Rem2 Slu Case

8/4/2019 Rem2 Slu Case

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Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY,

INC., Petitioner,

- versus -

EVANGELINE C.

COBARRUBIAS,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 187104 Present:

CARPIO MORALES , J., Chairperson

BRION ,

BERSAMIN,

ABAD, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ .

Promulgated:

August 3, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x D E C I S I O N

BRION, J .:

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari[1]

filed by petitioner

Saint Louis University, Inc. (SLU ), to challenge the decision[2]

and the

resolution[3]

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101708.[4]

The Factual Background

The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized

below.



Respondent Evangeline C. Cobarrubias is an associate professor of the

petitioner¶s College of Human Sciences. She is an active member of the Union of

Faculty and Employees of Saint Louis University (UFESLU ).

The 2001-2006[5]

and 2006-2011[6]

Collective Bargaining Agreements

(CBAs) between SLU and UFESLU contain the following common provision on

forced leave:

Section 7.7. For teaching employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation, thefollowing provisions shall apply:

(a) Teaching employees who are retained for three (3) cumulative

years in five (5) years shall be on forced leave for one (1) regular semester during which period all benefits due them shall be

suspended.[7]

SLU placed Cobarrubias on forced leave for the first semester of School

Year (SY ) 2007-2008 when she failed the evaluation for SY 2002-2003, SY 2005-

2006, and SY 2006-2007, with the rating of 85, 77, and 72.9 points, respectively,

below the required rating of 87 points.

To reverse the imposed forced leave, Cobarrubias sought recourse from the

CBA¶s grievance machinery. Despite the conferences held, the parties still failed to

settle their dispute, prompting Cobarrubias to file a case for illegal forced leave or

illegal suspension with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the

Department of Labor and Employment, Cordillera Administrative

Region, Baguio City. When circulation and mediation again failed, the parties

submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary

Arbitrator (VA) Daniel T. Fariñas.

Cobarrubias argued that the CA already resolved the forced leave issue in a

prior case between the parties, CA-G.R. SP No. 90596,[8]

ruling that the forced

leave for teachers who fail their evaluation for three (3) times within a five-year

period should be coterminous with the CBA in force during the same five-year

period.[9]

SLU, for its part, countered that the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90596

cannot be considered in deciding the present case since it is presently on appeal

with this Court (G.R. No. 176717)[10]

and, thus, is not yet final. It argued that the

forced leave provision applies irrespective of which CBA is applicable, provided

the employee fails her evaluation three (3) times in five (5) years.[11]



The Voluntary Arbitrator Decision

On October 26, 2007, VA Daniel T. Fariñas dismissed the case.[12]

He found

that the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90596 is not yet final because of the

pending appeal with this Court. He noted that the CBA clearly authorized SLU to

place its teaching employees on forced leave when they fail in the evaluation for

three (3) years within a five-year period, without a distinction on whether the three

years fall within one or two CBA periods. Cobarrubias received the VA¶s decision

on November 20, 2007.[13]

On December 5, 2007, Cobarrubias filed with the CA a petition for review

under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, but failed to pay the required filing fees and

to attach to the petition copies of the material portions of the record.[14]

Thus, on January 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition outright for

Cobarrubias¶ procedural lapses.[15]

Cobarrubias received the CA resolution,

dismissing her petition, on January 31, 2008.[16]

On February 15, 2008, Cobarrubias filed her motion for reconsideration,

arguing that the ground cited is technical. She, nonetheless, attached to her motion

copies of the material portions of the record and the postal money orders

for P4,230.00. She maintained that the ends of justice and fair play are better

served if the case is decided on its merits.[17]

On July 30, 2008, the CA reinstated the petition. It found that Cobarrubias

substantially complied with the rules by paying the appeal fee in full and attaching

the proper documents in her motion for reconsideration.[18]

SLU insisted that the VA decision had already attained finality for Cobarrubias¶ failure to pay the docket fees on time.

The CA Decision

The CA brushed aside SLU¶s insistence on the finality of the VA decision

and annulled it, declaring that the ³three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years´



phrase in Section 7.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBA means within the five-year

effectivity of the CBA. Thus, the CA ordered SLU to pay all the benefits due

Cobarrubias for the first semester of SY 2007-2008, when she was placed on

forced leave.[19]

When the CA denied[20]

the motion for reconsideration that

followed,[21]

SLU filed the present petition for review on certiorari.[22]

The Petition

SLU argues that the CA should not have reinstated the appeal since

Cobarrubias failed to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period, and

rendered the VA decision final and executory. Even if Cobarrubias¶ procedural

lapse is disregarded, SLU submits that Section 7.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBAshould apply irrespective of the five-year effectivity of each CBA.

[23]

The Case for Cobarrubias

Cobarrubias insists that the CA settled the appeal fee issue, in its July 30,

2008 resolution, when it found that she had substantially complied with the rules

by subsequently paying the docket fees in full. She submits that the CA¶s

interpretation of Section 7.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBA is more in accord with law

and jurisprudence.[24]

The Issues

The core issues boil down to whether the CA erred in reinstating

Cobarrubias¶ petition despite her failure to pay the appeal fee within the

reglementary period, and in reversing the VA decision. To state the obvious, the

appeal fee is a threshold issue that renders all other issues unnecessary if SLU¶s

position on this issue is correct.

The Court¶s Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.



Payment of Appellate Court Docket Fees

Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must

be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by law.[25]

Rule 43 of the

Rules of Court provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to

the CA, by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of

the notice of judgment.[26]

Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the

petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful

fees;[27]

non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient

ground for the petition¶s dismissal.[28]

Thus, payment in full of docket fees within

the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.[29]

It is an

essential requirement, without which, the decision appealed from would become

final and executory as if no appeal has been filed.[30]

As early as the 1932 case of Lazaro v. Endencia and Andres,[31]

we stressedthat the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for

the perfection of an appeal. In Lee v. Republic,[32]

we decided that even though half

of the appellate court docket fee was deposited, no appeal was deemed perfected

where the other half was tendered after the period within which payment should

have been made. In Aranas v. Endona,[33]

we reiterated that the appeal is not

perfected if only a part of the docket fee is deposited within the reglementary

period and the remainder is tendered after the expiration of the period.

The rulings in these cases have been consistently reiterated in subsequent

cases: Guevarra v. Court of Appeals,[34]

Pedrosa v. Spouses Hill ,[35]

Gegare v.

Court of Appeals,[36]

Lazaro v. Court of Appeals,[37]

Sps. Manalili v. Sps. de

Leon,[38]

La Salette College v. Pilotin,[39]

Saint Louis University v. Spouses

Cordero,[40]

M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva,[41]

Far Corporation

v. Magdaluyo,[42]

Meatmasters Int¶l. Corp. v. Lelis Integrated Dev¶t.

Corp.,[43]

Tamayo v. Tamayo, Jr.,[44]

Enriquez v. Enriquez,[45]

KLT Fruits, Inc. v.

WSR Fruits, Inc.,[46]

Tan v. Link,[47]

Ilusorio v. Ilusorio-Yap,[48]

and most recently

in Tabigue v. International Copra Export Corporation (INTERCO),[49]

and

continues to be the controlling doctrine.

In the present case, Cobarrubias filed her petition for review on December 5,

2007, fifteen (15) days from receipt of the VA decision on November 20, 2007, but

paid her docket fees in full only after seventy-two (72) days, when she filed her

motion for reconsideration on February 15, 2008 and attached the postal money

orders for P4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were paid late, and without



payment of the full docket fees, Cobarrubias¶ appeal was not perfected within the

reglementary period.

Ex ceptions to the Rule on Payment of Appellate

Court Docket Fees not applicable

Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules

were established primarily to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our

judicial system.[50]

While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on

reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the

prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy

discharge of judicial business.[51]

Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed

simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantiverights; like all rules, they are required to be followed. However, there are

recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and

weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with

his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting

party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default;

(4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case;

(6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored

by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is

merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced

thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the

appellant's fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each

case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the

issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all

the attendant circumstances.[52]

Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the

party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for

his/her failure to comply with the rules.

In Cobarrubias' case, no such explanation has been advanced. Other

than insisting that the ends of justice and fair play are better served if the case isdecided on its merits, Cobarrubias offered no excuse for her failure to pay the

docket fees in full when she filed her petition for review. To us, Cobarrubias¶

omission is fatal to her cause.

We, thus, find that the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias¶ petition for

review despite the nonpayment of the requisite docket fees within the reglementary



period. The VA decision had lapsed to finality when the docket fees were paid;

hence, the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal except to order its

dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision

and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101708 are

herebyDECLARED VOID and are consequently SET ASIDE. The decision of

the voluntary arbitrator, that the voided Court of Appeals decision and resolution

nullified, stands. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION



I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the

Court¶s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division

Chairperson¶s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the

aboveDecision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the

writer of the opinion of the Court¶s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,

per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.[1] Filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 13-42.[2]

Dated November 5, 2008, penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, and concurred in by Associate

Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Arturo G. Tayag; id. at 144-158.[3] Dated February 24, 2009; id. at 167-168.[4] Entitled ³ Evangeline C. Cobarrubias v. Saint Louis University, represented by Fr. Jessie M. Hechanova. ́[5] Rollo, pp. 62-64.[6] Id. at 65-67.[7] Id. at 63 and 66.[8] Decision of May 23, 2006, entitled ³Saint Louis University, Inc. v. Evangeline C. Cobarrubias.´[9] Entitled ³ Evangeline C. Cobarrubias v. Saint Louis University, Inc.´[10] Id. at 68-77.



[11] Id. at 45-61.[12] Id. at 78-85.[13] Id. at 86.[14] Id. at 86-95.[15] Id. at 97-98.[16]

Id. at 99.[17] Id. at 99-105.[18] Id. at 112-115.[19] Decision of November 5, 2008; supra note 2.[20] Resolution of February 24, 2009; supra note 3.[21] Id . at 160-165.[22] Id . at 13-44.[23] Ibid .[24] Id . at 219-228.[25] Espejo v. Ito, G.R. No. 176511, August4, 2009, 595SCRA 192, 204.[26] SEC. 4. Period of appeal . ² The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award,

judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its

effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the

governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon

proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary

period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to

exceed fifteen (15) days. (Rule 43, Revised Rules of Court.)[27] SEC. 5. How appeal taken. ² Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible

copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or

agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the

petitioner. Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court of the Court of Appelas the docketing

and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docketing and other

lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion setting forthvalid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other

lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial. (Rule 43, Revised Rules of

Court.) [28] SEC. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. ² The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the

foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of

service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be

sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (Rule 43, Revised Rules of Court.) [29] Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation v. Formaran III, G.R. No. 175914, February 10,

2009, 578 SCRA 283, 297.[30] Ruiz v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 166386, January 27, 2009, 577 SCRA 29, 43.[31] 57 Phil. 552, 553 (1932).

[32] No. L-15027, January 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 65, 67.[33] 203 Phil. 120, 127 (1982).[34] 241 Phil. 40, 44-45 (1988); docket fees paid forty-one (41) days late.[35] 327 Phil. 153, 158 (1996); docket fees paid four (4) months late.[36] 358 Phil. 228, 232 (1998); nonpayment of docket fees despite CA notice to pay.[37] 386 Phil. 412, 417 (2000); docket fees paid six (6) months late.[38] 422 Phil. 214, 221 (2001); docket fees paid almost ten (10) months late.[39] 463 Phil. 785, 793 (2003); docket fees paid one (1) year and eleven (11) months late.



[40] 478 Phil. 739, 750 (2004); docket fees paid almost a month late.[41] 484 Phil. 500, 504 (2004); docket fees paid seven (7) months and twenty-five (25) days late.[42] 485 Phil. 599, 610 (2004); docket fees paid 132 days late.[43] 492 Phil. 698, 701 (2005); docket fees paid one (1) month late.[44] G.R. No. 148482, August 12, 2005, 466 SCRA 618, 622-623; docket fees paid only upon the filing of the motion

for reconsideration.[45] G.R. No. 139303, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 77, 86; docket fees paid four (4) months late.[46] G.R. No. 174219, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 713, 730; docket fees paid more than thirty (30) days late.[47] G.R. No. 172849, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 479, 492; docket fees paid two (2) days late.[48] G.R. No. 171659, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 643, 646; docket fees paid more than three (3) months late.[49] G.R. No. 183335, December 23, 2009; deficiency in docket fees paid only upon the filing of the motion for

reconsideration.[50] Mejillano v. Lucillo, G.R. No. 154717, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 1, 9; Ko v. Philippine National Bank , G.R.

Nos. 169131-32, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 298, 303.[51] Villa v. Heirs of Enrique Altavas, G.R. No. 162028, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 157, 166; Moneytrend Lending

Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 165580, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 705, 714.[52] Lim v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 172574, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 607, 616-617; Villena v. Rupisan, G.R. No.

167620, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 346, 358-359.

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Rem2 Slu Case