo, 535 U.S. at_____; 122 S.Ct at 1840. Determination of "equivalency" under the doctrine of equiva-lents is at the time of the alleged infringement, not at the time the patent was issued, orat the time the application was filed, or at the time of the application's priority date. Warn-

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er-Jenkinson, 62 F.3d at 1519, rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). Thus, undercurrent United States law, the scope of protection under the doctrine of equivalents maychange over time, to cover equivalents that exist at the time of infringement, but whichwere not foreseeable at the time the original application was filed. Similarly, "equivalents"to the invention described in the claims that are developed later ("later developed equiv-alents") infringe under the doctrine of equivalents, then it could be said that the scope ofpatent protection could change.

United States law on this issue appears to differ from the current EPC protocol, whichseems to allow equivalents known to persons skilled in the art at the time of the applica-tion to be included within the scope of protection.

3. Does the prosecution history play a role in determining the scope of patent protection? Ifso, how does it work?

The doctrine of equivalents under United States patent law is limited by the doctrine ofprosecution history estoppel (also called "file wrapper estoppel"). If patent claims are nar-rowed by amendment during the course of prosecution of the patent, the amendmentsmay limit the scope of equivalents that the patent owner may assert in litigation. In otherwords, the prosecution history may be used to "estop" the patent owner from expandingthe scope of his or her protection for certain elements of the claim. Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 40-41.


"File wrapper estoppel" or "prosecution history estoppel" under United States lawgenerally applies when an amendment, for reasons related to patentability, ismade during prosecution. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 32-33. It prevents apatent owner from obtaining a scope of protection that would recapture or resur-rect protection that was surrendered during the course of prosecution. Id.

An amendment to a patent claim during prosecution does not present an absolutebar to the application of the doctrine of equivalents. When a patent applicantchooses to narrow a claim during prosecution, there is a rebuttable presumptionthat the claim was amended for a reason related to patentability. Thus, there is apresumption that the scope of protection or coverage for that element was sur-rendered. Festo, 535 U.S. at ____; 122 S.Ct. at 1842 ("A patentee's decision tonarrow his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general dis-claimer of the territory between the original claim and the amended claim.") Thepatent owner bears the burden of showing that the amendment does not surren-der a particular element. Id.

There are only a few cases where an amendment made during prosecution is notviewed as surrendering a particular equivalent: (1) where the equivalent was "notforeseeable" at the time of the application; (2) where the rationale underlying theamendment has "no more than a tangential relation" to the equivalent in question;or (3) where the patent applicant "could not reasonably be expected to have de-scribed the substitute in question" (in other words, the patent applicant could notreasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encom-passed the equivalent in question). Id.


Prosecution history estoppel applies to any proceedings that take place and arerecorded during prosecution of the patent. This includes formal amendments toclaims, but could also include arguments or remarks made urging the examiner to

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allow the claims, as well as comments to the examiners during interviews, to theextent such comments are recorded in written form in an interview summary. SeeElkay Mfg. Co. v Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Argumentsmade during the prosecution of a patent application are given the same weight asclaim amendments"); see also Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid, 774 F.2d448 (Fed. Cir. 1985).


Patent prosecution under United States law is generally an ex parte process, andthus does not normally involve statements or participants by third parties. 35U.S.C. § 122. However, third parties may sometimes become involved in the is-suance or re-issuance of a patent, such as through interference proceedings, re-examination, and reissue proceedings. In such instances, a patent applicant's re-sponses or comments to a third party's statement are considered to be part of thepatent prosecution record, and may form the basis for an estoppel. Intermatic Inc.v. Lamson & Sessions & Co., 273 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (amendments dur-ing reexamination can create prosecution history estoppel); Phillips PetroleumCo. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866 (Fed Cir. 1998)(interference pro-ceedings are part of the prosecution history); Howes v. Medical Components, Inc.,814 F.2d 638 (Fed. Cir. 1987)(reissue proceedings are part of the prosecution his-tory).


Because the determination of equivalence is a determination of fact, estoppel or admis-sions from a number of sources outside the prosecution can limit the scope of protectionand/or the doctrine of equivalents. Statements or admissions by the inventors or patentowners, whether orally, or in documents, can be introduced to prove what is or is not with-in the scope of equivalents to the invention, as can the testimony of experts, texts andtrustees, and the prior art. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605, 609-610 (1950).


The United States' recent experience with the doctrine may be helpful on the issue of har-monization. Because the doctrine of equivalents is based on a notion of fundamental fair-ness and equity, it will be difficult to develop uniform guidelines to implement it. Since the1980s, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has made several at-tempts to define bright-line standards for implementing the doctrine, in order to promotecertainty in application of the doctrine. For example, in the original Festo case, the Fed-eral Circuit established a rigid rule that any amendment to a claim of a patent during pros-ecution creates an absolute bar, or an absolute estoppel, to any equivalents for the ele-ment of the claim that is amended. Festo, 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The UnitedStates Supreme Court unanimously reversed, adopting a flexible bar. Festo, 535 U.S._____; 122 S.Ct. 1831 (2002).

Given this experience, it is likely that the most that could be achieved in terms of harmo-nization is for all countries to at least recognize that the doctrine should be applied insome instances. In addition, some form of prosecution history estoppel should apply tokeep the patent owner from seeking to recapture the scope of protection he or she gaveup to obtain the patent.

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Summary

The doctrine of equivalents is an important aspect of the law of patent infringement. It is neces-sary for purposes of fairness and equity, to prevent unfair subversion of the rights accorded tothe owner of a patent. However, application of the doctrine of equivalents should not allow apatent owner to recapture the scope of protection given up during prosecution in order to getpatent claims allowed. Therefore, prosecution history estoppel or file wrapper estoppel shouldserve as a limit to the scope of protection under the doctrine of equivalents, and will aid in giv-ing the public fair notice of the limits of the doctrine of equivalents for any patented invention.

Résumé

La doctrine d'équivalents est un aspect important de la loi d'infraction de brevet. Elle est néces-saire pour les buts d'impartialité et d'équité, et pour empêcher la subversion injuste des droitsselon le propriétaire d'un brevet. Cependant, l'application de la doctrine d'équivalents ne doitpas permettre à un propriétaire de brevet reprendre l'étendue de protection qu'il a renoncé pen-dant l'accusation dans l'ordre pour recevoir les réclamations de brevet permises. Donc, estop-pel d'histoire d'accusation ou estoppel de papier de fichier doit servir comme limite à l'étenduede protection sous la doctrine d'équivalents, et aidera a donner la notification juste publique deslimites de la doctrine d'équivalents pour n'importe quelle invention de brevet.

Zusammenfassung

Die Lehre von den Gegenwerten ist ein wichtiger Bestandteil der Vorschriften über Paten-trechtsverletzungen. Sie verhilft den Grundsätzen der Billigkeit und Gerechtigkeit zur Durchset-zung, indem sie eine unrechtmäßige Aushöhlung der Rechte des Patentinhabers verhindert.Allerdings darf die Anwendung dieser Lehre nicht dazu führen, dass der Schutzbereich desPatents wiederum die Bestandteile erfasst, derer sich der Patentrechtsinhaber im Rahmen derDurchsetzung seiner patentrechtlichen Ansprüche begeben hat. So begrenzt diese Ein-schränkung die Reichweite der Lehre von den Gegenwerten dergestalt, dass die Öffentlichkeitdie Grenzen einer patentierten Erfindung erkennen kann

Documents

Report Q175 The role of equivalents and prosecution ...aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/committees/175/GR175all_reports.pdf · The role of equivalents and prosecution history in defining