Repor&ng)Inten&ons) - abrahamkuypercenter.nl · Repor&ng)Inten&ons) Lieke)Asma Science&and&Inten+onal&Acon& Juni26,2018 1

Repor&ng Inten&ons

Lieke Asma Science and Inten+onal Ac+on

Juni 26, 2018

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Science and Inten&onal Ac&on

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Science and Inten&onal Ac&on

Libet’s (1985, pp. 529-‐530) defini&on of [voluntary] ac&on: (a) it arises endogenously, not in direct response to an external s&mulus or cue; (b) there are no externally imposed restric&ons or compulsions that directly or immediately control subjects’ ini&a&on and performance of the act; and (c) most important, subjects feel introspec&vely that they are performing the act on their own ini&a&ve and that they are free to start or not to start the act as they wish. 3

Current experiments lead to troublesome conclusions

Start readiness poten&al

Conscious inten&on Movement

Haggard (2008)

The inten(on occurs too late…

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Haggard (2008)


…or conscious inten(ons play no role in what agents do

Current experiments lead to troublesome conclusions

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Can inten&onal ac&ons be studied with scien&fic methods?

•  And if yes, how?

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Inten&ons and Inten&onal Ac&on

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Common ideas about inten&onal ac&ons in scien&fic research

•  Inten&onal ac&ons have to be caused by conscious inten&ons

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•  Inten&onal ac&ons have to be caused by conscious inten&ons

Mele (1997, p. 243): Given that he intends to walk to work at the +me, is a reasonably pro-‐ ficient walker, encounters no special obstacles requiring an altera+on in his gait, and so on, his inten+on to walk to work can play its causal role without his having a specific, dis+nct inten+on for each step he takes.


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•  Inten&onal ac&ons have to be caused by conscious inten&ons, but only intended ac&ons are caused by a specific, dis&nct inten&on


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1. The researcher is in a posi&on to determine what inten&on the subject has, or should have 2. Inten&ons are only conscious if the agent is conscious of the inten&on as a state


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1. The researcher is in a posi&on to determine what inten&on the subject has, or should have 2. Inten&ons are only conscious if the agent is conscious of the inten&on as a state


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What the intended ac&on is depends on the inten&on of the agent

a. The descrip(on under which the events are inten1onal

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What the intended ac&on is depends on the inten&on of the agent

a. The descrip(on under which the events are inten1onal

b. On what level the agent performs the intended ac1on

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1. Can scien&sts determine what the intended ac&on and inten&on is?

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1. Can scien&sts determine what the intended ac&on and inten&on is?

What is the intended ac&on that is performed?

Depends on context and the skills of the agent (Papineau, 2015)

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2. When is an inten&on a conscious inten&on?

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2. When is an inten&on a conscious inten&on?

Pacherie (2006, p. 160): Second-‐order consciousness: the creature has a representa+on of that state as a specific aGtude of hers toward a certain content

First-‐order consciousness: the creature whose state it is is conscious of the object, property, or state of affairs the state represents or is about

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Repor&ng Conscious Inten&ons

Haggard 2008 Libet (1983, p. 627): ‘the subject was asked to note and later report the +me of appearance of his conscious awareness of 'wan&ng' [or having an ‘urge’ or ‘inten+on’ or ‘decision’ to move] to perform a given self-‐ini+ated movement.’

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What is the intended ac&on in Libet-‐style experiments?

Haggard 2008

Push the buPon now

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Haggard 2008

Push the buPon whenever I feel the urge to do so


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Haggard 2008

Mele (2009): compare real Libet experiment with an imaginary experiment



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What is the intended ac&on in the rudeness experiment?

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Be rude

What is the intended ac&on in the rudeness experiment?

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I am going to ask the researcher what to do next

At what point is the inten&on conscious?

Haggard 2008


Second-‐order consciousness versus first-‐order conscious (Pacherie, 2006)

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Haggard (2008)


Troublesome conclusions?

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…or conscious inten(ons play no role in what agents do

Sugges&on for improvement

Ask subjects about their inten&ons, but:

1)  Do not assume knowing what the inten&on with which they act is

2)  Allow for different ways in which subjects can have a conscious inten&on

E.g.: What are you [inten+onally] doing?

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References Baumeister, R. F., Masicampo, E. J., & Vohs, K. D. (2011). Do conscious thoughts cause behavior? Annual Review

of Psychology, 62(1), 331–361. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.131126 Haggard, P. (2008). Human voli&on: towards a neuroscience of will. Nature Reviews. Neuroscience, 9, 934-‐946.

doi:10.1038/nm2497 Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W. & Pearl, D. K. (1983) Time of conscious inten&on to act in rela&on to

onset of cerebral ac&vi&es (readiness-‐poten&al); the unconscious ini&a&on of a freely voluntary act.

Brain 106:623-‐42. Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral ini&a&ve and the role of conscious will in voluntary ac&on. Behavioral

and Brain Sciences, 8, 529–566. doi:10.1017/S0140525X0004490 Mele, A.R. (1997). Agency and mental ac&on. Philosophical Perspec+ves, 11, pp. 231-‐249. Mele, A.R. (2009). Effec+ve Inten+ons: The Power of Conscious Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pacherie, E. (2006). Towards a dynamic theory of inten&ons. In S. Pockem, W. Banks, & S. Gallagher (Eds.), Does

consciousness cause behavior? An inves+ga+on of the nature of voli+on (pp. 145-‐167). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Papineau, D. (2015). Choking and the yips. Phenomenology and the Cogni+ve Sciences, 14, 295-‐308. doi:10.1007/s11097-‐014-‐9383-‐x.

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Repor&ng)Inten&ons) - abrahamkuypercenter.nl · Repor&ng)Inten&ons) Lieke)Asma Science&and&Inten+onal&Acon& Juni26,2018 1