Religious Aspects of La Violencia

7/28/2019 Religious Aspects of La Violencia

1/25

Religious Aspects of Colombia's LaViolencia.' Explanations and Implications

SUZANNE DAILEYThe Colombian historian German Arciniegas states that oneof the most sinister features of the civil strife in Colombiaduring the 1950s was "the diabolical confounding of religionwith politics."! La violencia which was a vicious feature in a

decade-long struggle between the nation's two leading politicalparties assumed early in its history religious overtones.' Duringthe two periods of upheaval, numerous national and foreignProtestants suffered restrictions on their civil liberties, propertydamages, and physical attacks. Officials closed schools; mobsharassed Protestant pastors and their congregations and stonedor burned Protestant churches. There were even murders attributed to religious antipathies.'For many North Americans who operate under the assumptionthat the United States has successfully compartmentalized religion and politics, the Colombian scene of the 1950s appearsincomprehensible. That in the mid-twentieth century religiousantagonisms could take the form of blantantly violent attackson minority religious groups seems fantastic. Yet the morerecent eruptions in Ireland have altered that impression and

SUZANNE DAILEY (B.A., St. Mary-of-the-Woods College; M.A., Indiana University; Ph.D., St. Louis University) is Assistant Professor of History at SaintMary-of-the-Woods College, Saint Mary-of-the-Woods, Indiana. This article is basedon the author's findings as presented in her doctoral dissertation, "United States Reactions to the Persecution of Protestants in Colombia During the 1950s."1. German Arciniegas, The State of Latin America, trans. Harriet de Onis (London:Cassel, 1953), p. 182.2. Social scientists in Colombia and throughout the world are still analyzing thenature of la violencia. Generally it appears that the 1946 election and the assassinationof Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in April 1948 were the immediate causes of the civil disorders. The conflict which began as a party contest for national control soon degenerated into irrational and barbaric attacks on many innocent and uninvolved people.Useful sources for understanding this phenomenon are German Guzman Campos,Orlando Fals Borda and Eduardo Umana Luna, La Violencia en Colombia: Estudiode uw Procesco Social, 2 vols. (Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1962-1964) ; JamesL. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven: Yale University Press,1968) ; Orlando Fals Borda, Subversion and Social Change in Colombia" trans. Jacqueline D. Skiles (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Vernon Lee Fluharty,Dance of the Mil iions:Mili tary Rule and Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930-1956(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957) ; and Richard L. Maullin, "Pri-vate War of a Guerrilla." Trans-Action, 7 (March 1970) : 45-54.3. The standard history of the Protestant problem is James E. Goff, "The Persecution of Protestant Christians in Colombia, 1948 to 1958: With an Investigation of ItsBackground and Causes" (Th.D. diss., San Francisco Theological Seminary, 1965).A discussion of this work will appear later in this paper.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom
http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/


2/25

382 CHURCH AND STATEconvinced the world again that such things are possible. Theyare possible because religion and politics are often not easilydissociated. In Colombia they are not dissociated at all.Colombia is a Catholic country. It is Catholic in the sensethat the vast majority if questioned would state, "I am a Catholic." It is Catholic also in the sense that the Roman CatholicChurch has a powerful, distinctive, and almost privileged positionin the state. The Constitution of 1886 while not providing foran officially established church did grant the Catholic Churchspecial protection. Concordats worked out between the Popesand Colombian officials had provisions that granted the churchextensive influence in the national life and especially education."Throughout the period since 1886, the Catholic Church inColombia-unlike the church in other Latin American countries-has retained its influence almost intact. There are no obviousreasons why this occurred in Colombia. The Colombiansociologist Orlando Fals Borda believes that from the earliestcolonial times the Catholic Church was more deeply integratedinto Colombian society than it was in any other Americancountry.' Certainly the long periods of Conservative proclericalrule during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was also afactor. Another plausible explanation presented by Robert H.Dix in Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (1967)is the rise in importance of the Department of Antioquia. Thelargely Basque settlers in this region have since the 1890s beenthe leaders in industrialization and modernization. At the sametime, the area is the most religiously oriented, producing a highproportion of the nation's clergy. The result, Dix concludes,is that in Colombia "modernization and support for the positionof the church . . . coincided rather than conflicted.:"Whatever the cause, the Catholic Church's presence and poweris visible at all levels of life. The Colombian Primate standsalongside the President at official functions. Churchmen playarole in drafting legislation as is evident in the divorce ban-upheld in the national legislature again in 1971-and the lawsrequiring Catholic religious instruction in the public schools.4. For extended treatments of Colombia's political-religious structure, see J. LloydMecham, Church and State in Latin America: A History of Politico-EcclesiasticalRelations, 2d ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), pp. 115-38;U.S., Department of the Army, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Colombia (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), PP. 169-86; and j ames E. Magner, "TheCatholic Church in Colombia," Catholic Historical Review, 26 (July 1940): 195-221.5. Fals Borda, Subversion and Social Change in Colombia, pp. 56-7.6. Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1967), p. 307.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


3/25

COLOMBIA'S LA VIOLENCIA 383

Benjamin Haddox, an American sociologist, in his monograph,"A Sociological Study of the Institution of Religion in Colombia"(1962), concludes that the Catholic Church is the nation'sprincipal institution. It is the church which has given Colombiaits distinctive character and direction. It is the one body thatcuts across all lines of class and race. It is, in this sense-asthe clericals so often assert-the unifying and integrating factorin society."Obviously since most Colombians are Catholics, most membersof the nation's two leading parties, the Conservatives and Liberals, are also Catholics. Nevertheless, it is the ConservativeParty that has traditionally favored the maintenance of thechurch's influential position.

The standard explanation for this is the Conservative philosophical stance. Conservatives place a high valuation on order,discipline, and authority which they view as prerequisites toadministrative efficiency and national progress. Their ideal orderis an aristocracy of merit governing the masses in a paternalisticspirit. To achieve their goals, they have two traditional platforms: centralism and proclericalism. In the Conservatives' view,governmental order and progress require both a strong centralgovernment topped by a powerful executive and a unifyingspiritual order. Since earliest times, the Catholic faith has fulfilled the latter need; and the Conservatives see no reason whythis should not continue to be the case.' They, therefore, favorcontinued civil-ecclesiastical cooperation and stress both its religious and secular benefits."In contrast to the Conservatives, the Liberals express apolitical philosophy that resembles nineteenth-century Europeanliberalism including its characteristic anticlericalism. Positivelythey stress individualism, rationalism, and personal liberties forcitizens and a federalist principle for government. They have led7. Benjamin E. Haddox, "A Sociological Study of the Institution of Religion inColombia" (Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1962), pp. 205-6. Fats Borda seeminglytakes an opposite view when he states "far from ... being an 'element of nationalunity' and 'social order' ... the Catholic religion has been rather a source of conflictand bloody disunity among Colombians" (p. 106). In this instance Fals Borda isanalyzing the religious orientations of the Conservative Party rather than ColombianCatholicism as a whole. Actually reasoning in a very manner, Fals Borda arrives atthe same conclusion made later in this paper-namely, that religion has been and is asource of conflict in Colombian society.8. John D. Martz in Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1962), pp. 11-20, presents a summary of thepolitical philosophies of both the Liberals and Conservatives. See also Dix, pp. 231-55.Both Martz and Dix rely on the views expressed by Colombia's political leaders intheir various writings.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


4/25

384 CHURCH AND STATEin efforts to extend the suffrage, to uphold free speech and press,and to limit the church's civil influence.This explanation while having some validity tends to oversimplify Colombia's political scene. While ideological differenceshave existed in Colombia since Bolivar and Santander's era andhave undoubtedly provided the slogans for division, the realorigin of the present dominant parties is the large landowner-poordependent relationships of the nineteenth century. Under thisalmost feudal arrangement, the landowner supplied protectionand access to the benefits of the national state and the poor

supplied labor. Conformity characterized the campesinos' actsand a politician's role consisted chiefly of rounding up therural folk at election time. Over the years, this system produced not only an aristocratic leadership but also deep politicalallegiances that have persisted to the present." According toDix, these attachments continue and grow through a socialization process in which every Colombian-rich and poor,rural and urban-learns very early "enmity toward one andloyalty toward the other historic party.'?" Furthermore, it is an"enmity" and "loyalty" based not on ideology or programs buton "blood, race, and tradition.?" The net result of these emotional identifications is a complete split in Colombian society."Historically the interplay between these two rival parties hasoften been bitterly sharp. Though loudly debated, ideology andprinciple often give way to opportunism in the actual scramblefor power and its spoils. Once in power a party tends tostrengthen its position by reducing as much as possible theopposition's strength. The American political analyst, John D.Martz, describing this situation, likened Colombia's system to a"voracious jungle," where concession is impossible because itappears weakness, and force is acceptable since it signifiesstrength." Vernon Lee Fluharty in his popular Dance of theMillions (1957) dubbed the parties "two rival bands of brigands,"stating that there was little to distinguish one from the other."Even in normal, non-crisis periods, Colombian politics is a matterof extremes, and charges and countercharges are made at a highpitch. Is The situation becomes more acute when, as often9. Dix, Colombia, p. 211.10. Ibid.11. Ibid.12. Dix draws this conclusion. Payne, whose views are often at variance with Martzand Dix, agrees on this point (p. 133) as does Fals Borda (p. 105).13. Martz, Colombia, p. 19.14. Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, p. 231.15. Martz, Colombia, p. 19.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


5/25

COLOMBIA'S L.A VIOLENCIA 385happens, the mutual attacks often have no real content. Responsible or not, the administration in office is simply fair gamefor merciless attack." Thus the complete polarization of Colombian society, the cultivated bitter hatreds between the twotraditional parties, and the tendency toward extreme and irrational invective make impossible the development of moderategroups." Furthermore, they fasten on Colombia what some calla "climate of violence" which can and sometimes does have tragicconsequences."

Twentieth-century conditions have served only to aggravateColombia's conflict-ridden environment. New problems haveappeared which neither the parties nor the system seems capableof handling. Economic fluctuations, resulting principally fromexpanded international trade during the two world wars and itscontractions during the post-war periods and the rise and fall ofworld coffee prices, have resulted in a seriously inflated currency.The foreign capital inputs, particularly during the 1920s, havestrengthened the country's landed and industrial oligarchs andmade attainment of public office highly desirable. The socialarrangement has created a situation in which the masses inthe face of the elite's growing prosperity realize only a slightmaterial gain."

More important, a genuine popular awakening has made itpossible for these factors to affect the workings of Colombiansociety. Starting in the interwar years, air travel and improvedcommunications began breaking down Colombia's geographic isolation and injecting into society new ideas about man's possibilities. Urbanization and the rapid population growth forcedmany into close contact and furthered the dissemination of thenew proletarian doctrines of socialism, communism, and militantunionism. For Fluharty, this process's dramatic culmination wasthe 1929 Santa Marta strike. This incident, in which police shotdown the striking banana workers, demonstrated not only the]6. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia, pp. 298-300.17. A distinctive feature of Colombia's political life is the persistent strength of thenation's two traditional parties. Third parties, such as socialist and communist groupsand personalist parties like Gaitan's Union N acional Izquierdista Revolucia:naria,Gilberto Alzate Avendano's Acci6n Nacionalista Popular, and Gustavo Rojas Pinilla'sAliansa N acional Popular, have at times captured some attention but none so far havesurvived for long or successfully challenged the dominant parties. Reformers havetraditionally found it necessary to cast their lots with the traditional parties and hopefor change from within the system.18. Dix, Colombia, p. 215.19. Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, p. 19; and Fals Borda, Subversion and SocialChange in Colombia, pp. 118-26.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


6/25

386 CHURC'H AND STATEworkers' new self-consciousness but also the government's inability to respond positively to popular needs."

In the face of these developments, party attachments continued into the twentieth century; but the old slogans came tomean less and less. By 1930 the centralism-federalism issue wasdead. As for the church question, many Liberals were willing toabandon their staunch anticlericalism and assume a position ofneutrality and indifference." Politicians, aware of the changedspirit, cast about for new issues to stimulate debate. Accordingto David Bushnell, a noted Colombian scholar, this search's longrange result was the intensification of Colombia's political extremism. No moderate could build up a following or gain anaudience. Instead, among Conservatives, it was the "irrationalagitator" types who gained most strength during the 1930s and1940s. Proposing cure-all schemes of right-wing totalitarianism,they angrily attacked the Liberals with accusations of demagoguery and anarchism and of anticlericalism and atheism.Among Liberals, the swing was toward social reform as thesepoliticians did their best to appear the champions of a neworder and the forces of progress." In reality, neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals could afford much change in thestatus quo.Despite the verbiage, it appears that by the 1940s Colombianpolitics was largely non-ideological. The real difference betweenthe two contending groups was the difference between being inand out of power, Yet despite the time and circumstances,there was one issue on which Conservatives and Liberals continued to express divergent views-that was the Roman CatholicChurch. Whether from conviction, tradition, or expediency,Conservatives and Liberals still identified themselves as defendersor opponents of the church's position in the Colombian state.Certainly extremist pressures were a large factor in keeping theclerical issue alive. Then too the simple existence of a churchstate arrangement unique at this time in the Western Hemisphere could not fail to' arouse comment and debate. Whateverthe reason, the church issue was by the mid-twentieth century animportant factor distinguishing between the two parties."Although never forcefully stated until well after the Protestant difficulties began, this fact is crucial for understanding20. Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, p. 19.21. Ibid., p. 42.22. David Bushnell, "What Happened to Democracy in Colombia?" Current History,24. (January 1953) : 39.23. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia, p. 82.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


7/25

COLOMBIA'S L.:4 VIOLENCIA 387the religious aspects of the violence of the 1950s. Colombia-.acountry where political divisions run deep, where the end ofpolitical activity is the office, and where the only real partydistinction is the church issue-provided a setting where theCatholic Church could and often did become deeply involvedin national politics. Usually this involvement took the form of aclose identification of the church with the proclerical faction.While on the surface the Conservative Party-Roman CatholicChurch connection was one of mutual dependence in such mundane matters as money and political endorsements, the relationship went much deeper." During periods of Conservative rule,the church appeared the chief supporter of all party actions.If the church objected to some Conservative policies, it had adifficult time dissociating itself from them or even expressingdisapproval." Whether this was the case with the Protestantsduring the 1950s is very hard to ascertain. No Catholic apologistwriting between 1948 and 1960 in either the United States orColombia ever maintained that it was. Yet there is evidencethat some of the hierarchy objected to the outrageous activitiesagainst the Protestants and attempted to make themselvesheard." Eduardo Ospina, the chief spokesman for the ColombianCatholic Hierarchy, continually maintained that the CatholicChurch had no part in the matter." Significantly Richard Pattee,a Catholic historian and former State Department official, in1944 had expressed alarm over Colombia's Conservative PartyRoman Catholic Church arrangement precisely because it madeit difficult if not impossible for the church to repudiate unacceptable party positions. Pattee referred specifically to theConservative newspaper El Siglo and criticized it for representingitself as the "Catholic" mouthpiece." El Siglo was the paper ofLaureano Gomez, the president and dictator of Colombia from1949 to 1953. It was during the Gomez era that the Protestantattacks were most frequent and vicious.24. Gustavo N. Roa, "Colombia Church in Crisis," Jesuit Missions, 39 (December1965) : 32.25. Implicit in Payne's reasoning is the thesis that despite the Catholic Church's tieswith the Conservative Party, the church maintains a degree of independence notappreciated by the untrained observer. Individual churchmen possess a freedom ofaction which renders them capable of participating or not participating in the politicalarena or of siding with one party or the other (pp. 80-2). Expressing this independence is difficult.26. Hispanic American Report, May 1949, p. 12; and Arciniegas, The State of LatinAmerica, pp. 181-2.27. Eduardo Ospina, The Protestant Denominations in Colombia, trans. by author(Bogota: National Press, 1964), p. 66.28. Richard Pattee, "Do We Really Understand the Church in Latin America?"America, 29 January 1944, p. 457.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


8/25

388 CHURCH AND STATEGiven Colombia's political-religious situation, it is not difficult to understand how a phenomenon like the politically-rooted

violencia developed religious overtones. Religion and politics arefar less separated in Colombia than they are in the United States.Furthermore, religion is not just involved in politics, it is-orat least it has the potential of becoming-a political issue. Ifinterparty trouble develops, it is hard to see how the church canremain completely aloof.The second aspect of Colombia's political-religious situationrequires little development since it is within the experience of

today's thinking adults. From the sixteenth century until justrecently, the relationships between Protestants and Catholicsalmost anywhere in the world were far from amiable. Catholicslooked upon Protestants as heretics, and Protestants took a dimview of many Catholic practices. There was little exchange ofviews or appreciation of one another's faith convictions evenamong theologians. The intercourse between the two religionswas usually competitive, often taking the form of verbal denunciations of the rival's dogma or discrimination against its members. The incidents of Protestant-Catholic cooperation were fewand far between.This was true in the United States where Catholics formed asizeable minority and often associated with Protestants professionally and socially. It was also true in Colombia whereProtestants constituted a very small minority and where mostCatholics had few, if any, contacts with Protestants."One significant feature of the Colombian scene in the immediate pre-violence period was the fact that both Protestants andCatholics saw their respective positions as worsening. Bothbelieved they were losing ground to their competitor.The basis for Catholic apprehension was the growing numberof Protestants and their obvious fervor. Although there had beenscattered Protestant missions in Colombia since the mid-nineteenth century, real Protestant growth began after World War1.30 Three factors account for its advance at that time: friendliness, or at least indifference, on the part of several Colombian29. According to Anglican Bishop David Reed, former Bishop of Bogota, Protestantspresently constitute one percent of Colombia's total population. The Criterion (Indianapolis), 5 May 1972, p. 4.30. To date there is no authoritative history of Colombian Protestantism. The bestis Francisco Ord6nez's Historic del Christianismo Euonqelico en Colombia (Cali: LaAlianza Christiana y Misionera, 1956), a book prepared to commemorate the centennial of Colombian Protestantism. Goff has a section on this topic, PP. 42-53, asdoes Suzanne Dailey in "United States Reactions to the Persecution of Protestants.inColombia during the 1950s" (Ph.D. diss., St. Louis University, 1971), pp. 73-103.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


9/25

COLONfBIA'S LA VIOLENCIA 389

governments during the inter-war years; the organizational workand encouragement of the Committee for Cooperation in LatinAmerica, a group founded in 1913 to coordinate evangelicalmission activity; and the closing out of the missionaries from theFar East.Although all three factors worked together, the closing of the

Far Eastern missions attracted the most attention. While forcenturies this area had absorbed most of the energies of missionary groups, the inter-war troubles in China-the civil warand the Japanese invasion-and the likelihood of problems elsewhere in Southeast Asia made the missionaries' position thereuncertain. Considering this circumstance in 1938 at the ThirdWorld Missionary Council at Madras, President John A. Mackayasked the delegates to turn their attention to Latin America. Thisarea's linguistic and cultural unity, its friendly governments,and its nearness to the United States made it appear an attractiveplace for North American evangelism. Although some ecumenically-conscious delegates maintained-as they had earlier atsimilar meetings when the Latin American question arose-thata movement into Latin America was undesirable since it wouldaffront the Roman Catholic Church, Mackay discounted theirobjections." Despite the Catholics' claim that they had or werechristianizing Latin America, Mackay reasoned, Christian lifethere was clearly decadent and in need of the vivifying influenceof the evangelical message."The interest aroused by Mackay heightened as the Far Easternsituation deteriorated. Missionaries and monies that earlierwould have gone to the Orient went into Latin America. In 1952Alberto Remboa in "The Latin American Miracle" pointed out

that over the first half of the twentieth century Protestantmissionaries increased in Latin America at a faster rate than inWilliam R. Estep, jr., in Colombia: Land of Conflict and Promise (Nashville: Convention Press, 1968) treats briefly of Protestantism's background, pp. 28-55. A shorttreatment by an early Colombian missionary is Charles P. Chapman, "Our ColombianField: Some Early History," Gospel Message, 56 (April 1948) : 2-3.31. There are several works that treat of the debate within world Protestantismover t.he advisability of Latin American evangelism. Particularly useful ar e DavidP. Gaines, The World Council of Churches: A Study of Its Background and History(Peterborough, New Hampshire: Richard R. Smith, 1966); Ruth Rouse and StephenCharles Neill, eds., A History of the Ecumenical Movement, 1517-1948 (Philadelphia:Westminster Press, 1967) ; and William R. Read, Victor M. Monterrosa, and HarmonA. Johnson, Latin American Church Growth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1969).32. John A. Mackay, President of Princeton Theological Seminary during the 1940s,presented his most complete analysis of Latin American Catholicism in The 0 theySpanish Christ: A Study of the Spiritual History of Spa,in and South America (NewYark: Macmillan, 1933).

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


10/25

390 CHURCH AND STATE

any other mission area. "Whereas in the whole field 'newchurches' have grown from one in 1900 to six in 1950, the ratiofor Latin America is one to ten," he states." Frank W. Price ofthe Missionary Research Library stated that from 1935 to 1955the number of North American Protestant missionaries in LatinAmerica increased by 237 percent." Writing a year later, John J.Considine, the Maryknoll priest who encouraged the post-WorldWar II Catholic missionary effort in Latin America, pointed outthat in the mid-1950s "one in four of all North American Protestant missionaries overseas were in Latin' America.':"The results of these endeavors were amazing. Interpolatingfrom his statistical survey of Latin American Protestantism,Prudencio Damboriena noted that the net increase in LatinAmerican Protestantism indicates that more Catholics becameProtestants in that area during the twentieth century than inEurope during the Reformation era."Although not the scene of the greatest Protestant advance,

Colombia reflected the general Latin American trend. Statisticsfrom various surveys indicate a rise in both foreign personnel andtotal membership. Figures from the World Christian Handbookindicate that in 1952 there were approximately 146 foreignmissionaries in Colombia, 1957 there were 279, in 1962 therewere 466, and in 1968 there were 406.37 Likewise total membership grew in the same tables from 11,325 (1952), to 14,317(1957), to 36,568 (1962), and to 64,954 (1968). A census takenby a Protestant organization shows that during the height ofthe violence period (1948-1953) total church membership grewfrom 7,908 to 11,958, or a growth of 51 percent."Contributing to Protestantism's increase in Colombia was agrowing spirit of cooperation among the various groups. Whereas

33. Alberto Rembao, "The Latin American Miracle," Christian World Facts, 32(1952) : 3.34. E. J. Bingle and Kenneth Grubb, eds., World Christian Ha:ndbook 1957 (London:World Dominion Press, 1957), p. xix.35. John J. Considine, New Horizons in Latin America (New York: Dodd Mead,1958), p. 240.36. Interpolations from Prudencio Damboriena's EI Protestantismo en AmericaLatina, 2 vols. (Bogota: Oficina Internacional de Investigaciones Sociales de FERES,1962-1963) as published in National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), NewRelease, 15 April 1965, p, 1.37. E. J. Bingle and Kenneth Grubb, eds., World Christian Handbook 1952 (London:World Dominion Press, 1952), pp, 227-8; Bingle and Grubb, Handbook 1957, pp.127-8; H. Wakelin Coxill and Kenneth Grubb, eds., World Christian Handbook 1962(London: World Dominion Press, 1962), pp. 134-5; H. Wakelin Coxill and KennethGrubb, eds., World Christian Ha,ndbook 1968 (London: Lutterworth, 1967), pp. 136-7.38. Goff, "The Persecution of Protestant Christians in Colombia," pp. 44-5.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


11/25


earlier Protestant missionary work had been scattered and isolated, in the 1940s under the prodding of Samuel Guy Inman ofthe Committee for Cooperation in Latin America, the Protestantgroups began pooling their efforts. In 1942 eighteen missionsformed the Evangelical Mission Officers Council. This organization arranged comity agreements and helped various groups planevangelical programs. In 1950 the Evangelical Confederation ofColombia (CEDEC) replaced this organization. According toits leaders CEDEC membership in 1950 represented 90 percentof the Colombian Protestant community." Although during itsearly years, CEDEC devoted most of its efforts to problemsrelating to the violence, it did arrange regional conferences todiscuss broad mission problems. CEDEC at this time succeededin drawing into cooperative enterprises representatives from boththe historical and non-historical churches." Since members ofthe latter groups were often averse to interdenominational work,this was a noteworthy achievement."James E. Goff, a Presbyterian minister who in the 1950s wasprobably one of the most important Protestants in Colombia,looks back on these post-World War II years as something of the"golden years" of Colombian Protestantism. Their numbers wererelatively large and growing and there existed a spirit, a dedication, and an optimism that made work there seem exciting."It is hardly any wonder that individuals or groups who consideredthe Protestants a danger became alarmed by the state of Protestantism at the time. Catholic churchmen especially beganlooking askance.Yet despite their evident vigor, Protestants too had groundsfor fear. Although they operated outside the political arena,they tended to feel that their safety and freedom depended upon"friendly" governments-and in Colombia these would beLiberal governments. Protestants feared the Conservatives' proclericalism and looked upon the Liberals' philosophy as closer to

39. Ibid., p. 45.40. In general the historical churches are the traditional Protestant denominationssuch as the Episcopalians, Lutherans, and Presbyterians. Non-historical churches arethe so-called "fr inge groups" that do not belong to the mainstream of Protestantthought. Pentecostals and fundamentalists are usually but not always non-historical.See Robert Kenneth Strachan, The Missionary Movement of the Non-HistoricalGroups in Latin America (New York: Committee on Cooperation in Latin America,J957). pp. 1-3.41. Undoubtedly much of CEDEC's success related to the necessity for Protestantunity in those troubled times.42. National Council of the Churches of Christ, Problem of Potoer (film, 1970).

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


12/25

392 CHURCH AND STATEtheir own." Furthermore, circumstances had seemingly demonstrated that their troubles were fewer under Liberal regimes.Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, Liberal governmentsheld power in Colombia. In 1946 the Liberal Party split andlost the presidential election. The story of Colombian politicsfrom the 1946 election to the violent eruption of April 1948,known as the bogotazo, is long, complicated, and tragic. Inessence the Conservative President Mariano Ospina Perez,although widely respected and a moderate himself, experiencedgreat difficulty in carrying on normal government under thepressure of extremists in both parties. Particularly upsetting werethe activities of the left-wing Liberal Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, along-time labor reform advocate and a genuine hero among theColombian masses. To foster cooperation in this crisis, OspinaPerez formed a coalition government; but this failed to bring aremedy. Some interparty fighting erupted, and a threat of forcehung over the nation. Throughout this time, Protestants becameincreasingly anxious." They feared the disorders and whatappeared a growing Conservative consolidation.By 1948 then Colombia was a deeply troubled land. Thesituation was explosive politically and to a degree religiouslyalso. Divisions were deep and irreconcilable. There were no legalmechanisms for handling difficulties.Then on 9 April 1948, the tensions in Colombia suddenlysnapped. While hemispheric leaders met in Bogota for the Ninth

International Conference of the American States, an assassintook Gaitan's life. Immediately rioting broke out in the city.Within a few days, the burnings, pillagings, and lootings destroyedlarge sections of the capital and took the lives of some twothousand people. In the succeeding weeks the disorders spreadonto the countryside where Liberals and Conservatives attackedeach other mercilessly. Amid this turmoil, Ospina Perez attempted to hold his government together until the 1949 elections.43. Goff, "The Persecution of Protestant Christians in Colombia," p. 54.44. The first reports of Protestant apprehensions and difficulties appeared in theUnited States in the news magazines of the sponsoring organizations. Examples arethe Gospel Message (Kansas City, Missouri) of the Gospel Missionary Union,Missionary Broadcaster (Chicago) of the Scandinavian Alliance Mission of NorthAmerica, Alliance Weekly (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania) of the Christian and Missionary Alliance, and Commission (Richmond) of the Southern Baptist Foreign Missions. Few of the early reports were feature stories with shocking headlines. Instead,the majority appeared tucked away in those "letters from the field" sections that characterize mission-appeals publications. This was true despite the fact that some storiesinvolved violent incidents.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


13/25


But the Liberals, increasingly suspicious of Conservative motivation and alarmed by the escalation of violence, withdrew from thecoalition and at the last minute also from the balloting." As aresult, the right-wing Conservative candidate Laureano Gomezwon an unchallenged election.Authoritarian, anti-democratic, and proclerical, LaureanoGomez incarnated a political philosophy similar to that whichundergirded Franco's Spanish policies. During the 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 ~period, Gomez either directly or through his designated substitute, Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez, exercised near-dictatorialpowers. He censored the press and strictly limited all politicalactivities. While he tried to quell the rural violence, his policeforce often only aggravated the troubles. By mid-1953 oneestimate put the average monthly political death toll at onethousand.Aroused by the continued troubles, the military under theleadership of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla engineered a coupand established the General as President." Viewed as a welcomechange, Rojas Pinilla at first received the support of importantsegments of both political parties and the Catholic Church.During his first year, with amnesty offers and promises of rehabilitation to guerrillas who agreed to stop fighting, he reducedconsiderably the violence level. Despite his success in this regard,other policies worked to erode his popularity. Sensitive to personal and political criticism, he often reacted harshly to opposition. His worst and most sensational action was the 1956 BullRing Massacre in which the police viciously clubbed those whofailed to salute the presidential banner." In May 1957, thearmy-realizing it had merely replaced one dictator with another-acted again. This time it removed Rojas Pinilla from officeand established a military junta which ruled Colombia for a yearbefore returning the government to civilian hands. The newarrangement, known as the National Front, was essentially acompromise government in which the parties agreed to alternatethe presidency every four years and to share equally the toppolitical posts for a period of sixteen years (1958-1974). Tenyears of the bloodiest civil war in twentieth century WesternHemispheric history alone brought the parties to this point ofcompromise and cooperation.45. The brother of the Liberal candidate was killed shortly before the Novemberelection.46. This was an unusual step for the Colombian military.47. "The Bull Ring Massacre," Time, 20 February 1956, p. 38.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


14/25

394 CHURCH AND STATEMany people died in the civil war. The usual estimate is200,000.48 There were few Colombians that were not in some

ways touched. The Protestants too were touched. Many werevictims of the violence. They were beaten, harassed, and sometimes had to flee for their lives. A number of Protestants died.From the evidence available, what appears to have happenedfrequently is that the Conservatives attacked the Protestantsbecause the Conservatives viewed them not only as religiousenemies but also as allies of the Liberals."The Protestants frequently charged that Catholic priests led

or inspired the attacks. This could well have been the case,particularly in rural regions. The clergymen there were a breedof their own. They were often men of little education whoexercised within the narrow confines of their jurisdiction considerable influence. They could become jealous and fearful of anywho challenged their social position. This the Protestant missionaries did not only by their presence but also by their evangelization programs which often expressed hostility toward Catholicism. For this reason it is not surprising that in the heatof civil strife they turned upon this enemy."Another explanation for the religious turn of events rests onthe person and character of Laureano Gomez. Gomez was notjust a Conservative politician. He was the Conservative of Conservatives. He was authoritarian, xenophobic, and devoted toa type of Hispanicism that combined Catholicism with a clericalcivil state such as had existed in Spain in the sixteenth century.

He had a penchant for turning all campaigns into religiouscrusades. Both in 1946 when he ran for office and during histerm, he frequently branded his opponents "atheists," "Communists," and "Protestants" and called the civil war a strugglefor the Christian order." Gomez, therefore, either unconsciouslyor deliberately injected religious fanaticism into the civil strife.48. Harry Bernstein, Venezuela and Colombia (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:Prentice Hall, 1964), p, 71. Some claim this is a conservative estimate.49. In the various studies of the Protestant difficulties, this point is made by some andseemingly denied by others. Dailey treats this issue throughout her cited work.50. Pat M. Holt, Colombia Today and Tomorrow (New York: Praeger, 1964), p.179. Holt stresses the division between the upper clergy and rural priests and pointsout that frequently the former could not curb the latter's fanaticism. This controlbreakdown is unappreciated by those who view the church as a monolithic structure.See Henry L. McCorkle, "What Should We Do about Colombia?" Presbyterian Life,7 June 1952, p, 7; and "Soft Answers at New Haven," The Christian Century, 28August 1957, p. 1006.51. Abelardo Patino B., "The Political Ideas of the Liberal and ConservativeParties in Colombia during the 1946-1953 Crisis," (Ph.D. diss., American University1954), pp. 154-5.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


15/25


He thereby unleashed many inter-religious antagonisms that werejust beneath the surface of Colombian life.Actually it is impossible to measure the full extent of theanti-Protestant outrages of this period. There is now no evidenceavailable that can supply a precise answer and there probablynever will be. The knowledge that we have today of the Protestants' situation is mainly the work of one man-James E. Goff.In 1951 CEDEC commissioned Goff and a companion, LorentzD. Emery, to undertake a study of the problem. According toGoff, the two traveled extensively in Colombia during 1951 and

1952 contacting witnesses and victims to what they by thentermed the "persecution.v" Goff's purpose was to documentthe Protestants' plight and eventually publish a report. Earlyin 1952 CEDEC leaders-concerned now that the world knowof the Protestants' suffering-decided not to wait for a fullaccount but to publish periodic reports of the incidents as theyoccurred. The results were the Confederation Bulletins, a seriesof eighty-one reports which CEDEC sent to missionary organizations, civil and religious leaders, and news services throughoutthe world." The first Bulletin came out in February 1952 andcontained twenty-three mimeographed pages recording twentythree persecution incidents. Subsequently until 1963 similar,though often shorter, Bulletins reached their destinations atirregular intervals. During the 1952 to 1959 period the Bulletinsdealt exclusively with the persecution. James E. Goff, thensecretary of CEDEC's information office, translated the Bulletins52. Goff, "The Persecution of Protestant Christians in Colombia," p, 11.53. Some indication of the extent of the Bulletins' circulation appears from severalavailable mailing lists. Bulletin 4 (20 June 1952) states: "Copies of all CEDECbulletins have been sent to the following persons or organizations: United NationsCommission on Human Rights; Organization of American States; Pan AmericanUnion; President Harry S. Truman; Secretary of State Dean Acheson; UnderSecretary of State Edward G. Miller; The World Council of Churches; The NationalCouncil of Churches of Christ in America; The National Association of Evangelicals;Home Boards of Missionary Societies which work in Colombia; Associated Press;United Press; France Press; International News Service; Religious News Service;Pope Pius XII; Vatican Cardinal officials; Cardinal Spellman; and the editors ofleading secular and religious publications throughout the world." A partial list available at the National Association of Evangelicals (Washington, D.C.) adds ReutersNews Service. A longer list, dated 1958, available at the same depository gives someindication of the specific editors and public figures receiving the Bulletins at that date.The New York Times, Time, The Christian Century, Christian Science Monitor,Hispanic American Report, and Presbyterian. Life were regular recipients. John A.Mackay, Clyde W. Taylor (National Association of Evangelicals), William StanleyRycroft (a Presbyterian missiologist), Stuart Herman (Secretary for Latin Americaof the National Lutheran Council), C. Emanuel Carlson (Baptis t Joint Committee onPublic Affairs), John E. Kelly (Director of Information of the National CatholicWelfare Conference), the United States Secretary and Under Secretary of State,seven other State Department officials, Senator Wayne Morse (Foreign RelationsCommittee) and the Colombian Ambassador also received Bulletins.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


16/25

396 CHURCH AND STATEinto English and supervised their distribution in the UnitedStates.In 1965 Goff drew together all his information in a dissertationpresented to the San Francisco Theological Seminary. In "ThePersecution of Protestant Christians in Colombia, 1948 to 1958;With an Investigation of Its Background and Causes," Goffcatalogues and numbers the Protestant grievances under suchheadings as "Violence Against Persons," "Violence AgainstProperty," "Denials of Personal Rights," "Harassments," and"Interferences with Religious Practices." He states that "a total

of 2,406 acts of violent persecution are documented in the filesof the Evangelical Confederation of Colombia" and lists 126Colombian Protestants "killed because of their religion.?" Healso details some of the more sensational stories such as theMorales abduction case and the arrest and humiliation of WilliamEaston, a Scottish missionary."Goff admits, and it is evident to anyone who studies his work,that his is no impartial presentation. He was a partisan, andalthough he tried conscientiously to present the Protestant casefairly, he nonetheless treats the case from the viewpoint of aninvolved party. Despite this circumstance, Goff's work is impressive and convincing. He establishes beyond all doubt thatthere were anti-Protestant elements in the civil disorders of the1950s. Although controversy surrounds some specific recordedevents and some scholars complain that Goff leaves the impression of a more widespread problem than actually existed,nevertheless, there is no question concerning his thesis that something resembling a religious persecution existed in Colombiaduring this era."54. Goff, "The Persecution of Protestant Christians in Colombia," pp, 121 and 138.55. According to Bulletin 11 (28 August 1953), a public school principal removedtwo boys, sons of a Protestant widow, from school without their mother's knowledge.'He handed them over to a Jesuit who in turn put them in a Catholic orphanage. Thereason for the action as stated by the priest was the necessity of keeping children fromtheir "apostate mother." After much effort, the mother got the authorities to returnthe boys.William C. Easton was a missionary in Tolima in 1951. While he was conductinga religious service on 5 June 1951, police interrupted the service and arrested him andtwo Colombian attendants. During the night police beat the three, subiected them tohumiliating trials, threatened their lives before releasing them the next day. Eastonlater incorporated this and his other Colombian experiences in Colombian Conflict(London: Christian Literature Crusade, 1954).56. Dailey, "United States Reactions to the Persecution of Protestants," pp. 219-34.Eugene K. Culhane in "Colombia and U.S. 'Missionaries'" (America, 28 March 1958,pp, 656-9) reports of tracing one recorded persecution incident and finding politicalrather than religious, antipathies responsible for a Colombian youth's death. MichaelDerrick in Spain and Colombia: The Position of Protestants (London: CatholicTruth Society, 1955) criticizes the Protestant reports for not noting the generalviolence problem in Colombia during the persecution period (pp. 9-14).

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


17/25


Besides Goff's work there are no other documents or studiesof the Protestant problem that have any value. Several timesduring the 1950s, there were calls for impartial studies but noneever materialized." The result is that today very little is knownof what actually happened in Colombia at the time.Curiously this lack of concrete evidence did not prevent agreat deal of discussion of the events. Since the majority of themissionaries who formed the nucleus of the Colombian Protestantcommunities were from the United States," the North Americanpress printed much CEDEC material. Publications such as theNew York Times and the popular news weeklies ran numerousarticles as did the specialized Hispanic American Report. Understandably the widest coverage and the most heated articles appeared in the confessional press-in Protestant and Catholicnewspapers and magazines. Here literally hundreds of articlesover the decade treated the "persecution" issue.A review of these sources makes two facts apparent: therewere sharp divisions between the Protestant and Catholic presentations, and neither side changed its stance in the leastduring the period from 1948 to 1960.59Briefly the Protestant thesis maintained that the CatholicChurch bore ultimate responsibility for the Protestant difficulties.According to their reasoning, the Catholic Hierarchy-alarmedby the Protestants' increasing numbers and their success inevangelism-determined to halt Protestantism's spread. Takingadvantage of the Conservatives' return to power, the church usedits influence within the party to pressure government officials toassume a position hostile to the Protestants' presence. With theoutbreak of the violence, clerics encouraged physical attacks,harassments, and restrictions on Protestants' freedom of movement. Thus, the Protestants concluded, in the 1950s thereexisted in Colombia a concerted government-church effort tolimit and possibly eliminate Colombian Protestantism."The Catholics in their turn presented a "standard" interpretation. While never denying Protestant difficulties during thist i m e ~ they stressed that the persecution reports were exaggerated57. James E. Goff, "The Ligutti Proposal" (unpublished manuscript, NationalAssociation of Evangelicals, Washington, 1958), p. 1; and "Monsignor Ligutti Proposes Inquiry in Colombia," The Christian Century, 8 February 1953, p. 182.58. Bingle and Grubb, Handbook 1957, p. xix.59. Dailey, "United States Reactions to the Persecution of Protestants," pp, 144-211.60. Two representative summaries are William Stanley Rycroft, "Bitter Struggle inColombia," The Christian Century, 1 February 1950, pp. 140-2: and Clyde W. Taylor,"The Persecution of Protestants in South America" (pamphlet; Chicago: The National Association of Evangelicals, 1950).

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


18/25

398 CHURCH AND STATEand often false," that the Catholic Hierarchy had no part in thematter," and that most, if not all, the Protestants' problemsresulted from political rather than religious opposition. According to the Catholics, since the Colombian Protestants had traditionally supported the Liberal Party, during the interpartystruggles of the 1950s the Conservatives identified the Protestants with the Liberals and attacked them along with CatholicLiberals." Furthermore, they argued, most Colombians associated Protestantism with Yankeeism; and, therefore, risingnationalistic feelings account for much anti-Protestant sentimerit." Finally, Catholics frequently maintained that the Protestants often brought problems upon themselves. Their evangelization programs had large doses of anti-Catholicism whichannoyed their Catholic neighbors. Simple Catholics interpretedthis as a holy threat and reacted strongly in this period whenviolence was part of the climate of life."

The static nature of the Protestant and Catholic stands duringthis period has several explanations, and an examination of themsheds light on the whole persecution issue. One reason for theendless repetition was the sheer impossibility of determining thetruth in the accusations. There simply was no objective evidence.CEDEC provided almost all the persecution stories, and Catholics drew rebuttal material mainly from the Jesuit EduardoOspina and his "official" answer-The Protestant Denominationsin Colombia (1953). Another equally important reason involvesthe state of Protestant-Catholic relations in both Colombia andthe United States at the time. In Colombia the Protestantsuntil this period while tolerated were never warmly accepted bythe majority of the people. The Catholic clergy viewed themissionary leaders as competitors for the masses' spiritual allegiance, while others resented them because they were mostlyNorth Americans. In the United States, inter-faith relationswere also strained.Eugene Carson Blake, the American leader of the WorldCouncil of Churches, called the 1950s the "cold war" period in

61. Culhane. "Colombia and U. S. Missionaries," pp. 656-9; and "Persecution inColombia," View, 21 (June 1957) : 7.62. "A Leftist Lie," Ave Maria, 23 February 1952, p. 227; and Eduardo Ospina," 'Persecution' of Protestants in Colombia," National Catholic Almanac, 1958 (Patter-son, New Jersey: 81. Anthony Guild, 1958), p. 352.63. Paul S. Lietz, "Protestants in Colombia," America, 26 June 1954, p. 335.64. NCWC. News Release, 17 Aug-ust 1954. p. 5.65. Albert]. Nevins, "Whipping Boy for Bigots," Sign, 33 (September 1952) : 29.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


19/25


United States Protestant-Catholic relations." There were variousreasons for this. One propounded by the Jewish sociologist WillHerberg was the sudden realization in the post-World War IIera that Protestantism was no longer the majority religion inAmerica. By 1945 the many sons of the earlier Catholic immigrants had completed their acculturation and assimilation process,and Catholicism began emerging as a religion of equal importancein American life." The result was a reawakening of old fearsand prejudices. Certain conservative Protestants became concerned over growing Catholic influence in American life.In this circumstance, verbal confrontations occurred over anumber of issues. Because of the prominence of the Catholicschools question, Protestant-Catholic debates often centeredaround church-state issues. Protestants denounced Catholics asanti-democratic and alien to the American spirit." In 1948 withthe publication of American Freedom and Catholic Power, themilitant secularist Paul Blanshard began his powerful attacks.

That same year a group of Protestant leaders formed Protestantsand Other Americans United for the Separation of Church andStates (POAU), an organization which took as a primary goalto oppose the appropriation of public funds to parochial schools."Catholics, in their turn, reacted to these attacks on their churchstate policies. During the 1950s Catholic intellectuals issued aspate of materials explaining Catholic doctrine and demonstrating its basic compatibility with American life and institutions."In this atmosphere of interfaith bickering, the Colombianissue had little chance for an impartial hearing. This was particularly true because the Colombian problem was not just aProtestant-Catholic confrontation but a debate over church-state

66. "Protestant-Roman Catholic Relations: New Patterns to Come?" PresbyterianLiie, 1 December 1959, p. 22. See also Leonard Loving Curry, "Protestant-CatholicRelations in America Since World War I: Historical Developments and HumanisticExpressions" (Ph.D., diss., Florida State University, 1967).67. Will Herberg, Proiestant-Caiholic-I eWJ 2d ed. (Garden City, New Jersey: Doubleday, 1960), p. 235.68. Even such long-time advocates of ecumenism as Protestant theologian ReinholdNiebuhr stressed the overriding importance of the church-state question in interfaithdiscourse. Reinhold Niebuhr, "A Protestant Looks at Catholicism," Commomoeal,8 May 1953, p, 117.69. Luke Eugene Ebersole, Church Lobb}'ing in the Ntuion: Capital (New York:Macmillan, 1951), pp. 72-3.70. The most outstanding Catholic spokesman was John Courtney Murray. Murraycriticized the church for not updating its pronouncements on political philosophy andyet maintained that the church's traditional stand if properly understood was nohindrance to Catholic participation in American life. A summary of his thoughts isJohn Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960).

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


20/25

400 CHURCH AND STATErelations. For many Protestants the persecution seemed veryrelevant because it involved a situation where "Rome" seeminglydictated national policy. This fear of Rome has a long historyamong certain American Protestants whom Thomas G. Sandersin his scholarly and perceptive study of Protestant philosophieslabels Separationists." According to, Sanders, the Separationists- b y far the largest and most vocal strain of American Protestantism-express an oversimplified, non-theological view ofchurch-state relations, put an exaggerated emphasis on the socalled "wall of separation," and apply this strict wall againstCatholics only." The great bulk of the North American Protestant missionaries in Colombia and their spokesmen in the UnitedStates belong to this Separationist group." John Mackay, thenPresident of Princeton Theological Seminary, was a charterPOAU member. Another was Clyde Taylor of the NationalAssociation of Evangelicals, a group which coordinated thepersecution propaganda in the United States. James E. Goffwas a Princeton theology student during Mackay's administration and worked closely with the National Association of Evangelicals.For these men the Colombian issue contained everything theyfeared and so strenuously opposed in the United States. Theso-called Conservative Party-Roman Catholic alliance was themedieval union of church and state-complete with bishops andpriests engaged in secret machinations to eliminate enemies.

The Church's resistance to the Protestant missionaries was theInquisition renewed, and the influence exercised by the clergyover education was a moral violation of man's right to freeinquiry. In short, Colombia was an example of what couldhappen in the United States should Catholics become dominant."Sanders' thoughts lead to an even deeper understanding ofthe Colombian problem. According to Sanders, the Separationiststrace their origin in the United States to the Baptists, theVirginia Presbyterians, and the East coast Congregational

71. Thomas Griffin Sanders, Protestant Concepts of Church and State: HistoricalBackarounds and Approaches for the Future (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 165.72. Ibid., pp. 209-12.73. In their journalistic discussion religious liberty was always central and especiallyso after 1953when the violent attacks were fewer and the government more restricting.See Richard M. Fagley, "Colombia: Major Issues," The Christian Century, 9 April1958, pp. 434-6; and Miner Searle Bates, "Policy Crisis in Catholic Colombia," TheChristian Century, 30 June 1954, pp. 786-8.74. On occasion Protestant publications carried sensational persecution stories alongside articles noting the fearful rise of Catholic power in America.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


21/25

COLOMBIA'S LA VIOLENCIA 401churches. They have always been at the center of American lifeand intimately connected with its cultural development. Theytake pride in the part they have played in shaping Americandemocracy and consider the notions of representative governmentand universal suffrage as outgrowths of their political thinking.Because of their long-time association with those governmentalforms characteristic of the United States, the Separationists havenever been able to understand the Latin American system. Theycannot conceive of a government system based on personal,paternalistic principles nor a mentality which viewed a divorcebetween civic and religious life undesirable." Probably becausecertain Colombian groups agreed with their evaluations, themissionaries there persisted in the belief that the Latins woulduniversally accept their ideas if experienced. In fact, the Protestant governmental philosophy was never wholly appreciated inColombia. Many considered it Anglo arrogance to believe thatthe "wall of separation" could solve age-old church-state problems. Liberty, law, justice, and order posed problems that eventhe Yankees with all their well-known ingenuity had not yetcompletely solved. Therefore, the argument put forth by theCatholics that Protestantism-as it manifested itself in Colombia-was alien to much in the national life has validity.An interesting sidelight to this point is the effect the journalistic debate had on American Catholics. While for ColombianCatholics the issue was fairly simple-there was no organizedpersecution; whatever problems the Protestants had resultedfrom their own imprudence-for American Catholics the issuewas a nightmare. Because by the mid-twentieth century Catholics had adopted values similar to those of their Protestantneighbors, they tended to sympathize with the Protestant casebecause of the terms in which it was expressed." Believing inreligious liberty and a freely functioning civil and ecclesiasticalorder as strongly as the Protestants did, they found the Colombian politico-religious structure incomprehensible even if thereports were exaggerated. While some said as much,more oftenthey refused to give ground to their rivals and instead assumeda defensive stand or relinquished the platform to Ospina or someother Latin American spokesman."Although difficult to prove, it is possible that one effect ofCEDEC's journalistic campaign was to make settlement of the75. Sanders, Protestant Concepts of Church and State, pp. 212-22.76. Herberg, Protestant-Catholic-Jew, p, 77.77. Dailey, "United States Reactions to the Persecution of Protestants," pp. 122-3.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


22/25

402 C'HURCH AND STATE

problem more difficult. The Protestant writers never concealedthe fact that they hoped the exposure would bring the weight ofworld opinion to pressure the Colombian government to do something about the matter. Daniel Pattison, a member of thePresbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, in 1950 stated in Pres-byterian Life his belief that the Colombian government wouldprobably change its course of action if it noted in the UnitedStates strong disapproval of its religious policy." He and otherswere happy when several general religious councils condemnedthe persecution and some United States officials expressed interest in the case."During the Rojas Pinilla period (1953-1957), the violentattacks against the Protestants were fewer reflecting the generallowering of the violence level. Nevertheless, the President refused to extend sympathy to the Protestants and instead enforceda series of laws severely restricting Protestant religious activities." In 1955 Rojas Pinilla's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr.Evaristo Sourdis, while visiting the United States discussed theProtestant problem. He reiterated all the standard chargesagainst the foreign missionaries and maintained that Colombia'srestrictive legislation was necessary for preserving calm in acountry where passions were destroying national order." In1959 at a Georgetown meeting, a group of Colombian bishopsreported that many Colombians deeply resented the widespreadpublicity given the persecution incidents." The fact thatthroughout the National Front era Colombia refused to alter itstraditional church-state arrangement or to repeal the disablinglaws indicates that this may well be the case.78. "Background for Persecution," Presbyterian Life, 29 April 1950, p, 16.79. In 1953 the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the U.S.A. condemned the persecution as did the General Board of the National Council of theChurches of Christ in 1954 and the Baptist World Alliance in 1958.McCorkle, "What Should We Do About Colombia?" p. 7, urged Protestant leadersto write protesting the persecution to the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Chairmanof the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Colombian Ambassador. Thatsome did write and that some groups engaged in lobbying aotivities is evident fromcomments made in the Protestant press throughout the period 1950-1958. Dailey,"United States Reactions to the Persecution of Protestants," pp. 162-5.80. These are the so-called disabling laws. Protestants could not establish schools orparishes in the areas designated as "Mission Territories." Those already there had toclose. Protest.ants could not street preach and could hold services only in their owninstitutions and sometimes only with closed doors. Goff in "Persecution" treats thisextensively, pp. 165-83.81. NCWC, News Release, 17 February 1955,p. 3.82. "Minutes of the Meeting of the Inter-American Episcopal Conference" (unpublished report, Latin American Bureau of the U.S. Catholic Conference, Washington,1959), p. 178.

atUBSiegenon

March15,2013

http://jcs.oxfo

rdjournals.org/

D

ownloadedfrom


23/25

COLOMBIA'S LA VIOLENCIA 403Throughout 1958 and 1959 the Protestants' position in Colombia improved steadily. While the National Front governments did not repeal the laws against Protestants, neither didthey enforce them. Many Protestant churches and schools reopened. North American missionaries found it easier to getinto the country. In the 1960s opposition practically disappeared. After Vatican Council II officially reversed the CatholicChurch's position vis-a-vis world Protestantism, the ColombianCatholic Church dropped all measures limiting Protestants. Thegovernment declared the 1953 Mission Treaty-the legal basisfor the anti-Protestant laws-in abeyance until it could be reinterpreted. Once again Protestants could evangelize at will.One of the most significant features of the Protestant problemin Colombia was the rapidity with which the whole issue dissolved. The quick and quiet manner in which what had been ahotly debated issue disappeared in the 1960s indicates that by

that time both Protestants and Catholics wanted nothing morethan an end to the public disputing. Actually the whole conflictreflected no good on either side. As an international organization,the acts of the Catholic Church in one country reflect upon theChurch in other areas. For United States Catholics, there wasvery little in the actions of the Colombian Catholic Church whichthey could admire. Even if the Colombian Hierarchy was offi-cially uninvolved, the Hierarchy had refused to take a vigorousstand condemning the anti-Protesta

Documents

Religious Aspects of La Violencia