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Hacia un Contrato Social con la Previsión en Chile EL DERECHO A UNA VIDA DIGNA EN LA VEJEZ REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM SOLIDARITY PILLAR: A KEY FEATURE OF THE PROPOSED REFORM MARIO MARCEL, Chairman Seminar Reforming Pension Reform Regional Operations Department I, Inter-American Development Bank Washington D.C., November 27, 2006

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM SOLIDARITY PILLAR: A KEY FEATURE OF THE PROPOSED REFORM MARIO MARCEL, Chairman Seminar Reforming Pension Reform Regional Operations Department I, Inter-American Development Bank Washington D.C., November 27, 2006. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

Hacia un Contrato Social con la Previsión en ChileEL DERECHO A UNA VIDA DIGNA EN LA VEJEZ

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

SOLIDARITY PILLAR: A KEY FEATURE OF THE PROPOSED REFORM

MARIO MARCEL, Chairman

Seminar Reforming Pension Reform

Regional Operations Department I, Inter-American Development Bank

Washington D.C., November 27, 2006

Page 2: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

2

Projections of current system

  Both MenWome

n

Higher than minimum pension 52% 67% 37%

On government-guaranteed min pension 2% 1% 2%

Lower than minimum pension 46% 32% 61%

Total 100% 100% 100%

Projected distribution of pensioners of cohort 2020-2025 according to value of pension

Source: Berstein, Larraín y Pino (2006)

•The unequal distribution of contribution densities, plus 20-year contribution requirement, means that pensions might be be more unequally distributed than the highly unequal labour earnings

Page 3: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Reform targets

Page 4: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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New solidarity pillar

• Assessment: current non-contributory benefits weak, loosely integrated

• Proposal: create new solidarity pillar to replace current MPG and PASIS

• Related goals: universal coverage, prevent poverty at old age, increase replacement rate, reduce replacement rate gaps

• Main aim is to integrate all Chileans to pension system and to support those with lower capacity to contribute

Page 5: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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• Elligibility: lower 60% of households, 5 years of residence

• Based on Universal Basic Pension of maximum value of US$ 140/month, gradually withdrawn as self-financed contributory pension increases

• Withdraw rate designed so that total pension always increases in response to higher contributory effort

• UBP completely absorbed for contributory pension of US$ 350/month

New solidarity pillar

Page 6: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Pension values SP support

PF: Pensión finalPMAS Pensión máxima con aporte solidarioPBU Pensión básica universalPAFE Pensión autofinanciada estimada

New solidarity pillar

Page 7: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Solidarity pillar: illustration

2000040000

6000080000

100000120000

140000160000

180000200000

75000

67500

60000

52500

45000

37500

30000

22500

15000

7500

0

00

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

NPS

PAFE

75000

200000

87500

175000

100000

187500

162500

112500125000

137500

150000Current MP

Page 8: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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• Main advantages:– SP integrated into CP– Distortions from contribution requisites

eliminated• Risks:

– Weaken incentives to contribute– Fiscal costs

• Enabling conditions: – Resources released by transition– Enforcement of contributions

• Side effects:– Gender equity

New solidarity pillar

Page 9: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Proposed institutional structure

Page 10: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Expected results

Page 11: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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An integrated system

APV

PMG

PASIS

PILARCONTRIBUTIVO

PILARVO LU N TAR IO

PILARC O N TR IBU TIVO

PILARSO LID AR IO

Page 12: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Replacement rates and fiscal cost per density of contributions

-

2,0

4,0

6,0

8,0

10,0

12,0

14,0

0% 5% 10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

55%

60%

65%

70%

75%

80%

85%

90%

95%

Densidad

Co

sto

Fis

ca

l Es

pe

rad

o (

MM

$)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

Ta

sa

de

Re

em

pla

zo

CF Base CF Reforma TR Base TR Reforma

Fuente: Superintendencia de AFP

A more efficient incentive structure

Page 13: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Ordenado en base a quintiles de fondo proyectado.

Fuente: Superintendencia de AFP.

Pensión / (promedio ingreso estimado ultimos 3 años, sin considerar densidad)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

quintil másbajo

quintil 2 quintil 3 quintil 4 quintil másalto

Autofinanciada M60-H65

E0: M60,PASIS+PM

E1: M65,PASIS+PM

E2: Pilar Solidario

E3: PS + Bono Hijos

E4: PS+BH+SIS

E5: PS+BH+SIS+Rent 5.5

Impact on replacement rates

Page 14: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Valor Presente Neto Esperado al momento de jubilarse

0

2.000.000

4.000.000

6.000.000

8.000.000

10.000.000

12.000.000

14.000.000

quintilmás bajo

quintil 2 quintil 3 quintil 4 quintilmás alto

Peso

s de

200

4

E0: M60,PASIS+PM

E1: M65,PASIS+PM

E2: Pilar Solidario

E3: PS + Bono Hijos

E4: PS+BH+SIS

E5: PS+BH+SIS+Rent 5.5

Incidence of government transfers

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CASOS Situación actual(8) Con propuesta (9) Var % Hombres(1) Ingreso Mínimo ($135.000) - Densidad 30% 69.197 100.430 45,1% - 240 meses 97.187 112.675 15,9% - Densidad 80% 115.669 142.814 23,5% Renta imponible promedio ($362.000) - Densidad 30% 115.632 144.329 24,8% - 240 meses 166.996 177.710 6,4% - Densidad 80% 296.669 295.804 -0,3% 60 UF ($1.092.000) - Densidad 30% 353.423 352.948 -0,1% - 240 meses 499.331 498.966 -0,1% - Densidad 80% 898.290 898.139 0,0%

1) Hombre con cónyuge, dos hijos, cotizaciones parejas a lo largo de vida laboral8) Pensión autofinanciada más garantía estatal o PASIS si es mayor y elegible9) Incluye: aumento edad de jubilación de mujeres, bonificación por hijo (que se incluye en el eje x para el calculo del NPS), pilar solidario, aumento mínimo imponible empleada doméstica

Impact upon pensions: men

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CASOS Situación actual(8) Con propuesta (9) Var % Mujeres(2) Ingreso Mínimo ($135.000) - Densidad 30% 58.756 103.985 77,0% - 240 meses 96.516 115.349 19,5% - Densidad 80% 96.516 143.323 48,5% Renta imponible promedio ($362.000) - Densidad 30% 85.395 144.729 69,5% - 240 meses 129.201 175.710 36,0% - Densidad 80% 199.110 283.156 42,2% 60 UF ($1.092.000) - Densidad 30% 224.614 321.208 43,0% - 240 meses 372.948 471.717 26,5% - Densidad 80% 595.232 842.200 41,5%

2) Mujer con cónyuge, dos hijos, cotizaciones parejas a lo largo de vida laboral8) Pensión autofinanciada más garantía estatal o PASIS si es mayor y elegible9) Incluye: aumento edad de jubilación de mujeres, bonificación por hijo (que se incluye en el eje x para el calculo del NPS), pilar solidario, aumento sueldo mínimo empleada doméstica

Impact upon pensions: women

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CASOS Situación actual(8) Situación con reforma (9) Var % Casos especiales Dueña de casa, incorporación tardía trabajo rem (3) 96.516 121.784 26,2% Cotizante tardío (4) 71.362 101.996 42,9% Mujer ingresos medios, sin hijos (5) 129.201 170.328 31,8% Empleada doméstica (6) 96.516 143.323 48,5% Temporera (7) 99.361 160.454 61,5%

3) Mujer que se incorpora al empleo a jornada parcial a partir de los 35 años, por un ingreso parcial de $90 mil4) Caso idéntico hombre ingreso medio, densidad 30%, en años previos a jubilación5) Mujer sin cónyugue, sin hijos, renta promedio, densidad 240 meses6) Mujer sin cónyuge, dos hijos, remuneración por mínimo especial empleadas domésticas ($101.000), que sube con lareforma, densidad 80%7) Mujer con cónyuge, dos hijos, trabaja remuneradamente por 3 IM durante cuatro meses en el año.8) Pensión autofinanciada más garantía estatal o PASIS si es mayor y elegible9) Incluye: aumento edad de jubilación de mujeres, bonificación por hijo (que se incluye en el eje x para el calculo del NPS), pilar solidario, aumento sueldo mínimo empleada doméstica

Impact upon pensions: selected cases

Page 18: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Pension system and social protection

• HD studies reveal high insecurity in Chilean population

• Insecurity is due more to the lack of effective protection mechanisms than to size or likelyhood of contingencies

• Surveys commissiones by the Council revealed:– Aging generates two conflicting views: golden years vs.

old destitute– Pension system as necessary, but insufficient resource to

set future course– Savings valued as source of support for old age– But lack of control over funds, mistrust to AFPs,

uncertainty inherent to defined contribution regime– In the face of uncertainty many choose not to think about

it, look forward to luck, successful business– People prepared to larger effort but need to see more

challenging environment for AFPs

Page 19: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Implications to the development of a social protection system in Chile

• Pension system as key component of social protection: aging as certain event

• Universal coverage, pension as a right• Solidarity through tax system• Consolidate public-private mixture in pensions• Interplay of different components os social

protection: pensions, health care, work injury, maternity, pre-school childcare, unemployment

• Keep the social protection package together• Impact upon uncertainty, likelyhood to take up

business risks, labour market operation, innovation

Page 20: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Progress in social protection1999

Page 21: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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¿2010?

Progress in social protection

Page 22: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Financial effects

Sin Reforma Con Reforma

INP+PMG+PASIS+BR(1) 2,9% 1,6% _____

PILAR SOLIDARIO _____ _____ 2,5%

PILAR CONTRIBUTIVO 1,1% 2,5% 2,9%

TOTAL 4,0% 4,1% 5,4%

Nota:(1) BR: intereses por bonos de reconocimientoFuente: SAFP, Dipres y proyecciones del Consejo.

20252005

Gasto anual como % del PIB

Page 23: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Fiscal pension commitments

2,5% (2008)

2,8% (2006)

1,6% (2025)

0,0%

0,5%

1,0%

1,5%

2,0%

2,5%

3,0%

3,5%

1,2%0,9%

Page 24: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Recent record

Crecimiento Real del Gasto 2000-2005

(base 1999)

Acumulado Promedio

Anual

Gasto Total 29,1% 4,4%

Pensiones (Edad Avanzada) (*) 12,8% 2,0%

Resto Social 41,7% 6,0%

(*) Incluye efecto de pensiones especiales a exonerados y víctimas de violaciones a los derechos humanos

Page 25: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Transition issues

• The Concil did not propose to provide benefits only in 2025• The report provides estimates for 2025 to account for

steady-state effects and funding feasibility• Feasibility does not require to reduce funding for other

purposes; same current composition of spending• If reform reduces insecurity, it benefits the current working

generation• Report indicates need to design transtion on the basis of

better information, unavailable to Council• Faster transition or other commitments might require to

raise taxes• Accelerating the transition might require not only to sort out

financing needs but also operational and institutional requirements

• Short transition of 5-6 years feasible

Page 26: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR PENSION REFORM

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Solidarity pillar and pension reform

• Different component of reform closely intertwined, high cost of separating them out

• Strengthening of capitalization regime key to ensure success of solidarity pillar

• Three key links:– Goals: New Solidarity Pillar aimes at increasing

coverage, preventing poverty at old age; strengthening of capitalization pillar aims at raising replacement rates

– Moral hazard on contribution to capitalization system– Cost: more accumulation in capitalization funds due to

higher densities and profitability reduces fiscal costs of solidarity pillar by 1/5