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This article was downloaded by: [TBTAK EKUAL]On: 2 September 2009Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 772815468]Publisher RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
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Religious Intolerance among Orthodox Christians and Muslims in RussiaVyacheslav Karpov; Elena Lisovskaya
Online Publication Date: 01 December 2008
To cite this Article Karpov, Vyacheslav and Lisovskaya, Elena(2008)'Religious Intolerance among Orthodox Christians and Muslims inRussia',Religion, State and Society,36:4,361 377
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09637490802442975URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637490802442975
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http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713444726http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637490802442975http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdfhttp://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdfhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637490802442975http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t7134447267/29/2019 Religious Intolerance Among Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia
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Religious Intolerance among Orthodox Christians and Muslims
in Russia1
VYACHESLAV KARPOV & ELENA LISOVSKAYA
ABSTRACT
Religious intolerance (the unwillingness to grant religious liberties to other faiths) among Russias
Orthodox Christians and Muslims is widespread, as our 2005 national survey data (2972
interviews) show. The intolerance is strongest among the Orthodox in the largely non-Muslimareas of Russia and among both faith groups in the conflict-torn Caucasus. Mutual tolerance is
highest in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. The intolerance has more to do with reactionary
ideological influences and regional socio-political conditions than with Orthodox and Muslim core
religious beliefs and practices. Orthodox-Muslim intolerance reflects a broader popular hostility to
religious freedom in Russia. Fuelled by Russias current undemocratic tendencies, this hostility
poses a threat to Eurasian stability and calls for efforts to lessen ethno-religious tensions. Such
efforts need to include systematic sociological monitoring of religious intolerance, and this study is
a first step in this direction.
The Problem
Recently there have been numerous reports about incidents of OrthodoxMuslim
intolerance in various parts of Russia. In some cities, groups acting in the name of
Orthodoxy have initiated successful bans on building mosques. In other places (such
as Yaroslavl, Sergiyev Posad and Vladimir) mosques have been attacked. At the same
time, Islamic radicals in the North Caucasus have referred to Orthodox Christians as
enemies of Chechens and other Muslim peoples. Symptomatically, on 20 October
2005, in a statement on the website Kavkaz-Center, Chechen separatist leaders
accused the Russian Orthodox Church of participation in a genocidal war against
Muslims and declared a ban on all of the churchs activities in the Caucasus
(Zayavleniye, 2005). In November 2006 the leader of the Islamists in Kabardino-
Balkaria, Amir Seifulla (Astemirov), declared a war against the infidels throughout
Russia (Organizator, 2006). In recent years serious tensions among Orthodox and
Muslim leaders have surrounded debates on religion in state schools and other aspects
of churchstate relations.
The spread and intensity of such incidents point to the importance and timeliness of
research on religious intolerance among Muslims and Christians in Russia and its
regions. In particular, survey research could show how widespread and strong
ChristianMuslim intolerance is, and to what extent it reflects the nature of Christian
and Islamic religiosity rather than ethnic, social and political influences. This would
Religion, State & Society, Vol. 36, No. 4, December 2008
ISSN 0963-7494 print; ISSN 1465-3974 online/08/040361-17 2008 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09637490802442975
7/29/2019 Religious Intolerance Among Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia
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clarify, with obvious policy implications, the prospects for reducing religious tensions.
Yet systematic sociological research on MuslimChristian religious intolerance is
remarkably rare worldwide. Researchers know little about the extent to which
Christians and Muslims in various parts of the world are unwilling to put up with each
other and why.
Our paper addresses these timely but understudied issues. Prior to our study, a
handful of publications addressed the resurgence of religious intolerance in Russia
(Filatov and Lunkin, 1999; Krasikov and Tokareva, 2006). However, they did not
provide systematic empirical evidence showing the spread, intensity and determinants
of intolerance among the Orthodox and Muslims. Meanwhile, Russia is one of the
largest lands where Muslims and Christians have coexisted in peace and conflict for
over a thousand years, which makes it an excellent case for understanding the
dynamics of MuslimChristian conflict and coexistence.
Using representative survey data, we show that OrthodoxMuslim intolerance is
widespread in Russia. Orthodox Christians strongly oppose granting religious liberties
to Muslims. Similarly, in some Muslim areas there is strong intolerance of the
Orthodox. Thus popular support for religious freedom in Russia is very weak even forits traditional and historically predominant faiths. Next we find that the intolerance
among Russias Christians and Muslims varies greatly by region, and regional
differences shed light on its causes. Importantly, some of the highest intolerance levels
are found among Russian Christians who live in the areas with negligibly small
Muslim populations. Mutual tolerance is much greater in Tatarstan and Bashkorto-
stan, the two regions where large Orthodox and Muslim populations have long
coexisted peacefully. The war-torn North Caucasus shows strong ChristianMuslim
intolerance. Finally, we find that mutual intolerance has relatively little to do with the
core religious beliefs and practices of Orthodox and Muslims. It is more closely related
to peoples beliefs about religions than to religious beliefs as such. Thus ethnocentricviews of ones own and other faiths, opposition to granting religions equal rights and
negative stereotypes about Christianity and Islam increase mutual intolerance. The
intolerance is further aggravated by secular influences, including ethnic prejudice,
reactionary political orientations and an unwillingness to put up with dissent and
nonconformity. However, while these phenomena may be alien to religion
normatively (that is, theologically and traditionally) defined, they appear absorbed
by the popular religious culture of ordinary Orthodox and Muslims in contemporary
Russia. Thus we suggest that greater commitment to the fundamentals of Orthodoxy
and Islam hardly makes Russians more intolerant. At the same time, reducing
intolerance may be impossible without serious changes in popular interpretations of
Orthodoxy and Islam that have absorbed ethnocentric, prejudicial and illiberal beliefs
so common in the political, ideological and psychological environments in which
Christians and Muslims currently practise their faiths in Russia.
Religious Intolerance: Conceptualisation and Measurement
Social scientists have conducted much research on tolerance of such groups as
communists, atheists or homosexuals, but have done little empirical exploration of
religious tolerance. Moreover, although the latter term is broadly used, its
interpretations are often vague and hard to implement in research and policy
analysis. Against this background, we have introduced a conceptualisation of religioustolerance as the willingness to grant religious freedom to people and groups of other
faiths. Accordingly, religious intolerance means the refusal to grant such freedom to
362 Vyacheslav Karpov & Elena Lisovskaya
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these people and groups. As we have explained elsewhere (Karpov and Lisovskaya,
2006, 2007a, b) this conceptualisation builds on historical and philosophical studies of
religious toleration (Zagorin, 2003) as well as on sociological research on support for
civil liberties (for example, Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al., 1982; McClosky and Brill,
1983; Gibson, 1992; Gibson and Duch, 1993). It is also consistent with the notion of
religious freedom as a fundamental human right (Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2006).
This approach distinguishes between religious intolerance and prejudice. For
example, negative attitudes towards Islam may or may not translate into the
unwillingness to grant Muslims the right to worship freely. At the same time, those
supporting Muslims rights do not necessarily view Islam positively. Furthermore, we
differentiate between abstract support for religious freedom, which by itself is a
dubious indicator of tolerance, and concrete attitudes in concrete situations. For
instance, those who abstractly support the idea of religious freedom for all may be
reluctant to grant it to specific religious minorities in their home towns. For this
reason, our conceptualisation of religious intolerance focuses on the extent to which
people in a given social context are unwilling to grant specific religious liberties to
outgroups. What specific religious liberties do we mean? Since interfaith tensionstypically build around negative reactions to public rather than private expressions of
faith, our survey indicators deal with the former. They include peoples unwillingness
to allow religious outgroups to build places of worship, preach publicly, establish
confessional schools, publish and engage in other activities of this kind.
In line with this approach, we asked Orthodox Christians if, in their home towns,
they would allow Muslims to build mosques, open Islamic schools, preach on
television, do charitable work and so on. Similarly, we asked Muslims if they would
support the same activities by Orthodox Christians (see the full list of questions in the
Appendix). This questionnaire allowed us to determine whether or not, and how
strongly, Christians and Muslims opposed granting specific religious freedoms to eachother. Orthodox and Muslim respondents were asked eight questions. Thus, we
obtained eight indicators of intolerance, which were analysed separately as well as part
of cumulative indices of religious intolerance among Christians and Muslims.
Theoretically, opposition to public expressions of faith can reflect peoples
commitment to a secular public space devoid of open manifestations of any religion,
including their own. However, there are two reasons to believe that what we measure
in this study is indeed religious intolerance of other faiths rather than such a secularist
opposition to public expressions of all faiths. First, the data show that most of
Russias Orthodox and Muslims are accepting of public expressions of their respective
faiths but not of their neighbours. For instance, in our survey 30 per cent of the
Orthodox said that foundations of Orthodoxy should be taught as a required course in
state-run schools, and 60 per cent said that such a course should be offered as an
option. Thus, 90 per cent of the Orthodox would accept teaching foundations of their
faith in state-run schools in some form. Yet only 13 per cent would grant Muslims the
right to teach the foundations of Islam. Similarly, 90 per cent of Muslims said that
foundations of Islam should be taught in state-run schools (23 per cent saying it
should be compulsory and 67 per cent saying it should be optional), but only 29 per
cent would allow the Orthodox to teach their faith. Second, multivariate statistical
analyses that we are preparing to publish elsewhere show that the eight indicators we
use are closely interrelated (for example, those who do not want Muslims to fundraise
are likely also to oppose their right to preach or teach). To use a statistical term, theseanalyses point to an underlying latent variable with which our eight indicators are
closely associated, and of which they all are manifest expressions. This underlying
Religious Intolerance in Russia 363
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variable can legitimately be called religious intolerance. In other words, manifest
opposition to building mosques or teaching Islam in schools in most cases expresses
an underlying generalised religious intolerance towards Muslims rather than a
commitment to a secular public square.
How was the Evidence Collected?
This paper is based primarily on evidence from our international collaborative study
Religious Intolerance among Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia: How
Strong is it and Why?. The study involved a representative national survey conducted
in Russia in June 2005 using a national probability area sample of the adult household
population. In order better to represent Russias Muslims (as well as the Orthodox
residing in majority Islamic areas) the survey included four oversamples from the
predominantly Muslim regions of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkaria and
Dagestan. Overall, 2972 in-person interviews lasting on average slightly more than one
hour were conducted. Of the 2972 interviews, 1651 were part of Russias national
sample, and 1321 more were from oversamples in Muslim regions. The response rate(measured as the ratio of completed interviews to the total number of attempted
contacts) was 64 per cent.
Findings
Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia: Basic Facts
The problem of religious intolerance we discuss in this paper potentially involves
millions and millions of people and thousands of religious organisations in Russia.
Indeed, Orthodoxy and Islam together account for the vast majority of traditionalreligious affiliations and organisations. The press service chief of the Moscow
Patriarchate Fr Vladimir Vigilyansky sarcastically notes that sociological estimates of
the number of Orthodox Christians in Russia vary from 1 to 90 per cent (Vigilyansky,
2007). This sarcasm, however, seems misplaced. Simply, low estimates are based on
strict criteria of religious adherence (consistency of belief and practice), while high
ones reflect self-identifications. In our survey over 80 per cent of all Russians
(which would mean nearly 116 out of 143 million) and close to 90 per cent of ethnic
Russians identified themselves as Orthodox Christians. Percentages of those who
share basic Orthodox beliefs and regularly practise their faith are dramatically
smaller. Even using rather soft criteria of religiosity (including relatively consistent
core beliefs and relatively active practice), in our study we estimated that only 10 per
cent of self-identified Orthodox could be considered religious in a traditional sense.
When stricter criteria are applied, proportions of traditional believers drop to single
digits.
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) enjoys a remarkable public trust which in
our survey was surpassed only by Russians confidence in their president. According
to the Moscow Patriarchate of the ROC, in 2005 there were 12,665 Orthodox parishes
and 433 monasteries in Russia (Statisticheskiye, 2005).
The number of Muslims in Russia is a hotly debated and politically contested issue.
In our survey 3.1 per cent of Russian citizens identified themselves as Muslims, and
this is consistent with other reliable surveys conducted in Russia in the last 15 years.However, probability sample surveys may underrepresent minorities concentrated in
small towns and villages. We therefore used a different way to estimate the number of
364 Vyacheslav Karpov & Elena Lisovskaya
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Muslims. Using the 2002 Russian census data, we calculated that the traditionally
Islamic ethnic groups account for 9.4 per cent of Russias population (roughly 14
million people). In our survey, in these ethnic groups up to 80 per cent identified
themselves as Muslims. If the census data are reliable, then no more than 78 per cent
of Russias population will be self-identified Muslims. As was the case with the
Orthodox, traditional beliefs and practices among self-identified Muslims are not so
common. No more than 20 per cent in this group combine relatively consistent
monotheist beliefs with relatively active practice. This is close to the estimate of 2.8
million practising Muslims provided by Walters (2006).
Several regions have an especially high concentration of Muslims. Among them,
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan also have large Orthodox populations. By contrast, in
the North Caucasus recent hostilities have resulted in the emigration of non-Muslims,
leaving Muslim populations in overwhelming majorities (for example 92 per cent in
Dagestan). According to Russias Justice Ministry in 2006 there were nearly 3700
officially registered Islamic organisations in Russia (Svedeniya, 2006). However, the
actual number may be much greater because many Muslim groups (for example
radical jamaats2
in the Caucasus) are opposed to the Spiritual Boards (official regionalMuslim governing bodies) and avoid registration.
Although Orthodoxy and Islam are legally considered traditional religions with
formally equal rights, our data show that there is a strong opposition among ordinary
Russian to granting equal rights to these religions in practice. Moreover, the
aforementioned relatively low traditional religiosity does not preclude widespread
religious intolerance.
How Widespread is OrthodoxMuslim Religious Intolerance?
OrthodoxMuslim intolerance is widespread, and Russias Orthodox are overall lesstolerant of Muslims than the latter are of the former. Levels of mutual tolerance by
specific religious activity are shown in Figure 1. It can be seen that only 57 per cent of
the Orthodox would allow Muslims to build a mosque in their home town, while 72
per cent of Muslims would permit the building of an Orthodox church. About
30 per cent of the Orthodox would allow the public preaching of Islam, compared to
44 per cent of Muslims who would allow the public preaching of Orthodoxy. Both
Orthodox and Muslims are especially opposed to the teaching of their neighbours
faith in state-run schools: only 13 per cent of the Orthodox and 29 per cent of
Muslims would be in favour. This is a divisive and potentially explosive issue
considering the recent introduction of courses on Orthodoxy in state schools in some
regions.
Generally, with the exception of building mosques and doing charitable work, less
than half of the Orthodox would grant Muslims religious liberties. Meanwhile five out
of eight religious activities of the Orthodox would be allowed by more than half of all
Muslims.
Muslims greater tolerance of the Orthodox does not by itself suggest that they are
generally more willing to put up with other faiths. The Orthodox are Russias
dominant majority, and it would be impracticable for its Muslim or other minorities
to question the majoritys right to practise its faith. As shown below, in regions where
Islam is predominant, differences in tolerance among Orthodox Christians and
Muslims are much smaller. Furthermore, religious intolerance towards the Jews andwestern churches is slightly stronger among Muslims than among the Orthodox
(Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007a).
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The Importance of Regional and Local Differences
Russia is known for the tremendous ethno-cultural and religious diversity of its
regions. Regional differences prove crucial for understanding the state and origins of
tolerance among Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia. We compared levels of
OrthodoxMuslim tolerance in four traditionally Islamic regions. We also compared
tolerance in these regions with that in Russia in general. In addition, we looked at the
variation of tolerance in some of Russias other regions and in selected cities.
To provide a salient illustration of regional differences we computed average levels
(also known as mean values) of tolerance by area. These averages, which may range
from 8.0 to78.0, reflect regional populations tolerance of all eight religious activities
we asked about, from mosque or church building to fundraising. The higher thenumbers, the more tolerance they show (an eight-point level would indicate a full
tolerance of all religious activities, which is hard to find in Russia). The lower the
Figure 1. Religious tolerance among the Orthodox (N 1331) and Muslims (N833) in Russia
by religious activity. (Numbers indicate the percentage of those who would allow a particular
activity.)
366 Vyacheslav Karpov & Elena Lisovskaya
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averages, the less tolerance they reflect. When numbers drop to near or below zero,
they mean strong intolerance.
Figure 2 compares tolerance averages in the four traditionally Islamic regions with
the general Russian sample (see Table 1 in the Appendix for a detailed comparison of
tolerance by region and activity). The comparison yields three facts reflecting a
consistent pattern. First, the strongest religious intolerance is among the Orthodox in
Russia outside the traditionally Islamic regions, which accounts for a vast majority of
the countrys Christians. Mutual intolerance is strong in two majority conflict-torn
Muslim regions of the North Caucasus (Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria). Yet it is
slightly less than the intolerance shown by the Orthodox majority outside Islamic
regions. Finally mutual tolerance is greatest in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan where
sizeable Orthodox and Muslim populations have coexisted in peace and relative
stability since the Soviet collapse.
Russia (excluding oversamples from Islamic regions) is 80 per cent Orthodox and
has only 3 per cent of Muslims. Thus most Russian Christians have few if any Muslim
neighbours. Yet precisely in this population we see the strongest intolerance towards
Muslims. As shown in Figure 2, tolerance of Muslims drops there to a sub-zero level.Remarkably, within Russia, intolerance of Muslims is strongest in some areas with
very small Islamic minorities. Indeed, the tolerance average is at Russias absolute low
of72.4 in the Central-Chernozem region, which is not known for a sizeable Islamic
presence. In this heartland region Russian Christians are even less tolerant of Muslims
than they are in the North Caucasus areas neighbouring traditionally Islamic lands
(72.1). In western nations, the largest and most cosmopolitan cities usually show
more tolerance. This is not the case in Russia. In Moscow and St Petersburg, the
countrys wealthiest and best educated cities, there is less tolerance of Muslims (71.1)
than in Russia generally (70.3). Counterintuitive as it may seem, this finding is
consistent with what some other studies of prejudice and intolerance in Russia haverecently shown. For instance, a 2006 study by the Moscow-based Public Opinion
Foundation shows that Muscovites and megacity-dwellers in general (which includes
both Moscow and St Petersburg), as well as younger people with higher education and
income, show higher than average levels of ethnic intolerance. They tend to be slightly
Figure 2. Average levels of Orthodox-Muslim tolerance by region. (Numbers indicate average
tolerance by region on a scale where 8.0 is the highest and 78.0 the lowest tolerance level
possible.)
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more often irritated by people of other ethnicities, and more willing to support
banning and deporting certain nationalities from their cities (Kertman, 2006). As
shown below, ethnic prejudice is associated with religious intolerance. Therefore it is
unsurprising that the wealthy and educated megacities show high levels of both.
The population of Tatarstan is 48 per cent Muslim and 42 per cent Orthodox, while
in Bashkortostan the ratio is the reverse: 50 per cent Orthodox to 40 per cent Muslim.
As shown above in Figure 2, both republics have relatively high levels of Orthodox
Muslim tolerance (four to almost five points out of eight possible). This contradicts
Starks theoretical prediction that two particularistic religious groups to the extent
that they perceive one another as equally matched . . . will be reluctant to risk violent
conflict, but relations will always be shaped by barely concealed hatred and contempt
(Stark, 2001, p. 233). Both regions have sustained political stability since the Soviet
collapse, and ethno-religious tensions have never escalated there into large-scale
violence. This relatively peaceful atmosphere was reinforced by the regional
authorities suppression of separatism and their policies of balancing Tatar and
Bashkir ethno-nationalism with loyalty to the Russian state. Similarly, the authorities
in both regions have been known for their efforts to curb the spread of radical Islam incollaboration with established and politically loyal Muslim leaders.
The situation is dramatically different in Dagestan, which is 92 per cent Muslim and
only 7 per cent Orthodox, and in Kabardino-Balkaria, which is 75 per cent Muslim
and 22 per cent Orthodox. As shown in Figure 2 above, both regions have some of the
lowest levels of interfaith tolerance. Tolerance does not rise in either region above a
one-point mark on our eight-point scale. Perhaps to some extent the overwhelming
Islamic majorities account for a strong intolerance towards Orthodox minorities. This
appears similar to the predominant sentiment in non-Muslim Russia towards its small
Islamic minority. Even so, tolerance towards the Orthodox in both regions is higher
than tolerance towards Muslims in heartland Russia. However, the logic of numbersdoes not explain why Orthodox minorities in the two regions show so little tolerance
to their Muslim majorities (by contrast, we have seen that in non-Islamic Russia the
Muslim minority is remarkably tolerant towards the Orthodox). More plausible
explanations of mutual intolerance may have to do with the political, socio-economic
and demographic environment of the regions.
Mutual negativity has multiple causes. Let us consider some of them. The spread of
radical Islam in the North Caucasus was likely to result in greater intolerance towards
non-Muslims. In turn, the reactions of Moscow and local authorities to Islamist and
separatist movements have been marked by intolerance towards free expression of
Islamic religiosity. In recent years the authorities in the Caucasus have often portrayed
any opposition they have encountered as part of a Wahhabi underground, thus
feeding suspicion and intolerance, which only exacerbate Muslim radicalism. The
vicious cycle of hostility has peaked in armed conflicts. In Dagestan fierce battles with
Islamist groups took place in 1999. Since then small-scale clashes and terrorist attacks
have been routine in the republic. In Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, over
130 people were killed in street battles with Muslim rebels (reportedly affiliated with
the jamaat Yarmuk) in October 2005. In addition, and in contrast to the situation in
relatively wealthy Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, these conflicts take place amid socio-
economic hardships that can only worsen inter-group tensions. Rising ethnic tensions
have driven many ethnic Russians, most of whom are Orthodox by tradition, away
from the Caucasus (census data suggest that the population of Dagestan is now nomore than 6 per cent Russian). In this atmosphere of conflicts, hardships and tensions
mutual religious intolerance appears a natural outcome.
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Overall, there seems to be no single explanation for regional variation in tolerance.
The ethno-religious makeup, economic conditions, radical Islam and reactions to it,
and a history of violence and instability along with the quality of policies meant to
deal with them all appear important. The relative importance of each factor varies by
region. At the same time, we show below that some factors are universal.
What makes Orthodox and Muslims Intolerant of Each Other?
We have seen above that, with the remarkable exceptions of Tatarstan and
Bashkortostan, OrthodoxMuslim intolerance is widespread in Russia. A crucial
question of this study is if and to what extent this widespread mutual intolerance is a
product of adherence to Orthodox and Muslim beliefs and practices. Do religious
commitment and devotion to Orthodoxy and Islam make their adherents more
intolerant of each other? If so, we may be dealing with tensions between two
religiously defined civilisations, which would confirm Huntingtons (1996) grim
outlook for the future of stability along ChristianMuslim borders. Alternatively, if
the main causes of intolerance are not religious in nature, if they rather reflect thecircumstances in which Orthodoxy and Islam have been practised, then there may be
policies to remedy such circumstances. Thus the question of the religious roots of
ChristianMuslim intolerance is of crucial importance.
Religious determinants of interfaith intolerance are even less researched than the
intolerance itself. However, there has been a line of studies of the influence of religion on
political intolerance (of such groups as atheists, communists, homosexuals and others).
Focusing primarily on the USA, some of these studies show considerable effects of
attendance, personal piety and traditional denominational affiliations on political
tolerance (see, for example, Stouffer, 1955; Fislinger, 1976; Nunn et al., 1978). However,
more complex analyses suggest that these influences may be mediated by such factors astheocratic political orientations, illiberal views and other factors extrinsic to religious
beliefs and practices proper (Smidt and Penning, 1982; McFarland, 1989; Ellison and
Musick, 1993; Jelen and Wilcox, 1990; Karpov, 1999, 2002). As shown below, our
analyses of OrthodoxMuslim intolerance in Russia yield similar patterns.
Specifically, we looked at how OrthodoxMuslim intolerance is related to: (1) core
beliefs of ones faith and main religious practices (church or mosque attendance,
frequency of prayer, and frequency of reading the Bible or the Quran); (2) near-religious
ideology, which is not the core beliefs of the religions, but rather peoples beliefs about
their and other religions: for instance, these may include peoples beliefs about various
religions as good or bad, or ethnically native or alien, and about the treatment they
deserve in society; and (3) non-religious ideology: peoples secular beliefs and sentiments:
in our study, these include ethnic attitudes, pro-democracy and pro-western
orientations, and willingness to put up with dissidents (usually defined as political
tolerance). The influence of these three groups of factors on intolerance is summarised
below. Pertinent statistical details may be found in Table 2 in the Appendix.
Core religious beliefs and practices. To measure the former, we relied upon
commonly used survey indicators of monotheistic beliefs (for example, in God, the
devil, life after death, heaven and hell), and, for the Orthodox, of specific Christian
beliefs (for example, in Jesus Christ and his resurrection). These indicators were
aggregated into cumulative indices of religious belief. Religious practices weremeasured in terms of how often Orthodox and Muslims attended churches or
mosques, prayed and read the Bible or the Quran.
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Table 2 shows partial correlations of religious beliefs and practices with Orthodox
Muslim tolerance, controlling for the effects of the respondents age and education
and the size of the cities where interviews were collected. Since younger, better
educated people living in larger cities in our analyses (and in previous research) are
usually more tolerant than others, it was important to separate the effects of religiosity
from these background factors. Negative correlations mean that predictors decrease
tolerance. All coefficients reported below are statistically significant.
First, we found that religious beliefs per se do not make Russians more intolerant.
On the contrary, among the Orthodox, those who more fully share monotheistic and
Christian beliefs tend to be slightly more tolerant of Muslims than those who do not
(partial correlations are 0.09 and 0.08 respectively).
Next, religious practices are differently associated with tolerance among the two
groups. As Table 2 shows, among Muslims, those who more often go to the mosque,
pray and read the Quran appear less tolerant towards the Orthodox (correlations
range from 70.18 to 70.11). Among the Orthodox, only church attendance is
negatively and slightly associated with tolerance towards Muslims (70.07). In other
words, praying and reading the Bible more often do not make the Orthodox moreintolerant, while mosque attendance, praying and reading the Quran more often make
Muslims somewhat more intolerant of the Orthodox. Although these effects are
statistically significant, they are small in magnitude.
Near-religious ideology. While core religious beliefs do not make Orthodox and
Muslims more intolerant of each other, their beliefs about religions do. In particular, a
negative view of Islam (as militant, reactionary, inhumane, anti-democratic and so on)
makes Orthodox strongly intolerant of Muslims (0.41). Similarly, a negative view of
Orthodoxy predisposes Muslims for intolerance (0.23). As data show, negativism
towards Islam more strongly predicts intolerance of Muslims than negativism toOrthodoxy predicts intolerance of the Orthodox. An important predictor of tolerance
is the acceptance of the view that all religions should have equal rights in Russia: those
who do not share it are more intolerant. Among the Orthodox, opposition to equal
rights for religions predicts intolerance more strongly (0.30 compared to 0.12).
Another predictor of intolerance is a phenomenon we define as ethnodoxy, that is, a
belief system that rigidly links peoples ethnic identity to their dominant religion and that
views other faiths as alien. This belief system creates an explosive fusion of religious
and ethnic identity and leads to intolerance. We designed a questionnaire that
measured peoples adherence to such ethno-religious beliefs. The survey data show
that such beliefs are very common in Russia. For instance, 85 per cent of ethnic
Russians believe that they are Orthodox in their heart even if they were not baptised
and do not go to church. Nearly half believe that only ethnic Russians can be true
Orthodox, and more than one third see converts to non-Orthodox faiths as no longer
truly Russian. As partial correlations in Table 2 show, this ideology noticeably
decreases tolerance towards Muslims (70.20). Although religious ethnodoxy is also
common among Muslims (85 per cent of Tatars, Bashkirs, Avars and other
historically Islamic ethnics say they are Muslims in their heart regardless of actual
religiosity), it is significantly but weakly (0.08) associated with their intolerance
towards the Orthodox.
Non-religious ideology. We found that religious intolerance is also linked to beliefsand attitudes that have nothing to do with religion (see Table 2). Particularly
important is the link between religious intolerance and ethnic prejudice. Those
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Russian Orthodox who have negative attitudes to ethnic non-Russians from the
Caucasus and Asia are markedly less tolerant of Muslims (70.28). Similarly,
prejudice against ethnic Russians makes Muslims markedly less tolerant of the
Orthodox (70.26).
Pro-democratic and pro-western views make both Muslims and Orthodox more
tolerant of each other. Interfaith tolerance is also linked to support for civil liberties
for political and social out-groups (for example, fascists, atheists and homosexuals).
Those Muslims or Orthodox who are more willing to put up with such groups are also
more tolerant of each other. The link between political and religious tolerance is
stronger among Muslims than among the Orthodox (0.30 compared with 0.12).
Conclusion
Although most Russians calling themselves Orthodox Christians or Muslims do not
actively practise or fully accept the tenets of their faiths, religious intolerance among
them is widespread and strong. A majority of self-identified Orthodox would curtail
Muslims basic religious freedoms. In the regions where Muslims are in an absoluteminority and where Orthodox Russians have hardly any immediate contact with
Islam, the intolerance towards Muslims is stronger. Strikingly, in Moscow and St
Petersburg, Russias two wealthiest and most cosmopolitan cities with highly educated
populations, intolerance towards Muslims is stronger than the countrys average.
Russias Muslim minority appears on average more willing to grant religious liberties
to the Orthodox majority. Yet, in strategically important areas, such as the North
Caucasus, Muslims intolerance of Christian minorities is remarkably strong.
In this atmosphere, reports about religious hate crime and violations of religious
freedom in Russia reflect more than isolated incidents. Acts of hate and intolerance
seem to have deep roots in popular hostility to religious freedom. The problem ofChristianMuslim intolerance in Russia is not confined to actions of extremists and
illiberal officials. It is a societal problem that reflects the ordinary Russians
unwillingness to put up with minorities.
OrthodoxMuslim intolerance is not an isolated interfaith issue in Russia. As we
have written elsewhere, both groups unwillingness to put up with the Jews and
western churches is much stronger than their mutual intolerance (Karpov and
Lisovskaya, 2007a). Thus OrthodoxMuslim intolerance is only a part of a much
broader culture of religious intolerance that has taken root in Russia in just 15 years
since the collapse of official Soviet atheism.
Importantly, this widespread culture of religious intolerance is, at most, weakly
associated with core beliefs and practices of Orthodoxy and Islam. Consistency of
religious belief is positively, and church attendance negatively but weakly, correlated
with tolerance among the Orthodox. Among Muslims, active engagement in religious
practices is more noticeably yet weakly correlated with intolerance.
Overall, the culture of religious intolerance is shaped not so much by core religious
beliefs as by ideological beliefs about religions. Such are prejudices against Islam
among the Orthodox, and against Orthodoxy among Muslims. Such are also beliefs
that ethnic Russians are Orthodox by birth or definition, just as Tatars and Chechens
are Muslims, and that any other religion is alien and harmful to these peoples.
Conflating religious and ethnic animosities, this popular ideology of religious
ethnocentrism breeds intolerance and poses a threat to the unity and stability of themultiethnic and multireligious Russia. Finally, opposition to the idea of equality of all
faiths under the law correlates with intolerance. Let us note that this popular
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sentiment is congruent with Russias official ideology that has treated some religions
as more equal than others since the enactment of the 1997 Law on Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations.
The climate of intolerance is further worsened by non-religious ideological
influences. Racial prejudice against the ethnicities of the Caucasus and Asia
(pejoratively referred to in Russian street slang as chernyye, meaning blacks)
increases intolerance towards Muslims, just as prejudice against ethnic Russians
increases intolerance towards the Orthodox. Not surprisingly, people who hold
antidemocratic and antiwestern views and oppose granting liberties to dissidents are
also more intolerant of their neighbours religion.
What do our data on the relative importance of religious, near-religious and non-
religious factors of intolerance suggest about the influence of religiosity on
intolerance? In our view, these findings mean that inquiries into religiosityintolerance
links should not be limited to core religious beliefs and practices. While the
phenomena we called near-religious may be viewed as alien to Orthodox and Muslim
religiosity normatively defined, they may be an integral part of Orthodoxy and Islam
as they are interpreted and practiced by ordinary Russians in their everyday lives. Forinstance, although the ethnoreligionist belief about presumed innate Orthodoxy of an
ethnic Russian may normatively be considered heretical (Nikita Struve once likened
ethnodoxy (etnoslaviye) to the heresy of phyletism: Struve, [1982] 2000, p. 94), for
most Russians it seems to be an important part of their mundane interpretation of
what Orthodoxy means. Similarly, the beliefs we analytically defined as non-religious
may be firmly established as part of popular religiosity. For instance, ordinary
Orthodox and Muslims may think that democracy and acceptance of ethnic diversity
and political dissent are alien to their religions. For such people, ethnic, political, and
religious intolerance will be natural and logical consequences of their religiosity.
Remarkably, both ethnocentric and antidemocratic views are congruent with publicstatements by many of Russias past and present religious leaders.
To summarise, our findings suggest that religiosity normatively understood (as
adherence to core beliefs and practices of Orthodoxy and Islam) has limited influence
on intolerance. However, popular religiosity (interpretations of Orthodoxy and Islam
by ordinary Russians in their everyday life) may predispose people to intolerance
more strongly than their core beliefs and practices.
This means both good and bad news for the prospects for reduction of mutual
intolerance. The good news is that greater commitment to the fundamentals of
Orthodoxy and Islam normatively understood is unlikely to make Russians more
intolerant. Conversely, achieving greater tolerance does not require compromises on
the fundamental tenets of both faiths (contrary to what zealots on both sides often
say). However, the bad news is that reducing intolerance may be impossible without
serious changes in popular interpretations of Orthodoxy and Islam that have
absorbed ethnocentric, prejudicial and illiberal beliefs. Ridding mass religious cultures
of such orientations may take generations and would require consistent systematic
effort on the part of religious leaders and educators. However, so far little seems to be
done in this direction and much in the opposite.
Yet our study also shows that even in this societal atmosphere a much greater
mutual tolerance among Russias Orthodox and Muslims can be achieved and does
exist in some places. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, where nearly equal populations of
Muslims and Christians live side by side, and where peace among them is supportedby the local authorities resistance to separatism and encouragement of interfaith
contacts, show tolerance levels markedly higher than elsewhere in the country. This
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sharply contrasts with the situation in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria, republics of
the war-torn North Caucasus, where ethno-religious tensions are worsened by
economic hardship, the emergence of radical Islam and failed attempts to eradicate it
through violence and suppression of religious freedom.
Given the spread of OrthodoxMuslim intolerance and its roots in a more general
popular hostility to religious freedom and minority rights, this problem is unlikely to
be resolved any time soon. If anything, it is likely to worsen amid Russias current
undemocratic tendencies, which cannot but fuel popular anti-libertarian sentiment. In
turn, escalating intolerance may trigger conflicts with ramifications for Eurasian and
global security (just as the conflict in Chechnya has already done). In this context,
trends in OrthodoxMuslim intolerance in Russia need regular sociological
monitoring, and we see our study as a first step towards this end.
Notes
1 This research was supported by funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and
East European Research (NCEEER) under authority of a Title VIII grant from the USDepartment of State. Neither NCEEER nor the US government is responsible for the views
expressed in this paper.
2 A jamaat is a community of Muslims. Jamaats may be formed territorially, ethnically or on
the basis of a certain interpretation of Islam, and are sometimes headed by imams. In
Dagestan, for instance, jamaats appeared in the thirteenth century headed by councils of
elders representing various clans. Other jamaats recently emerged as religio-political
formations and some of them have embraced Islamist and Wahhabi ideas (see Yemelianova,
2003).
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http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/socium/internat_ro/dd064525http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/socium/internat_ro/dd064525http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=reference&div=20http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=reference&div=20http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=reference&div=20http://www.religare.ru/article36302.htmhttp://www.religare.ru/article49096.htmhttp://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2005/10/20/38620.shtmlhttp://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2005/10/20/38620.shtmlhttp://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2005/10/20/38620.shtmlhttp://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2005/10/20/38620.shtmlhttp://www.religare.ru/article49096.htmhttp://www.religare.ru/article36302.htmhttp://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=reference&div=20http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=reference&div=20http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=reference&div=20http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/socium/internat_ro/dd064525http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/socium/internat_ro/dd0645257/29/2019 Religious Intolerance Among Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia
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Append
ix
Table1.
Orthodox
Muslimtoleranceby
region
Percenta
gesof
Builda
m
osque/
church
Publicly
preach
Publish
religious
mater
ials
Open
religious
schools
Teach
theirfaith
instate
schools
Preachon
television
Docharitable
work
Fundraise
Russia:
Orthodo
x*allowingMuslimsto
57
30
44
44
13
34
63
48
Muslims**allowingOrthodoxto
94
72
80
80
41
74
87
80
Tatarsta
n:
Orthodo
xallowingMuslimsto
94
64
87
86
25
62
95
81
MuslimsallowingOrthodoxto
88
56
76
75
27
62
92
78
Bashkor
tostan:
Orthodo
xallowingMuslimsto
88
67
78
80
34
62
79
74
MuslimsallowingOrthodoxto
85
69
75
66
41
62
78
71
Dagestan:
Orthodo
xallowingMuslimsto
67
33
52
52
19
33
76
48
MuslimsallowingOrthodoxto
61
37
48
47
24
44
63
52
Kabardino-Balkaria:
Orthodo
xallowingMuslimsto
74
32
44
47
25
35
70
70
MuslimsallowingOrthodoxto
64
26
35
34
27
36
60
68
*Orthod
oxfromthesampleofthewholeofRussia(N
1331).
**Muslimsfromnon-Muslimregionsof
Russiaonly(N
48).
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Table 2. Determinants of OrthodoxMuslim tolerance (partial correlations, controlling for the
influence of age, education and city size)
Determinants
Tolerance among
Orthodox towards
Muslims
Tolerance among
Muslims towards
Orthodox
Core religious beliefs and practices:Monotheistic beliefs 0.09**
Christian beliefs 0.08** N/A
Church/mosque attendance 70.07* 70.18***
Prayer frequency 70.16***
Frequency of reading Bible/Quran 70.11**
Near-religious ideology (beliefs about and
attitudes to ones own and other religions):
Belief that all religions should have equal rights 0.30*** 0.12**
Negative views of Islam/Orthodoxy 70.41*** 70.23***
Religious ethnodoxy 70.20*** 70.08*
Non-religious ideology (secular beliefs and attitudes):
Pro-democratic and pro-western views 0.13** 0.11**
Political tolerance 0.12*** 0.30***
Prejudice against ethnic non-Russians/Russians 70.28*** 70.26***
No significant association; *p50.05; **p50.001; ***p50.0001, two-tailed test.
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Religious Intolerance Questionnaire
The questions are translated from the original Russian
Questions to Orthodox Christians Questions to Muslims
In Russia, there are followers of various
religions, including Muslims (the
followers of Islam):
I will read to you some statements about
the Orthodox. Would you say that the
Orthodox should be allowed to do thefollowing or prohibited from doing so:
1. Suppose Muslims wanted to build a
new mosque in our town. Do you
think they should be allowed to do so
or prohibited from doing so?
1. Suppose Orthodox wanted to build a
new church in our town. Do you think
they should be allowed to do so or
prohibited from doing so?
2. And now suppose Muslims started
publicly preaching Islam in our town.
Should they be allowed to do so or
prohibited from doing so?
2. And now suppose Orthodox started
publicly preaching their faith in our
town. Should they be allowed to do so
or prohibited from doing so?
3. What if Muslims wanted to publish
and distribute Islamic newspapers andmagazines in our town?
3. What if Orthodox wanted to publish
and distribute their religious news-papers and magazines in our town?
4. And if Muslims wanted to open an
Islamic school in our town?
4. And if Orthodox wanted to open an
Orthodox school in our town?
5. Now suppose Muslims wanted to
teach the foundations of Islam in state
schools in our town. Should this be
allowed or prohibited to them?
5. Now suppose Orthodox wanted to
teach the foundations of the Orthodox
faith in state schools in our town.
Should this be allowed or prohibited
to them?
6. And if Muslims wanted to preach their
religious views on television?
6. And if Orthodox wanted to preach
their religious views on television?
7. If Muslims wanted to engage incharitable work in our town?
7. If Orthodox wanted to engage incharitable work in our town?
8. And if Muslims in our town started
collecting money and donations for
their religious needs, should they be
allowed to do so or prohibited from
doing so?
8. And if Orthodox in our town started
collecting money and donations for
their religious needs, should they be
allowed to do so or prohibited from
doing so?
Religious Intolerance in Russia 377