REPORT OF THE YALTA (CRIMEA) CONFERENCE

TREATY AT A GLANCE

CompletedFebruary 11, 1945, at Yalta, Crimea, USSR (present-day Ukraine)

SignatoriesGreat Britain, United States, and the Soviet Union

OverviewThe results of the Yalta Conference (February 4-11, 1945; seeYALTA AGREEMENT) between the Big Three Allied leaders were pub-lished in a report containing their consensus on the conduct of theclosing months of World War II and on the organization of thepostwar world. Since the strains among the Allies were becomingevident, the conference and report not only laid the groundworkfor the establishment of the United Nations but also presaged thecoming cold war.

Historical BackgroundDuring the summer of 1944, Churchill, who had earlyon cast a critical eye on the Bolsheviks and had nogreat love for his putative ally Joseph Stalin, lobbiedfor an Italian campaign in the European theater of thewar in hopes that the Western powers among theAllies would reach the Danube before the Red Army.Representing a Britain that was the weakest of the BigThree powers in the alliance (the other two of coursebeing the United States and the Soviet Union),Churchill was interested in restoring a balance ofpower in Europe that might keep England competitivewith its old imperial rival Russia. Toward that end, hepreempted President Franklin Delano Roosevelt bymeeting with Stalin in October to make a deal on theirrespective nations' spheres of .influence in the post-war world.

Roosevelt seemed hardly to mind. Not only was heill and growing sicker, but American war aims in gen-eral were nebulous at best and pretty much nonexist-ent except for a reaffirmation of Woodrow Wilson'spost-World War I internationalism. Stalin, for his part,was perfectly willing to barter. He planned ultimatelyonly to honor those arrangements he was forced tohonor. Like Churchill, Stalin realized Roosevelt'sunwillingness to strain the alliance was helping theSoviet leader to undermine Churchill's ministers'diplomatic goals. In fact, Roosevelt's pliant attitudetoward Stalin made the British prime minister gloomy

about his country's postwar prospects. Heading for thelast summit conference of the war, he warned col-leagues that this world conflict might prove even moredisappointing than the last one.

When a dying Roosevelt arrived at Yalta on theCrimean peninsula in February 1945, he was com-pletely exhausted from the strenuous journey. IfChurchill saw Yalta as the final opportunity for theBritish and Americans to take a firm stand againstSoviet control of eastern Europe, Roosevelt probablyviewed it as the last chance to forestall the disintegra-tion of the alliance upon what everyone knew was thecoming victory. Certainly, the U.S. position showed lit-tle evidence of economic motives. Indeed, Rooseveltseemed not even to have a contingency plan for thebreakdown of relations with an increasingly assertiveUSSR.What he feared more than that, evidently, was aretreat at home into American isolationism, whichwould scuttle his Wilsonian vision of a great powerpostwar condominium housed in an effective UnitedNations organization.

Wishing for Soviet participation in a postwar U.N.,Roosevelt was prepared in both word (at the YaltaConference) and deed (in the allied advance acrossEurope) to assure Stalin that the Anglo-Saxons werenot ganging up on him. But Stalin, for all his formerrevolutionary zeal, proved as old-fashioned a Europeanas Churchill: he sought postwar security through mili-tary and political control of eastern Europe, controlthat would create a buffer for Russia against the liberal

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democracies and the kind of ideas that might threateneven his iron control over the varied peoples of theUSSR.

At length, the Big Three were able to maintaintheir unity at the Yalta Conference only by resorting tovague language or by postponing the more explosiveissues that divided them.

TermsThe Yalta Conference and report reaffirmed earlieragreements to accept nothing less than unconditionalsurrender of the Axis powers. Inviting the Free Frenchto join them, the Big Three decided to divide thedefeated Germany into zones of occupation, with theFrench zone carved out of lands held by the Americansand British, while the Soviet zone would extend to theElbe. The German capital, Berlin, would also bedivided into four zones, although it would be sur-rounded by Soviet-held territory. Overall, the occupa-tion would be run by a joint European AdvisoryCommission.

Even though the Western powers rejected theextreme plans, discussed earlier at Quebec, to turnGermany into a pastoral nation and pushed for revi-talized German industry under Allied control, Stalincontinued to insist on reparations, on stripping thevanquished foe of some $20 billion in industrialmachinery and raw materials. The conference meeklyassigned the question to a reparations commission.Stalin also revived earlier talk about breaking up Ger-many into small states, but here at least the Americansheeded British warnings about further Balkanizationin central Europe in the face of the newly powerfulSoviet behemoth, and this too they left for additionalstudy.

For the past eight days Winston S. Churchill, PrimeMinister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Pres-ident of the United States of America, and Marshalj.VStalin, Chairmen of the Council of People's Commis-sars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, havemet with the Foreign Seeretaries, Chiefs of Staff andother advisers in the Crimea ....

The following statement is made by the Prime Min-ister of Great Britain, the President of the United Statesof America, and the Chairman of the Council or-Peo-ple's Commissars of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics, on the results of the Crimea Conference.

1. THE DEFEAT OF GERMANYWe have considered and determined the military plansof the three Allied Powers for the final defeat of thecommon enemy. The military staffs of the three Alliednations have met in daily meetings throughout theConference. These meetings have been most satisfac-tory from every point of view and have resulted in

closer coordination of the military effort of the threeAllies than ever before. The fullest information hasbeen interchanged. The timing, scope and coordina-tion of new and even more powerful blows to belaunched by our armies and air forces into the heart ofGermany from the East, West, North, and South havebeen fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made knownonly as we execute them, but we believe that the veryclose working partnership among the three staffsattained at this Conference will result in shorteningthe war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continuedin the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people willonly make the cost of their defeat heavier to them-selves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

II. THE OCCUPATION ANDCONTROL OF GERMANY

We have agreed on common politics and plans forenforcing the unconditional surrender terms whichwe shall impose together on Nazi Germany after Ger-man armed resistance has been finally crushed. Theseterms will not be made known until the final defeat ofGermany has been accomplished. Under the agreedplan, the forces of the Three Powers will each occupya separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administra-tion and control has been provided for under the planthrough a central Control Commission consistingof the Supreme Commanders of the Three Powerswith headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed thatFrance should be invited by the Three Powers, if sheshould so desire, to take over a zone of occupation,and to participate as a fourth member of the ControlCommission. The limits of the French zone will beagreed by the four Governments concerned throughtheir representatives on the European Advisory Com-mission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German mil-itarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany willnever again be able to disturb the peace of the world.We are determined to disarm and disband all Germanarmed forces; break up for all time the German Gen-eral Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgenceof German militarism; remove or destroy all Germanmilitary equipment; eliminate or control all Germanindustry that could' be used for military production;bring all war criminals to just and swift punishmentand exact reparation in kind for the destructionwrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party,Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove allNazi and militarist influences from public office andfrom the cultural and economic life of the Germanpeople; and take in harmony such other measures inGermany as may be necessary to the future peace andsafety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy thepeople of Germany, but only when Nazism and mili-tarism have been extirpated, will there be hope for adecent life for Germans, and a place for them in thecomity of nations.

Ill. REPARATION BY GERMANYWe have considered the question of the damagecaused by Germany to the Allied nations in this warand recognized it as just that Germany be obliged tomake compensation for this damage in kind to thegreatest extent possible. A Commission for the Com-pensation of Damage will be established. The Com-mission will be instructed to consider the question ofthe extent and· methods for compensating damagecaused by Germany to the Allied countries. The Com-mission will work in Moscow.

Stalin was more conciliatory when the rest of theAllies wished to issue a call-pursuant to proposalsmade at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference back inAugust through October of 1944 -for a Conference ofUnited Nations to be held in San Francisco on April25, 1945. He nevertheless demanded that all 16 of therepublics that made up the USSR be represented.Although the United States might have made a similarargument for its 48 individual states, it did not. Stalin'srationale again owed something to Russia's ages-longcompetition with the British Empire: he needed suchrepresentation, so he claimed, to balance all thenation~ of that empire, which would naturally votewith London. The Soviets also demanded that the per-manent members of the Security Council, which ofcourse included Russia, retain a veto on all issuesinstead of merely on questions involving sanctions andthreats to the collective peace.

In light of concessions elsewhere, however, Stalinsettled for three members in the General Assembly anda limited veto. A relieved Roosevelt declared, "TheRussians have given in so much at the conference that1don't think we should let them down." Like Wilson,Rooseveltput much-and as it turned out-too muchstock in international peacekeeping organizations.

IV UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCEWe are resolved upon the earliest possible establish-ment with our Allies of a general international organ-ization to maintain peace and security. We believe thatthis is essential, both to prevent aggression and toremove the political. economic and social causes ofwar through the close and continuing collaboration ofall peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. Onthe important question of voting procedure, however,agreement was not there reached. The present Confer-ence has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a Conference of Unitedations should be called to meet at San Francisco in

the United States on the 25th April 1945, to preparethe charter of such an organization, along the linesproposed in the informal conversations at DumbartonOaks.

The Government of China and the ProvisionalGovernment of France will be immediately consultedand invited to sponsor invitations to the Conference

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jointly with the Governments of the United States,Great Britain and the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics. As soon as the consultation with China andFrance has been completed, the text of the proposalson voting procedure will be made public.

The Americans also put great stock-and as itturned out, too much stock-in free elections. Roo-sevelt proposed a Declaration on Liberated Europe, bywhich the Big Three committed to help all liberatedpeoples to solve their pressing political and economicproblems "by democratic means" and endorsed freeelections of governments "responsive to the will ofthe people." To Bolshevik ears-for whom the lexiconof democracy meant something quite different fromwhat it did for Americans-this may well havesounded like more Wilsonian rhetoric, perhaps meantby FDR for domestic consumption to keep his nationfrom once again isolating itself from European affairs.Since Roosevelt announced, much to Churchill's dis-may, that the United States intended to withdraw itstroops from Europe within two years, Stalin would feelperfectly comfortable that he could, if he wished, soonsimply ignore the declaration.

V DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPEWe have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration onLiberated Europe. This Declaration provides for con-certing the policies of the Three Powers and for jointaction by them in meeting the political and economicproblems of liberated Europe in accordance with dem-ocratic principles. The text of the Declaration is as fol-lows:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,and the President of the United States of America haveconsulted with each other in the common interests ofthe peoples of their countries and those of liberatedEurope. They jointly declare their mutual agreementto concert during the temporary period of instabilityin liberated Europe the policies of their three Govern-ments in assisting the peoples liberated from the dom-ination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the formerAxis satellite States of Europe to solve by democraticmeans their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and therebuilding of national economic life must be achievedby processes which will enable the liberated peoples todestroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and tocreate democratic institutions of their own choice.This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter-the right ofall peoples to choose the form of government underwhich they will live-the restoration of sovereign rightsand self-government to those peoples who have beenforcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peo-ples may exercise those rights, the three Governmentswill jointly assist the people in any European liberatedState or former Axis satellite State in Europe where in

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their judgement conditions require: (a) to establishconditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emer-gency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c)to form interim governmental authorities broadly rep-resentative of all democratic elements in the popula-tion and pledged to the earliest possible establishmentthrough free elections of Governments responsive tothe will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where nec-essary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the otherUnited Nations and provisional authorities or otherGovernments in Europe when matters of direct inter-est to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments,conditions in any European liberated State or any for-mer Axis satellite State in Europe make such actionnecessary, they will immediately consult together onthe measures necessary to discharge the joint respon-sibilities set forth in this Declaration.

By this Declaration we reaffirm our faith in theprinciples of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in theDeclaration by the United Nations, and our determi-nation to build in cooperation with other peace-lovingnations a world order under law, dedicated to peace,security, freedom and the general well-being of allmankind.

In issuing this Declaration, the Three Powersexpress the hope that the Provisional Government ofthe French Republic may be associated with them inthe procedure suggested.

Poland, as always with the Soviets, proved thebiggest sticking point at Yalta. The British and Ameri-cans wanted to keep the Curzon Line, agreed to inTehran, as the Soviet-Polish border and even to modifythat line slightly in Poland's favor. Churchill, however,objected to assigning 2.7 million Germans to Poland inthe west, to-as he put it-stuffing "the Polish gooseso full of Germans that it died of indigestion." So, onceagain the three leaders put off the question; it would beresolved, they declared, at a peace conference comewar's end. Roosevelt, with Churchill's stout backing,secured a promise from Stalin to permit free electionsamong "non-Fascist elements" within a month of thatpeace. But it was a vague promise, and Stalin reservedfor himself the sale right to determine who exactly was"Fascist" while at the same time rejecting internationalsupervision of the elections.

VI. POLANDWe came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settleour differences about Poland. We discussed fully allaspects of the question. We reaffirm our commondesire to see established a strong, free independentand democratic Poland. As a result of our discussionswe have agreed on the conditions in which a new Pol-ish Provisional Government of National Unity may beformed in such a manner as to command recognitionby the three major Powers.

The agreement reached is as follows:A new situation has been created in Poland as a

result of her complete liberation by the Red Army.This calls for the establishment of a Polish ProvisionalGovernment which can be more broadly based thanwas possible before the recent liberation of westernPoland. The Provisional Government which is nowfunctioning in Poland should therefore be reorganii.edon a broader democratic basis with the inclusion ofdemocratic leaders from Poland itself and from Polesabroad. This new Government should then be calledthe Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr areauthorized as a Commission to consult in the firstinstance in Moscow with members of the present Pro-visional Government and with other Polish demo-cratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad,with a view to the reorganization of the present Gov-ernment along the above lines. This Polish ProvisionalGovernment of National Unity shall be pledged to theholding of free and unfettered elections as soon as pos-sible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret bal-lot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Naziparties shall have the right to take part and to put for-ward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of NationalUnity has been properly formed in conformity with theabove, the Government of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics, which now maintains diplomatic relationswith the present Provisional Government of Poland,and the Government of the United Kingdom and theGovernment of the United States will establish diplo-matic relations with the new Polish Government ofNational Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors bywhose report the respective Governments will be keptinformed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that theeastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzonline with digressions from it in some regions of 5 to 8kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognize thatPoland must receive substantial accessions of territoryin the north and west. They feel that the opinion of thenew Polish Provisional Government of National Unityshould be sought in due course on the extent of theseaccessions and that the final delimitation of the west-ern frontier of Poland should thereafter await thePeace Conference.

The conference took up the question of Yugoslavia,once again trying to yoke the future interests of com-munists and democrats, and then arranged for the for-eign secretaries of each power to keep in closer contactfor the duration of the war.

Vll. YUGOSLAVIAWe have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and DrSubasic that the Agreement between them should beput into effect immediately, and that a new Govern-ment should be formed on the basis of that Agree-ment.

We also recommend that as soon as the new Gov-ernment has been formed it should declare that:

(i) The Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Libera-tion (Avnoj) should be extended to include membersof the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupshtina) who havenot compromised themselves by collaboration withthe enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a tem-porary Parliament; and

(ii) Legislative acts passed by the Assembly ofNational Liberation will be subject to subsequent rati-fication by a Constituent Assembly.

There was also a general review of other Balkanquestions.

VIII. MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIESThroughout the Conference, besides the daily meetingsof the Heads of Governments, and the Foreign Secre-taries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secre-taries, and their advisers, have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost valueand the Conference agreed that permanent machineryshould be set up for regular consultation between thethree Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet asoften as may be necessary, probably about every threeor four months. These meetings will be held in rota-tion in the three capitals, the first meeting being heldin London, after the United Nations Conference onWorld Organization.

IX. UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAROur meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed ourcommon determination to maintain and strengthen inthe peace to come that unity of purpose and of actionwhich has made victory possible and certain for theUnited Nations in this war. We believe that this is asacred obligation which our Governments owe to ourpeoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with continuing and growing cooperationand understanding among our three countries, andamong all the peace-loving nations, can the highestaspiration of humanity be realized-a secure and lastingpeace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter'Afford assurance that all the men in all the lands maylive out their lives in freedom from fear and want'.

Victory in this war and establishment of the pro-posed international organization will provide thegreatest opportunity in all history to create in the yearsto come the essential conditions of such a peace.ISigned]

WINSTON S. CHURCHILLFRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

]Y. STALIN11th February 1945

Finally, Roosevelt at Yalta obtained from the USSRa promise to declare war against Japan "two to threemonths" after the surrender of Germany, in return forU.5. support of the Soviet acquisition of territories lostin the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and Sovietdominance in Outer Mongolia and Manchuria-all the

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objectives of the old imperial Russia in East Asia (seeYALTA AGREEMENT).

ConsequencesWithin a month it became clear that Russia had nointention of meeting the expectations raised at Yalta.Molotov announced on March 23 that most of the Lon-don Poles, whom the United States and Great Britainhad fought so hard to include in the provisional"unity" government, were being disqualified by theRussians from Polish elections. Similar news of generalSoviet foot-dragging and bad faith had been reachingRoosevelt and Churchill from all the various commis-sions the conference had set up.

When he heard Molotov had disqualified the Lon-don Poles, Roosevelt banged his first on the arm of hiswheelchair and barked, "We can't do business withStalin. He has broken every one of the promises hemade at Yalta." Angry and disillusioned, FDRretreated to Warm Springs, Georgia, and died on April12. In the coming years he would be attacked forattending the conference in the first place, for hiseagerness to placate Stalin, and for including in hisentourage Alger Hiss, who later was exposed as acommunist agent.

Whether Roosevelt was duped at Yaltaand sold outeastern Europe to the Bolsheviks, as his right-wingAmerican critics charged, the conference would cer-tainly have turned out differently if the United Stateshad listened more carefully to Churchill's advice. Theatmosphere of trust might well have been replaced withthe hard-nosed Old World haggling more typical ofEuropean peace conferences in the past, but even thenthere would have been little Churchill and Rooseveltcould have done to stop Stalin other than threateningRussia, whose Red Army was just then engaged insoundly defeating the common enemy, with a newworld war. Short of that, Roosevelt would certainly havebeen expected to give up some of the recently liberatedstates in his (and Churchill's) haggling with Stalin,which he could hardly have done without turning hisback on the very principles for which he claimed to befighting the war and alienating millions of u.s. voters.

On the other hand, Roosevelt was facing a costly. campaign against Japan in East Asia, so purchasingSoviet help was both realistic and, in terms of Ameri-can lives saved, humane. FDR could no more havepredicted that the atomic bomb would render Sovietaid useless than he could have known that the young,aristocratic Hiss was in reality a sinister spy. After all,the scientists of the Manhattan Project had theirdoubts about "the gadget" right up to the moment itexploded in the desert around Alamogordo at 0529:45

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on July 16, 1945. And even after Richard Nixonexposed him, Hiss was only convicted of perjury, neverof espionage. Millions of people continued to considerhim not only innocent but a martyr to right-wingfanaticism until some 50 years later, when the fall ofthe Soviet Union and the opening of its state archiveslent more credence to the charges.

The Yalta Report itself was a noble statement andset important goals. If it was rightly criticized for fail-ing to establish any specific plan for achieving thesegoals, the report at least presented a facade of unity

among the Allies, which was important at thatmoment. While it is true that the report's ultimatevagueness, most evident in the broad provision for thefour-power occupation of Germany, resolved fewerissues than it left unresolved, only when the documentis read in the full context of subsequent events does itseem clear that the sharp ideological differences unof-ficially motivating the Western Allies and the SovietUnion were narrowly overcome by their common needto defeat Nazi Germany.