Religious Zionism: What’s Next? - Amazon Web Servicesou.org.s3.amazonaws.com/pdf/ja/5766/spring66/ReliZionism.pdf · Religious Zionism: What’s Next? According to some, the only

44 JEWISH ACTION Spring 5766/2006

ISRAEL

Religious Zionism:What’s Next?

According to some, the only feasible way to guarantee that theState retains its Jewish majority is total disengagement from

areas of the country where large Arab populations are concen-trated. Photo: www.sassontiram.com

jewish_41_58.qxd 3/9/06 10:12 PM Page 44

Spring 5766/2006 JEWISH ACTION 45

The disengagement was a watershed eventthat seared the psyche of many thou-sands of Jews, though the effect on

young Religious Zionists was most pronounced.

The crucial issue concerns the long-term effects of thedisengagement. We have posed several questions to sixindividuals, each of whom is a keen observer of theIsraeli scene. They represent widely divergent views andshould help us gain a better understanding of the disen-gagement’s background and meaning.

1What prompted the disengagement—security considerations, improving

prospects for peace, diverting attention from possible corruption charges or

the desire to break up Religious Zionist communal life and undermine the

Religious Zionist spirit?

2 What will be the short- and long-term effects of the disengagement on

Religious Zionism’s attitude toward the State? Toward the army?

3Has the long-standing alliance between secular and religious Jewry in Israel

been irreparably damaged as a result of the disengagement?

4Were ordinary Chareidi Jews more sympathetic to the plight of the uproot-

ed than were their political leaders? If so, what effect will that have on the

relationship between Chareidi and Religious Zionist Jews?

5 How do you explain the failure of so many Religious Zionists to follow

the views of their religious leaders such as Rabbi Avraham Shapira and

Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu?

6 Can the current split within the Religious Zionist movement be bridged?

Can those who will “not forgive and not forget” be reconciled with those

who seem ready to adapt to the disengagement? Can the bitterness and trau-

ma engendered by the disengagement ever be overcome?



Rachel Saperstein, a resident of theJerusalem Gold Hotel (as of this

writing), is a friend of ours who lived inNeve Dekalim in the Gaza Strip forover twenty-five years before beingexpelled from her home. Some monthsago, she went on a fund-raising trip tothe United States on behalf of the10,000 refugees from Gush Katif andNorthern Shomron. Her biggest disap-pointment was that many shuls refusedto give her a forum because they didnot want to take a stand on a politicalissue.

What a sad commentary on thestate of the Orthodox community inAmerica when the obligation to assistfellow Jews who are homeless, joblessand in desperate need of support, bothfinancial and emotional, is twisted intoan issue of politics. Their situation is asserious as that of the thousands of vic-tims of Hurricane Katrina. Yet theresponse to their needs has been verydifferent.

This human disaster was not theresult of a sudden, unanticipated act ofnature but the consequence of a meticu-lously planned move by the Israeli gov-ernment. In anticipation of the expul-sion, police were thoroughly prepared—they were given detailed informationabout the Jews to be expelled includingthe number of people in each home, theages of the children, the professions ofthe adults and their psychological pro-files. But there seemed to have been farless concern and certainly far less plan-ning for what would happen to the peo-ple the next day. The homes, liveli-hoods, schools, community centers and

shuls of 10,000 Jews have beendestroyed, and the victims have beencast out, for the most part, to fend forthemselves. Even those who adhered tothe government’s timetable anddemands have not fared much betterthan those who did not. Should this notbe the concern of every Jew everywhere?

One of the most tragic stories isthat of the late Chezi Hazani, coinci-dentally of the destroyed community ofNetzer Hazani. Chezi died suddenly ofa heart attack one month after he andhis family were expelled from theirhome. But there was no place to buryChezi because he no longer had an offi-cial residence. Finally, after the body layin an ambulance on the road for fourhours, the city of Rishon Letzion per-mitted Chezi to be buried in its ceme-tery, near the graves of his own parents.But he was not entitled to the free bur-ial services granted to the residents ofthe city. His family had to pay an exor-bitant 30,000 NIS (around $6,000)“non-resident” fee before the city’schevrah kadishah (burial society) wouldproceed with the burial.

As of this writing, four monthsafter the expulsion, more than half ofthe expellees are still living in hotels.Others are living in small, leaky cara-vans, a fraction of the size of the homesin which they once lived. According to arecent article in The Jerusalem Post, 78percent of the expellees are unemployed.Many have no access to their posses-sions, which are locked away in storagecontainers. These are real people withreal needs. They and their children havebeen scarred by the traumatic events ofAugust 2005. The current plight of therefugees is a humanitarian, not a politi-cal, issue. Instead of being helped, peo-ple who built communities in whichTorah study and observance flourishedare harassed by the government institu-

tions for their efforts to try to rebuildtheir lives and communities. Irrespectiveof whether or not one agrees with thedisengagement, or whether or not a par-ticular family left willingly or had to becarried out, we are obligated to assistthese Jews in their time of need.

But the real issue that should con-cern American Orthodoxy is the ongo-ing struggle to define the nature of theJewish State. Shimon Peres has oftenasked if Israel is a Jewish or an Israelistate. When Peres was defeated byBinyamin Netanyahu in the 1996 elec-tions, he was quoted as saying that “theJews won and the Israelis lost.” Pereswas Ariel Sharon’s chief political partnerat the time of the disengagement.Although we cannot see into the mindsof the architects of the disengagement,many Israelis believe that the evidenceclearly points to an agenda to break upReligious Zionist communal life andundermine the movement’s idealisticspirit. This point is particularly criticalto understand in light of the Road Map,which envisions the uprooting of manymore religious, idealistic Torah-basedcommunities, this time in the undisput-ed heart of Biblical Israel, throughoutYehudah and Shomron. Therefore, thequestion we must ask is this: Are we anation that is guided by the principlesof Jewish tradition and Jewish law, or acountry, like every other country, runfor and by people who happen to beJewish?

The struggle over the identity ofthe Jewish State is nowhere more evi-dent than in the political realm. TheShinui Party, whose platform called forIsrael to be run as a secular state, wasthe third largest vote getter in the lastelections. After the election, Orthodoxpoliticians were outraged, accusing partyleader Tommy Lapid of virtually declar-ing war on Judaism. Nevertheless,

Peter Abelow writes a regular column forJewish Action. His son Avi, an organizationalpsychologist, was a volunteer in Gush Katif atthe time of the disengagement and wasexpelled with the residents of Netzer Hazani.They both live in Efrat.

PETER AND AVI ABELOW



Sharon had no problem making Shinuia key member of his coalition. In theUnited States, a party with a Shinuiagenda would most likely be labeledanti-Semitic and would probably nevermake it onto a ballot. The Anti-Defamation League and the AmericanCivil Liberties Union would see to that.Moreover, every Orthodox Union con-gregation would be up in arms. InIsrael, a platform that espouses disdainfor observant Jews and Jewish practice isgiven full credibility while right-wingreligious parties that dare to dream of aJewish state within what they under-stand to be the Divine mandates asexpressed in the Torah, are ostracized,marginalized and even banned.

Unfortunately, the successful exe-cution of the expulsion plan is a strongindication that many of the officialinstitutions of the State of Israel are“anti-Jewish.” This is apparent notbecause the State of Israel decided toexpel Jews from areas that many believeto be within Biblical Israel or because itdecided to give over parts of the Landto our enemies. Rather this is apparentin the ways the State of Israel dealt withthose who disagreed with its decision toexpel fellow Jews from their homes.

Israel, like America, cherishes thebasic democratic rights of its citizens,including the right to free speech andthe right to peaceful assembly. Yet, thesedemocratic rights were trampled by theState of Israel when it dealt with theanti-expulsion protestors, or the “ketu-mim,” (literally, oranges—orange wasthe color worn by those protesting thedisengagement) as we were called.Furthermore, the rules of proper judicialprocedure and punishment were tram-pled on as well by the justice systemwhen it came to the anti-expulsion pro-testors.

This is explained very clearly in areport issued by the Israel PolicyCenter, and sponsored, in part, by theOU, called Israeli GovernmentViolations of Disengagement Opponents’Civil Rights (for the full report, visitwww.merkazmedini.org). The reportreveals that Attorney General Menahem

Mazuz made it clear to state prosecutorsin public remarks that they were to treatnon-violent protesters as if they wereinvolved in a rebellion against Stateauthorities with the purpose of destroy-ing the State and its institutions. Notonly were the protestors’ democraticrights to non-violently demonstratetaken away from them, but the protest-ers were classified as rebels out todestroy the State of Israel. A very harshjudicial precedent indeed against the(mostly) teenagers of the religious/settlerestablishment.

The report states: By choosing to reclassify nonviolent

offenses such as blocking roads and passive-ly resisting arrest—usually considered mis-demeanors—as crimes against public secu-rity, and by invoking what the accusedthought while performing them, Israelicourts justified draconian measures of pre-trial detention against adults and minors

alike. In the case of three minors detainedfor lengthy periods of time, summarizedbelow, the presumed ideological tendencyof the minors’ parents was used as justifica-tion for refusing to return the minors totheir parents’ custody. The conflation of theparents’ presumed ideology with their evi-dent religious lifestyle is hard to miss.

The report cites a number ofcases. In one, the prosecution wanted toarrest a group of girls prior to their trialin order to “prevent them from makingtheir dangerous opinions heard, eveninside their own homes”; it also arguedthat “reeducation could be an appropri-ate reason for restricting their freedom.”

The report clearly points out thatthe phrase “ideological crime”(“avaryanut ideologit”) pops up againand again in court decisions regardingopponents of the disengagement.

The picture that emerges from thereport is that the government allowed itsjudicial arm to pass judgment againstprotestors based on their ideology andbeliefs and not based on human rightsand rule of law.

Gary Rosenblatt, editor of NewYork’s Jewish Week, wrote:

Reading the report on the govern-ment’s alleged violation of the disengage-ment opponents’ civil rights is a sad andpainful exercise for anyone who valuesIsrael’s reputation as an outstandingdemocracy.1

Furthermore, in a second report,Dr. Avital Molad, of the Israel PublicDefender’s Office, wrote that she saw inthe police and in the court system “aselective enforcement of the law basedon political affiliation, trampled rightsand a light trigger finger.”2 Dr. Moladalso found that for the sake of the disen-gagement the State created “new rules,”under which hearings for minors wereconducted collectively, rather than sepa-rately.

Neither report received muchpublicity and so there was not much ofa public reaction in Israel. (The role theIsraeli media played in making the dis-engagement happen was the subject ofan extensive article in theSeptember/October issue of theColumbia Journalism Review.)Statements by high-ranking governmentofficials often reflected this same atti-tude of intolerance. Yair Lapid, TommyLapid’s son, was quoted as saying thathe is not afraid of a civil war in Israelbecause the settlers are not “our” broth-ers.3 And Knesset Member EphraimSneh, in an interview with the Israelidaily Maariv, called for a civil waragainst Religious Zionists. Using theAmerican Civil War as a precedent,Sneh wrote:

Eighty-five years after its establish-ment, the United States of America wasdrawn into a cruel and destructive civil

The Palestinians,who have waged anongoing terror waragainst our society,are our peace part-ners, while thevisionaries and ide-alists within the“settler” populationare the “obstacles topeace.”



war, but the results of that war formed thedemocratic character of the giant country.The confrontation among [Israelis] is alsounpreventable.4

A similar sentiment was expressedpublicly by Ami Ayalon, a former headof Shabak, the Israeli counter-intelli-gence and internal security service, anduntil recently, a contender for the LaborParty leadership, when he said that “it isabout time for Israel to have anotherAltalena.”

Caroline Glick, a columnist forThe Jerusalem Post, summed up the situ-ation in the following way:

In the year and a half which preced-ed the implementation of Prime MinisterAriel Sharon’s withdrawal and expulsionplan from the Gaza Strip and northernSamaria, the leftist elites in Israel wagedan unrelenting cultural war against theIsraeli Right generally and against religiousZionists specifically. Religious Zionists wereportrayed by the media, by entertainmenticons, by Sharon’s advisers, and by hispolitical allies on the Left as blood-crazedzealots, parasites, and the single largestdanger to Israel’s well-being.5

As the months dragged on, theattacks against religious Israelis intensi-fied. In July, Haaretz editorialized:

The disengagement of Israeli policy

from its religious fuel is the real disengage-ment currently on the agenda. On the dayafter the disengagement, ReligiousZionism’s status will be different.

The editorial went on to castigateReligious Zionism as “a Trojan horsethat has infiltrated Zionism in order todestroy it from within.”

The Council of JewishSettlements in Yehudah, Shomron andGaza, which organized the campaignagainst the expulsion plan, was unableto find a public relations firm willing totake it on as a client. Its leaders weretold time after time by public rela-

tions executives that working with “thesettlers” would wreck their reputations.

These reports allow us to see thata governmental, judicial and media warwas waged against the mostly religiousanti-expulsion protestors, as if they werethe biggest threat to the stability of theState of Israel. Many Religious Zionists,who once viewed themselves as modern-day Israeli pioneers who claimed theidealistic activism that once belonged toLabor Zionism, now find themselvesbranded as the existential enemies of theState of Israel. Even while the Israelipolitical and judicial bodies have adopt-ed the view that the conflict with theArabs is between Israel and “terrorists”

(and not the Palestinian people), theyhave made the Religious Right anenemy of the state. The Palestinians,who have waged an ongoing war againstour society, are our “peace partners,”while the visionaries and idealists withinthe “settler” population are the “obsta-cles to peace.”

Israeli government institutionshave a vested interest in preventing thetruth of their anti-religious agenda frombeing revealed. There is clearly a planfor further massive expulsions that willmake Gaza look like a drop in the buck-et. But if the Israeli government couldn’tget it right for 10,000 people aftereighteen months of planning, how canit expect to get it right for 50,000 or100,000 expellees? So it covers-up ordownplays the reality—after all, theexpulsion went smoothly, soldiers andresidents cried in each other’s arms,everything is fine! But it wasn’t fine, andit still isn’t fine. Just ask the Jews whosevibrant communities were destroyed orthose who are living in Ir Ha’emunah,or Yad Mordechai, or Nitzan or inhotels without any permanent housingsolution in sight.

How is the committed Orthodoxcommunity supposed to act vis-a-vis theState of Israel now that we know thetruth? Are we exempt from learningfrom what happened and from adoptinga new action plan for our communityvis-a-vis the State of Israel? A specificanswer will not be found in this article,but these questions must be the basis forfurther introspection and soul-searchingwithin our community.

Relying on official governmentpress releases and the media regardingthe situation in Israel and the expulsionplan (and its outcomes) has left most ofworld Jewry believing half-truths andPR spin. Brothers who care must makesure they really understand the plight oftheir fellow brethren in order to thenact accordingly.

The Land of Israel is our home-land, and the State of Israel is the offi-cial institution that allows us to fulfillthe two-thousand-year-old dreams—“Vetechezenah eineinu beshuvcha leTzion

Policemen arrest an anti-disengagement protester who tried to block the road at the entrance toJerusalem. Photo: Ariel Jerozolimski


berachamim, May our eyes behold Your return to Zion incompassion” and “Vehavienu leshalom mearba kanfot ha’aretz,Bring us in peacefulness from the four corners of the earth.”In order to steer the State of Israel in the right direction, aspart of the redemption process, we must fully understand thereality of what the State of Israel is today.

The ideal solution is that committed AmericanOrthodox Jews should be making aliyah. Israel is the onlyplace where you can truly make a difference! Until thattime, it behooves the Orthodox world to seek the truth andstrive in whatever ways it can to fulfill God’s promise toAvraham: “To you and your descendents I have given thisLand … to be a light unto the nations.”�JA

Notes1. “A Sad Chapter for Israeli Justice,” 25 November

2005.2. See “Abusive Policemen, Biased Judges,” Haaretz, 24

November 2005.3. Quoted by Caroline Glick, “Avoiding Israel’s Self-

Destruction,” Jewish World Review, 10 January 2005.4. Quoted by Caroline Glick, “The Scarlet Letter,” The

Jerusalem Post, 5 November 2005.5. “The Scarlet Letter,” 5 November 2005.

ADVERTORIAL

The Personal TouchA Judaica Gallery by I-deas!

23 Ben Yehuda Street (corner of King George)

“Inspiring!” “Exhilarating!”“A positively enjoyable shopping experience!”

These are just a few of the accolades showered upon David Hersh,Yaakov Kessler and Aryeh Weil by customers and visitors who fre-

quent their new gallery on the corner of Ben Yehuda and KingGeorge Streets in Jerusalem.

“We did not want to replicate what is currently available on the street,so we cherry pick from a variety of artists and crafts persons,” says

Kessler. “We try to focus on Judaica, jewelry and artists with a story.”

The gallery features fine art by Myra Mandel, Jordana Klein andDevora Bloch; paper cuts by Michel Patish; photographs on canvas byYaacov Rabinowitz and Eugene Weisberg; painted glass by “One of aKind” as well as a stunning variety of sterling silver, ceramics and hand

crafted jewelry. Many of the products are produced by immigrantsfrom the United States, Canada, Australia, France and South Africa.

Visit the gallery in Jerusalem or shop onlineat www.i-deas.co.il.




What prompted the disengagement—security considerations, improvingprospects for peace, diverting attention

from possible corruption charges or the desire tobreak up Religious Zionist communal life andundermine the Religious Zionist spirit?

Clearly, the disengagement/expulsion plan wasnot prompted by security considerations. When theLabor Party candidate Amram Mitzna ran on a plat-form calling for a unilateral withdrawal from Gazain the previous election, it was Likud candidate ArielSharon who attacked the plan, basing his oppositionon valid security arguments. When Sharon, for hisown purposes, suddenly made a 180-degree turn-about, his newly declared Gaza policy was openlyopposed by those directly responsible for Israel’ssecurity: the Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lt.General Moshe Ya’alon and Director of Israel’sGeneral Security Services Avi Dichter. Sharon subse-quently fired both of these gentlemen prior to theexpulsion despite their success in fighting the waragainst terror. Moreover, all those who opposed the“Sharon Plan” as being detrimental to Israel’s securi-ty have already been proven correct. While I am notaddressing the security problems of the Gaza with-drawal, it is suffice to note that the Kassam rocketscontinue to rain down upon Israeli civilian townsand villages—from Netivot to Ashkelon—and sui-cide/homicide bombers continue to be sent fromsecure Palestinian Authority bases.

It was known initially, and has been subse-quently documented by even leading left-leaninginvestigative journalists (see e.g., Boomerang: TheFailure of Leadership in the Second Intifada by OferShelah and Raviv Drucker [Jerusalem, 2005] inwhich three of the twenty-eight chapters are devotedto this topic), that the “Sharon Plan” was introducedto divert attention from corruption charges, and infact cause the attorney general to bury recommend-ed indictments against Sharon and his sons.Tactically it worked. Everyone knows it’s true, but inthe words of one top leftist Israeli investigative jour-nalist, “The media must protect Sharon [read: coverup for Sharon] like a rabbi protects his etrog beforeSukkot” so he will carry out the Left’s policy and

expel the Jews from Gaza.The ultra-secular left-wing parties that gave

Sharon a political umbrella did so not because theyagreed with his corruption but rather because theywere willing to overlook it to achieve their policygoals. One of these goals is to break the spirit of theReligious Zionist public who is, by definition, theideological enemy. We are in a struggle for Israel’sJewish soul, and the post-Zionist secularist left-wingminority is trying its best to stay in power and dom-inate the direction and character of the State ofIsrael—not as a Jewish state. This was the basis oftheir support for Sharon.

What will be the short- and long-term effectsof the disengagement on Religious Zionism’s atti-tude toward the State? Toward the army?

Those who persist in trying to break the spiritof the Religious Zionist public failed and will con-tinue to fail in their crusade to cause ReligiousZionists to disassociate from the State and itsorgans, such as the army. Hence, despite the justi-fied anger of many at the unwarranted and deliber-ate persecution by the Sharon regime, the over-whelming majority understands that to disassociateitself is to give the Left a victory.

After graduating from high school this pastyear, my son and many others like him undertookgrueling physical and psychological tests to gainacceptance into some of the IDF’s most elite combatunits. After the tragedy in Gush Katif, my son, filledwith justifiable anger, expressed reservations abouthis upcoming induction into an elite unit. I toldhim that his reaction was exactly what the post-Zionist secular Left wanted—for young religiousmen not to be part of such units, not to becomeofficers, advance and ultimately change the militaryand give it a more Jewish mindset. If he didn’t go,they will win, I told him. He, like many of hisfriends, understands. They are still entering the mostelite units with a sense of mesirut nefesh—self-sacri-fice. They won’t let the expellers win.

In the short term, we can expect this strugglefor Israel’s soul to intensify. In the long term, we willwin. We have a deep and unshakable faith in theAlmighty and His promises. We have many morechildren (so ultimately we will be a majority), andwe know that we will undergo difficult times in thepre-redemption period, which we must withstand(see Sanhedrin 98a and b).

Has the long-standing alliance between secu-

YED

IDYA

ATL

AS

Rabbi Atlas is a senior correspondent and commentator forArutz 7 Israel National News. He is a major in the IDFreserves, serving as an army rabbi in a combat brigade. Aresident of Beit El, he is married and has seven children andone grandchild.



lar and religious Jewry in Israel beenirreparably damaged as a result of thedisengagement?

No, I don’t think so. Let’s not for-get that Sharon was elected in the previ-ous election by the greatest majority inIsrael’s electoral history when heopposed the very policy he subsequentlyadopted. The majority of the countrystill perceives itself as being one nation.What has changed in my opinion is thefact that young Religious Zionists cer-tainly, and many of their elders, havenow switched mental gears and nolonger see themselves as subordinate tothe secular political leadership. Theseindividuals view themselves as being noless, and perhaps more, suitable fornational leadership. This is clearly ahealthier and less galut-like mindsetthan the one that permeated theReligious Zionist political leadership formany decades.

Were ordinary Chareidi Jewsmore sympathetic to the plight of theuprooted than were their political lead-ers? If so, what effect will this have onthe relationship between Chareidi andReligious Zionist Jews?

I think the young to middle-aged

Chareidim are far more Zionist-orientedthan their elders, and they are morepolitically active than generally assumed.The number of Knesset seats for theAshkenazic Chareidi parties has consis-tently stayed at five. Yet the Chareidipopulation growth should have giventhem more than double that number.This is not the case because many of theyounger Chareidim vote for other par-ties such as National Union and evenLikud. This is a political fact that pre-ceded the expulsion. The Chareidi pub-lic came to political maturity as a resultof the 1996 elections between BinyaminNetanyahu and Shimon Peres.

Therefore, it is no surprise thatthere is an ongoing relationship betweenyounger Chareidi elements and theReligious Zionist public, particularly thegrowing Chardal, or Chareidi-Leumi(nationalist Chareidi) public. Anyonewho attended the mass prayer rally at

the Kotel in the days prior to the expul-sion, for example, saw the vast Chareidicooperation with the Religious Zionistpublic.

Moreover, it is clear that theAshkenazic Chareidi party’s joining ofthe Sharon government—which gave

Sharon a political fig leaf at a time whenhe planned to forcibly expel Jews fromtheir homes and destroy synagogues andyeshivot—was not a popular move onthe Chareidi street. And then Sharoncarried out his plan with the practicalpolitical acquiescence of the Chareidim.This is going to cost the Chareidim inthe upcoming election.

Can the current split within theReligious Zionist movement bebridged? Can those who will “not for-give and not forget” be reconciled withthose who seem ready to adapt to thedisengagement? Can the bitterness andtrauma engendered by the disengage-ment ever be overcome?

I don’t accept that there is an actu-al split, per se. I don’t believe there isanyone from the Religious Zionist campwho is sanguine about the disengage-ment and its ramifications. I think thatmost people realize the issue is not over.

I can’t imagine that anyone can forgetwhat has happened and what is stillhappening. Thus, there are differingapproaches to the question of whetheror not to cooperate with the organs ofthe State, and on what level.Continuing to serve in the IDF and in

Religious Zionist youth are still entering the most elite IDF units. Photo: www.sassontiram.com



reserves and enlisting in elite combat units, for example, arein dispute to some degree. Not a few people, particularly theyouth who were in the forefront of mesirut nefesh activity tosave Gush Katif as well as the refugee children of Gush Katif,still look at the army and the police with justifiable suspicionand concern. This leads to a certain stepping away to reevalu-ate the relationship between these Stateorgans and the very youth who were,and are, considered the cream of thecrop. Nonetheless, most of our youthunderstand the ramifications of not serv-ing in the army. It gives those whooppose us a victory. This is exactly whatthey want.

Moreover, the overwhelmingmajority of the people, while neither for-giving nor forgetting those directlyresponsible for this self-inflicted nationaltragedy, make a clear distinctionbetween the State of Israel and its inher-ent sanctity, and a government thatacted in a deliberately evil manner and clearly has no sanctity.To disassociate would serve no purpose to those who don’tforgive and don’t forget. No one really wants to forgive, espe-cially since it’s not over. Those who continue to cooperatewith the government authorities on various levels are not nec-

essarily thrilled with the government’s behavior, but they aresimply not making an issue of their differences so as not togive the authorities an excuse to not cooperate with them.

As to the ill feelings towards certain Religious Zionistfigures for their behavior and statements that contributed inone way or another to the success of the Sharon government’s

expulsion policy, this will, for the mostpart, be forgiven in time. Few reallybelieve that any Religious Zionist figurewho took a foolish position did so out ofmalice. Naiveté is an unfortunate mala-dy of many well-meaning people.

However, the incapability of manyof these leading figures, includingprominent rabbis, to grasp the evil ofsome of our political leadership—bothtoday and during the ongoing persecu-tion of those who actively opposed theexpulsion—still boggles the mind. It wasexcusable prior to the fact, when it wasstill difficult to comprehend to what

lengths Sharon and his cohorts would go to carry out theirevil and undemocratic decree. But today, when their methodof operation is clear, when their future plans are openlydeclared, this incapability cannot be explained by naiveté. Itappears to be more a case of blindness, a fear perhaps, of fac-ing reality and acting accordingly. But one result is that thesepublic figures will have significantly less weight with theReligious Zionist public. So while I don’t dismiss the differ-ences, I wouldn’t take the so-called “split” between elementsof the Religious Zionist public all that seriously in the longterm.

The real split taking place is between the ReligiousZionist, Chareidi and traditional Zionist public on the onehand—who are in fact the majority of the country—and thehard-core ultra-secular post-Zionist leftist minority. Thisdoctrinaire minority uses its power to cow its ideologicalopposition with utter ruthlessness and impose its will upon aquasi-helpless majority. I say quasi-helpless because ultimate-ly the majority will win.

Unquestionably, we have suffered a setback thatrequires us to be more committed and more active, to workharder in the many areas in which we did not invest suffi-cient resources and energies. It requires us to learn from ourmistakes—and we made them—and to go on to fight forwhat we believe in. We, like Rabbi Akiva who laughed whenhis compatriots cried at the sight of the Second Temple’sdestruction (Makkot 24b), must believe that even if we don’tunderstand life’s difficulties, we must accept them with lovefor God and have faith that ultimately the Prophecy will befulfilled. Then, in the framework of the rules of This World,we try our best to do the right thing and overcome the chal-lenges we face, in accordance with our emunah in Hashemand in the derech HaTorah.�JA

We are in a strugglefor Israel’s Jewishsoul, and the post-Zionist secularistleft-wing minority istrying its best tostay in power anddominate the direc-tion and character ofthe State of Israel.



If I had to teach the meaning ofpostmodernism—in particular, toexplain the meaning of a subjective

narrative—perhaps there would be nobetter illustration of the entire theorythan the events of the disengagement.In Israel today we hear two utterly dif-ferent narratives of the destruction ofGush Katif. The facts behind the twonarratives are essentially the same, andthat is precisely why the discrepancy isso striking. The difference is already evi-dent in the name: We Religious Zionistscall what happened “destruction,”“expulsion,” “uprooting” and “racisttransfer”; an absolute majority of thesecular public, however, refer to it as“disengagement.” We regard the expul-sion as a traumatic event, whose rever-berations will never be forgotten or for-given, while for the other sector, it wasan insignificant event, no longer on theagenda. We see it as an act of dictator-ship, tantamount to usurpation of gov-ernment by corrupt, underhand means,but an entire sector of the public sees itas a legal, democratic act—perhapsrather crooked, but such are the ways ofdemocracy. We feel that our dispropor-tionate contribution to the army andelsewhere has gone unrecognized andhas earned us no gratitude, whereas the“others” feel that we have trampledeverything that they value and holdsacred. They accuse us of having reject-ed the legislative and executive authorityof the State and of refusing to obey itsorders; of dismissing the authority ofthe judiciary and considering the jus-tices of the Supreme Court as unfair; ofspurning the holy of holies—thearmy—and calling for insubordination

and, in general, of rejecting the rule oflaw. We, for our part, have seen the lifework of hundreds of families, in fact, ofan entire community, destroyed, but the“others” see us as the destructiveparty—we have destroyed two genera-tions of Israelis, for it was our fault thatIsrael became involved in settling Judea,Samaria and Gaza and has ruled overthe Palestinians for thirty-five allegedlysuperfluous years.

These two narratives are the realthreat to the State of Israel. That eachside is immersed in its own narrative,without understanding that of the otherside, clearly heralds an imminent rup-ture. That being said, let me begin withan attempt to understand the narrativeof the Israeli public as I understand it.Unfortunately, an absolute majority ofthe Israeli people are sick and tired ofthe question of Judea and Samaria. Ifelections in Israel were personal, andone of the candidates were to announcea platform of secure and recognizedinternational boundaries with a firmJewish majority, he or she would win anabsolute majority. If, as part of a pack-age deal, a constitution were proposedthat defined Israel as a democraticJewish state but gave relatively littlepractical weight to the term “Jew,” itwould receive almost all of the secularvotes.

Accordingly, it cannot be arguedthat public support for the disengage-ment was dishonestly procured by thegovernment with the sole purpose ofdiverting public attention from corrup-tion, or that the government is bent ondestroying Religious Zionism. Ofcourse, the plan undoubtedly had somehidden motives and was not unrelatedto government corruption; but the

truth, I am sorry to say, is simpler: Alarge part of the public would like toremove the subject of security from theagenda. The Israeli public, having noconfidence in the Arabs and in agree-ments with them, has accepted a unilat-eral plan with its own logic. A majorityof people believe that the plan meets allof the criteria of legal government. Itwas approved by the government, thecourts and the Knesset, with the unfor-tunate result that the plan was wellreceived by the general public. As far asthese Israelis are concerned, the varioushitches in the process—violation of thetreaty between voter and candidate, dis-missal of government ministers, refusalto hold a referendum, et cetera—weresimply part and parcel of the politicalgame; our opponents have in factargued that the settlements themselveswere originally established by the verysame methods, and we expressed noopposition at the time. The same man,Ariel Sharon, has thus worked in exactlythe same way to destroy the settlementsas he did to build them.

We tried to fight this position in avariety of ways. We first tried the ideo-logical path, citing rulings that prohibit-ed the surrender of parts of Eretz Yisraelto non-Jews, and publicly condemningthe plan as the collapse of Zionism. Wewent on—too late—with an attempt todescribe the ratification of the plan asseriously flawed from a democraticstandpoint; our arguments had littlecredibility, however, because we hadrefused from the start to accept a demo-cratic decision, on the grounds thathalachic authority overrules democracy,and so our “democratic” arguments didnot sound very sincere. Subsequently,we committed an unforgivable sin in

Rabbi Cherlow is rosh yeshivah of YeshivatPetach Tikva.

YUVAL CHERLOWTranslated from the Hebrew by David Louvish



the eyes of most Israelis: We directedthe anti-disengagement campaignagainst the army—whether by trying toundermine it from within by calling forsoldiers to refuse to obey orders, or bytrying to prevent implementation of theplan by dispatching tens of thousands ofpeople to Gush Katif. The dreadful planfinally went through without anyonebeing physically harmed—largely thanksto the efforts of the rabbinical and spiri-tual leadership—but at the cost of agreat deal of psychological harm. As Iwrite, hundreds of families are still inlimbo, unemployed and humiliated; theState of Israel, which planned thedestruction so perfectly, failed to preparewhat was necessary to rebuild, and hasabandoned these people to their fate.

I have already said that our viewof what has happened is utterly differentfrom that of the majority of secular Jewsin Israel. We describe the disengagementas the collapse of Zionism, continuingwith further collapse, namely, the aban-donment of the Land of Israel and thedestruction of the settlement endeavor.The disengagement and its outcome aremorally disgraceful, both because of thedestruction of Gush Katif and NorthernShomron and the eviction of peoplefrom their homes and because of theState’s failure to care for the needs of theevacuees. In terms of national securitythe disengagement was enormously dan-gerous. In terms of democracy it was afailure, signaling a loss of confidence inthe rule of law; and it had many otherflaws.

I have much to say about therestitution that the State of Israel mustmake and about the terrible failure ofthe legal and social systems representedby the disengagement plan. The planhas uncovered a great deal of hypocrisyon the part of many self-styled champi-ons of democracy who—since the cor-ruption of the democratic process wasin line with their leftist political out-look—were silent and made no protest.Those who have called for ReligiousZionism to engage in soul-searchingrefuse to practice what they preach, totake a hard look at their own shameful

behavior in the context of the disen-gagement. My purpose in this article,however, is to examine how ReligiousZionism should conduct itself withinthe maelstrom; I will therefore concen-trate on that aspect.

From its very beginnings,Religious Zionism adopted a policy ofcooperation with the Jewish collective as

a whole in the foundation of a Jewishstate, out of the conviction that itwould ultimately lead to the completerealization of the Torah’s vision of “akingdom of priests and a holy nation.”Accordingly, an absolute majority ofReligious Zionists maintain a connec-tion with the State of Israel and its insti-tutions. An absolute majority ofReligious Zionists continue to serve inthe army, to pray for the welfare of theState, to celebrate Yom Ha’atzmaut andto participate in all the State institu-tions. This connection has indeed suf-fered a severe blow, leaving no few scars,but the overall power of the ReligiousZionist vision has not been destroyed.On the contrary, an absolute majority ofReligious Zionists are convinced thatnow is the time to invest more in thevarious spheres of public activity andimbue them with the message ofReligious Zionism. The relatively highbirthrate of the religious sector justifiesthe optimistic hope that the State ofIsrael may be shaped in what we consid-

er its rightful image—not by fighting it,but from within.

Our attitude toward the armywarrants particular attention. On theperiphery of the camp we hear ofdozens of isolated phenomena, admit-tedly minor but nevertheless worrisome:a petition of Torah scholars against mili-tary service; refusal to give soldiers whotook part in the eviction a lift or tocount them as part of a minyan inMe’arat Hamachpelah; settlers cominghome on leave who take off their uni-forms before entering their settlements;refusal to date soldiers who participatedin the disengagement and so on. Theproblem is not these particular incidentsin themselves, but the fact that theyderive from two general phenomena.First, a great many people no longerrefer to the army as Tzahal, “the IsraelDefense Forces,” but call it “the army ofeviction,” “The Sharon family army” orthe like. Second, the official calendar ofMoetzet Yesha (the Yesha Council) fea-tures the declaration “We shall neitherforgive nor forget,” referring, amongother things, to the army. All this revealscontinued internalization of hostilitytoward the army. We seem to be persist-ing in making the worst mistake of theanti-disengagement campaign: directingthe struggle specifically against the army.

It is now clear that ReligiousZionism needs to establish stronger tieswith additional sectors in the nation.Surely it seems most natural to foster astronger bond with the Chareidi world.Such a bond seems to be vital, and itmight be thought easier to achieve sincethe Chareidi public, somewhat unlike itsleaders, has always evinced strong sup-port for the settlers of Gush Katif andNorthern Shomron. Nevertheless, thematter is not so simple, and I doubtwhether it will be possible at all, for tworeasons. The first is Chareidi anger atReligious Zionism. Religious Zionismstood on the sidelines and was in factpart of a coalition government—Likud,Shinui, National Religious Party andNational Union—whose economic poli-cies severely injured the Chareidi com-munity by drastically reducing child

It cannot be arguedthat public supportfor the disengagementwas dishonestly pro-cured by the govern-ment with the solepurpose of divertingpublic attention fromcorruption, or thatthe government isbent on destroyingReligious Zionism.



allowances and by abolishing theMinistry of Religious Affairs. The sec-ond reason, however, is paramount: Alarge part of the Chareidi world doesnot recognize Religious Zionism at all asa legitimate denomination. Shamefully,many Chareidim ignore the entireReligious Zionist Torah world, evenomitting the name of Rav AvrahamYitzchak HaKohen Kook, z”l, frombooks that should include it; because ofthese reasons, a renewed bond betweenReligious Zionists and Chareidim willbe very hard to achieve.

The disengagement also clearlyrevealed the yawning gap in ideologicaloutlook between the secular elite andReligious Zionists, due to their utterlydifferent cultural understandings of life,mission, the importance of nationalism,sanctity and ideals. The gap may beunbridgeable. Nevertheless, despite thedifferences, most of the public wouldlike somehow to preserve a Jewish iden-tity and to strengthen Zionism. Realconnections may, I believe, be forgedwith the public at large. To that end,Religious Zionism will of course have toextend its fields of activity in severaldirections and to devote itself fully tosocial questions; such a course of action,if successful, would be beneficial to bothsectors.

All of these admittedly importanttasks find Religious Zionism in thethroes of a profound crisis. The crisisbegan before the disengagement, as aresult of a great number of new ques-tions that have come up about femi-nism, rabbinical authority, the relation-ship between the Torah and the aca-demic world and methods of Torahstudy. Indeed, the disengagement inten-sified the crisis and brought it to newpeaks. Today, moreover, the ReligiousZionist world recognizes no single focusof Torah and spiritual leadership.Religious Zionism has never acknowl-edged a binding rabbinical authority. Itis deeply committed to the rabbinicalworld, but has never been committed toone single authority. Attempts to do sohave repeatedly met with failure, andthe disengagement merely proved once

again that Religious Zionism has neverconsidered itself obligated to obey therabbis. For that reason, attempts by var-ious parties to issue binding halachicdirectives—instructing soldiers to obeyor disobey orders, advising the settlers of

Gush Katif to pack up their belongingsor not to do so or elaborating on thehalachic permissibility of handing overparts of Eretz Yisrael to the Arabs—were doomed from the start. The onlyeffective rabbinical leadership was pro-vided by those rabbis who were physi-cally present in Gush Katif andNorthern Shomron. While those leaderswere fortunately in contact with thegreatest rabbis, their activities were notgoverned by any absolute commitmentto them; their authority derived fromtheir actual presence “on the spot.” Thedivisions in the rabbinical world onlyserved to emphasize the unique attitudeof Religious Zionism to that world:Religious Zionists consider us, the rab-bis, as just one source of leadership andadvice; rabbinical authority exercisesconsiderable, but not decisive, influence.

Rabbinical differences and divi-sions not only reflect the enormousdiversity of Religious Zionism, which ina sense constitutes a threat to its exis-tence as a movement, but they concernall levels of life: Attitudes toward thepersonal lifestyles of Israelis, culture,academic studies, mixed society,

women’s status in general and muchmore. Rabbinical differences concernthe appropriate political language—doesthe political have to reflect the ideologi-cal? Or is politics a question of “fairarrangements,” implying that politicallanguage requires a fair compromise inthe interest of national unity? They con-cern the field of Torah—how should thestatus of the rabbi in Israel be struc-tured? To what degree should the Torahinform political positions? To whatdegree does it dictate a definite positionon such questions? And so on. The divi-sions have also infiltrated sociologicalissues: There are three differentReligious Zionist youth movements anda host of educational systems; nuancesof religious observance are a significantfactor in dating and matchmaking;there are different periodicals, parties, etcetera, each of which refers to the Stateof Israel in different terms. On the otherhand, there is a basic ethos, which inprinciple relates favorably to the idea ofthe State of Israel, and an absolutemajority still join the army and serve init.

Beyond ideological positions,Religious Zionism possesses a centralpositive feature, which is a major sourceof optimism. The struggle against thedisengagement revealed the tremendousenergies at the command of ReligiousZionism—a powerhouse of strength,faith, determination, devotion and otherqualities, attesting to the spiritualresilience of Religious Zionists. Evenmost of Religious Zionism’s opponentsin Israeli society could not hide theirprofound admiration for its conduct,ranging from the exemplary behavior atKfar Maimon (the community rightoutside of Gush Katif where severalthousands of Jews gathered to peacefullyprotest the disengagement) to the factthat, in the end, there were no Jewishcasualties (we should by no meansignore the two murderous acts perpe-trated against Arabs). These energies arethe main guarantee of our ability to facethe future. Everyone agrees that the dis-engagement was merely the first step,and that we shall probably have to face

The disengagement andits outcome are moral-ly disgraceful, bothbecause of thedestruction of GushKatif and NorthernShomron and the evic-tion of people fromtheir homes andbecause of the State’sfailure to care for theneeds of the evacuees.



no less difficult challenges in the future.At this point, it is difficult to predict thecourse of those future struggles, whetherour actions will be guided by our truthin every possible way or whether we willbow to the dictates of democracy, pro-vided only that its own rules are obeyed.There is a great danger that some adher-ents of Religious Zionism, looking atthe failure of the anti-disengagementcampaign, will conclude that nothingcan be accomplished by peaceful means,

that active violence will be necessary.This is the great danger at our doorstep,but I would like to argue that this is notthe main issue at stake; there is a moreimportant issue to be debated.

The principal existential questionfacing Religious Zionism today is whereto direct its enormous stores of energy,which could well flow into destructivechannels. Anger and frustration mayinvite a constant erosion of the positiveconnections forged with Israeli society.Such calls for deliberate “disengage-ment” on our part have already beenheard—disengagement from the State ofIsrael, from Israeli society and from gen-eral culture. Advocates of such a coursebase their reasoning on two main argu-

ments. First, secular society has beenexposed in all its bankruptcy and cal-lousness; it is collapsing, and so it ispointless to seek any cooperation; secu-lar society deserves the bleak future thatit has brought upon itself. The secondreason is the positive side of this evalua-tion: It is the task of Religious Zionismto seize power, to sweep away decadentculture, corruption and evil; this will beachieved by withdrawing into ourselvesto build up an absolute alternative to

Israeli democracy. Such an alternativewill be based on the authority of theTorah—not on an authority operatingalong secular lines—on the cultural val-ues of the Torah and not of world cul-ture and on absolute loyalty to EretzYisrael. This course of action places itshopes in the Religious Zionist/Chareidiwomb, since these sectors are in favor oflarge families—far in excess of the Israeliaverage; within twenty years, the reli-gious community is expected to consti-tute a majority of the Jewish populationof Israel, and it will then be able toassume power and completely transformthe State of Israel.

Many, however, are very muchopposed to this position. It has been

condemned as being utterly unrealistic,and the very possibility of gaining con-trol by segregating oneself from societyhas been discounted; in addition, itsbasic assumptions concerning thenumerical strength of Religious Zionismand Chareidi Judaism have been brand-ed as unscientific. Moreover, the argu-ment that we possess the requisiteknowledge and ability to lead the nationis nothing but childish arrogance andrepulsive pride. But the principal oppo-

sition to the plan is ideological-ly motivated. ReligiousZionism believes in principle inthe need to connect with KlalYisrael, to act together with,not against or in confrontationwith, the nation as a whole.The energies of which wespoke should be directed,therefore, into quite differentchannels. They should beexploited in the interests ofgreater involvement in Israelisociety, public life and thearmy, and in deeper penetra-tion into the worlds of com-munications and culture; and,of course, they should be uti-lized to find additional ways ofserving God and expressingone’s devotion to Him. Theseare all worthy goals for thestrengths that Zionism hasdemonstrated.

Moreover, there is no doubt thatthe weight attached to socio-economicproblems in Israel is now on the rise,transforming the public agenda in thiscountry. Questions of security and set-tlement are gradually giving way to suchissues as social justice, governmentintegrity, a just distribution of capital, etcetera. The considerable energies ofReligious Zionism need to be directedtoward these issues—not only becausethey are the most pressing questions (itis our duty, after all, to ensure the rele-vance of our Torah message), but alsobecause they are in fact the central issuesdealt with by the Torah. We have beentaught that Avraham Avinu’s missionwas to “keep the way of God by doing

As of December 2005, more than half of the Gaza expellees were still living in cramped hotel rooms.Photo: www.sassontiram.com


L

L

ADVERTORIAL

Prosperity Real Estate is a boutique real estate brokerageand investment firm that markets unique, high-end resi-

dential and commercial properties in prime locations (spe-cializing in Shaarei Chesed, Rechavia, Talbieh, Old

Katamon, the German Colony, the Greek Colony, Baka,Old Talpiot and Arnona) in Jerusalem. The company

caters to the needs of a growing international clientele.

Ronit Dwek, President and CEO of Prosperity RealEstate, and a native of Jerusalem, has marketed real estate

in Israel for more than a decade.

Prosperity Real Estate’s team comprises handpicked, high-integrity, consummate professionals who provide personal-ized, step-by-step guidance. Established associations withthe entire range of real estate experts insures a one-stop

shop for integrated service. Additionally, Prosperity’s serv-ice is based on decades of combined experience and

expertise, empowering its clientele to make informed deci-sions and enjoy the process.

TALLIA AMOS/ PresidentTAProductions USA Inc. / Los Angeles

what is just and right…” (Bereishit 18:19). An essential partof the commandments of the Torah is concerned with“repairing” society, perfecting the world through social actionand matters pertaining to interpersonal conduct (bein adamlechaveiro). Moreover, the prophets frequently preached theprecedence of social justice and the repairing of society overthe sacrificial rites and other commandments governing therelationship between human beings and God—without, ofcourse, exempting us from the obligation to observe suchcommandments. Our tremendous energies should thereforebe channeled into that vast field of activity, thereby alsobringing the State of Israel closer to its proper image as aJewish state. This will enable us to reconnect with wider cir-cles of Zionist society and advance within our own camp,constantly enhancing our devotion to God’s command bywalking in His ways.

I believe that Religious Zionism is already embarking ona course of reconstruction and creativity; that it well under-stands its great mission in the world, the covenant of idealsthat it had entered into with Israeli society. I believe that thecurrent storm raging around us will be an inexhaustible sourceof renewed creativity, of influence upon the Jewish people as awhole. I believe we will be able to make a virtue of necessity,to bring our message to all of Israeli society—the message oftikkun olam, repairing the world through the Kingdom of theAlmighty.�JA



jewish_59_80.qxd 3/14/06 9:56 AM Page 59


At the train station, they put us allinto the railway wagon andordered us to lie down on the

floor, since Arab rioters had arrivedbehind us and were stoning the car-riage…. The train began to move, andafter a few kilometers the Jews of Gazaarose from the floor and then sat down onthe benches, accompanied on the train bypolicemen … until they reached the LodJunction, and from there they continueduntil Tel Aviv.1

The account above may soundchillingly familiar to anyone who wit-nessed the expulsion from Gush Katif inAugust 2005, when Prime MinisterAriel Sharon unilaterally withdrew fromGaza and compelled the area’s Jews toleave their homes.

In fact, though, it is an eyewitnessdescription of a previous calamity, dat-ing back to 1929, when rioting Arabsled British Mandatory authorities toevacuate the entire Jewish communityfrom Gaza, bringing to an end yetanother attempt to rebuild Jewish life inthe area.

The speaker is Moshe Elkayam, amember of a prominent family that hadplayed a leading role in reviving Gaza’sJewish presence. Over the years, theElkayams had developed close friend-ships with many of their Arab neigh-bors, and often provided them withassistance, advice and support. Indeed,Chacham Nissim Elkayam, the head ofthe family, was a respected religious fig-ure, looked up to by Jew and non-Jew

alike, with stories of miracles and won-ders that he had performed popularamong both communities.

But in 1929, as Moshe and hisfamily were led away by British troops,years of coexistence quickly dissolved ashe and his loved ones came under a bar-rage of stones hurled by gleeful Arabs.Adding insult to injury, they tauntedMoshe by shouting “Ya Musa, weburned down your store!”

Later, Moshe’s family membersrecalled how attempts to soothe hisshock and pain proved fruitless, and theentire incident disturbed Moshe greatlyfor many years afterward.

It is worth recalling the events of1929, however briefly, because doing sowill help, at least in part, to confrontthe seminal questions now being debat-ed regarding the impact of the Gazawithdrawal on the future of ReligiousZionism.

One thing is clear: The trauma ofthis past summer’s retreat from GushKatif has left deep scars on Israeli socie-ty, and as we try to come to grips withits meaning and significance, it is diffi-cult to contain the emotions stirringbeneath the surface.

There can be no denying the factthat in the short term, the withdrawalfrom Gaza was a painful blow toReligious Zionism. To see the IsraelDefense Forces deployed against the cit-izens of their own state, with the expresspurpose not of defending the Jewishpeople but of exiling them from parts oftheir homeland, was a shocking andunthinkable sight.

“Is this the state that we prayedfor?” many began to ask, recoiling indisbelief that Jews would banish theirown brothers from their homes.

And, some wondered, how can wesay that the Final Redemption is near

when photographs broadcast around theworld showed Hamas leader Mahmoudal-Zahar leading an Islamic prayer serv-ice in the abandoned synagogue of KfarDarom?2

Stories abound about a crisis offaith among many who were certain thewithdrawal would not—or could not—come to pass. A friend of mine who wasin Kfar Darom in the weeks leading upto the withdrawal said that not onefamily in the entire community hadtaken down a single picture or packed abag in anticipation of the retreat, sostrong was their faith that a miraclewould occur.

But, as we know, that miracle didnot occur, and many are now left tograpple with questions and uncertainty.

That, however, is precisely where1929 comes into play. Because then, asnow, the dream of building a Jewishcommunity amidst the sand dunes ofGaza ended prematurely. But just asthose pioneers did not give up hope,neither can we.

After all, as the events of 1929demonstrate, the withdrawal from GushKatif is hardly the first setback that theJewish people have suffered in our longand sometimes torturous return toZion, and it is almost certainly not thelast. Every ideological movementinevitably encounters stumbling blocksand impediments on the road to reach-ing its goals, and in this respectReligious Zionism is no exception. Thereal test of a movement’s strength liesnot in whether it can avoid such diffi-culties, but in its ability to get up after afall and continue marching forward.

Those who cast doubt on thefuture of Religious Zionism in the wakeof the Gaza retreat are overlooking asimple yet salient point: Whoever saidthat the road to redemption would be

Mr. Freund, a native of New York who madealiyah, served as deputy director of policy plan-ning and communications under former IsraeliPrime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. He isnow chairman of Shavei Israel(www.shavei.org), a Jerusalem-based groupthat assists “lost Jews” seeking to return to theJewish people.

MICHAEL FREUND



one without obstacles?As Rabbi Yehoshuah ben Levi

explains in the Talmud,3 redemptioncan indeed come speedily and via super-natural means, but only if the Jewishpeople are worthy. In such a case, Godwill act to “hasten it.” If, however, weare not worthy, then redemption willcome “in its time,” meaning slowly andthrough natural means.

The uprooting of Gaza’s Jews inno way casts into question the validityof Religious Zionism or its worldview.Israel’s previous redemptions, fromEgyptian bondage and later from theBabylonian Exile, were both repletewith setbacks, hindrances and delays,but that did not diminish or take awayfrom the redemptive vision guiding theJewish people to their inevitable deliver-ance.

Take, for example, the Exodusfrom Egypt. When God sent Moshe forhis initial encounter with Paroh todemand Israel’s liberation from slavery,the immediate result was actually aworsening of their situation. TheEgyptian monarch increased the Jewishpeople’s burden, requiring them toobtain their own straw in addition toproducing their daily quota of bricks.4

After being set free, the Jews spentthree days traveling away from Egypt,but then God instructed them to turnaround and head back toward Egypt.5

Several verses later, the Jewish people arebeing chased by the advancing Egyptianarmy, only to reach the Red Sea, withseemingly nowhere to go.

The redemption from theBabylonian Exile was no different, asthe book of Ezra makes clear. ThoughCyrus granted the Jews permission toascend to Jerusalem and rebuild theTemple, few chose to answer the call.Then, after construction work on theTemple had finally begun, theSamaritans and others succeeded in con-vincing Cyrus to halt the project, whichhe did.6 It was only resumed some twodecades later.

Each move backward, then, how-ever inscrutable to our human compre-hension, was nonetheless part of God’s

ultimate plan, and far be it from us toassume otherwise. The roads to our pastredemptions were often bumpy, and sotoo is the path we are presently on.And, quite frankly, that is exactly whatour Sages foresaw.

As the Vilna Gaon pointed outover two centuries ago, “During theperiod of the ingathering of the exiles,the sitra achra [the forces of evil] willbecome stronger,” and they will exertthemselves more forcefully in an effortto combat Israel’s progress towardredemption.7 But, warns the VilnaGaon, we need to bear this in mindahead of time, and be aware, in effect,that our efforts to bring about Israel’sredemption will meet with resistanceand attempts at obstruction. By doingso, “we will know how to deal with [thesituation] practically … for truth willgive us the strength as we proceed stepby step,” and God will aid us in ourefforts.

This message—that Israel’s FinalRedemption will not be pain-free—isalso subtly reinforced throughout a Jew’sdaily existence, as a simple glance at theBirkat Hamazon reveals. In thankingGod for our sustenance, we ask Him to“send us Eliyahu HaNavi, who isremembered for good, and may hebring us good tidings of salvation andcomfort.”

According to tradition,8 Eliyahuwill come to inform us of the momen-tous news of Mashiach’s imminentarrival, so one wonders why he wouldneed to bring us “comfort” as well.Clearly, the answer is that events preced-ing his arrival will be such that theJewish people will need comforting forall they have suffered on the road toredemption.

The fact that all this was foreseenshould serve to strengthen our convic-tion that Religious Zionism is on theright path. It is only if we wronglyassume that all will go smoothly andeffortlessly that we run the risk of fallingprey to despondency and anguish.

In this respect, the case of Gaza isparticularly instructive. There is noquestion that Gaza is part of the Land

of Israel and that it belongs to theJewish people by Divine right.9

Nonetheless, Jews have been expelledfrom the area seven times in the pasttwo millennia. The Roman governorGabinius threw out Gaza’s Jews in 61CE. Subsequently, they were exiled bythe Crusaders, Napoleon, the OttomanTurks, Arab rioters in 1929, theEgyptian army in 1948 and now, mostrecently, by Israeli Prime Minister ArielSharon.

Each of these expulsions was cer-tainly a crisis unto itself, leading manyto question the future of a Jewish pres-

ence in the area. Nonetheless, the Jewsreturned, guided each time by theirresilient faith. They rebuilt Jewish Gaza,the land of their ancestors, and weshould have no doubt that they will doso again in the future, when the situa-tion permits.10

It is certainly true that the with-drawal from Gush Katif revealed anumber of fissures among ReligiousZionists over various ideological andeven theological issues, ranging fromwhether soldiers should follow orders toexpel Jews from their homes to disputesover inserting alterations into the prayerfor the State of Israel.

In addition, political discorderupted too, as the National ReligiousParty came apart at the seams, with for-mer party leaders Effie Eitam and RabbiYitzhak Levy opting to break away from

Those who cast doubton the future ofReligious Zionism inthe wake of the Gazawithdrawal are over-looking a simple yetsalient point:Whoever said that theroad to redemptionwould be one withoutobstacles?



the movement. But it is precisely because of all this fermentwithin Religious Zionism that we should have reason to be sooptimistic about its future.

It may sound trite, or evenclichéd, but the fact is that theplethora of impassioned debates tak-ing place within Religious Zionismtoday is a sign of its potency andstrength. The heat of the argumentsshow that people do care, and quitedeeply at that, about the issues athand. How many other movementscan still generate a similar level ofintellectual zeal and rhetoricalenthusiasm?

Even disagreements amongleading Religious Zionist rabbis,such as that between Rabbi AvrahamShapira and Rabbi Shlomo Avinerover the question of a soldier’s refus-ing orders,11 are no cause for shame.Whatever one may think regardingthe issue itself, no one can dispute that both Rabbi Shapiraand Rabbi Aviner represent legitimate Torah viewpoints.

Many people seem to forget that the process of debateand deliberation is an essential part of man’s quest for truth,

and a key component of Jewish tradition. For better orworse, Judaism does not have the equivalent of a pope wholays down the final word on doctrinal issues.

The days leading up to the Gaza retreat also providedfirm evidence regarding the bright future that lies ahead forReligious Zionism. Countless rallies and protests were heldacross Israel against the impending withdrawal, and anyonetaking a close look at the faces of those taking part wouldsurely have seen that many of the participants were youngpeople, primarily in their teens and early twenties.

In most Western countries, these youth’s peers gatheren masse for far less lofty purposes, such as sex, drugs androck-and-roll. But Religious Zionists were able to look onproudly and see that they had raised thousands of youngmen and women willing to forego their free time in order tostand up and speak out for their fellow Jews.

The commitment that these young people have to thecause and the idealism and fervor that they generate areexceptional and unique. They, more than anything else, arethe surest indicators that Religious Zionism has a future, anda bright one at that.

And that is why I am convinced that people who saythe Gaza withdrawal marks the end of Religious Zionism aremerely narrow and shortsighted, ignoring the long sweep ofJewish history.

Even in the darkest and most foreboding periods of theExile, Jews never doubted that we would one day return.Massacres and pogroms, Inquisitions and expulsions neverbroke our collective spirit, and neither will the Gaza with-

drawal.Sharon and his comrades may have been able to with-

draw from Jewish history, but they can-not withdraw from Jewish destiny. Theycan bend and twist and stretch tradition-al Zionist and Jewish beliefs, but theycannot break them.

If there is a danger to the future ofReligious Zionism, it lies in the fact thatso many Orthodox Jews continue to pre-fer living in the Diaspora to makingaliyah. Some are so busy creating newstringencies that they appear to haveoverlooked the Torah’s basic requirementto live in Israel.

But even in the face of all thesechallenges and uncertainties, the dreamof our national return lives on. It mighttake years or even decades to achieve,but of one thing we can all be sure: TheJewish people will eventually bounce

back from the Gaza fiasco, just as we have throughout themillennia.

And there to lead the charge, at the head of the move-ment, will be a robust and resilient Religious Zionism. �JA

There is no questionthat Gaza is part ofthe Land of Israeland that it belongs tothe Jewish people byDivine right.Nonetheless, Jewshave been expelledfrom the area seventimes in the past twomillennia.

ADVERTORIAL

Tivuch Shelly Realty, established in 1989, is one of Israel’s lead-ing real estate specialists serving English-speaking newcomers

and the investor community.

BRAND NEW LUXURY TOWERS IN THE HEART OFJERUSALEM Private synagogue ... and walk to the Western

Wall! New project in Arnona-Jerusalem—190 luxury apartments

MODI’IN: BUCHMAN: The Buchman neighborhood is locat-ed in the heart of Modi’in, Israel’s number one “growth city.”

Five and six-room cottages available.

BEIT SHEMESH: SHAINFELD is home to one of Israel’s mostpopular communities. Exceptionally popular two-story town-houses with gardens and balconies. New phase of two-family

exclusive homes now on sale.

RAMAT BEIT SHEMESH ALEPH: RAMAT SHILO is anexciting new community within the ever-popular Ramat Beit

Shemesh-Aleph neighborhood. Fifty-four homes and apartmentswith full community services.

MA’ALE ADUMIM: MITZPE NEVOThis amazing new project—to be built in one of the Jerusalem

area’s most successful knitted-kippa suburban communities—willinclude 5- and 6-room apartments and cottages in Mitzpe Nevo.

For more information, call tel: 972-2-566-2499fax: 972-2-566-2488 or e-mail: [email protected]


Notes1. The account of Moshe Elkayam, who was

evacuated together with his family from Gaza in1929, appears in Mordechai Elkayam, 40 ShenotYishuv Yehudi BeAza, Be’er Sheva Vehakamat HavatRuchamah (Hebrew), (Gaza, 1994), 386.

2. Agence France-Presse, 12 September 2005.3. Sanhedrin 98a.4. Shemot 5:6-9.5. Shemot 14:1-2, “God spoke to Moshe, say-

ing, ‘Speak to the Children of Israel, and let themturn back and encamp before Pi Hachirot.…”

6. Ezra 4:24, “The work of the Temple of Godin Jerusalem was halted, and remained halted untilthe second year of the reign of Daryavesh, king ofPersia.”

7. See Kol Hator by Rabbi Hillel of Shklov, dis-ciple of the Vilna Gaon, chap. 5 (Jerusalem, 5754).

8. Malachi 3:23, “Behold, I send you EliyahuHaNavi before the coming of the great and awesomeday of God.” See Eruvin 43b.

9. See, for example, the commentary of the OhrHaChaim Hakadosh and Ramban on Bereishit 26:3.

10. A particularly prescient view can be found inthe commentary of Radak to Bereishit 26:23, wherehe discusses the various accounts of the Patriarchs’digging of wells and the conflict that this led to withthe Philistines. In all of these accounts, Radak notes,we see that no disputes arose between the Patriarchsand the Philistines about wells located in areas cap-tured and held centuries later by Joshua and theIsraelites. This, says Radak, was intended as a sign tothe Patriarchs that these areas of the Land of Israelwould unquestionably belong to their descendants.But, as for the wells dug by Avraham and Yitzchak inthe land of the Philistines (i.e., Gaza), disputes aroseregarding them, in order to inform the Patriarchs thateven though Gaza was part of the Land of Israel, theirdescendants would not hold on to it without contro-versy and strife. Radak adds that Israel will only suc-ceed in controlling all of Gaza when Mashiach comes.

11. A former chief rabbi of Israel and the cur-rent head of Yeshivat Mercaz Harav in Jerusalem,Rabbi Shapira came out forcefully against the ideathat soldiers should follow orders and take part in theexpulsion from Gush Katif. Rabbi Aviner of Beit El,head of Yeshivat Ateret Cohanim in the Old City ofJerusalem, expressed strong disapproval of the expul-sion itself, but nonetheless rejected the notion thatsoldiers should refuse orders.




It’s astonishing to think that as I sit down to writethis piece, three months have passed since theJews of Gush Katif were expelled from their

homes, and yet no profound upheaval has occurredin Israel. Among the general public, the whole affairhas practically been forgotten. Even the suffering ofthe expelled settlers, many of whom are still leading anomadic existence with no permanenthome in sight, has not rated a prominentplace in the headlines of late. This oughtto teach us something about what is hap-pening to Israeli society. In the followingparagraphs we shall try to examine whathas happened and what repercussions theuprooting of Jewish Gush Katif will haveon the future of the State, on the stabilityof Israeli society in general and on thelives of the expellees in particular.

There are still those among theIsraeli public who are trying to compre-hend what drove a right-wing prime min-ister to destroy Gush Katif. For manyyears Ariel Sharon had been an enthusias-tic supporter of this region of pioneer set-tlements. The simplistic claim that pro-tecting the Gush from terrorist attacksdemanded huge expenditures on the partof the national security system nowappears groundless, because it is assumedby the people of Israel that had Sharonbeen able to win the coming elections bya large majority, he would have repeatedhis Gush Katif experiment on Yehudahand Shomron as well. This he neverdeclared out loud; it was more in thenature of a whispered rumor.

Similarly, it is difficult to accept thenotion that Sharon believed for a momentin his own declarations that the withdraw-al from Gush Katif would induce the Palestinians toadopt a peaceful stance toward Israel. Both he him-self and his spokesmen repeatedly claimed that rela-tive calmness would descend upon the Gaza Striponce the Palestinians of the area had been granted

partial independence. In the meantime, of course,the reality has proven to be quite different. Thedestruction of Gush Katif did not result in calmness,and anyone who understands anything about Arabsmust have known from the start that they wouldinterpret any show of generosity as weakness, that itwould only whet their appetite to continue the strug-

gle against Israel. The mortar shells and Kassamrockets flying into Israeli territory provide more tan-gible proof that nothing has changed as far as securi-ty is concerned. Opponents of the disengagementvoiced a warning that after the withdrawal, Ashkelonwould be the next target of the Kassam rockets.Their prediction has already come true.

It is indeed quite possible, as many haveclaimed, that Sharon’s personal entanglements withthe law played a part in his dramatic decision.

Rabbi Grylak is editor-in-chief of Mishpacha magazine. Heis the author of four volumes of essays on the parashah, andwrites novels under the name Chaim Eliav. His most famousnovel is In the Spider’s Web (New York, 1996).

MOS

HE

GRY

LAK

Translated from the Hebrew by Yocheved Lavon

Rabbi Yigal Kirshenzaft, his wife and their twelve children have beenliving in the Jerusalem Caesar Hotel since being expelled from theirhome in the Neve Dekalim settlement in Gush Katif. TheKirshenzafts, who were victims of terror attacks, have had their hotelroom broken into and valuables stolen. Photo: Ariel Jerozolimski



According to this theory, the disengage-ment was devised to deter investigationsagainst him. But it is becoming increas-ingly clear that such calculations wereonly marginal. An analysis of the cur-rent social climate in Israel reveals twomuch deeper reasons behind the deci-sion to evacuate Gush Katif. The morethe facts are revealed, the clearer itbecomes that two main social factorscombined to cause Sharon’s dramaticturnabout: deeply-rooted hatred towardthe settlers on the part of secular Israelisociety and the Jewish identity crisis suf-fered by the latter.

The psychological background forsettler-hatred is deeply embedded in thesecular mentality. The settlers disturbthe tranquility of Israeli society, especial-ly the left-wing elite that wields somuch influence over the public’s think-ing. The settler holds up a mirror to thesecular Israeli, showing him an image ofhow he might look had he remainedfaithful to his Zionist ideals. The aver-age secular Zionist has cast off the yokehe took upon himself a century ago—the task of conquering, settling andbuilding up Eretz Yisrael. It is clearbeyond any doubt that at some pointon his way up the mountain, he weariedof the climb.

When the Rabin governmentdecided to go along with the OsloAccords, the Gerrer rebbe, the PneiMenachem, remarked, “It looks asthough the Zionists are giving up ontheir dream.” Yitzhak Rabin had alwaysbeen known as a leader who made secu-rity a top priority; I heard at that timefrom sources close to him that thechange in his stance had come as aresult of the mass exodus from Tel Avivunder the Iraqi missile attacks duringthe Gulf War. Witnessing that, he con-cluded that the nation was no longerwilling to fight. Indeed, that disillusion-ment with the Zionist vision hasbrought European decadence in itswake, the hedonistic culture of the Westthat is eating away at everything ofvalue in Eretz Yisrael. Thus the settler,by his very existence, by his sacrifice foran ideal and by his willingness to suffer

for it, is a reminder to the average Israelithat he himself has betrayed the idealsof his youth. And this reminder elicitsever-increasing resentment that hasgradually turned to animosity, and evenhatred. In order to justify this animosity,the average Israeli has internalized theidea that it is the settlers who are pre-venting the achievement of peace withthe Arabs. Only recently, I encounteredthe shocking fact that in numerous

recent Hebrew works, it is not uncom-mon for the settler to be depicted as fol-lowing in the footsteps of the Nazis.Considerations of space prevent mefrom quoting some of these “flattering”descriptions of settlers, but this is howfar things have gone.

This is reason enough for the sec-ular public’s wish to see the destructionof the settlements, the constantreminders of their own failing. Onething is clear: The hatred toward thesettlers prevalent among the Israeli pub-lic, and especially among those in con-trol of the media, made Sharon’s jobmuch easier to carry out when the timecame. However, when all the statementson the subject made by Sharon and hisclose associates are summed up, whatemerges is that a certain very basicproblem led him to take such a drasticstep, specifically the problem of Israel’sidentity as a Jewish state. This is a prob-lem that has greatly troubled parts ofthe Israeli establishment in recent years,especially those on the right-wing endof the political spectrum. While manyon the Left have already given up view-

ing Israel as a Jewish state and are evenstriving to make it “a state of all its citi-zens,” nationalist circles are seeking away to preserve the Jewish character ofthe State. As they witness what is hap-pening to Israeli society, they aregripped by increasing fear that theJewish State, according to their defini-tion of what is Jewish, is slippingthrough their fingers. Secular youngpeople today are totally cut off from anyconnection, even an emotional connec-tion, to Jewish tradition and to EretzYisrael. In both their outlook andbehavior they have strayed deep intoforeign pastures. And as if the loss ofspiritual identity weren’t enough, thereis the creeping threat of natural increaseon the part of the Arabs. The Arab pop-ulation living within the borders ofIsrael is rapidly closing the gap with theJewish majority and could easily out-number it in the near future.

In view of this dilemma, the onlyfeasible way to guarantee that the Stateretains its Jewish majority, at least froma biological point of view, is total disen-gagement from areas of the countrywhere large Arab populations are con-centrated. Justice Minister Tzipi Livni, aclose associate of Sharon, has expressedthis intention almost explicitly. In amore closed setting, at a forum held byThe Foundation for a ConstitutionalDemocracy, at which this writer was inattendance, one could sense the distressof the justice minister and the otherspeakers as they addressed this topic.The possibility of increasing the Jewishbirthrate in Israel and rekindling interestin Judaism among the youth does noteven occur to those who set the policiesof the State of Israel. In their eyes, theliquidation of Gush Katif serves as theonly successful model for preserving theJewish majority, assuming that it werealso to be applied to Yehudah andShomron. This is not the place for ana-lyzing how shortsighted and narrow thisapproach is; like it or not, this is thethinking that prevails among the disen-gagement supporters.

During the period leading up tothe expulsion, the Sharon camp certain-

The settler, by hisvery existence, byhis sacrifice for anideal and by hiswillingness to sufferfor it, is a reminderto the averageIsraeli that he him-self has betrayed theideals of his youth.



ly made use of the widespread hatredtoward the settlers to delegitimize themin the public eye. This delegitimizationgreatly weakened the settlers in theirstruggle against the decree that had beensealed against them. They weren’t accus-tomed to being hated by the rulingestablishment. And as if that weren’tenough, this deeply rooted hatred alsoled to the crime of abandoning theexpellees to their fate. After all thegrandiose promises made before theexpulsion, many of the expellees wereabandoned in the most shameful man-ner. The government is ignoring itsobligation to restore these people’s livesas quickly as possible. This hardhearted-ness, too, is sure to have repercussionson Israel’s internal social relations. It hasbeen months since these people werethrown out of their homes, and, as ofthis writing, around eighty percent ofthem are still unemployed, and manyare not living in suitable homes. Thetension generated by this situation hasbroken up families. According to news-paper reports, a number of the displacedhave had to receive psychological care,and the fact that many of the childrenhave still not been placed in proper edu-cational frameworks is undoubtedlycausing serious damage to their develop-ment. The astonishing thing is how lit-tle people care. Disgraceful as it is, cer-tain groups have even displayed joy overtheir fellow man’s misfortune. This isthe power of hatred. All of these goings-on have stained the image of the Statethat calls itself Jewish, and the stain willnot be easily removed.

The disengagement was a histori-cal moment of truth for Israeli society,especially for the National Religiouscamp. At such times of crisis, whensociety is put to the test, things that areordinarily rather vague and foggy sud-denly become clear. Ideas that had beenheld as truths for many years suddenlycollapsed. Relationships that had lastedfor generations were undermined, andbasic beliefs were reforged in the fires ofthose critical events. It was especiallyhard for those with National Religiousinclinations who had linked the princi-

ple of settling the territories liberated inthe Six-Day War with various stages ofthe Final Redemption. For them, thedisengagement posed a crisis of massiveproportions, of significance far beyondthe loss of one’s home. During the pre-disengagement period, many raised theconcern that the expulsion was likely totrigger an acute crisis of faith amongyouth who identified the settlement ofthe Land with reishit tzemichat geu-lateinu, the initial stage of our redemp-

tion. We can be thankful that in fact,this crisis of faith occurred only in thehearts of a few individuals, as far as wecan see.

In any case, however, NationalReligious society is indeed suffering anacute crisis. It has not yet developed aclear position platform, but it is full ofpain as it calls for disengagement fromold beliefs and for a reevaluation of itsrelationship to the general society. Thefeeling of many in these circles is thatthe State to which they were so loyal hasbetrayed them. All of a sudden, theirpartners of yesterday in the task ofbuilding Israel as a state and a society,the partners to whom they were faithfulheart and soul, became unrecognizable.All of a sudden, the realization dawnedupon them that for all these years, theyhad glossed over the fundamental differ-ences between themselves and their fel-low Zionists, and that in fact, the twogroups had been pulling the cart ofEretz Yisrael in different directions allalong. The contrast became obvious

when the secular side of the partnershipdecided to turn its ideas concerning theborders of Eretz Yisrael into reality. Asan initial response, the stunned settlersand their supporters angrily declaredthat they were divorcing themselvesfrom the State. This extreme reactionshed light on where they actually stood:on the ruins of a philosophy that theyhad nurtured for decades. But of course,such declarations were not easily accept-ed and have triggered much debateamong many of the best thinkers in thatcamp. Judging by articles that haveappeared in the right-wing press and bywhat we’ve heard in countless discus-sions, a lively and incisive ideologicaldialogue is taking place on howReligious Zionists ought to respond tothe ringing slap in the face they’vereceived from their secular counterparts.Even those who oppose the notion thatseparation from the State is the onlyanswer don’t know how they can go onliving within the State.

It’s only been a few months sincethe disengagement, and it is still tooearly to tell whether a historical turn-about has really taken place in theNational Religious public’s attitudetowards secular Zionism, or whether thestormy responses were, on the whole,merely outbursts of rage that will be for-gotten once the dust has settled, andrelations between the two groups willresume as they were before the expul-sion.

Meanwhile, the breakup betweenthe National Religious camp and secularIsraeli society has sharpened the posi-tions and the identities of both sides.Despite the pain involved, the new real-ity could bring about something posi-tive. It cannot be denied that ReligiousZionism’s long-standing association withsecular society, often to the point ofactually identifying with it, has blurredthe religious identity of many memberswithin that camp. Enough ink has beenspilled over this issue. The breakup,then, could potentially yield abundantfruits in the form of religious growthand a renewed Jewish outlook. Thebuds have already appeared in right-

The hatred towardthe settlers preva-lent among theIsraeli public, andespecially amongthose in control ofthe media, madeSharon’s job mucheasier to carry outwhen the time came.


wing religious newspapers such asB’Sheva and Makor Rishon.

Another point of contention andconfusion for the National Religiouspublic is the matter of refusing to com-ply with a military order. It seems thatthe number of soldiers who refused totake part in the expulsion was actuallyvery small. This would seem to indicatethat the authority of the great rabbanimover that camp, such as the geonimRabbi Avraham Shapira and RabbiMordechai Eliyahu, is actually quiteminimal as their calls for refusal wentunanswered. No doubt this sector willdeal at great length with the weightyquestion of how much influence thosewho bring the word of Torah to thepeople really have on the NationalReligious public. It is too early to tellwhat the repercussions of the tensiongenerated between the people and theirspiritual leaders will be.

If the voices in favor of separatingfrom the State should prevail, even ifthe belief in the State as the initial phaseof the Redemption were to be dropped,it would not necessarily bring about arapprochement between non-ZionistOrthodoxy and the National Religious.These two movements are separated bya deep ideological chasm. Even whencertain portions of Chareidi Jewrydemonstrated their solidarity with thepeople of Gush Katif, this was simplyout of a sense of empathy; none of uswants to see Jews thrown out of theirhomes and dragged off their land, espe-cially not at the hands of other Jews.But there was no shared ideologybehind those gestures of sympathy.These two sectors of Jewry are funda-mentally divided, and it doesn’t look asthough recent events will bring aboutany real cooperation between them.They might join together in certainstruggles on an ad hoc basis, but noth-ing more.

The disengagement was also amoment of truth for the Chareidi pub-lic, which could have extended more aidafter the expulsion. The NationalReligious sector is deeply disappointedat the failure of the Chareidi public and

its leaders to rally publicly to its aid inits time of trouble. This lack of supportdid not stem from a lack of sensitivityto the pain of Jews about to be forciblyexpelled from their homes. Joiningforces with the Religious Zionists to tryand prevent the expulsion would havebeen interpreted as acquiescence to theReligious Zionist view that the mitzvahof settling Eretz Yisrael stands above allelse. To have participated in those force-ful struggles would have been seen notonly as a show of sympathy for fellowJews in distress, but as allegiance to anideology that the Chareidi sector doesnot believe in at all. Eretz Yisrael is noless beloved by the Chareidim than bythe National Religious, but theChareidim view the mitzvah of yishuvHaAretz as one mitzvah among the rest,not as a mitzvah exalted above all oth-ers. This is a broad topic, and this is notthe place to elaborate on it.

When a complaint was voicedbefore a Chareidi rabbi that the youth ofhis camp had not shown up at the massdemonstration in Kfar Maimon, hisanswer gave expression to the wall thatdivides the two factions: “I don’t think,”he said, “that you expected me toinstruct bnei yeshivah and Beis Yaakovgirls to take part in a demonstration andin activities that were not conductedaccording to the standards of modestyaccepted by the Chareidi public, whichviews modesty as the crucial key tomaintaining our position in EretzYisrael. I’m not trying to hint,” headded, “that anything happened in KfarMaimon that was prohibited, God for-bid. But our students, who were raisedwith different standards of modesty,cannot come to such places.” In otherwords, even if ideological differenceswere put aside, the Chareidi publicwould not have been able to standshoulder to shoulder with the NationalReligious camp in the struggle againstthe expulsion. This, too, is a topic thatrequires incisive analysis and a broadertreatment, and this is not the place todiscuss it at length.

It should be stressed that Chareidichesed organizations were among those

that offered a helping and supportivehand to the expellees. The Chareidipublic as a whole, however, did not vol-unteer as much aid as could have beenexpected. The ideological gap caused acorresponding psychological gap, whichnot every individual knew how to over-come. It should be pointed out, howev-er, that some Chareidi yeshivos that cus-tomarily organize “camps,” vacationtrips of several days for their studentsevery summer, announced that therewould be no camp in 2005. We cannotindulge ourselves, they said, while otherJews are suffering. That would bemorally corrupt; let us at least bear theirpain with them.

Only a few months have passedsince the disengagement. Although itappears on the surface that the peoplehave already forgotten what happened,at a deeper level those memories contin-ue to simmer, and it will be a long timebefore they fade away, for the problemsand tensions generated by those eventsare with us, whether we recognize themor not.�JA




This past summer Medinat Yisraelexperienced one of the majortraumas in its fifty-seven-year-old

history. The disengagement, a policypursued by the Sharon government tounilaterally withdraw from the GazaStrip and four other West Bank settle-ments, became a reality. As a result,some 10,000 Israelis were uprootedfrom their homes, and the land was“returned” to the Palestinian Authority.Many of these evacuees are still notresettled.

The public debate on the disen-gagement was vigorous, heated andtense. In fact, the extreme positions, proand con, were articulated in voices thatwere too shrill for comfort. Intenseopponents of the disengagement didnot hesitate to invoke memories of theShoah. Government personnel, such asarmy officers responsible for carryingout the orders of the government andPrime Minister Ariel Sharon himself,were compared to Nazis.

Supporters, on the other hand,demonized the settlers, most of whombelong to the Religious Zionist commu-nity. The very term “settler” became oneof derision and contempt. Some equat-ed “settlers” with “occupiers.” Settlerswere no longer considered Israelis andwere accused of being disloyal to theState. The situation was so tense thatthere was a real fear of civil war and vio-lence.

However, despite this incendiaryatmosphere, the civil peace held; therewas no civil war. Why? Perhaps because,contrary to the hype on both sides andto the usual portrayal of Israelis as cyni-cal, most Israelis did not view the disen-gagement as a ploy by the Sharon gov-

ernment to divert attention from itsown domestic problems. Neither wasthe disengagement seen, even by manyReligious Zionists, as an anti-religiouscampaign directed at an overwhelminglyreligious settler population to advancesome long-term secular agenda. Rather,it was seen as one way of dealing withthe major problem facing Israel, that ofwar and peace, of sheer physical securi-ty.

Even proponents of the disengage-ment plan recognized its flaws. For one,it was unilateral. Israel received nothingin return. The Palestinians did not com-mit to reciprocate in any meaningfulway. Even so, the status quo also has itsown dangers. An unstable situation isalways prone to violent eruptions. Israelbefore the disengagement was viewed asa “pariah” state by most of the interna-tional community. The demographicproblem of Jews becoming a minorityin their own country is, according to all,a problem that needed a solution. And,the people are tired of a fifty-seven-year-old war, and sickened by the experienceof the last two intifadas. Such a peoplesaw the disengagement as a chance,albeit a very slim one, for peace. Theysaw it as a gamble that may move thecountry from military confrontation topolitical negotiation. The Israeli govern-ment felt this was a risk worth taking,and, apparently, most Israelis agreedwith that assessment.

At the premise of questions 2 and3 raised by Jewish Action (What will bethe short- and long-term effects of thedisengagement on Religious Zionism’sattitude toward the State? Toward thearmy? and Has the alliance between sec-ular and religious Jewry in Israel beenirreparably damaged as a result of thedisengagement?) is the notion that, untilrecently, there was a long-standingalliance between secular and religiousJewry. The premise is correct, but it ismy contention that the Religious

Zionist alliance with the secular com-munities broke down well before thedisengagement.

When political Zionism appearedon the scene, the religious communitywas divided on the very legitimacy ofthe Zionist effort to establish a state.The basic difference in opinion revolvedaround central ideas that, in reality, stilldivide the religious community. Thefirst issue is that of activism versus pas-sivity. The religious anti-Zionist posi-tion was that Klal Yisrael cannot have asovereign state before the Messianicadvent. Any attempt to “hasten” theRedemption, they argued, is both theo-logically and halachically beyond thepale. So much so that any attempt tocreate a state invites, and is worthy of,Divine retribution. Obviously, ReligiousZionists rejected this approach com-pletely. To them, activism as regardsbinyan HaAretz, developing Eretz Yisraeland establishing sovereignty there, is thehighest expression of the Biblical pre-cept of yishuv Eretz Yisrael.

The second issue concerned relat-ing to non-observant Jews. The religiousanti-Zionists argued that cooperationwith the non-observant—hitchabrutlareshaim—even for good causes, is pro-hibited. Hence cooperation with secularZionists is out of the question. ReligiousZionists argued, with equal fervor andconviction, that cooperation with thenon-observant does not imply recogni-tion of their secular ideology.

The establishment of the State didnot end these debates. It is true that fora short—very short—period most seg-ments of religious Jewry saw in theestablishment of the State some form ofDivine blessing. Rabbi MenachemKasher published a letter, written in1949, addressed to the religious com-munity in Israel regarding the impor-tance of voting in the upcoming elec-tions. In that letter, Rabbi YechezkelSarna, rosh yeshivah of the Slabodka

Rabbi Krauss is rabbi emeritus of the YoungIsrael of Hillcrest, in New York, and immedi-ate past president of the Religious Zionists ofAmerica. He and his wife recently madealiyah. He is on the Talmud faculty of YeshivatEretz HaTzvi in Yerushalayim.

SIMCHA KRAUSS




yeshivah in Hebron; Rabbi Tzvi PesachFrank, chief rabbi of Yerushalayim;Rabbi Yaakov Sinkiewic, rosh yeshivah ofGur, and a host of other Chareidi aswell as Religious Zionist rabbis androshei yeshivah called the establishmentof the State of Israel atchalta deGeulah(the beginning of the Redemption) (KolHator [5732], p. 374). But this unity inoutlook was short-lived.

In fact, initially both the ReligiousZionists and the religious anti-Zionistsparticipated in the government. Buttheir rationales for doing so diverged.While the justification given by the reli-gious anti-Zionists for joining the gov-ernment was complex, the ReligiousZionist position was simple. By joiningthe government and creating an alliancewith the secular community, ReligiousZionists were simply implementing, in aJewish state, their long-held historicview of contributing and working withall segments of the Jewish community.In the early days of the State when somuch had to be done, they shared acommon social, economic and politicalagenda with the larger secular commu-nity. In fact, out of that early coopera-tion on all kinds of issues, thereemerged the “historic alliance” betweenthe secular (Labor Party) and the reli-gious (National Religious Party) thatlasted for a long time. When the lateDr. Yosef Burg, one of the leaders of theNRP, was asked which is the moreimportant component of the NRP, the“national” or the “religious,” heanswered: “the hyphen.” That was notjust a clever retort; it reflected the pro-found reality of the Religious Zionistcommitment to uniting with the broad-er Jewish community.

Israel’s stunning victory in the Six-Day War of 1967 had a profoundimpact on the Religious Zionist self-image. It now saw itself in a new andtriumphant light. The ReligiousZionists could now, after the miraculousvictory, speak to their allies in statebuilding on the Left of God’s interven-tion without apologia. Indeed, with thereligious moment acknowledged evenby the secularists, Religious Zionists

were no longer junior partners in thebroader national-religious alliance. Totheir religious adversaries on the Right,they could now point to God’s interven-tion as nothing less than bestowingDivine legitimacy on Israel’s existence.Indeed, reishit tzemichat geulateinu wasno empty phrase; what it meant exactlywas a matter of debate, but the elementof Divine “blessing” of the State wasacknowledged by all.

This new triumphalism had prac-tical consequences, specifically in rela-

tion to settlements. When successiveIsraeli governments encouraged its citi-zens to settle in the newly conqueredterritories of Eretz Yisrael, the religiouscommunities responded with enthusi-asm. They were now in the forefront ofbuilding Eretz Yisrael. And for a longtime the Religious Zionist communi-ty—with its idealism and its policy ofinvolvement in the State, in the army(via hesder yeshivot) and in all areas ofpublic life—became a model for theentire community.

But Israel was also a country atwar. Above all other problems, thereloomed the specter of political instabili-ty and insecurity. Terrorism, intifadasand suicide bombs all brought home,on a daily basis, the message that ourvery existence should not be taken forgranted. And there was Oslo—the hopefor peace, the disappointments, thetrauma of the assassination of PrimeMinister Yitzhak Rabin. The countrybecame torn by the issue of land forpeace.

In this new divide over land forpeace, there were three discernible polit-ical groups. The general secular commu-

nity associated with the Labor Party,who was the erstwhile ally of theReligious Zionists, favored negotiationand the “giving up” of land. The right-wing nationalistic groups, who, fromthe early rise of Zionism, viewed theState in maximalist terms, obviouslyopposed the giving up of land. As thisdebate over land continued and sharp-ened, the third constituency, theReligious Zionists, slowly but surelybegan to move away from consensus-building political alliances that focusedon negotiations and compromise. Theybegan to increasingly ally themselveswith the extreme right positions thateschewed compromise.

In this process, however, ReligiousZionism lost sight of the other criticalissues facing society. In its exclusivefocus on the issue of land, it becametransformed into a one-issue party. Theconsequence was the loss of a politicalbase, loss of political power and loss ofinfluence. Nothing marginalizes a partymore than being addicted only to a sin-gle issue. The isolation of the settlersduring the whole disengagement periodwas only the most painful example ofhow far this marginalization affected theReligious Zionists.

Is the rift irreparable? I am confi-dent that the break can be healed. Israelisociety faces many problems; the gap,not only between the rich and the poorbut also between the satiated and thehungry, is growing. The integrity ofgovernmental institutions is in question.The public educational system needs anoverhaul. Not to speak of the broaderissues such as the Jewish character ofMedinat Yisrael and the role of Jewishtradition in the State.

The Religious Zionist communityhas the human resources, the enthusi-asm, the idealism and the ideology thatcan get the country moving in the rightdirection. Its message that what we dohere and now can be stamped with thebreath of eternity is one that the majori-ty of Israelis can accept. But firstReligious Zionism must move out of itsself-imposed isolation and restore the“hyphen” to its central position.�JA

The Religious Zionistalliance with thesecular communitiesbroke down wellbefore the disengage-ment.



Documents

Religious Zionism: What’s Next? - Amazon Web Servicesou.org.s3.amazonaws.com/pdf/ja/5766/spring66/ReliZionism.pdf · Religious Zionism: What’s Next? According to some, the only