67
Report of the Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options Philip J. DiNenno, Chair Hughes Assoc., Inc., MD [SE] Jeff L. Harrington, Secretary Harrington Group, Inc., GA [SE] Michael P. Broadribb, BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., AK [U] William M. Carey, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., IL [RT] Jon S. Casler, Fike Corp., MO [M] Salvatore A. Chines, Industrial Risk Insurers, CT [I] Miehelle Collins, Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin, FL [El William J. Fries, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., MAt [I] Rep. The Alliance of American Insurers William A. Froh, II.S. Dept. of Energy, MD [U] William L. Grosshandler, Nat'l Inst. of Standards & Technology, MD [RT] Elio Guglielmi, North American Fire Guardian Tech. Inc., Canada [M] Alankar Gupta, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, WA [U] Matthew T. Gustafson, U.S. Coast (;nard Headquarters, DC [El David H. Kay, U.S. Dept. of the Navy, VA [U] George A. Krabbe, Automatic Suppression Systems Inc., IL I IM] Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Assn. Robert L. Langer, Aa-lsul Inc,/Tyco, WI [M] Robert C. Merritt, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA [I] Daniel W. Moore, f)uPont Fluoroproducts, DE [M] Cene V. Paolucci, Yasnda Fire & Marine Insurance Co. of America, NY [I] Rep. American Insurance Services Group, Inc. W. Douglas Register, Great Lakes Chemical Corp., IN [M] Paul E. Rivers, 3M, MN [M] Joseph A. Senecal, Kidde-Fenwal, Inc.~Williams Holdings, /VIA [MI Clifford R. Sinopoli, II, Bahimore Gas & Electric, MD [UI Rep. Edison Electric Inst. Louise C. Speitel, Federal Aviation Administration, NJ [El P,obert E. Tapscott, New Mexico Engr Research hast, NM [RT] Tim N. Testerman, Procter & Ganlble, ()H fill Stephen B. Waters, Fireline Corp., MD [IM] Rep. Nat'l Assn. of Fire Equipment Distributors Inc. Carol Weisner, IJ.S. Environmental Protection Agency, DC [El Alternates Charles Bauroth, Liberty Mutual Insurance (;roup, TX[I] (Alt. to W. J. Fries) Kerry M. Bell, llnderwriters Laboratories Inc., IL [RT] (Alt. to W. M. Carey) Robert L. Darwin, II.S. Dept. of the Navy, VA [U] (Alt. to D. I-1. IZ~y) Christopher P. Hanauska, Hughes Assoc., Inc., MN [SEI (Alt. to P.J. DiNenno) Paul William Lain, II.S. Dept. of Energy, DC [IJ] (All. to W. A. Froh) Lorne MacGregor, North American Fire Guardian Technology Inc., Canada [M] (Alt. to E. Gugliehni) J. Douglas Mather, New Mexico Engr Research Inst., NM [RT] (Alt. to R. E. Tapscott) onathan S. Mehzer, Kidde-Fenwal Inc./Williams Holdings, MA MI (Alt. toJ. A. Senecal) Earl D. Neargarth, Fike Protection Systems, MO [M] (Alt. toJ. S. Casler) David A. Pelton, Ausul Inc./Tyco, IL [M] (Alt. to R. L. [,anger) John A. Pignato, Jr., 3M Co., MN [M] (AIt. to P. E. Rivers) Todd E. Schumann, Industrial Risk Insurers, IL [I] (Alt. to S. A. Chines) David C. Smith, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA [I] (Alt. to R. (L Merritt) Al Thornton, Great Lakes Chemical Corp., TX [M] (Alt. to W. D. Register) Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn., NC [IM] (Art. to ('. A. Krabbe) Joseph A. Wright, Federal Aviation Administration Tech Ctr., NJ [El (All. to L. C. Speitel) Robert E. Yeilin, CaIProtection, CA [IM] (All to S. B, Waters) Nonvoting Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M] Michael John Holmes, Preussag Fire Protection Ltd,England Douglas J. Pickersgill, Fire and Safety Systems, Australia Fernando Vigara, Vimpex - Security Devices, SA, Spain Staff Liaison: Mark T. Conroy Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on alternative protection options to Halon 1301 and 1211 fire extinguishing systems. It shall not deal with design, installation, operation, testing, and maintenance of systems employing carbon dioxide, dry chemical, wet chemical, foam, Halon 1301, Halon 1211, Halon 2402, or water as the primary extinguishing media. This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the mevnbership may have occurred. A k~ to classifications is found at the front of this book. Tile Report of tile Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options is presented for adoption. This Report was prepared by the Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options, and proposes for ' adoption amendments to NFPA 2001-1996, Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems. NFPA 2001-1996 is published in Volume 9 of file 1998 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form. This Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options, which consists of 28 voting members; of whom 23 voted affirmatively, 5 negatively after circulation of negative ballots (Messrs. Chines, Grosshandler, Langer, Rivers, and Senec~d). Mr. Chines voted negatively stating: "Proposal 2001-1 (Log #CP37) - Editorial. (page 2) Section 1- 4.2.7, specifically addresses total flooding. The scope limits this document to total flooding system at present There is either no need to address total flooding. If we do, it should be determined that it does not apply to possible future application system. Proposal 2001-1 (Log #CP 37) - Negative. (page 3) Section 2- 1.1 is totally messed up. This could be considered editorial since the intent has not changed. I suggest the following wording: 2-1.1.1 Primary Agent Supply. The amount of agent in the system shall be at least sufficient for the largest single hazard protected or group of hazards that are to protected simultaneously. 2-1.1.2* Reserve Agent Supply. Where uninterrupted protection is required, both the primary and the reserve agent supply, shall be permanently connected to the distributes piping and arranged for easy changeover. Note that 2-1.1.2 and 2-1.1.3 have been combined. The appendix material remains. Proposal 2001-1 (Log #CP 37) - Negative. (pages 9 and 10) Sections 34.2.1.2, 3-4.2.2.1 and 3-4.2.2.2 wording in conflict with 2001-30 (Log #CP38). Should action on 2001-30 (Log #CP38) be accept in principal see 2001-1 (Log #CP37). Proposal 2001-61 (Log #24) Editorial. (page 88-98) Tiffs is the new chapter for marine applications. All material showing section numbers in parentheses and all sub-committee comments following them should be delete before publishing this section for public comment. Only the text in Chapter 5 should be shown. Most of these are found on pages 94-96. Proposal 2001-104 (Log #40) Negative. (page 164) According to my notes the vote on this proposal very close. My note say it was defeated by a slight margin. 61

Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

  • Upload
    others

  • View
    1

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

Report of the Committee on

Halon Alternative Protection Options

Philip J. DiNenno, Chair Hughes Assoc., Inc., MD [SE]

Jef f L. Harrington, Secretary Harrington Group, Inc., GA [SE]

Michael P. Broadribb, BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., AK [U] William M. Carey, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., IL [RT] Jon S. Casler, Fike Corp., MO [M] Salvatore A. Chines, Industrial Risk Insurers, CT [I] Miehelle Collins, Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin, FL [El William J. Fries, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., MAt [I]

Rep. The Alliance of American Insurers William A. Froh, II.S. Dept. of Energy, MD [U] William L. Grosshandler, Nat'l Inst. of Standards & Technology, MD [RT] Elio Guglielmi, North American Fire Guardian Tech. Inc., Canada [M] Alankar Gupta, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, WA [U] Matthew T. Gustafson, U.S. Coast (;nard Headquarters, DC [El David H. Kay, U.S. Dept. of the Navy, VA [U] George A. Krabbe, Automatic Suppression Systems Inc., IL I IM]

Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Assn. Robert L. Langer, Aa-lsul Inc,/Tyco, WI [M] Robert C. Merritt, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA [I] Daniel W. Moore, f)uPont Fluoroproducts, DE [M] Cene V. Paolucci, Yasnda Fire & Marine Insurance Co. of America, NY [I]

Rep. American Insurance Services Group, Inc. W. Douglas Register, Great Lakes Chemical Corp., IN [M] Paul E. Rivers, 3M, MN [M] Joseph A. Senecal, Kidde-Fenwal, Inc.~Williams Holdings, /VIA [MI Clifford R. Sinopoli, II, Bahimore Gas & Electric, MD [UI

Rep. Edison Electric Inst. Louise C. Speitel, Federal Aviation Administration, NJ [El P, obert E. Tapscott, New Mexico Engr Research hast, NM [RT] Tim N. Testerman, Procter & Ganlble, ()H fill Stephen B. Waters, Fireline Corp., MD [IM]

Rep. Nat'l Assn. of Fire Equipment Distributors Inc. Carol Weisner, IJ.S. Environmental Protection Agency, DC [El

Alternates

Charles Bauroth, Liberty Mutual Insurance (;roup, TX[I] (Alt. to W. J. Fries)

Kerry M. Bell, llnderwriters Laboratories Inc., IL [RT] (Alt. to W. M. Carey)

Robert L. Darwin, II.S. Dept. of the Navy, VA [U] (Alt. to D. I-1. IZ~y)

Christopher P. Hanauska, Hughes Assoc., Inc., MN [SEI (Alt. to P.J. DiNenno)

Paul William Lain, II.S. Dept. of Energy, DC [IJ] (All. to W. A. Froh)

Lorne MacGregor, North American Fire Guardian Technology Inc., Canada [M]

(Alt. to E. Gugliehni) J. Douglas Mather, New Mexico Engr Research Inst., NM [RT]

(Alt. to R. E. Tapscott) onathan S. Mehzer, Kidde-Fenwal Inc./Williams Holdings, MA MI (Alt. toJ. A. Senecal)

Earl D. Neargarth, Fike Protection Systems, MO [M] (Alt. toJ. S. Casler)

David A. Pelton, Ausul Inc./Tyco, IL [M] (Alt. to R. L. [,anger)

John A. Pignato, Jr., 3M Co., MN [M] (AIt. to P. E. Rivers)

Todd E. Schumann, Industrial Risk Insurers, IL [I] (Alt. to S. A. Chines)

David C. Smith, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA [I] (Alt. to R. (L Merritt)

Al Thornton, Great Lakes Chemical Corp., TX [M] (Alt. to W. D. Register)

Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn., NC [IM] (Art. to ('. A. Krabbe)

Joseph A. Wright, Federal Aviation Administration Tech Ctr., NJ [El

(All. to L. C. Speitel) Robert E. Yeilin, CaIProtection, CA [IM]

(All to S. B, Waters)

Nonvoting

Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia t i e Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M] Michael John Holmes, Preussag Fire Protection Ltd,England Douglas J. Pickersgill, Fire and Safety Systems, Australia Fernando Vigara, Vimpex - Security Devices, SA, Spain

Staff Liaison: Mark T. Conroy

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on alternative protection options to Halon 1301 and 1211 fire extinguishing systems. It shall not deal with design, installation, operation, testing, and maintenance of systems employing carbon dioxide, dry chemical, wet chemical, foam, Halon 1301, Halon 1211, Halon 2402, or water as the primary extinguishing media.

This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the mevnbership may have occurred. A k~ to classifications is found at the front of this book.

Tile Report of tile Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options is presented for adoption.

This Report was prepared by the Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options, and proposes for ' adoption amendments to NFPA 2001-1996, Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems. NFPA 2001-1996 is published in Volume 9 of file 1998 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

This Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options, which consists of 28 voting members; of whom 23 voted affirmatively, 5 negatively after circulation of negative ballots (Messrs. Chines, Grosshandler, Langer, Rivers, and Senec~d).

Mr. Chines voted negatively stating: "Proposal 2001-1 (Log #CP37) - Editorial. (page 2) Section 1-

4.2.7, specifically addresses total flooding. The scope limits this document to total flooding system at present There is either no need to address total flooding. If we do, it should be determined that it does not apply to possible future application system.

Proposal 2001-1 (Log #CP 37) - Negative. (page 3) Section 2- 1.1 is totally messed up. This could be considered editorial since the intent has not changed. I suggest the following wording:

2-1.1.1 Primary Agent Supply. The amount of agent in the system shall be at least sufficient for the largest single hazard protected or group of hazards that are to protected simultaneously.

2-1.1.2* Reserve Agent Supply. Where uninterrupted protection is required, both the primary and the reserve agent supply, shall be permanently connected to the distributes piping and arranged for easy changeover.

Note that 2-1.1.2 and 2-1.1.3 have been combined. The appendix material remains.

Proposal 2001-1 (Log #CP 37) - Negative. (pages 9 and 10) Sections 34.2.1.2, 3-4.2.2.1 and 3-4.2.2.2 wording in conflict with 2001-30 (Log #CP38). Should action on 2001-30 (Log #CP38) be accept in principal see 2001-1 (Log #CP37).

Proposal 2001-61 (Log #24) Editorial. (page 88-98) Tiffs is the new chapter for marine applications. All material showing section numbers in parentheses and all sub-committee comments following them should be delete before publishing this section for public comment. Only the text in Chapter 5 should be shown. Most of these are found on pages 94-96.

Proposal 2001-104 (Log #40) Negative. (page 164) According to my notes the vote on this proposal very close. My note say it was defeated by a slight margin.

61

Page 2: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

Proposal 2001-112 (Log #30) Editorial. (page 181) Section A-3. 5.3.3 The text tha t begins "Suggestions on how to proceed" th rough page 182 shou ld be deleted."

Mr. Grosshandler voted negatively stating: "2001-28 (Log #CP5): Reject This may be editorial, but in the process of clarifying the text,

the paragraphs got mis -numbered . T h e modificat ion to 3-4.2.1.2 is fine, bu t the next two are confusing. The re is no 3-4.l.1 or 3- 4.1.2. See my c o m m e n t s on Proposal 2001-33 for sugges ted wording.

2001-33 (Log #CP2): Reject The fatal flaw of this proposal is the inclusion of test results

tlmt have not u n d e r g o n e peer review. NFPA should not put itself iH tile posit ion of inc luding unsubs tan t ia ted data for a test m e t h o d that is still be ing developed. (Compare this act ion to the care that has gone into the cup bu rne r table). Also, the specific wording was not awailable when the proposal was accepted by the committee~ T he second and tl~ird e lements of Proposal 2001-2'8 could also be rolled into this one. I suggest the following remedies:

3-4.2.2.1" M i n i m u m design concent ra t ion , Class B hazard. The m i n i m u m design concent ra t ion for a Class B fuel hazard shall be the ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion , as d e t e r m i n e d in A-3- 4.2.2.1, t imes a s:ffety factor of 1.2. For hazards with mult iple fuels, the value...

3--4.2.2.2* Min imum design concent ra t ion , Class A hazard. Tile m i n i m u m design concent ra t ion for a Class A surface fire hazard shall be d e t e r m i n e d by test, as part O f a listing program, but shall no t be less t han the exting~tishing concent ra t ion as de t e rmined in 3-4.2.2.1 for heptane.

3-4,2.2.3" M i n i m u m design concenWation, Class G hazard. The m i n i m u m design concent ra t ion for a Class C surface fire shall be at least that of a Class A surface design.

3-4.2.2.4* (Old para. 3-4.2.2.3*) 3-7* and A-3-7 OK as in proposal A-3-4.2.2.3 OK as written on p. 45 of a t tachments . Modify

a t t a chmen t pages 46 and 47 by e l iminat ing Tables A-3-7.1 and A- 3.7.2, and by striking specific resnlts for any particular agent. The value of the append ix is to give the reader a start ing poin t f rom which addit ional tests migh t be conducted . If da ta are .Flresented for a specific agent , the des igner of Author i ty Having

Jrisdiction may be t empted to use it as a gospel. 2001-40 (Log #40) a n d 2001-121 (Log #CP32): Reject 1 accept in principle what both of these proposals are trying to

do, but I have reconsidered the impor tance of the deviations f rom the 1SO s tandard . I now feel tha t we shou ld conform f i t ly to the IS(.) s tandard to avoid a rgumen t s in the fu ture with our foreign friends. The ch imney length tolerances and the fuel t empera tu re toler,-mces shou l d be those as specif ied in 1SO. The elevated t empera tu re tests, however, should no t be required.

2001-111 (Log #CP31): Reject ! appreciate the in ten t to quantify Class A fire test, bu t surfaces

fires are not the issue. Deep-seated and electrically energized fires ,are likely to require addit ional agent . The p roposed tests are no t likely to p roduce requi red concent ra t ions in excess o f hep tane cup bu rne r values. A better way is to simply call ou t the m i n i m u m concent ra t ions as I suggest above in par t . 3-4.2.2.2, and devote more effort towards the more difficult, deep-seated and energized e q u i p m e n t problems. ! would be willing to reconsider my posit ion if addit ional test ing with the proposed m e t h o d suggests tha t des ign concent ra t ions greater t han cup burner t imes 1.2 are actually required. Otherwise, we are simply r e c o m m e n d i n g an addit ional unnecessary a n d expensive test.

2-1-113 (Log #5): Reject See nw response to 2001-33 (Log #CP2)."

Mr. Langer voted negatively stating: "Proposal 2001-29 (Log #CP21), Page 41 Graph on page 42 appears to be for 2001-51 (Log #CP28) riot

2001-29 (Log #CP21) as stated. Proposal 2001-33 (Log #CP2), Page 45 R e c o m m e n d reject. Data specific to one manufac tu re r ' s p roduc t is no t appropr ia te

for the Standard. Proposal 2001-39 (Log #CP24), Page 54 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n 2 appears to be hand led with 2001-121 (Log

#CP32) on Page 194 and is no t related to R ecommenda t i on 1. Proposal 2001-54 (Log #CPI5) , Page 83 3-8.1.2.2 incorrectly states 956 percent , this shou ld be 95

percent. Proposal 2001-108 (Log #CP34), Page 168 R e c o m m e n d reject.

Repor ted data is no t s o u n d or consistent, nor de t e rmined in accordance with the proposed s tandard m e t h o d as descr ibed in 2001-121 (Log #CP32), page 194. See substant ia t ion for 2001-121 (Log #CP32) / '

Mr. Rivers voted negatively stating: "Commit tee Proposal 2001-33 (Log #CP2) and 2001-113 (Log

#5): 3M has a concern with the addi t ion of the test me thods to A-3-

7. 3M has been support ive and active in the efforts to define the effects of energized electrical circuits in hazards where constant electrical energy is no t only the ignition source, bu t also would cause re-ignition of Class A or B fuels if clean agent were not present in sufficient concent ra t ion .

Tile problem with this informat ion, taken alone, is tha t it gives the misleading impress ion that the m i n i m u m design criteria is adequate when h igher than m i n i m u m concent ra t ions may be appropriate . While it defines a g e n t p e r f o r m a n c e for given fire scenarios, it does not address hazards involving materials subjected to h igher electrical energy levels. These h igher energy levels may very well be die governing factors, factors that may be more d e m a n d i n g , in de t e rmin ing clean agen t design concent ra t ions for hazards involving energized electrical equ ipment .

Fur thermore , a l though both tests were classified as an energized Class C fire, one could a rgue that perhaps the scenarios were more chacacteristic of those involving a Class A or B fuel only with no energy. The test protocols required :t pilot f lame for ignition; the electrical energy was riot sufficienl t . cause ignition by itself. If the sample could uot ignite by electrical energy to begin with, it can be conc luded that the electrical energy c o u l d n e v e r re-ignite the sample as well.

These test me thods may be useful, but only useful in part of the realm of Class C hazards, and perhaps the least d e m a n d i n g at that.

Proposals 2001-14 (Log #26) and 2001-15 (Log 27): In the past, 3M has consis tendy opposed inchtsion of an egress

t ime criteria in the s tandard as is the case presently with the

~ roposed changes to 1-5-1.2.1 and 1.5.1.3. The opposi t ion is ased on the fact that these limits can ne i ther be enforced as a

mat ter of law nor can they be des igned into a clean agen t system. A survey commiss ioned by 3M a t t empt ing to de te rmine the

opinion of a represents sample of the Uni ted States fire marshals and submi t t ed to all the commit tee m e m b e r s prior to the A99 Report on Prol~osals mee t ing resul ted in the bullets following. These au thor iues having jur isdic t ion did not conc lude that dae egress t imes being p roposed in 2001-14 (Log #14) a n d 2001-15 (Log #15) can be ei ther guaran teed or enforced. As any part of NFPA 2001 is t a n t a m o u n t to law when it is in the body of the documen t , the commi t tee mus t take into accoun t all of the facts when de t e rmin ing its enforceability. The re is no way to assume that author i t ies having jur isdic t ion designers or owners can reasonably take the responsibility to say tha t anyone can egress f rom an enclosure in a set time.

Results of the survey,

® The majority (20 to 23) of the authori t ies having jur isdic t ion interviewed said there is no way to gua ran tee a t imely egress f rom an occupancy.

• The majority (16 of 23) of the authori t ies having jur isdic t ion interviewed said that a m a x i m u m egress t ime canno t be enforced.

• Severed (7 of 23) of the authori t ies having jur isdict ion answered the quest ion, "If an NFPA d o c u m e n t requires a m a x i m u m egress t ime, bow will you assure the r equ i r emen t is met?" by saying they canno t assure the r equ i r emen t is met. T h e r emain ing authori t ies having jur isdic t ion surveyed (16) m e n t i o n e d one or more of the following items: evacuation drills, inspections, citations, t raining, testing, a larms and third-party analysis.

• The majority (19 of 23) o f the authori t ies having jur isdic t ion interviewed said they would assume persons with disabilities could be in the room when d e t e rm in in g egress times.

• Several (12 of 23) of the authori t ies having jur isdic t ion interviewed would consider requi r ing a study to model the egress scenarios.

• The majority (16 of 23) of the authori t ies having jur isdic t ion interviewed said that contractors or installers do no have the ability to correctly comple te an egress study.

62

Page 3: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 1 A 9 9 R O P

• Four teen of tile author i t ies having jur isdic t ion surveyed said occupants do not take a larms seriously and do not leave an occupancy immediate ly while 9 of the authori t ies having jur i sd ic t ion surveyed said occupants only somet imes take a larms seriously.

• Fifteen of the anthori t ies having jur isdic t ion interviewed would use inspect ions ( in-honse a n d follow-up) to assure exits are no t blocked while 7 of tile authori t ies having jur isdic t ion interviewed said it is no t possible to assure exits are no t blocked.

• The majority (12 of 23) of the authori t ies having jnr isdic t ion interviewed said it is no t possible to enforce an egress r e q u i r e m e n t r e c o m m e n d e d in an NFPA s tandard while 10 said it is possible and 1 was unsu re whether it is possible or not.

• Twelve of tile authori t ies having jur isdict ion interviewed said the ul t imate responsibility for ensur ing the safe and timely egress o f people f r o m an occupancy rests with the bni ld ing owner, while 6 said it was the occupan t who was ul t imately responsible."

Mr. Senecal voted negatively stating: Proposal 2001-15 (Log #27) Reject: Reason: Tile proposal to permi t exposures up to three minutes

to a m m s p h e r e s where the oxygen concent ra t ion is as low as 10.0 vol percent , the snbmi t te r has no t adequately justified. While it appears that such exposure has been d e e m e d by a suitable exper t panel to be valid for cases where tim amb i en t pressure i s one s tandard a tmosphe re (760 m m Hg at sea level) there has been no informat ion offered to substant iate that the proposed exposures are also safe where tile ambien t pressure is significantly below 760 m m Hg, say in Denver or Albuquerque where the alti tude is approximately 5200 ft above sea level and the ambien t pressure is approximate ly 615 m m Hg. Tile reason this is significant is that oxygen transfer rates and arterial blood oxygen partial pressure establ ished by pu lmonary funct ion are regulated by the alveolar oxygen partial pressure (not m o l e fraction concent ra t ion) which is typically 100 m m Hg when tbe amb ien t oxygen partial pressure is 159 m m Hg (dry a tmospher ic air). See J.B. West, Respiratory Physiology- tile essentials, Williams and Wilkins, 5th ed., especially Chapter 5 ,and 6. A~ 10 percent oxygen at 760 m m Hg total pressure the degree of oxygen saturat ion of blood is at the critical point of the oxygen dissociation curve. Fur ther reduct ion of oxygen partial pressure in the lung moves the degree of oxygen saturat ion in the blood down tile s teep part of the curve. All this may have been cons idered by the exper t panel. If so, verification of such should be made by tile submit ter , i f not, daen the exposure t imes need to be re-ewaluated for with respect to variation in ambien t a tmospher i c pressure.

Make tile following editorial changes on Proposal 2001-1 (Log #CP37):

2-1,1.3 Where un in t e r rup t ed protect ion is required, both tile prin-tary and the reserve e , ~ y a g e n t supplies shall be pe rmanen t ly connec ted to the distr ibution p ip ing and a r - ~ g e 6 ¢ o e - 4 e a s t - ~ sufficient to achieve the design concent ra t ion for the largest single hazard protected or g roup of hazards that are to be protected simultaneously. -r~.: . . . . . . . . : . . . . c . . . . . . :~ ~ . ~ . a - - ,,-~ pr 'ma.- ; agen t o~rv . 1.

2-1.1.2" Reserve Agent Supply. Where required, tl-~ea reserve agent supply ell-urn6 ~ shall b e - ~ as many mult iples of the primary ilg.c, lK supply as dae author i ty having jur isdict ion easy c!~a:;gca:'er nf.g.q!!j£~

2-2.1.1" P-ilKs, ag,P..jl~ used in agen t distr ibut ion systems shall be of noncombus t ib l e material having physical a n d chemical characteristics such dial its integrity u n d e r stress can be predicted with reliability. Special corrosion-resistant materials or coatings shall be requi red in severely corrosive a tmospheres .

Pipe wall thickness cf ,!:e ~ : . n g ;;~!l shall be calculated in accordance with ASME B31.1, Power Piping Code. Tile internal pressure used for this calculation shall be the m a x i m u m pressure in the conta iner at a m a x i m u m storage t empera tu re of not less than 130°1 (55°C) (use manufac tu re r ' s m a x i m u m allowable fill density), but in no case shall the value used for tile pressnre be less than tile following:

2-3.2.3 When a new clean agone suppress ion system is bein~ installed in a space that has an existing detect ion system, a n d analysis shall be made of the detect ion devices to assure that the detect ion system is in good opera t ing condi t ion and will respond prompt ly to a fire si tuation. T!:ia al:all bc d.v.nc to. ::~'at in l imit ing t!:e dcccmFe=!t lcn Freducts f r am a ~upFre:='on event.

Ed. Note. The last sen tence is no t enforceabli~ If the commit tee wishes to retain it it shou ld be moved to the appendix .

3-2.3 Change "Piping" to "Pipe". 3-4.2.1.2 Delete the extra "1.1"~ Proposal 2001-15 (Log #27) p24. Reject. Reason: The proposal to pe rmi t exposures up to three minutes

to a tmosphe re s where file oxygen concent ra t ion is al low as 8.0 vol percent , the submit ter has not adequate ly justified. While it appears that such exposure has been d e e m e d by a suitable exper t panel to be valid for cases where ambien t pressure is one s tandard a tmosphe re (760 m m Hg at sea level) there has been no informat ion offered to substaxitiate tha t the proposed exposures are also safe where the ambien t pressure is significantly below 760 m m Hg, say in Denver of A lbuque rque where tile alt i tude is approximate ly 5200 ft above sea level and tile amb ien t pressure is approximate ly 615 m m Hg. The reason this is significant is tha t oxygen transfer rates and arterial blood oxygen partial pressure establ ished by pu lmona ry funct ion are regulated by the alveolar oxygen part ial pressure (not mole fraction concent ra t ion) which is typically 100 m m Hg when tile ambien t oxygen partial pressure is 159 m m Hg (dry a tmospher ic air). (See J.B. West, Respiratory Physiology- tile essentials, Williams & Wilkins, ed., esp. Ch. 5 & 6). At 10 percen t oxygen at 760 m m Hg total pressure the degree of oxygen saturat ion of blood is at the critical point of the oxygen dissociation curve. Fur ther reduct ion of oxygen partial pressure in the lung moves die degree of oxygen saturat ion in tile blood down tile s teep part of the curve. All this may have been considered by the exper t panel. If so, veri f icat ion of such shou ld be m a d e by the snbmit ter . "If not, t hen the exposure t imes need to be re- evahmted for with respect to variation in ambien t a tmospher ic pressure.

Proposal 2001-68 (Log # 1 3 ) p . 115. Reject. Reason: The proposal of a discharge t ime of 120 sec to achieve

85 percent of the design concent ra t ion is no t consis tent with the requ i rements of 3-8.1.2.2 which requires that 95 percent of the inert gas agen t be discharged within 60 sec. The discharge of inert gases follows an exponent ia l decay t ime profile: M = Mo( l - e x p ( t / T ) ) where M is the mass d ischarged in t ime, Mo is the total mass d ischarged and T is the t ime constant . Th e t ime cons tant for the 95 p e r c e n t / 6 0 sec r e q u i r e m e n t is 20 sec; the t ime constant for the proposed 85 pe rcen t /120 sec r eqn i r emen t is 63 sec. In o ther words, the t ime required to reach an equi~alent level protect ion in the 85 pe rcen t /120 sec scenario is three t imes longer.

The 85 pe rcen t /120 sec is taken directly f rom SOLAS requ i remen t s for carbon dioxide systems (SOLAS Chapter 11-2, Part A, Regulat ion 5, Part 2.4, page 163 of the 1992 edition). SOLAS fur ther requires that file m i n i m u m quant i ty of carbon dioxide be as follows: a. Cargo spaces: 30 percen t of the gross volume; b. Machinery spaces: 35 or 40 percen t of the gross volume ( d e p e n d i n g on criteria).

Since the ex t ingu i sh ing concent ra t ion of carbon dioxide for hydrocarbon fuels (machinery spaces) is 22-23 percen t by the cup bu rne r method , the safety factor for the SOLAS requ i r emen t is 56-77 percent . The p roposed discharge t ime for an inert gas agen t shou ld be similar to that for carbon dioxide only if tile agen t safety factor is also equivalent.

Proposal 2001-96 (Log #22) p. 153-155. Editorial comment . Change format of g raphs to have black lines on white background.

Proposal 2001-108 (Log #CP34) p. 168-169. Reject. Reason: The hep tane ex t inguish ing values for the iner t gases

mixtures are not consis tent with pure gas data. The ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion values repor ted for IG-01 (argon, 42 percent) a n d IG-100 (ni t rogen, 33 percent) agree well with results repor ted by at least four diverse laboratories us ing the s tandard scale cup bu rne r appara tus (VdS, NIST, Koatsu, NRIFD). The ex t ingu i sh ing concen t ra t ion of a non-chemical ly active agen t is directly proport ional to its hea t capacity at cons tant pressure , Cp. (Not repor ted in the table but relevant is CO2 at 22.5 percent as it is a cons t i tuent of IG-541). The ex t inguish ing concent ra t ions of mixtures of iner t gases mus t be linearly proport ional to the mixture hea t capacity. (Sncb has been t o u n d to be the case by the same labs). As such, the ex t inguish ing concent ra t ions for IG-541 and I(;-55 for hep tane shou ld be 35 a n d 37 percent respectively, values in ag reemen t with those of the a fo remen t ioned labs. The re aj?pear to be significant inconsistencies in repor ted ext inguislf ing concent ra t ions for o ther fuels for IC,-541 and R>55.

Mr. Gupta voted affirmative stating: "Please see the following suggest ions for improvements .

63

Page 4: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

Item 10/Page 3 -Please review. Something appears to be missing.

Item 13/Page 3. - Tables identify quality requirements. The text identifies standards of quality and specifications. I suggest we use same terms. Reason: causes confusion.

Item 46/Page 9 - suggest add...inerting concentration, ,xs appropriate ...{Reason to make it clear there are two types of systems extinguishing and inerting}

Item 5.~/Page 9 - Paragraph 3.4.1.2 deals with Class A fire. Please check paragraph call out.

Item 54/Page 10 - Paragraph 3.4.1.1 deals with Class B fire. Please check paragraph out.

Item 59/Page 10 - Equations (4 and (5), something appears to be missing, In the following I have calculated the amoun t of IG- 10 required by methods in the 1996 Edition and the Report on Proposals A99. 1 get different answers. Maybe I am dom~ something wrong. I suggest a review of the various equauons. They must all give essentially the same answer and in the same units, weight.

{I note in Item 66/page 11 you plan to make some changes. May be my comment is not valid. I have left in the comment as a caution.}

Lets assume Inert Gas IC,-01 Minimum temperature = 40F Design concentrate = 40 percent by voinme (1) From Tabular data. Table 3-5.1(p) {NFPA 1996 editionl

W/V = 0.541 (lb/ft3) Assume Hazard Volume = 1000 ft3 W = 0.541 x 1000 = 541 Ib {Note Units} (2) From Equation (6) on the Table 3-5.1 {NFPA 1996 Edition} W = V/S x in. [ 1000/(100-C)] S = 8.514 + 0.0185 T -8.514 + 0.0185 x 40 - 9,254 {Note the table

lists it as 9.13422} W = {1000/9.254} x (100/60) = 108.06 x 0.5106 = 55.17 W = 55.17 Ib {Note units} (3) From Report on Proposals A99 Page 10 Equation (3), X = 2.303 {V/S} Log 10 [100/(100-C)] Vs-8.514 + 0.0185 x 70 - 9.809 {Note the Table lists it as 9.68265} =2.303 {9.809/9.254} Log 10 [100/60] =2.303 x 108.06 x 0.221849 =55.21 Ib X -- 0.54156 ft3/ft$ [Note units} (4) From Report on Proposals A99, page 10 Equation (4) X - 2.303 [530/(460 + T ) ] L o g 10 [100/(100-C)] = 2.303 x [530/500] Log 10 [100/60] = 2.303 x 1.06 x 0.221849 = 0.5415 X = 0.5415 ft3/ft?, {Note units} Item 60/page 11. It is easy to mistake V s the specific volume of

the inert gas agent at 70°F and 14.7 psia for hazard volume identified by V.

S = specific volume of agent vapor (We are talking about inert gas.) I believe it should be Specific volume of inert gas at temperature T."

Mr. Moore voted affirmative stating: Proposed Section A-3-T should not be included in NFPS

Standard 2001 for the following reasons:

• The submisdsion constitutes a "fire performance report" on a particular product; a category which h ~ never been included in the standard, odler cup burner and inerting data.

O It is an implied endorsement of that product to the exclusion of others in the standard,

O It begs other manufacturers to submit data according to their chosen parameters and test methods. The end result being a voluminous standard containing non-comparable information. Also, this would set a precedent for |ncluding other fire performance reports on such subjects as decomposition, room pressurization, deep seated extinguishment, etc.

• This information can be made available to interested parties via industry publications and seminars.

64

Page 5: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 i A 9 9 R O P

(Log #CP37) 2001~ I - (Chapters 1, 2, and 3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

1. 1-4.1" Applicability o f Cdean-Agents.

2. 1-4.1.1 The <-4eat* fire ext inguishing agents addressed in this s tandard are electrically ncncc;nduc~ivc agen::; non-conduc t ing ........ ..... : . . . . . ~ ....... ;~" .qrec and leave no residue upon evaporation.

3. 1-4.1.2" ~ A g e n t s that mee t the criteria of 1-4.1.1 and are discussed in this stan(tard are shown in Table 1-4.1.2.

4. 'Fable 1-4.1.2 Glean-Agents Addressed in this S tandard

FC-%I-10 P e l ~ u o r o b u t a n e C4Ft0

HCFC Blend A Dichlurotr i f luoroethalJe CHCI2CF,4 HCF(M 23 (4.75%) Cl f lo rod i f luoromethane GHCIF 2 l ICF(:-22 (82%) Chloro te t ra f luoroe thane GHCIFt2F 3 HC F ( ' 124 (9.5%) lsopropenyl-I - methylcvclohexene

(3.75%) " HCFC-124 Chl orotetr~ffluor oe thane CHCIF(;F 3

HFC-125 Pentaf f imroethane CHF2CF 3 H F C 2 2 7 e a H e p t a f i u o r o p r o p a n e CF3CHFCF

3 HFC-23 Trifh, o r o m e t h a n e CHF 3

HFCr236fa Hexa f l uo rop ropane CF3CH 2CF3

FIC-1311 Tr i f luo iodomethane CF3I

IG-01 Argon (99.9%) Ar IG-541 Nitrogen (52%) N 2

Argon (40%) Ar Carhon dioxide (8%) CO 2

I(2-55 Nitrogen (50%) N 2

Argon (50%) AJ" NOTE 1: Other agents might become available at later dates. They migh t be added via the NFPA process in fllture edit ions or a t u e n d m e n t s of the sumdard .

NOTE 2: Composi t ion of inert gas agents are given in percent by volume. Composi t ion of I ICFC Blend A is given in percen t by weight.

5. 1-4.2.6 Electrostatic charging of r ; cng rcunded n n g r o u n d e d conductors migh t occur du r i ng the discharge of liquefied gases. These conductors migh t discharge to odaer objects, causing an electric arc o f sufficient energy to initiate an explosion. ( S e e N F P A

7 7 . R e c o m m e n d e d P r a c t i c e o n S t a t i c E l e c t r i c i t y . )

6. I-4.2.7 Where clean agent a total f looding systemsi~:e is used, a fixed enclosure shall be provided about the hazard daat i-s- adequate . . . . . . . . ~.~ . i . - allows a specified ~ concent ra t ion to be achieved and nminta ined for f h e a specified period of time.

7. 1-5.1.2" Halocarbon GleaA-Agenm.

8. 1-8.1" Mixing of~-lea~ agents in the same conta iner shall be permit ted only if the system is listed.

9. 1-8.2 Systems employing the s imul taneous discharge of different ~ agents to protect the same enclosed space shall no t be permit ted.

10. 2-1.1.1 pr imary Agent Supply, The a m o u n t o f N e a ~ a g e n t in the system primary agent supply shall be at considers necessary.

11o 2-1.1.3 Where un iu t e r rup t ed protect ion is required, both the primary and the reserve s~hN~¢ agen t supplies shall be pe rmanent ly connec ted to the distr ibution p ip ing and a r ranged for least sufficient to achieve the desien concent ra t ion for the largest single hazard protected or group of hazards tha t are to he protected sinmltaneously. T!~i~ . . . . . . : . . . . r . . . . . :~ a ^ , : ~ . . n . ~ , ~ . ~ "

12. 2-1.1.2" Reserve Aeent Supply. Where required, t h e a reserve agent supply ( ~ r a ~ shall be-consist of ,as many mult iples of the primary ~ supply ~ the authori ty having jur isdict ion easy changeover .

13. 2-1.2" Quality. New c!ean & g e n t s ~ shall meet the s tandards of quality ~ s - s t - ~ given in Tables 2-

1.2(at, 2-1.2(b), a im 2-1.2(c). Eacla man 'afac turcr 'z batch of_qLg_g.ej~ manuf~tcmred shall he tested and certified to the to!e.rancez or specifications a~ indicated ivgjy~_ in the tables. C : d e a ~ g e n t blends shall remain h o m o g e n e o u s in storage and use ~-m6er-within the listed t empera tu re range and condit ions of service that dley will e n c o u n t e r .

14. Table 2-1.2(a) Halo~enated ~ A~;ent Quality Requ i rements

M! Clean A g e n ~ L!eted in Standard Specification

Agent purity, M-mole %, m i n i m u m

Acidity, ppm (by weight HCI equivalent) , m a x i m u m

Water content, % by weight, m a x i m u m Nonvolatile residues, g r a m s / 1 0 0 mL m a x i m u m

99.0

3.0

0.001

0.05

15. Table 2-1.2(b) Inert Gas ~ Agent Quality Requirements

IC.-01 IG-541 IG-55 Composition. N 2 % by volume

Ar

CO 2

Water content. % by weight

52% ( 4% 50% ( 59

99.9% 40% ( 4% 50% ( 5~

8%+ 1% - O.O%

Maximum Maximum Maximum O,OOB 0.005 0.005

HCFC g l c n d A Amoun t , weight % C o m D o n e n t

HCFC-22 82 ( 0.8% HCFC-124 9.50 ( 0.9% HCFCr123 4.75 ( 0.5% isopropenyl- l -medQ, lcyclohexene 3.75 ( 0.5%

),1 . . . . . . . . . . b)' w~ig~.: ".. . . . . . 1 1 . . . . . . .

Table 2-1.2(c) ~!cnd b.gc~t HCFC Blend A Quality Requirements

16. 2-1.5.1 Storage containers and accessories shall be ,~o located and ar ranged so that inspection, testing, recharging, and odler ma in t enance activities are facilitated and in ter rupt ion of protect ion is held to a m i n i m u m .

65

Page 6: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

17. 2 !.S.~ ,c.t~rage coatai~ers :!:a!~ ,q~.t 5c !oc~te.d s-.~ -~ to 5"c subject to. sc'.'crc :;'catl:cr cc.::dlt!ens or to pctc::tia! damagc duc to I ] ] e r l ] ~ , i ] :C~. I , ~ . • s . I . . . . l ~ . I - - ~ - - * 1 . . . . . . . . . . l J t ~ l . . . . . . * . - - * ; . . I h ,

. 1 . . . . . . . . ~, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : n i . t ~ t . : o * ~ . , : t a l . l . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A .

18, 2-1.3.3 A~ent storaue containers shall not be located where they can be rendered ioopefable or unreliable due to mechanical damage or exposure to chemicals or harsh weather conditions or by any 9ther foreseeable cause. Where container exnosure to such condit ions is unavoidable then suitable enclosures or nrotective measures shall be employed.

19. 2-1.3.5 Where storage containers are connected to a manifolded-, automatic means, such as a check valve, shall be provided to prevent agent loss if the system is operated when any containers are removed for maintenance.

20. 2-1.4 _Agate Storage Containers.

21. 2-1.4.1" Storage Containers, Tke c!ea.~ ::gear strpply~,~_m. sh:dl be stored in containers designed to hold tbat specific agent at ambient temperatures. Containers shall trot be charged to a fill density or superpressurization level d ' f fc res t frem within the range specified in the manufacturer 's ~ l i s t e d manual.

22. 2-1.4.5 .~.{a~--'fc.:~c-. ~ C.~:t:$~c.-z. Containers connec ted to a manifold.

23. 2-2.1" P i p i ~ P i p e ,

24. 2-2.1.1" P-iph~Pi_j.O.g shall be of noncombust ib le material having physical and chemical characteristics such that its integrity under stress can be predic ted with reliability. Special corrosion- resistant materials or coatings shall be required in severely corrosive atmospheres. The dfickness of the p ip ing wall shall be calculated in accordance with ASME B31. l, Power Piping Coda The internal pressure used for this calculation shall be the maximum )ressure in d~e container at a n ~ x i m u m storage temperature of not I less than 130(F (55(C) (use manufacturer ' s maximum allowable fill density), but in no case shall the value used for the pressure be less than the following:

(a) For clean agents in Table A-2-1.4.1 having a charging pressure tip to and including 360 psig (2482 kPa) at 70(F (21 (C), itse an internal pressure of 620 psig (4275 kPa) at 130(F (55(C).

(b) For HFC-23, use an internal pressure of 2250 psig (15,514 kPa) at 130(F (55(C) Exception: Steel piping used in HFG-23 systems shall meet the following requirements:

1 / 8 in. through 3 /4 in. NPS shall be a minimum of Schedule Pipe 40. t ' ipe 1 in. through 4 in. NPS shall be a minimum of Schedule 80. Black or galvanized steel pipe shall be either %STM A-106 Seamless. ( ; rade A, B, or C; or ASTM A-53 Seamless or Electric Welded, ( ;fade A or B. ASTM A-120 and ASTM A-53 Class F Furnace Welded Pipe shall not be used.

Table 2-2.1.1 Internal Pressures Used for Calculations

Normal Charging Internal Pressure ~ 130(F (55(C)

Pressure upstream downstrean/ of pl-essure

reducer

of ~oressure reaucer

IG-OI charged m 2650 psig 2371 psig

(18,972 kPa) (16,341 kPa)

16-541 charged to 2575 psig 2175 psig

(17,755 kPa) (14,997 kPa)

16-55 charged to 2475 psig 2222 psig

(17,065 kPa) (15,318 kPa)

975 psig (6723 kPa)

1000 psig (6895 kPa)

950 psig (6550 kPa)

16-55 charged to 3300 psig 2962 psig

(22,753 kPa) (20,424 kPa)

16-55 charged to 4950 psig 4443 psig

(34,130 kPa) (30,636 kPa)

950 psig (6550 kPa)

950 psig (6550 kPa)

25. (c) For c-~a~ agents in Table 2-1.4.1 having a charging pressure of 600 psig (4137 kPa) at 70(F (21(C), use an internal pressure of 1000 psig (6895 kPa) at 130(F (55(C).

(d) For inert gases use Table 2-2.1.1. The pressure-reducing device shall be readily identifiable.

(e) If higher storage temperatures are approved for a given system, d~e internal pressure shall be adjusted to tire maximum internal pressure at maximum temperature. In performing this calculation, all jo in t factors and threading, grooving, or welding allowances shall be taken into account.

66

Page 7: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

NlCPA 2001 ~ A 9 9 R O P

26. 2-2.1.4 Where used, flexible p i i ~ p . i l ~ tubing, or hoses (including connections) shall be of approved materials and pressure ratings. (Additionally change "piping" to "pipe" throughout the document).

27. 2-2.1J~ Each pipe section shall be cleaned internally after preparation and before assembly bymeans o f swabbing, utilizinga sui t~le nonflammable cieaneL The p i t ~ a ~ g i ~ network shall be free of particulate matter and oil residue before installation of nozzles or discharge devices.

28. 2-2.3.1 * Fittings shall have a minimum rated working pressure equal to or greater titan the maximum pressure in the container at 130(F (54.4(G) when filled to the maximum allowable fill density for the clean agent being used, or as otherwise listed or approved. For systems that employ the use of a pressure reducing device in the distribution piping, the fittings downstream of the device shall have a minimum rated working pressure equal to or greater than the maximum anticipated pressure in the downstream piping.

29. 2-2.8.6 Where copper, stainless steel, or other suitable tubing is jointed with compression-type fittings, the manufacturer's )ressure and temperature ratings of the fitting shall not be

exceeded.

$0..2-2.4.2* All gaskets, o-rings, sealants, and other valve components shall be constructed of materials that are compatible with the ~ agent. Valves shall be protected against mechanical, chemical, or other damage.

31. 2-3.1.$ initiating and releasing circuits shall be installed in raceways. AC and d~-DC wiring shall not be combined in a common conduit or raceway.

32. Exception: AC and dc-DC: wiring shall be permitted to be combined in a common conduit or raceway where shielded and grounded.

$3. 2-3.2.3 When a new ¢#ea~ agent systemis being installed in a space that l~as an existing detection s~em, an analysis shall be made of the detection devices to assure that the detection system is in good operating condition and will respond promptly to a fire situation. This shall be done to assist in limiting the decomposition )roducts from a suppression event.

34. 3-1.1 Specifications. Specifications for ~ clean Lgent fire extinguishing systems shall be prepared under the

supervision of a person fully experienced and qualified in d~e design of =~:~--'= =g : : t :.'=ti--g'.:'-~ing such systems and with the advice of the authority having jurLsdiction. The specifications shall include all pertinent items necessary for the proper design of the system such as the designation of the authority having jurisdiction, variances from the stan~lard to be permitted by the authority having jurisdiction, design c~iteria, system sequence of'operations, the type and extent of the approval testing tO be performed after installation of the system, and owner training requirements.

35. 3-1.2.1 Working i~lans and calculations shall be submitted for approval to the authoilty havingjurisdlction before installatiori or remodeling begins. These documents shall be prepared only by persons fully experienced andqualified in the design of ~ d e a n agent fire extinguishing systems. Deviation from these documents shall require permission of the authority having jurisdiction.

56. 3-1.2.2 Workingplans shall be drawn to an indicated scale, and shall show the following items that pertain to the design of the ,system:

(a) Name of owner and occupant; (b) Location, including street address; (c) Point of compass and symbol legend; (d) Location anc[ construction of protected enclosure walls and

partitions; (e) LoCation of fire walls; (f) Enclosure cross section, full height or schematic diagram,

including location and construction of building floor/ceiling assemblies above and below, raised access floor and suspended ceiling;

(g) T~-Fc .~f c!c~-: :gc:.: d~xJlg, being used; (h) Design extinguishing or inertingconcentration; (i) Description Of occupancies andhazards being protected,

designatin[,[ whether O r not the enclosure is normall), occupied; • (j) Description of exposures surrounding the enclosure; (k) Descrfption of the agent storage containersused including

internal volume, storage pressure, and nominal capacity expressed in units of agent mass, or volume at standard conditions of temperature and pressure;

(I) Description of nozzle(s) used including size, orifice port corLqguration, and equivalent orifice area;

(m) Description of pipe and fittings used including material specifications, grade, and pressure ratin~

(n) DescriptiOn of wire or cable used including classification, gauge (AWg$), shielding, number of strands in conductor, conductor material, and color coding schedule. Segregation requirements of various system conductors shall be dearly indicated. The required method of making wire terminations shall be detailed;

(o) Description of the method of detector mounting (p) Equipment schedule or bill of materials for each piece of

equipment or device showing device name, manufacturer, model or part number, quantity, and description; •

(q) Plan view ofprotec tedarea showing enclosure partitions (full and partial height); agent distribution system including agent storage containers, piping, and n0zzles; type Of pipe h~agers and rigid pipe supports; detection, alarm, and control system including all devices andschematic of wiring interconnection between them; end-of-line device locations; location of controlled 'devices such as dampers and shutters; location of instructional signage;

(r) Isomeric view of agent distribution'system showing the length and diameter of each pipe segment: node referer/ce numbers relating to the flow calculations; fittings including reducers and stralners~ orientation of tees, nozzles includingstze, orifice port configuration, 'flow rate, and equivalent orifice area;

(s) Scale drawing showing the layout of the annunciator panel graphics if required by the authority having jurisdiction;

(t) Details of each unique rigid pipe support configuration showing method of securement to the pipe and to tile building structure;,

(u) Details of the method of container securement showing method of securement to the confainer and to the building structure;

(v) Complete step-bp~tep description of the system sequence of operations including functioning of abort and maintenance swishes, delay timers, and emergency_power shutdown;

(w) Point-to-point wiring schematic diagrams showing all circuit" connections to the systemcontrol panel and graphic a~nunciator panel;

(x) Point-to-point wiring schematic diagrams showing all circuit connections to external or add-on relays; ' .(y) Complete calculations to determine endosure volume, "

quantity of clean agent, and size of backup batteries. Method used to determine number andlocation of audible and visual indicating device, and number and location of detectors; and

(z) Details of any special features.

67

Page 8: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

37. $-2.1" System flow calculations shall be pe r fo rmed us ing a calculation m e t h o d listed or approved by the au thor i ty having jur isdict ion fa r d:c agc:=:. T he system design shall be within the mant f fac turer ' s l i s ted limitations.

Exception: Pre-engineered systems do not require a flow calculation where used within thei r listed l imitations.

38. $-2.2 Valves ,and fittings shall be rated for equivalent length in terms of pip,e or tub ing sizes with. which they will be used. . The equivalent length of the conta iner ~ l ~ w a l v e shall be listed and siiall include s iphon tube, valve, d ischarge head, and flexible connec tor .

39. 3-2.3 Tl 'c p~F'ng~o. i f lg lengths and, nczz!e and . ~ ' n g or ienta t ions of fittin~m and nozzles shall be in accordance with the manu fac tu r e r ' s listed l imitat ions . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . p e d c r m a n f~ .

40 :$ -3 .1 In the design o f a total f looding ~ S y s t e m , the characterist ics of the protected enc losure shaU be cons idered as

l " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41. 3-3.2 The a rea of unclosable open ings in the orotected shall be kept to a mitximum. T h e m:d;c . -e ; ka - -ag

tegts . . . . . . . t-,~t -~. t- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . .

4~, 3-3.x The author i ty havine iurisdiction can reouire nressurizat ion / denressur izat ion of the nro tec ted enc losure or o ther tests to ,assure ne r fo rmance m e e t i @ the r eou i r emen t s of this s tandard. {See Anoend ix BL

45." $-$.4* Forced-air vent i la t ing systems shall be shu t down or closed automatiGally where thei r con t i nued opera t ion would adversely affect the pe r fo rmance o f the fire . . . . : . . . . :-' . . . . . . . . . . exdnmf i sh ing system or result iu propagat ion of the fire. Complete ly self-contained recirculat ing venti lat ion systems are no t requi red to s h u t down. T he vo lume of the ventilation system a n d associated duc t work shall be cons idered when de t e rmi n ing d~e mmnti w of agen t ffmm~it-i~.

44. Exception: Ventilation ~.stems necessar 3 to ensure safe~, are not required to be shut down upon ~)ao~ activation of the fire ?~ppresslon

t~g£q~. An extended agent discharge shall be prodded to maintain the design cancentration for the required duration of proteaion

;;~[:':.~ U,-:2 :. -=:L: :3-: ~:~A~'~':]J:_-=:~:C.gT:~L:~7 7 ~i ~ VEff g,'-" r e n u m b e r e d as $-4.2, below.

$-4.1 F~r a p:a'*Jcu!z." fuc!, e"-'d:er the T he f lame . . . . : ~ ' : - ' . . . . . extinLruishin~ or iner t ing concent ra t ion shall be used ill d e t e rmin ing the agen t desima concent ra t ion for a oardcular

:fuel.

47. 3-4.1.1 T h e f lame extintruishing concent ra t ion for Class B fuels shall be d e t e r m i n e d by the c u e b u r n e r me thod .

48. 3-4.1.2 The f lame ext in~uishimt concent ra t ion for Class A fuels sl~all be de t e rmined by test ~ dart of a listing progFam,

49. 3-4.1.$* As a m i n i m u m , the listin~ p rog ram shall con fo rm to I lL 1058. StancLard for Ha loeena ted A~-ent Extinf.mlshin~ System

i lJnits, and IJL p rocedure lit'led "Fire E x t i n t r u i s h m e n t / ' ~ u ' e a Covera~'e Fire "i'est Procedure for Entr ineered and nre-En~rineered G l e a n Agent Extimznishin~ System Units". or equivalent. I~OVED from 3-4.2.2.$

50. $-4.1.4 The iner t in~ concent ra t ion shall be de t e rmioed by test.

51. 3-4.2.1.1 The i n e r d n g ~ c o n c e n t r a t i o n shall be used in de t e rmin ing the a~ent desitrn concentratiQR where condi t ions for s u b s e q u e n t reflash or explosion could exist.

52. 3-4.2.1.2 T h e m i n i m u m design eoacen'~'~de:=, e concen t ra t ion used to "inert . . . . . . . - . . . . . v ' . . . . . t he atmosphere, o f an en~losore

where the hazard is a f l ammable ~ l iuuid or a ~ L g ~ , e s shall be 1.1 t imes d ie iner t ing concent ra t ion (dtis adds a

lO percen t safety factor de t e rmined by :c : : d~c "nc~-ng

53. ~4,2.2.1 The m i n i m u m design concent ra t ion for aC la s s B

h a ~ d shall be a dcmena+-~tcd cup bu rne r cxt'ng'-: 'zh~ng cencentra*dcn -~!'.:e fa r each C!~°.-: B fuel, the extintmishin~ 6oncentrat ion. as d e t e r m i n e d in $4.1.2. t imes 1.2 (this adds a 20 >ercent safety factor) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . u .u r . e .ue.= .~

54. $-4.2.2.2* The m i n i m u m design concent ra t ion for mClass A surface fi~e~fire hazard shall be an- the ext inguishing concent ra t ion , as d e t e r m i n e d in 3-4d.1 $ e : c r m ' n c d 5'r' =ca:, ag part ~c z. !":'.2ng plus a 20 pe rcen t safety factor.

j g ~ 9 A ~ ~ ~t~t A .

' .~rc Tea: Prccc~..urc fa r En~'~ncerCd -~--'~d ~rc E n - ' n c c r c d C!can • _^= . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Z ~ . . . . . . . . . . . E . . . . . :o

56. 3-5.1" The a m o u n t o f ha loca rbon ~ a g e n t , requi red to achieve the des ign concen t ra t ion shall be calculated f rom the following formula:

W =,(.V/$,h~. [ C / ( l O 0 - C ) ]

g~-k-.l. ~ k~ (T)

S = k l + k 2 { T

Where

57. W : wc 'gh : a:

T m'n."m'a:

( ] )

( . ' 2 )

( ~ )

: ; 'c i :h: =.f ~car . ~ , c n :

. ' r , ~ ' , ~ ~, r.. ", .r . . . . , . . . . , - i . ^ ~ , . . g~ .

V = : : . . - t ; ' a ! u . m c . ~ f "...~.c ! . a g a r d , . " f g - ( - m - ~ ( c n c l c . = ~ J ; ' o k : m e : : . ' ~ m ' . ~

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " " ~ ' . T L . . . . . . . "1 . . . . .

: . " L L T . A - L E : ~ ' L " 2 . , ~ ° C Z ? ; _ ~ T 3 2 Y F ,Y ~ . _ . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v . . . . 4- . . . . . . . . . . v . . . . -Lz-"

W = Weight of clean agent. Ib, (k~zl. V = Net vo lume of the hazard calculated ,as the trross

vo lume minus the vo lume of f ixed

s t ructures impervious to atzent vaoor, ft $ (m$~.

S = Snecific vo lume of a~ent vapor at t emnera tu re T. Ib / f t $

58. ~ = A~ent design concentra t ion. V01, %, l ~ l . k ~ = C o e ~ c l e n ~ of g~ua t ion 2. See Table A-3-5,| {~) ,

T = M i n i m u m ant ic inated t empera tu re of the nrotected volume. (F ~ ( C / .

59. 3-5.2* The a m o u n t of iner t gas ~ agen t required to achieve the design concen t ra t ion shall be calculated fr-om-t4~ ~ ^ " ^ " ' - - fo rmula us ing Eouat ion $. 4 or 5:

X = 2.303 [ V s / S ] Log10 [100 / (100-C)]

X = 2.303 [530 / (460 "1- T)I Lgglg l l00 / (lO0-C)l where T is in

°F (4~ Eq. No. added

X = 2.303 [294.4 / (273 + TI1 LOgl0 l l 0 0 / (100-C~] where T is in

°(3 (5~ Eq. No. added

- - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . t , . . . . . . ,, . . . . . . , p c : " v c . ! : . : : ' . . c o f c p a c e ,

~ . # ' # . f t . $

~:1. ===d ~;~ = C~.aaw_':== apcci~qc :c. d-¢ incr : ~,--~° be lag - :¢d . S¢c

Page 9: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2001 - - A 9 9 R O P

" - " 4 * " " ~ x - • s 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ - - - s - - * ~ ! . . . . . . .

^ - - . . . . . .- . . . . .

. . . . . . . t" . . . . 4- . . . . . . . . r'-- .= -¢e

X = Volume of iner t eras added fat s tandard condit ions of ]14.7 osia. 70(F or ].013 b a r .

~1 (C ~ her volume o f hazard mace. ft3/t~ 3 or m 3 / m 3. ~_~ = SDecific volume of ineiX Q'as a~ent at 70(F f~l fC~ and

14.7 p*ia (1.01~ bar).

$ = Specific volume of a~ent vanor at temoera ture T. Ib/f t 3

kl.,_ ~ = Coefi'icients o f Eauation 2. See Table A-3-5.Hal .

T = Minimum anficioated t emneramre of the nrotected volumq, /F ( (CL C = Inert tins design concentrat ion.Vol . % .

6 I. Ed. Not~. The calculation ofEq. 3 or 4 aaualh does include an allowance for the leakage of agent from the enclositr¢

62. 3,5.3 The ouandtv of a~ent delivered, to the orotected volume shall be at least 'sufficient tO achieve the min imum des~n concentrat ion.

63. Tables 3-5.1 (a~ throu~rh Table 3-5.1fw~: Move to Annendix A and pr¢ccde table numbers with "A-'. - "

64. Table 3-5.1 (a) Add a note below Table 3-5.1(a).as follows: Note'.

The units of the constants k l . a l l d ~ are f t 3 / ib and. ft311b-fF.

resnectivelv, when tile t emnera ture is in (F : and are m3/k~ and

m3/ks~-fC, res~ectlvelw when the temoera ture is in (C.

65. Table 3-5.1 (p) through Table 3-5.1(u)

These tables are for the iner t gas agents. The agent quantities are given as volume of agent per uni t volume of enc losure , VAGEN T

VENCLOSUR E , yet the table heading indicates "W/V ~. The table heading should be changed to read

66. [G-xx Volume Reoui rement of A~ent her Uni t Volume of Hazard. VAGENT ~ -

where IG-xx is replaced by IG-01, IG-55. IG-541 as appropriate.

Table 3-5.i (p) and Table 3-5.1 (q)

67. V A G E N T / V ~ - In ( I 0 0 / ( ]00-G))

68.

HFC-236fa 2.098 0.0051 0.1413 0.0006

69. A-3-4.2.1.1 (a) These condit ions are when both: (a) The ~ quantity of fuel permit ted in tile closure has

the notential ~c :-:~w.'c'cnt to lead to deve looment of d4s~14~ a fuel vapor concentrat ion equal to Or greater than one43alf of the lower fl ~a~k~mable !i mit..,..O2.rou g~l°ut ,t~e ~nd?~.ure" and ; : . . . . . . . . . . . .

~_ =._l t e ¢ - - - - " . . . . . . . . . . J _ . t . _ - i . . . . . . . a _ _ t _ __.._.._--.___=.__)

!=:c! ~ c r - - - ' - ! : c f "~¢ . ~ . and'. (bV The ssstem resnonse is n o t m i d e n o u e h to detect and

extinmfish the fire before {he volatility o f the~fuel is increased to a dangerous level as a result o f the' fire. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP4.) 2001- 2 - (1-3.1 Agent ConcenLr'atioo, Design Factor, Safety Factor (New)): Accept SUBMITTER:. Technical Commit tee on Haion Alternative Protect ion Opt ions

[ RECOMMENDATION: Add ' the following n~w definitions: I Agent Concentrat ion. Agent concentrat ion, as used in this [ standard, is volume fraction of agent vapor in an agent-air mixture [ expressed in volume per~:ent. ' [ Design Factor. A design factor is a mul t ip l ie r applied to the base [ agent quantity required to achieve the des ignconcen t ra t ion . [ Safety Factor. The safety factor is a multiplier appl ied to the agent [f lame extinguishing or lnert ing concentraoon. • SUBSTANTIATION: Added definitions of terms used or to to be used in the standard. Also see Commit tee Proposal 2001-30 (Log #CP58). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept,

(Log #54) 2001- 3 - (1-3.1 Class C F'wes): Reject S U B M I T r E ~ Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

Class C Fires. Fires that involve energized electrical equipment where an un in te r rup ted power sunnlv wiO'continue tO re kmite the sur rounding Oass A or B fuels and whet'e the elecu~cal nonconduci ivi ty of the extinguishing media is o f importance. SUBSTANTIATION: Class C fires ~ e extremely bazardous because tile power supply acts as a cont inuous reignition source. This needs to be a d d e d t o the definit ion to alert users of the s tandard to this hazard and to clarify why a nonconduct ive extinguishing media is important . COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTER STATEMENT: It is no t d e a r that an unin ter rupted power source will cont inue to reignite class A or class B fires,

(Log #25) 2001- 4 - (1-3.1 Design Concentradon, Seal Level Equivalent o f

Carol Weimer, US Environmental Protection

' ATION- Add defiohio= folin.= Define the meaning of Design Concentration which would

include the meaning'of sea legel equivalent of agent. Define the meaning of Sea Level Equivalent of Oxygen: The

ox3~gen conc~enWation where the oxygen conc. (vol.%) at bypobaric or l~yperbaric-pressures which has an equivalent partial pressure of oxygen for a given normobaric .0~ conc. (vo|. %). Include definitions for hypobaric, hyperbaric and normobaric (approximately I Wan). SUBSTANTIATION: The proposal is provided, along with companion proposals to (]) achieve consistency between NFPA • standards and EPA and OSHA regulations; to (2) incorporate updated information allowing the use of total flooding agents to less conservative, yet safe, concentrations; and to (3) clarify existing safety standard~

NOTE: Support ing material is available for review at NFPA Headquar ters . COMMrrTER ACTION: Reject. C O M M I T r E E STATEMENT/ See Commit tee Action and Stotement on Proposal 2001-6 (Log #4).

69

- (Log #s) 2001- 5 - (14.1 L o ~ s t Ol~ervable Adverse Effect Level (LOAEL), and No Observed Adverse Effect Level (NOAEL)): Reject S U B ~ David R. Whit ing, 300 Oceangate RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

Lowest Observable Adverse Effect Level (LOAEL). The lowest :cn::~.-~'..'-~.--- doae or exoosure level o f a chemical in a study at which there is a smdstica'Hv or biologically slmxificant increase in

. 7 . the freauencv or sm~eriW of an advet~se ~h:,-xct . .~.~ or effect " ; 7 - in the exonsed_ ooouiation_ .

as comoared with an anorooriaie, unexnosed contro l .~rnun. No 0i~ervecl Advene'~li 'e;ct Level (NOAEL) . Thehighest _- : - ex.oerimental dose at which t h e ~ is n o st~alsticaJlv or

binlocricallv sltmificant increases in f reouencv o r severity o f adverse

Page 10: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2001 - - A99 R O P

_t . ._ :~ ,~:_ . , effects, as seen in the exnosed w.:2cotoglcal c.r v-'~ . . . . . ~ , ~ nonulat ion c0mrrared with an anDronriate, unexposed nonulation. i~a z ~cc3 ot'~zcr'.'c~. Effects mav'l~e nroduced at this level, but they ,are not considered t o be adverse. SUBSTANTIATION: These terms are not clearly defined. Tile current definitions for LOAEL and NOAEL appear to be the same, but are stated in two ways. The proposed definit ions better provide a clear distinction between the two and provide information on bow these nmnbers are derived. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMEN'I~: Tile Committee believes that the definitions in the s tandard more accurately describe the terms.

(Log #4) 2001- 6 - (1-3.1 Sea Level Equivalent of Agent, and Sea Level Equiwalent o f Oxygen (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: Louise G. Speitel, Fed. Aviation Admin. R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Add tile following definitions:

Sea Level Equivalent of Agent. The agent concentrat ion (volume %) at; sea level for which the partial pressure of agent matches tile ~ambient partial pressure of agent at a given altitude.

Sea Level Equivalent O f Oxygen. The oxygen concentrat ion (volume %] at sea level for which the partial pressure of oxygen frl~[ches die ambient nartial nressure of oxygen at a ~iven altitude. SUBSTANTIATION:" The t e r m sea level equivalent is used throughout NFPA 2001, yet the term is not de f ined in this d o c u m e n t . (The term is used in 1-5.1.3, A-1-5.1.2, and A-1-5.1.3.) COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP35) 2001- 7 - (1-3.1 Various Definit ions): Accept SUBMITTER~ Technical Commit tee on Halon Alternative Protection Options RECOMMENDATION: Revise definitions ,as follows:

1. Class C Fires. Fires that involve energized electrical equ ipment where the electrical :~o~co::duct';5~)' ~ of the extinguishing media is of importance.

2. Clearance. The air distance between clean =ge:~t extinguishing equipment , including piping and nozzles, and unenclosed

not at . . . . . . . . . . or uninsulated live electrical components ~,~ . . . . 1 .~ ground potential.

3. Engineered System~ ~ A systems requir ing individual calculation and design to de te rmine the flow rates, nozzle pressures, pipe size, area or volume protected by each nozzle,

uantity of de,a~ agent, and the number and types of nozzles and eir p lacement in a specific system.

Ed. Note: Change to singular from plural. 4. Fill Density. T-he- Mass ofc-Iea~ agent per uni t of container

volume (e.g., !E/ft~,--kg76~ - ( the customary units are l b / f t 3 or k g / m 3) .

5. Halocarbon Agent. A I ~ agent that contains as primary componen t s one or more organic compounds containing one or more of the e lements fluorine, chlorine, bromine, or iodine. Examples are hydrof luorocarbons (HFGs), hydrochlorof luorocarbons (HCFCs), per f luorocarbons (PFGs or FGs), and f luoro iodocarbons (FIGs).

6. Inert Gas Agent. All ~ agent that contains as primary components one or more of the gases helium, neon; argon, or nitrogen. Inert gas agents that are blends of gases can also contain carbon dioxide as a secondary component .

7. Pre-Engineered Systems. Those having p rede te rmined flow rates nozzle pressures, and quantities of~4em~ agent. These systems have the specific pipe size, maximum and min imum pipe lengths, flexible hose specifications, number of fittings, and number and types of nozzles prescribed by a testing laboratory. The hazards protected by these systems are specifically l imi tedas to type and size by a testing laboratory based upon actual fire tests. Limitations on hazards that can be protected by these systems are conta ined in the manufacturer ' s installation manual, which is re ferenced as part of tile listing.

8. Suoemressurizat ion. The addition of ~ to a fire extingu]shi'ng agent container to achieve a s-necified pr¢~ur¢

9. Total l~oodln~. The act and manne r of dischar~in~r an as~ent for the ournose ofachievin~ a specified min imum a~Tenf concent~ration th roughout ahaz 'ard volume.

I 10. Total FIoodinf System. A svstem consistin~ of an auent suonlv and distribution network des igned to achieve a to t a l fioodin~ - - condition in a hazard volume. SUBSTANTIATION: Added and revised definitions for terms used in the standard. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #20) 2001- 8 - (Table 1-4.1.2): Reject SUBMrI ' rER: Lorne MacGregor, North American Fire Guardian Technology, Inc. R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Add table as follows:

Table 14 .1 .2 Clean agents addressed in this standard NAF P-IV Dichlorotr i f luoroethane CHCI&CF~,

HCFG-123 (00%) pentaf luoroethane CHFI~CF t HFO125 (8%) 4-isopropenyl-l-methylc~,clohexene (2%/

SUBSTANTIATION: NAF P-IV is a new agent developed primarily as a replacement to halon 1211. While it is anticipated that its primary use will be as a streaming agent it is expected that some equipment manufacturers might wish to use it, as halon 1211 was used, for total f lood applications for normally unoccupied areas. The U.S.E.P.A has placed NAb" P-IV on the Significant New Alternative Program (SNAP) list. Pease note that the E.P]A. has started to use trade names and no longer tries to invent generic names for products such as NAF P-IV. C O M M I T r E E ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATFaMENT: This agent is a streaming agent, not in tended for use in total f looding systems. Additionally, the submitter requested that the proposal be withdrawn. Th is could not be done procedurally (see Regulations Governing Committee Projects section 4-3.4).

(Log #38) 2001- 9 - (Table 1-4.1.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Revise Table 1-4.1.2 as follows:

Table 1-4.1.2 Clean Agents Addressed in this Standard

Perf iuoropropane .G_.~.E~ FC-3-1-10 Perf luorobutane C4F~0

HCFC Blend A Dichlorotr i f iuoroethane CHCI~CF s HCFC-123 (4.75%)

Chlorodifiu o romethane CHC1Fe HCFC-22 (82%)

Isopropenyl-1- CH C 1FCF s methytcyclohexene

(3.75%) HCFC-124 Chlorotet raf luoroethane CHCIFCF~ HCFG-125 Pentafluoroethane CHF~CF s HFC-227ea Hepta f iuoropropane CFsCHFCF

$

HFC-23 Trif iuoromethane CHF s HFC-236fa Hexaf luoropropane GF s CH ~CF s FIG-1311 Triflu oro i odide45gGlZsJ- CF~I

IG-OI Argon (99.9%) Ar IG-541 Nitrogen (52%) N~

Argon (40%) Ar Carbon Dioxide (8%) CO s

IG-55 Nitrogen (50 %) N~ .~on (50%) Ar

SUBSTANTIATION: FC-2-1-8 is in the process of development with commercialization a possibility within this s tandard cycle for use in occupied spaces as a clean extinguishing agent where no o ther alternative is technically feasible due to performance or safety. It has a zero ozone deple t ion potential- and a superior toxicity profile. FC-2-1-8 has a NOAEL of 30 percent , a LOAEL >30 percen t and an LC50 of 81 percent ( 0 2 added) , as compared with its heptane cup burner value of 6.5 percent .

Correct typos on FIG-1311 row. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

70

Page 11: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

(Log #60) 2001- 10 - (Table 1-4.1.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Hideki Takamatu , Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add the unde r l i ned informat ion to Table 1-4.1.2 ,after the row for IG4)I:

lG-01 Argon (99.9%) Ar Nitrogen (99.9%) N 2

IG-541 Nitrogen (52%) N 2

S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Table 1-4.1.2 does not current ly address IG- 100. The 99.9% is the m i n i m u m value spacified by Koatsu Co., Ltd. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #45) 2001- 11 - (Table 1-4.1 (b)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals

I RECOMMENDATION: Revise Table 1-4.1 (b) as follows: (See Table 1-4.1 (b) o n p a g e 72. SUBSTANTIATION: FC-2-1-8 is in tile process of deve lopment with commercia l izat ion a possibility within this s tandard cycle for use in occupied spaces as a clean ex t inguish ing agen t where no o ther alternative is technically feasible due to pe r fo rmance or s,'ffety. It has a zero ozone deple t ion potential and a super ior toxicity profile. FC-2-1-8 has a NOAEL of 30 percent , a LOAEL >30 percen t a n d an LC50 of 81 percen t ( 0 2 added) , as compared with its hep tane cup bu rne r value of 6.5%. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP 14) 2001- 12- (1-4.2.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions

[RECOMMENDATION: Add a new part (b) "subfloors and o ther ] concealed spaces;" and r e n u m b e r tile existing part (b) as part (e).

SUBSTANTIATION: The Commi t t ee on Electronic Compute r Systems reques ted tha t we address this issue. T he task g roup discussed dais issue at grea t length. It was conc luded that partial f looding applicat ions are plentiful and legitimate. Tile pr imary examples are the space benea th raised access f looring (subfloors) and tile space within tape storage units.

The re is no confusion in the industry regarding partial f looding of spaces and if this practice is acceptable. T h e task group feels that it is an acceptable appl icat ion of clean agen t systems. It is recognized that partial f looding applicat ions often have problems regard ing m i n i m u m hold t ime and unenc losed openings. These are simply problems which mus t be addressed in the design. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP25) 2001- 13 - (1-4.2.3(b)): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative

• Protect ion Opt ions IRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: I (b) Subfloor and o ther concealed spaces. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

• (Log #26) 2001- 14 - (1-5.1.2.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTEP~ Carol Welsher, US Environmenta l Protection

ncy OMMENDATION: Replace the cur ren t text, inc luding the

Exception, with the following text: "Unnecessary exposure to ha locarbon d e a n agents shall be

avoided. The r e q u i r e m e n t for predischarge a larms and t ime delays are in t ended to prevent h u m a n exposure to agents. The following addit ional provisions shall apply in order to account for failure of these safeguards:

1. Halocarbon systems des igned to concent ra t ions up to the LOAEL shall be permit ted, given tilat:

(a) The space is normally occupied, and (b) Means silall be provided to limit exposure to no longer than

X minutes (where X is the t ime interval at which the blood level lo t a given halocarbon, as es t imated by the US EPA-approved and peer-reviewed PBPK model or its equivalent, equals the LOAEL.)

2. Halocarbon systems des igned to concent ra t ions above the LOAEL shall be permit ted, given that:

(a) The space is no t normally occupied, and (b) Where personnel could possibly be exposed, m e a n s shall be

provided to limit specific exposure t imes us ing the US EPA- approved and peer-reviewed PBPK model or its equivalent.

3. In tile absence of tile informat ion needed to fulfill the condi t ions listed above, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) Where egress f rom an area canno t be accompl i shed within one minute , the ha locarbon agen t shall no t be used in concent ra t ions exceeding its NOAEL;

(b) Where egress takes longer than 30 seconds but less than one minute , the ha locarbon agen t shall no t be used in a concentra t ion exceeding its LOAEL;

(c) Concent ra t ions exceeding the LOAEL are only permit ted in areas no t normally occupied by personnel provided tha t any personne l in the area can escape within 30 seconds. No unpro tec t ed personnel shall en ter tbe area du r ing agen t discharge." SUBSTANTIATION: Tile proposal is provided, a long with c o m p a n i o n proposals to (1) achieve consis tency between NFPA s tandards a n d EPA a n d OSHA regulations; to (2) incorpora te upda ted in format ion allowing tile use of total f looding agents to less conservative, yet safe, concentrat ions; and to (3) clarify existing safety s tandards.

NOTE: Suppor t ing material is available for review at NFPA Headquar te r s . COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Replace tile cu r ren t text, inc luding tile Exception, with the following text:

"Unnecessary exposure to ha locarbon clean agents shall be avoided. The r equ i r emen t for predischarge a larms a n d t ime delays are i n t ended to prevent h u m a n exposure to agents. The following addit ional provisions shall apply in order to accoun t for failure of these safeguards:

1. Halocarbon systems for spaces that are normally occupied, des igned to concent ra t ions up to the LOAEL, shall be permit ted, given tbat m e a n s be provided to limit exposure to no longer than X minu tes (where X is the t ime interval at which the blood level for a given halocarbon, as es t imated by the US EPA-approved an d peer- reviewed PBPK model or its equivalent, equals the LOAEL.)

2. In spaces that are not normal ly occupied, and protected by a ba locarbon system des igned to concent ra t ions above file LOAEL, and where personne l could possibly be exposed, m e a n s shall be provided to limit specific exposure t imes us ing the US EPA- approved and peer-reviewed PBPK model or its equivalent~

3. In the absence of the informat ion needed to fulfill the condi t ions listed above, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) Where egress f rom an area canno t be accompl i shed within one minute , the ha locarbon agen t shall no t be used in concenu 'a t ions exceeding its NOAEL;

(b) Where egress rakes longer than 30 seconds but less than one minute , the ha loearbon agen t shall no t be used in a concentra t ion exceeding its LOAEL;

(c) Concent ra t ions exceeding the LOAEL are only permit ted in areas no t normally occupied by personnel provided tha t any personne l in the area can escape within 30 seconds. No unpro tec t ed pe r sonne l shall en te r tile area du r ing agen t discharge." COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Editorial.

71

Page 12: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

Table A-l-4.1 (1~_) Physical Properties of Clean Halocarbon Agents (English Units)

Units

Molecular Weight N/A Boiling Point @ 760 mm

Hg. °F Freezing Point °F Critical Temperature °F Critical Pressure psia Critical Volume ~ / l b m Critical Density Ibm/ f t s Specific Heat, liquid ~ 77°F Btu/lb-°F Specific heat, ~apor

constant pressure (1 arm.) & 77°F Btu/lb-°F

Heat of Vaporization at boiling point Bm/lb

Thermal Conductivity of liquid @ 77°F Btu/h ft °F

Viscosity, liquid @ 77 °F lb/ft hr Relative Dielectric: strength

@ lama,@ 734mmHg, 77 °F (N~=I) N/A

Solubility of water in agent @ 70°'F - N/A

Vapor Pressure g 77 °F psi

HFC FC-2-1-8 FC-3-1-10 Blend A HFC-124 HFC- HFC-227ea HFC-23 HFC-236fa FIC-13II

125 18..88 238,03 92.90 136.5 120.02 170.03 70.01 152 195.91

-34,___~4 28.4 -37.0 12.2 -55.3 2.6 -115.7 29.4 -8.5 -297.4 -198.8 <-161,0 -326.0 -153 -204 -2474 -136.5" -166 161.4 235.8 256.0 252.0 150.8 215.0 78.6 256.9 252 388.7 337 964 524.5 521 422 701 464.1 586

0.0250 0.0280 0.0283 0.0281 0.0258 0.0305 0.0283* 0.0184 39.3 39.30 36.00 35.28 35.68 38. 76 32.78 35.29* 54,38 0.26 0°25 0:30 0.270 0.301 0.2831 0.370 0.3022 0.1414

0.19 0.192 0.16 0.177 0.191 0o1932 0A 76 0.2007 0.864

45.1 41 A 97 83.2 70.8 57.0 03.0 68.97 48.4,t

0.00_8 0.0310 0.052 0.0417 0.0376 0.040 0.0450 0.04025 0.0,t 0,719 0.783 0.508 0.723 0.351 0.433 0.201 0.7014 0.473

0.955 2.2 ~,-,-,~ 2.8 1.32 1.55 @ 70°F 2.00 1 , ( /4 unknown 1.41

<0.005% by 0,001% b,, 0.12% by' 0.07%by 0.07%by 0.06% by 500 ppm unknown 0.0062ezc by weight weight weight ~ weight weight ~ 50°F weight

77°F @ 77°F 126.6 42.0 137 56 199 66.4 686.0 39.51 63~70

*Dupont estimated values

I

¢)

Page 13: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 I A 9 9 R O P

(Log #27) 2001- 15 - (1-5.1.3): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Carol Welsher, US Environmental Protection ]ncy

OMMENDATION: Replace the current text, including the Exception, with the following text:

"Unnecessary exposure to inert gas agent systems resulting in low oxygen atmospheres shall be avoided. The requirement for

~ redischarge alarms and time delays are intended to prevent uman exposure to agents. Tbe following additiona/provisions

shall apply in order to account for failure of these safeguards: 1. Inert gas systems designed to concentrations below 53 percent

(.corresponding to an oxygen concentration of 10 percent) shall be permitted, given that:

(a) the space is normally occupied, and (b) means sball be provided to limit exposure to no longer than

3 minutes. 2. Inert gas systems designed to concentrations between 53 and

62 percent (corresponding to between 10 and 8 percent oxygen) sball be permitted, given that:

(a) the space is normally unoccupied, and (b) where personnel could possibly be exposed, means shall be

provided to limit the exposure to less than 30 seconds. 3. Inert gas systems designed to concentrations above 62 percent

(corresponding to 8 percent oxygen or below), may only be used in unoccupied areas where personnel sbaU not be exposed to such oxygen depletion." SUBSTANTIATION: The proposal is provided, along with companion proposals to (1) achieve consistency between NFPA standards and EPA and OSHA regulations; to (2) incorporate updated information allowing the use of total flooding agents to less conservative, yet safe, concentrations; and to (3) clarify existing safety standards.

NOTE: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Replace tbe current text, including the Exception, with the following text:

"Unnecessary exposure to inert gas agent systems resulting in low oxygen atmospheres shall he avoided. The requirement for predischarge alarms and time delays are intended to prevent human exposure to agents. The following additionalprovisions shall apply in order to account for failure of these safeguards:

1. Inert gas systems for spaces that are normally occupied designed to concentrations below 53 percent (corresponding to an oxygen concentration of 10 percent) shall he permitted ~iven that means be provided to limit exposure to no longer than 3 minutes.

2. In spaces that are not normally occupied and protected by an inert gas system designed to concentrations between 53 and 62 percent (corresponding to between 10 and 8 percent oxygen) shall be permitted, and where personnel could possibly be exposed, me,ms shall be provided to limit the exposure to less than 30 seconds. ,

3. Inert gas systems designed to concentrations above 62 percent (corresponding to 8 percent oxygen or below), may only be used in unoccupied areas where personnel shall not he exposed to such oxygen depletion." COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Editorial.

(Log #28) 2001- 16 - (1-5.1.4.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Carol Weisner, US Environmental Protection Agency

IRECOMMENDATION:, Delete the phrase "For fire situations,". SUBSTANTIATION: The proposal is provided, along with companion proposals to (1) achieve consistency between NFPA standards and EPA and OSFIA regulationsg to (2) incorporate

updated information allowing the use of total flooding agents to less conservative, yet safe, concentrations; and to (3) clarify existing safety standards.

NOTE: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #19) 2001- 17- (1-8.1 and 1-8.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Lorne MacGregor, North American Fire Guardian Technology, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Eliminate 1-8.1 and 1-8.2 and replace with:

"Systems or combinations of systems using more than one clean a~ent shall be listed for such use." S~UBSTANTIATION: It could be argued that the nitrogen or other inert gas commonly used for discharging many halocarbon agents is itself an agent and thus its use is not allowed. T h e proposed wording allows the use of more than one extinguishing agent if a listing agency is satisfied that such use would not compromise safety. The proposed wording is more concise than thepresent wording but does not compromise safety. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Same as existing 1-8.1. The two existing paragraphs clearly state the requirements for compatibility.

(Log #61) 2001- 18- (Table 2-1.2(b)): Accept SUBMrrTER: Hideki Takamatu, Koatsu Co. Ltd.

I RECOMMENDATION: Add a column for IG-100 to Table 2-1.2(b) as shown below. SUBSTANTIATION: Table 2-1.2(b). does not currently address IG-100. The values shown are specified by Koatsu Co., Ltd. COMMI'VrEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #20a) 2001- 19 - (Table 2-1.2(c)): Reject SUBMITTER: Lorne MacGregor, North American Fire Guardian Technology, lnc. RECOMMENDATION: Add table as follows:

I Table 2-1.2(c) Blend Ah, ent quality Requirements

- I HCFC,-123 I 90±0.9%

I H FC,-125 I 8 0.8% 14-isopropenyl-I -meth)dcyclohexene 2~0.5%

SUBSTANTIATION: NAF P-IV is a new agent developed primarily as a replacement to halon 1211. While it is anticipated that its primary use will beas a streaming agent it is expected that some equipment manufacturers might wish to use it, as halon 1211 was used, for total flood applications for normally unoccupied areas. The U.S.E.P.A has placed NAF P-IV On the Significant New Alternative Program (SNAP) list. Pease note that the E.P.A. has started to use trade names and no longer tries to invent generic names for products such as NAb" P-IV. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 2001-8 (Log #'20).

Table 2-1.2(b) Inert Gas Clean Agent Quality Requirements

Composition, % by volume

Water content, % by weight

IC,4) 1 ~ IG-541 IG-55 52% ± 4% 50% ± 5%

N~ 99% 40%±4% 50%±5% Ar 8% ±1%

CO ~ - 0.0% Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum

0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005

73

Page 14: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

(Log #2) 2001- 20 - (2-1.3.5): Reject SUBMITTER: Mukhtar Farid, Salem Agencies Serv, RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"Clause ~-1.3.5 where s torage conta iners are mani fo lded with main and reserve cylinders au tomat ic means such as a check valve shall be provided to prevent agen t loss if the system is opera ted when any containers are removed for ma in tenance , ff system has only main cylinder b.'mk and no back-up (reserve cylinder) then the system to be d i sconnec ted to prevent it's operat ion if any cylinders are removed for maintenance° in such cases El-Check w.tlves are not mandatory." S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : This is in reference to the subject clause which asks for El-Check in mani fo lded cylinders. The reason given "to prevent agen t loss if the system is opera ted when any conta iners are removed for main tenance" ,

In fact if there are main and reserve cylinders then the s t a tement holds good but if there are only ma in cylinders then removing one or more cylinders for ma in t enance leaving o ther cylinders in opera t ion shou ld not be allowed for following reasons.

If any cylinder is removed then the cylinders left in the system will no t be sufficient to achieve the requi red concent ra t ion , thus the removal o f any cylinder will leave t h e system ineffective. In such c i rcumstances the costly g:Ls will be released without achieving any result. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject, COMMITTEE STATEMENT: T he inclus ion of an el-check protects personnel f rom direct (skin) exposure to ex t inguish ing agen t in the event of an accidental cylinder discharge du r ing m a i n t e n a n c e and shou ld be required. Also see Proposal 2001-21 (Log #CP3).

(Log #CP3) 2001- 21 - (2-1.3.5): Accept SUBMITTER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions

] RECOMMENDATION: Revise 2-1.3.5 to read as follows: I '~W'bere s torage conta iners are manifolded, au tomat ic m e a n s such I as a check valve shall be provided to prevent agen t loss J ensu re oe r sonne l sztfetv if the system is opera ted when arty [ conta iners are r emoved for main tenance ."

S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : T he main reason for check valves is PCersonnel .safety.

OMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP26) 2001- 22 - (2-1.3.5): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions RECOMMENDATION: Add "and to ensure pe r sonne l safety" :ffter "agent loss".

Text to read as follows: "~Nhere storage conta iners are manifolded, au tomat ic m e a n s such

as a check valve shall be provided to prevent agent loss and to ensure personnel safety if the system is opera ted when any containers are removed for main tenance ."

S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Tbe main purpose of the check valve is i0r safety° COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #30) 2001- 23 - (2-2.1, A-2-2.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Charles F. Wilhns, Fire Suppress ion Systems Assoc. R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : This proposal includes substant ive changes tO the basic concept for p iping design descr ibed in Section 2-2.1, inc luding changes to all o the r affected sections. Because of titis inter-relationship, p roposed changes to 2-2.1.1, 2-2.3.1, Append ix A-2-2.1, and A-2- 2.1.1 are all inc luded in dais one p roposa l

1. Paragraph 2-2.1.1: Completely revise and reword to read as follows:

2-2.1.1" Piping shall be noncombus t ib l e material having physical and chemica l characteristics such that its integri ty u n d e r stress can be predic ted with reliability. Special corrosion-resis tant materials or coatings shall be requi red in severely corrosive a tmospheres . The thickness of the p ip ing sltall be calculated in accordance with the ASME B31.1, Power Piping Code.

(a) The internal pressure used for this calculation shall no t be less than the greater of ei ther of the following values:

The normal charg ing pressure in the agen t container at 70°F (21°C).

o 80 percen t o f the m a x i m u m pressure i n ' t he agen t container at the m a x i m u m storage t empera tu re of no t less than 130°F (55°C), (us ing the e q u i p m e n t manufac tu re r s m a x i m u m allowable fill density, if applicable).

In no case shall the value used, for the m i n i m u m piping design pressure, be less than that specif ied in Table 2-2.1A(a) or Table 2- 2A. l (b ) , for the condi t ions shown.

(b) For iner t gas clean agents use Table 2-2.1.1(a)o The pressure reduc ing device shall be readily identifiable.

(c) For ha locarbon clean agents use Table 2-2.1.1(b). Seamless or Electric Welded, Grade A or B.

ASTM A-120 ,and ASTM A-53 Class F Furnace Welded Pipe shall no t be used,

(d) If d i f ferent fill densities, pressurization levels, or higher storage tempera tures , o ther than those shown in Tables 2-2.1.1(a) or 2-2.1.1 (b), are approved for a given system, tile m i n i m u m design pressure for the piping shall be adjus ted to the m a x i m u m pressure m the agen t conta iner at m a x i m u m tempera ture , us ing the basic design criteria specif ied in 2-2.1.1 (a).

2. Revise 2-2.3.1 to read as follows: 2-2.3.1" Fittings shall have a m i n i m u m rated working pressure

l equal to or greater than the m i n i m u m design working pressure specified in 2-2.1.1, for the clean agen t being used, or as otherwise hsted or approved. For systems that employ the use of a pressure reduc ing device in the distr ibution piping, the fittings downst ream of the device shall have a m i n i m u m rated working pressure equal to or greater than the m a x i m u m ant ic ipated pressure in the downs t r eam piping,

IG-01

Table 2-2.1.1(a) Minimum Design Working Pressure for Inert Gas Clean Agent System Piping

A~ee,

Agent Container Charging Pressure'

at 70°F (21°C) 2371 psig

"(16,341 kPa) 2964 psig

(20424 kPa) 2175 psig

(14,997 klXa)

Agent Container Pressure

at 130°F (55°C) 2650 psig

( 18,972 kPa) 3306 psig

(22778kPa) 2575 psig

(17,755kPa)

Piping Upstream of Pressure Reducer

2371 psig (16,341 kPa)

2964 psig ( 14997 kPa) 2175 psig

( 14,997 kPa)

Piping Downstream of Pressure Reducer

975 psig (6,723 k.Pa)

975 psig (6728 kPa)~

1000 psig (6.895 kPa)

2900 psig 3433 psig 2900 psig 1000 psig ( 19,996 kPa) (23,671 kPa) ( 19,996 kPa (6,895 kPa)

2222 psig 2475 psig 2222 psig 950 psig (15,318 kPa) (17,065 kPa) (15,318 kPa) (6,550 kPa)

IG-55 2962 psig 3300 psig 2962 psig 950 psig (20,424 kPa) (22,753 kPa) (20,424 kPa) (6,550 kPa)

4443 psig 4950 psig 4443 psig 950 prig (30,635 kPa) (34,130 kPa) (30,635 kPa) (6,550 kPa)

If~ 1 O0 TBA TBA TBA TBA

74

Page 15: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 I A 9 9 R O P

Table 2-2.1.1 (b) Minimum Design Working Pressure for Halocarbon Clean Agent System Piping

A•ent

HFt~227ea

Agent Container Maximum Fill

Densit~

62 Ib/ft 3

Agent Container Charging Pressure

at 70°F (21°C)

Agent Container Pressure

at 130°F (55°C) 1~o mig* 247 psig

Minimum Piping Design Pressure

at 70°F (21°C) 198 psig

72 Ib/ft 3 360 psig* 520 psig 416 psig

72 lb/ft 3 600 psig* 1,025 psig 820 psig

Ft ;-3-l-10 80 l b/ft 3 360 pslg* 450 psig 360 psig

HCFC Blend A 56.2 Ib/ft 3 360 psig-* 540 psig 432 psig

HFC 23 47 lb/ft 3 6089 psig** 1,648 pslg 1,318 psig

42 Ib/ft 3 60&9 psig** 1,438 pslg 1.150 psig

* Super pressurized with Nitrogen. ** Not super pressurized with Nitrogen.

3. Revise and res t ructure paragraphs A-2-2.1, A-2-2.1.1, and all pipe tables as follows:

A-2-2.1 Piping shou ld be installed in accordance with good commercia l practice. (;:are shou ld be taken to avoid possible restrit ions due to foreign matter , faulty fabrication, or improper installation.

The piping system should be securely suppor t ed with due allowance for agen t thrus t forces and thermal expansion and contract ion and shou ld not be subjected to mechanical , chemical, vibration, or o ther damage . ASME B31.1, Power Piping Code, should be consul ted for gatidance on this matter . Where explosions are likely, t im p i p i n g sbould be a t tached to suppor t s that are lea.st likely to be displaced.

Al though clean agen t piping systems are no t subjected to con t inuous pressurization, provisions shou ld be made to ensure that the type of piping installed can withs tand the m a x i m u m stress at m a x i m u m storage tempera tures , M a x i m u m allowable stress levels for this condi t ion shou ld be establ ished at values of 67 percent of the m i n i m u m yield s t rength or 25 percent of the m i n i m u m tensile s t rength, whichever is less. All j o in t factors shou ld be appl ied after this value is de te rmined .

A-2-2.1.1 T h e following presents calculations to provide m i n i m u m pipe schedules (wall thickness) for use with clean agen t fire ex t inguish ing systems in accordance with this s tandard. Paragraph 2-2.1.1 requires that "the p ip ing wall thickness shall be calculated in accordance with ASME B51.1, Power Piping Code."

M i n i m u m Piping Requ i rements for Clean Agent Systems 1. Limitat ions on piping used for clean agen t systems (or any

pressurized fluid) are set by: (a) M a x i m u m p r e s s u r e expected within the pipe. (b) Material o f const ruct ion of the pipe, tensile s t rength, yield

s t rength, and t empera tu re limitations of the material. (c) End connec t ion j o i n i n g methods , e.g., threaded, welded,

grooved, etc~ (d) Pipe cons t ruc t ion me thod , e.g., seamless, ERW (electric

resistance welded), f l lrnace welded, etc.; (e) Pipe diameter ; and (f) Wall tlfickness of the pipe.

2~ The calculations are based on the following: (a) The calculations con ta ined he re in apply only to steel pipe

confo rming to ASTM A 53 or ASTM A 106. (b) The calculations cover threaded, welded, and grooved

jo in ts for steel pipe. (c) O the r materials, such as stainless steel pipe or tubing, can

be used provided that the appropr ia te SEw, dues, wall thickness, and end connec t ion factors are substi tuted.

3. The basic equat ion to de te rmine the m i n i m u m wall thickness for p iping unde r internal pressure is:

t = (PD/2SE) + A w h e r e t = requi red wall thickness (inches) D = outside pipe d iameter (incites) P = m a x i m u m allowable pressure (psig) SE = m a x i m u m allowable stress [ inc luding jo in t efficiency] (psi) A = ~ lowance for threading , grooving, etc. ( inches)

NOTE: For these calculations: A = dep th of thread for th readed c o n n e c t i o n s A dep th of groove for cut groove connect ions A zero for welded or rolled groove connect ions A = zero for jo ints in tub ing us ing compress ion or flare

fittings The term SE is def ined as 1 /4 of tbe tensile s t rength of the piping

material or 2 / 3 of the yield s t rength (whichever is lower) muh ip l i ed by a jo in t efficiency factor.

Joint efficiency factors are: 1.0 for seamless 0.85 for ERW (electric resistance welded) 0.60 for fu rnace butt weld (con t inuous weld) (Class F) 4. The basic equat ion can be rewritten to solve for P so as to

de t e rmine die m a x i m u m allowable pressure for which a pipe having a nomina l wall thickness, t, can be used.

P = 2SE ( t - A ) / D 5. If h igher storage tempera tures are approved for a given

system, the internal pressure shou ld be adjus ted to the m a x i m u m internal pressure at m a x i m u m tempera ture . In pe r fo rming this calculation, all jo in t factors and threading , grooving, or welding allowances shou ld be taken into account .

The requ i rements given in 2-2.1.1 (d) provide guidance for de t e rmin ing the m i n i m u m piping design pressure for approved or listed systems having pressurization levels, fill densit ies a n d / o r t empera tu re l imitations different f rom those shown in Table 2- 2.1.1(a) a n d Table 2-2.1.1(b).

The in tent of 2-2.1.1 (d) is i l lustrated in the following example: Given Clean Agent: HFG-227ea Fill Density: 65 lb / f t 3 Charg ing Pressure at 70°F: 360 psig Max. Opera t ing Tempera tu re : 160°F.

Using Figure A-2-1.4.1 (g) for HFC-227ea, the pressure in the

agent conta iner at 160°F a n d 65 lb / f t 3 fill density, is f o u n d to be 600 psig. In this case, the governing criteria o f 2-2.1.1(a) is "80% of the pressure in the agent conta iner at 160°F". Therefore , the m i n i m u m design pressure for the p ip ing is calculated to b e :

Pmin = 0.80 ( 600 psig = 480 psig 6. The following list gives values for SE as taken f rom Append ix

A of the ASME B31.1, Power Piping Code.

SE Value Grade C Seamless Pipe ASTM A 106 17500 psi Grade B Seamless Pipe ASTM A 53 15000 psi Grade B Seamless Pipe ASTM A 106 15000 psi Grade A Seamless Pipe ASTM A 53 12000 psi Grade A Seamless Pipe ASTM A 106 12000 psi Grade B ERW Pipe ASTM A 53 12800 psi Grade A ERW Pipe ASTM A 53 10200 psi Grade F Furnace Welded Pipe ASTM A 53 6800 psi

For SI units: 1 psi = 6,895 kPa.

7. Paragraph 102.2.4(B) of ASME B31.1, Power Piping Code, allows tbe m a x i m u m allowable stress (SE) to be exceeded by 20

~i ercent if the dura t ion of tile pressure (or t empera ture ) increase is mi ted to less than 1 percent of any 24-hr period. Since die clean

a g e n t p i p i n g is normally unpressur ized, the system discharge periocl satisfies this criteria. Therefore , die p ip ing calculations set out in this paragraph are based on values of S E t h a t are 20 percent greater than those out l ined above in paragraph 6 (per Appendix A of ASME 631.1, Power Piping Code). The specific values for m a x i m u m allowable stress used in these calculations are ,as follows:

75

Page 16: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

SE Value Grade C Seamless Pipe ASTM A 106 21000 psi Grade B Seamless Pipe ASTM A 53 18000 psi Grade B Seamless Pipe ASTM A 106 18000 psi Grade A Seamless Pipe ASTM A 53 14400 psi Grade A Seamless Pipe ASTM A 106 14400 psi Grade B ERW Pipe ASTM A 53 15360 psi Grade A ERW Pipe A,STM A 53 12240 psi Grade F Furnace Welded Pipe ASTM A 53 8160

psi

For SI units: 1 psi = 6,895 kPa.

NOTE 1: When us ing rolled groove connec t ions or welded connect ions with internal project ions (backup rings, etc.), the hydraulic calculations shou ld consider these factors. NOTE 2: Pipe suppl ied as dual s tenci led A 120/A 53 Class F meets the r equ i r emen t s of Class F furnace welded pipe ASTM A 53 ,as listed above. Ordinary cast-iron pipe, steel pipe confo rming to ASTM A 120, or nonmeta l l i c pipe shou ld no t be used° NOTE 3: All grooved coupl ings / f i t t ings shou ld be l i s ted /approved for use with clean agen t ex t inguish ing systems. NOTE 4: Tile above calculations do not apply to ex t ended discharge t imes exceed ing 14.4 rain. NOTE 5: For compress ion or flare-type tub ing fittings, the m a x i n m m allowable working pressure specif ied by the fit t ing manufac tu r e r shou ld be used.

8. M i n i m u m Pioin~ Reou i remen t s . Iner t agen t svstems: For piping ups t r eam a n d downs t ream of the

pressure r educe r , choose the p roper piping where the pressure rat ing is equal to or greater than the m i n i m u m design pressure values specif ied in Table 2-2.1.1 (a).

H a l . c a r b o n agen t systems: For h a l . c a r b o n agen t systems, choose the p roper piping where the pressure rat ing is equal to or greater than the m i n i m u m design pressure values specified in Table 2- 2.1.1(b).

For all o the r condi t ions de t e rmine the min imu~l piping design ~ressure r equ i rements as detai led in paragraph 2-2.1.1(d) and A-2- ~.1.1.5.

9. The following tables provide da ta on the m a x i m u m allowable wessure for which the most c o m m o n types of steel pipe can be

)sed. The pressures have been calculated us ing the formula, SE values and end connec t ions shown in A-2-2.1.1.3, A-2-2.1.1.4, and A-2-2.1.1.7.

Table A-2-2.1.1 (a) provides m a x i m u m allowable pressure ratings for NPS steel pipe with th readed end connect ions in Scbedule 40, 80, 120 and Schedule 160 wall thickness.

Table A-2-2.1.1 (b) provides m a x i m u m allowable pressure ratings for NPS steel pipe with rolled groove (,as applicable) or welded end connect ions in Schedule 40, 80, 120 and Schedule 160 wall thickness.

4. Pipe Tables. • Delete all existing pipe tables A-2-2.1 (a) t h rough A-2-2.1 (f). o Delete all exist ing pipe tables A-2-2.1.1 (a) t h ro u g h A-2-2.1.1 (i). o Replace with new pipe table A-2-2.1.1 (a) and new pipe table A-

2-2.1.1 (b) shown below:

Table A-2-2.1.I (a) M a x i m u m Allowable Pressure (psig) Steel Pipe with Threaded End Connections (A = thread depth)

NPS Wall Pipe Thick. Size (t)

1/2 3/4

1 1-1/4

Sch. 1-1/2 4O 2

2-1/2 3 4 5 6 8

1/2 3/4

1 1-1/4 1-1/2

Sch. 2 8O 2-1/2

3 4 5 6 8

"A" Grade: A-106C A-53B A-53B Dim. Type: Smlso A-106B ERW

s ~ : 21000 Smls . 15360

4 Sch. 5 120 6

8

Scb. 160

I/2 3/4

1 1-1/4 1-1/2

2 2-1/2

3 4 5 6 8

.109 .057 2593

.113 .057 2234 • 133 .070 2026 .140 .070 1782 .145 ,070 1667 .154 ,070 1494 .203 .100 1505 .216 .100 1392 .237 .100 1278 .258 .100 1193 .280 .100 1141 .322 .100 1081 .147 .057 4493 .154 .057 3874 .179 .070 3495 .191 0070 3073 .200 .070 2883 o218 .070 2625 .276 .100 2571 ,300 .100 2400 .337 .100 2212 °375 .100 2076 .432 .100 2105 .500 .100 1948 .437 .100 3145 .500 .100 3029 °562 .100 2929 .718 .100 3009 .187 .057 6500 .218 .057 6440 .250 .070 5749 .250 .070 4554 .281 .070 4664 .343 .070 4828 .375 o100 4017 .437 .100 4044 .531 .100 4023 .625 .100 3964 .718 .100 3918 .906 .100 3925

A-53A A-53A A-53F A- 106A ERW Furnace Smls . 12240 8160

18000 14400 2222 1896 1778 1511 1008 1915 1634 1532 1302 868 1736 1482 1390 1181 787 1528 1304 1222 1038 692 1429 1220 1144 972 648 1280 1093 1025 871 581 1290 1100 1032 877 584 1193 1018 954 811 541 1096 935 876 745 497 1022 872 818 693 463 978 834 782 664 443 926 790 740 630 420 3851 3286 3080 2618 1746 3320 2833 2657 2258 1505 2996 2556 2397 2037 1358 2634 2248 2107 1792 1194 2472 2110 1978 1681 1121 2250 1920 1800 1530 1020 2204 1882 1764 1499 1000 2957 1756 1645 1399 932 1896 1618 1517 1289 859 1780 1518 1423 1210 806 1804 1540 1442 1226 817 1669 1424 1336 1135 757 2696 2301 2157 1833 1222 2589 2209 2071 1760 1173 2510 2142 2008 1707 1138 2579 2201 2064 1754 1169 5571 4754 4457 3789 2526 5520 4710 4416 3754 2502 4928 4205 3942 3351 2234 3904 3331 3123 2654 1770 3998 3412 3198 2719 1812 4138 3531 3310 2814 1876 3443 2938 2755 2342 1561 3466 2958 2773 2357 1571 3448 2942 2758 2345 1563 3397 2899 2718 2310 1540 3358 2860 2687 2284 1522 3364 2871 2691 2288 1525

76

Page 17: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

NIPS Pipe Size

112 3/4

I I - I / 4

Sch. I - I / 2 4O 2

2- I /2 3 4 5 6 8

I /2 3/4

1 1-1/4 1-1/2

Sch. 2 80 2-1/2

5 4 5 6 8 4

Sch. 5 120 6

8 1/2 3/4

1 1-1/4 1-1/2

Sch. 2 160 2-1/2

3 4 5 6 ' 8

NFPA 2 0 0 1 - A99 ROP Table A-2-2.1.1(b) Maximum Allowable PressUre (pslg)

Steel Plpe with Rolled Groove or Welded End Connect ions (A = 0)

Wall Grade: A-106C A - ~ B A4iSB A.5$A A - ~ A A - ~ F Thick. ~ Sml~. A-106B ERW A-106A ~ W Furnace

(t) $1~: 21000 Smls. I~L~60 Smis . 1 ~ 4 0 8160 18OOO 14400

.109 5450 4672 3986 3737 3176 2118

.113 4520 3875 3306 3100 2634 1757 • 133 4248 3641 3107 2912 2475 1650 • 140 3542 3036 2591 2429 2064 1376 .145 3205 2747 2344 2197 1868 1246 • 1 54 2723 2334 1992 1867 1588 1058 .203 2965 2542 2168 2033 i 728 1152 • 215 2592 2221 1898 1777 1511 1007 .237 2"212 1896 1618 1516 1289 859 .258 1948 1669 1424 1336 1135 757 .280 1775 1522 1298 i217 1034 690 .322 1568 1 $44 1147 1075 914 609 • 147 7350 6 ~ 0 5376 5040 4284 2856 • 154 6160 5280 4506 4224 3590 2394 • 179 5717 4900 4182 3920 3332 2221 • I91 4833 4142 $555 3314 2816 1878 .200 4421 3789 3234 3032 " 2576 1718 • 218 3855 3304 2820 2644 2248 1498 • 276 4032 3456 2949 2765 2350 1567 .300 3600 3086 2633 2469 2098. 1339 ,337 3145 2696 2301 2157 1834 1223 .375 3831 2427 2071 1941 1650 1100 • 432 2739 2347 2003 1878 1596 1064 • 500 2435 2087 1781 1670 1420 946 • 437 4079 3496 2983 2797 2377 1585 ,500 3775 3236 2761 2589 2200 1467 ,562 3563 3054 2606 2443 2077 1384 • 718 5496 2097 2557 2397 2038 1359 • 187 9350 8014 68~t9 6411 5450 3633 • 218 8720 7474 6378 5979 5083 3388 .250 7985 6844 5840 5475 4654 3103 .250 6325 5422 4827 4337 3687 2458 .281 6212 5324 4543 4259 3620 2414 .343 6066 5199 4437 4159 5535 2357 .375 5478 4696 4007 3757 3193 2129 • 437 5244 4495 3836 3596 3057 2038 • 531 4956 4248 3625 3398 2889 1926 • 625 4719 4045 3451 3236 2750 1854 • 7 ! 8 4552 3902 5520 3121 2653 1769 .906 4419 3782 3227 $025 2571 1714

S U I k ~ A N T I A T I O N : T h e cur ren t criteria used in NFPA 2001; to establisll the min imum design working pressure for the system piping, was reviewed and reevaluated based on comments quest ioning the justification for requir ing the piping to be des igned t O a ldgher pressure than that required for the agent containers. For th i s revlew; the requi rements for DOT containers (e.g., DOT 3AA, 4BA, 4BW types) were used for comparison.

Paragraph 2-2.1.1 of NFPA 2001, 1996 edition, specRies that the min imum pipe design pressure shall no t be less than t h e p r e s s u r e in the container (at max, fill density if apl~licable ) a t 130°F.

The majority of agent containers are destgned and fabricated in accordance with DOT specifications. DOT 49 CFR specifies two (2) criteria that must be met to establish the service pressure of the containers when used with a particular agent, pressurization level, and fill density (if applicable). These criteria are found in' 49 CFR 173.301 (e) and 173.301(0, which state:

173.501(e): The pressure in the container at 70°F must no t exceed the marked service pressure of the container.

173.301(f): The pressure in the container at 1 ~ F ~;hall no t exceed 5 / 4 times the service pressure. (e.g., the marked service pressure of the container shall no t be less than 4 /5 o r 80% of the pressure at 130°F).

Comparisons used in the reevaluation include: • The agent container s are continuously under pressure.

At The piping is no t normally pressurized undl system actuation. the t ime of actuation the pressure in the piping is only sustained

for a short time period.

o The design safety factor o f the DOT coniainers used (3AA. 4BA. 4BW) are in the order of 2.5:1 (3AA) to 4:1 (4NA, 4BW).

, The Power Piping Code provides for a design safety factor of 4:1 (e.g., ultimate s trength vs. max. allowable design stress) for the material being used, and also inc ludes fur ther reductiOns in pressure rat ing based on construction efficiency factors a n d end connect ion fac tom

• The safety fac to rsused for the container design and the piping design are comparable to each other.

Substantiation for the n r o n m e d changes: • There, is no justification four requir ing the piping~design pressure to be greater than the min imum service pressure o f the agent container~ The proposed changes, included herein , use ihe same criteria as that used for t h e DOT containers in establishing the min imum design preMure for t he system piping.

• Based on use of the Power Piping Code the p roposed changes in p ipe design criteria do not compromise safety or performance.

• Existing pipe tables were de le ted to simplify this section and eliminate redundancy. The new tables provide alE Of the data necessary to de te rmine the piping acceptable for each d e a n agent. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

77

Page 18: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

(Log #62)" 2001- 24 - (Table 2-2.1.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Hjdeki Takamatu, Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add the information to Table 2-2.1.1 for IG-100. It should be added after the information for IG-01 as shown below:

Table 2-2.1.1 Internal Pressures Used for Calculations

Normal Charging Inte~-nal Pressure @ 130°F (55°C) P r e s s u r e

Piping upstream of Piping downstre.'un of pressure reducer pressure reducer

IG-01 charged to 2371 psig 2650 psig 975 psig (6723 kPa) (16,341 kPa) (18,97"2 kPa)

IG-100 char~ed to 2006 usi~ ~ t 13.836 kPa) (16.080 kPa)

IG-100 charfred to 2404 psi~ ~ .LQ.Q.O-P.gfig ( 16.580 kPa~ ( 19.300 kP~)

SUBSTANTIATION: Table 2-2.1.1 does not currently address I(~ 100. Tile pressures listed are specified by Koatsu Co., Ltd. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

>

(Log #29) 2001- 25 - (2-3.5.6.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Carol Weisner, US Environmental Protection Agency RECOMMENDATION: Replace the current text with the following text:

"For clean agent extinguishing systems, a predischarge alarm mad time delay, sufficient to allow personnel evacuation prior to discharge, shall be provided. Only for hazard areas subject to fast growth fires, where the provision of a dine delay seriously would increase the threat to life or property, may a time delay be eliminated. Hazards ,associated with fast growth fires would include, but not be limited to, f lammable liquid storage and aerosol filling areas." SUBSTANTIATION: The proposal is provided, along with companion proposals to (1) achieve consistency between NFPA standards and EPA and OSHA regulations; to (2) incorporate updated information allowing the use of total f looding agents to less conservative, yet safe, concentrations; and to (3) clarify existing safety standards.

NOTE: Support ing material is available for review at NFPA Headquar ters . COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Replace the current text with the following text:

"For clean agent extinguishing systems, a predischarge alarm and time delay, snfficient to allow personnel evacnation p rmr to discharge, shall be provided. For hazard areas subject to fast growth fires, where the provision of a dine delay would seriously increase the threat to life ~md property, a t ime delay can be eliminated."

A-2-3.5.6.1 Hazards associated with fast growth fires would include, but not be limited to, f lammable liquid storage or transfer and aerosol filling areas. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Editorial corrections. The last sentence is advisory and belongs in the Appendix.

(Log #CP9) 2001- 26- (3-3.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commit tee on Halon Alternative Protection Opt ions [ RECOMMENDATION: Revise the last sentence of 3-3.3 to read as follows:

"Where reasonable conf inement of agent is not practicable, protect ion shall be expanded to include tile. adjacent connec ted bazards or work areas; or additional agent shall be in t roduced into the protected enclosure using an ex tended discharge configuration." S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : The Commit tee felt that where reasonable conf inement of the agent is not practicable, the option of extended discharge should also be a consideration. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP13) 2001: 27- (3-~,.5): Accept SUBM]TTER: Technical Cotumittee on Halon Alternative Protection Opt ions RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

3-3.5 The protected enclosure shall have the structural s trength and integrity necessary to contain the agent discharge. Enclosure pressures developed during the discharge of a clean agent system are d e p e n d e n t on many variables including factors unique to each agent, system and enclosure. Over- or under-pressurization of the enclosure can occur dur ing the discharge. If the developed pressures present a threat to the structural s trength of the enclosure, venting shall be provided to prevent excessive pressures. Designers shall consult system manufacturer 's r e c o m m e n d e d procedures relative to enclosure venting. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : This' offers clarification to the text that states "pressure venting shall be provided to prevent over- or under7 pressurization of the enclosure." Additionally, it clarifies text as being associated with deve lopment of enclosure pressures rather than venting. Further it clarifies under what conditions venting should be considered and stipulates that manufacturer 's recommendat ions shall be followed regarding the requi rement for pressure venting:

Kidde-Fenwal in association with Great Lakes Chemical Corporat ion has be actively conduct ing research into the deve lopment of enclosure pressures dur ing FM-200 discharges and the relationship to strengths of structural components used in construction of enclosures typically protec ted by clean agent systems. Research has included experimental discharge testing and analytical model ing of enclosure pressures as well as analytical comparison with the strengths of various structural components . COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP5) 2001- 28- (3-4.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commit tee on Halon Alternative Protection Opt ions RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: • 3-4.2.1.2 Minimum design concentrat ion for inerting. The min imum design concentrat ion used to inert the a tmosphere of an enclosure where the hazard is a f lammable liquid or gas shall be the inerting concentrat ion times a safety factor of 1.1.

Replace the first sentence of 3-4.2.2.1 with the following: 3-4.2.2.1 Minimum design concentrat ion, Class B hazard. The

min imum design concentrat ion for a Class B fuel hazard shall be the extinguishing concentrat ion, as de termines in 3-4.1.2, times a safety factor of 1.2. 3-4.2.2.2 Minimum design concentrat ion, Class B hazard. The

min imum design concentrat ion for a Class A surface fire hazard shall be the extinguishing concentrat ion, as de termines in 3-4.1.1, times a safety factor of 1.2. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. Also see Proposal 2001-32 (Log #CP23). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP21) 2001- 29- (3-4.2.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commit tee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Options RECOMMENDATION: Move the CAUTION to Section 3-4.2.2. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : The existing CAUTION correctly warns against extinguishing burning gas j e t fires. This could subsequently lead to explosion if the gas supply is not shut off first.

This caution is probably more appropriate within a section of the Standard which addresses fire ext inguishment rather than inerting. Inert ing concentrat ions ,are normally specified where explosive a tmospheres cannot be completely avoided. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

78

Page 19: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

(Log #CP38) 2001- 30 - (3-4.2.1.2)': Accept SUBMrrTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protec~tion OptiOns RECOMMENDATION: 1. Revise 3-4.2.1.2 as follows:

3-4.2.1.2 Minimum dt~ign concentration for inerting. The minimum design'cohcentration used to inert the atmosphere of an enclosure where the hazard is a flammable liquid or gas shall be tile inerting concentration times a safety factor on 1.1.

3-4.2.2.1 Minimum design concentration, Class B hazard. The minimum design concentration, as determined in ~4.1.2, times a safety factor of 1.2.

3-4.2.2.2 Minimum design concentration, Class A hazard. The mininmm design concentration for a Class A surface fire hazard shall be the extinguishing concentration, as determined in 3-4.1.1, times a safety factor of 1,2.

2. Add the following new 5-5.~ and renumber existing 3-5.3 as 3- 5A.

3-5:3 Agent design quantity. The agent design quantity is the agent quantity determined in 3-5.1 or 3-5.2 times combined product of the design factors.

3. Replace existing 3-6 text with: ~ 3-6 Design factor ~or enclosure pressure. Change title. Keep first

two sentences. Change third sentence to the following. • The design factor to account for cases where the pressure of the protected hazard is different from atmospheric pressure is computed as the ratio of the nominal absolute pressure within the hazard divided by the average atmospheric pyessore at sea level. 14.7 psia. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMITrgE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #8) 2001- 31 - (3=4.2.2.1): Reject SUBMITrER: Thomas Wysocki, Guardian ~ Services, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise current first sentence to read :

" T h e m i n i m u m design concentration for Class B flammable and combustible liquids and flammable gases sha l lbe a demonstrated extinguishing concentration value for each Class B fuel as determined in a laboratory test acceptable to theauthor i ty having jurisdiction, plus a 20 percent safety factor." SUBSTANTIATION: The current wording only permits the cup burner test to be used. The cup burner test has provided a wide range of values of extingu~hing concentration for some of the halocarbon agents for specific fuels. The Standard should encourage alternate means of determining valid extinguishing concentrations since the cup burner results have not given the desired consistency.

There have been reports that cup burner concentrations used with the 20 percen.t safety factor have not extinguished the n- heptane fires in system approval tests consistei~tly. There have been reports that nozzles had to be spedally designed to direct the agent discharge directly at the fire sources in approval tests in order to achieve success. If these reports p rove to b e accurate, thif, is evidence that the extinguishing values determined from the cup burner apparatus may not be appropriate for field application of halocarbon agents - - particularly those wifich d e p e n d o n heat extraction as their primary extinguishing mechanism.

The proposed wording will tend to encourage investigation of otl~er laboratory methods of determining extinguishing concentrations appropriate for total flooding applications. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. - COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The cup burner method is intended to be used to establish the flame extinguishing concentration.for ('lass B fi~els. The cup burner method has been highly , standardized and can b e performed as a service by any of several laboratories. The standard does no t preclude the use of higher concentrations titan cup burner values.

(Log #CP23) 2001- 32 - (3-4.2.2,1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protect3on Options RECOMMENDATION:- Revise the second sentence to read as follows:

[ '~ /here mixtures or blends of Class B fuels exist, the flame [ extinguishing or inerting concentration for the individual fuel or

I fuel component requiring the greatest quantity of agent shall be used unless a lower extinguishing or inerting concentration for the specific hazard is:establist~ed by-test." SU~ ' rAlqTIATION: More clearly states the criteria for both mixtures or blends. Also see Committee Proposal 2001-28 (Log #CPS). COMMr['YEE ACTION: Accept. -

(Log #CP2) 2001- 33 - (3-4.2.2.3, A-3-4.2.2.3 and" A-3-7): Accept SUBM]T]'ER: Technical Committee on Halon Alterna~ve Protection Options RECOMMENtDATION: 1. Renumber paragraph 3-4.2.2.3 to 3- 4.2.2.4.

2. Add the following new_paragraph: 3-4.2.2.3* Minimum design concentration for Class C hazards

shall be at least that for Class A surface fire. 3. 5-7* Duration of Protection. It is important that the agent

design concentration not only shall be achieved, but also shall be maintained for a specified period of time to allow effective emergency action by trained personnel. This is equally important in all classes of fires since a persistent ignition sour~:e (e.g., an arc, heat source, oxyacetylene torch, or -"deep-seated" fire) carl lead to resurgence of the initial event once the clean agent has dissipated.

A-3-7 In esl~tblishing the hold time, designers and authorities having jurisdiction should consider: 1) response time of-trained personnel, 2) sources of persistent ignitior~, S) excessive' enclosure leakage, 4) system enclosure venting requirements, 5) inertion and reflash hazards, 6) wind down o f rotating equipment, or other unique factors which may influence the performance of the suppression system. The hold time for t h e d u r m i o n of protection should be sufficient to control the initial event and allow for support should resurgence occur once the agent has dissipated.

Energized electrical equipment that might 'provide a prolonged ignition source should b e de-energized prior to or d t ~ l g . agent discharge. If electrical equipment cannot be de-energize__, consideration should be .given to the u s e o f extendeddisclh~rge, the use of higher initial design concenwation, and the pomibility ~f the formation of combustion and decomposition products.

4. Delete first paragraph in A-5-7. 5. Renumber paragraph A-5-4.~2.$ to A-3-4.2.2A 6. Add the following new paragraph :

. A-3-4.2.2:3 Ene r~ . ed electri/:al .equipment that might provide a I prolonged ignition source should be de-energized prior to or I during agent discharge. I If electrical equipment cannot be de-energized, consideration [should be given tO the use of extended agent discharge, higher [ initial concentration, and the possibility of the formation of [combustion and decompost t ionproducts . Additional testing may [ be needed on su ppeesslon .°f energized electrical equipment fires

to determine these quantifies. Some examples of tes t methods on electrically energized

equipmentfires that might be useful are given i n t h e following raphs.

lA~agtl~e followin~ to" A-3-7i Two test methy ls that nrovide information, on extinguishment of

¢ller~ized electri¢.~l fires-have been develo~cL A ht'ief descfintion of t l~ test methods and the ~esults obta lnedns ina HFC-~27ea are i)resented below. A comnle ted i~nss ion of these-tes~ ~ m be found in "Exfin~uis~urnent Tests-0f.c0ntinu0uslv E n e n f i ~ d Class C Fires Usin~ HFC-227ea fFM-200~." vrenared hv Hu~h-es Associates. Inc..for Great Lakes Chenflcal Ck~m'nanv.

The first test. desimaed to renlicate an overcurrent event is called the ~]~adc :Hea t l t~ ~ test. In'this,test. a letml~ ofnower cable'was overloaded electrically by connection to an a~rc we]clef, resultin~ in in terna l over-heatina ~f the cable which-lem~m-m~rotvsis of the insulation material .-A small oilot flame was axmt'ied tb the sanmle after the conductors were heated and smoke , ~ issuin~r from ~ e center of the cable. A short ore-burn was allowed to reach a fully dmteloaed fire. and then the dean a~ent was discharged. CUrrent was ao~lled throua4mut the discharge, and continued for annr&~imatelv 10 ~ainutes following-discharae to d~eck for reflash tnon/~ was observedL In tests usin-~ HFC-2'2e/ea as4he exfinmitshin~ a~ent, the followin~ results were reoorted:

79

Page 20: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

T~lTle A-$,7.1 Ohmic Heating Suppression Test Results

'Cu~ent Number • Cgncentration

8 awg, Cross-Linked Polyethylene. 350A ~ 5.8% HFC~227ea Yes arranged in a horizontal bundle of 5 ]. 5,0% HFG-227ea Yes c~bles with only the center cable owp__~_ex_~.

Extingu ishment?

5,8% HFC-227ea Yes 5.5% HFCe-227e~ Yes 5.0% HFG-227ea Ye._.fis

8 awg. Cross-Linked Polyethylene. 350A 4 5.8% HFC-227ea Yes cable, arranged in a vertical bundle of 5 1 5.0% HFC-227ea Yes cables with only the center cable

1~ ~wg. SITW-A. 3 conductors per ~ _3 cable, arranged in a horizontal bundle 2 of 6 cables with 4 of file 18 conductors .]_ powered.

8 awg. PVC cable, arranged in a 325A 3 5.8% HFC-227ea Yes horizontal bundle of 7 cables with file cer~ter cab]e powered.

18 awg. 3 conductors per cable, 29A 4 5.8% HFC-227ea polyetlaylene insulation on conductors, with chrome PVC jacket around twisted conductors. 4 cable horizontal bundle, with 12 conductors powered.

16 ~,wgL 12 conductbrs per cable, 56A 3_ ~IIl~ffI~;~ yes lleoprene over rubber insulation, single horizontal cable. 9 conductors powered.

yes - In one test the gas did not completely

extinguish the fire,

18 ~wg. polyethylene insulated coaxial cable with the outeriacket and braided conductor removed fi.e., center core of the coaxial cable onlyL arranged in a horizontal bundle of 4 cables, all 4 conductors powered. (Note: in this series. the polyethylene insulation melted and formed a pool fire. A tray w~ ipstalled under the wire bundle so that the glowing wires were in contact with the molten pool of polyethylene.I

I~I; 1 5.7% HFC-227ea No 1 5,8% HFG-227ea No 2 6.5% HFC-227ea No 4 6.8% HFG-227ea Yes 3 7.2% HFC-227ea Yes

Ngt¢; In all ¢~sfs wber¢ the fire was extinguished, the time to extinguishment from be~nning of agent discharge was betwfen 3 and 15 seconds.

In the second test method, called the "Conductive Heating" test. the 10weF 4 in. (101 mm) of a 10.25 in. (260 nun) long sample of 350 locm diameter power cable was clamped vertically inside a ring heater, ensuring firm contact between the inside of the heater and t~l¢ ?9pper conductor. The heater was set to 890°C. and the sample was heated until the temperature at the top of the sample reached 310°C. The sample was then ignited by a small pilot flame, and tile ensuing fire was allowed to fully develop before agent discharge. The heater was energized throughout the discharge, and for 10 minutes diereafter to check for reflash (none was observed1. In tests using HFC-227ea as the extinguishing agent, the following results were reported:

SUBSTANTIATION: Added criteria for designing for Class C hazards. The material in A-3.7 is replaced by the new material in A-3-4.2.2.$. The need for higher initial concentrations and the need for extended discharge vary depending on the energy source. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

Table A-3-7.1 Conductive Heating Suppression Test Results

Number o f Concentration ' !

2550 mcm conner cable. Hwalon insulation with cotton braid sheathing and satu~n~ £Lamatai~=L~2£ 350 mcm copper cable. Hypa.[on insulation. .(l~;taaLKg_2~&

Ayerage Time tO Xe, m

1 5.2% HFC,-~27ea Yes 2 5.8% HFC-227ea Yes l l sec, 1 5.9% HFC-227ea Yes 7sec. 2 6.0% HFC-227ea Yes 10 sec.

S 5.8% HFC-227ea Yes 9sec. J_ fi.g% HFC-227ea Yes J. fi.0% HFC-227ea Yes 10 sec.

80

Page 21: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

(Log #42) 2001- 34- (3-5): Reject SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

Rename the existing Table 3-5.1(b) to Table 3-5.1 (d). Rename the existing Table %5.1 (c) to Table 3-5.1 (e). Rename the existing Table 3-5.1(d) to Table 3-5.1 (0. Rename tile existing Table %5.1(e) to Table %5.1(g). Rename the existing Table 3-5.1 (f) to Table %5.1 (h). Rename the existing Table 3-5.1 (g) to Table 3-5.1 (i). Rename the existing Table 3-5.1 (b) to Table 3-5.1 (j). Rename the existing Table 3-5.1 (i) to Table 3-5.1(k)o Rename the existing Table %5.1(j) to Table %5.1 (I). Rename the existing Table %5.1 (k) to Table %5.1 (m). Rename the existing Table %5.1 (I) to Table 3-5.1 (n).

SUBSTANTIATION: In order to add Tables 3-5.1(b) and 3- 5.1(c), the tables that follow must be re-alphabetized. Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Table will be incorporated in logical order. See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 2001-40 (Log #40) and 2001-41 (Log #41).

(Log #43) 2001- 35 - (3-5): Reject SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

Rename the existing Table %5.1 (m) to Table %5.1 (o). Rename tile existing Table Rename the existing Table Rename the existing Table Rename the existing Table Rename the existing Table Rename the existing Table Rename the existing Table Rename the existing Table Rename the existing Table Rename tire existing

SUBSTANTIATION:

3-5.1(n) to Table %5.1 (p). %5.1 (o) to Table ~-5.1 (q). 3-5.1(p) to Table 3-5.1(r). $-5.1 (q) to Table %5.1(s). %5.1(r) to Table %5.1 (t). 3-5.1(s) to Table 3-5.1(u). 3-5.1(t) to Table %5.1(v). %5.1(u) to Table %5.1(w). 3-5.1 (v) to Table 3-5.1 (x).

Table %5.1(w) to Table %5.1(y). In order to add Tables %5.1(b) and %

5.1 (c), the tables that follow must re-alphabetized. Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Table will be incorporated in logical order. See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 2001-40 (Log #40) and 2001-41 (Log #41).

2001- 36 - (Table %5.1(a)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER= Paul E. Rivers, 3MChemicals RECOMMENDATION: Revise Table %5.1 (a) as follows:

(Log #39)

Table 3-5.1 (a) Specific Volume Constants k l and k2

SUBSTANTIATION: FC-2-1-8 is in the process of development with commercialization a possibility within this standard cycle for use in occupied spaces as a clean extinguishing agent where no other alternative is teclmically feasible due to performance or safety. It has a zero ozone depletion potential and a superior toxicity profile. FC-2-1-8 has a NOAEL of 30 percent, a LOAEL >30 percent and an LC50 of 81 percent (0 2 added), as compared with its heptane cup burner value of 6.5 percent. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Incorporate table in logical order. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee agrees with the inclusion of this material.

(Log #63) 2001- 37- (Table 3-5.1(a)): Accept SUBMITTER: Hideki Takamatu, Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add the information for IC-190 (underlined) to Table %5.1(a) after the information for IG-01 as shown below:

o F o C

I~O1 8.514 0.0185 0.5685 0.00208 ~ ~ ~ o.oo29s

SUBSTANTIATION: Table 3-5.1(a) does not currently address IG-100. The listed values are specified by Koatsu Co., Ltd. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #69) 2001- 38- (Table 3-5.1(a)): Accept SUBMITTER: Hideki Takamatu, Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add the following information to Table %5.1(a) after tile information for IG-OI (underlined):

No Effect Low Effect Agen t Level Level* IG-01 43% 52%

IG-55 43% 52% IG-541 43% 52%

SUBSTANTIATION: Table °A-l-4.1(b) does not currendy address IC~100. The numbers for tile No Effect Level and Low Effect Level are specified by Koatsu Co., Ltd.

NOTE: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

°F °C Agents kl IO. kl !~

~ 0.0042 0.11712 0.~047 FC-3-1-10 1.409 0.0031 0.0941 0.0003 HCFC Blend A 3.612 0.0079 0.2413 0.00088 HCFC-124 2.3395 0.0058 0.1575 0.0006 HFC~125 2.7200 0.0064 0.1825 0.0007 HFC227-ea 1.885 0.0046 0.1269 0.0005 HFC~23 4.7250 0.0107 0.3164 0.0012 FIC,1311 1.683 0.0044 0.1138 0.0005 IG-01 8.514 0.0185 0,5685 0.00208 IG-541 9.8579 0.2143 0.65799 0.00239 IG-55 9.8809 0.0215 0.6598 0.00242 I-[FC-236fa 2.098 0.0051 0.1413 0.0006

(Log #CP24) 2001- 39 - (Table %5.1(a) through (w)): Accept SUBMrrTER: Technical Committee on Halon Altei, iaative Protection Options RECOMMENDATION: 1. Move Tables %5.1 (a) through (w) to the end of Chapter 3.

2. Add the following as a new Appendix B and renumber existing Appendix B.

Determination of the flame extinguislfing concentration of gaseous extinguisbants by the

cup burner method

B-I Scope. This procedure sets out tile minimum requirements for determining the flame extinguishing concentration of a gaseous extinguisbant in air for flammable liquids and gases employing the cup burner apparatus.

81

Page 22: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

B-2 Principle. Diffusion f lames of fuels bu rn i ng in a r o u n d reservoir (cup) centrally posi t ioned in a coaxially flowing air s t ream are ex t inguished by addit ion of a gaseous ex t inguishan t to tile air.

B-3 Apparatus . The cup bu rne r appara tus for these m e a s u r e m e n t s shall be a r ranged and const rncted as in Figure 1, employing the d imens ions shown; the tolerance for all d imens ions is ( 5% unless otherwise indicated.

B-3.1 Cup. T h e cup shall be round; shall be cons t ruc ted of glass, quartz or steel; have an outside d iameter in the range of 28 to

31 ram, wid~ a wall tl~.ickness of 1-2 ram; have a 45 ° chanffer g r o u n d into the top edge of tile cup; have a means of t emperau l re m e a s u r e m e n t of the filel inside tile cup at a location 2 to 5 m m below the top of the cup; have a m e a n s of hea t ing the fi~el; sl~ail be subslamtially similar in shape to the example shown in f igure 1. A cup. in t ended for nse with gaseous fuels shall have a m e a n s of a t ta ining a un i fo rm gas flow at . the top o f the cup (e.g., the cup may be packed with refractory marerials).

B-3.2 Chimney. T he ch i mney shall be of r o u n d glass or quar tz construct ion; have an inside d iamete r of 85 ( 2 m m and a wall thickness of 2 to 5 ram.; have a he igh t of 535 ( 25 ram.

B-3.3 Diffuser. The diffuser shall have a means o f f i tdng to tile bo t tom end of tile chimney; have a means of admi t t ing a premixed s t ream of air a n d ext inguishant ; and have a means of uni formly distr ibuting tile a i r / e x d n g u i s h a n t flow across tile cross section of the chimney.

B-3.4 Fuel supply, liquids. A liquid fllel supply shall be capable of delivering liquid filel to die cup while main ta in ing a fixed, but adjustable, liquid level therein.

B-3.5 Fuel supply, gases. A gaseous fuel supply shall be capable of delivering the fnel at a control led and fixed rate to the cup.

B-3.6 Manifold. A mimifold shall receive air and ex t ingu i shan t and deliver t hem as a single mixed s t ream to tile diffuser.

B-3.7 Air snpply. A means for delivering air to tile manifold shall allow ad jus tmen t of the air flow rate; have a calibrated means of measu r ing the air flow rate.

B-3.8 Ext inguishant supply. A means for delivering extingafishant to tile manifold shall allow ad jus tmen t of die ex t inguishant flow rate and have a calibrated means of measur ing die ex t inguishant flow rate.

B-3.9 Delivery System. Tile delivery system shall deliver a representat ive and measurable sample of the agen t to the cup b n r n e r in gaseous form.

B-4 Materials.

B-4.1 Air. Air shall be clean, dry and oil-free. T h e oxygen concent ra t ion shall be 20.9 ( 0.5 % v.v. T he source and oxygen con ten t of tile air employed shall be recorded.

NOTE: "AirO suppl ied in commercia l h igh-pressure cylinders may have an oxygen con ten t s iguif icandy different f rom 20.9 % v/v.

B~t.2 Fuel. Fuel shall be of a certified type and quality.

B-4.3 Ext inguishant . Ext inguishant shall be of certified type and shall mee t the specifications o f the supplier. Mul t i componen t

l ex t ingulshants shall be provided premixed .

!B-5 Procedure , f l ammable liquids.

B-5A Place tile f l ammable liquid in the fuel supply reservoir.

B-5.2 Admi t fuel to the cup, ad jusdng tile liquid level to within 5 to 10 m m of the top of the cup.

B-5.3 Opera te the hea t ing a r r a n g e m e n t for the cup to br ing the fuel t empera tn re to 22-+4°C or to 5 + I°C above die open cup flash point, whichever is h igher .

B-5.4 Adjust the air flow to achleve a flow rate of 10 l l t e r s /mlnute .

82

B-5.5 Ignite the fuel.

B-5.6 Allow die fuel to burn for a period of 90 to 120 s before beg inn ing flow of ext inguishant . Dur ing this period, tile liquid level in the cup should be adjusted so tha t the fuel level is at tile top of the cup.

B-5.7 Begin tile flow of ext inguishant . Increase the ex t inguisbant flow rate in inc rements until f a m e ex t ingu i shmen t occurs, an d record tile ex t inguishan t and air flow rates at ex t inguishment . The flow rate i nc r emen t shou ld result in an increase in the flow rate of no more than 2 pe rcen t of the previous value. Adjus tments in tile ex t inguishant flow rate are to be followed by a brief waidng period (10 s) to allow tile new propor t ions of ex t ingu i shan t and air in tile manifold to reach the cup position. Dur ing dlis procedure , tile liquid level in the cup is to be main ta ined at the top of tile clip.

NOTE: On an initial run, it is convenien t to employ relatively large flow inc rements to ascertain tile approximate ex t inguishant flow requi red for ex t ingu i shment , and on subsequen t runs to start at a flow rate dose to tile critical and to increase tile flow by small a m o u n t s until ex t i ngu i shmen t is achieved.

B-5.8 De te rmine the ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion of tile ex t inguishan t in accordance with Section B-7.

B-5.9 Prior to subsequen t tests remove tile fuel f rom the cup and remove any deposits of residue or soot that may be present on the clip.

B-5.10 Repeat B-5.1 to B-5.9 employing air flow rates o f 20, 30, 40 and 50 fiters/minutt3.

B-5.I l De te rmine tile air flow rate cor responding to tile m a x i m u m agen t concent ra t ion required for f lame ex t ingu i shmen t f rom a plot of fire ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion versns airflow.

NOTE: A "plateau region" in tile ex t inguish ing concentra t ion versus air flow plot occurs over which the ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion is at a m a x i m u m and is i n d e p e n d e n t of tile air flow. For tile purpose of de t e rmin ing tile air flow cor responding to the m a x i m u m required ex t inguish ing concentra t ion, ex t inguish ing concent ra t ions differing by ( 0.2% shall be considered to be equivalent, i f the "plateau region" in tile concent ra t ion versus ,air flow plot has not been reached at an airflow rate of 50 L/ ra in , fu r ther m e a s u r e m e n t s employing h igher flow rates shall be made until the plateau region can be found .

B-5.12 Repeat steps B-5.1 t h rough B-5.9 employing an airflow cor respond ing to the m a x i m u m requi red agen t concentra t ion, i~ de t e rmined in B-5.11.

NOTE: In tile case that a range of airflows exist over which tile ext inguishing concent ra t ion is cons tan t to within ( 0.2 % and is at a m a x i m u m ,employ an airflow rate in the middle of said range.

B-5.13 De te rmine tile ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion of tile ex t ingu i shan t in accordance with Section B-7 by establishlrig tile average of tile 5 tests.

NOTE: Tile cu r ren t task g roup considered the de te rmina t ion of ext inguishing concent ra t ions for tile case o f elevated fuel t empera tures and decided to not inc lude such informat ion in fills s tandard. This decision was based upon tile fact that die relevance of such data to real-world fire scenarios is current ly unknown .

B-6 Procedure , f lammable gases

NOTE: A cup in tended for use with gaseous fuels shall have a means of a t ta ining a un i form gas flow at the top of tile cup. For example, the cup employed for liquid fuels may be packed witll refractory materials.

B-6.1 Gaseous fuel shall be f rom a pressure regadated supply with a calibrated means of ad jusdng and nleasur ing the gas flow rate.

B-6.2 Adjust the air flow to 10 l i t e r s /minu te .

B-6.3 Begin fuel flow to the cup and adjust tile ftteI flow rate to attain a gas velocity nominal ly equal to the air velocity past the clip.

Page 23: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

NEPA 2901 - - A99 ROP

s-6.4..ignite am ~a~q.

B-6.5 &[low the fuel to b u m .for a .peri~l of C~ s before begimaing flow ofextinguisham.~ / " ~ ,,

l flow raie3n increments uniifI lame extingutdament occurs, and I record the air, e x ~ i s h a n t [ a n d fuel flow rates at exfinguislwhent~ The ¢xtinguishant flow rat e I increment should result l n a n increaseln the-flow rate of no more

than 2 percent of the previous value. Adjustments in the exfinguishant flow rate are to be foilowed~by a briefwattin~ period (10 s) to allowthe new proportions of extinguishant and mr in the manifold to readl theciJp ~ ~ o n . Dm-ihg:Tfl~ procedure, ti~e liquid level in fl~e cup is to be maintained at the top nf the cup.

NOTE: On an initial run, i t is convenient to employ relatively large flow incremenm masf.erlain the approximate e~ainguishant flow required for e x t i ~ i s h m e n t , and on sube~iuent ru~a~ to • start at a flow rate close m the critical and m increase the-lflow by small amounts until extinguishment is achieved.

13-6.7 Upon flame'extinguishment shut off the flow of flammable gas.

B-6.8 Prior to sut~q:luent tests remove deposits of'residu~ or soot if present on the cup.

B-6.9 De te rmine the ~ n g concentration of the extinguishant in accordance with Section B-7.

B-6.10 Repeat steps B-6.3 through B-6.9 at air flow rates of 20, 30. 40 and 50 liters/minUte.

B-6.1 ] Determine the air f l o w r a t e corresponding to the maximum agent concentration required for f lame extinguishment from a plot o f the extinguishing concentration versus -airflow.

NOTE: A ~plateau pegion" ~n the extintmishing concentration versus air flow plot occurs ~wer which ti~e extinguishing concentration B at a maximum and is independent of the air flow. For the purpose of determinin~ the air flow corresponding to the maximum required exlinguishmg concentration, extinguishing concentrations-differing by ( 0.2% sha~ be considered to be equivalent, if the "plateau region in the : concentration venn~s air f lowplot h ~ not been rea~:hed at an airflow rate of SO L/rain, f u r t b ~ measurements employing ' higher flow rates shall be made until the plateau region can be found.

I5-6.12 Re]~.e. at steps B-6.$ throughB-6.9 employing an airflow corresponmng to the maximum required agent concentration, as determined in B-6A 1.

NOTE: In the ca~e that a range of airflows exist over which the extinguishing concentration is con~n~nt to within ( O.I[ % and b at a maximum .employ an airflow rate in the middle of said range.

13-6.13 Determine the extinguishing conci~ntration of the extinguishant in accordance.with Secdon B-7 by establishing the average of 5 tests.

B-7 Extinguishant extinguishing concentration

B-7.1 Preferred method The prefer'Ted method for determining the concentration of extinguishant vapor in the extinguishant plus air mixture which just causes flame extinguishment is to employ a gas analyzing device, calibrated for the concentrat ion range of extinguishant-air mixtures being measured. The device may have continuous sampling capability, e.g., on line gas analyzer, or may be of a type which analyzes discrete samples, e.g., gas chromatography. Continuous measurement techniques are preferred.

Alternatively, the remaining oxygen concentration in the chimney may be measured with a continuous oxygen analysis device. The extinguishant concentration is then calculated as follows:

O2 c= i001(1 o:Fsup).)

where:

C = extingulshant concenwafieu, % v/v. 0 2 - oxygen ¢oncentratioa.ln d i k ~ e y ,% v/v O2(sup) -: ox3gen concentration in supply air ,% v /v

B-7.2 .Alternative me thod Extlnguishant concentration in the exti6guishant p lm air mixture may, alternatively, b e calculated from the measured flow rates of extinguishant and a i r /Where mass flow rate devices are e ~ p l o ~ d , the resulting rna~ flow rates need m be ccmveftt~.tO ~ ttow rates as follows

v i = n ~ / ( i

where:

V i = volumetric flow rate of gas i , l i t e n / m i n u t e

m i ffi mass flow rate of gas i, g ram/minute

(i ~ densi tyof gas i, graw~/liter

NtOTE:: Care shoutd b e taken to employ the actual vapor density. The vapor ~ l t y of many haiogebated hydrocarbons at ambient ~ , r a n g e a n d _pressure may differ from that . " calculated b~ the ideal gas-law by sewral per cent. By way of example, ~ e demity oftPlFC-227ea vapor at a premure 101,S kPa and temperature of ~ K B approximmely ~,4% higher than would I~ ca lcu la tedm an equivalent ideal gas. At a pressure of 6.7 Idea (~6 vol%), however, the difference between the actual vapor demity and that calculated a s a n ideal gas is less than 0.2%. Pubfi~fed property data should be used where possible. Lacking published d~a , esdmadon tedmiques may be used. The source of ph~ical property values used should be recorded in the test report.

The concxmwation of exdnguishant in volume per cent, C, is calculated as follows

C = V . . <-400 V air +V , , , ,

where: C - extingulshant concentration i n % v/v

Vai r ,. volumetric flow rate of air, l i ters/minute

" Vex t = volmnetric flow rate of extinguishant, l i ters/minute

B-8 Reporting of Results.

As a minimum, the followin 8 information should be included in the report of re~lts:

( a ) S c h e m a f i c diagram of apparatus, including dimensions. ( b ) Source and a s a y of the extinguishant, f ue l and a i r . ~c) For each te~, the temperature of the air/extinguishant

~uxmre at extinguishment. (d) Extinguld~nt, gaseous fuel and air flow rates at

extinguishment. (e) Method employed to determine the extinguishing

concentration. t~,) Extinguishant concentration determined for each tesL

M e~uremen t error analysis and statistical analysis of results.

This procedure differs from ISO as follows: A. Extinguishing concentrations relative to temperaxures are not

measured. B. Chimney lengths tolerances are more lenient. • C. Fuel temperatures employed

18 -261C NFPA

~ T ¥ O N : Standardizat ion of cup bu.rner methodology.

8 3

Page 24: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

(Log #40) 2001- 40 - (Table 3-5.1 (b)) : Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, SM Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Insert Table 5-5.1 (b) as follows: SUBSTANTIATION: FG-2-1-8 is in the process ofdevelopment with commercialization a possibility within this standard cycle for use in occupied spaces as a clean extinguisbing agent where no other alternative is technically feasible due to performance or

safety. It has a zero ozone depletion potential and a superior toxicity profile. FC,-2-1-8 has a NOAEL of 30 percent, a LOAEL >30 percent and an LGS0 of 81 percent (O 2 added), as compared with its heptane cup burner value of 6.5 percent. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

]Table will be incorporated in logical order. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee agrees with the inclusion of this material.

Table 3-5.1 ~b~ FC-2-1-8 Total Floodine Ouantitv I l l

specif ic Vapor Volume

-t- -s-

I~1 I41 -40 1.5754

16174 -2O 1.6594 -10 1.7014 _0 1.7454 10 1.7854

30 1.8694 40 1.9114 50 1.9534 60 1.9954 7O 8O 2.0794 90 2.1214 100 110 2.2O54

leO 14o 150 160 170 2.4574 180 190 2OO 210 22O

FC-2-I-8 Weight Reauirement~ of Hazard Volume W /V f l b / f t s) 121

Design Concentratiop (% by volumei [51

0.0~05 0.0478 0.0552 0.0628 0.0705 0.078.__..._~5 0.086_.__._~6 ~ 0.0465 0.05~8 0.0611 ~ ~ o.o385 o.o454 o.o524 0.0596 0.0670 0.0745

0.0309 0.0575 o.o442 0.0511 ~ 0.065~ o.o726 0.0801 0.030~ 0.0366 0.0432 0.0499 0.0567 0.0637 0.0709 0.0782 O.O2% ~ O.O422 O.O487 O.O554 O.O622 O.O692 O.O764 O.O288 0 .0~9 0.0412 O.O476 ~ O.O6O8 O.O676 O.O746 0.0282 0.0341 0.0403 0 .0465 0,052_9_ 0.0594 0.0661 0.0729 O.O275 ~ O.O394 O.O455 0 .0517 0 .0581 O.O647 O.O269 ~ ~ O.O445 O.O5O6 O.O569 O.O633 O.O698 0.0264 0.0320 0.0377 0.0436 0.0496 0.0557 0.0619 0.0683 0.0~58 ~ ~ 0.04~7 O.O485 O.O545 O.06O7 O.O669

0.0~07 O,O362 0.0418 O.O476 0~0534 0.05~4 0.0~56 0.0248 0.0301 0.0355 0.0410 0.0466 ~ 0.058_______~3 0.0643 O.O243 0.0295 O.0348 O.O4O2 O.O457 0 .0514 ~ 0.06~0 o.o239 ~ 0.0341 ~ o.o448 o.o5o4 o.o56o 0.0618

O.O284 ~ 0.0~87 O.O44O O.O494 0.0550 0.0230 ~ 0,0329 o.o38o ~ o.o485 0.0540 o.o596 o.o226 o.o274 ~ o.o373 0.4~4 o,o477 0~05~0

o.o269 0.0317 0.0~66 ~ o.o468 0.0521 0.0575 0.0218 o.o264 0.0312 0.0360 o.o4o9 o.o46o 0.0512 o.o565 0.0214 o.o26o o,o3o6 ~ o.o4o2 o.o452 o.o5o3 o.o555 0.0211 o.o255 o,0301 o.o348 o.o396 o.o445 0.049~ o.o546

~ ~ 0 .0~42 0.0~9 ~ o.o486 0.05~7 o.o2o4 o.o247 0_0.0.221. ~ ~ o.o43o o.o478 o.o528 o.o2oo o.o243 o.o287 0.0331 0.0s77 ~ 0,0471 0.0197 0 .0239 0.0282 O.Q~_2fi ~ 0 .0417 0.046~

[ l l T h e m a n u f a c t u r e r s lisfin~ shall soecifv the t e m p e r a t u r e r a n g e for the ope ra t i on . | 2 ] V W / V |Pute~at W e i g h t R e o u i r e m e n t s ( l b / f t s ) l - P o u n d s of a ~ e n t r e o u i r e d p e r cubic foot"of n r o t e c t e d v o l u m e to p r o d u c e indicat¢¢i concentr~t , ion 'ag t e m p e r a t u r e specif ied.

V C

[31 t [ T e m p e r a t u r e (°F)I - T h e des ign t e m p e r a t u r e in the haza rd area. [41 s [Spegific V o l u m e {ft3/ll~) 1 - Specific vo lume of s u o e r h e a t e d FC-2-1-8 v a p o r may be a o o r o x i m a t e d by the

° .

f o ~ u l a : s = 1.7434 + 0 . 0 0 4 2 t where t = T e m p e r a t u r e (°F)

[ 51 C J C o n c e n t .radon (%) 1 - Vo lumet r i c c o u c e n t ra t ion of FC- 2-1-8 in a i r a t t he t e m p e r a t u r e indicat¢~l,

84

Page 25: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

(Log #41) 2001-41 - (Table 3-5.1(c)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Insert Table 3-5.1(c) as follows: S U B S T A N T I A T I O N - FC~2-1-8 is in the process of deve lopment with commercial izat ion a possibility within this s tandard cycle for use in occupied spaces as a clean ex t inguish ing agen t where no o ther alternative is technically feasible due to pe r fo rmance or

safety. It has a zero ozone deple t ion potential and a super ior toxicity profile. FC-2-1-8 has a NOAEL of 30 percent , a LOAEL >30 percen t mad an LC50 of 81 percen t ( 0 2 added) , as compared with its hep tane cup burner value of 6.5 percent .

I COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Table will be incorpora ted in logical order. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Commi t t ee agrees with the inclusion of this material.

Table 3-5.1(c) FC-2-1-8 Total Flooding Quanti .ty [11

FC~2=L~_ Specific Vapor

Teml~ Volume -t._= -s...:

eta

FC-2-1-8 Weight Requirements of Hazard Volume W/V (kg/m 3) [21 Metric Units

Design Concentration (% by volume) [5]

IN I l l 4__00 0.0984 -35 0.1008 -3__9_O 0.1031. -25 0.1054 -20 0.1078 -1__~5 -I__Q -5 0.1148 _0 0.117l 5_ 0.1195 10 0.1218 15 0.1241 20 25 3O 0.1311 3.5 0.1335 40 0.1358 4`5 5O 0.1405 55 0.142~ 60 0.145~. 65 0.1475 70 0.1498 75 0.1522 8O 0.1545 85 0.1569 9O 95 0.161,5

100

I.ill [61 171 1181 ~ IlOl i l n lira/ 0.5347 0.648,5 0.7647 0 .883,5 1.0048 1.128,9 1.2557 1.385t 0.5223 0.6335 0.747~ 0 8630 ~ 1.1027 1.2266 1.3533 0.5105 0.6191 0.7301 0.8434 0.9593 J.0777 1.1988 1.3226 0.4992 0.6054 0.7139 0.8247 0.9380 J.0538 1.1722 1.2933 0.4883 0.5923 0.6984_ 0.8068 ~ 1.0310 1.1468 0.4780 O_Q~. 797 0.6836 0.7897 0.8982 1 . 0 0 9 1 1.1225 0.4680 0.5676 0.6694 0.7733 0.8795 0.9881 1.0991 1.2127 0.4585 0.5561 .Q.6557 0.7576 0.8616 0.9680 1.0767 1.1880 0.4494 0.5450 0.6426 0.7424 0.8444 0.9487 1.0553 1.1643 0.4406 0.5343 0 . 6 3 0 1 0.7279 ~ 0.9301 1.0346 1.1415 0.4321 0.5241 ~ 0.713,0 0.8~20 0.9123 1.0148 0.4240 0.5142 0.6063 0.7005 0 7q67 0.8951 0.9957 0.4162 0.5047 0.5951 0.6876 0.7820 0.8785 0.9773 1.07821 0.4086 0.4955 0.5843 0 .6751. 0.7678 0.8626 0.9595 1.0587 0.401,3 ~ 0.5739 0.6631. 0.7541 ~ 0.9424 1.0398 0.3943 0.478R 0.5639 0.6514 0.7409 0.8324 ~ 1.0216 0.3875 o.47oo o.5542 o.64o2 o.7282 0.8181 0.9100 Lo040 0.381_Q o.462o 0.5~8 ~ ~ o.8o42 0.8946 0.3746 0.4543 0.5357 0.6189 0 .~39 0.7909 0.8797 0.9706 0.3685 0.446,0 0.5270 0.6088 0.6924 0.777q 0.8653 0.9547

O.4397 0.5185 ~ 0.68~3 O.7654 0.8514 0.9393 0.3568 0.4327 0.5103 0.5895 0 .6705. 0.7533 0.8379 0.9245 0.3512 0.4260 0.5023 0.5803 0.6600 0.7415 0.8248 0.9100 O3458 ~ O.4946 0.5714 ~ 0.7301 0.8122 0.8961 0.3406 0.41,31 0 . 4 8 7 1 0.5628 0.6401 ~ 0.799~ 0.8825 0.3~355 ~ 0.4799 0.5544 0.6305 0.708t 0.7880 0.8694 0.3306 0.4010 0.4728 0.5462 0.6213 0.0__6. 980 0.7764_ 0.8566 0.3258 0.3952 0.466~ 0.5383 0.6123 0.6879 0.7652 0.8442 0.3212 0.3895 0.4593 0.5307 0.6035 0.6781 0.7542 0.8~2

[11 The manufacturers listing shall soecifv the temperature range for the ooeration. [21 W/V [Agent Weight Reguirements (kg/mS) l -

v

Kilograms reouired oer cubic meter of Drotected vohnne to produce indicated concentration at tempermre specified.

w=V ,0 c) I31 t [Temperature (°C)] -Ti le design temperture in the hazard area. [41 s [Specific Volume (mS/kg)l -Soecific volume of superheated FG-2-1-8 vapor may be approximated by the

s=0.117212 = 0.00047 t where t = Temperature (°C)

[51 C fConcentration (%)] -Vohullewic ¢ollcentratiQIl of FC-2-1-8 in air at tile temperature indicated.

85

Page 26: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

(Log #23) 2001- 42- (Table 3-5.1(d)): Accept SUBMITTER: Lorne MacGregor, North American Fire Guardian Teclmology, Inc.

]RECOMMENDATION: Revise the body of the table to read as Ishown below: SUBSTANTIATION: The proposed revision brings this table into line with Table 3-5.1(e) the metric version of this table. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

temp. Spec, Vol.

°F t~3/Ib 8.6% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% -50 3.2192 0.0292 0.0307 0.0345 0.0384 0.0424 0.0464 0.0506 '0.0548 -40 3.2978 0.0285 0.03 0.0337 0.0375 0.0414 0.0453 0.0494 0.0535 -30 3.3763 0.0279 0.0293 0.0329 0.0366 0.0404 0.0443 0.0482 0.0523 -20 3.4549 0.0272 0.0286 0.0322 0.0358 0.0395 0.0433 0.0471 0.0511 -10 3.5335 0.0266 0.028 0.0314 0.035 0.0386 0.0423 0.0461 0.0499

0 3.6121 0.026 0.0274 0.0308 0.0342 0.0378 0.0414 0.0451 0.0489 10 3.6906 0.0255 0.0268 0.0301 0.0335 0.0369 0.0405 0.0441 0.0478 20 3.7692 0.025 0.0262 0.0295 0.0328 0.0362 0.0396 0.0432 0.0468 3(} 3.8478 0.0245 0.0257 0.0289 0.0321 0.0354 0.0388 0.0423 0.0459 40 3.9264 0.024 0.0252 0.0283 0.0315 0.0347 0.0381 0.0415 0.0449 50 4.0049 0.0235 0.0247 0.0277 0.03(X3 0.034 0.0373 0.0406 0.0441 60 ¢0835 0.023 0.0242 0.0272 0.0303 0.0334 0.0366 0.0399 0.0432 70 4.1621 0.0226 0.0238 0.0267 0.0297 0.0328 0.0359 0.0391 0.0424 80 4.2407 0.0222 0.0233 0.0262 0.0291 0.0322 0.0352 0.0384 0.0416 00 4.3192 0.0218 0.0229 0.0257 0.0286 0.0316 0.0346 0.0377 0.0409

100 4.3978 0.0214 0.0225 0.0253 0.0281 0.031 0.034 0.037 0.0401 110 4.4764 0.021 0.0221 0.0248 0.0276 0.0305 0.0334 0.0364 0.0394 120 4.555 0.0207 0.0217 0,0244 0:0271 0.0299 0.0328 0,0357 0.0387 130 4.6336 0.0203 0.0213 0.024 0.0267 0.0294 0.0322 0.0351 0.0381 140 4.7121 0.02 0.021 0.0256 0.0262 0.0289 0.0317 0.0345 0.0375 150 4.7907 0.0196 0.0206 0.0232 0.0258 0.0285 0.0312 0.034 0.0368 160 4.8693 0.0193 0.0203 0.0228 0.0254 0.028 0.0307 0.0334 0.0362 170 4.9479 0.019 0.02 0.0225 0.025 0.0276 0.0302 0.0329 0.0357 180 5.0254 0.0187 0.0197 0.0221 0.0246 0.0271 0.0297 0,0324 0.0351 190 5.105 0.0184 0.0194 0.0218 0.0242 0.0267 0.0293 0.0319 0.0346 200 5.1836 0.0182 0.0191 0.0214 0.0238 0.0263 0.0288 0.0314 O.O34

(Log #CPI) 2001- 43 - (Table 3-5.1(o)): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options RECOMMENDATION: Change the values for F1C-1311 in Table 3-5.1 (o) ,as shown below:

Table 3-5.1(o) FIC-13[1 Total Flooding Quantity [1]

FIC-1311 Temp Specific Vapor

-T- Volume (°C) -S -

(cu m/kg) 131 141

FIC-1311 Weight Requirements of Hazard Volume W N (kg/cu m) [2]

Design Concentration (% by volume) [5]

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 -40 ~ 0.0938 0.3297 -30 0,0068 0.0988 0.3130 -20 ODO06 0.1038 0.2980 -10 O-,-,-,-,-,-,-,-,-,~ 0.1088 02843 0 ~ 0.1138 0.2718

10 0-.t078 0.1188 0.2603 20 0-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.~ 0.1238 0.2498 30 ~ 0.12_88 02401 40 0-.t-t60 0.1338 0.2311 50 ~ 0.1388 0,2228

60 ~ 0.1438 02151 70 ~ 0.1488 02078 80 ~ 0.1538 0.2011 9O 0-2-297- 0.1588 0,1948 100 ~ 0.1638 0.1888 I

0.4442 0.5611 0.6805 0.8024 0.9270 1.0544 1.1846 0.4217 0.5327 0.6461 0.7618 0.88)1 1.0010 1.1246 0.4014 0.5070 0.6149 0.7251 0.8377 0.9528 1.0704 0.3830 0.4837 0.5867 0.6918 0.7992 0.9090 1.0212 0.3661 0.4625 0.5609 0.6614 0.7641 0.8691 0.9764

0.3507 0.4430 0.5373 0.6336 0.7320 0.8325 0.9353 0.3366 0.4251 0.5156 0.6080 0.7024 0.7989 0.8975 0.3235 0.4086 0.4956 0.5844 0,6751 0.7679 0.8627 0.3114 0.3934 0.4771 0.,5625 0,6499 0.7392 0.8304 0.3002 0.3792 (/.4599 0.5,423 0.6265 (I.7125 (LF,(~5

0.2898 0.3660 0.4439 0.5234 0.6047 0.6878 0.7727 02800 0.3537 0,4290 0.5058 0,5844 0.6647 I).7467 0:2709 0.3422 0.4150 0.4894 0.5654 0.64:~ 1 0.7224 02624 0.3314 0.4020 0.4740 0.5476 0.6228 0.6997 02544 0,3213 0.3897 0.4595 0.5309 0,6038 0,6783

86

Page 27: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : T he re are p rob lems with the specific vapor volume values (SI units) for FIC-1311 in Table 3-5(0). The values in Table 3-5.1(n) (English units) appear to be correct, however, there is no t a correlation between the SI and English values. It appears that the values for die English uni ts were no t converted to SI uni ts correctly. For example , consider the value o rS at 50°F which happens to be 1.9019 ftg/Ib. This can be converted to m 3 / k g as follows:

1.9019 f t3 / Ib ÷ (0.4536 kg/Ib) + (35.31 f t 3 / m 3) = 0.11875 m3/kg

This is the w, ahle for 50°F, or in S1 units, 10°C. The value of 0.11875 m 3 / k g is shown on Table 3-5.1(o) as the ~due for 50°C rather daan 10°C. It appears that all the values were converted without first convert ing tempera tures . If any of the t empera tures are p lugged into the equat ion for the specific volume vapor (S=0.1138 + 0.0005t) the calculated ~dues for S are significantly different than those listed. The equat ion is correct, however, as will be shown below.

A l inear fit ~ t s done for the S values listed in Table 3-5.1 (u), and the equat ion for S was de t e rmi ned to be correct. T he n u m b e r s were then converted to English units, and ano the r linear fit was per formed, and the listed equat ion of S=0.1138 + 0,0005t was also found to he correct. It is therefore suggested that the values for the specific wtpor vohtme S ( m 3 / k g ) in Table 3-5.1(o) be es t imated with die equat ion S=0.1138 + 0.0005t for each of the listed tempera tures , and the co r respond ing weight requ i rements be es t imated with the equat ion W=V/s * (C/(100-C)) . This has been done as shown. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #33) 2 0 0 1 - 4 4 - (Table 3-5.1(p), (q) f o o m o t e 2): Accept

SUBMITTER: Steven W. Hansen , Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Editorial, the te rm "In" in these two Tables shou ld be changed to read "In". S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : The t e rm is improper ly abbreviated. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. Editorially change to read "In" (lower case L) COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Editorial.

(Log #32) 2001- 45 - (Table 3-5.1(p), (q), (r), (s), (t), (u)): Accept SUBMITTER: Steven W. Hansen , Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Change the table head ing to read:

"IG-XXX Volume Requ i r emen t of Agent per Uni t Volume of Hazard, VAgent /VEnclosure"- SUBSTANTIATION: Inert gases are des igned on a volmne per volume basis no t a mass per uni t volume. Data in the table is presented as vo lume of agen t per uni t volume enclosure. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #64) 2001- 46 - (Table 3-5.1(r) and (s)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Hideld Takamatu , Koatsu Co. Ltd.

I RECOMMENDATION: Add Tables for IG-100 (in both English and SI units) . It is sugges ted that the tables be placed after Table 3-5.1(q) a n d called Tables 3-5.1(r) and 3-5.1(s). The Tables that follow these should be r e n u m b e r e d accordingly. The sugges ted tables are sbown below:

Table 3-5.1(0 Total Flooding Quant i ty [1]

IG-100 IG-100 Volume Requirements of Hazard Volume X (ft~/ft ") [2] Specific English Units

Temp Volume Design Concentration (% by volume) [5] -t- -S- °F (ft~/lb) [3] [4] 34 37 40 42 47 49 58 62

-40 10.934 0.522 0.581 0.642 0.685 0.798 0.847 1.091 1.216 -30 11.195 0.510 0.567 0.627 0.669 0.780 0.827 1.065 1.188 -9-0 11.455 0.499 0.554 0.613 0.654 0.762 0.808 1.041 1.161 -10 11.716 0.488 0.542 0.5 tYO 0.639 0.745 0.790 1.018 1.135

0 11.976 0.477 0.530 0.586 0.625 0.729 0.773 0.996 1.111 10 12.237 0.467 0.519 0.574 0.612 0.713 0.756 0.975 1.087 2)0 12.497 0.457 0.508 0.562 0.599 0.698 0.741 0.954 1.064 30 12.758 0.448 0.498 0.550 0.587 0.684 0.726 0.935 1.043 40 13.018 0.439 0.488 0.539 0.575 0.670 0.711 0.916 1.022 50 13.279 0.430 0.478 0.529 0.564 0.657 0.697 0.898 1.002 60 13.540 0.422 0.469 0.519 0.553 0.645 0.684 0.881 0.982 70 13.800 0.414 0.460 0.509 0.543 0.632 0.671 0.864 0.964 80 14.061 0.406 0.452 0.499 0.533 0.621 0.658 0.848 0.946 90 14.321 0.399 0.444 0.490 0.523 0.609 0.646 0.833 0.929

100 1 4 . 5 8 2 0.392 0.436 0.482 0.514 0.599 0.635 0.818 0.912 110 14.842 0.385 0.428 0.473 0.505 0.588 0.624 0.803 0.896 120 15.103 0.378 0-421 0.465 0.496 0.578 0.613 0.790 0.881 130 15.363 0.372 0.413 0.457 0.487 0.568 0.602 0.776 0.866 140 15.624 0.366 0.407 0.449 0.479 0.559 0.592 0.763 0.851

" 150 15.885 0.350 0.400 0.442 0.471 0.549 0.583 0.751 0.837 1 6 0 16.145 0.354 0.393 0.435 0.464 0.541 0.573 0.739 0.824

170 16.406 0.348 0.387 0.428 0.456 0.532 0.564 0.727 0.811 180 16.666 0.343 0.381 0.421 0.449 0.524 0.555 0.716 0.798 190 16.927 0.337 0.375 0.415 0.442 0.516 0.547 0.705 0.786 200 17.187 0.332 0.370 0.409 0.436 0.508 0.539 0.694 0.774

[1 ] "/'he manufacturers shall specify the temperature range for operation. [2] X [Agent Volume Requirements (ft~/fts)] - - Volume of agent required per cubic foot of protected volume to produce indicated concentration at temperature specified.

X = 2.303 * * L°g l0 k, 1 0 0 - C J \ I 0 0 - C J

[3] T [Temperature (°F)] - - T h e design temperature in the hazard area, [4] S [Specific Volume (ftS/Ib)] - - Specific Volume of superheated IG-100 vapor may be approximated by the formula:

S -- 11.976 + 0.02606t where t - t e m p e r a t u r e (°F)

[51 C [~ ;oncentration (%)] --Volumetric concentration of 1C~100 in air at the temperature indicated at 1 annosphere and storage temperature o f 70°F.

I1°°) [6] V s = The term X = In - - gives the volume at a rated concentration (%) mid temperature to reach an air-agent mixture at the end of flooding \ 1 0 0 - C /

time in a volume of I ft ~

17] V s = Specific volume of inert gas at 68°F = 13.747 ft '/lb.

87

Page 28: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

IG-100 Specific

Temp Volume -t- -S- °C (mS/kg)

N F P A 2 0 0 1 m A 9 9 R O P

Table 3-5.1 (s) Total Flooding Quantity, I I ] IG-100 Volume Requirements of Hazard Volume X ( m ' / m ~) [9]

Metric Units Design Concentration (% by volume) [51

[31 141 34 37 40 42 47 49 58 62 -40 0.6826 0.5225 0.5809 0.6423 0.6849 0.7983 0.8466 1.0908 1.2166 -30 0.7119 0.5009 0.5570 0.6159 0.6567 0.7654 0.8118 1.0459 1.1665 -20 0.7412 0.4811 0.5350 0.5915 0.6308 0.7352 0.7797 1.0045 1.1204 -10 0.7704 0.4629 0.5147 0.5691 0.6069 0.7073 0.7501 0.9664 1.0779

0 0.7997 0.4459 0.4959 0.5482 0.5846 0.6814 0.7227 0.9310 1.0384 I 0 0.8290 0.4302 0.4783 0.5289 0.5640 0.6573 0.6971 0.8981 1.0017 20 0.8582 0.4155 0.4621 0.5109 0.5448 0.6349 0.6734 0.8676 0.9677 30 0.8875 0.4018 0.4468 0.4940 0.5268 . 0.6140 0.6512 0.8389 0.9357 40 0.9168 0.3890 0.4325 0.4782 0.5100 0.5943 0.6304 0.8121 0.9058 50 0.9461 0.3769 0.4191 0.4634 0.4942 0.5759 0.6108 0.7870 0.8778 60 0.9753 0.3657 0.4066 0.4495 0.4794 0.5587 0.5925 0.7634 0.8515 70 1.0046 0.3550 0.3947 0.4364 0.4654 0.5424 0.5753 0.7411 0.8266 80 1.0339 0.34-49 0.3835 0.4241 0.4522 0.5270 0.5590 0.7201 0.8032 90 1.0631 0.3355 0.3730 0.4124 0.4398 0.5126 0.5436 0.7004 0.7812

100 1.0924 0.3265 0.3630 0.4613 0.4280 0.4988 0.5290 0.6816 0.7602

[1] The manufac tu re r s shall specify the t empera tu re range for operat ion. [2] X [Agent Volume Requ i remen t s (mS/ res ) ] I Volume of agen t requi red per cubic me te r o f protec ted vo lume to p roduce indica ted concen t ra t ion at t empera tu re specified.

X = 2.303 * * LOgl0 = * In

[3] T [Tempera tu re (°C)] i T he design t empera tu re in the hazard area. [41 s S [Specific Volume (m / kg ) ] - - Specific Volume of supe rbea ted IG-100 vapor may be approx imated by the formula:

S = 0.7997 + 0.00293t where t = t empera tu re (°C)

[51 G [Concent ra t ion (%)] - - Volumetr ic concent ra t ion of IG-100 in air at the t empera tu re indicated at 1.013 bar and storage

t empera tu re of 20°C.

[6] T h e t e r m X = l n ( 100 / g i v e s t h e v o l u m e a t a r a t e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n ( % ) a n d t e m p e r a t u r e t o r e a c h a n a i r - a g e n t \ 1 0 0 - C /

mixture at the end of f looding t ime in a volume of 1 ms .

[7] V s = Specific vo lume of inert gas at 20°C = 0.8582 mS/kg .

SUBSTANTIATION: Tables 3-5.1 do not currently address IG- 100, a n d the informat ion needs to be added. T he n u m b e r s were d e t e r m i n e d by taking tile values for specific vapor volume(s) as de t e rmined by Koatsu Co., Ltd., a n d us ing the equat ion in 3-5.2* of the NFPA 2001 s tandard (below) to de te rmine vo lume requ i remen t s per un i t vo lume Of protec ted space (X).

Volume requ i remen t s per un i t vo lume of protected space: X = 2.303 (Vs/S) Log 10 (100/100-C)

Note: An addi t ion equa t ion is shown on each of the p roposed tables: X = (Vs /S ) In (100/100-G)

This equat ion can also be used since In (a) = 2.303 L o g l 0 ( a ) where a is any n u m b e r . COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #34)

2001- 47 - (Table 3-5.1(r), (s), (t), (u) , footnote 2): Accept SUBMITTER: Steven W. Hansen , Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Correct equat ion to read:

W = V/S * In (100/(100-C)) . SUBSTANTIATION: Present equat ion is incorrect for calculating iner t gas quantifies.

I COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. Editorially correct to read W=V/s*In(100/ (100-C)) . (Note this is a lower case S and a lower case L). COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Editorial.

(Log #35) 2001- 48 - (Table 3-5.1(r), (s), (t), (u) , t oo tno te 6 (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: Steven W. Hansen , Ansul Inc.

I RECOMMENDATION: Add footnote [6] to read: '%V" = V a g e n t / V e n c l o s u r e = In (10O/(100-C)).

SUBSTANTIATION: Footnote [6] uses '%V" to me an gas volume where elsewhere in die s tandard 'qN" represents a mass quantity. This more clearly defines the m e a n i n g of the equat ion in footnote [2]. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #20b) 2001- 4 9 - (Table 3-5.1(x)): Reject SUBMITTER: " • Lorne MacGregor, Nor th Amer ican Fire Guardian Technology, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add table as follows: (See Table 3-5.1(x)on page 89.) SUBSTANTIATION: NAF P-IV is a new agen t developed primarily as a r ep l acemen t to ha lon 1211. While it is ant ic ipated that its pr imary use will be as a s t reaming agen t it is expected that some e q u i p m e n t manufac tu re r s m igh t wish to use it, as ha lon 1211 was used, for total f lood appl icat ions for normal ly unoccu, pied areas. The U.S.E.P.A has placed NAF P-IV on the Significant New Alternative Program (SNAP) list. Pease note tha t the E.P.A. has started to use t rade names and no longer tries to invent generic n a m e s for p roduc t s such as NAF P-IVo COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject° COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Commi t t ee Action and S ta tement on Proposal 2001-8 (Log #20).

88

Page 29: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2001 m A 9 9 R O P

Table 5-.q.l(x) Total flooding quantity

temp. 8 .

c m3/Itg 9% 1o% 1i% ' ~ " 12% 13% -50 0.1~2~ 0.0064 0.906 1.0078 1.1119 1.2184 -45 0.1254 0.7888 0.8861 0.9857" 1.0875 1.1917 -40 0.1281 0.7718 0.8671" 0:9646 ? 1.0642 1.1661 -35 0.1509 " 0.7556 0.8489 0.9443 1.0419 1.1417 -50 0.1556 0.7401 0.8315 0.9249 1.0204 1.1182 -25 0.1564 0.7252 0.8147 0.9063 0,9999 1.0957 -20 0.1591 0.7109 0:7986 0.8884 0.9801 1.074 -15 0.1419 0.6971 0.718.$2 0.8712 0.0611 1.0532 -I0 0.1446 0:68"39 0.7683 0.8546 0.9429 1.0352 -5 0.1474 0.6711 0.754 0.8587 0.99_53 1.0159 0 0.1501 0.6588 0.7402 0.8233 0.9084 0.9954 5 O. 1529 0.647 0.7268 0.8085 0.892 0.9775 I0 0.1556 0.6356 0.714 0.7942 0.8763 0.9602 15 0.1584 0.6245 0.7010 0.7805 0.8611 0.9436 20 0.1611 0.6139 0.6897 0.7671 0.8464 0.9575 25 0.1639 0.0056 0.6781 0.7545. 0.8322 0.9119 56 0.1666 0.5956 0.6669 0.7418 0.8185 0.8969 35 0.1694 0.584 0.6561 0.7208 0.8052 0.8823 40 0.1721 0.5747 0.6456 0.7182 0.7025 0.8682 45 0.1748 0.5656 0.6:$55 0.7069 0.7799 0.8546 50 0.1776 0.5569 0.6256 0.6959 0.7678 0.8414 55 0.1803 0.5484 0.6161 0.6853 0.7561 ~ ~:8286 60 0.1851 0.5402 0.6069 0.675 0.7448 0.8161 65 0.1858 0.5322 0.5979 0.6651 0.7338 0.8041 70 0.1886 0.5244 0.5892 0.6554 0.7231 0.7923 ")5 0.1913 0.5109 0.5807 0.646 0.7127 0.781 80 0.1941 0.5098 0.5725 0.6368 0.7026 0.7699 85 0.1968 0.5025 0.5645 0.6279 0.6928 0.7592 90 0.1996 0.4955 0.5567 0.6193 0.6855 0.7487 95 0.2023 0.4888 0.5492 0.6109 0.674 0.7385

Calculations for one atmosphere pressure. Weight requirements calcuhted as W/¢-I /s*(C/(IO0-C))

2001- 50 - (Table 3-5.1(x)): Reject (Log #20c) SUBMITTER: Lome MacGregor, North American Fire Guardian Technology, Inc . RECOM]~ENDATION: Add table as follows:

S ~=. temp. V ~ Weih, ht/Volume {mb/ftS~ Requlremem for Conceatration F ff/$1b ~ . . . . . . 10~ 11~

-56 2.00~2 0.0494 -" 0.0555 0.0817 O.lO~ 1

14% 1.3274 1.~83 1.2"/04 1,2438 1.2182 1,1937 1.1701 1,1474 1.1256 1.1046 1.0844 1.0649 1.0461 1.058

1.0104 O.O935 0.9771 0.9612 0.9459 0.951

0.9166 0.9027 0.8891 0.876

,0.8032 0.8508 0.8388 0.8271 0.8157 0.8046

1.4589 1.4074 k3772 1.348,$ 1.3206 1.294

- 1.2684 1.2438 1.2202 1.1975 1.1755 1.1544 1.134 1.1145 1.095.?, 1.077 1.0592 1.04~ I ,O254 1.0093 0.9937 0.9785 0.9638 0.9496 0.9357 0.9223 0.9002 0=8966 0.8842 0.8722

lS~ 14~t lS% '16% 0.0746 0.0813 0.0881 0.0951

-40 2.0521 0.0482 0,0541 0,0602 0,0665 0.0728 0.0793 0.086 0.0928 -$0 2.101 0.0471 0.0529 0.0588 0.0649 0,0711 0.0775 0.084 0.9097 -20 2.1499 0.046 0.0517 0.0575 0.0634 0.0695 0.0757 0.0821 0,0886 -10 2.1988 0.045 0.0505 0.0562 0.062 0.008 0.074 0.0803 0.0866 0 2.2476 0.044 0.0494 0.055 0.0607 0.0665 "0.0724 0.0785 0.0847 10 2.2965 0.0431 0.0484 0.0538 0.0594 0.0551 0,0709 0.0768 0.0859 20 2.3454 _ 0.0422 0.0474 0.0527 0.0581 0.0637 0.0694 0.0752 0.0812 $0 2.3943 0.0413 0.0464 0.0516 0.057 0.0624 0.068 0.0737 0.0796 40 2.4432 0.0405 0.0455 0.0500 0.0558 0.0812 0.0566 0.0722 0.078 50 2.4921 0.0397 0.0446 0.0496 0.0547 0.06 0.0653 0.0708 0.0764 60 2.541 0.0389 0.0437 0.0480 D.0537 0.0588 0.0041 0.0694 0,075 70 2.5899 0.0382 0.0429 0,0477 ~ 0.0527 0.0577 0.0529 0,0681 0.0735 80 2:6388 0.0375 0.0421 0.0468 0.0517 0.0566 0.0617 0.0669 0.0722 90 2.6877 0.0368 0.0413 0.046 0.0507 0.0556 0.0606 0.0657 0.0709 100 2.7566 0.0561 0.0406 0.0452 0.0498 0.0546 0.0595 0.0645 0.0696 110 2.7855 " 0.0555 0.0399 0.0444 0.049 0.0556 0.0584 0,0684 0.0684 1 20 2.8344 0.0349 0.0392 0.0436 0.0481 0.0527 0.574 0.62'5 0.0675 150 2.8833 0.0343 0.0385 0.0429 0.0473 0.0518 0.0565 0.0612 0.0561 140 2.9322 0.05,$7 0.0379 0.0422 0.0465 0.051 0.0555 0.0002 0.065 150 2.0811 0.0332 0.0375 0.0415 0.0457 0.0501 0.0546 0.0592 0.0859 160 3.03 0.0326 0.0367 0.0408 0.045 0.0493 0.0537 0.0582 0.9829 170 3.0789 0.0321 0.0361 0.0401 0:0443 0.0485 0.0529 0.0573 0.0619 180 3.1278 0.0316 0.0355 0,0395 0.0436 0,0478 0,052 0.0564 0.0609 190 3.1766 0.0311 0.035 0.0589 0.0420 0.047 0.0512 0.0556 0.06 200 3.2255 0.0507 0.0544 0.0583 0.0423 0.0465 0.0505 0.0547 "0.0591

Calculationsfor one atmosphere pressure. Weight requirements calcu|ated as W/V-1/s*(c/(tO0-C))

16% 1.5531 1.5191 1.4865 1.4553 1 . 4 ~ 4 1.3967 1,3691 1.3426 1.317

1.2925 1.2688 1.246 '1.224 1.2028 1.1823 1.I624 1.1433 1.1247 1.1068 1.0894 1.0725 1.0562 1.0403 1.0249

1.01 0.9955 0.9814 0.9677 0.9.544 0.9414

89

Page 30: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2001 - - A 9 9 R O P

SUBSTANTIATION: NAF P-IV is a new agent developed primarily as a replacement to halon 1211. Whi l e it is anticipated that its primary use will be as a streaming.agent it is expected that some equipment manufacturers might wt~h to use it, as halon 1211 was used, for total flood applications for normally unoccupied areas. The U.S.E.P.A has placed NAF P-IV on the Significant New Alternative Program (SNAP) list. Pease note that the E.P.A. has started to use trade names and no longer tries to invent generic names for products such as NAF P-IV. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 2001-8 (Log #20).

(Log #CP28) 2001- 51 - (3-5.3, A-3-5.3.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options

[ RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: [ 3-5.3 Design Factors. In addition to the concentration [ requirements, additional quantities of agent are required through J the use of design factors to compensate for any special conditions I that would affect the extinguishing efficiency. ] 3-5.3.1" Enclosure Pressure Design Factor. The design quantity I of the clean agent shall be adjusted to compensate for ambient I pressures that vary more than 11 percent [equivalent to approximately 3000 ft (915 m ) o f elevation change] from standard sea level pressures [29.92 in. Hg at 70°F (760 mm Hg at 0°G)]. The ambient pressure is affected by changes in altitude, pressurization or depressurization of the protected enclosure, and weather-related barometric pressures changes. The design factor to account for cases where the pressure of the protected hazard is different from atmospheric pressure is computed as the ratio of the nominal absolute pressure within the hazard divided by the average annospheric pressure at sea level, 14.7 psia.

3-5.3.2* Multiple Tee Design Factor. The following table sliali be used to define a design factor for engineered systems with tees. Tile number of nozzles used to determine the design factor shall be based on the minimum number of nozzles possible for the system considering the maximum area coverage limits, not the actual number of nozzles used in the design.

Exception: For symetrical systems or systems that discharge into one space, this provision does not apply.

Table 3-5.3.2 I

Nun~ber of Design Factor Design Factor Nozzles Hal ocarbon ,A~ents Inert Gas Ahrents

0-5 0 percent TBD 0 1 percent TBD 7 2 percent TBD 8 3 percent TBD 9 4 percent TBD

10 5 percent TBD 11 6 percent TBD 12 7 percent TBD 13 8 percent TBD 14 9 percent TBD 15 10 percent TBD 16 11 percent TBD 17 12 percent TB D 18 13 percent TBD 19 14 percent TBD 20 15 percent TBD

A-3-5.3.2 The additional agent required by this design factor is intended to compensate for the increased uncertainty in the quantity of agent coming from a particular nozzle in a complicated system. This uncertainty is due to the propagation of errors in the predictions for each tee split the agent must pass through. Table 3- 5.3.2 provides the required desi~m factor based on the number of nozzles (the number of nozzles ~s always one more than the number of tees, do not count any tees used in manifolding. This it to allow a designer to use smaller nozzle spacing without having to increase the design factor.

Exception: For symmetrical systems or systems that discharge into one space, this provision shall not apply. SUBSTANTIATION: Tile additional agent required by dais design factor is intended to compensate for the increased uncertainty in the quantity of agent coming from a particular nozzle in a complicated system. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP29) 2001, 52 - (3-5.3,3): Accept S U B ~ Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

3-5.3.3* The designer shall assign and document additional design factors for each of the following;

Unsealable openings and their effects on distribution and concentration (see also 3-8.2); control of acid Ip~ases; re-ignition from heated surfaces; and fuel type, conflgnranons, scenarios not fully accounted for in the extinguishing concentration, enclosure gdeometry and obstructions and their affects on distribution. The

esign factors assigned can be positive. SUBSTANTIATION: Added a list of items for additional design factors. COMMITFEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP 10) 2001- 53- (3-7): Accept SUBMITI'ER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options RECOMMENDATION: 1. Section 3-7. In the first sentence change "...for a sufficient period of time..." to "...for the specified period of time..." to be consistent with the wording used in Section 1-4.2.7. Text will now read:

3-7* Duration of Protection. It is important that the agent design concentration not only shall be achieved, but also shall be maintained for a specified period of time to allow effective emergency action by trained personnel. This is equally important in all classes of fires since a persistent ignition source (e.g., an arc, heat source, oxyacetylene torch, or "deep-seated" fire) can lead to resurgence of the initial event once the clean agent has dissipated.

2. Revise A-5.7 to read as follows: A-3-7 In establishing the hold time, designers and authorities

having jurisdiction should consider: 1) response time of trained personnel, 2) sources of persistent ignition, 3) excessive enclosure leakage, 4) system enclosure venting requirements, 5) inertion and reflash hazards, 6) wind down of rotating equipment, or other unique factors which may influence the performance of the suppression system. The hold time for the duration of protection should be sufficient to control the initial event and allow for

I support should resurgence occur once the agent has dissipated.

Energized electrical equipment that might provide a prolonged ignition source should be de-energized prior to or during agent discharge. If electrical equipment cannot be de-energized, consideration should be given to the use of extended discharge, the use of higher initial design concentration; and the possibility of the formation of combustion and decomposition products. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP 15) 2001- 54 - (5-8.1.2, A-~,-8.1.2.1 and A-5-8.1.2.2 (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 3-8.1.2 and add new e~iPtiendix material A-3-8.1.2.1 and A-5.8.1.2.2, to NFPA 200 (1996

on) to read as follows: 3-8.1.2" Discharge Time. 3-8.1.2.1" For halocarbon a~ents, the discharge time required to

achieve 95 percent of the mimmum design concentration for flame extinguishment shall not exceed 10 seconds, or as otherwise required by the authority having jurisdiction.

3-8.1.2.2* For inert gas agents, the discharge time required to achieve 95 percent of the minimum design concentration for flame extinguishment shall not exceed 60 seconds, or as otherwise required by the authority having jurisdiction.

3-8.1.2.3 The discharge time period is defined as the time required to discharge from the nozzles 95 percent of the agent mass, at 70°F (21°G), necessary to achieve-the minimum design concentration for flame extinguishment.

3-8.1.2.4 Flow calculations performed i n accordance with Section 5-2, or in accordance with the listed pre-engineered systems instruction manuals, shall be used to demonstrate compliance with 3-8.1.2.

A-5-8.1.2 (Wording to be the same as currently shown in NFPA 2001, 1996 edition).

90

Page 31: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - - A 9 9 R O P

A-3-8.1.2.1 and A-.~8.1.2.2 (New) The minimum design concenwation for flame extinguishment is defined in SeOion $- 4.2.2 and includes a 20 percent safety factor for both Class A ( ~ U ~ e r f i r ~ ) and Oasl B hazards. However, many applications involve the use of higher than normal design concentraoons for flame ext iogt~maeat in order to:

• Provide aninitial concentration that will pass minimum holding time requirements.

, • .Allow hot surfaces to cool in _order to prevent reignition, . • Provide protection for elect~cal equipment that rtm~alns

energized. • Provide inerting concentrations to protect against the worst

case possibill'ty of explosion of gas vapors, without a fire developing.

In the examples cited above, it is the intent of Section 3~.1.2 to allow discharge times greater than t0 seconds for halocarbon .. agents, and greater than 60 seconds for inertgas agents (for that portion of the a~ent mass that exceeds the quantity required to achieve the minimum design concentration for / lame extinguishment). The additional quantity of clean agent is to be introduced into the hazard at the same nominal flow rate required to achieve the flame extinguishing design concentration, using the same piping and nozzle(s).distributiop system, or as an alternative, sel~arate piping networks with different flow rates can be used. S BSTANTIATION: The same desil~a principles .apply to similar type applications where larger quantiues of extinguishing agent are supplied, that exceeds the amount required to achieve the minimum design concentration for flame extinguishment. The discharge time allowances permitted under this section should not be misinterpreted as a requirement for extended discharge. COMMITY]gE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #9) 2001- 55 - (~8,1.2.2):. Reject S ~ . rThomas ~rysock], Guardian Services, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

For flammable liquids or ClassA surface fires, for inert gas agents 95 percent of the d e ~ concentration shall be achieved within 60 seconds after the start of discharge or as otherwise required by the audiority having jurisdiction. For deep seated fires, for inert gas agents the design concentration sh~i be achieved withiu 7 minutes after the start of discharge but the discharge rate shall not be less than that required to achieye the design concentration required to extinguish surface rites wlt~in 2 minutes after the start of discharge. SUBSTANTIATION: The current wording does not differentiate between hazards involving surface burning/flammable liquid fuels and deep seated burning, The Sta~ndard does recognize that deep seated bui'ning may reqfijre higher concentrations and longer holding times (NF~A ~J0! A-3,~.2.2,2). Inert gases may be appropriate agents for deep seated fire laazards - - guidance for ap ro riate discha e times for the use of inert gases in deep sLPeaPt~i3s shouq~[ be included in the stai~aia~d.

The recommended guidance tracksthat given in NFPA 12 on Carbon Dioxide Systems paragraph 2-5.2,$ (190SEdition). A great deal of real World experience~has been had with carbon dioxide another "inert gas." It is recognized that deep seated fires require relatively high concentrations to be held for relatively long times. The philosophy behind the NFPA 12 requirement for CO 2 and behind the proposed wording for inert gas agents is; extinguish the open flaming relatively fast minimizing spread of the surface burning component of the fire - - build up th e final design concentration over a period of time which permits economical pipe sizes and minimizes venting requirements,

The designation of a time to reach a given concentration also gives a clearer "target" for a system imtallatton to meet than the current wording. Concentrations can actually be measured in real time under "field conditions."

If the use of certain halocarbOn agents is demonstrated to be appropriate for use on deep seated fires, similar requirements may be set for halocarbon agent disd3arge times. We are not suggesting that this wording be added to the requirements for halocarbon agent discharge ilmes becanse we have no information indicating the suitability of such agents for deep seated fire hazards. COMMIIIT_£ ACTION: Reject. . . . . COMMrI'YEE STATEMENT: Currently, there is no data to support discharge rates and times for deep seated fires. There are also no concentrations provided f0rdeep seated fires.

(Log #CPI 9) 2001- 56 - (3-8.1.2.5, ~,-3-8.1.2)= Accept SU'BMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options RECOMMENDATION: 1. Revise text to read as follows:

3-8.1.2.5 For Explosion prevention ss~ems the discharge time for agents shall ensure that the minimum inef~ag design c0ncentration is achieved before concentration of flammable va2p.ors reach the flammable rarige~

A-3-8.1.2 Add new text to the end of the present text, as follows:

"Systems designed for explosion prevention present particular design challenges. These systems typically discharge the agent, before ignition occurs, upon detection f some specified fraction of the lower flammable limit of the flammable vapors present." SUBSTANTIATION: The specification of a fraction of the lower flammable limit provides twosafety margins. First, that local concentrations 04" vapor .within. the enclosure may exceed the detected fracti0n: and second, to protect upon continuing[ vapor release during the time taken for agent discharge and mixing within the enclosure. Depending upon the rate of increase in concentration of flammable vapors present, the discharge time may need to be very short to prevent possible explosion. Given the potentially, serious donseqUences of an,~expl~ion .~md the short • agent discharge times required, the detection system may also need careful design and siting to provide the required sensitivity and reliability. C O ~ ACTION: Accept.

(Log#CPH) 2001- 57 - ,(3-8.2): Accept S U B ~ Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options

[ RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to ~ a d as follows: I "When an extended discharge is necessary to maintain the design ]concentration for the specified period of time, additional agent [quantifies c anbe applied at a reduced rate. The initial discharge Ishall be completed Within the limits specified in $.8.1.2. The iperformance of the extended discharge system shall be confirmed Iby test." SUBSTANTIATION- Added criteria for extended discharge to ensure reliability. COMMrI 'rEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log :#C~I 8) 2001- 58- (4-7.~2.10): Accept SUBMITTIg~' Technical Committee on Halon Alternative- Protection Options RECOI~[]~[EN~DATION: I. Delete the first eight words of 4- 7.2.2.10.

.This paragraph will now read as follows: 4-7.2.210 A ~:=k.=g: : = : - g==~.~)..==: :'=~=..~.."~=nded, If a

discharge test is .to be conducted, containers for the agent to be used sh~ii be weighed before and'after discharge. F'fll'weight of container shall be verified by weighing or other approved methods. For inert gas clean agents, cont~dner pressure shill be recorded before and after disc[mtge.

2. Add a new ap~. ndix section to read as follows: A-4-7,2.2.10 A discha.,ge test is generally not recommended.

SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. Hrs t part of 4-7.2.2.10 is explanatory information. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #1) 200t- 59, (4-7.2.3): Reject SUBMITTRR: Western Regional Fh-e Code Dev. Committee RECOMMENDATION: Provide additional guidance for enclosuce, testing of rooms under 5000 sq ft. SUBSTANTIATION: Door fan _equipment manufacturer indicate in their operation manuals that the test equipment is byand large ineffective in spaces under 5000 sq ft., Additional guidance is needed by the enforcement community to effectively assess tile test data in these sngaller spaces. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reiect. COMMITrEESTATI~IENT/ No text provided. The room .pressurization equipment works in spaces smaller than 5000 sq ft.

91

Page 32: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

(Log #CP7) 2001- 60- (4-8): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative

i Protection Options RECOMMENDATION: Add the following:

4-8 Safety. Safe procedures shall be observed during installation, servicing, maintenance, testing, handling, and recharging of clean agent systems and agent containers. SUBSTANTIATION: Added general safety criteria. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #24) 2001- 61 - (Chapter 5 (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITI'ER: Matthew T. Gustafson, US Coast Guard Headquarters RECOMMENDATION: Include a new chapter on Marine Systems to read:

NFPA 2001, Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems

Chapter 5 Marine Systems (Draft)

5-1 (1-1) General. Tliis chapter outlines the deletions, modifications and additions that are necessary for marine applications. All other requirements of NFPA 2001, Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems, shall apply to shipboard systems except as modified by tiffs chapter. Where the provisions of Chapter 5 confh'ct with the provisions of Chapters 1-4, the provisions of Chapter 5 shall takeprecedence. Alternate 5-1(1-1) General All the provisions of Chapters 1-4 of this standard apply to marine applications.

Exception: Where provisions of Chapter 5 conflict with the provisions of Chapters 1-4, the provision~ of Chapter 5 shall take precedent.

5-1.1 (1-1.1) Scope. (Reserved) This chapter is limited to marine applications of halocarbon clean agent on commercial and government vessels. Inert gas clean agents are ~a0t within the scope of this chapter. Halocarbon explosion inerting systems were not considered during development of this chapter. Recreational vessels were not considered during development of this chapter.

5-2 (4-2) Use and Limitations.

5-2.1 (1-4.2.1) Total flooding clean agent fire extinguishing systems are used primarily to protect hazards that are in enclosures or equipment that, in itself, includes an enclosure to contain the agent. Some typical hazards, that might be suitable include, but are not limited to, the followin~

(a) Machinery spaces such as main machinery spaces (b) Emergency generator rooms. (c) Pump rooms; and (d) Flammable liquid storage and handling areas and paint

lockers.

5-2.2* (1-4.2.5) In addition to the limitations given in 1-4.2.5, halocarbon agents shall not be used to protect:

(a) Dry cargo holds (b) Bulk cargo

5-2.3 The effects of agent decomposition on fire protection effectiveness and equipment shall be considered where using clean agents in hazards with ltigh ambient temperatures (e.g. incinerator rooms, hot machinery and piping.)

5-3 Hazards to Personnel.

5-3..1 (1-5.1,1) All main machinery spaces are considered normally occupied spaces.

Exception." Engine rooms < 170xx m 3 which are accessed for maintenance onl_~.

5-3.2* For marine systems, 29 CFR t910 Subpart S does not apply electrical clearances shall be in accordance with 46 CFR Subchapter J.

5-4 Agent Supply.

5-4.1 Reserve quantities of agent are not required by this standard.

5-4.2 Storage container arrangement shall be in accordance with 2- 1.3.1, 2-1.3.3, 2-1.3.4, 2.1.3.5 and the following:

1.1 Except in the case of modular systems with storage cylinders located within tile protected space, pressure containers required for the storage of the halocarbon agent shall be in accordance with paragraph 1.2.

1.2 Unchanged.When the halocarbon agent containers are outside a protected space, they sghall be stored in a room which shall be situated in a safe and readily accessible position and shall be effectively ventilated. Any entrance to such a store room shall be from the open deck and in any case shall be independent of the protected space. Access doors shal lopen outwards, and bulkheads and decks including doors and other means of closing any opening therein, which form the boundaries between such rooms and adjoining spaces shall be gas tight.

5-4.3 Where agent containers are stored in a dedicated space, doors at exits shall be outward-swinging.

5-4.4 (2-1.$.$) Where subject to moisture, containers shall be installed such that a space of at least 2" between the deck and the bottom of the container is provided.

5-4.5 (2-1.3.4) In addition to the requirements of 2-1.3.4, containers shall be secured with a minimum of two brackets to prevent movement from vessel motion and vibration.

5-4.6* For marine applications, all piping, valves and fittings of ferrous materials shall be protected inside and out against corrosion. Prior to acceptance testing, the inside of the piping shall be cleaned without compromising its corrosion resistance.

5-4.7 Pipes, fittings, nozzles & hangers, including welding and brazing filling materials within the protected space shall have a melting temperature greater than 1700°F(927°C).

Aluminum components shall not be used.

5-5 Detection, Actuation, and Control Systems.

5-5.1 General.

5-5.1.1 Detection, actuation, alarm and control systems shall be installed, tested and maintained in accordance with the

. requirements of the Authority Having Jurisdiction.

5-5.1.2" Automatic release of the fire extinguishing agent shall not be permitted where actuation of the system may interfere with the safe navi~.tion of the vessel. Automatic release of the fire extinguishing agent shall be permitted for any space where actuation of the system will not interfere with the safe navigation of the vessel.

Exception: Automatic release is permitte d for any space of 6000fl 3 (17(hn 3) or lesso

5-5.2 Automatic Detection. 5-2-3.2.1" No change.

5-5.2.1 The detection, signaling, control and actuation system(s) shall have at least two sources of power. The primary source shall be from the vessel's emergency bus. The back-up source shall either be the vessel's general alarm battery or an internal battery within the system. Internal batteries shall be capable of operating the system for a minimum of 24 hours. All power sources shall be supervised. Exception: For vessels without an emergency bus or battery, the primau~ source may be the main electrical supply.

5-5.2.2 In addition to the requirements set forth in paragraph 2- 3.3.5, dae following requirements apply to marine systems: A. Where manual electrical actuation is used, actuation circuits shall not be routed through the protected space.

Exception: Modular systems. Systems complying with 5-2-4.

92

Page 33: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2001 - - A 9 9 R O P

5-5.2.3* Manual actuation for systems shall not be capable of being put into operation by any single action. Manual actuation stations shall be housed in an enclosure.

Exception: Local manual actuation at the cyllnder(s) location.

5-5.2.4 Every system shall have a manual actuation station located in file main egress route outside the protected space. In addition. systems having cylinders within the protected space modular systems and systems protecting unattended main machinery spaces shall have an actuation station in a continuously monitored control station outside the protected space.

Exception: Sgstems protecting spaces Of 6000 j~, or less shall be permitted to have a single actuation station a t either of the locations described above,

5-5.2.5 Emergency lighting shall be provided for remote actuation stations serving systems protecting main machinery spaces. All manual operating devices shall be labeled to identify the hazards they protect. In addition, the following information shall be provided:

1. Operating instructions. 2. Length o f time delay. 3. Actions to take if system fails to operate. 4. Other actions to take.(Closing vents, head count, etc.)

For modular systems having cylinders within the protected space, a means of indicating system discharge shall be provided at the remote actuation station.

5-6 Additional Requirements for Systems with Stored Cylinders within the Protected Space.

5-6.1" An automatic fire detection system shall be installed in the protected space to provide early warning of fire to minimize potential damage to file fire extinguishing system before it can be manually actuated. The detection system shall initiate audible and visual alarms in the protected space and on the navigating bridge upon detection of fire. All detection and alarm devices shall be electrically supervised for continuity and trouble indication shall be annunciated on the navigating bridge.

5-6.2* Electrical power circuits connecting the containers shall be monitored for fault conditions and loss of power. Visual and audible alarms Shall be provided to indicate this and these shall be annunciated on the navigating bridge.

5-6.3* Pneumatic or hydraulic circuits connecting the containers shall be duplicated. The sources of pneumatic or hydraulic pressure shall be monitored for loss of pressure. Visual and audible alarms shall be provided to indicate this and these shall be annunciated on the navigating bridge.

5-6.4* Within the protected space, electrical circuits essential for the release of the system shall be heat resistant (e.g.: mineral- insulated cable to specification complying with NFPA 70 Article 330 or equivalenL) Piping systems essential for the release of systems designed to be operated hydraulically or pneumatically shall be of steel or other equivalent heat-resisting material.

5-6.5* The arrangements of containers and the electrical circuits and piping essential for the release of any system shall be such that in the event of damage to any one power release line through fire or explosion in a protected space, he., a single fault concept, the entire fire extinguishing charge required for that space can still be discharged.

5-6.6* The containers shall be monitored for the decrease in pressure due to leakage and discharge. Visual and audible alarms signals, in die protected area and either on the navigating, bridge or m the space where the fire control equipment is centrahzed shall be provided to indicate dais a low pressure condition.

5-2.$.4.6 Within the protected space, electrical circuits essential for the release of tile system shall be Glass A rated (to be defined)

5-7 Enclosure. (integrity, venting, openings)

5-7.1" To prevent loss of agent through openings to adjacent hazards or work areas, openings shall be:

(a) permanently sealed or, (b) equipped with automatic closures or

93

(c) equipped with manual closures outfitted with an alarm circuit to indicate when these closures are not sealed upon activation of the system.

Where reasonable confinement of agent is not practical, or if the fuel can drain from one compartment to another(i.e, via bilge), protection shall be extended to include the adjacent connected compartment or work areas.

Exception: When the f u d source can move to compartments outside the protected enclosure, protection shall be extended to include the adjacent connected compartment or work area.

5-7.2* Prior to agent discharge, al l ventilating systems shall be closed and isolated to preclude passage of agent to other compartments or the vessel exterior. Automati/: shut downs, or manual shut downs capable of being closed by one person from a position collocated with the agent discharge station shall be used.

5-8 Design Concentration Requirements.

5-8.1 For combinations of fuels, the design concentration shall be derived from the flame for extinguishment or inerting value for the fuel requiring the greatest concentration shall be used.

5-8.2 For a particular fuel, the design concentration referred to in 5-3-4.2.2 shall be used.

5-8.3* Flame Extinguishment.

5-8.$.1 The minimum design concentration for Class B flammable and combustible liquids shall be as determined following the procedures described in IMO MSC/Circular 776.

5-8.$.2* Class A Fuels.(Hdd p/ace)

5-8.3.3* Use the same as Listing program to determine flame extinguishment.

Editorial Not~" From this point on the numbering system parenthetieall 3 refers to the section of the standard that is modified.

5-8.4 (8-5.1") Total Flooding Quantity. The quantity of agent shall be based on the net volume of the space.

5-8.5 (8-7) Insert $-7 text plus..." Duration of Protection. It is important that the agent design concentration not only shall be achieved, but also shall be maintained for a sufficient period of time to allow effective emergency action by trained ship's personnel. This is equally important in all classes of fires since a persistent i~nition source ( e.g. an electric arc, boiler front, heat source, engine exlranst, turbo char~er, hot metal, or deep seated fird) can lead to resurgence Of the mitlal event once the clean agent has dissi~ated. I n n o case shall the hold time be less than 15 minutes .

5-9 (3-8) Distribution System.

5-9.1 (3-8.1) Rate of Application.

5-9.1.1 (3-8.1.1) The minimum design rate of application shall be based on the quantity of agent required for the desired concentration and the time allowed to achieve the desired concentration.

5-9.1.2 (3-8.1.2") Discharge Time.

5-9.1.2.1 ($-8.1.2.1) The discharge time for halocarbon agents shall not exceed 10 seconds, or as otherwise required by the authority having jurisdiction.

5-0.1.2.2 ($.8.1.2.$) For halocarbon agents, the discharge time period is defined as the time required to discharge from the nozzles 95 percent of the agent mass[at 70°17(21 °C)] necessary to achieve the minimum design concentration. The following should be subtracted from the volume of th e space include, but are not necessarily limited to: Auxiliary machinery Boilers Condensers Evaporators Mainengines Reduction gears Tanks Trunks

Page 34: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

5-10 (3-9.1) Nozzle Choice and Location. Nozzles shall be of the YPe listed for the in tended purpose. Limitations shall be e te rmined b,xsed on testing in accordance with IMO

MSC/Circular 776. Nozzle spacing, area coverage, height and al ignment shall not exceed the limitations.

Excz~ption: For spaces having only Class A fuels, nozzle placement shall be in accordance with the nozzles' their listed limitations.

5-11 (4-1) Inspection and Tests.

(4-1.1) No change.

5-11.1 (4-1.2) Inspection repor t with recommendat ions shall be filed with the vessel's master and the owner 's agent. The repor t shall be available for inspect ion by the Authority Having Jurisdiction.

5-11.2 (4-1.$) At least annually, the agent quantity of refillable containers shall be checked by competen t personnel . The container pressure shall be verified and logged at least monthly by the vessel's crew.

5-11.3" (4-1.3,1) For halocarbon clean agents, if a container shows a loss in agent of more than 5 percen t or a loss in pressure(adjusted for temperature) of more than ][0 percent, it

shal l be refilled or replaced.

(4-1.3.2) No change.

Marine Task Group's Recommended Change to the Main Body o f the 2001 document

(4-1.$.$) Where the amoun t of agent in the container is de te rmined by special measuring devices, these devices shall be listed.

Exception: Liquid levd measu~ng devices such as ultrasonic/audiogauging or radioisotope gauging shall be permitted to be used provided that all Of the following are reeL.

(a) Measurement equipment shall be calibrated for the cylinder wall thickness and clean agent liquid.

(b) Calibration shall be verified by weighing the ~linders which indicate the lowest levels of liquid in each release group, but in no case less than a minimum of I0 percent o f the inspected containers in each release group.

(c) The acceptable liquid level is identified by the original system installer or coincides with all other c~ntainer liquid levels of the same release group.

(d) Measurements are made by personnel skilled in ultrasonic/audiogauging or radioisotope gauging techniques.

(4-1.4) No change.

(4-1.~i) No change.

(4-1.6) No change.

(4-2) Container Test.

(4-2.1) No change.

(4-2.2) No change.

5-2.3 (4-2.3) No change.

(4-3.1) Host Test

5-2.5 (4-2.5) No change.

5-2.2 (4-2.2) No change.

(4-4) No change.

(4-5) Maintenance. No change.

(4-5.1) No change.

(4-5.2) No change.

(4-5.3) No change.

(4-6) Training. No change.

94

(4-6.1) No change.

5-11.4 (4-6.2*) The installing contractor shall provide an instructional video illustrating the operational features and inspection procedures specific to the clean agent system installed on the vessel.

5-12 (4-7) Approval o f Installations. Prior to acceptance of the listing, technical documenta t ion such as the system design manual, test reports or listing repor t shall be p r e s e n t e d t o the Authority Having Jurisdiction. This documenta t ion shaU show that the system and its individual componen t s are Compatible, employed withiiff tested limitations and suitable for marine use. The listing organization shall: o Verify fire tests conducted in accordance with predetermined

standard. o Verify componen t tests conducted in accordance witll

p rede te rmined standard. • Review componen t quality assurance program. • Review design and installation manual. • Identify system and componen t limitations. • Verify flow calculations.

• Verify integrity and reliability of system as a whole. o Have a Follow-up program. o Publish a list of equipment .

(4-7.1) No change.

(4-7.2) Installation Acceptance.

(4-7.2.1) No change.

(4-7.2.2) Review Mechanical Components.

(4-7.2.2.1) No change.

(4-7.2.2.2) No change.

(4-7.2.2.3) No change.

(4-7.2.2.4) No change.

5-7.2.2.5(4-7.2.2.5) Piping sball extend at least 2 inches beyond the last nozzle in each branch line to prevent clogging.

Main Body of NFPA 2001 Question: (4-7.2.2.6) (Nozzle deflectors are not defined. What are nozzle deflectors? For what application are they used. i.e., Ceiling escutcheon or to direct nozzle discharge away from some equipment?)

(4-7.2.2.7) No change.

(4-7.2.2.8) No change.

(4-7.2.2.9) No change.

(4-7.2.2.10) No change.

(4-7.2.2.11) No change.

5-12.1 (4-7.2.2.12) The piping shall be hydrostatically tested at 1.5 times the design operat ing pressure for a per iod of 10 minutes. At the end of 10 minutes, the pressure shall not drop more than 5 percent from die test pressure.

Exception: The pressure test shall be permitted to be omitted i f the total piping contains no more than one change in direction f i t t ing between the storage container and the discharge nozzle, and where all piping is physically checked for tightness.

(4-7.2.2.13") No change.

(4-7.2.3*) Review Enclosure Integrity.

5-13 (4-7.2.2.12) Periodic Puff Testing. A test in accordance with 4-7.2.2.13 shall be per formed at 24 month intervals. The periodic test program shall include a functional test of all alarms, controls, and time delays.

5-14 (4-7.2.4.1) Electrical systems shall be in accordance with Subchapter J of Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations. For Canadian vessels, electrical installations shall be in accordance with Transpor t Canada TP127.

Page 35: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

NFIPA 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

(4-7.2.4.2)

(4.7.2.4;$)

(4-7.2.4;4)

(4.7.2.4.5)

(4-7;2.4.6)

(4-7.2.4.7)

(4-7.2.4.8)

(4-7.2.4.9)

(4.7.2.4.10)

(4-7.2.4.11)

(4.7.2A.12)

(4-7.2.4.13)

(4-7.2.4.14)

(4.7.2.5) Functional Testing.

(4-7,2.5.1) Preliminary Functional Tests. No change.

(4-7.2.5.2) • System Functional Operational Test. No change.

(4-7.2.5.3) Remote Monitoring Operations. No change.

(4.7.2.5.4) Control Panel Primary Power Source. No change.

(4.7.2.5~) No chang e.

Chapter 6

(5-1.2.8) Government Publications.

Appendix A Explanatory Mater ia l

A-5-2.2 General cargo should not b e protected with halocarbon clean agents due tO ~ possibility 0F~eep seated cargo fires and due to wide variations in cargo material~ ~ Dry cargoes, such ,as containerized cargoes, often Include a wide mix of Conun .0di, ties that may include material s or storage arrgn~ements not suttably protected using halocarbon clean agents. The volume of halocarbon agent needed to protect cargo spaces varies depending on the volume of the cargo space minus the volume of the cargo carried. Th i s quantity varies as cargo volume changes and may affect fire extinguishing effectiveness or agent toxicity.

A-5-3.2 46 CFR 111.59 in SubchapterJ requires busways to comply with Article 364 of the National Electrical Code. Article 364 requires compliance with Article 300 for clearances around bnsways.

A-5-4.6 Corrosion resistance is required to prevet~t clogging of nozzles with scale. Examples of suitable materials are h o t dipped galvanized steel piping inside and out or stainless steel. (Check w i ~ ' Charlie WiUms re: methods

A-5-5.1.2. The intent of this section .is to ensure that a suppression system will not interfere with the safe uavig~tion of the vessel. Many internal combustion propulsion engines and generator prime movers draw combustion a i r from the protected space in which they are installed. Since these types of engines are required to b e shut down prior to system discharge, an a u t o i ~ c a l l y discharged system would shut down propulsion a n d electricity supply when needed most. Anon-automatic system gives the ship's crew the flexibility to decide the best course of action. For example, while navigating in a high density shipping channel, a ship's ability to maneuver may be more important than immediate system discharge. For small vessels, the use of automatic systems is considered appropriate taking into consideration the vessel's mass, cargo and crew training.

A-5-5.2.3 The intent is to prevent accidental or malicious system operation. Some examples of acceptable actuation stations are: • Break a glass e n d m u r e and pulling a handle. • Break a glass enclosure and opening a valve.

• Opening an enclosure door and flipping a switch.

All are examples of acceptable manual actuation stations.

A-5-6.1 Heat detectors are typically u~ed in machinery SoPraces and are sometimes combined with smoke detectors. Listeo approved Optical flame detectors may also be used provided they are additional to the required quantity of heat a n d / o r smoke detectors.

A-5-6.2 This requirement is derived from SOLAS Regulation II- 2/3.3.2.

A-5-6.S This requirement is d e r ~ d from (SOLAS Regulation II- 2/3.3.2).

A.5-6.4 This requirement is derived from (SOLAS Regulation II- 2/3.3.4).

A~;-6.5 This requirement is derived from (SOI_.AS Regulation II- 2/3.3,5).

A-5-6.6 This requirement is derived from (SOLAS Regulation II- 2/3.3.6).

A-5-6.7 This requirement is derived from (SOLAS Regulation II- 2/3.3.8).

A-5-7.I A well sealed enclosure is vital to proper operation of the system and subsequent extinguishment of ]ires in tile protected space. Gas tight boundaries 0f the protected space, such as those constructed of welded.steel,, offer a highly effective means for holding the fire extinguishing gas concentration. Where the space is fi t ted with openings; avendes for escape of the gas exist. Automatic closure 0~ openings is the preferred method of-ensuring enclosure in C~p~i'ty prior to discharge. Manually closed openings introduce added delay and an added human element into the chain of proper operation of the system. Failure of personnel to properly close all openings has been a recurring cause of gaseous systems not performing as intended. It is recognized that some Openit3gs in the enclosures cannot be fitted with automatically operated closers due m personnel hazards or other limitations. 0.e. maintenance hatches, water fight doors) In these cases an indicator is rrequired to alert the s~ tem operator that an opening has not been closed as required a ~ d t h u s the system is not ready for operation.

A-5-7.2 Automatic shutdowns are the preferred method for shut down of a ventilation-System. Shutdowns i'equiring personnel to find and manually close dmnl~rs far.from the fire e .xtin~uishing system discharge station should not be are no t permitted.

A-~8.$.2 The minimum design critexia~for marine CJass A surface fires should Shah be in accordance with provisions of g-4.2~2.2.. This includes computer rooms, switch gear rooms and control rooms where there is no Class B fuel loading.

A-5-8.$.3 The listing program should be" equivalent to UL 1058, however, the minimum design concentration for Class B flammable and combustible liquids shall b e as determined following the procedures descr3bed in IMO MSC/Circular 776.

A-5-8.4 When calculating the net volume of the machinery space, the ne t volume should tndt ide the volume of the bilge and the ~'olume of the s t a ~ uptake. The volume calculafi0~ shall be permitted to exclude the portions of the stack U pt~tke that have a horizontal cross sectional area less than 4 0 ~ :of~the horizontal cross sectional area of the main machinery space~ ~ The horizontal cross sectional area of the main machinery Space shall be measured midway between the lowest level (tank, top) and the highest level (bottom of the stack casing)~ •

The objects that occupy volume in the protected space should be subtracted from the volume of the space. They include, but are not necessarily limited to: - Auxiliary machinery • Boiters • . Condensers • Evaporators • Main engines • Reduction gears • Tanks • Trunks

95

Page 36: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

E o o ==

LU

/ Area C

~ rea B

Bottom o~ casing

Et ual

Mid-level ,

E£ ual

Tank top ,_

For the casing to be considered separate Irom the gross volume o! the machinery space, Area B must be 40 percent or less el Area A.

If Area B is greater than 40 percent of:Area A, the volume of casin~l up to Area C (or where the area is 40 percent or less o! Area A) mustbe included in the gross volume of the space.

Any area of the casing containing boilers, internal combustion machinery or oil-fired installations must be included in the gross volume of the engine room

Figure A-5-8.4.

A-5-11.3 When determining container pressure, the original container fill density shouldbe obtained from the system manufacturer and the temperature/pressure relation should be obtained from tables published by the system manufacturer. When determining container liquid level, the liquid level/temperature relationship should be obtained from the system manufacturer. SUBSTANTIATION: There currently are no suitable standards for marine use of clean agents. The marine community needs an industry standard that address the unique concerns of shipboard applications. The inclusion of a marine chapter in NFPA 2001 will fill tiffs need.

The proposed marine chapter is the product of a combined effort by many members of NFPA 2001 committee and die marine community who served on a Marine Chapter Task Group. The Group met in Baltimore, MD, Seattle, WA, and Quincy, MA over the course of 1997 to produce die draft chapter. The draft cllapter incorporates many. practices, developed by the International Maritime ()rgamzanon as well as USCG rules. The draft marine chapter has been available on die NFPA web site for several months. Several issues of the USCG's Marine Safety Newsletter have made reference to the new document and its' availability of the NFPA web site.

I COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. 1. Revise 5-1.1 to read:

This chapter is limited to marine applications of clean agent fire extinguishing systems on commercial and government vessels.

Explosion inerfing systems were not considered during development of this chapter.

2. Paragraph 5-4.7, delete "and brazing" Paragraph 5-4.7 will now read as follows: 5-4.7 Pipes, fittings, nozzles and hangers, includingwelding

filling materials within the protected space shall have a melting temperature greater than 1700°F (927~C).

3~ Add the following: A-5-4.7 Fittings conformin~ to ASTM F 1387 and fire tested with

zero leakatze conform to the renuirements of 5-4.7. v

4. All cites should read ll-2/Regulation 5-3.3.X in the following paragraphs:

A-5-6.2 A-5-6.3 A-5-6.4 A-5-6.5 A-5-6.6 A-5.6.7

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: 1. Chapter 5 is now applicable to ;dl clean agents. Also see actions on Proposals 2001-63 (Log #10), 2001-64 (Log #11 ), 2001-67 (Log #15), 2001-68 (Log #13), and 2001- 69 (Log #16).

2. Brazing will not meet dais criteria. 3. Corrected references.

96

(Log #CP39) 2001- 62 - (Chapter 5 (New)): Accept SUBMI'Iq'ER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options RECOMMENDATION: Add a new Chapter 5 to read as follows:

NFPA 2001, Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems

Chapter 5 Marine Systems (Draft)

5-1 (1-1) General. This chapter outlines t h e deletions, modifications and additions that are necessary for marine applications. All other requirements of NFPA 2001, Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems, shall apply to shipboard systems except as modified by this chapter. Where the provisions of Chapter 5 conflict with the provisions of Chapters 1-4, the provisions of

!Chapter 5 shall takeprecedence. :Alternate 5-1(1-1) General All the provisions of Chapters 1-4 of :this standard apply to marine applications.

Exception: Where provisions of Chapter 5 ognflict with the pTovisions of Chapters 1-4, the provisions of Chapter 5 shall take precodenc~.

5-1.1 (1-1.1) Scope.(Reserved) This chapter is limited to marine applications of clean agent fire extinguishing systems on commercial and government vessels. Explosion inerting systems were not considered during development of this chapter.

5-2 (4-2) Use and Limitations.

5-2.1 (1-4.2.1) Total flooding clean agent fire extinguishing systems are used primarily to protect hazards that are in enclosures or equipment that, in itself, includes an enclosure to contain the agent. Some typical hazards, that might be suitable include, but ,are not limited to, the following:

(a) Machinery spaces such as main machinery spaces (h) Emergency generator rooms. (c) Pump rooms; and (d) Flammable liquid storage and handling areas and paint

lockers.

5-2.2* (1-4.2.5) In addition to the limitations given in 1-4.2.5, clean agent fire extinguishing systems shall not be used to protect:

(a) Dry cargo holds (b) Bulk cargo

5-2.3 The effects of agent decomposition on fire protection effectiveness ,and equipment shall be considered where using clean agents in hazards with high ambient temperatures (e.g. incinerator rooms, hot machinery and piping.)

Page 37: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N T P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

5-3 Hazards m Personnel .

53.1 (1.5,1.1) All main machinery spaces are considered normally occupied spaces.

Exception: Engine rooms< 170xx m 3 which are accessed for mainfenance on~..

5-3.2* For marine systen~, 29 CFR 1910 Subpart S does not apply electrical clearances shall be in accordance with 46 CFR Subchapter j .

5-4 Agent Supply.

5-4.1 Reserve quantities of agent are not required by this standard.

5-4.2 Storage container arrangement shall be in accordance with 2- 1.3.1, 2-1.$.3, 2-1.$.4, 2-1.$.5. Where equipment is s.ubject to extreme weather conditions, the s~ tem shall be installed in accordance with tile manufacture(ts design and installation instructions.

5-4.2.1.1 Except in the case of s~tems with storage cylinders located within the protected space, pressure containers required for the storage of the agent shall he in acc_ordance with paragraph 1.2.

5-4.2.1.2 Unchanged.When the halocarbon agent containers are outside a protected space, they sghall be stored in a room which shall be situated in a sa feand readily accessible position and shall be effectively ventilated. Any entrance to such a store room shall be from die open deck and in any case shall be independent o f the protected space. Access doors shall open outwards, and bulkheads and decks including doors and other means of closing any opening dlerein, which form the boundaries between such rooms a n d adjoining spaces shall be gas tight.

5-4.3 Where agent containers are stored in a dedicated space, doors at exits shall be outward=swinging.

5-4.4~ (2-1.$.$) Where subject to moisture, containers shall be installed Such that a space of at least 2" between the deck and the bottom of the container is provided.

5-4.5 (2-1.$.4) In addition to the requirements of 2-1.$.4, containers shall be secured With a minimum of two brackets to prevent movement from vessel motion and vibration.

5-4.6* For marine applications, all piping, valves and fittings of ferrous materials shall be protected inside and out against corrosion. Prior to acceptance testing, the inside of the piping shall be cleaned without compromising its corrosion resistance.

5-4.7 Pipes, fittings, nozzles& hangers, including welding filling materials within the protectedspace shall have a melting temperature greater than 17001F(9271C ).

Aluminum components shall not be used.

5-5 Detection, Actuation, and Control Systems.

5-5.1 General.

5-5.1,1 Detection, actuation, alarm and control systems shall be installed, tested and maintained in accordance with the requirements of the Authority HavingJurisdiction.

5-5.1.2" Automatic release of the fire extinguishing agent shall not be permitted where actuation of tile system may interfere with the safe navigation of the vessel. Automatic release of the fire extinguishing agent shall be permitted for any space where actuation of the system will not interfere with the safe navigation of the vessel.

Exception: Automatic release is permitted for any space of 6000f13 (170m 3) or less.

5-5.2 Automatic Detection. 5-2-3.2.1" N o Change.

5-5.2.1 The detection, signaling, control and actuation system(s) shall have at least two sources of power. The primary source shall he from the vessel's emergency bus. The back-up source shall either be tile vessel's general alarm battery or an internal battery

97

within the system. Internal batteries shall be capable of operating the system for a minimum of 24 hours~ All power sources shall be supervised.

Exception: For vessels without a n ~ bus or battery, "the pdnm~. source may be the main dearical supp b.

5-5.2.2 In addition to the requirements set forth in paragraph 2- 3.3.5, the following requirements apply to marine systems: A. Where manual electrical actuation is used, actuation circuits shall not be routed through the protected space.

Exert ion: Modular ssstems. Systems comp~ing with 5-2-4.

5-5.2.3* Manual actuation for systems shall not be capable of being put into operation, by any single action. Manual actuation stations shall be housed m an enclosure.

Exception: Local manual actuation at the cylinder(s) location.

5-5.2.4 Every system.shall have a manual actuation station located in the main egress route outside the protected space. In addidon, systems having cylinders within the protected space modular systems and systems protecting unattended main machinery spaces shall have an actuation station in a continuously'monitored control station outside the protected space.

Exception: Systems protecting spaces o f 6 0 0 0 f l 3 or less simll be permitted to have a single actuation station at either of the "locations described above.

5-5.2.[; Emergency lighting Shall be provided for remote actuation stations servinl{ systems protecting main machinery spaces. All manual opecaung devices shall be labeled to identify the hazards hey protec~ In addition, the following information shall be ~rovided:

1. Operating instructions. Length o f time delay.

3~ Actions to take if system fails to operate. 4. Other actions to take.(CIosing vents, head.c0unt, etc.)

For modular systems having cylinders within the protected space, means of indicating system discharge shall be provided at the-

remote actuation station.

5-6 Additional Requirements for Systems with Stored Cylinders within the Protected Space.

5-6.1" An automatic fire detection system shall be installed in the protected Space to provide early warning of fire to minimize potential damage to the fire extinguishing system before it G'm be manu~ly actuated. The detection system shall initiate audible and visual alarms~in the protected space'and on the navi[~ating bridge upon detection of fire. All detection and alarm devines shall be electrically supervised for c0ntinuity and trouble indication shall be annuficiated on the navigating bridge.

5-6.2* Electrical power circuits connecting thecontainers shall be monitored for fault conditions and loss o f power. Visual and audible alarms shall be provided to indicat~ this and these shall be annunciated on the navigating bridge.

5-6.$* Pneumatic or hydraulic circuits connecting the containers shall be dupe'cared. The sources of pneumatic or hydraulic premm7e shall be monitored for loss of pressure. Visual and audible alarms shall be provided to indicate this and these shall be annunciated on the navigating bridge.

5-6.4* Within the protected space, electrical circuits essential for the release of the system shall be heat resistant (e.g.: mineral- insulated cable to s p e c i f i c a t i o n complying with NFPA 70 Article 330 or equivalent.) Piping systems essential for the release of systems designed to be operated hydraulically or pneumatically shall be of steel or other equivalent heat-resisting material.

5-62;* The arranl~ements of containers and the electrical circuits and piping essenuai for the release of any system shall be such dlat in the event of damage to any one power release line through fire or explosion, in. a p .r°tected space,. . . , i e a single fault concept, the entire fire exungutshing charge requtred for that space can still be discharged.

5-6.6* _The c0ntainers shall be monitored for the decrease in )ressure due to leakage and discharge. Visual and audible alarms

Page 38: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

signals in the protected area and either on the navigating bridge" or in the space where the fire control equipment.is centralized shall be provided to indicate this a low pressure condition.

5-6.7 Within the protected space, electrical circuits essential for the release of the system shall be Class A rated (to be defined)

t 5-7 Enclosure. (integrity, venting, openings)

5-7.1" To prevent loss of agent through openings to adjacent hazards or work ,areas, openings shall be:

(a) permanently sealed or, (b) equipped with automatic closures or (c) equipped with manual closures outfitted with an alarm

circuit to indicate when these closures are not sealed upon activation of the system.

Where reasonable confinement of agent is not practical, or if the fitel ~an drain from one compartment to another(i.e, via bilge), protection shall be extended to include the adjacent connected compartment or work areas.

Exception: When the fuel source can move to compartments outside the protected enclosure, protection shall be extended to include the adjacent connected compartment or ~mrk area.

5-7.2* Prior to agent discharge, all ventilating systems shall be closed and isolated to preclude passage of agent to other corfipartments or the vessel exterior. Automatic shut downs, o r manual shutdowns capable of being closed by one person from a position collocated with the agent discharge station shall be used.

5-8 Design Concentration Requirements.

5-8.1 For combinations of fuels, the design concentration shall be derived from the flame for extinguishment or inerting value for the fuel requiring the greatest concentration shall be used.

5-8.2 For a particular fuel, the design concentration referred to in 5-3-4.2.2 shall be used.

5-8.3* Flame Extinguishment.

5-8.3.1 The minimum design concentration for Class B flammable and combustible liquids shall be as determined following the procedures described in IMO MSC/Circular 776.

5-8.3.2* Class A Fuels.(Hold place)

5-8.3.3* Use the same as Listing program to determine flame extinguishment.

Editorial Note: From this point on the numbering ostem parenthetically refers to the section of the standard that is modified.

5-8.4 (3-5.1")Total Flooding Quantity. The quantity of agent shall be based on the net volume of the space.

5-8.5 (3.7) Insert $-7 text plus. . . ~ Duration o f Protection. It is important that the agent design concentration not only shall be achieved, but also shall be maintained for a sufficient period of time to allow effective emergency action by trained ship's personnel. This is equally important in all classes of fires since a persistent ignition, source ( e,g. an electric arc, boiler front, heat source, engine exhanst, turbo charger, hot metal, or deep seated fire) can lead to resurgence of the initial event once the clean agent has dissipated. In no case shall the hold time be less than 15 minutes .

5-9 (3-8) Distta'bution System.

5-9.1 (3-8.1) Rate of Applicatlon.

5-9.1.1 (3-8.1.1) The minimum design rate of application shall be ! based on the quantity of agent required for the desired concentration and the time allowed to achieve the desired concentration.

i

5-9.1.2 (3-8.1.2") Discharge Time.

5-9.1.2.1 (3-8.1.2.1) The discharge time for halocarbon agents shall not exceed 10 seconds, or as otherwise required by the authority having jurisdiction.

5-9.1.2.2 (3-8.1.2.3) For halocarbon agents, tile discharge time period is defined as the time required to discharge from tile nozzles 95 percent of tile agent mass[at 70iF(21IC)] necessary to achieve the minimum design concentration. The following should be subtracted from tile volume of the space include, but are not necessarily limited to:

Auxiliary machinery Boilers Condensers Evaporators Main engines Reduction gears Tanks Trunks

5-10 (3-9.1) Nozzle Cholce and Location. Nozzles shall be of the ype listed for the intended purpose. Limitations shall be etermined based on tesdng in accordance with IMO

MSC/Circular 776. Nozzle spacing, area coverage, height and alignment shall not exceed the limitations.

Exception: For spaces having only Class A fuels, nozzle placement shall be in accordance with the nozzles' their listed limitations.

5-11 (4-1) Inspection and Tests.

(4-1.1) No change.

5-11.1 (4-1.2) Inspection report with recommendations shall be filed with the vessel's master and the owner's agent. The report shall be available for inspection by the Authority Having urisdiction.

1-11.2 (4-1.$) At least annually, ti~e agent quantity of refiilable containers shall be checked by competent personnel. The container pressure shall be verified and logged at least monthly by the vessel's crew.

5-11.3" (4-I.$.1) For halocarbon clean agents, if a container shows a loss in agent of more than 5 percent or a loss in pressure(adjusted for temperature) of more than 10 percent, it shall be refilled or replaced.

!(4-1.3.2) No change.

M a r i ~ Task Group's Recomnumd~ C h a t ~ to the Main Body o f the 2001 docume~

(4-1.3.3) Where the amount of agent in the container is determined by special measuring devices, these devices shall be listed.

Exception: Liquid level measuring devices such as ultrasonic/audio.oga_autgt~'ng or radioiso top.e gaugt'ng shall be permitted to be used promded that all o f the following are me~"

(a) Measurement equipment shall be calibrated for the ~linder wall thickness and clean agent liqui&

(b) Callbration shall be verified by weighing the c3linders which indicate the lowest levels o f liquid in each release group., but in no case less than a minimum of 10 percent of the inspected containers in each release group.

(c) The acceptable liquid level is identified by the o~4ginal sy. ste~n installer or coincides udth all other container liquid levels of the same release group.

(d) Measurements are made by personnel skilled in ultrasonic/audiogauging or radioisotope gauging techniques.

(4-1.4) No change.

(4-1.5) No change.

(4-1.6) No change.

(4-2) Container Test.

(4-2.1) No change.

(4-2.2) No change.

5-2.3 (4-2.3) No change.

(4-3.1) Host Test

98

Page 39: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

5-2.5 (4-2.5) No change.

5-2.2 (4-2.2) No change.

(4-4) No change.

(4-5) Maintenance. No change.

(4-5.1) No change,

(4-5.2) No change.

(4-5.3) No change.

(4-6) Training, No change.

(4-6.1) No change.

5-11.4 (4-6.2*) The installing contractor shall provide an instructional video illustrating the operational features and inspection procedures specific to the clean agent system installed on the vessel

5-12 (4-7) Approval o f Installations. Prior to acceptance of the listing, technical documenta t ion such as the system design mmmal, test reports or listing report shall be presented to tlle Authority Having Jurisdiction. This documenta t ion shall show that the system and its individual componen t s are compatible, employed within tested limitations and suitable for marine use. The listing organization shall: * Verify fire tests conducted in accordance with prede te rmined

standard. - Verify componen t tests conducted in accordance with

prede te rmined standard. * Review c o m p o n e n t qualify assurance program. e Review design and installation manual.

* Identify system and c o m p o n e n t limitations. o Verify flow calculations.

o Verify integrity and reliability of system as a whole. * Have a Follow-up program.

o Publish a list of equipment .

(4-7.1) No change.

(4-7.2) Installation Acceptance.

(4-7.2.1) No change.

(4-7.2.2) Review Mechanical Components .

(4-7.2.2.1) No change.

(4-7.2.2.2) No change.

(4-7.2,2.3) No change.

(4-7.2.2.4) No change.

5-7.2.2.5(4-7.2.2.5) Piping shall extend at least 2 inches beyond die las t nozzle in each branch line to prevent clogging.

Main Body of NFPA 2001 Question: (4-7.2.2.6) (Nozzle deflectors ,are not defined. What are nozzle deflectors? For what application are they used. i.e., Ceiling escutcheon or to direct nozzle discharge away from some equipment?) (4-7.2.2.7) No change.

(4-7.2.2.8) No change.

(4-7.2.2.9) No change.

(4-7.2.2,10) No change.

(4-7.2.2.11) No change. (4-7.2.2.13") No change.

(4-7.2.3") Review Enclosure Integrity.

5-13 (4-7.2.2.12) Periodic Puff Testing. A test in accordance with 4-7.2.2.13 shall be per formed at 24 month intervals. The periodic test program shall include a fimctional test of all alarms, controls, and time delays.

5-14 (4-7.2.4.1) Electrical systems shall be in accordance with !Subchapter J of Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations. For Canad ian vessels, electrical installations shall be in accorckmce with Transport Canada TP127.

(4-7.2.4.2)

(4-7.2.4.3)

(4-7.2.4.4)

(4-7.2.4.5)

(4-7.2.4.6)

(4-7.2.4.7)

(4-7.2.4.8)

(4-7.2.4.9)

(4-7.2.4.10)

(4-7.2.4.11)

(4-7.2.4.12)

(4-7.2.4.13)

(4-7.2.4.14)

(4-7.2.5) Functional Testing.

(4-7.2.5.1) Preliminary Functional Tests. No change.

(4-7.2.5.2) System Functional Operat ional Test. No change.

(4-7.2.5.3) Remote Monitoring Operations. No change.

(4-7.2.5.4) Control Panel Primary Power Source. No change.

(4-7.2.5.5) No change.

Chapter 6

(5-1.2.8) Government Publications.

Appendix A Explanatory Material

A-5-2.2 General cargo should not be protected with clean agents due to the possibility O f deep seated cargo fires and due to wide variations in cargo materials. Dry cargoes, such as containerized cargoes, often include a wide mix of commodit ies that may include materials or storage arrangements not suitably protected using clean agents, The volume of agent needed tO protect cargo spaces varies depend ing on the volume of the cargo space minus the volume of the cargo carried. This quantity varies as cargo volume changes and may affect fire extinguishing effectiveness or agent toxicity.

A-5-3.2 46 CFR 111.59 in Subchapter J requires busways to comply with Article 364 of the National Electrical Code. Article 364 requires compliance with Article 300 for clearances a round busways.

A-5-4.2 Agent cylinder storage spaces should be adequately ventilated. Entrances to such spaces should be from an open spaces,

A-5-4.6 Corrosion resistance is required to prevent clogging of nozzles with scale. Examples of suitable materials are hot d ipped galvanized steel piping inside and out or stainless steel.

A-5-5.7 Fittings conforming to ASTM F 1387 and fire tested with zero leakage conform to the requirements of 5-4.7. (Check with Charlie Willms re: methods

A-5-5.1.2 The intent of this section is to ensure that a suppression system will not interfere with the safe navigation of the vessel. Many internal combustion propulsion engines and genera tor prime movers draw combustion air from the protected space in wltich they are installed. Since these types of engines are required to be shut down prior to system discharge, an automatically discharged system would shut down propulsion and electricity supply when

99

Page 40: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

n e e d e d most. A non-au tomat ic system gives the sh ip ' s crew the flexibility to decide the best course of action. For example , while navigating in a h igh densi ty sh ipping channel , a sh ip ' s ability to maneuver may be m ore impor tan t than immedia te system discharge. For small vessels, tile use of au tomat ic systems is considered appropr ia te taking into considerat ion the vessel 's mass, cargo and crew training.

A-5-5.2.3 The in tent is to prevent accidental or malicious system operation. Some examples of acceptable ac tua t ion s tat ions are:

• Break a glass enclosure and pul l ing a handle .

* Break a glass enclosure and open ing a valve.

o ( )pen ing an enclosure door and f l ipping a switch.

All are examples of acceptable manual actuat ion stations.

A-5-6.1 Heat detectors are typically used in mach inery spaces and are sonlet imes combined with smoke detectors. Listed or approved optical f lame detectors may also be used provided they are addit ional to the requi red quant i ty of heat a n d / o r smoke detectors,

A-5-6.2 This r equ i r emen t is derived t rom SOLAS Regulat ion ll- 2 /Regu la t ion 5-3.3.X.

A-5-6.3 This r e q u i r e m e n t is derived f rom (SOL/kS Regulat ion II- 2 / Regulat ion 5-3.3.X)o

A-5-6.4 This r e q u i r e m e n t is derived f rom (SOLAS Regulat ion II-2/ Regulat ion 5-3.3.X).

A-5-6.5 This r e q u i r e m e n t is derived f rom (SOLAS Regulat ion I1- 2/ Regulat ion 5-3.3.X).

&-5-6.6 This r e q u i r e m e n t is derived f rom (SOLAS Regulat ion II-2/ Regulat ion 5-3.3.X).

A-5-6.7 This r equ i r emen t is derived f rom (SOLAS Regulat ion II-2/ Regulat ion 5-3.3.X).

A-5-7.1 A well sealed enclosure is vital to p roper operat ion of the system and subsequen t ex t i ngu i shmen t of fires in the protec ted space. Gas t i g b t b o u n d a r i e s of the protected space, such as those cons t ruc ted of welded steel, offer a highly effective means for ho ld ing the fire ex t inguish ing gas concent ra t ion . Where the space is f i t tedwi th openings , avenues for escape of the gas exist. Automat ic d o s u r e of open ings is the prefer red m e t h o d of ensur ing enclosure integrity prior to discharge. Manually closed openings in t roduce added delay and an added h n m a n e l emen t into the chain of proper opera t ion of the system. Failure of personnel to properly close all open ings has been a recur r ing cause of gaseous systems not pe r fo rming as in tended. It is recognized that some openings in the enclosures canno t be fitted with automatical ly opera ted closers due to personnel hazards or o ther limitations. (i.e. ma in t enance batches, water t ight doors) In these c~ases an indicator is requi red to alert the system operator that an open ing has not been closed as requi red a n d thus tile system is not ready for operat ion.

A-5-7.2 Automat ic shu tdowns are the preferred mef l md for shu t down of a ventilation system. Shutdowns requi r ing pe rsonne l to f ind and manual ly close dampe r s far f rom the fire ext inguishing system discharge station shou ld no t be are no t permit ted.

A-5-8.3.2 Tile m i n i m u m design criteria for mar ine Class A surface fires shou ld shall be in accordance with provisions of 3-4.2.2.2. This includes c o m p u t e r rooms, switch gear rooms and control rooms where there is no Class B fiiel loading.

A-5-8.3.3 The listing p rogram should be equivalent to UL 1058, however, the m i n i n m m design concent ra t ion for Class B f lammable and combust ib le l iquids shall be as d e t e r m i n e d following the p rocedures descr ibed in IMO MSC/Circnlar 776.

A-5-8.4 When calculating the ne t vo lume of the mach inery space, the ne t vo lume should include the volume of the bilge and the volume of tile stack uptake~ The vo lume calculation shall be

] )ermit ted lo exclude the port ions of the stack uptake that have a lorizontal cross sect orial a rea less than 40% of the horizontal cross

sectional ,u'e,t of tire main Inachinery space. Tile horizontal cross sectional area of the main mach inery space shall be measured midway between the lowest level ( tank top) a n d tile h ighes t level (bot tom of the statck casing).

The objects that occupy vo lume in the protec ted space should be subtrac ted f rom the volume of the space. They include, but are not necessarily l imited to: o Auxiliary mach ine ry

o Boilers

• Condense r s

o Evaporators

• Main engines

• Reduct ion gears o Tanks

• Trunks

~ottom of casing

l Equal

° t lid-level

g LU

Equal

a.nk top J

For the casing to be considered separate from the gross volume of the machinery space, Area B must be 40 percent or less of Area A. If Area B is greater than 40 percent of Area A, the volume of casing up to Area C (or where the area is 40 percent or less of Area A) must be included in the gross volume of the space. Any area of the casing containing boilers, internal combustion machin ery or oil-fired installations must be included in the gross volume of the engine room

Figure A-5-8.4.

A-~I I .$ W h e n de te rmin ing container pressure, the original conta iner fill densi ty s h o u l d be obta ined f rom the system manufac tu re r and the t e m p e r a t u r e / p r e s s u r e relation shou ld be obta ined f rom tables publ ished by the system manufac ture r . Wh en de te rmin ing conta iner liquid level, the liquid l eve l / t empera tu re re la t ionship should be obta ined f rom the system manufac turer . SUBSTANTIATION: This incorpora tes Woposals 2001-61 (Log #24), 2001-63 (Log #10), 2001-64 (Log #11), 2001-66 (Log #14), 2001-67 (Log #15), 2001-68 (Log #13), 2001-69 (Log #16), 2001-70 (Log #17), and 2001-118 (Log #18). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept°

100

Page 41: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

(Log #10) 2001- 63 - (5-1.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: J o h n P. Goudreau , Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"This chapter is l imited to mar ine appl icat ions of ha locarbon clean agen t mid inert .g~es on commercia l ,and g o v e r n m e n t vessels. Ir~cr~ g-a: :;Ican a g c n = arc n~t - : ' : .d~ tl~c =ccpc c,f ~I~= chapter . Halocarbon and iner t gas explosion iner t ing systems were not cons idered d u r i n g d e v e l o p m e n t of this chapter." SUBSTANTIATION: Cur ren t did, fit does not include inert gas systems. Inert gas systems are suitable for mar ine applicat ions and zire recognized as such in IMO MSC Circular #776. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Revise 5-1.1 to read:

"Tiffs chapter is l imited to mar ine applicat ions of clean agen t fire ex t inguish ing systems on commercia l and g o v e r n m e n t vessels. Explosion iner t ing systems were not considered du r ing

I deve lopmen t of this chapter." COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The revision meets the in tent of the submi t te r by inc luding iner t gases.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Commi t tee agrees to delete the manda to ry r equ i r emen t for an open deck en t rance door because while such an a r r a n g e m e n t is good practice is unnecessary an d somet imes impractical as a manda to ry requ i rement . The revision meets the in tent of the submitter .

(Log #15) 2001- 67 - (5-4.2.1.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTERz J o h n P. Goudreau , Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"When the halocarbon or inert gas agent containers etc." SUBSTANTIATION: Cur ren t draft does not inchlde inert gas systems. Inert gas systems are suitable for mar ine applicat ions and are recognized as such in IMO MSC Circular #776. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Commi t tee Acdol] and S ta tement on Proposal 2001-66 (Log #14) that includes inert g~Lses,

(Log #11 ) 2001- 64- (5-2.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: J o h n P. Goudreau , Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"In addi t ion to the l imitations given in 1-4.2.5, ha locarbon and agents shall no t be used etc."

SUBSTANTIATION : Cur ren t draft does not include inert gas systems. Iner t gas systems are suitable for mar ine applicat ions and are recognized as such in IMO MSC Circular #776.

] COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. ]Revise 5-2.2* (1-4.2.5) to read as follows: [ "In addit ion to the limitations given in I-4.2.5, !:z!cczr.bc= .~.gcr:t: [ clean agen t fire ex t inguish ing systems shall no t be used to protect:"

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The revision meets the intent of the suhmi t t e r by inc luding inert gases.

(Log #12) 2001- 65 - (5-4.2.1.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: J o h n P. Goudreau , Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Except in the case of systems with storage cylinders located within the protected space, pressure containers requi red for the storage of the ha locarbon and inert gas agen t shall be in accordance with paragraph 1-2." S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Cur ren t draft does not include iner t gas systems. Inert gas systems are suitable for mar ine applicat ions and are recognized as such in IMO MSC Circular #776.

i C O M M I T T E E ACTION: Accept in Principle. [ Revese 5-4.2.1.1 to read: [ Except in the case of systems with storage cylinders located within [ the protected space, pressure conta iners requi red for the s torage of [ the agen t shall be in accordance with paragraph 1-2.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The revision meets the in tent of the submi t te r by inc luding iner t gases but uses the te rm agen t to refer to all types of agents.

(Log #14) 2001- 66 - (5-4.2.1.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: J o h n P. ( ;oudreau , Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"...Any en t rance to such a store room ~ha!! ~c f rom tt;z ope:~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,4~m . . . . ~ : . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ~ shall be i n d e p e n d e n t of the protected space." SUBSTANTIATION: The r equ i r emen t is overly restrictive and se ldom done in practice. Rather than a " requi rement" it should

Jeat in the append ix as a r e commenda t i on . MMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise 5-4.2 to read: 5-4,2 Storage conta iner a r r a n g e m e n t shall be in accordance with

2-1.3.1, 2-1.3.3, 2-1.'~.4, 2-1.3.5. Where e q u i p m e n t is subject to ext reme weather condit ions, the system s h a h be installed in accordance with the manufac tu re r ' s design mad installation instructions.

A-5-4.2 Agent cylinder storage spaces should be adequately ventilated. Entrances to such spaces shou ld be from an open deck

(Log #13) 2001- 68 - (5-11.3.1): Accept SUBMITTER: J o h n P. Goudreau , Ansul Inc.

[ RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: [ 'q 'he discharge t ime for iner t gas agents shall not egceed 1~0 [ seconds for 85 pe rcen t of the design concent ra t ion or as otherwise [ requi red by the author i ty having jur isdic t ion." SUBSTANTIATION: Cur ren t draft does no t include inert gas systems. Inert gas systems are suitable for mar ine applicat ions and are recognized as such in IMO MSC Circular #776. Discharge t imes are in compl iance with the "Principle Requirements" . paragraph 4 of this circular. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #16) 2001- 69 - (5-11.3.1): Accept SUBMITTER: J o h n P. Goudreau , Ansul Inc.

[ RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: [ "For iner t ~as clean agents tha t are no t liquefied, pressure iS ~rl [ indicat ion of agen t quantity, ff an iner t gas clean agen t conta iner [shows a loss in oressure (adiusted for t emoera tu re / of more tllan 5 [percent . it shal l 'be refilled or replaced. "V~'here conta iner pressure [ ~au~es are used for this ournose , they shall be compared to a [ seoffrate calibrated device at" least annually."

S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Curren t draft does not include inert gas systems. Inert gas systems are suitable for mar ine applicat ions arid are recognized as such in IMO MSC Circular #776. T-his r equ i r emen t is taken f rom the main body of the 2001 s tandard and is in t ended to compl imen t paragraph 5-11.3. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #17) 2001- 70 - (5-12.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: J o h n P. Goudreau , Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Delete paragraph in its entirety and substi tute paragraph 4-7.2.2.12 in main body of the 2001 standard. SUBSTANTIATION: Measur ing a percentage of pressure loss in a hydrostatically pressure tested piping system is a contradictim~. A02L leak will result in "complete" loss of pressure. Pneumat ic pressure testin~ is prefer red so ,as to avoid the necessity of removing all "stop valves ~ "selector valves", "check valves", etc. f rom the piping network, or worse, run the risk of incomple te drying of such valves were they to be subjected to hydrostatic pressure. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. De ete 5-12.1. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Commi t t ee agrees that a pneuma t i c test is sufficient for mar ine applications. It is not necessary to repeat the requ i rements of 4-7.2,2.12 in the mar ine chapter because they will apply without modificat ion.

101

Page 42: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

NFPA 2001 - - A99 ROP

(Log #(2P36) 2001- 71 - (A-1 and A-2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read ,as follows:

A-1-3.2 Units.

A-1-3.2.1 Met r i cun i t s of m e a s u r e m e n t in this s tandard are in accordance with the modern ized metr ic system known as the Internat ional System of Units (SI). Two units (liter and bar), outside of bu t recognized by SI, are commonly used in internat ional fire protect ion. These units are listed in Table 1-3.2 with conversion factors.

A-1-3.2.2 If a value for m e a s u r e m e n t as given in this s t andard is followed by an equivalent value in o ther units, the first stated is to be regarded ,as the requ i rement . A given equivMent value migh t be approx imate .

Table A-1-3.2 Metric Conversion Factors Name of Unit Unit S~ambol Conversion Factor meter m 1 ft = 0.3048 m mil l imeter m m 1 in. = 25.4 m m liter L 1 gal = 3.785 L cub i c d c c i m c t c r d+~g ~ ~ _ ~ ~o~ A~.&

cubic mete r m 3 1 ft 3 = 0.028317 m 3 ki logram kg 1 lb = 0.4536 kg kilograms per k g / m 3 ! Ib/f t3 = 16.0183 k g / m 3 cubic mete r

~ ascal Pa 1 psi = 6895 Pa ar bar 1 psi = 0.0689 bar

bar bar 1 bar = 105 Pa

NOTE 1: For addit ional conversions a n d informat ion see ASTM E 380, Standard for Metric Practice. NOTE 2: In Canada refer to Canadian Metric Practice Guid~ CSA Standard CAN3-Z234.1-89.

A-2 These condi t ions are when both:

(a) The ~ q u a n t i t y of fuel permi t ted in the enclosure has the notential i~ ~u~c icn t to lead to deve lonmen t o f d e ~ e l o p a

concent ra t ion equal to or greater than one-half of the lower f lammable limit througlaout the enclosure, and;

t!:c f i re before ~'..~c ;'c.lati!it 7 c.f *J:c f'-c~ i: intrenched m a dar:.gcrous !c:'c: ~ v. rczu!t 8 f "&c f i rc . a n d :

(b) t|l(~ system resnonse is no t rapid e n o u g h to detect and ext inguish the fire I~efore the volatility of the fuel is increased to a dange rous level as a result of the fire. SU13STANTIATION: Moved the units section to the append ix as it is inc luded for informat ional purposes only. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #65) 2001- 72 - (A-I-4.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER- Hideki Takamatu , Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add the fo l loMng wording to pa rag raph A-l-4.1 as shown (under l ined) :

"The clean ha locarbon agents and iner t gas agents current ly listed possess the physical proper t ies as detai led in Tables A-I-4.1 (a) and A-l-4.1 (b)." S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Pbysical proper t ies are detai led in Tables A- 1-4.1 (a) a n d A-l-4.1 (b) for the inert gases, bu t t r ey are not addressed in the text which makes reference to .these tables.

I COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Add the following wording to paragraph A-l-4;1 as shown (under l ined) :

"The ~ current ly listed possess the physical propert ies as detai led in Tables A-1-4.1(a) and A-I-4.1 (b)." COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Editorial.

(Log #59) 2001- 73 - (A-1-4.1(a) and (b)): Accept SUBMITTER: Howard Hammel , D u P o n t RECOMMENDATION: Revision of da ta for HCFC-124, HFC-23, HFC-125, and HFC-236fa.

1o Revision of Physical Propert ies Tables A-1-4.1(a) a n d A-1- 4.1(b) for HCFC-124, HFC-125, HFC-23, and HFC-236fa are shown on page 102°

2. Revision of Isometric Diagrams for HFG-23, Figure A-2- 1A.1 (k) a n d Figure A-2-1.4.1 (I).

30 Addit ion of Isometric Diagrams for HFG-125, pressurized with ni t rogen, to Append ix A.

4. Addit ion of Isometric Diagrams for HFC-236fa, pressurized with ni trogen, to Appendix A. SUBSTANTIATION: Correct ion of Data

1. Reason for revision: The data conta ins typo errors an d in o ther cases more accurate data is available.

2. Reason for revision: More accurate da ta is now available. 3. Reason for revision: Exper imenta t ion has been compiled for

this c o m p o u n d and is now available for publication. 4. Reason for revision: Exper imenta t ion has been complied for

this c o m p o u n d and is now available for publication. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #66) 2001- 74 - (A-1-4.1.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Hideki Takamatu , Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add the following sen tence to paragraph A-1-4.1.2 as shown (under l ined) :

"The des ignat ion IG-01 is used in this s tandard for an u n b l e n d e d iner t gas: argon. The desi~nz, l~ion IG-100 iS used in this sreandard for an u n b l e n d e d iner t ~ : ni t rogen." SUBSTANTIATION: Section A-1-4.1.2 does not cur rendy address IG-100. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #20d) 2001- 75 - (Table A-1-4.1(a)): Reject SUBMITTER: Lorne MacGregor, Nor th Amer ican Fire Guardian Technology, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add .table as follows:

Table A-l-4.1 (a) Physical Properties of Clean Halocarbon A ~ n t s

NAF P-_zlY_ molecular weight 149.3 boiling poin t @ 760 m m Hg 1..__0_6 Freezing poin t <-100 critical t empera tu re 185 critical pressure 4 2 ~ critical vo lume critical density 481 Specific heat liquid @ 25°G 1.0_..~5 Specific hea t vapour @ cons tan t pressure 0.7.__44 (1 arm) & 25 °C Heat of vaporization at boil ing point 148 The rma l conductivi ty of l iquid @ 25°C 0.083 Viscosity, l iquid @25°C 0.39 Relative dielectric s t rength @ 1 a tm @ 734 m m Hg, 25°C (N~ 1.0) Solubility of water in agent @21°C Vapor pressure @25°C 217.6 Liuuid densi ty 1.42

SUBSTANTIATION: NAF P-IV is a new agen t developed primarily as a r ep lacemen t to ha lon 1211. While it is ant ic ipated that its pr imary use will be as a s t reaming agen t it is expected that some e q u i p m e n t manufac tu re r s m igh t wish to use it, as halon 1211 was used, for total f lood appl icat ions for normal ly unoccup ied areas. The U.S.E.P.A bas placed NAF P-IV on the Significant New Alternative Program (SNAP) list. Pease note tha t the E.P.A. has started to use t rade names and no longer tries to invent genet ic n a m e s for p roduc t s such as NAF P-IV. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Commi t t ee Action and Sta tement on Proposal 2001-8 (Log #20).

102

Page 43: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

NFPA Table A-I-4. l(a)

N F P A 2 0 0 1 m A 9 9 R O P

Physical Properties

Physical Properties of Clean Halocarbon Agents (SI Units) i i

P~r_QlZea~ Units ~ ~ Molecular Weight N/A 136.5 120 70.01 Boiling Point @760 mmHg °C -12.1 -48.5 -82.1 freezingpoint °C -198.9 -102.8 -155.2 Critical Temperature °C 122.6 66 25.9 Critical Pressure kPa 3620 3595 4836 Critical volume cc/mole 243 210 133 Critical density kg/m s 560.72 572 525 Specific Heat, liquid @25°C kJ/kg°C 1.153 1.481 4.337 @20°C Specific Heat, vapor @constant pressure (1 atm) & 25°C kJ/kg°C 0.754 0.794 0.731 @20°C Heat of Vaporization at boil ingpoint kJ/kg 163.1 164.8 238.8 Thermal conductivity of liquid @ 25°C W/m°C 0.0746 0.0634 0.0527 Viscosity, liquid @ 25°C cenfipoise 0.305 0.143 0.083 Relative dielectric strength @ 1 arm, 25°C (N~ = 1.0) N/A 1.55 0.~)55 @ 21°C 1.04 Solubility of water in agent @ 21°C ppm 700 @ 25°C 700 @ 25°C 500 @ IO°C Vapor pressure @ 25°C kPa 383 1381 4741

HFC-236fa 152 -1.4 -103

124.9 3200

274 555.3 1.283

0.844 160.1

0.0745 0.306

to be determined 740 ppm @20°C

272

Physical Properties

NFPA Table A-I-4.1 (b) Physical Properties of Clean Halocarbon Agents (English Units)

Units HCFC- 124 HFC-125 HFC-2$ HFC-236 fa N/A 136.5 120 70.01 152

o F 10.3 -55.3 -115.8 29.5 o F -326 -153 -247.4 -153.4 °F 252.5 150.8 78.6 256.8

~ sia 527 521 701 464 / l b 0.0289 0.0281 0.0305 0.0288

lb/ft 3 34.58 35.68 32.78 34.67 Btu/Ib-°F 0.276 0.354 1.037 @68°F 0.307

Btu/Ib-°F 0.180 0.190 0.175 @68°F 0.202 Btu/lb 70.2 70.8 103 68.8

Btu/h-ft-°F 0.0417 0.0367 0.0305 0.0431 Ib/ft-hr 0.738 0.346 0.201 0.74

N/A 1.55 0.955@70°F 1.04 to be determined ppm 770 ppm@77°F 770 ppm@77°F 500 ppm @50°F 740 ppm @68°F

psi 55.5 200 688 39.5

103

Page 44: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2001 ~ A 9 9 R O P

(Log #44) 2001- 76 - (Table A-l-4.1 (a)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Revise Table A-1-4.1(a) as shown on page 105.

SUBSTANTIATION: FC-2-1-8 is in the process of deve lopment with commercialization a possibility within this s tandard cycle for use in occupied spaces as a clean extinguishing agent where no other alternative is technically feasible due to performance or safety. It has a zero ozone deplet ion potential and a superior toxicity profile. FC-2-1-8 has a NOAEL of 30 percent , a LOAEL >30 percent and an LC50 of 81 percent ( 0 2 added) , ,as compared with its heptane cup burner value of 6.5 percent.

Correct relative dielectric s trength value for FC-3~I-10 is 2.8. For consistency repor t the English Units first as Table A-I-4.1 (a),

followed by the Metric Units ,as Table A-l-4.1 (b). ] COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. [ Correct editorially as needed.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee agrees with the inclusion of dais material.

(Log #67) 2001- 77- (Table A-l-4.1 (a)): Accept SUBMITTER: Hideki Takamatu, Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add the information shown below for IC~ 100 to Table A-14.1 (a) as shown below.

"Also, the critical pressure values for IG-01 and IG-55 are incorrect and need to be changed as shown below: SUBSTANTIATION: Table A-l-4.1 (a) does not currently address IG-100. The listed values are specified by Koatsu Co., Ltd.

Note: The critical pressure values for IG4)I and IG-55 are incorrect. The English values in Table A-1-4.1(b) appear to be correct, and a mistake may have been made in converting to SI units. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

Table A-1-4.1(b) Physical Properties of Clean Halocarbon Agent~

NAF P-IV molecular weight 149.3 boiling point ~ 760 mm Hg 3.5 Freezing point <-140 critical tempera ture 36_.~5 critical pressure .598 critical volume 0.033 critical density 30 Specific heat liquid @ 77°F Specific heat vapour @ constant 0.18

pressure (1 a t m ) & 77°F Heat of vapourization at boiling point 64 Thermal conductivity of liquid @ 77°F 0.048 Viscosity, l iqu id @ 77°F 0.9__._55 Relative dielectric s trength @ 1 atm

734 mm Hg, 77°C (N2=l.0) Solubility of water in agent ~70°F Vapor pressure ~ 77°F 32 Liqnid density lb / f t ~ 89

(Log #68) 2001- 79 - (Table A-l-4.1 (b)) : Accept SUBMITTER: Hideki Takamatu, Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add the information below for IG-100 to Table A-l-4.1(b) as shown on page 106. SUBSTANTIATION: Table A-14.1(b) does not currently address IG-100. The listed walues are specified by Koatsu Co., Ltd.

Note: The critical pressure values for I(;4)1 and IG-55 are incorrect. The correct values are suggested in a separate comment sheet. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #20e) 2001- 78 - (Table A-l-4.1 (b)) : Reject SUBMITTER: Lorne MacGregor, North Aanerican Fire Guardian Technology, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add table A-1-4.1(b)as follows: SUBSTANTIATION: NAF P-IV is a new agent developed primarily as a replacement to halon 1211. While it is anticipated that its primary use will be ,as a streaming agent it is expected that some equipment manufacturers might wish to use it, as halon 1211 was used, for total f lood applications for normally unoccupied areas. The U.S.E.P.A has placed NAF P-IV on the Significant New Alternative Program (SNAP) list. Pease note d~at the E.P.A. has started to use trade names and no longer tries to invent generic names for products such as NAF P-IV. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 2001-8 (Log #20).

Table A-l-4.1(a) Physical Propert ies o f Inert Gas Agents (SI Units)

U nits IG-01 IG-100 IG-541 . IG-55 Molecular weight Boiling point @ 760 mm Hg Freezing point Crltic;d temperature Critical pressure Criti~d volume Critical density Specific heat, liquid ~ 25°C Specific heat, vapor + constant pressure

(1 atm.) and 250( .` Heat of vaporization at boiling point Thermal conductivity of liquid @ 25°C Viscosity, liquid @ 25°C Relative dielectric strength @ 1 atm

@ 734 mm Hg 25°C (N2 = 1.0) Solubility of water in agent @ 25°C Vapor pressure @ 25°C

N/A 39.9 ~ 34.0 33.95 °C -189.85 -195.8 -196 -190.1 °C -189.35 ~ -78.5 -199.7 °C -122.3 -146.9 N/A -134.7

kPa 48_7- 4,903 3.399 N/A 4 t ~ 4,150 c c / m o l e N / A N / A N/A N/A

kg /m ~ N/A N.N/__A N/A N / A kJ/kg°C N / A N/A N/A N/A kJ/kg°C 0.519 ~ 0.574 0.782

kJ/kg 163 199 220 181 W / m ° C N/A ~ N/A N / A

centipose N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.01 1 ._00 1.03 1.01

N/A 0.006% ~ 0.015% 0.006% kPa N / A N / A 15200 N/A

104

Page 45: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

Units Molecular Weight N/A Boiling Point @ 760 mm

Hg. °C Freezing Point °C Critical Temperature °C Critical Pressure kPa Critical Volume cc /mole Critical Density k g / m ~ Specific Heat, liquid @

25°C kJ/kg °C Specific heat, vapor @

constant pressure (1 atm.) & 25°C kJ/kg °C

Heat of Vaporization at boiling point kJ/kg

Fhermal Conductivity of liquid @ 25°C W/m °C

centipoise

Table A-1-4.1(ai2) Physical Properties of Clean Haloearbon Agents (SI Units)

Viscosity, liquid @ 25 °C Relative Dielectric

strength @ 1 atm.@ 734 mm Hg, 25 °C N/A (N~=I.0)

Solubility of water in agent ~ 21 ° C N/A

Vapor Pressure @ 25 °C kPa

Dupont estimated values

HFC FC-2-1-8 FC-3-1-10 Blend A HFC-124 HFC-125 HFC-227ea

188 238.03 92.90 136.5 120.02 170.03

-37.0 -2.0 -38.3 -11.0 -48.5 -16.4 -183.0 -128.2 <107.2 198.9 -102.8 -131 719 113.2 124.4 122.2 66.0 101.7 2680 2323 6647 3614 3595 2912 300.8 371 162 241.6 210 274 629 629 577 565 571 621

1.099 1.047 1.256 1.13 1.260 1.184

0.794 0.804 0.67 0.741 0.800 0.808

104.8 96.3 225.6 194 164.7 132.6

0.0138 0.0537 0.0900 0.0722 0.0651 0.069 0.297 0.324 0.21 0.299 0.145 0.184

HFC-23 HFC-236fa FIC-13II 70.01 152 195.91

-82.1 -1.4 -22.5 -155.2 -93.6* -110 25.9 124.9 122 4836 3199.9 40,tl 133 268.5* 225 525 565.3* 871

1.549 1.2653 0.592

0.737 0.8403 0.3618

239.6 160.4 112.4

0.0779 0.0697 0.07 0.083 0,2923 O. 196

2.2 ~2~ 2.8 1.32 1.55 0.955 2.00 1 . 0 4 unknown 1.41 @ 21 °C

0.001% by 0.12% by 0.07%by 0.07%by 0.06% by 500 ppm unknown 1.0062% <0.005% bv weight weight weight weight @ weight @10 °(2 by

@ 25°C 25°C weight

872.7 289.6 948 386 1371 457.7 TBD 272.4 439.2

I

C)

Page 46: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

Table A-l-4.1(b) Physical Properties of Inert Gases (Engfish Units)

Units IG-O 1 IGLOO Molecular weigl~t N / A 39.9 28.0 Boiling po in t @ 760 m m Hg °F -302.6 -320.4 Freezing poin t °F -308.9 -346.0 Critical t empera tu re °F -188.1 -232.4 Critical pressure psia 711 492.9 Critical vo lume f f3 / Ibm N / A Critical density Ibm/ f t ~ N / A N / A Specific heat, l iquid @ 77°F Btu / lb - °F N / A N / A Specific beat, vapor @ cons tan t pressure B tu / lb - °F 0.125 0.445

(1 atm.) and 77°F Heat of vaporization at boil ing po in t B t u / l b 70.1 85.6 Therntal conductivity of liquid ~ 77°F B t u / h ft °F N / A N / A Viscosity, [iqt,id @ 77°F Ib/f t hr N / A N / A Relative dielectric s t rength ~ 1 a tm N / A 1.01 1.0

734 m m Hg 77°F (N z = 1.0) Solubility of water in agent ~ 70°F N / A 0.006% Vapor pressure ¢~ 77°F psi N / A N / A

IG-541 IG-55 34.0 33.95 -320 -310.2 -109 -327.5 N / A -210.5 N / A 602 N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A N / A 0.195 0.187

94.7 77.8 N / A N / A N / A N / A 1.03 1.O1

0.015% 0.006% 2207 N / A

(Log #CP22) 2001- 80 - (A-1-5.1.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions RECOMMENDATION: Add to Section A-1-5.1.2 file new text and table where indicated:

A-1-5.1.2 These decompos i t ion products have a sbarp, acid odor, even in minu te concent ra t ions of only a new parts per million. This characterist ic provides a built-in warning system for the agent, bu t at the same t ime creates a noxious, irritating a tmosphe re for those who mus t en te r the hazard following a fire.

Insert: Table A-1-5.1.2(b~ (New table~ urovides informat ion on the

toxicological effects of Hvdro~enF luor ide . T he emergency resnonse n l ann in¢ tmidelines~ERPGs for Hydrogen Fluorifl~ reoresen t ceilin¢ ex-oosure levels for the ~eneral-nubl ic and are annlicable to emergency exposure ner iods of 10 minu te s and one llour. Three ERPUos were c[evelooed for each exnosure neriod.

ERPG-3 is the m a x i m u m a i rborne concent ra t ion be lowwhich it; is believed nearly all individuals could be exnosed for the stated ner iod without exoer iencin~ or develoDin¢ l ife-threatenin~ heal th effect.

ERPC~2 is tire m a x i m u m ai rborne concent ra t ion below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for the stated per iod wi thout exner iencin~ or developing irrcver,ible or o ther serious heal th effects of svrr~ntoms tha t could imnalr ,an individual 's ability to take protective action.

ERPG-1 is the m a x i m u m a i rborne concent ra t ion below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exnosed for the stated Deriod without exner ienc in¢ Other t han mild. t ransient adverse heal th effects or wi thout oerceivin~ a clearly def ined obiect ionable

Table A-1-5.1.2(b) Toxicity In format ion for Hydrogen Fluoride 10 Minute 1 Hour

ERPG-3 170 p p m 50 ppm ERPG-2 95 ppm 20 ppm ERPG-1 2 p p m 2 p p m

SUBSTANTIATION: Recently two groups bare reviewed the toxicity of this cbemical. T he Amer ican Hygiene Association's Emergency Response P lann ing Guidel ine (ERPG) (Reference 1) (on Hydrogen Fluoride gives n u m e r o u s references to suppor t these guidefines. The National Advisory Commi t tee on Acute Exposure Guidance Levels (AEGL) (Reference 2) Technical Suppor t D o c u m e n t on Hydrogen Fluoride gives even more references than the ERPG to suppor t their guidel ines and gives guidel ines for 30 utinutes, one hour , 4 hour s a n d 8 hours . T h e AEGLs.are similar in ' magn i tude to the ERPGs.

Tbe Dangerous Toxic Load (DTL) was derived by Meld rnm based upon an evaluation of HF exposure data for mice, which sitow the greatest sensitivity to HF exposure of all m a m m a l s tested, and cor responds to exposure levels at which severe distress would be expec ted for all exposed personnel . According to the DTL analysis tbe p roduc t o f the exposure level in ppm and the exposure t ime in minu tes is 12.000 ppm*min , e.g. for an exposure t ime of 10 minutes , the DTL is 1200 ppm HF. 3

10q

1 T h e Amer ican Hygiene Association's Emergency Response P lann ing Guidel ine (ERPG) 1 for Hydrogen Fluoride, AIHA Press, Amer ican Industr ial Hygiene Association, Falrfax, VA, Estimated publicat ion date: J anua ry 1998.

2 The National Advisory Commi t t ee on Acute Exposure Guidance Levels (AEGL) Suppor t d o c u m e n t on Hydrogen Fluoride, Augalst 1997 draft. E s t m a t e d publicat ion date: January 1999.

3 M. Meldrum, Toxicology of Substances in Relation to Major Hazards: Hydrogen Fluoride. HMSO, London , 1993. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #200 2001- 81 - (Table A-1-5.1.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Lorne MacGregor, Nor th Amer ican Fire Guardian Technology, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows:

A-1-5.1.2 Toxicity Informat ion for Halocarbon Clean Agents NAF P-IV 3.6% TBD TI3D

SUBSTANTIATION: NAF P-IV is a new agen t developed primarily as a r ep lacemen t to ha lon 1211. Wllile it is ant ic ipated that its pr imary use will be as a s t r eaming agen t it is expected that some e q u i p m e n t manufac tu re r s m igh t wish to use it, as halon 1211 was used, for total f lood applicat ions for normally unoccup ied areas. T h e U.S.E.P.A has placed NAF P-IV on the Significant New Alternative Program (SNAP) list. Pease no te tha t the E.P.A. has started to use t rade n a m e s and no longer tries to invent generic names for p roduc t s such as NAF P-IV. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Commi t t ee Action and S ta tement on Proposal 2001-8 (Log #20).

(Log #46) 2001- 82 - (Table A-1-5.1.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Revise Table A-1-5.2 a.s follows:

Table A-1-5.1.2 Toxici ty In fo rmat ion For Halocarbon Clean Agents

L ~ Agent or ALC

FC- 3-1 - 10 >80% >12.8

HCFC Blend A 64% H CFC- 124 23%-29% HFC-125 >70%

HFG-227ea >80% HFG-23 >65%

HFG-236fa >18.9% Halon 1301 >80%

N o Lowest Observable Observable

Adverse Effect Adverse Effect Level Level

(NOAEL) (LOAEL) 3O% >3O% 40% >40%

10.0% >10.0% 1.0% 2.5% 7.5% 10.0% 9.0% -M4M.5-%-I 0.5 % 50% >50% 10% 15% 5% 7.5%

Page 47: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

SUBSTANTIATION: FC-2-1-8 is in the process of deve lopmen t with commercial izat ion a possibility within dais s t andard cycle for use in occupied spaces as a clean ex t inguish ing agen t where no taller alternative is technically feasible due to pe r fo rmance or safety. It has n zero ozone deple t ion potential and a super ior toxicity profile. FC-2-1-8 has a NOAEL of 3 0 p e r c e n t , a LOAEL >30 percent and a n d LCs0 of 81 percen t (O 2 added) , as compared with its hep tane cup bu rne r value of 6.5 percent .

The LOAEL value for HFC,227ea is incorrect- FIG-1311 is referenced in o ther parts of the s tandard and shou ld be included in this table. Editorial.

I COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle~ Editorially place in logical order. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Commit tee agrees with the inclusion of dais material.

(Log #6) 2001- 83 - (A-1-5.1.3): Reject SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Delete second paragraph, first sen tence beg inn ing "IC,-541" and end ing "personnel". SUBSTANTIATION: Technical accuracy. An exper t panel has indicated the addi t ion of CO 2 offers no advantage with regard to low O 2 survivability. See Toxicity/Safety Task Group repor t of 2001 Task Group ' s Carol Welsher , Chair, pg. 19. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Sta tement in Append ix is accurate.

(Log #21) 2001- 84 - (A-l-6): Reject SUBMITTER: Lorne MacGregor, North Amer ican Fire Guardian Technology, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

"Many factors impact the envi ronmenta l acceptability of a fire suppress ion agent. Uncont ro l led fires can result in very significant local env i romnenta l impact. Ozone deplet ion is a well known global env i ronmenta l oroblem. Global cl imate change or. as it is v

c o m m o n l y called, global warming, is also a major e n v i r o n m e n ~ l p rob lem today,

The effeqhs of global warming are m u c h more thap the weather becomin~ a litde warmer. T he whole climate of the globe will change: weather is exoected to become more variable: severe s torms such as hur r icanes and to rnadoes will increase in intensitv and fremlencw, some areas will exner ience f looding while o thers will exner ience d rought : a n d so on. In addi t ion th-e change in climate is exoec ted to have serious affects on the global ecosystem. Dr. Watson. fo rmer White House Science Adviser.-now with the World Bank has exoressed the oninion, that global climate change is a more serious o rob lem than ozone deple t ion and that serious action will have to be taken verv soon to reduce the imnact of climate chan~e.

The al;m0spheric lifetime of a substance is nol; ill and of itself an env i ronmenta l o rob lem however, it is an indicator of notential oroblems. Substances with shor t a tmosnher i c lifetimes tend to have low ODP and low global warming ootentials. The re is al$9 an uncer ta in ty associated ~ t h a tmosoher ic l i f e t ime . We may be ~ble to gamble tllat some t h i ng that oersists in the a tmosphe re for ~ few years will no t be h a r n f f u ( b u t m u c h less willing to gamble that some th ing that oersists for mi l lennia is harmless.

All e x t i u g u i s h i n g a g e n t s shou ld be used in ways..." SUBSTANTIATION: I believe tha t addi t ional informat ion about the potential envi ronmenta l impact of fire ext inguishing agents would be useful to professionals a t t empt ing to choose the best agen t to use for a given situation. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Commi t t ee recognizes the impor tance and complexi ty of envi ronmenta l impact. The Commi t t ee believes that the existing wording in A-1.6 captures flae in tent of the s tandard to minimize unnecessary impact of these systems on the env i ronment .

(Log #48)

2001- 85 - (Figure A-2-1.4(a)): Accept SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Add Figure A-2-1.4(a) Isometric d iagram of FG-2-1-8 (for 360 psig containers) .

ft.

900

BOO

700

600

500

400

300

f , / / 100

/ /

I 70 Ib/ft 3

I 65 Ib/ft 3

/I 60 Ib/lt 3 / ,

0 I . . , I . = . l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . , , i i , ,

-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

Temperature (°F)

SUBSTANTIATION: FC,2-1-8 is in the process of deve lopmen t with commercial izat ion a possibility within this s t andard cycle for use in occupied spaces as a clean ex t inguish ing agen t where no o ther alternative is technically feasible due to pe r fo rmance or safety. It has a zero ozone deple t ion potential and a super ior toxicity profile. FG2-1-8 has a NOAEL of 30pe rcen t , a LOAEL >30 percen t and and LC50 of 81 percen t (O 2 added) , as compared with its hep tane cup bu rne r value of 6.5 percent . COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #49) 2001- 86 - (Figure A-2-1.4(b)): Accept SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Add Figure A-2-1.4(b) Isometric d iagram of FC-2-1-8 (for 2.5 MPa containers) .

,00 i I I I

1120 kg/m 3 1041 kg/rn 3

.00 0 g/m 3

• /// .oo

.oo i , 0

.oo / J

f . /

.00 f

J I

0 i

-40 -30 -20 -10 i

0 10 20 30 40

Temperature (°C)

50 60 70 80 90

107

Page 48: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

SUBSTANTIATION: FC-2-1-8 is in the process of deve lopment witb commercialization a possibility within dais s tandard cycle for use in occupied spaces as a clean extinguishing agent where no other alternative is technically feasible due to per formance or safety. It has a zero ozone deplet ion potential and a superior toxicity profile. FC-2-1-8 has a NOAEL of 30 percent , a LOAEL >30 percent and and LCs0 of 81 percent ( 0 2 added) , as compared with its heptane cup burner value of 6.5 percent. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #57) 2001- 87 - (A-2-1.4.1): Accept SUBMITrER: Howard Hammel, DuPont RECOMMENDATION: Add text as follows:

Figures for isometric diagrams of HFG-125 [pressurized with ni trogen to 360 psig at 72~F / 6 0 0 psig at 72~F/750 psig at 72°F (Englisb and S.I).]

v

if_

I /

/ /

/

58 Ib/ft

Z 5 6 Ib/fl

~ 54 Ib/f' 52 ib/fl

5O Ib/fl

20 40 60 80 1 O0 120 140 160 180

Temperature (°F)

Figure Isometric Diagram of FE-25 Pressurized with Nitrogen 360 psig Ca) 72°F

. Q

I I

. / f

/ /

/

i i929 kg/m 3

897 kg/m 3 I

865 kg/m 3 833 kg/m 3

800 kWm 3

Z i

Y

-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Temperature (°C) Figure Isometric Diagram of FE-25 Pressurized with Nitrogen to

24.82 Bar, gauge @ 22°C

a-

J I

i

/

/

2'

~ T8 Ib/ft

~ Ib/lt

/zz //

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Temperature (°F)

Figure.Isometric Diagram of FE-25 Pressurized with Nitrogen to 600 psig Ca) 72°F

108

Page 49: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

/

_ / /

/,

F

y/

929.1 kg/r

896.4 kg/r

866.6 kg/r

-20 0 20 40 60 80 1 O0

Temperature (°C)

Figure Isometric Diagram of FE-25 Pressurized with Nitrogen to 41.4 Bar, gauge @ 22°C

/

/ j "

|

58 Ib/f

~ ~ 55 Ib/f

45113/t

y//

-20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Temperature (°F)

Figure Isometric Diagram of FE-25 Pressurized with Nitrogen to 750 psig Ca) 72°F

i I

J

/ /

/

,//

///,7 ,p

921 ~gim ~

i

882 kg/m '

I 793 kg/m:

I 723 kg/m ~

-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Temperature (°C)

Figure Isometric Diagram of FE-25 Pressurized with Nitrogen to 51.7 Bar, gauge Ca) 22°C

SUBSTANTIATION: Data not included in present text. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #71) 9001- 88 - (A-2-1.4.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Hideki Takamatu, Koatsu Co. Ltd.

I RECOMMENDATION: Change dae first sentence in the second paragraph to read:

'q 'he variations in vapor pressure with temperature for the various clean agents are shown in Figures A-2-1.4.1 (a) d l rough ~ A - 2 - 1 . 4 . 1 (xU' SUBSTANTIATION: Two figures need to be added which address IG-100.

Note: The sentence as it now reads is incorrect. There are currently Figures A-2-1.4.1 (a) darough A-2-1.4.1 (v), not Figures A- 2-1.4.1(a) th rough A-2-1.4.1 (k). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #20g) 2001- 89 - (Table A-2-1.4.1): Reject SUBMITTERz Lorne MacGregor, North American Fire Guardian Technology, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add ' text to read as follows:

Table A-2-1.4.1 Storage Container Characteristics what pressures? fill densities etc.

SUBSTANTIATION: NAF P-IV is a new agent developed primarily as a replacement to halon 1211. While it is anticipated that its primary use will be as a streaming agent it is expected that some equipment manufacturers might wish to use it, as halon 1211 was used, for total f lood applications for normally unoccupied areas. The U.S.E.P.A has placed NAF P-IV on the Significant New Alternative Program (SNAP) list Pease note that the E.P.A. has started to use trade names and no longer tries to invent generic names for products such as NAF P-IV. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 2001-8 (Log #20).

][09

Page 50: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

(Log #47) 2001- 90 - (Table A-2-1.4.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Revise Table A-2-1.4.1 as follows:

Table A-2-1.4.1 Storage Container Characteristics

Maximum fill Minimum Total density for Container Pressure conditions Design Level at

listed below Level 70°F (psig) ( lb/ft 3) Working

Pressure (psi~)

65.0 50o 36._9.0 FC-3-1 - 10 80.0 500 360

HGFG Blend A 56.2 500 360

H CFC- 124 71.0 240.0 195.0 HFC-125 58.0 320.0 166.4*

H FC227ea 72.0 500 360 H FC23 54.0 1800 608.9* FI (3-1311 104.7 500 360

I (;-01 N/A 2120 2370 I (;-541 N/A 2015+ 2175 I(;-541 (200) N/A 2746 2900 IG-55 (222) N/A 2057+ 2222** IG-55 (2692) N/A 2743+ 2692*** IG-55 (4443) N/A 4 1 1 4 + 4443"***

SUBSTANTIATION: FG-2-1-B is in the process of development with commercialization a possibility within this standard cycle for use in occupied spaces ,as a clean extinguishing agent where no other alternative is technically feasible due to performance or safety. It has a zero ozone depletion potential and a superior toxicity profile. FC-2-1-8 has a NOAEL of 30percent, a LOAEL >30 percent and and LC50 of 81 percent (0 2 added), as compared with its heptane cup burner value of 6.5 percent. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #70) 2001- 91 - (Table A-2-1.4.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Hideki Takamatu, Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add the information below for IC, I00 to Table A-2-1.4.1 as shown (underlined):

The NOTE at the bottom of the table should be added after the existing notes.

Table A-2-1.4.1 Storage Container Characteristics

It-01 ~ ¢18m

N/A N/A N/A Maximum fill density for conditions listed below (Ib/ft s)

Maximum container 2120 1806 2161 design level working pressure (psig)

Total pressure level at 2370 2006 70°F /psi~/

NOTE: Total pressure level at 70°F is calculated from fillin~ condition: IC~100 (150): 2133 psig (14.7 Mpa) and 95°F (~5°C) I(;-100 (180): 2560 psig (17.7 MDa) arid 95°F (35°C) SUBSTANTIATION: Table A-2-1.4.1 does not currently address IG-100. Tbe Storage Container Characteristics are specified by Koatsu Co., Ltd. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

IG~41

N/A

2015

2175

(Log #50) 2001- 92 - (Figure A-2-1.4.1(a) through (v)): Reject SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4,1 (a) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (c) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1(b) to Figure A-2.|.4.1 (d) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1 (c) to Figu re A-2.1.4.1 (e) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1 (d) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (O

Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1 (e) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (g) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1(f) to Figure A-2.1.4.1(h) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1 (g) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (i) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1 (h) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (j) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1 (i) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (k) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1 (j) to Hgure A-2.1.4.1 (I) Rename die existing Figure A-2.1.4.1(k) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (m)

SUBSTANTIATION: In order to add the new Figure A-2-1.4.1(a) file figures that follow must be re-alphabetized. Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Table will be incorporated in logical ordero See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 2001-90 (Log #47).

(Log #51) 2001- 93 - (Figure A-2-1.4.1(a) through (v)): Reject SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

Rename the existing Figure A-2.1A.1 (I) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (n) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1 (m) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (o) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1(n) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (p) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1 (o) to Figure A-2.1.4.1(q) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1(p) to Figure A-2.1.4.1(r) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1 (q) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (s) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1(r) to Figure A=2.1.4.1 (t) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1 (s) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (u) Rename the existing Figu re A-2.1.4.1 (t) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (v) Rename the existing Figure A-2,1.4.1 (u) to Figure A-2.1.4.1 (w) Rename the existing Figure A-2.1.4.1 (v) to Figure A-2.1.4.1(x)

SUBSTANTIATION: In order to add the new Figure A-2-1.4.1 (a) the figures that follow must be re-alphabetized. Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Table will be incorporated in logical order. See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 2001-90 (Log #47).

2001-94- (Figure A-2-1.4.1(k) and (I)): Accept SUBMITrER: Howard Hammel, DuPont RECOMMENDATION: Replace figure widl new data:

240,000

220,000

200,000

(Log #58)

I 960 kg/m 3 / ,

/ 1 80,00O

/ 881 kg/m 3 160,000 L /

~"~ / # 86~ kg/m 3

& 140,000 ¢ I

120,000 / 80 k~m s

i. 100,000 1 6 4 ) kg/m 3

n 481 k~m 3 80,000

320 kg/m 3

J i f

60,000

40,000

20,0001

0.000 -20

~ t'~ Critical point 25.92 °C, 47.37 bar (gauge), 525 k~m 3

- 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Temperature (°C)

Figure Isometric diagram of HFC-23

110

Page 51: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

®

[3.

/ J

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Temperature (°F)

Figure Isometric diagram of HFC-23 SUBSTANTIATION: Figure updated. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

601 /

I / 551 / 5 3 . 7 Ib/ft 3

30 VfP

/ / / _ . , ~ 20 Ib/ft s

Critical point , , y 78.7 °F, 687 psig, - -

32.8 Ib/ft 3

-I T 140

(Log #72) 2001- 95 - (Table A-2-1.4.1 (w) and (x)): Accept SUBMITTER: Hideki Takamatu, Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: The figures shown below need to be added. Since the current figures are not shown in any particular order, the new figures can be added at die end as Figures A-2- 1.4.1 (w) and A-2-1.4.1 (x).

35O0

3000

2500

~ 2000 ~ - -

1500 " ' ~

1000

500

0 -30 -10 10 30

j ] f v ~ ""

IG-100 (180) ~

~ ....... ~ ~ IG-100 (150)

50 70 90 110 130 150 170 190 210 Temperature (°F)

Figure A-2-1.4.1 (w) Isometric diagram o f IC-100, English. (°F).

220

200

180

~ 160

140

12o J . I

I G-100 (180) J j r

/

J

J J

j f v

j ~

j f f -

J . I . . .

j f

J ~-G-1 oo (1 so) - - -

- 30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Temperature (°C)

Figure A-2-1.4.1(w) Isometric diagram o f I t -100 , metric. (°C). SUBSTANTIATION: There are currently no isometric diagrams in d~e NFPA 2001 standard which address IG-100. The diagrams were developed byKoatsu Co., Ltd~ COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #22) 2001- 06 - (Figure A-2-1.4.1 (x) (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: Lorne MacGregor, Nordl American Fire Guardian Technology, Inc.

!RECOMMENDATION: Add isometric for l!igil pressure HCFC Blend A systems as shown be low

55

50

45

¢ 40

~ 35 n

30

25 J f

I /

/ . /

/

-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Temperature (°C)

Figure A-2-1.4.l(x) Isometric diagram for HCFC Blend A (pressurized to 40 bar at 20°C, with N2) for fill densities o f 0.5 to

0.9 kg/L.

8OO j l

f

-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 ! 00 t 20 ! 40 Temperature (*F)

Figure A-2-I.4.I (x) Isometric diagram for HCFC Blend A (pressurized to 600 psig at 70°F, Mth N2) for fill densities o f 31.2

to 56.2 lb/ft 3. SUBSTANTIATION: This additional information is useful for system designer desiring to use HCFC Blend A at relatively high pressurization levels.

111

Page 52: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. Revise figures as follows:

55

s0 7 /

~" 45 J

40

a0 /

25 / -40 -30 -20 - 10 0 10 20 30 40 50

Temperature (°C)

Figure A-2-1.4.1(x) Isometric diagram for HCFC Blend A (pressurized to 40 bar at 20°C, with N2) for fill densities of 0.5 to

0.9 kg/L.

800

700

~ 6 0 0

500

A- 4OO

30O

J I . J

f

f ~ r J J

f

-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 t00 120 140 Temperature (~F}

Figure A-2-1.4.1(x) Isometric diagram for HCFC Blend A (pressurized to 600 psig at 70°F, with N2) for fill densities of 31.2

to 56.2 Ib/ft 3.

(Log #56) 2001- 97 - (A-2-1.4(w)): Accept SUBMITTER: Howard Hammel , DuP on t RECOMMENDATION: Add text as follows:

Figures for Isometric d iagrams of HFG236fa pressurized with n i t rogen to 360 psig at 72°F and 600 pslg at 72°F (English and S.I.) S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Data no t included in p resen t text. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #74) 2001- 98 - (Table A-2-2.1.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Hideki Takamatu , Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add the informat ion for IG-100 to the table which shows the m i n i m u m calculated pressures as shown (under l ined) below:

Clean A g e n t

Initial Charging Pressure

IG-01 2370 psig (16,341 kPa) Ups t ream of the pressure r educer Downstream of the pressure r educer 2006 Dsi~" (13.836 kPa)

10__00 Uns t ream of the nressure r e d n c e r [)owlastream of the pressure r e d u c e r

IG-55

2404 psig (16.580 kPa) l Jps t ream of the pressure r educe r Downst ream of the pressure

2222 psig (15,521 kPa) Ups t ream of the pressure r educer Downstream of the pressure r e d u c e r

Minimum Calculated Pressure (up to and

inc luding)

2650 psig (18,972 kPa) 975 psig (6723 kPa)

2332 nsi~ (16.080 kPa) 1.000 nsie (6.895 kPa)

2799 nsi~ (19.300 kPa) 1000 nsi~ (6.895 kP:O = .

2475 psig (15,318 kPa) 950 psig (6550 kPa)

S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : The m i n i m u m calculated pressures are not given tor IGLOO. They were de t e rmined by Koatsu Co., Ltd. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #73) 2001- 99 - (Table A-2-2.1.1 (j) ,and (k)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTEI~ Hideki Takamatu , Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add two tables for ICM00 ,after Table A-2- 2.1.1 (i). The suggested tables are shown on page 204: S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Table A-2-2.1.1 does no t current lyaddress ICM00. The p ip ing requ i rements were de t e rmined by Koatsu Co . , Ltd. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Commi t t ee Action and Sta tement on Proposal 2001-23 (Log #30).

(Log #75) 2001- 100 - (Table A-2-2.3.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Hideki Takamatu , Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add the informat ion for IG-100 to Table A-2-2.3.1 for p iping system fittings as shown on page 113. SUBSTANTIATION: The piping system fittings are not given t0r IG-100 in Table A-2-2.3.1. They are specified by Koatsu Co., Ltd. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP20) 2001- 101 - (A-2-3.2.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions RECOMMENDATION: Add the following text to the existing append ix text:

"Where there is a risk of fo rming f lammable a tmosphere , the spacing and sit ing of f lammable vapor detectors requires carefifl considerat ion to avoid excessive delay in agen t release." SUBSTANTIATION: Add gene~d informat ion on detector locations for system actuat ion. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP17) 2001- 102- (A-3-2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Hal0n Alternative Yrotection Opt ions RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

A-3-2 System Flow Calculations. Analyzing the behavior of two- phase agents in pipel ines is a complex subject with n u m e r o u s solutions. The re are two calculation me thods tha t are co m m o n ly used by fire protect ion professionals. The first is based on the work of Hesson 1 in 1953 and dae o ther is base don modifications to the HFLOW m e t h o d 2 comple ted in 1994. Since the latter is more prevalently used for eng ineered clean agen t systems it will be discussed first. Only those calculation m e t h o d s that have been peer reviewed and found acceptable and have been listed by fire test ing organizations, should be used for design purposes.

Modified HFLOW Calculation Method This m e t h o d is based on major modif icat ions of a calculation

m e t h o d called HFLOW developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Eliot et al 1984. The revised me thod is capable of predic t ing the two-phase flow characteristics of clean agents based on their t he rmodynamics properties. This me thod can calculate the flow characteristics of fire suppress ion agents across the wide range of real eng inee r ing systems in reasonable t ime scales.

Assumpt ions and Limitat ions Several basic assumpt ions are made to simplify the m e t h o d o l o ~ ° The condi t ions in the cylinder (pressure, tempera ture , and

composi t ion) are solely funct ions of the initial condi t ions and the outage fraction (fraction of the initial charge mass having left the

112

Page 53: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2001 - - A 9 9 R O P

Table A-2-2.1.1 (j)

Threaded Scb. 40 A-106C, SMLS 1/2 in., NPS A-53B/A-106B, SMLS Do Not Use A-53B, ERW Do Not Use A-53A/A-IO6A, SMLS Do Not Use A-53A, ERW Do Not Use A-53F, FW Do Not Use

Piping Requirements for IGLOO @ 2006 psig (2332 pslg)

Sch. 80 Sch. 120 Sch. 160 1/2 in. - 3 in., NPS 4 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS

I / 2 in. - 1-1/2 in., NPS 4 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 1 in., NPS Do Not Use 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 1 in., NPS Do Not Use 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS

1/2 in., NPS Do Not Use 1/2 in. - 4 in., NPS Do Not Use Do Not Use 1/2 in. - 3 /4 in., NPS

Welded A-10fiC, SML,S 1/2 in. - 3 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS 4 in. - 8 in., NPS A-53B/A-IO6B, SMLS 1/2 in. - 2 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 6 in., NPS 4 in. - 8 in., NPS A-53B, ERW 1/2 in. - 1-1/2 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 3 in., NPS 4 in. - 8 in., NPS A-53A/A-lO6A, SMLS 1/2 in. - 1-1/4 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 3 in., NPS 4 in. - 8 in., NPS A-53A, ERW 1/2 in. - 1 in., NPS 1/2 ino - 2-1/2 in., NPS 4 in., NPS A-53F, FW Do Not Use 1/2 in. - 3 /4 in., NPS Do Not Use

1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS t / 2 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 2 in., NPS

Table Ao2-2.1.1 (k) Piping Requirements for IGLOO @ 2,404 pslg (2,799 psig)

Threaded A-106C, SMLS A-53B/A-106B, SM I_,S A-53B, ERW A-53A/A- 106A, SMLS A-53A, ERW A-53F, FW

Welded A-106C, SMLS A-53B/A-I OrB, SMLS A-53B, ERW A-53A/A-IO6A, SMLS A-53A, ERW A-53F, FW

Sch. 40 Sch. 80 Sch. 120 Sch. 160 Do Not Use 1/2 in. - 1-1/2 in., NPS 4 in. - 6 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS Do Not Use 1/2 in. - 1 in., NPS Do Not Use 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS Do Not Use 1/2 in. - 3 /4 in., NPS Do Not Use 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS Do Not Use 1/2 in., NPS Do Not Use 1/2 in. - 2 in., NPS Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use 1/2 in. - 1 in., NPS Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use

1/2 in. - 1-1/2 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 5 in., NPS 4 in: - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 1-1/4 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 3 in., NPS 4 in. - 8 in., NPS

1/2 in. - 1 in., NPS 1/2 in.- 2-1/2 in., NPS 4 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 1 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 1-1/2 in., NPS Do Not Use

1/2 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 1-1/4 in., NPS Do Not Use Do Not Use 1/2 in., NPS Do Not Use

1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in . - 4 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 1 in., NPS

Table A-2-2.3.1 Clea'n Agent Initial Charging Pressure

(up to and inc lud ing) IG-OI

IG-IO0

1G-55

2370 psig (16,341 kPa) Upstream of the pressure reducer Downstream of the pressure reducer

2006 osig (13.836 kPa) Unstream of the nressure reducer Downstream of ~ e oressure reducer

2410 psig (16.580 kPa~ IJpstrea411 of the pressure reducer Downstream of the pl-essure redu~el"

222 psig (15,521 kPa) I Jpstream of the pressure reducer Downstream of the pressure reducer

Piping System Fittings

Acceptable Fittings Maximum Pipe Size

3000-1b forged steel All Class 300 malleable iron or ductile 3 in. NPS iron > 3 in. NPS 1000-1b rated ductile iron or forged All steel Class 600 flanged joints 2000-1b forged steel All Class 300 malleable iron or ductile iron > 3 in. NP$ 1000-1b rated ductile iron or forg¢~i All steel Class 600 flan~ed Joints 3000-11~ forged~ste¢[ All Class 300 malleable iron or ductile iron > 3 irl. NPS 1000-1b rated ductile iron or forged Al__!l

Class 600 flanged joints 3000-1b forged steel All Class 300 malleable iron or ductile 3 in. NPS iron > 3 in. NPS 1000-1b rated ductile iron or forged All steel Class 600 flanged ]oints

cylinder). This assumption effectively ignores file impact of the increased kinetic energy of the fluid leaving the cylinder on die cylinder energy balance.

• Quasi-steady flow exists. Tile average flow rate over a small time interval step is equal to tile flow rate that would exist if the cylinder conditions were held steady during that time step.

• The heat transferred from tile pipe walls to the flowing fluid is assumed to be insignificant.

o The flow through the pipe network is homogeneotts. Liquid and vapor flow through the piping is at the same velocity evenly dispersed.

Calculation can not be done without adequate manufacturer 's hardware data. This data includes dip tube and m,-mifold equivalent lengths and nozzle discharge coefficients. This model in its present form has been demonstrated to predict tile discharge time based on nozzle liquid run out with reasonable accuracy within limits that constrain the flow regime arid flow splits.

The model has only been tested against two tee orientations, bull- [lead and horizontal side flow. There are limitations, particularly due to the availability of experiment data on the largest flow splits that the model can handle. For both types of tees, the maximum flow split is on the order of 90 percent/10-percent.

113

Page 54: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

Required inpu t da ta include cylinder volume, valve, dip tube equivalent lengths, agent mass a n d tempera ture , pipe length and diameter , elevation, fittings, nozzle area, a n d discharge coefficient. Ou tpu t da ta for each node (pipe, cylinder, or nozzle) include pressure, t empera ture , c o m p o n e n t fraction, phase dis tr ibut ion, mass flow rate, and velocity.

Due to its complexity, this m e t h o d does not lend itself to h a n d calculat ion.

Modified Hesson Calculat ion Methodology This two phase flow m e t h o d was first developed by Hesson for

calculat ing pressure d rop a long a pipe line flowing carbon dioxide. In dais me thodo logy s tead state flow is ,'resumed, while in truth, is very dynamic.

Assumpt ions and Limitat ions When it came to apply the Hesson two-phase me thodo logy to

halon, it became a p p a r e n t tha t a better r e f inemen t was n e e d e d to partial filling of conta iners and dae lower quanti t ies of agen t used. Ati :Lssumption was made to base the steady state flow on the wemise that 50 percen t of dae agen t has left die nozzles. This same welnise is used to compu te pressure recession for a variety of two- bla~tse clan agen t ex t inguish ing agents. All the factors necessary for tiffs complex calculation are no t

:~;ailable to the fire protec t ion layman. For example , the formulas that address hea t ixansfer between die agen t and the p ip ing network are not available nor are the ad jus tments for flow splits t h r o u g h pipe fittings. Many of the necessary final ad jus tments to die calculations are proprietary informat ion he ld by the agen t e q u i p m e n t manufac turers . These factors however are inc luded in listed calculation programs. Wi thou t dais data no flow calculation for u n b a l a n c e d systems can b e p r e c i s e e n o u g h for des ign purposes. Al though c u m b e r s o m e dtis m e t h o d does lend itself to h a n d calculat ion.

l "Pressure Drop For Two Phase Carbon Dioxide Flowing In Pipe Lines", J. C. Hesson, Master of Science Thesis in CH.E. Illinois Insti tute of Technology. Jan. 1953.

2 DiNenno, P.J . , E. W. Forssell, M.J . Ferreica, C. P. Hananska , and B. A. J o h n s o n , "Model ing of the Flow Propert ies a n d Discharge of Halon Rep lacemen t Agents", Process Safety Progress (Vol. 14, No. l , J a n u a r y 1995). SUBSTANTIATION: Add general ly accepted informat ion on two phase flow. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CPI 6) 2001- t03 - (A-3-2.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

A-3-2.1 A listed or approved calculat ion m e t h o d shou ld predic t agen t mass d ischarged per nozzle, average nozzle pressure, and system discharge t ime widlin die following m i n i m u m limits of accuracy:

(a) The mass of agen t predicted to discharge f rom a nozzle by the flow calculation m e t h o d should agree with mass of agent measu red f rom the nozzle by -10 pe rcen t to +10 p e r c e n t (predicted to actual) . Therefore , the calculat ion m e t h o d shou ld no t over- predict the measu red mass of agen t by more than 5 percen t nor under -pred ic t the measu red mass o f agen t by more than 10 percent .

(b) The system discharge t ime predic ted by the flow calculation m e t h o d shou ld agree with the actual system discharge t ime widtin a range of + or - 10 percen t or 1 second, wltichever is greater.

(c) The average nozzle pressure predic ted by die flow calculation m e t h o d shou ld agree with the actual nozzle pressures within a range of + o r - 10 percenL SUBSTANTIATION: To establish tha t a calculation m e t h o d is capable o f p e r f o r m i n g t o the above stated limits requires a r igorous test program. A n u m b e r of tests mus t be designed, assembled, i n s t rumen ted a n d discharged. T he m e a s u r e m e n t s made f rom these tests mus t be compared to die predic ted values and found to fall with the limits s ta ted above. These tests shou ld have mult iple nozzles and shou ld be conduc ted at the m i n i m u m and m a x i m u m design limits for the calculat ion m e t h o d (for instance; fill density, flow split ratios, p ip ing configurat ions, etc.). T he design limits establ isbed and tested in this test p rogram must be publ i shed in the system design manua l and s lmuld be incorpora ted in the calculation m e t h o d such that the violation of a design limit results in a warning flag. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP40) 2001- 104 - (A-3-2.1 (a)): Accept SIJBMIq['rER: Technica l Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions

]RECOMMENDATION: Revise A-3-2.1 (a) to read "within a range ] o f - 1 0 p e r c e n t to +10 percent. . ." so that it reads as follows: ] (a) The weight of agen t predic ted by flow calculation to ]d ischarge f rom teh nozzle shou ld agree with the total weight of ] agen t actually d ischarged f rom each nozzle in the system within a I range of -10 p e r c e n t to +10 pe rcen t (predicted to actual). SUBSTANTIATION: Provides a more reasonable range. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #52) 2001- 105 - (Table A-3-4.2.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Revise Table A-3-4.2.1 as follows:

Table A-3-4.1.1 Inserting Concentration for Various Agents

Vol % lnert ing

Fuel Agent Concentration Refereno i -Butane H-1301 6.7 Senecal

HFC-227ea 11.3 Robin l -Chlorol- l ,1- HFC-227ea 2.6 Robin

d i f luoroe thane (HCFC-142b)

1 ,1-Dif luoroethane HFC-227ea 8.6 Robin (HFG-152a)

Diflu o r o m e t h a n e H FC-227ea 3.5 Ro bi n (HFG-32)

Ethylene Oxide HFG-227ea 13.6 Robin Methane ~ 8.._99 Moore

HFG-227ea 8.0 Robin HFC-23 20.2 Senecal H FC-125 14.7 Senecal IG-541 43.0 T a m a n i n Halon 1301 4.9 Skaggs

Pentane HFG-227ea 11.6 Robin Propane Ha lon - 7.7 Senecal

1301 Ha lon - 6.0 Seuecal 1301 Ha lon - 6.2 Moore 1301 HFC-227ea 11.6 Robin HFC-227ea 11.7 Moore HFC-23 20.2 Senecal HFC-23 20.2 Moore HFC-23 20.4 Skaggs HFC-125 15.7 Senecai IG-541 49.0 T a m a n i n

LL2 oM9_9_~ FG-3-1-10 10.3 Senecal FC-3-1 - 10 9.9 Skaggs FC-3-1- ! 0 9.6 Moo re FC-5114 7.3 Senecal HCFC 18.5 Moore Blend A FIC-1311 6.5 Mooce Halon 1301 6.2 Skaggs

Propane* HFC-227ea 11.7 Skag~s

SUBSTANTIATION: FG-2-1-8 is in the process of deve lopment with commercia l izat ion a possibility within this s tandard cycle for use in occupied spaces as a clean ex t inguish ing agen t where no o ther alternative is technically feasible due to pe r fo rmance or safety. It has a zero ozone deple t ion potential and a super ior toxicity profile. FG-2-1-8 has a NOAEL of 30 percent , a LOAEL >30 pe rcen t a n d an LC50 of 81 percen t ( 0 2 added) , as compared with its hep tane cup bu rne r value of 6.5 percent .

For consistency, replace H-1301 with Halon 1301. Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

114

Page 55: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

(Log #76) 2001- 106 - (Table A-3-4.2.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Hideki Takamatu , Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add iner t ing concent ra t ions for IC~I00 to Table A-3-4.2.1 as shown (under l ined) b e l o ~

Table A-3-4.2.1 Inertin~ Concentrat ions for Various Agents

Vol % Inerting

Fuel Agent Concen t ra t ion Reference i-Butane H-13~)l 6.7 Senecal

HFC-227ea 11.3 Robin IG-100 40.0 Zabetakis HFG-227ea 2.6 Robin 1-Chloro-1, 1

d i f luoroe thane (HCFC-142b)

1,1- Di f luoroe thane (HFC-152a)

D i f l uo rome thane (HFC-32)

Ethane IG-100 -Ethylene Oxide HFC-227ea Hexane IG-100 Methane H FG-227ea

HFC~23 HFC-125 IG-541 Halon 1301 IG-1001

Pent, me HFC~227ea IG-100

Propane H-1301 H-1501 H-1301 HFC-227ea HFC-227ea HFC-23 HFC-23 HFC-23 HFCA25 IG-541 FC-5-1-10 FC-~ 1-10 FC-g- 1-10 FC-5114 HCFC Blend A FICA 311 Halon 1301 IG-100

Propane* HFC-227ea

HFG-227ea 8.6 Robin

HFG-227ea 3.5 Robin

44 Zabetakis 13.6 Robin 42 Zabetakis

8.0 Robin 20.2 Senecal 14.7 Senecal 45.0 T a m a n i n i

4.9 Skaggs 37.0 Zabetakis 11.6 42.0

7.7 6.0 6.2

11.6 11.7 20.2 20.2 20.4 15.7 49.0 10.3

9.9 9.6 7.3

18.5 6.5 6.2

42.0

Robin Zabetakis Senecal Senecal Moore Robin Moore Senecal Moore Skagg~ Senecal T a m a n i n i Senecal Skaggs Moore Senecal Moore Moore Skaggs Zabetakis

11.7 S k , ~ s

S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : The NFPA 2001 s tandard does no t current ly address IG-100. The values shown on were taken f rom the following reference: Zabetakis, M.G., "Flammability Characterist ics of Combust ib le Gases and Vapors," Bulletin 627, Bureau of Mines, Pit tsburgh, PA, 1964.

NOTE: Suppor t ing material is available for review at NFPA Headquar te r s . COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

] revisions of this s tandard and should be submi t ted us ing the Form A-5-4.2.2. Add form A-3.4.2.2 as shown on page 116 and revise Table A-3-

[4.2.2 as shown on page 117. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : There is a need to collect fur ther data on cup bu rne r values. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #53) 2001- 109 - (Table A-3-4.2.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals RECOMMENDATION: Revise Table A-3-4.2.2 as shown on page 118. SUBSTANTIATION: FC~2-1-8 is in the process of deve lopmen t with commercial izat ion a possibility within this s tandard cycle for use in occupied spaces as a clean ex t inguish ing agen t where no o ther alternative is technically feasible due to pe r fo rmance or safety. It has a zero ozone deple t ion potential and a superior toxicity profile. FC-2-1-8 has a NOAEL of 30 percent , a LOAEL >30 percent and an LCs0 of 81 percent ( 0 2 added) , as compared widl its hep tane cup bu rne r value of 6.5 percent . COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Table submi t ted with Commi t t ee Proposal 2001-108 (Log #CP34).

(Log #77) 2001- 110 - (Table A-$-4.2.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Hideki Takamatn , Koatsu Co. Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Add a co lumn for cup bu rne r results to Table A-3-4.2.2. The co lumn can be a d d e d after the NIST column. The cup bu rne r results for IC,100 f rom NRL and NIST shou ld also be ,added as shown below:.

Table A-3-4.2.2 Cup-Burner Heptane Flame Extinguishing Data

Agent NMERI NRL

FC~3-1-10 5.0 5.2 HCFC~124 - - - - HFC-227ea 6.3 6.6 HFG-236fa 5.6 i HCFC Blend A 9.9 11 HFC-23 12.6 12 HFC-125 9.4 9 410 i - - CF31 __ I FIC-1311 3.0 3.241 IG-541 - - - - IG-55 28 - - IG-O1 38 - - Halon 1301 2.9 3.1 It.100 3o 3o

NIST FRI - - 5._! 7.0 6.2 6.15 6.5

12 8.7 5.3 3.2 I _ _ I

_ _ i

3.1 3.4 - - 33.6

NOTES: (d/ FRI - - Fire Research Institute. Tokyo. laoan

• v L

(2001-107 was not used)

(Log #CP34) 2001- 108- (A-3-4.2.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions RECOMMENDATION: Replace the last pa ragraph unde r A-3- 4.2.2 with tile following paragraph:

Cusp bu rne r test ing in the past has involved, a variety of techniques , i apparatuses , and investigators. Cup-burne r da ta has been col ected for tile preparat ion of this s t andard ,and have been reviewed to prepare a table of "best" values (Table A-3-4.2.2). Except where

n o t e d , data are for fuel t empera tu res of 25°C _+ 5°C. Data for cup bu rne r appara tuses similar to tha t descr ibed in tiffs repor t were giv~:n preference over "non-s tandard" cup burners . Data for the latter appara tuses were used where o ther da ta were not available, and this is no ted in the ruble. Data will be accepted for fu tnre

S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Cu I} Burner values for IG-10O :u'e not current ly listed in fl le 'NFPA 2001 s tandard. Values were taken f rom the following references: "A Compar i son of the NME~,I and ICI~Style C u p Burners," Halon Opt ions Technical Working Conference Proceedings , 1997, and " Improvement on Rel)roducibility of Flame Ext inguish ing Concent ra t ion Measured by Cup Burner Method," Halon Opt ions Technical Working Conference Proceedings, 1995.

NOTE: Suppor t ing material is available for review at NFPA Headquar te r s . COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Table submi t ted with Commi t tee Proposal 2001-108 (Log #CP34).

115

Page 56: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

NFPA 2 0 0 1 u A99 ROP t

C a p B u r n e r D a t a S u b m i s s i o n A p p a r a t u a / P r o c e d u r e

A p p a r a t u s d r a w i n g a n d / o r s p e c i f i c a t i o n s t o i n c l u d e t h e f o l l o w i n g ( a s a v a i l a b l e )

a ) I l l ~ l d e d i a n ] e t e l ( I D ) C u p n l m ~ h l n l n e y O i J ~ i d e d i a m e t e r ( O D ) C u p C h i m n e y m m H o l g ~ l t : C u p : m m C h l r n n o y

b ) F ' o ~ l t i o n Of c u p f l o l l l t o p o f c h i n l n e y h i m F ' o ~ l t l o n e l f u e l l e v e l b ~ l o w t o p o f c u p :

c ) A g e n t / f u e l r n l x i n g c h a n l t ~ l d o ~ c r i p t l o n

d ) L i q u i d f u e l l e v e l i n g c o m p ( ~ n e n t d e s c n p t i o n :

o ) F l o w c o n t r o l l i n g / m e a s u r i n g c o m p o n e n t d e s c r i p t i o n :

P r o c e d u r e

B ) H o w ~ r e f l o w r ~ t e ~ m e a s u r e d ?

b ) H o w w ~ f l o w ra tE* d o t e r r n l n a t i o n e q u i p l l n e n f c a l i b r a t e d ' ?

c ) H o w a ~ s a g t ~ n t ( t~ ,nd, i f ~ppro~iBte, gaS~US f u e l ) c o n c e n t r a t i o n s d e t o r m i n o £ 1 ?

d ) W h a t a r e t h e t i m e i n c r e m e n t s f o r a g e n t a d d i t i o n a n d p r e b u r n t i m e ?

e ) H o w a r e t e m p o r a t u c e . . ~ E n d p r e s s u r e ~ r n e a ~ u r e c l ?

C a p B u r n e r D a t a S u b m i s s i o n D a t a

a ) F u e l : A g e n t :

b ) A i r t e m p e r a t u r e : ° C F u e l t e m p e r a t u r e : A m b i e n t p r e s s u r e : T o r r

c ) E x t i n g u i s h m e n t o o n o Q n t r a t l o n , v o l u m e - - / . : N u m ~ r o f d a t a : A v e r a g e : " /o H i g h :

E s t i m a t e d u n c e r t a i n t y : = / .

d ) F l o w r a t e ~ ( r e p o r t I n e i t h e r g r ~ m ~ m l n u t e o r l l t e r £ / m l n ~ I t e ) :

U n i t s ( c h e e k o n e o n l y f o r HI I d a t a r e p o r t e d I o e l o w ) ; g / m l n : _ _ . L J m l n : _ _ C o n d i t i o n s u s e d t o c o n v e r t f r o m v o l u m e t r i c t o m a s s f l o w r a t e s : T e m p e r a t u r e

A i r :

A g e n t :

C a s e o u s f u e l :

S u b m i t t e d b y

N a m e ; O r g a n i z a t i o n :

° C P r e s s u r e :

A v e r a g e : H i g h : L o w :

A v e r a g e : H i g h : L o w :

A v e r a g e ; H i g h : L O W :

E s t i m a t ~ d u n o e r t a l n t y

E s t i m a t e d u n c e r t a i n t y

E s t i m a t e d u n c e r t a i n t y

T o r r

F a x :

E - m a l l :

P l e a s e s e n d a l l f o r m s t o :

N F P A 2 0 0 1 S t a f f L i a i s o n N a t i o n a l F i r e P r o t e c t i o n A s s o c i a t i o n

I B a t t e r y m a r c h P a r k P . O . B O X 9 1 0 1

Q u i n c y , M A 0 2 2 6 9 - 9 f 0 1 T e l e p h o n e : + 1 - S t 7 - 7 7 0 - 3 0 0 0 F a x : + t - 6 t 7 - 9 8 4 - 7 1 1 0

Form A-34.2.2

1 1 6

Page 57: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

t...t

" 4

T a b l e A - 3 . 4 . 2 . 2 C u p B u r n e r F l a m e E x t i n g u i s h i n g D a t a

F u e l F C - 3 - 1 - 1 0 F I C - 1 3 1 1 H C F C H C F C - H F C - 1 2 5 H F C . E I F C - 2 $ B l e n d A 124 227ea

70 % i s p o p r o p a n o l i n w a t e r . . . . . .

8 0 % m e t h a n o l / 2 0 % n - h e p t a n e . . . . . 8. - 3 ~ a c e t o n e - - - - 10.0 b _ _ - - 6.5 ' - -

a c e t o n i t r i l e - - - - 7.0 "'b . . . .

a v i a t i o n ga s , 1 0 0 o c t a n e , l o w l e a d - - - - 11.4, b . . . .

b e n z e n e 3 . 4 ' - - - - - - - - 4 .8" 1 0 . 6 "

c a r b o n d i s u l f i d e . . . . . . .

c y c l o h e x a n e - - - - 10.1 ~' . . . . .

d i e s e l - - - - - - 6 .8 "~ - - - - - -

d i e s e l n o . 2 - - - - 9 . 6 "~ . . . . d i e t h y l e t h e r . . . . . . .

e t h a n o l 6 .9 - - 11.0 ,b - - - - 8 .0 16

e t h y l a c e t a t e - - - - 10.6 ~b . . . .

e t h y l e n e g l y c o l - - - - I 1.1 ~b . . . .

E x x o n T u r b o O i l . . . . . . . g a s o l i n e ( u n l e a d e d ) - - - - 9 . T "b 7 .6 "~ - - - - - -

h y d r a u l i c o i l ( M o b i l F l u i d 3 5 0 ) - - - - 0.6 "b . . . . h y d r o g e n - - - - 2 0 ,.b . . . .

i s o b u t a n o l . . . . . . .

i s o o c t a n e - - - - 9 .8 "b . . . .

i s o p r o p a n o l - - - - 10.6 ..b . . . .

J e t A / J P - 5 - - - - 0 . 0 °'b 6 . 9 "'b - - - - - - J P - 4 - - - - 10.0 ,b . . . .

k e r o s e n e 5 .0" - - - - - - - - 6.4" 1 2 . 5 '

m e t h a n e - - - - 13.7 ~b . . . . m e t h a n o l 8 . 0 ' - - 16 b - - - - 9 . 7 19 °

m e t h y l i s o b u t y l k e t o n e - - - - 0 .4 °'b . . . .

m o r p h o l i n e . . . . . . .

n - b u t a n o l --- - - 12.?. ~b . . . .

n - b u t y l a c e t a t e - - - - 0 . 8 "b . . . .

n - d e c a n e . . . . . . .

n - d o d e c a n e - - - - . . . . .

n - h e p t a n e 5 .3 3.2 ° 0 .9 b 6 . 7 b 8 .9 b 6.6 12.7

n - h e x t a n e - - - - I 1.0 b . . . .

n - o c t a n e . . . . . . .

n - p e n t a n e . . . . . . .

n - p r o p a n o l - - - - 10.6 ~b . . . .

n - u n d c c a n e . . . . . . .

n a t u r a l g a s - - - - 1 2 . 4 " b . . . .

n i t r o m e t h a n e . . . . . . .

p r o p a n e - - - - 12.6 ~ . . . .

p y r r o l i d i n e - - - - 10.1 ~e . . . .

t e w a h y d r o f u r a n - - - - 12.0 ~b _ _ - - - - _ _

t o l u e n e 3 .6 - - 7 ,3 ~ - - - - 4 .8 9 . 7

t r a n s f o r m e r 5.4" - - - - - - 6.6' 12.8"

H F C -

2 3 6 f a

m

8.9 b

6 .3 b

x~lene "--" - - 8"T 'b - - - - I I - - " - - I ,

Notes." ( a ) S i n g l e s o u r c e f o r t h e d a t a , , ( b ) N o n - s t a n d a x d c u p b u r n e r a p p a r a t u s . , ( c ) T h i s v a l u e w a s o b t a i n e d f r o m t w o s o u r c e s , o n e u s i n g a f u e l

s t a n d a r d c u p b u r n e r

I G - 0 1 I G - 1 0 0 I G - 5 4 1 IC- ,~

38" 2 9 ' SO 5 1 " 33 ~b - - - - 16' 32 "b - - 30 ' 26 '

10.6 "b - - - - 3 2 '

2 7 "b 3 4 " - - • 2 6 " 45* 36" - - 4 1 ' 3 5 38" 3 0 "

3 6 ~ - - - - 30" 31 ,b _ _ - - 3 0 "

- - - - 16" 37"b _ _ 26 ,

2 6 "~ - - - - 21 '

3 5 L~ - - 28" 28" 3 T b - - - - 26"

- - 30" 31" - -

3 5 ~b - - - - 2 5 '

5 2 ' 41 41" 39"

3 6 ~b - - - - 3 3 '

- - 34* - - _ _ 38* - - _ _ 42 33 3 3 35

4 0 ' 3 1 ' 31 29"

42. 31 ° 3 3 ' - -

3 3 '

3 4 Lb - - - - 5 2 "

4 0 ~ - - - - M " - - - - - - $ 1 "

- - - - - - 5 2 " S3" 25 25 26 ' - - 27' 28' - -

26 ~b - - - - 2 4 " I

t e m p e r a t u r e o f 3 1 ° C a n d o n e u s i n g a n o n -

l int

I

Page 58: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

NFPA 2001 - - A99 ROP

[ROP 2001-I09 (Log#5$) Table A-3-4.2.2 Cup-Burner Heptane Flame Extinguishing Data

Investigator Agent NRL 3M NMERI Fenwal GLCC Ansul NIST

6.3 6.5 6.3 FC-3-1-10 5.2 5.9 5.0 5.5 5.3 HCFCr124 - 6.4 5.9 7.0 HFCr227ea 6.6 - 6.3 5.8 6.2 HFC-236fa - 5.6 5.3 6.5

I-IFC Blend A 11 9.9 12.7 HFC-23 12 - 12.6 12 12

HFG-125 9 - 9.4 8.1 8.7

~s.I--- ~2- FIC-1311 3.241 3.0 3.2 IG-541 29.1 IG-55 - 28 IG-01 - 38

H a l o n 1301 3.1 3.9 2.9 3 3.5 3.1

(Log #CP3I) 2001- 111 - (A-3-4.2.2.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options

I RECOMMENDATION: Add text at the end ofA-3-4.2.2.3 as I follows:

Figure Ext inguishment Test (non-cellulosic) Class A Surface Fires 1. Introduction. The purpose of the tests outlined in this

procedure is to develop the min imum extinguishing concentration (MEG) for a gaseous fire suppression agent for a a range of non- cellulosic, solid polymeric combustibles. It is intended that the MEG will be increased by appropriate safety factors and flooding factors as provided for in the standard. 2. Test Enclosure. These Class A tests shall be conducted in a draft free room with a volume of at least 35 m 3 and a maximum height of 4 m. Provisions shall be made for relief venting if required.

3. Test Objects. (a) Polymer Fuel Array. The polymer fuel array consists of 4

sheets of polymer, 9.5 mm thick, 406 mm tall, and 203 m m wide. Sheets are spaced and located per Figure 1. The bottom of the fuel arm), is located 203 mm from the floor. The fuel sheets shall be mechanically fixed at the r.equired spacing.

(b) Fuel Shield. A fuel shield consisting of a metal frame with sheet steel on the top and two sides shall be provided around the fuel array as indicated in Figure 1. The fuel shield is 381 mm wide, 851 mm high, and 610 rnm deep. The ill0 mm (wide) x 851 mm (high) sides and the 610 m m x 381 mm top are sheet steel. The remaining two sides and the bottom are open.

The fuel arra)' is oriented in the fuel shield such that the 203 mm dimension of the fuel array is parallel to the 610 mm side of the fuel shield.

I n l • ~ i i i x i ~ i l l l

~ I l o l l l l l i l l i i l i ~ I

/ ' - -37 ~" t i I l i i l l LI- 'L~,.~,~""" I I = '

i ~ l l , , l im, I

Figure 1 Four piece modified plastic setup.

(c) Two external baffles measuring 0.95 m sq and 305 mm tall are located a round the exterior of the fuel shield as shown in Figure 2. The baffles are placed 89 m m above the floor. The top baffle is rotated 45 ° with respect to the bottom baffle.

Video

nu m m ~

Backup co. ext.

i i i i *

Inlet E

I ,~ .... 3 .43 m (11.25 ft)

X

TC 1 Baffle

- Tc I

V '

] x TC3

I - - 1

>

"t

tO

o~

E p~ ¢0 t o

x TC1 - - 0 mm (0 in.), 305 mm (12 in.), 610 mm (24 in.), 915 mm (48 in.), 1.8 m (72 in.), 2.4 m (96 in.), 3 m (120 in.) from ceiling

x TC2 - - 0 mm (0 in.), 305 mm (12 in.), 610 mm (24 in.), 915 mm (48 in.), 1.8 m (72 in.), 2.4 m (96 in.), 3 m (120 in.) from ceiling

x TC3 - - 0 mm (0 in.), 305 mm (12 in.), 610 mrn (24 in.), 915 mm (48 in.), 1.8 m (72 in.), 2.4 m (96 in.), 3 m (120 in.) from ceiling

ODM - - 305 mm (12 in.) down from ceiling • - ~ F T I R - - 686 mm (27 in.) up from floor l i t Noise meier - - 305 mm (12 in.) down from ceiling

Figure 2 Chamber plan view.

118

Page 59: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

(d) Tests are conduc ted for dlree plastic fuels, polymedlyl methacryla te (PMMA), polypropylene (PP), and acrylonitrile- butadiene-s tyrene polymer (ABS). Plastic propert ies are given in Table 1 as shown below:.

(e) Ignition Source. The ignition source is a hep tane pan 51 m m x 51 m m x 22 m m deep centered 12 m m below tile bot tom of the plastic sheets. Pan is filled with 3.0 mL of hep tane to provide 90 seconds of burning.

(i') Agent Delivery System. T he agen t shall be distr ibuted t h rough an approved nozzle. The system shall be operated at the m i n i n n n n nozzle pressure (_+ 10 percent) and the m a x i m u m discharge t ime (_+ 1 second) .

4. Test Procedure. 4.1 Ignition. 4.1.1 T h e hep t ane pan is ignited and allowed to burn for 90

seconds . 4.1.2 Tbe agen t is discbarged 210 seconds after ignition of

heptane . 4.1.3 The c o m p a r t m e n t remains sealed for 600 seconds after the

end of discharge. Ex t ingu i shmen t t ime is noted. If the fire is ne t ex t inguished within 600 seconds of the end agent discharge, a h igber m i n i m u m ext inguisb ing concent ra t ion mus t be utilized.

4.1.4 The test shall be repeated two t imes for each fuel for each concent ra t ion evaluated and the ex t ingu i shmen t t ime averaged for eacb fuel. Any one test with an ex t ingu i sbment t ime above'600 seconds shall be cons idered a failure.

4.1.5 If the fire is ex t inguished du r ing the discharge period, the test shall be repeated at a lower concent ra t ion or addit ional baffling provided to ensure that local t rans ient discharge effects are not impact ing the ex t ingu i shmen t process.

4.1.6 At the beg inn ing of the tests, the oxygen concent ra t ion mus t be within 2 pe rcen t (approximately 0.5 percen t by volume 0 2 ) of amb ien t ~due.

Dur ing the pest-discharge period, the oxygen concent ra t ion shall no t all below 0.5 percent by volume of tile oxygen level measm'ed at tile end of agen t discharge.

4 . 2 0 b s e r w a t i o n and Recording. 4.2.1 T h e following data mus t be cont inuously recorded du r ing

tile test: (a) oxygen concent ra t ion (+ 0.5 percent) (b) fitel mass loss (-+ 5 percent) (c) agen t concent ra t ion (-+ 5 percent) (d) agen t discharge t ime 4.2.2 The following event sball be t imed and recorded: (a) t ime at which hep t ane is ignited (b) t ime of bep tane pan burn out (c) t ime of ignit ion of plastic shee t (d) t ime of beg inn ing to discharge of agen t (e) t ime of end o f discharge of agen t (f) t ime all visible f lame is ex t inguished 5. De te rmina t ion of M i n i m u m Ext inguish ing Concentrat ion. The

m i n i m u m e x i t n u g i s h m e n t concent ra t ion shall be de t e rmined by all of the following condit ions.

(a) All visible f lame ext inguished within 600 seconds of agen t discharge;

(b) The fuel weight loss between 10 seconds and 600 seconds ,after tile end of discharge shall no t exceed 15.0 g;

(c) No ignition of the fuel at the end of the 600 second soak time, and subsequen t test c o m p a r t m e n t ventilation. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : A d d e d test criteria for listing systems for Class A fires. C O M M I T T E E A C T I O N : Accept.

(Log #CP30) 2001- 112- (A-3-5): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t tee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Revise text to read as follows:

A-3-5.3.1 (Use wording f rom 1996 edit ion A-3-6). A-3-5.3.2 The listing of eng ineered halon alternative systems

requires r u n n i n g a n m n b e r of tests tbat include measur ing the agen t quant i ty f rom each nozzle. To successfully pass these tests, tbe flow calculation software canno t over-predict die measu red n~ass by more than 5 percen t nor under-predic t the measu red mass by more than 10 percent . Exper ience pe r fo rming these tests indicates the m a x i m u m laboratory accuracy for the calculations is )lus or minus 5 percent of the meast , red walue with a 90 percent certainty. This means tbat 90 percent of the measured agen t quant i t ies will be within plus or minus 5 percen t of the predicted value. If tbe error is due to r a n d o m factors, t hen this can be

r e p r e s e n t e d statistically by a normal (Gausian) distr ibution. A normal distr ibut ion curve is sbown in Figure 1, with the measured mass normal ized by d ie predicted value. The result ing s tandard deviation is 0.0304 fi-om s tandard tables (ref). These systems generally have 2 tees and 3 nozzles.

16 Standard deviation lor a 2 tee tests = 0.0304

14

> ,12

n O ~. 8 >* = 6 0~

4

0 I I I ~ I I

0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30

Measured agent quantity (normalized by the predicted agent quantity)

Fhgure 1 For a system dlat utilizes more tban two tees the error will propagate and the certainty for the predict ion of the agen t quanti ty will be less. The more tees between a nozzle and tile cylinder, the lower tile certainty. This propagat ion of er ror can be calculated and results in a new n o r t o n distr ibution with a greater s tandard deviation. This can be calculated for any n u m b e r of tees (reD. For example, the s tandard deviation fa r a system with 8 tees would be 0.0608. This is shown in Figure 2.

For die purpose of this s tandard, the uncer ta in ty for the )redicfion for an installed system is l imited to having at least 99 )ercent of the nozzles deliver at least 90 percent of the predicted

agen t quantity. This implies not "using up" more than one half of the 20 percen t safety factor for 99 pe rcen t of the nozzles. For a normal distr ibut ion with a s tandard deviation o f 0.0608, tile tail a rea represen t ing 1 percen t o f the systems occurs at a normal ized mass value of 0.859, as shown in Figure 2 on page 120.

Examining Figure 2, it is appa ren t that significantly more than 1 )ercent of the systems will bare less than 90 percent of tbe 3redicted mass delivered. To rectify this situation, more agen t ;hall be used in the system. This would move the entire probability curve up, as shown in Figure 3. The quant i ty of agen t that would need to be added is:

0.90 - 0.859 = 0.041 or 4.1 percent The addit ion of 4.1 pe rcen t more agen t would ensure that 99

percent of the nozzles deliver at least 90 percen t of tile required mass of agent .

T h e analysis for tbe table was pe r fo rmed for up to 19 tees, 20 nozzles, in a system.

Table 1 Plastic Fuel Properties

Fuel Descriptlon/Source

PMMA Polycast acrylic sheet Polycast Technology Corporation

PP Polypropylene homopolymer/Poly Hi solidur Menasha Corporation

ABS Absylux Westlake Plastics Company

Density

1.190g/cm s

0.905 g/cm ~

1.040 g/cm ~

Ignition Time at 25 kW/m z Irradiance(s)

77 (±m%)

91 (±10%)

115 (±10%)

180 Second Average Heat Release Rate at 25 kW/m z

Lrradiance Is ) 304 (+10%)

200 (±10%)

425 (+1o%)

119

Page 60: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 m A 9 9 R O P

16=

14F

>, 121"

-~ 10t e~

2 8~ Q .

-~ 6 |

~c 4~

2t

OI 0.70

22

Standard deviation for a 2 tee tests = 0.0304

0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20

Measured agent quantity normalized by the predicted agent quantity)

F~'ure 2

=

1.30

20

18

~>,16

-~ 14

• = 8

® 6 r r

4

2 0 I 0.60

Experiment standard deviation = 0.0304

I

0.70

2 tees

' , I I 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30

Normalized mass

lrgure 2

T h e a d d i t i o n o f 4.1 p e r c e n t m o r e a g e n t w o u l d e n s u r e t h a t 99 p e r c e n t o f f i le nozz les d e l i v e r a t l eas t 9 0 p e r c e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e d m a s s o f a g e n t .

T h e ana lys i s f o r t h e t a b l e was p e r f o r m e d f o r u p to 19 tees , 20 ~ nozz les , in a sys tem.

16

1.40

14

> .12

I Q

o 8 C L ® .>_

n- 4

2

0 0.70

Standard deviation for a 2 tee tests = 0.0304

0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20

Measured agent quantity (normalized by the predicted agent quantity)

lr%,'u re 3

1.30

16

14

> . 1 2

.10 o ~ 8

"~ 6

m 4

2

0 0 .70

16

14

> ` 1 2

. .0

.o 8

'>- 6

~ 4

2

0 0 .70

16

14

12

10

8

• ~ 6

2

0 0.70

i

0.80

Standard deviation from the tests = 0,0100

' I

0.90 .00 1.10

Measured agent quantity

I I I

1.20 1.30

(normalized by the predicted agent quantity)

Figure 3

P

Standard deviation from the tests = 0.0300

1 of 20 nozzles would fail

(1 of 6 or 7 tests) / ,7 oerc

I i \

L I I

0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20

Measured agent quantity (normalized by the predicted agent quantity)

F~,u re 3

1.30

Standard deviation from the tests = 0.0500

1 out of 6 nozzles would fail

(every other test)

0 .80 0 .90 1.00 1.10 1.20

Measured agent quantity (normalized by the predicted agent quantity)

F'~u re 3

i

1.30

120

Page 61: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2001 - - A 9 9 R O P

I A-3-5.3.3 The minimum design concentration based on the cup burner extinguiShing concentration plus 20 percent or Class A fire test extinguishing concentration plus 20 percent should encompass design tolerances for most applications. However, the 20 percent safety factor does not account for specific conditions or requirements for some particular applications that may require additional agent to ensure complete fire extin~[nishment. The following list gives certain conditions or consiaerations that may

I require the use of design factors that would increase the amount of agent used.

A. Unclosable Openings (See also Section 3-8.2). Special considerations must be taken into account when designing a fire suppression system for an enclosure that can not or will not be sealed or closed before the fire suppression system is discharged. The loss of agent through the ope[aings needs to be compensated for by some method.

Compensation for unclosable openings can be handled through extending the discharge time, which in turn extends the period of agent application. A method of determining the additional agent required/rate of application can be accomplished by conducting an enclosure integrity test per Appendix B.

When applying agent to compensate for the loss thrnugh an unclosabl-e opening consideration needs to be taken to extend the discharge of agent to enable the concentration within the enclosure to be held for a longer period of time. The discharge time defined in 3-8.1.2.1 is for the time required for the initial agent required to protect the enclosure without leakage through the unciosable openings. Without extending the dtscharge time for the additional agent being applied, thiS will cause leak rates through the unclosable openings to increase.

B. Acid Gas Formation Gonsiderations: Higl~ concentrations of hydrogen fluoride (HF) can be expected

.at cup .burner design concentrations. HF can be reduced by mcreasmgthe desil~ concentration. Dramatic reduction can be achievedby increasing design concentration up to cup burner plus 30 percent. Above cup burner plus $0 percent, reduction in HF is

i not as dramatic. For further information see references 1 and 2. Reference (1): Ronald S. Sheinson, Harold G. Eaton, Bruce

Black, Roger Brown, Howard Burchell, Alexander Maranghides, I Clark Mitchell, Glen Salmon, Walter D. Smith "Halon 1301 Total Flooding Fire Testing, Intermediate Scale ' ,Proceedings Halon Alternatives Technical Working Conference, May 3-5, 1994, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA.

Reference (2): Ronald S. Sheinson, Alexander Maranaghides, Harold G. E. Eaton, Doug Baryliski, Bruce H. Black, Roger Brown, Howard Burcheil, Peter Byne, Tom Friderichs, Clark Mitchell, Michelle Peatross, Glen Salmon, Walter D. Smith and Frederick W. William's, "Large Scale (840M3) Total Flooding Fire Extinguishment Results", Proceedings Halon Alternatives Technical Working Conference, May 1995, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA.

C. Fuel Geometry Considerations: For Class A and B fires, fuel geometry and compartment

obstructions can affect agent concentration at the fire. Full scale machinery space tests conducted by the Naval Research Laboratory have shown that for a large (30,000 cu ft) enclosure with a complex obstructed fuel geometry, agent concentration can vary plus or minus 20 percent. Increasing the design concentration or adding or relocaung discharge nozzles can compensate for concentrations below the design concentration. For further information see reference 3.

Reference (3): NRL Itr Report Ser 6180/0049.2 of 20January 11905, Agent Concentration Inhomogeneities in Real Scale Halon [ Replacement. I D . Enclosure Geometry:. I Typically in applications involving unusual enclosure geometry's, ]agent distribution is addressed through nozzle placement. If the Igeometry of the enclosure (or system design) b such that the agent I distribution can not be adequately addressed through nozzle • placement, additional concentration should be considered. An

example of such applications might be enclosures having very high or low aspect ratios (length/width).

E. Obstructions Within the Enclosure: There are three considerations tilat should be given to enclosure

obstructions: 1. Room volume should be calculated considering the room

empty. Exceptions can only be made for structural components or shafts timt pass through the room.

2. For small room volumes, consideration should be given to equipment/s torage that take up a considerable percen tage of the room volume. Specifically, consider if the reduced volume will raise the effective concentration of the agent from the NOEAL to the LOEAL, in normally occupied spaces. However, this must be closely balanced against the need to maintain an adequate concentration even when the room is empty.

3. Obstructions located near the nozzle which will block or impede agent diScharge from he nozzle and could affect the diStribution of the agent within the enclosure. Obstructions such as ducts, cable trays, large conduits, light fxtures, etc., located within "X" diStance of the outlet ports of the nozzle have the

otential to disrupt the flow pattern of the agent from the nozzle. the flow of the agent is forced down to the floor, for example, it

is unlikely that concentration will be achieved at the mid or upper elevations~ Certainly uniform dispersion and concentration will not be achieved.

Suggestion of how to proceed: 1. Does the committee agree with the concept of design factors

(relative to leaving the safety factor essentially as iS)? 2. Does the committee agree to put the diScussion about the

qualitative design factors in the appendix and the quantitative design factors (pressure adjustment and multiple tees) in the body?

3. Add/delete proposed design factors or information. 4. For multiple tees, does the committee agree:

(a) that the method of axialyzing the systems is acceptable? (b) That the two key "assumptions" are basically correct?

- accuracy is plus/minus 5 percent with 90 percent certainty

- 99 percent of nozzles must deliver 90 percent of predicted quantity

- should these numbers vary for different agent/hardware (c) How does the committee want to try to differentiate

between single and multiple hazards. 5. Word-smithing NOT part of the task group work: 6. Link to new UL 1058 mass limits, make it plus or minus 10

percent - Section A-$-2.1 Experimental - cylinder filling

- agent filled mass - super pressurization level

- mass measurement - calibrate instrument (2 percent) - instrument error (1 to 3 percent) - room leakage ~ . room volume (1 percent) - room te.mperamre - room mLmng - heel left in cylinder, if any

- cylinder temperature, pipe temperature - nozzle plugging Input errors - pipe actual internal cliameter (rain wall thickness spec,

measured?) - pipe actual internal roughness (no spec, not measured) - actual lenl~hs of pipe runs

fitting eqmvalent lengths, tee "assembly" actual nozzle coefficient

- cylinder equivalent length (dip tube entrance effects, valve open completely)

- actual cylinder internal volume - N2 nucleation ThiS iS what iS supposed to be tested: Calculation algorithm errors and assumptions

- steady state flow in small steps - cylinder condition during d~scharge - t ee flow splits - heat transfer - etc.

SUI~TANTIATION: Added Class A extinguishment test criteria. COMMITrRIg ACTION: Accept.

(Log #5) g)01- 113 - (A-5-7): Accept in Principle SUBM/TTER: L.A. McKenna, j r . , Hughes Assoc., Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows:

Add the following to A-5-7: v

Two test methods that provide information on extintruishment of enereized electrical fires'have been develor~ed. A brief description of the test methods and the resulm obtained using HFC,-'227ea a r c

vresented below. A comnlete discussion of these tests can b¢ founcl in "Extlneuishment Tests of C, ontinuously Ener~zcd Class C Fires Usin~ HFC-~27ea ¢FM-200~." predated by Hughes Associates, Inc. for Great Lakes Chemical Gompauy.

121

Page 62: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ A 9 9 R O P

The first test, des igned to replicate an overcurrent event, is called the "Ohmic Heat ing" test. In this test. a length of power cable was overloaded electrically by connec t ion to an arc welder, result in~ in internal over-heating of the cable whicll leads to pyrolysis o f the insulat ion material. A small pilot f lame was appl ied to the sample after the conductors were hea ted and smoke was issuing f rom the center of the cable. A shor t p re -burn was allowed to reach a fully developed fire, and therl the clea0 agen t was discharged. Cur ren t was appl ied t h r o u g h o u t the discharge, and con t inued for aooroximate lv 10 minu te s following discharge to check for reflasla ( none was observedl . In tests usin~ HFC-227ea as the exdnffuishin~ a~ent, the followinff results were re tor ted :

In t he secood test me thod , called the "Conductive Heating" test, the lower 4 in. (101 ram) of a 10.25 in. (~60 ram) long sample of 350 m c m diameter nower cable was c lamped vertical]y inside a rirw lleater, ensur ing f irm contact between the inside of the l~eater and ' - the coppe r conductor . The heater was set to 890°C, arid the samole was hea ted until the tempera tur¢ at t, he top of die sample reached 310°C. The sample was then ignited by a small pilot flame, and the ensu ing fire was allowed to fully c[evelop before a~ent discharge. The hea te r was energized th roughou t the discharge, and for l0 minutes thereaf ter to ctleck for reflash (no0e was observed]. In tests us ing HFC-227ea as the ext inguishin~ agent, the following results were repor ted as sbown below:

Table A-3-7.1 Ohmic Heatin~ Sunnression Test Results

S_gmp~ C u ~ n t N u m b e r Concen t ra t ion Ext inguisbl~ent? of T~sts

8 awg, Cross-Linked Polyethylene. 350 A _4 5.8% HFC-227ea Yes a r ranged in a horizontal bund le of 5 1_ 5.0% H F C - ~ 7 e a Yes cables with only the center cable

8 awg, Cross-Linked Polyethylene 350 A _4 5.8% HFG-227ea Yes .!_ 5.0% HFC-227ea Yes

12 aw~, SITW-A. 3 conduc to rs her 150A 3 5.8% HFC-227ea Yes

cable, a r ra0ged in a vertical bund le of 5 cables witll only ttle center cable

v

cable, a r r anged in a horizontal bund le of 6 cables with 4 of the 18 conductors

2 5.5% lrlF .C-~Tea Ye...As 1 5.0% HFC-227ea Ye...~s

8 awe, PVC cable, a r r anged in a horizontal bund le of 7 cables with the center cable nowered.

325~, 3 5.8% HFC-227ea Yes

18 aw~. 3 conductors oer cable. polyethylene insulat ion on conductors . with c l l rome PVC iacket a r o u n d twisted conductors . 4 cable horizontal bundle , with 12 conduc tors powered.

2 9 A $ 5.8% HFG-227ea yes - In one test the ~as did not complete ly

exdnttuish the fire.

16 awe, 14 conduc tors ne t cable, 56._._A 3, 5.8% HFC-227ea X~ n e o p r e n e over rubber insulation, single horizontal cable. 9 conduc tors towered .

18 awe, polyetllylene insulated coa~xial I I 9 A 1 5.7% HFC,-227ea No cable with the outer j acke t and braided conduc to r removed (i.e., cer~ter core of the coaxial cable only), a r r anged in a horizontal bund le of 4 cables, all 4 conductors powered. {Note: in this series. the polyethylene insulat ion mel ted and fo rmed a pool fire. A tray was installed unde r the wire bundle so that the glowing" wires were in contact with the mol ten pool of polyethylene.)

_1. 5.8% HFC-227ea .N__9. 2 6.5% HFC-227ea NO

6.8% HFG-227ea Ye._.As 3 7.2% HFC-227ea Ye....As

Note: In all cases where the fire was egtinguist~ed, the t ime t9 ext inguishmelat f rom bem'nning of agen t d ischarge was between 3 and 15 seconds,

Table A-3-7.1 Conductive Heating Suppression Test Results

N u m b e r o f Concen t ra t ion Extinguish 'ment? Average T i m e to Tests Ex t ingu i shment

350 m c m co Doer cable. 1 5.2% HFC-227ea ~ 029_a~. Hvoalon insulat ion with ~ 5.8% HFC-297ea Ye_.As 11 sec__.___, cotton braid shea th ing and ! 5.9% HFC-227ea Ye__As

v

saiturant. 2 6.0% H F G - ~ 7 e a Ye_...ss 10 sec. (Lucen t KS-5482L 350 mcm conner cable. 3 5.8% HFC-227ea Yes 9 s e c .

. =

Hvnalon insulat ion. 1 5.9% HFG-227ea Yes 11 sec. (l,uc~;nt KS-20921 1 6.0% HFC~227ea Yes 10 sec.

122

Page 63: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

NFPA 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

SUBSTANTIATION: The existing statement expresses a real concern, but provides no specific guidance for users. The proposed addition, while not all:encompassing, provides data that will be useful to some users of the document m specific instances. It is not intended to represent the cited test results as applicable to any other circumstances, agents, or situations. COMMITI3EE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Proposal 2001-33 (Log #GP2).

CLog #7) 2001- 114- (A-3-8.1.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Delete paragraphs 3 through 10 and replace with the following:

The concentration of thermal decomposition products produced from a halogenated fire suppression agent is dependent upon several factors. The size of the f i rea t the time of system activation and the discharge time of the suppression agent play major roles in determining the amount of decomposition products formed. The smaller the fire, the less energy.. (heat) is available to cause thermal decomposition, of the. su presston a~,ent, and hence the lower, the concentrauon of t h e r m ~ decomposmon products. The s,ze of the fire at the time of system activation is dependent upon the fire growth rate, the detector sensitivity and the system discharge delay time. The first factor is primarily a function of the fuel type and geometry, whereas the latter two are adjustable characteristics of the fire protection system. The discharge time affects the production of thermal decomposition products, as it determines the exposure time to the fire of sub-extinguishing concentrations of the fire suppression agent. Sup~,ression systems have traditionally employed a combination of rapid detection and rapid discharge to limit both the production of thermal decomposition products and damage to assets by providing rapid flame extinguishment.

The enclosure volume also affects the concentration of thermal products produced, since larger volumes, i.e., smaller fire size to room volume ratios, will lead to dilution of decomposition products. Additional factors affecting the concentration of thermal decomposition products include vaporization and mixing of the agent, the preburn time, the presence of hot surfaces or deep- seated fires, and the suppress,'on agent concentration.

The decomposition issue is not unique to the new clean lmlogenated agents. The thermal decomposition products resulting from the extinguishment of fires with Halon 1301 have been investigated by numerous authors [1-3], and is well established that the most important Halon 130 ! thermal decomposition products from the standpoint of potential toxicity to humans or potential corrosion of electronic equipment are the halogen adds HF and HBr. Concentrations ranging from a few ppm to over 7000 ppm HF and HBr have been reported, depending upon the exact nature of the fire scenario.

As was the case for Halon 1301, the thermal decomposition product of primary concern for the halogenated agents described in this standard is the associated halogen acid, HF. For Clam A fires typical of those expected to be encountered in computer and EDP facilities, modeling and test data have shown that the amount of HF produced following extinguishment by HFC-227ea is of the same approximate magnitude as the total decomposition produOs (HF plus HBr) formed from Halon 1301. For example, Skaggs and Moore [4] have pointed out that for typical computer rooms and office spaces, the analysis of DiNenno, et. al., [5]employing fire growth models and test data indicate that thermal decomposition product concentrations from the halogenated agetits would be comparable to that from Halon 1301.

Tes t by Hughes Associates, Inc., [6] have evaluated the thermal decomposition products resulting from the extinguishment of Class A fires typical of those encountered in telecommunication and electronic data processing (EDP) facilities by HFC-227ea. The test fuels included shredded paper, PC boards, PVC coated wire cables, and magnetic tape, representing the most common fuel sources expected to burn in a computer room environment. All fires were extinguished with the minimum design concentration of 7 percent HFC-*227ea, and the amount of HF produced was found to be below those levels presenting a threat to humans or electronic equipment. Peatross and Forsell [7] in their analysis of the test results, concluded that "from an examination of the HF exposures, it is evident that this type of fire does not pose a toxic threat". This study also demonstrated that I-IF concentrations can be reduced and controlled through proper engineering.

Numerous studies have also indicated that the amount of HF produced from the extinguishment of Class B fires with HFC-227ea ,s approximately two to six times the total decomposition products formed from extinguishment of the same fire with Halon f301, and the HF produded in such scenarios may pose a toxic hazard [8-11]. However, as pointed out by Peatross and Forsell [7], in many of

these large fire scenarios the levels of combustion products (e.g., CO) and the high temperatures involved make it unlikely that a person could survive large fires such as these, irrespective of the HF exposure.

The correlation between fire size and decomposition product formation has been well established, for example in the case of HFG-227ea. Figure 1 summarizes the results of six independent studies of thermal decomposition product formation from HFG- 227ea, including the suppressio n of both Class A and Class B fires. These studies employed HFG-227ea at a design concentration of between 7 and 8 percent by volume, and the average HF concentrations observed are shown in Figure I. As can be seen from Figure 1, the agreement between the studies is excellent, and the concentration of l-IF produced following the extinguishment of Class A and Clam B fires with HFG-227ea is observed to be a linear function of the fire size to room volume ratio. This correlation allows prediction of the amount of HF produced, given the fire size and room volume.

Figure 2 shows the average HF concentration resulting from extinguishment of Clam A test fires at 7 percent HFG-227ea with a 10 second discharge and 30 second delay, as measured in the Hughes study [6]. Also shown in Figure 2 is the approximate LC50 for mammals, derived from Sax [12], and the Dangerous Toxic Load (DTL) for humans based upon the analysis of Meldrum [13]. The DTL was derived by Meldrum based upon an evaluation of HF exposure data for mice, which show the greatest sensitivity to HF exposure of all mammals tested, and corresponds to exposure levels at which severe distress would be expected for all exposed personnel. According to the DTL analysis the product of the exposure level in ppm and the exposure time in minutes is 12,000 ppm°min, e.g. for an exposure time of 10 minutes, the DTL is 1200 ppm HF. As seen in Figure 2, the HF levels produced from the extinguishment of typical Glass A fuels under realistic conditions were well below both the estimated mamalian LC50 and DTL curves. It is also worth noting that the 15 minute approximate lethal concentration (ALC) for HF is reported by Sax to be 2500 ppm [12].

References 1. G.L Ford, Halon 1301 Computer Fire Test Program: Interim

Report, 1972. 2. R.R. Cholin, Testing the Performance o'f Halon 1301 on Real

Computer Installations, Fire Journal, Sept. 1972. 3. R.P.- Cholin, How Deep is Deep?, presented at the National

Fire Protection Association Meeting, San Francisco, CA, May 18, 1971.

4. S.R. Skaggs and T. Moore, Toxicological Properties of Halon Replacements, 208th ACS National Meeting, Washington, DC, 1994; S.R. Skaggs and T. Moore, Toxicology of Halogenated Halon Substitutes, Fire Safety Without Halon Conference, Zurich, Switzerland, September 1994.

5. P. DiNenno, Engineering Evaluation and Comparison of Halon Alternatives and Replacements, 1993 International CFG & Halon Alternatives Conference, Washington DC, 1993.

6. Hughes Associates Inc., Hazard Assessment of Thermal Decomposition Products of FM-200 TM in Electronics and Data Processlng Facilities, Hughes Associates, 1995.

7. M.J. Peatross and E. W. Forsell, A Comparison of Thermal Decomposition Product Testing of Halon 1301 Alternative Agents, 1996 Halon Options Technical Working Conference, Albuquerque. NM, 1996.

8. R. Hansen, et. al, USCG Full-Scale Shipboard Testing of Gaseous Agents, 1994 International CFC & Halon Alternatives Conference, Washington, DC, 1994.

9. P. DiNenno, et al, Evaluation of Alternative Agents for Halon 1301 in Total Flooding F'we Suppression Systems: Thermal Decomposition Product Testing, 1993 Halon Options Technical Working Conference, Albuquerque, NM, 1993.

10. C.P. Hananska, et a l ,Hazard Assessment of Thermal Decomposition Products of Halon Alternatives, 1993 Halon Options Technical Working Conference, 1093, Albuquerque, NM, 1993.

I 1. M. Ferreira, et al, An Update on Thermal Decomposition Products Results Utilizing PFG-410, International CFG & Halon Alternatives Conference, Washington, DC, Oct 1, 1992.

12. N.I. Sax, Dangerous Properties of industrial Materials, 6th ed., Van Nostrand Reinhold Go., New York, NY, 1984.

13. M. Meldrum, Toxicology of Substances in Relation to Major Hazards: Hydrogen Fluoride, HMSO, London, 1993. SUBSTANTIATION: Current text is outdated; suggested text brings topic up to date. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Prindple. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Proposal 2001-115 (Log #CP27).

123

Page 64: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

(Log #CP27) 2001- 115 - (A-3.8.1.2, A-3-8.2): Accept SUBM1TTER: Technical Commit tee on Halon Alternative Protection Options RECOMMENDATION: Insert the following material after paragraph 7 ofA-3-8.1.2:

"The d e p e n d e n c e of decomposi t ion product formulat ion on discharge t ime and fire size has been extensively evaluated (Sheinson et al 1994, Brockway 1994, Moore et al 1993, Back et al 1994, Forssell and DiNenno 199.5, DiNenno et al 1993, Purser 1988, Dierdorf et al 1993). Figure A-3.8.1.2(a) is a plot o f peak HF concentrat ion as a function of fire size to room volume ratio. The data encompass room scales of 1.2 m $ to 972 m S. The 526 m 3 results are from USCG testing; the 972 m 3 results are based on NRL testing. These fire include diesel and heptane pool and spray fires. The design concentrat ions in all cases except HCFC Blend A (at 8.6 percent) are at least 20 percen t above the cup burner value. For fires where the ext inguishment times were greater than 17 seconds, the ext inguishment t ime is no ted in brackets. Note that excessively high ext inguishment times (> 60 seconds), generally an indication of inadequate agent concentrations, yield qualitatively high HF concentrations. In addit ion, Halon 1~01 will yield b romine or b romine acids as well as HF. Likewise, HCFC Blend A will p roduce HC1 in addi t ion to HF.

The quantity of HF formed is approximately three to eight times h igher for all halocarbon replacements relative to Halon 1301. There may be differences between the various HFC/HCFC compounds tested, but it is not clear from these data wllether (a) such differences occur, (b) are high velocities or concentrat ions of agent from the nozzle. In all o f the data repor ted, the fire source, heptane pans of varying sizes, were baffled to prevent direct interaction with the agent jet.

While these results are based on f lammable and combustible liquid fires, so l idpolymer ic fires of similar size will generally p roduce lower HFconcen t ra t ions . Figure A-3.8.1.2(b) reports 10- minute average HF concentrat ion data for the 1.2 and 28 m $ enclosures as opposed to the peak values shown in Figure A-3. 8.1.2(a). These 10-minute average values show HF concentrat ions 50 percen t (or less) of the peak values.

I S,O00

I 0,000

S000

0vo)e

( tz)O

972mS[4 526ma[~ 29".......~ s 12m__.~ 3

• • O Hden 1~01 • • • W C~ltf l

• [ ] D C4Ft0 • • A OHF, • O NAF-S-|II

'V •

•(22v)(2s)

e(20) o

2 4 S 8 10 12 Fire ~ze to roan volume (kWNn 3)

Ex~ng~s~ment limtm Se¢) are gN~m ~ I~ackets tot I r ~ I lat look ~onge¢ than 17 seconds to extngu~sh. If more dlan one I r e was uB~ed, the longer e~lngu~rnent 1me s given.

Figure A-3-8.1.2(a)

] 2 8 m ~ 1.2 m ~ O H~Jon 1301

10 W C~HF, et C4F m Lk CHF3 ® C~Fe

~0 B CtHF ~ & NAF-S-III

)0

O • t t

)0 El O

0 O = 8 i 2

O ! I i t i

4 6

Fire sizo to room volume ~W,'m 3)

Figure A-$-8.1.2 (b)

I

= t

8 10

.~rt the following text after paragraph 8 of A-3-8.2: ~. impact of decompos i t i onp roduc t s on electronic equipment ~otential area of concern. There is not sufficient data at :nt to predic t the effects of a given I-IF exposure scenario on ectronic equipment . Several evaluations of the impact of on ronics equ ipment have been pe r fo rmed relative to -the • p o s i t i o n of Halon 1301, where decomposi t ion products de HF and HBr. One of the more notable was a NASA study e the space shuttle Orbiter electronics were exposed to 700, , and 70,000 p p m HF and HBr (Hananska 1993). In these

:ests, exposures up to 700 ppm HF and HBr caused no failures. At 7000 ppm, severe corrosion was noted; there were some operating :'allures at this level.

Dumayas (1992) exposed IBM-PC compatible mult ifunction cards :o environments produced by a range of fire sizes as part of an evaluation program on halon alternatives. He found no loss of function, of these boards foUowing a 15-minute exposure to postfire ext inguishment a tmosphere up to 5000 ppn HF, with uncondi t ioned samples s tored at ambient humidity and

I tempera ture condit ions for up to 30 days. Forssell et al (1994) exposed muit ifunctlon boards for 30 minutes in the postfire ext inguishment environment; no failures were repor ted up to 90 days e osttest. HF concentrat ions up to 550 ppn were evaluated.

While no generic rule or s ta tement can be made at this time, it appears that shor t term damage (<90 days) resulting in electronic equ ipment malfunction is not likely for exposures up to 500 ppm HF for up to 30 minutes. This, however, is d e p e n d e n t on the characteristics of the equ ipment exposed, post-exposure treatment, exposure to o ther combustion products, and relative humidity. Impor tant equ ipmen t characteristics include its location in the space, existence of equ ipment enclosures, and file sensitivity of tile equ ipment to damage. SUBSTANTIATION: Added informat ion on decomposi t ion products . COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

124

(Log #CPI 2) P001- 116 - (A-3-8.1.2.3): Accept SIJBMrlTER: Technical Commit tee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"For third party listing or approval o fp re -eng inee red systems or flow calculation software for e n g i n e e r e d systems (Section 3-2.1 ) direct measurement of the point of 95 percent of the agent mass discharged from the nozzle is no t necessary to sadsfy compliance with the intent of Section 3-8.1.2.3. For some agents the measurement of the point in time Where 95 percent of the total agent mass coming from a given nozzle is extremely difficult to measure. Rather, for a given agent, a surrogate measurement based on engineer ing principles may be used. For instance, for some halocarbon agents, the point where the agent discharge changes f rom predominately l iquid to gas represents approximately 95 percent of the agent mass out of the nozzle and has been previously used n the listing/approval testing for discharge time. For low boiling point agents, the point where the agent discharge changes from predominately liquid to gas may not be appropriate since this can occur before the point of 95 percent mass discharged. For such agents a me thod has b e e n developed which utilizes an equation of state and measured cylinder conditions from

Page 65: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

the po in t where the agen t discharge changes f rom predomina te ly liqutd to gas to calculate an agen t mass balance in the cy l inder /p ipe network. The exper imenta l d ischarge t ime is taken as the poin t where the s u m m e d c a l c u l a t e d mass d ischarged f rom all nozzles equals 95 pe rcen t of the agen t requi red to achieve m i n i m u m design concentra t ion. : SUBSTANTIATION: As an e q u i p m e n t m a n u f a c t u r e r Kidde- Fenwal feels tha t the in terpre ta t ion of discharge t ime requires clarification in the s tandard and tha t the language shou ld be broad e n o u g h to address single c o m p o n e n t low boil ing poin t agents for which this issue presents significant technical challenges. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

SUBSTANTIATION: Cur ren t fan test me thodo logy was developed for Halon 1301 and made several a ssumpt ions which in inaccurate r e t en t ionpred ic t ions .

The me thodo logy used in ISO follows tha t laid down by Phil D iNenno Hughes Associates in a paper t ided "Evaluation of the Door Fan Pressurization Leakage Tes t Me thod Applied in Halon 1301 Total Flooding Systems."

NOTE: Suppor t ing material available for review at NFPA headquar te rs . COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Commi t t ee Action an d Sta tement on Proposal 2001-120 (Log #55).

(Log #CP8) 2001- 117- (A-3-8.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t tee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions RECOMMENDATION: Add to the end o f the A-3-8.2 the following:

"ex tended discharge appl icat ions inherend'¢ have a pe r fo rmance objective of ma in ta in ing the agen t concent ra t ion at or above the design concent ra t ion within the enclosure. This objective is valid if there is mixing of agen t continual ly in the enclosure du r ing the hold per iod a n d die enclosure thereby exper iences a decaying concen t ra t ion over t ime as opposed to a descend ing interface. The appl icat ion of agen t shou ld be done with sufficient tu rbu lence as to accompl ish mix ing o f the addit ional agen t t h r o u g h o u t the enclosure. To accompl i sh dais, file e x t e n d e d discharge probably will need to be accompl i shed t h r o u g h a separate ne twork of p iping a n d nozzles. These systems are outside the scope o f cur ren t design requ i rements and test ing p rocedures for total f looding systems. The : ~ k g r , u F fcc! Lk.,~t ",,~.c:c systems shou ld be des igned and fully discharge tested on a case by case basis until the body of knowledge is sufficient e n o u g h to be addressed specifically in this

S b ] ~ TT~IT ~,~Ti~() ~i'.."" 2 d d i~fo f ru i t ion ' f~r e x t e'ndeVlVd isch a r g e ~PdMMI lications'

TTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #18) 2001- 118 - (A-5-2.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: J o h n P. Goudrean , Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Following each use of the word "halocarbon" add the words o_~ ~ "

SUBSTANTIATION: Curren t draft does no t include iner t gas systems. Iner t gas systems are suitable for mar ine applicat ions and are recognized as such in IMO MSC Circular #776. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. In die first sen tence , delete die word "halocarbon". In all o ther sen tences where the words "halocarbon agent" appear delete the word "balocarbon" so that the reference is only to agent. Revise to read as follows:

A-5-2.2 General cargo shou ld no t be protec ted with clean agents due to the possibility of deep seated cargo fires and due to wide variations in cargo materials. Dry cargoes, such as container ized cargoes, often inc lude a wide mix of commodi t ies tha t may include materials or s torage a r r a n g e m e n t s no t suitably protected us ing clean agents. The vo lume of agen t needed to protect cargo spaces varies d e p e n d i n g on die vo lume of the cargo space minus die vo lume of the cargo carries. This quant i ty varies as cargo vo lume changes and may affect fire ex t inguish ing effectiveness or agen t toxicity. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Commi t tee agrees with the in tent of the submi t te r a n d believes that the text will mee t the submit ters intent . T he fact tha t agen t is a clean agen t and may be ei ther a ha locarbon or iner t gas comes f rom the scope of the s tandard.

(Log #37) 2001- 119 - (Appendix B): Reject SUBMITTER: Robert I_anger, Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Replace the entire Appendix B with A n n e x E of the draft ISO s tandard ISO/DIS 14520 Gaseous Fire Ext inguishing Systems Part ! - General Requirements .

(Log #55) 2001- 120- (Appendix B): Reject SUBMITTER: R.A. Whiteley, Worma ld Ansul (UK) Ltd. RECOMMENDATION: Delete Append ix B a n d replace with Annex E of the draft ISO s tandard ISO/DIS 14520 Gaseous Fire Ext inguishing Systems Part 1 - General Requi rements . SUBSTANTIATION: I. Deficiencies in the existing s tandard.

The cur ren t test me thodo logy was developed for Halon 1301 an d made several a ssumpt ions which result in highly inaccurate re tent ion predictions.

These are: (a) It a ssumes a sharp descend ing interface i.e. 0 pe rcen t

concent ra t ion above a n d 100 pe rcen t below. In practice and in ISO a wide de scend ing exists.

(b) It assumes all enclosures have the same leakage characteristic. In practice it varies and in ISO it is measured and used to calculate the leakage rate.

(c) It plots the descen t of 50 pe rcen t of the design concentrat ion. ISO allows any concent ra t ion to be plotted.

(d) It adopts a m i n i m u m c o l u m n pressure of 10 Pascals - dais assumes any FM 200 protected enclosure is 2m high an d any inert gas pro tec ted enclosure is 10m high. 1SO uses the actual co lumn pressure.

2. The ISO methodo logy The Methodology used in ISO follows that laid down by Phil

D iNenno of Hughes Associates in a paper ent i t led "Evaluation of the Door Fan Pressurization Leakage Tes t Method Appl ied to Halon 1031 Total Flooding System", publ ished in the SFPE - Journa l of Fire Protection Engineer ing 1 (4) 1989.

D iNenno concluded: "The door fan pressurization air leakage test appears to be a good

m e t h o d for es t imat ing the leakage rate f rom an enc losure i f a distr ibut ion of the leakage area over the c o m p a r t m e n t boundary can be assumed. It can also give a good est imate of the total leakage area if a d ischarge coefficient is known or assumed.

Simple equat ions relating leakage area to Halon 1301 leakage rate have been shown to give excellent a g r e e m e n t with the exper imenta l data. The same e a u a d o n s can be used to mode l the leakage from ~n enclosure of o ther heavier than air gas¢~."

3. The ISO methodo logy conservatively models all gasses. 4. It brings all in ternat ional s tandards in line. 5. It has been extensively tested a n d used since 1993. NOTE: Suppor t ing material available for review at NFPA

headquar te rs . COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The commit tee is interested in improving this test p rocedure but there is insufficient informat ion provided to make dais major change.

125

(Log #CP32) 2001- 121 - (Appendix B): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions RECOMMENDATION: Redesignate existing Append ix B as Appendix C and add Append ix B to read as follows:

B-1 Scope. This p rocedure sets ou t the m i n i m u m requ i rements for de t e rmin ing the f lame ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion of a gaseous ex t inguishan t in air for f l ammable liquids and gases employing the cup bu rne r apparatus°

B-2 Principle. Diffusion f lames of fuels bu rn ing in a r o u n d reservoir (cup) centrally posi t ioned in a coaxially flowing air s t ream are ext inguished by addi t ion of a gaseous ex t inguishant to the air.

B-3 Apparatus. The cup bu rne r appara tus for these m e a s u r e m e n t s shall be a r ranged a n d cons t ruc ted as in Figure 1,

Page 66: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - A 9 9 R O P

employing tile d imens ions shown; the to lerance for all d imens ions is ± 5 percen t unless otherwise indicated.

13,-3.1 Cup. The cup shall be round; shall be cons t ruc ted of gl,xss, quartz or steel; have an outside d iamete r in the range of 28 to 31 him, with a wall thickness of 1-2 Film;' have a 45 ° chamfer g r o u n d into the top edge o f tile cup; have a means of t empera tu re m e a s u r e m e n t of tile fuel inside the cup at a location 2 to 5 m m below the top of tire cup; have a means of hea t ing tile fuel; shall be substantially similar in shape to the example show in Figure 1o A cup in t ended for use with gaseous fuels shall have a m e a n s of a t ta ining a un i fo rm gas flow at the top o f the cup (e.g., the cup may be packed with refractory materials).

Chimney

ll I 535.25 nv'n i

l ~ 235 mm

~E

Funl inlet ~ AJrlagent inlet Figure I

12mm-

Cup bu rne r apparatus .

Heating wire ~ A ' ~ " I

V'i A: 2S-31 mm o.d.

1-2 rum wall

Heater termir~l

B-3.2 Chimney. Tile ch i mney shall be of r ound glass or quartz construct ion; have an inside d iameter of 85 ± 2 m m a n d a wall thickness of 2 to 5 ram; have he igh t of 525 ± 25 ram.

B-3.3 Diffuser. Tile diffuser shall have a m e a n s of fitting to the bo t tom end of the chimney; have a means of admi t t ing a p remixed s t ream of air a n d ext inguishant ; and have a means of uniformly dis t r ibut ing the a i r / e x t i n g u i s h a n t flow across the cross section of the chimney.

B-3.4 Fuel Supply, Liquids. A liquid fuel supply shall be capable of delivering [iqmd fuel to the cup while main ta in ing a fixed, b u t adjustable, l iqmd level therein.

B-3.5 Fuel Supply, Gases. A gaseous fuel supply shall be capable of delivering the fuel at a control led a n d fixed rate to the cup.

B-3.6 Manifold. A manifold shall receive air a n d ex t inguisnan t and deliver t hem as a single mixed s t ream to the diffuser.

B-3.7 Air Supply. A means for delivering air to the manifold shall allow ad jus tmen t of tile air flow rate; have a calibrated means of measu r ing the air flow rate.

B-3.8 Ext inguisbant Supply. A means for delivering ex t inguishant to the manifold shall allow ad j u s t men t of the extingatishant flow rate and have a calibrated means of measur ing tile ex t inguishan t rate.

B-3.9 Deliver System. Tile delivery system shall deliver a representat ive a n d measurable sample of the agen t to the cup bu rne r in gaseous form.

B~ Materials. B-4.1 Air. Air shall he clean, dry and oil-free. T he oxygen

concent ra t ion shall be 20.9 ± 0.5 pe rcen t v.v. T he source and oxygen con ten t of the air employed shall be recorded.

N O T E : "Air" suppl ied in commercia l h igh-pressure cylinder may have an oxygen con ten t significantly different f rom 20.9 percent v/v.

B-4.2 Fuel. Fuel shall be of a certified type and quality. B-4.3 Ext inguishant . Ext inguishant shall be of certified type and

shall mee t tile specifications of the supplier. M u h i c o m p o n e n t ex t inguishants shall be provided premixed.

B-5 Procedure , F lammable Liquids. B-5.1 Place tile f l ammable liquid in tile fuel supply reservoir. B-5.2 Admit fuel to tile cup, adjust ing the liquid level to within 5

to 10 m m of tile top of the cup. B-5.3 Opera te tile hea t ing a r r a n g e m e n t for the cup to r ing the

fuel t empera tu re to 22 ±4°C or t o 5 ±I°C above the open cup flash point, wbicllever is h igher .

B-5.4 Adjust tile air flow to adf ieve a flow rate of I0 i t e r s /m nute. 17,-5.5 Ignite the Fuel. B-5.6 Allow the rue to bu rn for a per iod of 90 to 120 s before

I~e~mmn~ flow of extingafishant. Dur ing this period, the liquid

level in the up should be adjus ted so that the fuel level is at the top of the cup.

I?,-5.7 Begin the flow o fex t ingu i shan t . Increase the ext inguishant flow rate in inc rements until f lame ex t ingu i shmen t occurs, and record the ex t inguishan t and air flow rates at ex t inguishment . The flow rate i nc remen t shou ld result in an increase in the flow rate of no more than 2 pe rcen t of the previous value. Adjus tments in tile ex t inguishan t flow rate are to be followed by a brief waiting period (10 s) to allow the new propor t ions of ex t inguishan t and air in tile mani fo ld to reach the cup position. Dur ing this procedure , the liquid level in the cup is to be ma in ta ined at the top of the cup.

N O T E : O n an initial run, it is conven ien t to employ relatively large flow increments to ascertain the approx imate ex t inguishant flow requi red for ex t ingu i shment , and on subsequen t runs to start at a flow rate close to the critical and to increase the flow by small a m o u n t s until ex t i ngu i shmen t is achieved.

B-5.8 De te rmine tire ex t inguish ing concentra t ion of tile ex t ingu i shan t in accordance with Section B-7.

13-5.9 Prior to subsequen t tests remove the fuel f rom the cup an d remove any deposits of residue or soot that may be present on tile cup.

B-5.10 Repeat B-5.1 to B-5.9 employing air flow rates 20, 30, 40, and 50 l i te rs /minute ,

B-5.11 De te rmine the air flow rate cor responding to the m a x i m u m agen t concent ra t ion requi red for f lame ex t ingu i shmen t f rom a plot of the ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion versus airflow.

N O T E : A "plateau region" in the ex t inguish ing concentra t ion versus air flow plot occurs over which the ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion is at a m a x i m u m and is i n d e p e n d e n t of the air flow. For tire purpose of de t e rmin ing tile air flow cor respond ing to tile m a x i m u m requi red ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion , ex t inguish ing concent ra t ions differing by + 0.2 percent shall be cons idered to be

!equivalent. If the "plateau region" in tile concent ra t ion versus air flow plot has not been reached at an airflow rate of 50 L / m i n ,

, fur ther m e a s u r e m e n t s employing h igher flow rates shall be m~de until the p la teau region can be found.

B-5.12 Repeat steps B-5.1 t h rough 17-5.9 employing an airflow cor respond ing to tile m a x i m u m requi red agen t concentra t ion, :Ls de t e rmined B-5.11.

N O T E : In the case that a range of airflows exist over which the ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion is cons tan t to within ± 0.2 percent and is at a m a x i m u m , employ an airflow rate in the middle of said range.

B-5.13 Determine the ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion of the ex t ingu i shan t in accordance with Section B-7 by establishing the average of the 5 tests.

N O T E : The cur ren t task g roup considered the de te rmina t ion of ex t inguish ing concent ra t ions for the case of elevated fuel t empera tu res a n d dec ided to not inc lude such informat ion in this s tandard. This decision was based u p o n the fact that the relevance of such data to real-world fire scenarios is current ly unknown.

B-6 Procedure , F lammable Gases. N O T E : A cup i n t e n d e d for use with gaseous fuels shall have a

m e a n s of a t ta ining a un i form gas flow at the top of the cup. For example , tile cup employed for liquid fuels may be packed with refractory materials.

B-6.1 Gaseous fuel shall be f rom a pressure regulated supply with a calibrated means of adjust ing and measur ing the gas flow rate.

B-6.2 Adjust the air flow to 10 l i t e rs /minute . B-6.3 Begin fuel flow to the cup and adjust the fuel flow rate to

attain a gas velocity nominal ly equal to the air velocity past the cup. B-6.4 Ignite the fuel. B-6.5 Allow the fuel to burn for a per iod of 60 s before beginning

flow of ext inguishant . B-6.6 Begin the flow of extinguishasat. Increase the ext inguisbant

flow rate in inc rements until f lame ex t i ngu i shmen t occurs, and record the air, ex t ingu ishan t and fuel flow rates at ex t inguishment . The ex t ingu i shan t flow rate i nc r emen t shou ld resuh in an increase in e flow rate of no m o r e t han 2 percen t of the previous value. Adjus tments in the ex t ingu i shan t flow rate are to be followed by a brief waiting period (10 s) to allow the new propor t ions of ex t inguishan t and air in the manifold to reach tile cup position. Dur ing this procedure , the liquid level in the cup is to b e main ta ined at the top of the cup.

N O T E : O n an initial run, it is convenien t to employ relatively large flow inc rements to ascertain the approx imate exf inguishant flow requi red for ex t ingu i shment , and on subsequen t runs to start at a flow rate close to the critical a n d to increase the flow by small a m o u n t s unti l ex t i ngu i shmen t is achieved.

B-6.7 U p o n f lame ex t i ngu i shmen t shu t off the flow of f lammable gas.

B-6.8 Prior to s u b s e q u e n t tests remove deposi ts of residue or soot if p resent on the cup.

B-6.9 De te rmine the ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion of the ex t ingu i shan t in accordance with Section I?,-7.

126

Page 67: Report of the Committee on Joseph A. Wright, Federal ... · Anatoly Baratov, Moscow Building University, Enterprise "Gabar", Russia tie Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M]

N F P A 2001 - - A99 R O P

B-6.10 Repeat steps B-6.3 t h r o u g h B-6.9 at air flow rates of 20, 30, 40, and 50 l i t e rs /minute .

B-6.11 Determine the air flow rate co r respond ing to the m a x i m u m agen t concent ra t ion requi red for f lame ex t ingu i shmen t f rom it plot of the ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion versus airflow.

NOTE: A "plateau region" in the ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion versus air flow plot occurs over which the ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion is at a m a x i m n m arid is i n d e p e n d e n t of the air flow+ For the purpose of de t e rmin ing the air flow cor respond ing to the m:Lximum requi red ext inguisl t ing concent ra t ion , ex t inguish ing concent ra t ions differing by + 0.2 pe rcen t shall be considered to be equivalent. If the "plateau region" in the concent ra t ion versus air flow plot has riot been reached at an airflow rate of 50 L / m i n , fur ther m e a s u r e m e n t s employing h igher flow rates shall be made until the plateau region can be found.

B-6.12 Repeat steps 13-6.3 th rough B-6.9 employing an airflow cor respond ing to the m a x i m u m requi red agen t concentra t ion, as de te rnf ined in B-6.11.

NOTE: In tbe case that a range of airflows exist over which die ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion is cons tant to within + 0.2 percent and is at a m a x i m m n , employ and airllow rate in the middle of said range.

13-6.13 Determine tbe ext ingnislf ing concentra t ion of the ex t inguishan t in accordance with Section B-7 by establishing the average of 5 tests.

B-7 Ext inguishant Ext inguishing Concentrat ion. B-7.1 Preferred Medaod. T he preferred m e t h o d for de te rmin ing

the concent ra t ion of ex t inguishan t vapor in the ex t ingulshant plus air mix ture which j u s t causes f lame ex t i ngu i shmen t is to employ a gas analyzing device, calibrated for the concent ra t ion range of ext inguishant-air mixtures being measured . T he device may have con t inuous sampl ing capability, e.g., on line gas analyzer, or may be of a type which analyzes discrete samples, e.g., gas chromatography. Con t inuous m e a s u r e m e n t t echn iques are preferred.

Alternatively, the r emain ing oxygen concent ra t ion in the ch imney may be measu red with a con t inuous oxygen analysis device. The ex t inguishan t concent ra t ion is t hen calculated as follows:

C = 100°(1 02 0 2 (sup)

Vai r = volumetr ic flow rate of air, l i t e r s /minute .

Vex t - v o l u m e t r i c flow rate of extinguisharit , l i ters/ trf inute

13-8 Repor t ing of Results. As a minimnrn, the following informat ion shou ld be inc luded in the repor t of results+

(a) Schemat ic d iagram of apparatus , inc luding dimensions . (b) Source and assay of the ext inguishant , fiiel as~d ~dr. (c) For each test, the t empera tu re of the a i r / ex t ingu i shan t

nfixture at extinguishment+ (d) Ext inguishant , gaseous filel and air flow rates at

ex t inguishment . (e) Method employed to de te rmine the ext inguishing

concentra t ion. (f) Exct inguishant concent ra t ion de t e rmined for each t e s t (g) Measu remen t error analysis and statistical analysis of results.

SUBSTANTIATION: Added the cup bu rne r test p rocedure in order to s tandardize this me thodo logy t h r o u g h o u t the industl~+ COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #20h) 2001- 122- (B-2.7.1.4): Reject SUBMITTER: Lorne MacGregor, Nordl AJnerican Fire Guardiat~ Technology, Inc. R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Add text to read as follows:

B-2.7.1.4 Agent Mixture Density NAF P-W: 6.19 kg / tn 3 (0.386 lb / f t3Z

S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : NAF P-IV is a new agen t developed primarily as a r ep lacemen t to ha lon 1211. While it is ant ic ipated that its primary use will be as a s t reaming agen t it is expected that some e q u i p m e n t manufac tu re r s migh t wish to use it, as halon 1211 was used, for total f lood appl icat ions for normally unoccup ied areas. The [I .S.E.P.A has placed NAF P-IV on the Significant New Alternative Program (SNAP) list. Pease note that the E.P.A. has started to use trade names and no longer tries to invent generic names for products such as NAF P-IV, COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Commi t tee Action and Sta tement on Proposal 2001-8 (Log #20).

where: C = ex t inguishan t concentra t ion, % v/v. 0 2 - oxygen concent ra t ion in chimney, % v/v.

O2(sup) = oxygen concent ra t ion in snpply air. % v/v.

B-7.2 Alternative Method. Ext inguishant concent ra t ion in the ex t ingu i shan t plus ,air mixture may, alternatively, be calculated from the measu red flow rates of ex t inguishant a n d air. Where mass flow rate devices are employed, the resul t ing mass flow rates need to be converted to volumetr ic flow rates as follows:

(Log #31) 2001- 123- (B-2-7.1.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Steven W. Hansen , Ansul Inc.

I R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Change the density of IC.541 from 1.43 k g / m 3 (0.089 Ib/f t 3) to 1.41 k g / m 3 (0.088 Ib/f t3) . S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Listed values are incorrect. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

V i = M i / ( i

where: V i = volumetr ic flow rate of gas i, l i t e r s /minu te

m i = mass flow rate of gas i, g r a m / m i n u t e

( i = density of gas i, g rams / l i t e r

NOTE: Care shou ld be taken to employ the actual vapor density. T h e vapor density of many ha logena ted hydrocarbons at ambien t t empera tu re and pressure may differ f rom that calculated by the ideal ga s law by several per cent. By way of example, the density of HFC-227ea vapor at a pressure 101,3 kPa and t empera tu re of 295 K is approximate ly 2.4 percen t h igher t han would be calculated ,as an equivalent ideal, gas. At a pressure o f 6,7 kPa (6.6 vol .percent) , however, the difference between the actual vapor density and that calcnlated as an ideal gas is less than 0.2 percent . Published property da ta should be used where possible. Lacking publ ished data, est imation techniques may be used. The source of physical property values used should be recorded in the test report.

The concent ra t ion of ex t ingnishan t in vo lume per cent, C, is calculated ,as follows:

C - V ~ × 100 +v+.

where C = extingalishant concent ra t ion in % v / v .

127