Remedial law Rule 70

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G.R. No.171555 April 17, 2013EVANGELINE RIVERA-CALINGASAN and E. RICAL ENTERPRISES, Petitioners, vs.WILFREDO RIVERA, substituted by MA. LYDIA S. RlVERA, FREIDA LEAH S. RIVERA andWILFREDO S. RIVERA, .JR., Respondents.

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,1filed by petitioners Evangeline Rivera-Calingasanand E. Rical Enterprises,2assailing the February 10, 2006 decision3 of the Court of Appeals ( CA)

in CA-G.R. SP No. 90717. The CA decision affirmed with modification the April 6, 2005Decision4 and the July 8, 2005 order5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City, Branch 85, inCivil Case No. 2003-0982.

The Factual Antecedents

During their lifetime, respondent Wilfredo Rivera and his wife, Loreto Inciong, acquired severalparcels of land in Lipa City, Batangas, two of which were covered by Transfer Certificate of Title(TCT) Nos. T-22290 and T-30557.6On July 29, 1982, Loreto died, leaving Wilfredo and their twodaughters, Evangeline and Brigida Liza, as her surviving heirs.7

About eleven (11) years later, or on March 29, 1993, Loretos heirs executed an extrajudicialsettlement of her one-half share of the conjugal estate, adjudicating all the properties in favor ofEvangeline and Brigida Liza; Wilfredo waived his rights to the properties, with a reservation of hisusufructuary rights during his lifetime.8On September 23, 1993, the Register of Deeds of LipaCity, Batangas cancelled TCT Nos. T-22290 and T-30557 and issued TCT Nos. T-87494 and T-87495 in the names of Evangeline and Brigida Liza, with an annotation of Wilfredos usufructuaryrights.9

Almost a decade later, or on March 13, 2003,10Wilfredo filed with the Municipal Trial Court inCities (MTCC) of Lipa City a complaint for forcible entry against the petitioners and Star Honda,Inc., docketed as Civil Case No. 0019-03.

Wilfredo claimed that he lawfully possessed and occupied the two (2) parcels of land locatedalong C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas, covered by TCT Nos. T-87494 and T-87495, witha building used for his furniture business. Taking advantage of his absence due to his hospitalconfinement in September 2002, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. took possession and causedthe renovation of the building on the property. In December 2002, the petitioners and Star Honda,Inc., with the aid of armed men, barred him from entering the property.11

Both the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. countered that Wilfredo voluntarily renounced hisusufructuary rights in a petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights dated March 4, 1996,12 andthat another action between the same parties is pending with the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13 (anaction for the annulment of the petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights filed by Wilfredo),docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0773.

The MTCC Ruling

In its December 2, 2003 decision,13 the MTCC dismissed the complaint. It found no evidence ofWilfredos prior possession and subsequent dispossession of the property. It noted that Wilfredoadmitted that both E. Rical Enterprises and Star Honda, Inc. occupied the property through leasecontracts from Evangeline and her husband Ferdinand.

Wilfredo appealed to the RTC.

The RTC Ruling

In its November 30, 2004 decision,14the RTC affirmed the MTCCs findings. It held that Wilfredolacked a cause of action to evict the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. since Evangeline is theregistered owner of the property and Wilfredo had voluntarily renounced his usufructuary rights.

Wilfredo sought reconsideration of the RTCs decision and, in due course, attained this objective;the RTC set aside its original decision and entered another, which ordered the eviction of thepetitioners and Star Honda, Inc.

In its April 6, 2005 decision,15the RTC held that Wilfredos renunciation of his usufructuary rightscould not be the basis of the complaints dismissal since it is the subject of litigation pending withthe RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13. The RTC found that the MTCC overlooked the evidence proving

Wilfredos prior possession and subsequent dispossession of the property, namely: (a)Evangelines judicial admission of "J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas" as her residence sinceMay 2002; (b) the Lipa City Prosecutors findings, in a criminal case for qualified trespass todwelling, that the petitioners are not residents of the property; (c) the affidavit of Ricky Briones,Barangay Captain of Barangay 9, Lipa City where the property is located, attesting to Wilfredosprior possession and the petitioners entry to the property during Wilfredos hospital confinement;and (d) the petitioners, with the aid of armed men, destroyed the padlock of the building on theproperty. The RTC ordered the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. to pay P

620,000.00 asreasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property, andP20,000.00 asattorneys fees.

The petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. filed separate motions for reconsideration. In its July 8, 2005

order,16the RTC modified its April 6, 2005 decision by absolving Star Honda, Inc. from anyliability. It found no evidence that Star Honda, Inc. participated in the dispossession. Thepetitioners then filed a Rule 42 petition for review with the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its February 10, 2006 decision,17the CA affirmed with modification the RTCs findings, notingthat: (a) Evangelines admission of "J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas" as her residence (a placedifferent and distinct from the property) rendered improbable her claim of possession andoccupation; and (b) Evangelines entry to the property (on the pretext of repairing the building)during Wilfredos hospital confinement had been done without Wilfredos prior consent and wasdone through strategy and stealth. The CA, however, deleted the award ofP20,000.00 as

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attorneys fees since the RTC decision did not contain any discussion or justification for theaward.

The petitioners then filed the present petition. Wilfredo died on December 27, 2006 and has beensubstituted by his second wife, Ma. Lydia S. Rivera, and their children, Freida Leah S. Rivera andWilfredo S. Rivera, Jr. (respondents).18

The Petition

The petitioners submit that the CA erred in equating possession with residence since possessionin forcible entry cases means physical possession without qualification as to the nature ofpossession, i.e., whether residing or not in a particular place. They contend that thepronouncements of the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773, in the March 11,2003 order,19 that they have been "occupying the premises since 1997"20 and Wilfredos ownadmission that he padlocked the doors of the building contradict Wilfredos claim of priorpossession.

The Case for the Respondents

The respondents counter that the petitioners mistakenly relied on the statements of the RTC of

Lipa City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773 on the petitioners occupation since 1997; suchstatements had been rendered in an interlocutory order, and should not prevail over Evangelinesadmission in her answer of "Poblacion, Rosario, Batangas"21 as her residence, compared toWilfredos admission in his complaint of "C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas" as hisresidence, the exact address of the disputed property.22

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of who, between the petitioners and Wilfredo, had been in priorphysical possession of the property.

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit. Ejectment cases involve only physical possession or possession de facto.

"Ejectment cases - forcible entry and unlawful detainer - are summary proceedings designed toprovide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the propertyinvolved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled tothe physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to thepossession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property isquestionable."23 Thus, "an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who haspresented proof of ownership of the subject property."24

Indeed, possession in ejectment cases "means nothing more than actual physical possession, notlegal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law."25In a forcible entry case, "prior physical

possession is the primary consideration."26 "A party who can prove prior possession can recoversuch possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of hi spossession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him toremain on the property until a person with a better right lawfull y ejects him."27"The party inpeaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror."28

The respondents have proven prior physical possession of the property.

In this case, we are convinced that Wilfredo had been in prior possession of the property and thatthe petitioners deprived him of such possession by means of force, strategy and stealth.

The CA did not err in equating residence with physical possession since residence is amanifestation of possession and occupation. Wilfredo had consistently alleged that he resided on"C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas," the location of the property, whereas Evangeline hasalways admitted that she has been a resident of "J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas." Thepetitioners failed to prove that they have occupied the property through some other person, even ifthey have declared their residence in another area.

We note that in another proceeding, a criminal complaint for qualified trespass to dwelling, theLipa City Prosecutor also observed that the petitioners did not reside on or occupy the property on

December 16, 2002,29

about three (3) months before Wilfredo filed the complaint for forcible entryon March 13, 2003. The petitioners also alleged therein that they are residents of "J. Belen St.,Rosario, Batangas" and not "No. 30 C.M. Recto Ave., Lipa City."30

Furthermore, the petitioners failed to rebut the affidavit of Barangay Captain Briones attesting toWilfredos prior possession and the petitioners unlawful entry to the property during Wilfredoshospital confinement.31

The petitioners claim of physical possession cannot find support in the March 11, 2003 order32 ofthe RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773 stating that the petitioners "have beenoccupying the premises since 1997." We note that the order was a mere interlocutory order onWilfredos motion for the issuance of a cease and desist order. An interlocutory order does not

end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights andliabilities against each other. "It is basically provisional in its application."33It is the nature of aninterlocutory order that it is subject to modification or reversal that the result of further proceedingsmay warrant. Thus, the RTCs pronouncement on the petitioners occupation "since 1997" is notres judicata on the issue of actual physical possession.

In sum, we find no reversible error in the decision appealed from and, therefore, affirm it.

Wilfredos death did not render moot the forcible entry case.

The death of Wilfredo introduces a seeming complication into the case and on the disposition we

shall make. To go back to basics, the petition before us involves the recovery of possession ofreal property and is a real action that is not extinguished by the death of a party. The judgment in

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an ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by titlesubsequent to the commencement of the action; hence, it is enforceable by or against the heirs ofthe deceased.1wphi1 This judgment entitles the winning party to: (a) the restitution of thepremises, (b) the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use andoccupation of the premises, and (c) attorneys fees and costs.

The complicating factor in the case is the nature and basis of Wilfredos possession; he washolding the property as usufructuary, although this right to de jure possession was also disputedbefore his death, hand in hand with the de facto possession that is subject of the present case.

Without need, however, of any further dispute or litigation, the right to the usufruct is nowrendered moot by the death of Wilfredo since death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) ofthe Civil Code. This development deprives the heirs of the usufructuary the right to retain or toreacquire possession of the property even if the ejectment judgment directs its restitution.

Thus, what actually survives under the circumstances is the award of damages, by way o fcompensation, that the RTC originally awarded and which the CA and this Court affirmed. Thisaward was computed as of the time of the RTC decision (or roughly about a year beforeWilfredos death) but will now have to take into account the compensation due for the periodbetween the RTC decision and Wilfredos death. The computation is a matter of execution that isfor the RTC, as court of origin, to undertake. The heirs of Wilfredo shall succeed to the computedtotal award under the rules of succession, a matter that is not within the authority of this Court to

determine at this point.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal and accordingly AFFIRM the February 10, 2006decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90717 with the MODIFICATION that, with thetermination, upon his death, of respondent Wilfredo Riveras usufructory over the di sputedproperty, the issue of restitution of possession has been rendered moot and academic; on theother hand, the monetary award of P

620,000.00, as reasonable compensation for the use andoccupation of the property up to the time of the Regional Trial Court decision on April 6, 2005,survives and accrues to the estate of the deceased respondent Wilfredo Rivera, to be distributedto his heirs pursuant to the applicable law on succession. Additional compensation accrues andshall be added to the compensation from the time of the Regional Trial Court decision up torespondent Wilfredo Riveras death. For purposes of the computation of this additional amountand for the execution of the total amount due under this Decision, we hereby remand the case tothe Regional Trial Court, as court of origin, for appropriate action. Costs against petitionersEvangeline Rivera-Calingasan and E. Rical Enterprises.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183858 April 17, 2013

HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, represented by JENNIFER R.MARQUEZ,Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES CARLOS AND ELIZABETH ABACAN, Respondents.

SERENO, CJ.:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the Decision1 and Resolution2of the Court ofAppeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97862.

The CA recalled and set aside the Order3of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2,Malo los City, and granted respondents' Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Possession andDemolition4 in Civil Case Nos. 03-140 to 03-143.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

A parcel of land located in Sumapang, Malolos City i s registered in the name of Freddie Santiago(Santiago) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 103697.5 On 23 August 1999, petitionerHoly Trinity Realty Development Corporation (HTRDC) acquired the property from Santiago, butlater found that the lot was already occupied by some individuals, among them respondent-spouses Carlos and Elizabeth Abacan.6

HTRDC then filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent-spouses and the otheroccupants. It withdrew the complaint, however, because it needed to verify the exact location of

the property, which the occupants claimed was covered by emancipation patents issued by theDepartment of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

HTRDC commenced a complaint with the DARAB for cancellation of emancipation patentsagainst some of the occupants of the land. During the pendency of the DARAB case, theoccupants possession was tolerated.7On 30 April 2002, the provincial adjudicator ordered thecancellation of the emancipation patents of the occupants of the land.8 The DARAB later affirmedthe decision of the provincial adjudicator.9

On 4 November 2003, HTRDC filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages with theMTCC of Malolos against the occupants of the subject land, again including respondentspouses.10 Petitioner alleged that from the time it purchased the property in 1999 until the

pendency of the DARAB case, it had no immediate need for the subject parcel of land. When theneed arose, it made both verbal and written demands on the occupants to vacate the property.Despite its final demand on 17 June 2003, the occupants failed to vacate the property. Thus,HTRDC had to resort to the filing of an ejectment case against them.

Proceedings in the MTCC ensued, culminating in a Decision in favor of HTRDC. The trial courtordered the occupants to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable rent, attorneys fees andcosts of suit.11Respondents moved to reconsider the decision, but their motion for reconsiderationwas denied for being a prohibited pleading in summary proceedings. The MTCC then ordered theissuance of a writ of execution.12Respondents appealed on 15 August 2005, but their appeal wasdenied due course for being filed out of time, as the period to appeal had not been stayed by thefiling of the motion for reconsideration.13Thus, the Decision became final and executory.

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Meanwhile, the provincial agrarian reform officer (PARO) filed an action for annulment of saleagainst HTRDC.14Respondents thereafter moved to stay execution on the ground that asupervening event had transpired.15 The MTCC denied the motion, ruling that the mere filing of anaction by the PARO did not materially change the situation of the parties, and hence, may not beconsidered as a supervening event.16

In order to prevent the enforcement of the writ of execution and demolition, respondents filedseveral actions in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), to wit: (1) Civil Case No. 245-M-2006 forannulment of judgment;17 (2) Special Civil Action No. 364-M-2006 for certiorari;18and (3) Civil

Case No. 59-M-2007 for quieting of title.19Civil Case No. 245-M-2006 and Special Civil Action No.364-M-2006 were both dismissed by the RTC on the grounds of forum shopping and immutabilityof final judgment,20while Civil Case No. 59-M-2007 was dismissed on the ground of finality ofjudgment.21 Respondents did not appeal any of the adverse rulings.

The MTCC issued an Alias Writ of Execution on 25 October 2006,22 and an Alias Special Order ofDemolition on 28 October 2006.23 Respondents moved to quash both writs on the ground thatEmancipation Patent Nos. 00780489 and 00780490 had been issued in their favor during thependency of the case. As such, they argued that they had now acquired ownership of relevantportions of the subject property.24 The MTCC denied their motion on the ground that respondentsacquisition of ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment inthe unlawful detainer case.25

From the Order of the MTCC denying their motion to quash, respondents filed directly with the CAa Special Civil Action for Certiorari with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ ofPreliminary Injunction.26

The appellate court issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction27 and ultimately granted the petition forcertiorari in a Decision dated 27 March 2008. The CA held that the MTCC had no jurisdiction overthe unlawful detainer case, and disposed of the case as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Orderdated January 17, 2007 of the Municipal Trial Court in Citi es (MTCC), Branch 2 of Malolos City,

Bulacan, issued in Civil Case No. 03-140, is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, theMotion to Quash Alias Writ of Possession [sic] and Demolition of the petitioners in said case isGRANTED. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued is thus made permanent. Nopronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.28

Aggrieved by the decision of the CA, petitioner HTRDC filed the instant petition for review beforethis Court.

The Courts Ruling

We find merit in the instant petition. Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we first deal witha procedural issue.

HTRDC correctly argued that respondents erred in filing the special civil action for certioraridirectly with the CA instead of the RTC. In doing so, they violated the time-honored principle ofrespect for the hierarchy of courts. While this Court, the CA, and the RTC have concurrentjurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari the parties to a suit are not given unbridled freedom tochoose between court forums.29 Judicial hierarchy indicates that "petitions for the issuance ofextraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the RTC, and thoseagainst the latter, with the CA."30Therefore, respondents petition for certiorari was di smissibleoutright on procedural grounds.

Turning now to the merits of the petition, we find that the CA committed reversible error in rulingthat the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. What was before it was apetition for certiorari against the MTCCs denial of respondents motion to quash. The petition wasnot directed at the MTCCs Consolidated Decision of 25 May 2005, nor could it be, because aRule 65 petition for certiorari must be filed not later than 60 days from notice of thejudgment.31 Since respondents failed to timely appeal the Consolidated Decision, it has longattained finality and has become immutable and unalterable pursuant to the doctrine on finality ofjudgment.32 Thus, as respondents sole argument in their motion to quash was the existence of amaterial supervening event, and as the MTCCs denial of their motion was premised on theconclusion that their subsequent acquisition of ownership was not a supervening event, theresolution of the present case should be limited to that issue.

Did the MTCC commit grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents motion to quash? Werule in the negative.

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning in jurisprudence.1wphi1 In LittonMills v. Galleon Traders,33we explained:

An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretionwhen the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which isequivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as toamount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or toact at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic

manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. x x x. (Citation omitted)

In this case, the motion to quash was grounded on the sole argument that the judgment should nolonger be enforced because of the occurrence of a material supervening event. Respondentsalleged that before the alias writs were issued, but after the MTCC rendered judgment in theunlawful detainer case, they had acquired ownership over the subject property as evidenced byEmancipation Patent Nos. 00780489 and 00780490.34

The MTCC correctly denied their motion, citing our ruling in Oblea v. Court of Appeals35and Chuav. Court of Appeals36 to the effect that the subsequent acquisition of ownership is not asupervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case.According to the MTCC:

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This court gives due weight to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the cases of Oblea vs. Court ofAppeals (244 SCRA 101) and Chua vs. Court of Appeals (271 SCRA 564), wherein it made acategorical pronouncement that the subsequent acquisition of ownership by any person is not asupervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case. True itis that the sole issue in an action for un lawful detainer x x x is physical or material possession.Such issue of physical or material possession was already passed upon by this court during trial.As held in the case of Dizon vs. Concina (30 SCRA 897), the judgment rendered in an action forforcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bindthe title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action

between the parties respecting title to the land or buil ding. (Sec. 18, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure)37

It is well-settled that the sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of thesubject property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties.38 The argument ofrespondent-spouses that they subsequently acquired ownership of the subject property cannot beconsidered as a supervening event that will bar the execution of the questioned judgment, asunlawful detainer does not deal with the i ssue of ownership.

As the case now stands, both parties are claiming ownership of the subject property: petitioner, byvirtue of a Deed of Sale executed in its favor by the registered land owner; and respondents, bysubsequently issued emancipation patents in their names. This issue would more appropriately be

ventilated in a full-blown proceeding, rather than in a motion to stay the execution of the judgmentrendered in the instant summary ejectment proceeding. To reiterate, the sole issue in the presentcase is de facto possession of the subject property, and this was conclusively settled by theMTCC in HTRDC's favor in its final and executory Consolidated Decision of 25 May 2005. Wetherefore rule that the CA committed reversible error in ruling that the MTCC committed graveabuse of discretion in denying respondents' motion to quash the alias writs of execution anddemolition.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The assailed Decision andResolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97862 dated 27 March 2008 and 14 July2008, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The Order dated 17 January 2007 ofthe Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Malolos City, in Civil Case Nos. 03-140 to 03-143 ishereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172588 March 13, 2013ISABEL N. GUZMAN, Petitioner, vs. ANIANO N. GUZMAN and PRIMITIVA G.MONTEALTO, Respondents.

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,1filed by petitioner Isabel N. Guzman, assailing theFebruary 3, 2006 decision2and the April 17, 2006 resolution3of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90799. The CA decision dismissed the petitioners petition for certiorari for being thewrong mode of appeal and for lack of merit. The CA resolution denied the petitioners motion forreconsideration for lack of merit.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On June 15, 2000, the petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tuguegarao City,Cagayan, Branch 4, a complaint for ejectment against her children, respondents Aniano N.Guzman and Primitiva G. Montealto.4The petitioner alleged that she and Arnold N. Guzmanowned the 6/7th and 1/7th portions, respectively, of a 1,446-square meter parcel of land, knownas Lot No. 2419-B, in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-74707;5the respondents occupied the land by tolerance; the respondents did not comply with herJanuary 17, 2000 written demand to vacate the property;6 and subsequent barangay conciliationproceedings failed to settle the differences between them.7

In their answer,8the respondents countered that the petitioner transferred, in a December 28,1996 document,9all her property rights in the disputed property, except her usufructuary right, infavor of her children, and that the petitioner engaged in forum shopping since she already raisedthe issue of ownership in a petition for cancellation of adverse claim against the respondents,pending with Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.10

THE MTCs RULING

In a November 27, 2002 decision,11the MTC found the petitioner to be the lawful owner of theland with a right to its possession since the respondents had no vested right to the land since theyare merely the petitioners children to whom no ownership or possessory rights have passed. Itheld that the petitioner committed no forum shopping since she asserted ownership only toestablish her right of possession, and the lower courts can provisionally resolve the issue ofownership to determine who has the better right of possession. The MTC directed therespondents to vacate the land and surrender possession to the petitioner, and to pay P5,000.00

as monthly rental from January 2000 until possession is surrendered, plus P15,000.00 as moraland exemplary damages.

The respondents appealed to the RTC of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 1.12They arguedthat: (a) the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case; (b) the petitioner has no cause of actionagainst the respondents; (c) the petitioner engaged in forum shopping; and (d) the MTC erred indeciding the case in the petitioners favor.13

THE RTCs RULING

In its May 19, 2005 decision,14 the RTC rejected the respondents arguments, finding that the MTChas jurisdiction over ejectment cases under Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129;15thepetitioner has a valid cause of action against the respondents since the complaint alleged the

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petitioners ownership, the respondents possession by tolerance, and the respondents refusal tovacate upon the petitioners demand; and, the petitioner did not engage in forum shopping sincethe petition for the cancellation of adverse claim has a cause of action totally different from that ofejectment.

The RTC, however, still ruled for the respondents and set aside the MTC ruling. It took intoaccount the petitioners transfer of rights in the respondents favor which, it held, could not beunilaterally revoked without a court action. It also noted that the petitioner failed to allege andprove that earnest efforts at a compromise have been exerted prior to the filing of the

complaint.16Thus, the RTC ordered the petitioner to pay the respondentsP25,000.00 as attorneysfees and P25,000.00 as litigation expenses.

On June 16, 2005, the petitioner received a copy of the RTC decision.17On June 30, 2005, thepetitioner filed her first motion for reconsideration.18In its July 6, 2005 order,19the RTC denied thepetitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of the required notice of hearing.20

On July 14, 2005, the petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration.21In its July 15, 2005order,22the RTC denied the second motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

On July 20, 2005, the petitioner filed a third motion for reconsideration.23 In its July 22, 2005

order,

24

the RTC denied the third motion for reconsideration with finality.

On August 8, 2005, the petitioner filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA, all eging thatthe RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion: (a) in deciding the case based on matters notraised as issues on appeal; (b) in finding that the transfer of rights could not be unilaterallyrevoked without a court action; (c) in holding that the petitioner failed to prove that earnest effortsat a compromise have been exerted prior to the filing of the complaint; and (d) in denying thepetitioners motion for reconsideration on a mere technicality.

THE CAs RULING

In its February 3, 2006 decision,25 the CA dismissed the petition. The CA noted that a Rule 42

petition for review, not a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, was the proper remedy to assail an RTCdecision rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. It found that the petitioner lost herchance to appeal when she filed a second motion for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading underSection 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. The CA also held that the petitioner cannot validly claimthat the respondents occupied the properties through mere tolerance since they were co-ownersof the property as compulsory heirs of Alfonso Guzman, the original owner.

When the CA denied26 the motion for reconsideration27 that followed, the petitioner filed thepresent Rule 45 petition.

THE PETITION

The petitioner justifies the filing of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA by claiming that theRTC judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in passing on issues not raised in the appeal andin not relaxing the rule on the required notice of hearing on motions. She further argues that theCAs finding of co-ownership is bereft of factual and legal basis.

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS

The respondents submit that the proper remedy for appealing a decision of the RTC, exercisingappellate jurisdiction, is a Rule 42 petition for review, and that a Rule 65 petition for certiorari isnot a substitute for a lost appeal.

THE ISSUE

The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissingthe petitioners petition for certiorari.

THE COURTs RULING

The petition lacks merit. The petitioner availed of the wrong remedy

The petitioners resort to a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to assail the RTC decision and orders ismisplaced. When the RTC issued its decision and orders, it did so in the exercise of its appellatejurisdiction; the proper remedy therefrom is a Rule 42 petition for review.28Instead, the petitionerfiled a second motion for reconsideration and thereby lost her right to appeal; a second motion forreconsideration being a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules ofCourt.29The petitioners subsequent motions for reconsideration should be considered as merescraps of paper, not having been filed at all, and unable to toll the reglementary period for anappeal.

The RTC decision became final and executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial ofthe first motion for reconsideration. It is elementary that once a decision becomes final andexecutory, it is "immutable and unalterable, and can no longer be modified in any respect, even ifthe modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering i t or bythe highest court of the land."30Thus, the RTC decision, even if allegedly erroneous, can nolonger be modified.

Apparently, to resurrect her lost appeal, the petitioner filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari,imputing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC for deciding the case against her. Certiorari, by itsvery nature, is proper only when appeal is not available to the aggrieved party; the remedies ofappeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.31 It cannot substitute fora lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasionedsuch loss or lapse.32

No grave abuse of discretion

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In any case, even granting that the petition can be properly filed under Rule 65 of the Rules ofCourt, we hold that it was bound to fail.1wphi1

It should be noted that as a legal recourse, certiorari is a limited form of review.33It is restricted toresolving errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not errors of judgment.34 Indeed, aslong as the lower courts act within their jurisdiction, alleged errors committed in the exercise oftheir discretion will amount to mere errors of judgment correctable by an appeal or a petition forreview.35

In this case, the imputed errors pertained to the RTCs appreciation of matters not raised as errorson appeal, specifically, the transfer of rights and subsequent unilateral revocation, and the strictlyenforced rule on notice of hearing. These matters involve only the RTCs appreciation of facts andits application of the law; the errors raised do not involve the RTCs jurisdiction, but merelyamount to a claim of erroneous exercise of judgment.1wphi1

Besides, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction in considering the matter of the petitioners transferof rights, even if it had not been raised as an error. Under Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules ofCourt,36the RTC is mandated to decide the appeal based on the entire record of the MTCproceedings and such pleadings submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. Nonetheless,even without this provision, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review matters,even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary inarriving at a just decision of the case, or is closely related to an error properly assigned, or uponwhich the determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent.37Thematter of the petitioners transfer of rights, which was in the records of the case, was the basis forthe RTCs decision.

The RTC did not also commit a grave abuse of discretion in strictly enforcing the requirement ofnotice of hearing. The requirement of notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural dueprocess that seeks to avoid "surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must begiven time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by thecourt."38Given the purpose of the requirement, a motion unaccompanied by a notice of hearing isconsidered a mere scrap of paper that does not toll the running of the period to appeal. This

requirement of notice of hearing equally applies to the petitioners motion forreconsideration.39The petitioners alleged absence of counsel is not a valid excuse or reason fornon-compliance with the rules.

A final point

Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provided an expeditious means ofprotecting actual possession or right of possession of property. Title is not involved, hence, it is aspecial civil action with a special procedure. The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases isthe question of entitlement to the physical or material possession of the premises or possessionde facto. Thus, any ruling on the question of ownership is only provisional, made solely for thepurpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.40Accordingly, any ruling on the

validity of the petitioners transfer of rights is provisional and should be resolved in a properproceeding.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The February 3, 2006 decision and the April 17,2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 90799 are AFFIRMED. Costs againstpetitioner Isabel N. Guzman. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174436 January 23, 2013JUANITA ERMITAO, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, ISABELOERMITAO, Petitioner, vs. LAILANIE M. PAGLAS, Respondent.

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 o f the Rules of Court seekingto reverse and set aside the Decision1and Resolution2 dated September 8, 2004 and August 16,2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77617.

On November 5, 1999, herein respondent and petitioner, through her representative, lsabelo R.Ermitao, executed a Contract of Lease wherein petitioner leased in favor of respondent a 336square meter residential lot and a house standing thereon located at No. 20 Columbia St., Phasel, Doa Vicenta Village, Davao City. The contract period is one (1) year, which commenced onNovember 4, 1999, with a monthly rental rate of P13,500.00. Pursuant to the contract, respondent

paid petitioner P2,000.00 as security deposit to answer for unpaid rentals and damage that maybe cause to the leased unit.

Subsequent to the execution of the lease contract, respondent received information that sometimein March 1999, petitioner mortgaged the subject property in favor of a certain Charlie Yap (Yap)and that the same was already foreclosed with Yap as the purchaser of the disputed lot in anextra-judicial foreclosure sale which was registered on February 22, 2000. Yap's brother lateroffered to sell the subject property to respondent. Respondent entertained the said offer andnegotiations ensued. On June 1, 2000, respondent bought the subject property from Yapfor P950,000.00. A Deed of Sale of Real Property was executed by the parties as evidence of thecontract. However, it was made clear in the said Deed that the property was still subject topetitioner's right of redemption.

Prior to respondent's purchase of the subject property, petitioner filed a suit for the declaration ofnullity of the mortgage in favor of Yap as well as the sheriff's provisional certificate of sale whichwas issued after the disputed house and lot were sold on foreclosure.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 2000, petitioner sent a letter demanding respondent to pay the rentalswhich are due and to vacate the leased premises. A second demand letter was sent on March 25,2001. Respondent ignored both letters.

On August 13, 2001, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City, acase of unlawful detainer against respondent.

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In its Decision dated November 26, 2001, the MTCC, Branch 6, Davao City dismissed the casefiled by petitioner and awarded respondent the amounts of P25,000.00 as attorney's feesand P2,000.00 as appearance fee.

Petitioner filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City.

On February 14, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads asfollows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION. AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed the case for unlawful detainer but modified inthat the award of attorney's fees in defendant's herein respondent's favor is deleted and that thedefendant respondent is ordered to pay plaintiff herein petitioner the equivalent of ten monthsunpaid rentals on the property or the total sum of P135,000.00.

SO ORDERED.3

The RTC held that herein respondent possesses the right to redeem the subject property and that,pending expiration of the redemption period, she is entitled to receive the rents, earnings andincome derived from the property.

Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA.

On September 8, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch16, 11th Judicial Region, Davao City is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS as follows:

(a) Private respondent's obligation to pay the petitioner the amount of ONE HUNDREDTHIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P135,000.00) equivalent of ten (10) months ishereby DELETED;

(b) Attorney's fees and litigation expenses were correctly awarded by the trial courthaving compelled the private respondent to litigate and incur expenses to protect herinterests by reason of the unjustified act of petitioner (Producers Bank of the Philippinesvs. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 326), Thus: litigation expenses of only TENTHOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) not TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS(P25,000.00); and

(c) Attorney's fees REI NSTAT ED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS(P10,000.00) instead of only TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00).

SO ORDERED.4

Quoting extensively from the decision of the MTCC as well as on respondent's comment on thepetition for review, the CA ruled that respondent did not act in bad faith when she bought theproperty in question because she had every right to rely on the validity of the documentsevidencing the mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated August16, 2006.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following assignment of errors:

A.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THEUNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE BY RULING THAT A SHERIFF'S FINAL CERTIFICATEOF SALE WAS ALREADY ISSUED WHICH DECISION IS NOT BASED ON THEEVIDENCE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE LAWS ANDJURISPRUDENCE.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THATPRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH EVEN IF SHE WASINFORMED BY PETITIONER THROUGH A LETTER ADVISING HER THAT THEREAL ESTATE MORTGAGE CONTRACT WAS SHAM, FICTITIOUS AS IT WAS A

PRODUCT OF FORGERY BECAUSE PETITIONER'S PURPORTED SIGNATUREAPPEARING THEREIN WAS SIGNED AND FALSIFIED BY A CERTAIN ANGELACELOSIA.

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AWARDEDATTORNEY'S FEES WHICH WAS DELETED BY RTC-BRANCH 16 OF DAVAO CITYDESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY EXPLANATION AND/OR JUSTIFICATION IN THEBODY OF THE DECISION.5

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts resolve inejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to thepossession de facto and not to the possession de jure.6It does not even matter if a party's title to

the property is questionable.7In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is thephysical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownershipby any of the party litigants.8Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, thecourts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess theproperty.9 The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice anaction between the same parties involving title to the property.10

In the instant case, pending final resolution of the suit fi led by petitioner for the declaration ofnullity of the real estate mortgage in favor of Yap, the MTCC, the RTC and the CA wereunanimous in sustaining the presumption of validity of the real estate mortgage over the subjectproperty in favor of Yap as well as the presumption of regularity in the performance of the dutiesof the public officers who subsequently conducted its foreclosure sale and issued a provisional

certificate of sale. Based on the presumed validity of the mortgage and the subsequent

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foreclosure sale, the MTCC, the RTC and the CA also sustained the validity of respondent'spurchase of the disputed property from Yap. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart fromthese rulings of the MTCC, RTC and CA. Thus, for purposes of resolving the issue as to whobetween petitioner and respondent is entitled to possess the subject property, this presumptionstands.

Going to the main issue in the instant petition, it is settled that in unlawful detainer, one unlawfullywithholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possessionunder any contract, express or implied.11In such case, the possession was originally lawful but

became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue ofrightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and theplaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendants right to continue in possession.12

In the instant petition, petitioner's basic postulate in her fi rst and second assigned errors is thatshe remains the owner of the subject property. Based on her contract of lease with respondent,petitioner insists that respondent is not permitted to deny her title over the said property inaccordance with the provisions of Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

The Court does not agree.

The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, known asestoppel against tenants, provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

x x x x

(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement ofthe relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Emphasis supplied).

It is clear from the abovequoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the titleof his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation.13If the titleasserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of thatrelation, the presumption will not apply.14 Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord's title hasexpired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, ifhe has been ousted or evicted by title paramount.15 In the present case, what respondent isclaiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent to thecommencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, thepresumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply.

The foregoing notwithstanding, even if respondent is not estopped from denying petitioner's claimfor rent, her basis for such denial, which is her subsequent acquisition of ownership of thedisputed property, is nonetheless, an insufficient excuse from refusing to pay the rentals due topetitioner.

There is no dispute that at the time that respondent purchased Yap's rights over the subjectproperty, petitioner's right of redemption as a mortgagor has not yet expired. It is settled thatduring the period of redemption, it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of theforeclosed property, since the rule up to now is that the right of a purchaser at a foreclosure saleis merely inchoate until after the period of redemption has expired without the right beingexercised.16The title to land sold under mortgage foreclosure remains in the mortgagor or hisgrantee until the expiration of the redemption period and conveyance by the master'sdeed.17Indeed, the rule has always been that it is only upon the expiration of the redemptionperiod, without the judgment debtor having made use of his right of redemption, that the

ownership of the land sold becomes consolidated in the purchaser.18

Stated differently, under Act. No. 3135, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale has, during theredemption period, only an inchoate right and not the absolute right to the property with all theaccompanying incidents.19 He only becomes an absolute owner of the property if it is notredeemed during the redemption period.20

Pending expiration of the period of redemption, Section 7 of Act No. 3135,21as amended,provides:

Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court ofFirst Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to givehim possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent tothe use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shownthat the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirementsof this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of an ex parte motion inthe registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings inthe case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage dulyregistered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in eachcase the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified inparagraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, uponapproval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the

province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

Thus, it is clear from the abovequoted provision of law that, as a consequence of the inchoatecharacter of the purchaser's right during the redemption period, Act. No. 3135, as amended,allows the purchaser at the foreclosure sale to take possession of the property only upon the filingof a bond, in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve (12) months, toindemnify the mortgagor in case it be shown that the sale was made in violation of the mortgageor without complying with the requirements of the law. In Cua Lai Chu v. Laqui,22this Courtreiterated the rule earlier pronounced in Navarra v. Court of Appeals23that the purchaser at anextrajudicial foreclosure sale has a right to the possession of the property even during the one-year redemption period provided the purchaser files an indemnity bond. That bond, nonetheless,is not required after the purchaser has consolidated his title to the property following the

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mortgagor's failure to exercise his right of redemption for in such a case, the former has becomethe absolute owner thereof.24

It, thus, clearly follows from the foregoing that, during the period of redemption, the mortgagor,being still the owner of the foreclosed property, remains entitled to the physical possession thereofsubject to the purchaser's right to petition the court to give him possession and to file a bondpursuant to the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. The mere purchase andcertificate of sale alone do not confer any right to the possession or beneficial use of thepremises.25

In the instant case, there is neither evidence nor allegation that respondent, as purchaser of thedisputed property, filed a petition and bond in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of ActNo. 3135. In addition, respondent defaulted in the payment of her rents. Thus, absentrespondent's filing of such petition and bond prior to the expiration of the period of redemption,coupled with her failure to pay her rent, she did not have the right to possess the subject property.

On the other hand, petitioner, as mortgagor and owner, was entitled not only to the possession ofthe disputed house and lot but also to the rents, earnings and income derived therefrom. In thisregard, the RTC correctly cited Section 32, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides asfollows:

Sec. 32. Rents, earnings and income of property pending redemption. The purchaser or aredemptioner shall not be entitled to receive the rents, earnings and income of the property soldon execution, or the value of the use and occupation thereof when such property is in thepossession of a tenant. All rents, earnings and income derived from the property pendingredemption shall belong to the judgment obligor until the expiration of his period of redemption.(Emphasis supplied)

While the above rule refers to execution sales, the Court finds no cogent reason not to apply thesame principle to a foreclosure sale, as in this case.

The situation became different, however, after the expiration of the redemption period on February

23, 2001. Since there is no allegation, much less evidence, that petitioner redeemed the subjectproperty within one year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, respondent becamethe owner thereof. Consolidation of title becomes a right upon the expiration of the redemptionperiod.26Having become the owner of the disputed property, respondent is then entitled to itspossession.

As a consequence, petitioner's ejectment suit filed against respondent was rendered moot whenthe period of redemption expired on February 23, 2001 without petitioner having redeemed thesubject property, for upon expiration of such period petitioner lost his possessory right over thesame. Hence, the only remaining right that petitioner can enforce is his right to the rentals duringthe time that he was still entitled to physical possession of the subject property that is from May2000 until February 23, 2001.1wphi1

In this regard, this Court agrees with the findings of the MTCC that, based on the evidence andthe pleadings filed by petitioner, respondent is liable for payment of rentals beginning May 2000until February 2001, or for a period of ten (10) months. However, it is not disputed that respondentalready gave to petitioner the sum of P27,000.00, which is equivalent to two (2) months rental, asdeposit to cover for any unpaid rentals. It is only proper to deduct this amount from the rentals dueto petitioner, thus leaving P108,000.00 unpaid rentals.

As to attorneys fees and litigation expenses, the Court agrees with the RTC that since petitioneris, in entitled to unpaid rentals, her complaint which, among others, prays for the payment of

unpaid rentals, is justified. Thus, the award of attorney' and litigation expenses to respondentshould be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77617,dated September 8, 2004 and August 16, 2006, respectively, are AFFIRMED with the followingMODIFICATIONS: (1) respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner P108,000.00 as and for unpaidrentals; (2) the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses to respondent is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183822 January 18, 2012RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented by Attorney-in-Fact Wenifreda C. Agullana, Petitioner, vs.Sps. HILARION AGUSTIN and JUSTA AGUSTIN, Respondents.

SERENO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails theDecision1 dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645, whichaffirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City and i ts Resolution2 dated 15July 2008 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellatejurisdiction, affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which haddismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioner.

The Factual Antecedents

The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CAas follows:

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Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and JustaAgustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in SantaJoaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October 29, 1976 by the Laoag CityRegister of Deeds and with technical descriptions as follows:

1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with improvementsthereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x xcontaining an area of five thousand seven hundred and fifty nine (5,759) square metersmore or less x x x.

2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with theimprovements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag.Bounded x x x, containing an area of twenty thousand seven hundred and forty five(20,745) square meters, more or less x x x.

Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name OriginalCertificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 toFrancisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin tooccupy subject properties, the latter being relatives.

Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.

Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired thesame from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15,1971.

Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz,Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favorfor a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,150.00).

The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint.

In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which shows that they entered into andoccupied Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or owners,disproving the allegation of the plaintiff that defendants were merely allowed by Francisco Corpuzto occupy the subject properties, being his relatives, and considering further the length of time thatthe defendants have been in possession, as owners, of Lot

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