Reply to Richard Shiff

Leonardo

Reply to Richard ShiffAuthor(s): David CarrierSource: Leonardo, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1986), pp. 269-270Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1578259 .

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Letters Letters Letters

Readers' comments on texts published in Leonardo are welcomed. The Editors reserve the right to shorten letters. Letters should be written in English and sent to the Main Editorial Office.



COMMENTS ON GOMBRICH ON ART VERSUS BRYSON ON ART

I think that Ernst Gombrich may be spared the effort of taking issue with Norman Bryson's examples (Leonardo 18, 126-127, 1985) as there is already a substantial body of literature which does just that. I am referring, of course, to the reviews in professional art historical

journals. Readers of Leonardo who wish to pursue the matter can consult:

J. J. L. Whitely, "The Trouble with Words", Art Book Review 1, 39-40 (1982). R. Wrigley, "Word and Image...", Art International 26, 82-83 (1983). C. Duncan, "Rediscovering the Known", Art History 6, 246-248

(1983). A. Brookner, "Word and Image ...",

Burlington Magazine 125, 762-764

(1983). M. Podro, "Misconceived Alterna- tives", Art History 7, 243-247 (1984).

My own paper, which criticizes the first

chapter of Word and Image, will be

published as "Words and Pictures" in the British Journal of Aesthetics at the end of 1986.

Anyone tempted to believe Bryson's claims about the present state of British art history should look through back copies of the journal Art History. Anyone tempted to believe his, or David Carrier's, claims about Gombrich's views should read Gombrich's books. I would not like to be held responsible for the consequences of recommending Bryson's books, but in fairness they should be read if an objective view is to be obtained.

My own view is that much of what Bryson has said has been said before with greater cogency and clarity by other

people. Although Bryson claims to widen the scope of art history his bibliography makes very narrow reading, confined largely to a few fashionable figures. I find the lack of reference to any material from the journal Semiotica quite extraordinary,



























as well as a lack of reference to semiotic conferences. I could go on but I won't.

Richard Woodfield Trent Polytechnic

Nottingham NG1 4BU, U.K.

COMMENTS ON THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

In his discussion of creativity and artificial intelligence (Leonardo 19, 77-80, 1986), David Carrier cites my recent study of Cezanne and calls attention to one of its major concerns, the incongruity of an artist's practice and its associated theory or interpretation. Theory and interpretation often seem more normative or stable than the creative works that are their referents. This is so at least in terms of a cumulative historical effect, as a line of commentary on a given artist's oeuvre becomes canonical. Yet the work remains elusive enough to allow innovation in criticism.

As Carrier points out, the goal of artificial intelligence (AI) is to simulate the processes that produce creative works, rather than to imitate such works or to simulate some 'intelligent' evaluation of them. AI is aiming for art in the purest sense. One of the provocative implica- tions of Carrier's discussion is that the success or failure of the AI project might itself be impossible to criticize or evaluate. Indeed, the "computer simulation of creative thinking" is a con- tradiction; either it cannot happen, or, if it did, we would not know that it did.

Briefly, in my own terms, let me explain this point, as an addendum to Carrier's argument. To the extent that AI seeks to create in the modern artistic sense, it seeks a certain originality (actually, two originalities). AI strives to express both the originality we associate with individual difference (subjectivity) and the originality we associate with in- novative, unprecedented achievement. But, if we follow the examples Carrier cites, AI seems only to offer a third and 'older' kind of originality, the 'originality' or precedence of a first or proper solution. In other words, we regard the processes of AI as creative only when we















recognize in their products the very kinds of qualities and structures that already fit our preconceived, canonical notions of the creative and the original. This circularity may also characterize our evaluation of the products of human artistic creation. But our custom, for better or worse, is to deny the possibility of such a firm standard of evaluation and to reassert continually the incommensurability of creativity and its end products.

As a critical discourse of the artificial (or made) and the natural (or found) unfolds, incommensurability remains in the realm of the natural. How could AI simulate that feature of the creative? Simulation itself is a matter of measure rather than incommensurability. From an artistic perspective, the processes and products of artificial intelligence can always be measured against the superior standard set by the natural, itself the 'original' or privileged term in this dualistic relationship. Speculators in the stock of AI might be served by entertaining a fully dialectical relationship between the artificial and the natural in order to think beyond the hierarchical dualism. Perhaps they would do even better to avoid the issue of artistic creativity entirely.

Richard Shiff Department of Art History

University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, NC 27514

U.S.A.

REPLY TO RICHARD SHIFF

In his letter, Richard Shiff provides a

highly subtle interpretation of my discussion of creativity and his study of Cezanne's art. Since his remarks are brief and elliptical, and deal with a very important issue, I hope that in some future publication he will develop these ideas in more detail. My reply here may not do justice to his claims.

Why do we value originality in problem solving and in art? The first person to solve a mathematical equation provides an unprecedented achievement. If another person later solves that equation without knowing that it already has been solved, we may think that person is as intelligent as the first





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LEONARDO, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 269-273, 1986 LEONARDO, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 269-273, 1986 LEONARDO, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 269-273, 1986 269 269 269



problem-solver; but obviously his or her achievement is not as interesting as the first solution. To imitate that creativity by simulating the activity of the first

problem-solver is to reconstruct that act; starting from what that problem-solver knew, we seek to explain how he or she solved the problem. This reconstruction of the creative act is itself creative only in another sense, such as how a psy- chologist's study of creativity may explain in an original way how problems are solved.

Art historians often assume that artists

engage in problem solving. To take an

example from my own research, given what Jacques-Louis David knew about Italian painting from the Renaissance and more contemporary French work, art historians seek to reconstruct the

revolutionary composition of his Oath of the Horatii (1785). That painting, says Robert Rosenblum ("A Source for David's Horatii": Burlington Magazine 119, 273, 1970) "can be seen as a translation into the language of genius of an idea first stated tentatively by Hamilton and then by Beaufort", two earlier artists who painted similar images. Given David's picture, we can see both how that original work had such sources and how he, as a creative artist, trans- formed his sources. One question is whether such an analysis can explain his

creativity; 'genius' is often taken to be just what is inexplicable. Another, harder

question is whether artificial intelligence (AI) could simulate the creativity of the artist. As Shiff suggests, it is easy to offer a merely circular analysis; what is judged creative is like that which we already identify as creative. Here perhaps the differences between the examples dis- cussed in my account of AI and artistic cases is significant. We can identify an

original move in chess because the rules of that game are fixed; identifying an

original painting is more difficult since it

may break the rules. But whether this difference is merely one of degree or a difference of kind remains to be deter- mined.

David Carrier

Department of Philosophy Carnegie-Mellon University

Pittsburgh, PA 15213 U.S.A.

COMMENTS ON "COMPUTER-

problem-solver; but obviously his or her achievement is not as interesting as the first solution. To imitate that creativity by simulating the activity of the first

problem-solver is to reconstruct that act; starting from what that problem-solver knew, we seek to explain how he or she solved the problem. This reconstruction of the creative act is itself creative only in another sense, such as how a psy- chologist's study of creativity may explain in an original way how problems are solved.

Art historians often assume that artists

engage in problem solving. To take an

example from my own research, given what Jacques-Louis David knew about Italian painting from the Renaissance and more contemporary French work, art historians seek to reconstruct the

revolutionary composition of his Oath of the Horatii (1785). That painting, says Robert Rosenblum ("A Source for David's Horatii": Burlington Magazine 119, 273, 1970) "can be seen as a translation into the language of genius of an idea first stated tentatively by Hamilton and then by Beaufort", two earlier artists who painted similar images. Given David's picture, we can see both how that original work had such sources and how he, as a creative artist, trans- formed his sources. One question is whether such an analysis can explain his

creativity; 'genius' is often taken to be just what is inexplicable. Another, harder

question is whether artificial intelligence (AI) could simulate the creativity of the artist. As Shiff suggests, it is easy to offer a merely circular analysis; what is judged creative is like that which we already identify as creative. Here perhaps the differences between the examples dis- cussed in my account of AI and artistic cases is significant. We can identify an

original move in chess because the rules of that game are fixed; identifying an

original painting is more difficult since it

may break the rules. But whether this difference is merely one of degree or a difference of kind remains to be deter- mined.

David Carrier

Department of Philosophy Carnegie-Mellon University

Pittsburgh, PA 15213 U.S.A.

COMMENTS ON "COMPUTER- AIDED CORRELATION OF

MUSICAL AND VISUAL STRUCTURES"

The process of music-to-image generation and co-generation, proposed by Theo

AIDED CORRELATION OF MUSICAL AND VISUAL

STRUCTURES"

The process of music-to-image generation and co-generation, proposed by Theo

Golberg and Gunther Schrack in their article (Leonardo 19, 11-17, 1986) is a

challenging and promising contribution to the current thrust of investigations into this realm of interdisciplinary relation- ships. It is substantial enough, in fact, to merit serious application-and serious criticism.

Without having seen the most extended results of Goldberg and Schrack's investigations (i.e. the multimedia works of Goldberg-e.g. Le Tombeau de

Jacquard), heard the results of their collaborations with Barry Truax et al., or even seen the simple static music-

generated images in anything (to this

writing) but photocopied form, we regret not being able to evaluate the actual artistic results of the authors' methods. From observations in the article itself, however, we are concerned that artistic matters have played too little part in the authors' reasoning.

It would seem that the authors (with some justification) regard aesthetic considerations as too subjective and variable to figure in their methodology-the implication being that the system they have devised and continue to perfect is an

essentially objective one, as hard and fast as a sequence of mathematical calcula- tions. They seem to offer it to interested artists and musicians not as a framework for experiment but simply as a tool, a device like a protractor or a color wheel for deriving certain fixed physical factors within the artist's creative inspiration. In fact, Goldberg and Schrack's method is, or can be, much more all-encompassing than that. It is itselfa creative inspiration, a system of logic that can evolve even as it

generates artworks and can provide a beholder aesthetic satisfaction and stimulation in and of itself, like a well- honed Conceptual Art proposal. As such, the authors ought not limit the scope of the proposition to its few most obvious rudiments.

Perhaps the single most egregious such limitation is the consignment of

'expression' to the third coordinate of the

system's graphology, the coordinate

determining depth and thus com- prehended in two-dimensional rendering as formal distortion-in the authors' words, "the precarious tilt of the structure, the exaggerated nearness and distortion of one of the patterns." The z- coordinate is thus conceptualized as the "artist's point of view of the visual composition"-i.e. the subjective element.

Golberg and Gunther Schrack in their article (Leonardo 19, 11-17, 1986) is a

challenging and promising contribution to the current thrust of investigations into this realm of interdisciplinary relation- ships. It is substantial enough, in fact, to merit serious application-and serious criticism.

Without having seen the most extended results of Goldberg and Schrack's investigations (i.e. the multimedia works of Goldberg-e.g. Le Tombeau de

Jacquard), heard the results of their collaborations with Barry Truax et al., or even seen the simple static music-

generated images in anything (to this

writing) but photocopied form, we regret not being able to evaluate the actual artistic results of the authors' methods. From observations in the article itself, however, we are concerned that artistic matters have played too little part in the authors' reasoning.

It would seem that the authors (with some justification) regard aesthetic considerations as too subjective and variable to figure in their methodology-the implication being that the system they have devised and continue to perfect is an

essentially objective one, as hard and fast as a sequence of mathematical calcula- tions. They seem to offer it to interested artists and musicians not as a framework for experiment but simply as a tool, a device like a protractor or a color wheel for deriving certain fixed physical factors within the artist's creative inspiration. In fact, Goldberg and Schrack's method is, or can be, much more all-encompassing than that. It is itselfa creative inspiration, a system of logic that can evolve even as it

generates artworks and can provide a beholder aesthetic satisfaction and stimulation in and of itself, like a well- honed Conceptual Art proposal. As such, the authors ought not limit the scope of the proposition to its few most obvious rudiments.

Perhaps the single most egregious such limitation is the consignment of

'expression' to the third coordinate of the

system's graphology, the coordinate

determining depth and thus com- prehended in two-dimensional rendering as formal distortion-in the authors' words, "the precarious tilt of the structure, the exaggerated nearness and distortion of one of the patterns." The z- coordinate is thus conceptualized as the "artist's point of view of the visual composition"-i.e. the subjective element. To consign subjectivity, or expressivity, to one particular plane is to segregate a creative element that by its definition suffuses the conception and realization of the work. This element is at the heart of

To consign subjectivity, or expressivity, to one particular plane is to segregate a creative element that by its definition suffuses the conception and realization of the work. This element is at the heart of

those aesthetic considerations not otherwise accounted for. If such disembodied properties are for the most part moot in Goldberg and Schrack's methodology, the incorporation of 'expressivity' into the method is inconsistent. We believe that aesthetic considerations such as expressivity ought to be given latitude in Goldberg and Schrack's system. Con- signing expressivity to a large and distinct realm of coordinate function does not give expressivity that latitude.

Moreover, even without the third dimension, the potential exists here for the introduction of imagery, the variance of correlative formulae, and other factors which are necessarily arbitrarily de-

signated and as such are important in provoking creative play. Goldberg and Schrack's complex, thorough and work- able system must, and evidently can, have myriad open-ended characteristics, unsolved details of formal and subjective correlation that allow artists their

requisite elbow room. This would seem less necessary in the co-generated sonic- visual work to which this experimental approach ideally points, but in fact it makes all the difference. Whether the source of imagery is pre-extant or co- extant, the power of the imagery is not in the exactitude of its relationship to sound, but the particularity of the process of translation in the hands of any one artist and the conformation that results. Otherwise the system provides artists no creative play; it dictates that that play must take place before the system is

applied. The application of the system is thus formulaic, resulting in a limited, predictable range of images and/or sounds. And the element of'expressivity', one of the elements determining stylistic distinctions between artworks, becomes an inflection simply hung by the artist on the structure-even when 'expressivity' can be induced or charted on the z- coordinate. The structure is thus simply a mechanism, when it could be so much more, as well as a prescription, when it ought to be so much less. Electronically generated sonic and visual art has outgrown that rule-bound stage. Given that the authors have themselves worked through the necessary rudiments of their relational system, there is no further need for that potent system to focus exclusively on rudimentary relations.

Peter Frank

those aesthetic considerations not otherwise accounted for. If such disembodied properties are for the most part moot in Goldberg and Schrack's methodology, the incorporation of 'expressivity' into the method is inconsistent. We believe that aesthetic considerations such as expressivity ought to be given latitude in Goldberg and Schrack's system. Con- signing expressivity to a large and distinct realm of coordinate function does not give expressivity that latitude.

Moreover, even without the third dimension, the potential exists here for the introduction of imagery, the variance of correlative formulae, and other factors which are necessarily arbitrarily de-

signated and as such are important in provoking creative play. Goldberg and Schrack's complex, thorough and work- able system must, and evidently can, have myriad open-ended characteristics, unsolved details of formal and subjective correlation that allow artists their

requisite elbow room. This would seem less necessary in the co-generated sonic- visual work to which this experimental approach ideally points, but in fact it makes all the difference. Whether the source of imagery is pre-extant or co- extant, the power of the imagery is not in the exactitude of its relationship to sound, but the particularity of the process of translation in the hands of any one artist and the conformation that results. Otherwise the system provides artists no creative play; it dictates that that play must take place before the system is

applied. The application of the system is thus formulaic, resulting in a limited, predictable range of images and/or sounds. And the element of'expressivity', one of the elements determining stylistic distinctions between artworks, becomes an inflection simply hung by the artist on the structure-even when 'expressivity' can be induced or charted on the z- coordinate. The structure is thus simply a mechanism, when it could be so much more, as well as a prescription, when it ought to be so much less. Electronically generated sonic and visual art has outgrown that rule-bound stage. Given that the authors have themselves worked through the necessary rudiments of their relational system, there is no further need for that potent system to focus exclusively on rudimentary relations.

Peter Frank Jack Ox

712 Broadway 5th Floor

New York, NY 10013 U.S.A.

Jack Ox 712 Broadway

5th Floor New York, NY 10013

U.S.A.

Letters Letters 270 270



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