Reply to Reed and SwainAuthor(s): Gerald MillerSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 56, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1996), pp. 616-617Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/977265 .

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Reply to Reed and Swain by Gerald Miller

n a defense of their textbooks perspec- tive, Reed and Swain argue that

1. There are different perspectives among textbooks in financial management, generally economics, accounting, and budget execution.

2. The perspective a textbook takes is a product of not only the authors view but also marketing decisions in which authors participate.

3. The market for financial management texts is segmented on various dimen- sions, including conceptual/applied, student/practitioner, as well as perspec- tive (economics/accounting/budget exe- cution).

4. Their particular text does not appeal to any one market segment alone, rather it should be classed with "those without a dominant focus or orientation".

5. Differences in perspectives in this field have not fueled rivalry; rather most seek to reconcile differences without rancor. Although the first and last points make

the most difference, let me dispose of points 2-4 first. On the second point, who can disagree with the point that those who put money at risk want some control over how it is used? I have known only three editors, and worked with only one, who had any knowledge of financial manage- ment. My sense is that editors prefer authors to define their texts subject first; editors then let proposal or manuscript reviewers confirm it. Thus, the perspective a text takes relies less on true market analy- sis than it does on reviewers with an opin- ion on where the field lies.

Second, I do not see the degree of seg- mentation in the textbook market that Reed and Swain depict. All public finan- cial management texts that I have read try to reach the student community and the practitioner community. They do this in different ways in what they describe public financial management as doing-tools and techniques, procedures, and activities-and in what they prescribe as good practice, through concepts and applications. As far as audiences and markets of books are con- cerned, the MPA student and practitioner audiences are the same, if for no other rea- son than that most students eventually

become practitioners. Therefore, the only segmenting feature in the market is the backgrounds of those who teach financial management and, naturally, the materials they choose in their courses. These back- grounds are rooted in economics, account- ing, or budget execution. It is in these roots and their logics that real differences exist.

Third, as for whether Reed and Swain's textbook organizes the field around an eco- nomics logic or something else, I argue that users read the book. Fully one-third of the book's chapters explain material that could be found in almost any public finance text- book. What led to the classification of their book as one fitting with an economics bent was not just their choice of chapter subjects, however. They approach almost all their subjects with economic analysis, they place accounting in a distinct and unrelated subcategory, and they discuss the politics of financial management solely in footnotes. Their disclaiming an economics bent due to their lack of training in eco- nomics says less about their approach than the creeping dominance of the field by the economics perspective.

The other two major points Reed and Swain make are of much more conse- quence; that is, the field of financial man- agement has different perspectives but "the authors...do not appear to be contentious in respect to perspectives.... [R]ather than contend with them over the dominance of a perspective, we hope we can learn from them...".

I take issue with the idea that these text- books are not contentious, especially in their assumptions about the field or their underlying logic. I also do not agree with Reed and Swains view that the field lacks rivalry. Whether there is personal rancor among authors is beside the point. Whether there is or can be a synthesis of !the different perspectives into a coherent whole without one finally dominating, while unknowable today, poses the central and most important uncertainty discussed in the review essay.

Why is this important? Textbooks play a pivotal role in a field of study by dassify- ing, structuring, and creating a coherent whole of the research they survey. More than many other ventures in research, text- books construct the reality within which managers practice and students learn the

professions rules and norms. This reality has profound importance because our theo- ries and approaches function as instru- ments of managerial control, as Bendix (1956) has argued, and as instruments of legislative and citizen control.

As argued elsewhere about reforms in financial management, different perspec- tives have a way of encouraging develop- ment of warring factions. Jeopardizing institutional traditions and perspectives, familiar processes, expected outcomes, and even job security, the succession of domi- nant perspectives (or reform) creates rivalry and raises defenses. One need look no fur- ther than the development of federal bud- geting to see warring factions vying to con- trol the technique, process, and ultimately the organization used (Mosher, 1984; Walker, 1986; Miller, 1991, pp 24-27; Argyris, 1954). Different perspectives lead to politics and an effort to achieve domi- nance; to view the fundamental differences among perspectives in any other way is naive, it seems to me.

The three perspectives in financial man- agement give a good indication of the depth of the differences and the stakes for the adherents. The first perspective, public sector economics, distinguishes market suc- cess in production of private goods from market failure in providing public goods. The writers in the field often argue that provision of public goods by government suffers from overabundance on the supply side and an scarcity of choice on the demand side. Public sector economics' most conservative adherents in public choice theory, and especially agency theory, explain public goods provision problems as incentives problems. To wit: "the provision of government services is an incidental effect of the incentives and constraints of voters, politicians, and bureaucrats.... [T]he incentives of bureaucrats do not lead to behavior that is fully consistent with the interests of politicians.... [Bureaucrats are not] the selfless mandarins portrayed by the public administration literature from Con- fucius to Woodrow Wilson" (Niskanen, 1991; 14-15). Rational actors, like ratio- nal/analytical techniques they employ, have one aim in mind; that aim is to maximize discretion. Tinkering with incentives by appropriate uses of a cost calculation mech- anism, they argue, will lead to correct levels of production and amounts of choice of

616 Public Administration Review * November/December 1996, Vol. 56, No. 6

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public goods. Obviously, the cost calcula- tion mechanism involves different methods of analysis, backgrounds and training of practitioners, and views of public adminis- tration as it is traditionally known.

The second perspective, what I called budget execution, emerges as the bureau- cratic politics model of policy implementa- tion applied to financial management. That is, budgeting has two stages: formula- tion, where budget process reforms (PPBS, ZBB) and budget proposal politics hold most attention, and execution where, as intended or not, money gets spent or invested and tax programs get applied and litigated. If the devil is in the details, all who have an interest in the outcome of implementation vie for dominance in achieving their groups welfare, says this perspective. Those who teach and those who practice budget execution are likely to have analytical skills extremely sensitive to the question: Who gets what, when, where, and how?

Finally, the third perspective, account- ing, is the control orientation to bureau- cratic management and the application of methods that seek accountability for finan- cial management decisions. Accountings analysis of performance for its own sake- so the public will know and elected officials may make better informed decisions-begs the question of whether efficiency is the only criterion by which the public or elect- ed officials judge a potential outcome. Yet, accountings strong relationship to probity, that all financial decisions bear close scruti-

ny and that some which lack note in busi- ness should actually be a criminally pun- ished in government, gives efficiency the value equivalence of economic rationality and political participation. As with all value-neutral concepts like efficiency, we ask: Accountability for what? It is the neu- tral competence idea applied to financial management with its adherents given unique training and a license to probe and then to confer legitimacy or disgrace.

If a public administration field is domi- nated by economists, accountants, or polit- ical scientists, why do we need doctorates in public administration to teach it? The field, as I said in the review, is one not deal- ing with a financial question alone-cost calculus-but the financial requirements for achieving some other programmatic goal in government. Achievement of that goal is not determined by efficiency alone; equity or universality may actually be more important, as the debate over health care suggests. The choice of that other goal is not a solely a political decision either, as judicial determinations of exactly what shall be managed in what way with what financial consequences have so vividly illus- trated.

No one perspective-economics, bud- get execution, or accounting-encompasses all of these concerns. Only public adminis- trations approach to financial management offers such breadth, but the conflict has and will continue among rivals who see the power their perspective confers on their students careers.

I hope all fellow instructors shop around. Do not run afoul of the intention- al fallacy or, as one person put it about judging any creative work, "[What an author] says about his own [work] is of no interest at all. The [work] speaks so much louder than he does" (New York Times, 1994).

References Argyris, Chris, 1954. The Impact of Budgets on

People. New York: Controllership Founda- tion.

Bendix, Reinhard, 1956. Work and Authority in Industry: Ideologies of Management in the Course of Industrialization. Berkeley, CA: Uni- versity of California Press.

Miller, Gerald J., 1991. Government Financial Management Theory. New York: Dekker.

Mosher, Frederick C., 1984. A Tale of Two Agen- cies: A Comparative Analysis of the General Accounting Office and the Office of Management and Budget. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

New York Times, June 19, 1994, H24. Niskanen, William A., 1991. !A Reflection on

Bureaucracy and Representative Government. In Andre Blais and Stephane Dion, eds., The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat: Appraisals and Evidence. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Walker, Wallace Earl, 1986. Changing Organiza- tional Culture: Strategy, Structure, and Profes- sionalism in the U. S. General Accounting Office. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

The Perils of iy-Compleed Qjonnai T Zane Reeves, University ofNew Mexico

Imagine our surprise as researchers when the Public Administration Review pub-

lished a letter alleging "errors" on our part concerning employee drug testing by the City of St. Louis. In our article (January/February 1996), we had noted that "St. Louis was particularly intrusive because it randomly tested all employees regardless of their job classification or duties." Although not specifically stated, the Deputy Personnel Director for the City

of St. Louis implied that we had commit- ted an egregious error by indicating that all city employees in St. Louis were subject to random drug testing. Ms. Looney asserted in her letter that only Airport Police Offi- cers, holders of commercial drivers licenses, and "public safety" employees are subjected to random drug testing.

However, when we reexamined the orig- inal questionnaire completed by the Deputy Director of Personnel, the guilty party appears to be whomever completed the questionnaire. In addition to the afore- mentioned categories of employees subject to random testing by Ms. Looney, it was reported that the following groups of employees were also subject to random

testing: (1) blue collar, (2) white collar and technical, (3) as well as professional/man- agerial/supervisory employees. Hence, based upon this reported data from St. Louis which we assumed to be accurate, all city employees were subject to random test- ing.

Obviously, survey researchers are depen- dent upon their respondent's honesty and knowledge when completing a question- naire. Apparently, Ms. Looney has either forgotten her original responses or answered our questionnaire too hastily. In either case, her error is unfortunate but not one for which we as researchers can assume any responsibility.

Commuicatoon 617

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