Upload
lucien
View
29
Download
1
Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
NSF-PEEC Workshop of Power and Energy Education Transforming Cyber-Physical Systems Education with Emphasis on the Power Grid. Remediation Strategies after Disruptive Switching Cyberattacks. Wei Sun , Assist. Prof., South Dakota State Univ. Yunhe Hou , Assist. Prof., The Univ. of Hong Kong - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Citation preview
South Dakota State UniversityElectrical Engineering and Computer Science
Remediation Strategies after Disruptive
Switching Cyberattacks
Wei Sun, Assist. Prof., South Dakota State Univ.
Yunhe Hou, Assist. Prof., The Univ. of Hong Kong
Chee-Wooi Ten, Assist. Prof., Michigan Tech. Univ.
Arlington, VA, July 26, 2014
NSF-PEEC Workshop of Power and Energy Education
Transforming Cyber-Physical Systems Education with Emphasis on the Power Grid
South Dakota State UniversityElectrical Engineering and Computer Science
2
A four-layer system, including cyber-vulnerability evaluation, emergency control, restoration, and planning, is designed to provide remediation strategies for protecting and restoring power systems after the attack incidents.
A strategic defense system will be developed to enhance system reconfigurability and survivability from disruptive switching actions by a cyber intruder.
Joint education and research activities among three universities in U.S. and China.
Overview
South Dakota State UniversityElectrical Engineering and Computer Science
3
Strategies
Strategic Defense System
Planning Strategy
Restoration
Strategy
Emergency
Strategy
Cyber-Vulnerabilit
y Evaluation
Identify vulnerable
components
Defensive emergency control
Real-time adaptive actions
Optimal cyber- syst.
planning
South Dakota State UniversityElectrical Engineering and Computer Science
4
IEEE 30-bus system is used for illustration of the strategic defense system
1. Cyber-Vulnerability Evaluation provides the list of substations with high risk: substations 9, 12, 25, 27.
2. Emergency Control provides optimal defensive actions to reduce the probabilities of being intruded successfully.
3. Restoration Strategy provides optimal restoration actions, and identify more vulnerable substations 12 and 27.
4. Planning Strategy provides the optimal planning to minimize the risk of potential attacks subject to available resources.
Demonstration
57
58
59
Optimal Value
Possible Strategies
Equ
ival
ent l
oss
of lo
ad
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 500
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Restoration Time (pu)
Gen
erat
ion
Out
put
(MW
)
Compration of Generation Capability Curves
Base Case,Lose Sub 9,Lose Sub 25
Lose Sub 12Lose Sub 27
1 2 3 4 5 61.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9x 10
4
Substation Restored Time (hr)
Sys
tem
Gen
erat
ion
Cap
abili
ty (
MW
h)
Comparison of Two Vulnerbale Substations
Substation 12
Substation 27