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Durkheim, Religion, and BuddhismAuthor(s): Marco Orrù and Amy WangSource: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 47-61Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Society for the Scientific Study of ReligionStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1386831

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Durkheim,Religion,and Buddhism*

MARCOORRUt

AMYWANGt

Since its publication n 1912,Durkheim'sElementaryForms has been scrutinized n greatdetail,but researchershave mostly neglected or accepted uncritically Durkheim's brief discussion of

Buddhism at the beginningof BookOne. Suchdisregard s remarkable ince Durkheimrelied on his

interpretationof Buddhism to supporttwo crucial claimsin his definition of religiousphenomena:that gods or spirits are not essential to religion,for Buddhismhas no meaningfulgods or spirits;and that the sacred-profane ichotomyis characteristicof all religions,since it is found even in an

atheisticreligion ike Buddhism.We examine Durkheim'sdiscussion to showthat, despite qualifica-tions andcaveats, his claimsregardingBuddhismare flawed on both counts. On the one hand,we

show that Buddhism admits the existence of supra-mundanebeings not as a secondary,but as a

primarycomponentof its religion;on the other hand,we demonstrate that the distinction between

sacred and profaneis marginalto Buddhist thought.

INTRODUCTION

The study of religious phenomena was a lifelong, abiding interest of Durkheim's

sociology, from his 1887 review of Jean Marie Guyau's L'Irreligion de l'avenir, to his

1912 masterwork, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. The interest of other

social scientists in Durkheim's writings on religion has equaled, and perhaps surpassed,

Durkheim's own preoccupation with the topic, from Gustave Belot's "La Religion commeprincipe sociologique," published in 1900, to W. S. F. Pickering's definitive study,

Durkheim's Sociology of Religion, published in 1984. In his bibliography, "On Durkheim

and Religion," Pickering (1975:313-21; 1984:544-62) listed about 400 publications which

had appeared on the topic prior to 1982.

Durkheim's most articulate discussion of religious phenomena is found in Elementary

Forms, and most studies of Durkheim's sociology of religion have centered on the ideas

he presented in that book, including his concept of the sacred and the sacred-profane

dichotomy, and his discussions of totemic beliefs and of rituals. (For an analysis of the

literature on these topics, see Pickering 1984:parts II-IV.) This article does not provide

an overall assessment of Durkheim's sociology of religion, nor does it deal withDurkheim's Elementary Forms in its entirety. Instead, our specific concern is with

Durkheim's analysis of Buddhism in Elementary Forms and its relation to Durkheim's

general definition of religious phenomena in that same book.

*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the meetings of the AmericanSociologicalAssociation,

Cincinnati,Ohio,August 1991.Theauthorsaregratefulto the editorand theanonymousreviewersof thisjournal

for theirhelpfulcommentsand suggestions.

tMarcoOrru s associateprofessor n theDepartmentof Sociology, Universityof SouthFlorida,Tampa,Florida

336208100.Amy Wangis a doctoralstudent in the Departmentof Sociology, University of Illinois, Chicago,Ilinois 60680.

? Journalfor the Scientific Study of Religion, 1992,31 (1):47-61 47



JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

Despite the detailed scrutiny of Elementary Forms, researchers have mostly

neglectedDurkheim'sbriefdiscussion of Buddhism(inBookOne,ChapterOne,Sections

2 and 3), or acceptedit uncritically (e.g., Ling 1973:16-19).Such neglect is remarkable

since Durkheimrelied on his interpretationof Buddhism to support two crucialclaimsin his definitionof religious phenomena: hat gods or spirits are not essential to religion,for early Buddhism had no meaningful gods or spirits; and that the sacred-profane

dichotomyis characteristicof allreligions,since it is central even to an atheistic religionlike Buddhism. In this articlewe examineclosely Durkheim's short discussion to show

that his claims regarding Buddhism are ambiguous, if not altogether misleading, on

both counts. On the one hand, we show that Buddhism clearly posits the existence of

supra-mundanebeings, not as an afterthought but as a centralcomponentof its belief

system; on the otherhand,we demonstratethat the distinction betweenthe sacred and

profane,althougharguable, s innoway a crucialcharacteristicof Buddhism.In a cursory

fashion, Melford E. Spiro (1966:91-96)has alreadyraised similar objections regardingDurkheim's theses on Buddhism. However, in this article we go beyond Spiro's

preliminaryformulationand provide a detailed analysis of Buddhist doctrines as they

developedhistorically, to show Durkheim'sambiguousunderstandingof key features

of Buddhism in particular and of the central characteristics of religious phenomenain general.

Ourarticleproceeds n foursteps. First,we presentDurkheim'sdefinitionof religionand its philosophicalpresuppositions, to evince some of the backgroundfactors which

led to Durkheim'sowndefinition of religion.Second,we counterDurkheim's claimthat

Buddhism is atheistic at heartby showingthat Buddhismposits the existence of supra-

humanbeings, and that such beings are essential to Buddhism as a religion.Third,weshow that the sacred-profanedichotomy is not a central characteristic of Buddhism;

rather, in Buddhism the dharma of both the physical and the transcendental worlds

is similarlycharacterizedby emptiness,the signless, and the wishless. Fourth,we assess

the implicationsof ourfindingsforanimprovedunderstandingof Buddhism n particular,and for a better sociologicalcharacterizationof religiousphenomena n general.On the

basis of the evidence found in Buddhism we conclude, in a preliminaryfashion, that

the belief in supernaturalbeings is a better markerforreligious phenomenathan is the

concept of the sacred.

DURKHETM'SDEFINITION OF RELIGION

As is typical in much of his sociologicalwork,Durkheimbegins ElementaryForms

by addressing conceptual issues in the study of religions. ChapterOne of Book One is

titled "Definition of Religious Phenomenaand of Religion."There we find, italicized,

Durkheim's conceptualizationof religion as follows:

A religion s a unifiedsystem of beliefs andpracticesrelative to sacredthings, that is to say, thingsset apartand forbidden beliefs andpracticeswhich unite into one single moralcommunitycalled

a Church,all those who adhere to them (Durkheim 1912]1965:62).

For Durkheim,religioncombines four elements: beliefs, practices, the sacred, anda Church.Beliefs are sets of collective representationsin a society;practices are rituals

48



DURKHEIMAND BUDDHISM

enacted in a society to celebrate and reinforcebeliefs;the sacred is the referent matter

of religious beliefs and practices;and the Church s the organizationwhich structures

religionsocially. Of these fourelements, the sacred is undoubtedly the most important

component in Durkheim's definition of religion. Pickering (1984:115)has said it best:"For Durkheim, at the heart of every religion stands the sacred ... Durkheimgivesa priorplace to the sacredeven overreligionitself." The other threeelements of religion

(beliefs,practices, and a Church)are functional to the sacred and dependon it for their

existence. Beliefs and rituals are religious insofar as they refer to the sacred, and the

churchprovidesthe organizational ramework orcelebrating dentifiablysacred beliefs

and rituals.

Scholars have often objected to Durkheim's definition of religion in ElementaryForms,arguingthat it is not a scientificbut a metaphysicaldefinition; t is not a nominal,but an essential definition (Pickering 1984:163-192).Instead of providing operational

markersforempiricallyobservablereligiousphenomena,Durkheimincorporated n hisdefinition of religion his own theory of religion:He included what he consideredto be

an essential requirementof all religions (andthus what he thought constituted religion

itself), namely, the "sacred." Pickering has identified Durkheim's essentialist defini-

tion as resultingfrom several factors.For the purposeof ourdiscussionhere,two factors

are particularly significant:

First, during the periodfrom approximately1900 to 1906, the concept of the sacredrose to such

prominence n Durkheim'sthought [that]. . . There could thereforebe no alternativebut to define

religion in terms of that concept.... [Second,]Durkheimopenly denied that God or the godsexisted.... By contrast, as he was firmly convinced,the sacred had a reality which could not be

denied(Pickering1984:187-188).

The concept of the sacred, we can argue, became central to Durkheim's definition

of religionbecauseit providedhim with a substantive criterionforreligiousphenomena;the inclusion of such a criterion allowedhim to characterizethe belief in supernatural

beings as non-essential to religious phenomena.The sacred easily replacedthe super-natural. To be sure, Durkheimwas not, and has not been, the only social scientist to

define religionin terms of the sacred (Marett 1914;Malinowski 1925;Radcliffe-Brown

1952;Eliade 1959);but just as numeroushave been those social scientists who diddefine

religion in terms of beliefs in superhumanbeings (Spencer 1864; Tylor 1874; Evans-

Pritchard 1956; Firth 1959).Durkheim's problematic definition of religion was partly a result of the realist

philosophicalassumptionswhichled himto treat sociologicalconceptscommedes choses

(as if they were things). On the one hand, he thought of social concepts and beliefs as

partaking of the same facticity which characterizesnatural objects. To admit that all

religions display some form of belief in supernaturalbeings was, for Durkheim,equalto admitting that supernaturalbeings have a factual existence. To include the belief

in gods as a criterionfor identifying religious phenomenacould be construed, from a

realist stance, as saying that gods do exist. On the other hand, Durkheim still thoughtit necessary that religions everywhere should display some real and universal

characteristic, and he identified this universal characteristic with the sacred.Durkheim'spreliminarydefinitionof religion nElementaryForms was not a working

49




hypothesis or a tentative point of departure for empiricalanalysis. Rather, it was a

definitive statement about religion which was not open to later discussion or re-

elaboration (no new, revised definition is found at the end of Elementary Forms).

Durkheim'scharacterization f religionwas not an operationalconstructfor the purposeof setting out to study religious phenomena;rather, it was a theory which he soughtto support with relevant empirical evidence. For this reason, Book One, titled

"PreliminaryQuestions,"turns to the discussion of Buddhismin orderto demonstrate

that the definition of religion Durkheimprovides is a sound one.

Within the limited framework of this article we cannot address the complex

epistemology underlyingDurkheim's work on religion in particularor his sociology in

general,nor do we claim that we can provide definitive empiricalevidence to disproveDurkheim'stheory of religion. Such an endeavor would likely fail if it chose to ignoreDurkheim'sunderlyingepistemology and sought to disprove his theory of the sacred-

profane dichotomy simply on the basis of the empiricalevidence marshalledby con-temporary ethnographers.As Mestrovic has argued in his reappraisalof Durkheim's

ElementaryForms,the criticalapproachadoptedby several scholars(Jones1986;Lukes

1973;Pickering 1984)"entirelymisses Durkheim'spoint: namely, that the conceptualdistinction between the sacred and profane is all around us at all times" (Mektrovic

1989:267).However, for the purposeof ourlimited discussion, the crucial fact remains

that Durkheim endeavored to demonstrate the validity of his definition of religion by

citing the empiricalevidence found in Buddhism.

In Durkheim'sdefinition,empiricalgeneralizations regarding religiousphenomenabecome the buildingblocks of his essentialist conceptualizationof religion.His assump-

tion is that if a trait can be shown to characterizeall observed religions, then we canclaim that it constitutes the essence of all religions. Conversely,Durkheimassumes that

if a trait cannot be observed in every religion, then it cannot be said to constitute a

valid characteristicof any religion.Durkheim'sdefinitionof religionbecomesproblematicbecause the distinction between empirical generalizations and conceptual constructs

becomes very thin or disappears altogether; for Durkheim,empiricalgeneralizations

regarding religious phenomenabecome the real essence of religion. However, more to

the point for our purpose,the empiricalevidence on which Durkheim builds his essen-

tialist definition of religion s itself highly questionable.Durkheimrejectedsupernatural

beings as a feature of religious phenomenaandinstead proposedthe sacred as central

to allreligions, by referring o the evidence found n Buddhism.In the next two sections,we analyzein detail the evidence regardingthese two issues, and evaluate Durkheim's

claims concerning Buddhism.

THE SUPRA-HUMAN IN BUDDHISM

In Elementary Forms, the section on "Definition of Religious Phenomena and of

Religion"begins, in a typically Durkheimian ashion,with a methodical demonstration

of how the criteriaused by other scholars to identify and define religious phenomenaare unsatisfactory. This is Durkheim's standard procedureof "argumentby elimina-

tion"(Lukes1973:31-33). n the specificinstanceofElementaryForms,Durkheimshowsthat not all religions concern themselves with the supernatural or with divinity;

50



DURKHEIMAND BUDDHISM

accordingly, neither feature can be essential to religious phenomena. Criticizingthe

emphasis on the supernaturalby scholars like SpencerandMuller,Durkheim(1965:43)

argues that the idea of mystery "has a place only in a very small number of advanced

religions. It is impossible to make it the characteristic mark of religious phenomenawithout excluding from the definition the majority of the facts to be defined." Con-

currently,he reproachesRevilleandTylorforemphasizingthe belief in gods or spiritual

beings: "Religionis more than the idea of gods or spirits, and consequently cannot be

defined exclusively in relation to these latter" (50).The specific evidence Durkheim marshals from Buddhism to demonstrate that it

is a religion without gods or spiritual beings is ambiguous from the onset. He cites

Burnouf(1844),Barth (1879),andOldenberg 1881),to show that Buddhismis, at heart,an atheistic religion.(Fora morerecent defense of this thesis, see von Glasenapp1966.)He begins his argument by stating: "In the first place, there are great religions from

which the idea of gods and spirits is absent, or at least, whereit plays only a secondaryand minorrole. This is the case withBuddhism" Durkheim1965:45).He carefullyadmits

that the evidence from Buddhism might not be univocal: To say that gods and spirits

play a secondaryand minor rolein Buddhism is one thing;to claim that gods andspiritsare absentis quite another.Yet Durkheim'swholeargumentregardingBuddhismtreads

on equivocal evidence. For instance, he argues:

Instead of praying,in the ordinarysense of the term .. he [the Buddhist]reliesupon himself andmeditates. This is not saying "that he absolutely denies the existence of the beings called Indra,

Agni and Varuna;but 'he believes that he owes them nothing and that he has nothing to do with

them".... Then he is an atheist, in the sense that he does not concern himself with the question

whethergods exist or not (Durkheim1965:46;emphasis added).

Later he comments:

It is true that Buddha, at least in some divisions of the Buddhist Church,has sometimes beenconsidered as a sort of god ... [but]this divinizationof Buddha,granting that the term is exact,is peculiarto ... NorthernBuddhism.... We may well ask if he [Buddha]has ever reallydivestedhimselfcompletelyof allhumancharacter,andif we have a right to makehiminto a god completely;in any case, it wouldhave to be a god of a very particularcharacter.... Finally,whateverone maythink of the divinityof Buddha, t remains that this is a conceptionwhollyoutside the essentialpartof Buddhism(46-47;emphasis added).

The evidence Durkheimpresents regardingthe atheistic qualities of Buddhism isambiguous, and to remedy such shortcomings he has to qualify his claims repeatedly;thus, he strengthens his evidence fromBuddhismby elaboratingrestrictive criteriaon

prayer, atheism, divinity, and Buddhism itself. He resorts to narrow definitions of

divinity to downplay its role in Buddhism, or to dimiss it altogether. However, an

examinationof the availableevidenceconcerning he role of divinity in Buddhismreveals

a different picture from the one Durkheimprovided.To be sure,the ambiguityapparent n Durkheim'sdescriptionof Buddhism's beliefs

vis-a-vis divinity is not simply the productof his overzealousattempt to prove a point;it is mostly due to the ambiguity created by a multiplicity of doctrines which accom-

panied the development of Buddhism starting with the life of Buddha (560-580B.C.),through the archaicperiod of Buddhism (the first 140 years after the Nirvana of the

51



JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

Buddha),to the schism which saw the developmentof 18 orthodox schools (around140

B.E.): with the Sthaviras schools in Ceylon and Southeast Asia on one side, and the

Mahasinghikasin NorthernIndia on the other side (forhistorical overviews, see Conze

1980 and Kitagawa and Cummings 1989). The orthodox schools together are knownas Theravada(orHinayana)Buddhism;the other schools, which later spreadto China,

Japan, and Korea, are collectively labeled Mahayana Buddhism.A carefulexamination of Buddhist thought in these threephases reveals that some

idea of divinity and of supernaturalbeings is present throughout Buddhist thought,although t is stronger n MahayanaBuddhism than in archaicand scholasticBuddhism.

However, let us consider the available evidence.

Archaic Buddhism

In his Buddhist Thought n India,Conze 1967:56)has described he archaicBuddhistthought as follows:

Theprogressivedetachment from the world s accompaniedand facilitatedby the constant applica-tion of the threemarks[impermanent,ll, andnot-self] o allworldlyevents, and it furtherpromotesin its turn the five cardinal virtues [faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration,and wisdom].

Conzealso argues:"Once he has achievedperfect indifferenceto all worldlythings,the Yogin can automatically make Nirvana into an object" (56).The Visuddhimaggaof Buddhaghosa (VM xxi 128) proclaims:"Now at last the supramundanePath will

arise!" (cited in Conze 1967:77).This reference to entering the supramundanePath is

crucial in its implications:

At this point the Buddhists [distinguish]between two qualitativelydifferent kinds of persons, the

"holyperson"andthe ordinarypeople.... Holymen andordinarypeople occupytwo distinct planesof existence,the "worldly" nd the "supramnndene." personbecomes"supramundane"n "enteringthe Path".... The "saint," as distinguished fromworldlypeople,at the moment of entering thefirst Path is said to "realize"Nirvana in the sense of "seeing"it (57;emphasis added).

Nirvanais reachedthroughthe supramundanedoors to deliverance[emptiness,the

signless, and the wishless]: "They are quite near to the true reality of Nirvana, at its

very threshold" (69-70).Nirvana itself is Deathless, and the Buddha entered Nirvana

by conqueringDeath

(Mara),"a

deity,who tries to cause difficultiesto

anyonewho wants

to transcend death, and who was defeated by the Buddha immediately before his

enlightenment" (72).This evidenceshows that concepts of divinity and transcendenceareclearlypresent

in earlyBuddhism.Concludinghis descriptionof archaicBuddhistthought, Conzeclaims

that "Nirvana is obviously transcendental" and can be reached only through the

supramundanedoors to deliverance 76).He quotes fromthe Suttanipata (1069):"Alone,without support,0 Shakyan, I amunable to cross the great flood. Tell me the objective

support, 0 All-seeing One, leaning on which I could cross that flood" (cited in Conze,

1967:77).

52



DURKHEIM AND BUDDHISM

Scholastic Buddhism

The schism between the Mahasanghikasand the Sthaviras led to the development

of 18 schools of Buddhism. The Sthaviras (literally,the Elders) stood for tradition andorthodoxyin Buddhism.The significantdoctrinalpoint of the Sthavirasforourpurposeis the classification of those who have attained Nirvana;such a point is related, more

broadly,to Buddhism's envisioning of the Absolute. Conze(1967:159)has outlined the

issue: "The Absolute occursin an impersonalform as the 'Unconditioned'or 'Nirvana,'and in an apparently personal form as the 'Buddha' or 'Tathagata.' "

Attempts to characterizeNirvana aresporadicandequivocal n Sthavirasdoctrines,but these same doctrinesare detailed n theirclassificationof those whoachieve Nirvana.

Scholastic Buddhism identifies three classes of increasinglyenlightened ndividuals: he

Arhat, the Pratyekabuddha,and the Buddha The Arhat, at the lowest level, is "one

who has eliminated all ill." At the next higher level is the Pratyekabuddha,of whomConze (1967:167)writes:

He is a Buddhaforhimselfalone, who,unlike the Arhat,has ... won his enlightenmentby his owneffort without instruction from others, but who, unlike the Buddhas,does not proclaimthe truth

to others.... The first two "adepts" represent the ideals of the individualists.

The Buddha's enlightenment, at the highest level, is vastly superiorto that of the

Arhats or of the Pratyekabuddhas. The Buddha surpasses individually experienced

enlightenmentand is able to proclaim he truth to the world.In the Sthaviras doctrines,the Buddha s not simplyone who has achievedenlightenment,but one who canproclaim

the truth. Conze has elaborated:

The Abhidharmadefinesthe differenceof the Buddhafrom the othertwo adepts.... As forepithets,he is called "the Lord"(Bhagavan), he "Conqueror f Mara,"the "Kingof Dharma." he "super-man,"the "Tathagata,"the "victorunvanquished,"and so on (168-69).

The Buddha also has power over the cosmos and is its sovereign:

Possessing to a superiordegree the miraculouspowers attributed to all saints, the Buddha can

at will create, transform and conserve external objects, shorten or extend his life-span, move

throughsolid bodies, travel rapidlyfor long distances throughthe air, reduce the size of material

bodies.... (170).

Thus, one can conclude that, "It is, of course, a fallacy to regard the Buddha as

a 'person' in the ordinary sense of the term.... Far more than a person he is (1) an

impersonal metaphysical principle, (2) a supernatural potency, and (3) a type" (171;

emphasisadded).Scholastic Buddhism'stheoriesof supernaturalorcesandmetaphysicalentities strengthens the earlier evidence from archaic Buddhism.

Mahayana Buddhism

If the Sthaviras schools were unclear about the ontology of the Absolute (the

Unconditioned),MahayanaBuddhismresolutelyclarified his centralissue. (MaxWeber[(1923) 1958:244-56]detailed the sociological factors leading to the development of

53




Mahayana doctrines.) The Buddha, in Mahayana doctrines, is characterized as a

metaphysical principle, identified with the absolute Dharma: "The true Buddha is

transmundane ... the historical Buddha is a mere apparitionof him" (Robinsonand

Johnson 1982:65).The Mahayanabroadenedthe access to enlightenment to include allindividuals, whereas the Sthaviras schools had a more selective interpretationof who

could achieve Buddhahood.Robinson and Johnson (1982:65-66)have argued:

The Mahayana nnovation was to proclaim hat the bodhisattva [futureBuddha]courseis opento

all, to lay out a path for aspiringbodhisattvas to follow,and to create a new pantheonandcult of

superhumanbodhisattvas and cosmic Buddhaswho respondto the pleas of devotees.

There is no doubt that supernaturalbeings exist in MahayanaBuddhismand that

these beings are instrumental in the individual's path to Nirvana;cults of the greatbodhisattvas (like Maitreya, Manjusri, Avalotikesvara, and Mahasthamaprapta)flourished n MahayanaBuddhism.Robinson andJohnsonhave described he Maitreyacult:

Maitreya,unlike the Buddhas beforehim, is alive so he can respondto the prayersof worshippers.Being compassionate .. he willinglygrants help;andbeing a high god in his presentbirth,he hasthe power to do so. His cult thus offers its devotees the advantage of theism and Buddhismcombined(79-80).

Therecouldbe no strongerevidence hat supernatural eingsdoin factexist in MahayanaBuddhism, and that their help is actively sought by those who seek to achieve

enlightenment.

The evidencepresented throughout this section has shown clearlythat MahayanaBuddhismqualifiesas a theistic religion; t also shows that significant theistic elements

arepresentas well in archaicandin scholastic Buddhism.In archaicBuddhism,"apersonbecomessupramundane n enteringthe Path,"andenteringNirvanarequires ranscend-

ing the god of death, Mara. In scholastic Buddhism, the Buddha is clearly described

as a supernaturalbeing and a supernatural orce with supernaturalpowers;the Buddha

is also the only one who can proclaimthe truth of Buddhism to others.While one could

identify a variationin the centralityof beliefs in supra-humanbeings in the threephasesof Buddhism,it is nevertheless evident that the belief in supra-humanbeings is present

throughoutBuddhist religion.We will elaborateon the implicationsof this findinglater,

but next we must turn our attention to another issue: whether the sacred-profane

dichotomy is a central feature of Buddhism.

SACRED AND PROFANE IN BUDDHISM

In Book One, Chapter One, Section Three of The Elementary Forms, Durkheim

(1965:52)provides a sweeping definition concerning religions:

All known religiousbeliefs, whethersimple or complex, present one common characteristic: hey

presupposea classification of all the things, real andideal,of which men think, into two classes or

opposedgroups, generally designated by two distinct terms which are translatedwell enough bythe wordsprofaneand sacred. This division of the world into two domains,the one containingallthat is sacred, the other all that is profane,is the distinctive trait of religious thought.

54




He also clarifies that "by sacred things one must not understand simply those

personalbeings which are called gods or spirits" (52),and in support of such clarifica-

tion he resorts to the evidence obtained from Buddhism: "That is how Buddhism is a

religion:in default of gods, it admits the existence of sacred things, namely, the fournoble truths and the practices derived from them" (52).

We must emphasize here, that it is not our aim to prove the absence of a conceptof the sacred in Buddhism. Supernaturalbeings in Buddhism are clearly sacred in

religiouspractice, as they areenshrined and worshippedby the believers. Phenomeno-

logically speaking, the sacred is found in all societies and religions, and its identifica-

tion cannot be settled through doctrinal religious disputes (for a phenomenological

appreciationof the sacred andprofane,see Elisde 1959).Ouraim in this article s instead

to show that while Durkheim claimed that supernatural beings are marginal to

Buddhism, and the sacred-profanedichotomy is central to it, we wish to demonstrate

the opposite thesis: that supernatural beings are central, and the sacred-profanedichotomy is marginal, to Buddhism as a religion.

We saw in the previous section that Durkheim's evidence for claiming that spiritsand supra-mundanebeings are not central to Buddhismwas most ambiguous.We now

wish to show that the sacred-profanedichotomy Durkheim claims to be central to all

religions is in fact at least marginal,if not altogether rejectedor denied,in Buddhism.

Before presenting our evidence, however, let us consider Durkheim's only example

regarding the sacred in Buddhism: "the four noble truths and the practices derived

from them."

The Four Noble Truths

Theearlyscripturesof Buddhismshow that Buddhaproclaimedhe four noble truths

in his sermonat Benares,where "the enlightenedLord"addressedthe five monks. The

four noble truths concernpain, the cause of pain, the cessation of pain, and the waythat leads to the cessation of pain (Burtt 1982:30).Describing his path to enlighten-

ment, Buddha stated:

As long as in these four noble truths my knowledgeandinsight with the three sections and twelve

divisions was not wellpurified,even so long, monks,in the worldwith its gods, Mara,Brahma, ts

beingwith ascetics, brahmins,

gods,and men, I had not attained the highest completeenlighten-

ment (cited in Burtt 1982:31).

In his sermon,Buddhaannounced hat the highestcompleteenlightenment Nirvana)

cannot be achieved unless one has a "wellpurified"insight into, andknowledgeof the

four nobletruths. The Buddhahimself is able to proclaimthe four nobletruths because

he has achieved enlightenment, and he is now the Lord (Bhagavan).It appears, then,

that what gives the four noble truths a central position in Buddhism is that, havingattained complete enlightenment, the Buddha can proclaimthese truths as noble. For

those whohave not achievedNirvana,these fourtruths areincomprehensible:They are

philosophical statements about suffering in this world, and how to eliminate such

suffering,but they cannot be fully understoodunless enlightenmentis achieved.Whatdoes it matter to proclaim that "existence is unhappiness" unless one has obtained

55




Nirvana's purified knowledge?The four noble truths of Buddhism are not sacred in themselves; rather,they derive

their significance from the fact that the Buddha, having achieved enlightenment and

having becomethe Lord,proclaimsthem as such. Thus, at the center of Buddhismwefind not the four noble truths, but the enlightenment of the Buddha. Conze (1967:30)has explicitly arguedsuch a point: "Buddhism bases itself first of all on the revelation

of the Truth by an omniscient being, known as 'the Buddha.' " This shows that

supramundanebeings (andmost importantly the Buddha)are central to Buddhism as

a religion,directly underminingDurkheim's(1965:45)claim that "all that is essential

to Buddhism is found in the four propositions which the faithful call the four noble

truths." We admit, to be sure, that the four noble truths display some degree of

sacredness(onecouldarguethat the transition from the first truth to the second,third,and fourth represents the shift from most profaneto most sacred). However, the fact

remains that whatever sacredness these four noble truths display is not an intrinsicquality of the truths themselves, but a quality the Buddha has given them.

The Conditionedand the Unconditioned

The four noble truths are not a fitting example of the centrality of the sacred in

Buddhism,but are there any other elements in Buddhism which would fit Durkheim's

sacred-profanedichotomy?His central notion is that all religions divide the worldinto

two distinct domains: he sacredand the profane.Stanner(1967:217-240)ought to refute

Durkheim's dichotomy based on its logical inconsistencies and on contrary evidence

found in aboriginalreligions. He argued "not only that 'the profane' is the weaker ofthe two categories,but that the dichotomyitself is unusableexcept at the cost of undue

interference with the facts of observation" (229).Here we will limit our observations

to the evidence about the sacred and the profane found in Buddhism.

Durkheim did not provide any illustration of the sacred-profanedichotomy in

Buddhism,but if anything comes close, it is Buddhism's treatment of the Conditioned

(Pratitya-samutpadaor Samsara)and the Unconditioned (Nirvana),the two oppositerealms of the physical world(past, present, andfuture)and of the transcendental world

(enlightenment).This is an important ssue in Buddhism,as well as in othermajorworld

religions,since it displays the tension betweenthe profane"this-worldly" nd the sacred

"other-worldly," which is at the root of much religious thought (Weber [1922]

1978:518-634).Buddhism partakes of this tension (Lopez 1988).We do not seek here to dismiss sacred-profanedistinctions altogether, but rather

to makea morespecificpoint:namely, that a close scrutiny of the Conditionedand the

Unconditionedn Buddhismshows that they donot partakeof the sacred-profane ualitywhich Durkheim considered central to religious phenomena. Let us be clear that

Durkheimhimself did not discuss the Conditionedand Unconditioned n Buddhism;we

have chosen these as the best examples, if any, of a possible sacred-profanedichotomyin Buddhism.

DurkheimwritesinElementaryForms that "the sacredandthe profanehavealways

andeverywherebeen conceivedby the humanmind as two distinct classes, as two worldsbetween which there is nothing in common"(Durkheim1965:54;emphasis added).Yet

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Buddhism's Conditioned and Unconditioned are two classes of dharmas, that is, two

classes of "truly existing objects," and they share a number of similarities.

In Buddhism, Conditionedand Unconditioned dharmas are both characterizedas

Emptiness, the Signless, and the Wishless. Conze(1967:60-70)has described how thesethree concepts apply to each of the two classes of dharmas:

In one sense 'emptiness' designates deprivation,in another fulfillment.... Objects ... have no

relevanceto anythingthat is worthknowingordoing [they aresignless] ... Theyogin... forsakes

the 'sign,'... andaspiresin resolute faith towards that whichis without a 'sign.'... The Wishless

[is]... withoutpredilectionor desires for the objectsofperception.... Nirvana s anobjectof craving

only in so far as one forms a mistaken idea of it.

In Buddhist religion, since its inception, the Conditioned and the Unconditioned

appearto have significant commonalities which prevent us from considering them as

amutually

exclusivedichotomy

in the sense Durkheim envisioned. With thedevelop-ment of Mahayana Buddhism, the blurring of the two realms becomes even greater.

Conze(1967:160)has commented hat the Mahayanadeveloped he methodof "proclaim-

ing the truth by boldly self-contradictorypronouncements."The relationshipbetween

the Conditionedand the Unconditionedwas one such topic of contradictoryarguments:

The most startling innovationof the Mahayana s ... the identification of the Unconditionedwith

the conditioned.... The Mahayanapoints out that once someonehas given up everythingfor the

Absolute,he simply s the Absolute,andnothing nhim s anylongerdifferent rom t.... Theidentityof the contemplatorwith the Absolute seems to have a value of a self-evident mmediatefact of ex-

perience(Conze1967:227-28).

Thus, in MahayanaBuddhism, the conditioned individual becomesunconditioned;as one achieves enlightenment,one is the Absolute. Yet the identity of Conditionedand

Unconditioned is also proclaimed at the level of non-individual entities. Both the

Conditionedand the Unconditionedare dharmas.TheMahayanaclaimthat if alldharmas

are non-different,they are by that very fact all the same (Conze1967:228;Robinson

1978:184-90).They argue: "Nothing in Samsara is different from Nirvana;nothing in

Nirvana is different from Samsara. The limit of Nirvana is the limit of Samsara;there

is not even the subtlest something separating the two" (Madhyamakakarika 5, 19-29;cited in Conze 1967:228).

The Absolute in this system is definedas ... the supremelyreal Element, Dharma-element r theBuddha-element.This pure and eternal factor is the basis of the entireworldof appearance,andin

the absenceof any limitationsit is the omnipresentgerm of Buddhahoodwhich indwellsall beings(Conze 1967:229).

In the Mahayana doctrine of sameness (or "suchness"), the Conditionedand the

Unconditioned thoroughly merge and become indistinguishable. They are central to

Buddhist doctrine, but they most clearly do not meet Durkheim's requirementof a

sacred and profane dichotomy which he considered to be the universal characteristic

of all religions.Thus far, we have shown that Durkheim's arguments regarding Buddhism were

defective on two counts: He arguedambiguously that Buddhism does not really admitof suprahumanbeings or spirits, and he claimed inaccurately to have identified and

57




characterizedthe sacred in Buddhism. What are the implications of our findings for

characterizingBuddhism in particular and religious phenomenain general? We turn

next to these questions.

LESSONS FROM BUDDHISM

In his definition of religious phenomena and in his presentation of supportingevidencefrom Buddhism,Durkheim used two strategies: He opted for a narrow defini-

tion of the super-humanwhichallowedhimto show Buddhism to be essentially atheistic,and he chose a broad characterization of the sacred which, in Buddhism, could be

identified with the four noble truths. On the one hand,Durkheimarguedthat only those

beings which directly intervene in human affairs and are actively instrumental in

achieving salvation meet his definition of what gods are.This is the thrust of his argu-

ment, since he claims that the gods Indra,Agni, and Varuna do exist, but the Buddhist"believesthat he owes them nothing and that he has nothing to do with them.... Then

[the Buddhist]is an atheist" (Durkheim1965:46).On the other hand,Durkheimpositedthe sacred as anything a collectivity deems sacred, regardless of its pertinence to

transcendental matters. He claims that "a rock, a tree, a spring, a pebble, a piece of

wood, a house, in a word, anything can be sacred" (52), thus constructing the sacred

as an undeterminedcategory whose only criterion is its opposition to the profane.Yet

the profane s, in Durkheim'stheory, a residualcategory for what is not sacred(Stanner

1967:230). Given the shortcomings of Durkheim's two-pronged approach, we must

conclude that it simply does not do justice to Buddhism as a religion, or to most

sociologically observed religious phenomena.

Arguing against Durkheim's criterionregardingsuperhumanbeings in Buddhism,

Spiro (1966:92)has contended:

Withrespect to supermundane oals, the Buddha s certainlya superhumanbeing.Unlikeordinary

humans,he himselfacquired he powerto attain Enlightenmentand henceBuddhahood.Moreover,he showed others the means for its attainment. Without his teachings, natural man could not,

unassisted, have discovered the way to Enlightenmentand to final release.

Plainly, Buddha is central to Buddhism as an observed religious phenomenon;neither

the four noble truths, nor the Dharma,nor the Samgha, nor the Unconditioned would

have any meaning without the Buddha. We believe the evidence we provided fromBuddhism warrants such a claim.

Spiro (1966:95)has also criticized Durkheimfor his unwarrantedconclusion "that

religionuniquelyrefers to the 'sacred'while secularconcernsarenecessarily 'profane.'"

Instead, Spiro has claimed that "religiousand secularbeliefs alike may have reference

either to sacredorto profane phenomena" 96).As an example,civic values we consider

sacred like liberty, or patriotism, or the pursuit of happiness are not commonlyunderstood to be attributes of a religion (but see Bellah 1970; Bellah and Hammond

1980); heirendorsementor acceptancedoes not rest on a beliefin transcendentalspirits.

Conversely,any kind of everydayprofaneactivity (singing, bathing, eating)can assume

a religiouscharacterif it relates to beliefs in transcendentalpowers. Again, Buddhismprovides exemplaryevidencein this respect. The four noble truths of Buddhism,taken

58




by themselves, have no sacredquality. Stoic philosphers n classical Greece and ancient

Rome,forinstance, claimed as much as the fournoble truths claimconcerningsuffering

in this world and how to become indifferentto it (Polhlenzet al. 1987;Capes 1909),butwe do not commonly consider stoicism's pronouncementsto be religious truths. The

differencebetweenBuddhism andstoicism, then, is that the formerrests on the teachingsof the Buddha, the Lord, and it is geared toward achieving transcendental Enlighten-

ment; stoicism, instead, proposes itself as a philosophy of life in this world, without

any referenceto supernaturalbeings.

We have shown throughoutthis article that Durkheimwas exceedingly ambiguousin describing he corebeliefs of Buddhismconcerning he existenceof suprahumanbeingsand concerning the sacred and profane, and their relationship. To conclude, we want

to explore the broaderconsequences of Durkheim's misreadings and propose ways to

overcome hem. Religious phenomena,as observedempiricallyn socialgroups, postulatethe belief in supra-mundanebeings as their distinguishing characteristic. Eliminatingthis requirement, as Durkheim did in his Elementary Forms, makes religion and

philosophy, and even science and technology, essentially undistinguishable social

phenomena.Strong collective sentiments can accompanyDarwin's theory of evolution

as much as they can accompany Buddhism's Eightfold Path to Enlightenment. The

singing of a national anthem can elicit the same strong collective emotions as does the

singing of religioushymns. Thereligiouscharacterof a phenomenon,however,is clearlylocated not in the sacrednessof the phenomenon tself (as Durkheimclaimed)but rather

in the phenomenon'srelation to the suprahumanand the transcendental.

Rejecting Durkheim's definition of religion, Spiro (1966:96)has provided his ownworkingdefinitionof religionas "aninstitution consisting of culturally patternedinter-

actionwith culturallypostulatedsuperhumanbeings."We also subscribe o sucha defini-

tion. All social institutions, of course, are characterizedby culturally patterned inter-

action (Berger and Luckmann 1966), but the distinguishing element of religion as an

institution is its collective belief in transcendental spirits (Goody 1961;Horton 1960).

Spiro(1966:98)has concluded hat "viewedsystematically,religioncanbe differentiated

from other culturally constituted institutions by virtue only of its reference to

superhumanbeings."It is outside the scope of this article to engage in an extensive demonstration of

how Spiro's definition of religion does better justice than Durkheim's definition to

religious phenomena; t is also outside its scope to discuss the desirability of identify-

ing some modernideologies as "varities of civil religion"(Bellahand Hammond 1980).

All we claim to have shown here is that Durkheim'sanalysis of Buddhism is seriouslydefective. The evidencewe foundin Buddhismgreatly underminesDurkheim'sbroader

definitionof religionbut it does not, by itself, provide finalproof that such a definition

is wrong.Moreextensive,cross-cultural esearchon religiousphenomenawould be needed

to make such a conclusive claim. However, we hope our analysis of Buddhism has

achieved broadersignificanceby raising seriousquestions about past characterizations

of religionand by providing some preliminaryhypotheses toward a better social scien-

tific definition of religious phenomena.

59



JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

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