Religion as art and identity

Religion (1986) 16, 1-17

RELIGION AS ART

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Benjamin Beit-8allaluni

INTRODUCTIONA common theme in the literature on the psychology of religion is the searchfor psychological processes unique to religion . Here is a contrasting viewpoint,which states that religion is not unique in terms of process, but rather in termsof content. The psychological processes involved in religious activities can befound in other human activities, and art is one example of human activity inwhich processes similar to those operating in religion are involved . Throughlooking at the psychology of art, we may gain useful insights into thepsychology of religion . This may be not just a useful way, but a major way, ofunderstanding religion, because religion, like art, is so readily recognized forbeing an expressive human activity, something which is non-instrumental, butnevertheless so pervasive. At the least, this would be a useful intellectualexercise, providing insights through the application of analogies . At the most,it would be a way of obtaining major new insights into religion . Art is simplythe most similar to religion among all spheres of human activity . That is whywe use it as our starting point. We definitely regard art as a general category,denoting a wide range of human activity, and religion as a more limited case,exemplifying the basic processes of the general category of art .

Presenting an analogy, or finding an analogy for something we are studying,is a way of gaining new understandings and insights . Scientific creativityconsists of finding fruitful analogies and metaphors, normally referred to asmodels. Here I am suggesting a metaphor and a model, which will contributeto the development of a general theory of religion . The starting point, themoment of discovery, can be summarized as a metaphor, in the sense adoptedby Black (1962 p . 4) :

Metaphor is, at its simplest, a way of proceeding from the known to the unknown . Itis a way of cognition in which the identifying qualities of one thing are transferred inan instantaneous, almost unconscious, flash of insight to some other thing that is, byremoteness, or complexity, unknown to us . . . Metaphor is our means of effectinginstantaneous fusion of two separated realms of experience into one illuminating,iconic, encapsulating image.

* This article is based on an invited address to Division 36, delivered at the AmericanPsychological Association 91st Annual Convention, Anaheim, California, U.S.A .,August 1983 .

0048-721X/86/010001+17 $02 .00/0 ©1986 Academic Press Inc_ (London) Ltd .

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This analogy between art and religion is based on the belief that both can beexplained through basic and common psychological processes . The ideasexpressed here are only a preliminary contribution, but the main point isintended to be taken quite seriously : looking at religion as a form of art may bea considerable advance over previous attempts to develop a coherent psy-chology of religion . Using art as a starting point in formulating our observationsmay help us in understanding the basic processes, the functions and theconsequences, of religion .

The important theoretical contribution by Pruyser (1976) draws attentionto various similarities between religion and art . In both art and religion wehave universal psychological processes, the general experience of an imaginaryworld, together with specific cultural products and traditions, and the psy-chological response to both is similar . Both art and religion exist as socialinstitutions for the same reasons : to provide gratification through fantasy . Artin practice, for both the artist and the audience, involves the combination ofimagination and emotional arousal . So does religion . In religion, as in art, wehave the involvement of producer-artists, products of the artists' work, andthe audience which is responding to the artist through the product . Religion,as art, according to Pruyser, is the product of human imagination, being madepossible by uniquely human qualities . The psychological process of responding toreligion is similar to the process of responding to other forms of art . It includesthe activation of the human capacity for imagination and fantasy, and theinvolvement of such processes as identification, projection, displacement andreaction-formation. While I take Pruyser's (1976) ideas as an importantstarting-point, I intend to go much further, as will be seen in what follows .

To highlight the basic psychological similarities between the institution ofart and the institution of religion in human society, we might say that bothinstitutions are expressive, i .e . non-instrumental, emotional, irrational and`feminine'. Religion, like art, is a form, and a product, of human labor . It is asystem created by humans, and a proof of human activity and genius . To putthis claim in the strongest possible terms : religion is a work of art . It is (forbelievers, and even for non-believers) beautiful, harmonious, pleasing andattractive . In a confused, confusing and cruel world, where mankind feelshelpless before nature and history, religion and art provide order and beauty .Religion and art are both comforting illusions in a world which makes suchillusions necessary, to paraphrase Marx . Religion has inspired art much morenaturally and easily, and with better results, than any kind of secular ideology,which may serve as another indication of their affinity . We will not deal herewith the effect of religion on art as a source of inspiration, since this separatetopic has been dealt with extensively in art history .

Turning to anthropological and sociological literature, we find both classicaland contemporary expressions of this notion . Malinowski, in his great work,

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Magic, Science and Religion, (1925) which is really an important contributionto the psychology of religion, approvingly quotes Harrison, who has said thatÀrt and religion alike spring from unsatisfied desire' (Harrison, 1948) .Raymond Firth (1981, p . 584) has explicitly made the same claim I am makinghere regarding the basic nature of religion, and in clear enough language, asfollows :

. . . religion is really a form of human art, a symbolic product of human anxiety,desire, and imagination expressed in a social milieu . Like any art, religion is aproduct of tension-between the ideal and the actual, between the individual andthe mass, between the urge to satisfaction and life, and recognition of the inevita-bility of suffering and death . A religion is distinguished from other arts by threemain criteria . Its most effective expressions are generated, as in all arts, byindividual creative effort, but they depend more than other arts upon tradition andmembership of a community . Again, while every art has its forms and ceremonies toguard its practice, the rituals of religion tend to be so frequent, elaborate, evocative,and mandatory that they provide very strong guidelines for faith . Then, the rules ofreligious interpretation and conduct, unlike those of science and philosophy or thevisual arts, are given a legitimacy of ultimate authority which is regarded asabsolute and unchallengeable by those who subscribe to them . Now politics hasbeen variously described as the art of the possible, or the art of the plausible .However this may be, one basic character of religion is clear-after a certain point itbecomes the art of the implausible, in the sense of resting upon postulates which arenon-empirical, which claim an inner rather than an outer appearance of truth, sincethey may run counter to what are ordinarily thought of as natural laws . In thispromise to provide explanations which go beyond the world of sensory experiencelies much of the appeal of religion .

In the literature of psychoanalysis, the Freudian notion of illusion is used toexplain both art and religion in a way strikingly similar to Jane Harrison's, asthe fulfillment of unsatisfied or unattainable wishes through imaginery means .Kardiner (1939, 1945), combining psychoanalysis and anthropology, definesboth art and religion as cultural projective systems . The psychological mech-anism of projection is basic to our understanding of art, and it is basic in sometheories of religion, notably Freud's and Marx's. According to psychoanalyticconceptions, religion is a projection of early family relations onto a cosmicscreen. According to Marx, religion is an upside-down projection of socialrelations in the real world . In both cases there is a creative process involved .

Ego psychology views the whole of human behavior as adjustment efforts onthe part of the ego, and assumes that the ego's defense mechanisms anddefense manoeuvres are the basis for both art and religion . Art (and religion)are ways in which we turn away from direct coping with reality . Kris (1952)and others have referred to a `regression in the service of the ego' . There areobvious reality limits on how much we can regress, and how often . That is whyart may be regarded as a luxury, which we cannot always afford . Continuingthe line developed by Kris, Brenner (1966), spoke of regression in the service of

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the ego, as it appears, in his words,' . . . in intellectual and artistic creativity, inthe enjoyment of works of art, in religious activities . . .' (Brenner, 1966,p.395) .

Winnicott (1971) offers a fascinating conceptualization of the basic processescommon to art and religion, and refers explicitly to both, as he states : Ì amtherefore studying the substance of illusion, [italics in the original] that whichis allowed to the infant, and which in adult life is inherent in art and religion,and yet becomes the hallmark of madness when an adult puts too powerful aclaim on the credulity of others . . .' (p . 3) . This `substance of illusion' is alsothe basis for `play, . . . artistic creativity and appreciation, . . . religiousfeelings, dreaming, fetishism, lying and stealing . . . and the talisman ofobsessional rituals . . .' (p . 5) . Winnicott arrived at this conception throughthe study of transitional objects, the infant's first possession, to which it isextremely attached, the proverbial `security blanket' . The relationship to thisobject is the model for a special mode of experiencing . According to Winnicott(p. 14) :

Transitional objects and transitional phenomena belong to the realm of illusionwhich is at the basis of initiation of experience . This early stage in development ismade possible by the mother's special capacity for making adaptation to the needsof her infant, thus allowing the infant the illusion that what the infant creates reallyexists .

The intermediate area of experience, unchallenged in respect of its belonging toinner or external (shared) reality, constitutes the greater part of the infant'sexperience, and throughout life is retained in the intense experiencing that belongsto the arts and to religion . . .

RELIGION AS ARTBasic elementsThere are two major social roles in art ; the role of the creator and the role of theaudience (spectator, consumer) . Kreitler and Kreitler (1972) suggest thatconcentrating on the role of the creator in art leads to the study of artisticmotivation, creativity, uniqueness of artistic creativity and the development ofartistic creativity . Concentrating on the role of the audience in art leads to thestudy of the psychological processes involved in experiencing art, the develop-ment of the experience of art, and the effects of the experience of art . We canfind exact parallels for the above concepts as we develop a psychology ofreligion .

We may describe great religious leaders and mystics as equivalent to greatartists, theologians and philosophers of religion as equivalent to art historiansand art critics, and the great mass of believers may be compared to artaudiences and consumers . We can concentrate on religious creators, i .e .religious innovators, leaders and saints, or we can examine the religiousaudience of common believers in their common experience of religion as a


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social reality. Truly creative individuals, in both art and religion, are few andfar between. Spectators, in both art and religion, far outnumber creators .

The psychology of art assumes a certain unity of basic processes, which areinvolved in all forms of art . Now we suggest that the same processes areinvolved in religion . The process of artistic creation is a mode for understandingthe process of religious creation . Individual (and group) reactions to religioncan best be interpreted by looking at individual (and group) reactions to art .Both art and religion are based on imagination and emotional involvement (oremotional àrousal') . These are the necessary conditions for the existence ofboth. There are, of course, cognitive, conscious processes involved in thecreation of art, which are as crucial as the presumed unconscius ones .

There is an individualistic bias in the psychology of religion, and a similarindividualistic bias in the psychology of art . But the individual does not inventhis own religion, and does not come to experience it individually . Art, likewise,is not created, nor is it experienced, outside of social relations . A social systemcreates both religion and art . For the past one hundred years there has been inthe literature a common emphasis on the personal and private nature of thereligious experience . And what is more private, personal and ineffable than theaesthetic experience, which is much more common than the ecstatic `religiousexperience' described by James (1902)?

In religious ritual the artistic elements are most obvious and most conscious .The ritual is designed as a drama which enacts the relationship between thebeliever and the deity . Ritual is a highly structured repetition of a religiousdrama, designed to heighten emotions and commitments . The aestheticnature of the experience is conscious and intentional . Much conscious effort isput into making ritual as artistically successful as possible . Even a sermon isfirst of all an artistic product, which has to capture attention and keep it, shed anew light on a common experience, and arouse strong feelings . When Iparticipate in a religious ritual, or when I have a religious experience, I am anactor . The difference between ritual and individual experience is in the stageon which the drama is played out . Ritual provides ready made structure . Inindividual experience I am both actor and playwright . Seguy (1977) hasdiscussed the production of emotion, and the control of emotion by variousconscious and deliberate means, which he has termed èlements de spectacle',in religious ritual . He implies an awareness of the artistic process of ritual onthe part of religious institutions . The goal of artistic technologies is to enableus, the audience, to put a distance between ourselves and our normal realitytesting . That is why art needs special expressive styles, and the same expressivestyles exist in religious rituals . Literary style, as opposed to everyday languagetakes us away from reality . Poetry is less reality related than prose, and specialreligious language has similar effects . The kind of coping which is representedby the two human activities of art and religion, is characterized by being

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expressive, magical or imaginary, and that special kind of coping, differentfrom instrumental coping, is based on several basic psychological mechanisms .

Identification and catharsisInspiration and identification are two terms crucial to the understanding ofboth art and religion . The mechanism of identification, which is so essential toart, operates selectively, according to given cultural constraints . Throughidentification, every member of the audience can participate in the unfoldingdrama on stage, and in the case of religion, he can participate in a drama set ona cosmic stage . Any religious myth is a fantasy, which has been created to servethe needs of both creator and audience . To be acceptable to the audience, ithas to be reliable from a psychological point of view, not from any otherviewpoint. This is the artistic, psychological truth of mythology .

There have been attempts to define religion or `religious experience' through aspecial form of emotional arousal, which is supposedly involved in it . Definingreligion by emotional arousal, èmotionality', or `catharsis' is a `functional'definition, which is too broad to be useful . Emotional arousal, èmotionality',or catharsis can be found in various human activities, most of which cannot bedefined as religious . When we look closely at the process of emotional arousalin religion, we discover that it is indistinguishable from the process ofemotional arousal in situations which would be defined as secular . Ecstasy isto be found among the participants in religious ceremonies, but it would alsobe found among participants in rock concerts, football games and politicalrallies. The triggering of ecstasy by similar means, leading to very similarresults, can be seen in three varieties of American popular culture : the revivalmeeting, the pop concert, and the college football game . In all three rituals wecan see the effects of a mass setting, music and group identification, leading toa heightening of emotions, and to ecstasy and exhilaration, warmth, joy,happiness-as the audience shares in this state of emotional arousal .

All religions offer us opportunities for joy and sadness . Religious rituals giveus opportunities for ritual joy and for ritual mourning . We rejoice at victories,salvations, and promises of salvation . We mourn at the defeats of the just andfaithful, of ancient destructions and massacres . The ritual experiencing ofvictories and defeats is capable of creating real catharsis, but there is anenormous range of individual reactions to religious stimuli, ranging from noresponse to sublime ecstasy .

There is a whole range of private experiences in both art and religion . Notevery private aesthetic experience leads to ecstasy, nor does every privatereligious experience . Art is a good starting point for understanding thegradations of individual arousal in response to emotional stimuli. The gra-dations of emotional arousal related to both art and religion may be adum-brated through the following scale, from high to low: mystical experience,


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ecstasy, catharsis, relief of tension, anxiety reduction, a pleasant feeling . All ofthese terms describe levels of excitement and pleasure . All of them representexperiences which occur in response to both religious and artistic stimuli . Inboth religion and art, ecstatic experiences are rare . The notion of using`religious experience' as the starting point for the understanding of religiontends to obliterate this obvious fact . For most religious people religion isexperienced through routine rituals, rather than ecstasy . For most people art isexperienced as mildly pleasurable, rather than ecstatically cathartic . For mostreligious believers, religious activities and involvements are remarkably non-dramatic. There are no miracles, no religious crises, and no mystical experi-ences in their own lives .

Illusion and beliefFrom the non-believing observer's point of view, the question which createsthe need for a psychology of religion goes as follows : `How can people believe insomething which is so clearly an illusion?' One answer, which leads us to thetask at hand, is `But in art they do it all the time, and nobody asks why' . Thesuspension of disbelief is a precondition for the enjoyment of art and theacceptance of religion . (The enjoyment of religion as a form of art is not limitedto believers . Even non-believers, such as myself, enjoy religious stories,symbols, and rituals as a source of aesthetic pleasure .) The basis for thisexperience is described by Taylor (1981 p . 177 .) as follows :

The fact that we have the ability to conceive of the "as if' is a central feature ofhuman consciousness . Imagining, and being able to think of what is not the case,are clear instances of how fundamental this ability is to human thought . We canmake it as though things are impinging upon consciousness when they are not, andthis ability is one we put to use in a variety of ways . One of the possibilities for us, inthis respect, is the creation of às if worlds that there is the possibility of us enteringfor their own sake . We can create situations and objects that are not the same asother situations and objects but which are like them . Moreover, we can see andrespond to the likenesses we create although knowing they are only likenesses .

Unlike any other kind of art, a unique claim is made, in the case of religion, forthe truth of the artistic message. The products of imagination are differentiatedfrom the products of the secular artistic imagination by their special psycho-logical status of holiness, and are preclaimed to be true, while art is alwaysrecognized as illusion . Thus, religion can be defined as that form of art which isclaimed to be not just beautiful, but also true . What may be unique in theartistic process through which religion is created, is that the creators of religionascribe their artistic achievements to divine sources . The question of `truth' iscentral to both religion and art, though in different ways . Adherents of areligion believe in the literal truth of its claims . Art audiences are likely tospeak of àrtistic truth', which is quite different . Following Freud (1927) we

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may suggest that whatever truth there is in religion and art must be psycho-logical truth .

One of the tasks of modern social science, since its beginnings in the 19thcentury, has been to explain the persistence and attraction of religion . Thequestion of the persistence of religion in a rational world should be posedagainst the question of the persistence of art in the same . To the question `howdoes religion survive in this modern, rational, world?' we should reply with aparallel question : `how does art survive in this modern, rational, world?' Thesecond question gives the answer to the first one. On the level of psychologicaltheory, psychoanalytic ego psychology has suggested that there is a naturallimit to the rational reality testing, and the tension of rationality is relieved byopportunities for regression in the service of the ego, which creates both artand religion .

Children tell and hear imaginary stories, and act out roles and events . Theytalk to unseen objects, create symbols and are taught to share in culturalsymbols. This early experience prepares the child for participation in thecultural institutions of art and religion . Religion is most often transmitted andlearned not as a belief system in abstract principles, but as a system ofnarratives (myths, stories) . It is first learned through stories, not abstractprinciples (Pruyser, 1976) . The child is exposed to narratives, and is told thatthese imaginary stories have special significance in regard to himself and inregard to the whole culture, or even the whole world . The normal course ofacquiring religious beliefs, i .e. the way in which children acquire religiousbeliefs inside the family, is by learning simple stories and rituals . Only later isthere any cognitive involvement in beliefs and arguments in favor of certainbeliefs . Religion is a collection of moving stories and moving rituals . Thestories are wonderful because they can move us so deeply and touch us sodeeply . Mythology presents us with moving dramatic stories, into which wecan, and do, project ourselves . The power of these moving stories is in creatingpowerful identification, and that is the power of art in every case .

Religious belief is, first and foremost, belief in certain narratives, which areexperienced as true and significant . Beliefs are most often expressed asfantasies . Belief is a certainty that something happened, that a certain story istrue. Religion does not exist in the abstract, as a general acceptance ofsupernaturalism . For most concrete human beings in most concrete humansituations (with the exceptions of some philosophers and theologians who areattempting to defend supernaturalism by making it abstract ; Kolakowski,1982), religion is a specific belief in a specific set of promises, claims andstories. Psychology should aim at dealing with religion in the concrete reality ofhuman history ; the religion of real people rather than of the theologians(theologians are real, only their religion isn't) . This means that the psycho-logist of religion deals with specific content, a specific text, if you will, which


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exists in the real world and calls for interpretation . I do not know betterexpression of the reality of religious faith than William Blake's lines (1905, p .108)

ScoffersMock on, mock on, Voltaire Rousseau ;Mock on, mock on ; 'tis all in vain!You throw the sand against the wind,And the wind blows it back again .And every sand becomes a gemReflected in the beams divine ;Blown back they blind the mocking eye,But still in Israel's path they shine .

The Atoms of Democritusand Newton's Particles of LightAre sands upon the Red Sea shore,Where Israel's tents do shine and bright .

This is our subject matter, and our abstractions should grow out of it, and notabove it. William Blake's unshakable belief in specific, concrete, and vividstories is our datum .

The audienceIn the literature of the psychology of art, there is a common assumption of thebasic similarities between creators and audiences in art, as far as basicpsychological processes are concerned . As Berlyne (1960) stated, ` . . . thecreator, the performer, and the audience of a work of art . . . must, at least insome measure, be actuated by common motivational factors and reinforced bycommon sources of reward value' (p . 220). According to the psychoanalyticalview, both the creation of art and the enjoyment of art are based on identicalpsychological mechanisms, especially sublimation and regression in the service ofthe ego .

There has to be, and there is, a basic psychological readiness for art, as thereis a basic psychological readiness for religion, and the basic processes involvedare identical. The psychological processes involved in responding to religionon the part of the audience are similar to the process of responding to art . Theyinclude the activation of the imagination and the emotions, and an identi-fication with elements of the artifact presented to the audience . The artisticproduct creates in the individual member of the audience reverberations,which go deep into his or her unconscious . Readers do not participate in theprocess the novelist went through in creating the novel, but it reverberatesthrough their unconscious responses, and approaches the original process ofcreation .

There is a gap, perhaps an unbridgeable one, between artist and audience . A

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similar gap exists between the creators of religion and the audience of religion .Since religious rituals, like classical art, have been preserved over long periodsof time, the connection between original intentions (by the creators) andpresent experience is unclear . The artistic audience's distance from Shakespeare,El Greco or Bach is smaller than the religious audience's distance from credos,rituals and prayers, sometimes dated more than a millenium, but preservedwithout changes . That is the gap between religion as given and religion asadopted. The official versions of religion, given by religious leaders andtheologians, are always far removed from folk religion, the way in whichpeople actually practice and (unofficially) create a living religious tradition .This gap can be compared to the parallel gap in art between high art andpopular art. Routine religious activities can thus be compared not to high artbut to entertainment, providing an easy, non-commital, outlet and emotionalarousal. In the response to art we have two parallel systems . One belongs tothe experts, the other one to the common audience . In religion we have asimilar gap between experts and audience, with theologians and philosophersplaying the role of art critics passing judgments on the merits of religiouscreations . The difference between the art critics and the theologicans is, ofcourse, that the critics pass judgement on artistic merits only, and not on truthvalues . Art critics do not ever claim that a certain work of art has meritsbecause it is veridical .

We may hypothesize that the number, and characteristics of people in anysociety, who are seriously involved in religion, parallels the number andcharacteristics of people involved seriously in the arts . In both cases we aredealing with small minorities, and with a possible overlap between the twogroups. An interesting similarity beteen the social institutions of art andreligion is in the nature of their audience . In modern Western societies (andpossibly in other societies) the audience for both religion and art is largelymade up of women, while the creators of both art and religion are men .Women are the customers for religion in all forms, and for art in all its forms,more so than men (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975) because of their lack ofpolitical and social power . They may have to cope through the creative use ofimagination, since their inability to change reality is limited . In this respectwomen may resemble other oppressed groups .

We are now in a position to explain varius findings in the social psychologyof religion, such as the differences in religious involvement on the basis of sex,age and family status . We may hypothesize an inverse relationship betweenreadiness and opportunity for instrumental coping on the one hand, andinvolvement in religion and magic on the other hand .

The question ofconsequencesLooking at art and related processes may lead us to insights about one of the


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persistent questions in the contemporary psychology of religion : the questionof effects . One of the common questions in the contemporary psychology ofreligion is that of consequences . The question is often asked with a degree ofamazement: why don't we find any behavioral effects of religious participation?Why doesn't going to church on Sunday have any effect on behavior during therest of the week? (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975) . This question will beasked with less amazement when the comparison to art is made . The effects ofreligious experience and rituals should be compared to the effect of artisticexperience, since the processes involved are so similar . The effects of religiousrituals and beliefs can be compared to the effects of art . There is an obviouslysatisfying quality about art, but we do not expect any of this satisfaction tolinger on and to affect our behavior outside the specific situation of the art-ritual, be it a theate or a museum. We do not expect any consequences afterfinding out that a certain individual attends chamber music concerts everyWednesday. We might be able to say something about him in terms of socialbackground and education, but we will rarely venture a guess as to his moralqualities or personality structure . Has anybody ever been ruined (or saved) bylistening to Beethoven, reading Proust or looking at a Van Gogh painting?

The major function of art has been considered, since the days of Aristotle,that of catharsis, i .e . the production of a (vicarious) emotional experience,through the arousal and ventilation of strong emotions . It is unclear whethersuch catharsis is likely to lead to other, instrumental behaviors . If we look atreligion through the catharsis perspective, we can then understand its limitedbehavioral consequences . If we adopt a Marxian perspective, it becomes clearthat religion exists to serve this catharsis function, thus supporting the existingsocial arrangements by providing an expressive outlet to instrumental frus-trations .

There are many human activities that are engaged in for themselves,without any additional consequences expected, and such activities are indeedreferred to as àrt' or èntertainment' . Do you expect any effects from a weeklyvisit to a museum or a concert, similar to the ones you expect from religion? Wedo not expect any effects in subsequent behavior when people go to museums,theatres or athletic events ; why should we expect any effects when they go tochurch? Once this analogy is made, things become clearer. It is possible tohave an emotional experience, a catharsis experience, or an ecstatic experience,without any lasting, or even short-term, effects . One can recall numerousoccasions of artistic catharsis or ecstasy, which were not followed by anylasting changes in behavior (despite the presumed ènnobling effects' of art) .Actually, the value of artistic experiences may lie in their temporariness .Remaining in a state of catharsis or ecstasy for long is something most of uscannot afford, psychologically and socially .

The puzzle of the presumed effects of catharsis is clarified once we realize

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that people search again and again for catharsis experiences, either in secularart or in religion . There is apparently no permanent or cumulative effect tocatharsis . That is why the experience has to be repeated in various ways .People are ready to participate again and again in religious and artistic events,which provide them with opportunities for emotional expression and venti-lation . In other words, the effect of the experience is in the experience itself,when relief is provided . This relief, like all human satisfaction, is temporary,and has to be attained repeatedly . There should be only minimal behavioralconsequences to artistic experience, because it provides only an imaginarysolution to behavioral problems. Art relieves tensions and neutralizes them,and thus should have some behavioral consequences . The imaginary relief ofboth art and religion should have some consequences, but their appreciationshould be a matter of sensitive gauging . It may be that the behavioralconsequences of art and religion are noticeable when there is an identityinvolvement or ego-involvement, and this carries us to the second element inthis essay .

RELIGION AS IDENTITYThe lack of behavioral consequences following religious rituals and secularartistic rituals may be characteristic of specific situations, and not of allhistorical periods . It is a definite characteristic of both religion and art inmodern society . Religion does, of course, have consequences on social levels,as a way of defining identity and belonging, but these can be separated fromthe psychological effects of religion (as experience and as ritual) on theindividual .

Is there any religious activity which is not part of an institution? Are thereany private creations in religion which reflect only an experience ìn solitude',without reference to a tradition? Religion is both personal and social, indi-vidual and cultural. The questions are what and how does the individual addto the cultural tradition . The concept of identity seems to provide a bridgebetween the private and the public realms in religion, as an appropriate locusfor that which connects the individual personality and the cultural matrix . Anindividual identity is made up of several subidentities, and the religioussubidentity may be one of those .

The theoretical sources for the understanding of religion as art come fromclassical psychoanalysis. The theoretical sources for the understanding ofreligion as a form of identity and as a way of attachment come from socialpsychology, sociology and anthropology . Identity and subidentity are usefulsocial-psychological concepts which provide a bridge between individualpersonality and social tradition . The psychology of identity, as a social-psychological concept, should contribute to understanding the `persistence ofreligion' (Allport, 1950) . Religion is preserved not just because of its qualities


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as art, but is tied to those groups where social forces keep it as part of a groupidentity, and is often promoted as such .

Peter Berger has described identity in the following way (1973, pp . 275-277) .

Every society contains a repertoire of identities that is part of the objectiveknowledge of its members . . . As the individual is socialised, these identities areinternalised . They are then not only taken for granted as constituents of an objectivereality òut there' but as inevitable structures of the individual's own consciousness .The objective reality, as defined by society, is subjectively appropriated . In otherwords, socialisation brings about symmetry between objective and subjectivereality, objective and subjective identity . . .

Identity, with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality, is alwaysidentity with a specific, socially constructed world . . . One identifies always identitywith a specific, socially constructed world . . . One identifies oneself, as one isidentified by others, by being located in a common world .

Social identity is structured by the culture, and maintained in manydifferent ways . Labels used to define religious affiliation structure one'sidentity in social space . Such labels are imposed from the outside, and may notlead to real ego-involvement . However, much effort is put into making theidentity label into social reality . While in most cases the identity label is nomore than a passive acceptance of a social convention, the religious com-munity will make it into a central identity structure . Social group identity maybe described as a loyalty structure, and as such it is reinforced and maintainedby rituals of loyalty .

To use the term suggested by Mol (1978), religion sacralizes identity, andthus contributes to social integration . This sacralization is maintained by fourmechanisms, as described by Mol (1976) : objectification, in which the socialorder is projected beyond the temporal commitment, emotional investment,ritual and myth . Religion becomes the basis for social identity by creatingdifferences between groups, and it then becomes an ideology, a system ofidentity maintenance. The differences between religious groups in mythology,rituals and customs all create barriers to social interaction, and serve toexpress existing social divisions . For most individuals, religion exists as part oftheir identity . They do not believe in a certain religious system . They aremembers of a religious group . They are Catholics, Jews or Moslems . The onlychoice most individuals make, if they can make a choice at all regarding thedominant religious belief system in their group, is whether they will followgroup tradition . Most individuals don't choose a religion ; they are simply borninto one. And they learn their religion in the same way they learn other aspectsof their social identity . After they have acquired an identity, they have todiscover (sometimes to their utter surprise) that they have also acquired asystem of beliefs which is tied to that identity

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believing in certain things, while being Jewish means believing in other things .And since religion is part of social identity, most people simply follow thereligion they have learned . Only few people adopt a religion as a result of aconscious quest. For 99% of religious people all over the world, religion is partof a conventional identity .

The truth claims of religion are tied to identity . These beliefs are true, notonly because of their intrinsic merits, but also because they are a part of the selfand the `me' . And beliefs may serve an important function in enhancing self-esteem through social identity . Religion may compensate for objective sufferingand inferiority, by creating a group identity of the chosen, who are trulysuperior despite their worldly misery . The few may be chosen and superiorbecause of their possession of the truth and their promised future salvation .There are endless examples of millenarian groups, which are secure in theirexpectation of imminent salvation and in their superiority feelings, despite thelack of any objective indications for those .

The uniqueness of religion as a system of beliefs and attitudes is oftenalleged to be its high degree of resistance to change, and its high degree ofemotionality . Both can best be explained in terms of the identity system .Religion as an individual belief system is so resistant to change because it istied to a sense of identity . Every challenge to a religious belief is a threat to thepersonal identity system, and people react strongly to such threats . Thereligious groups make sure, through the process of religious socialization, thatreligious beliefs are indeed tied to one's sense of identity, so that one will beready to defend these beliefs, if necessary . Identity then becomes the meetingground for cognition and emotion, and these meetings have been known, ofcourse, to lead also to battle grounds . When religious beliefs are part of the selfsystem, every challenge to the religious system becomes a challenge to the self .Individual differences in the closeness of the religious system to the core of theself may explain individual differences in religious commitment .

Whereas there is little ìnstrumental' value in either art or religion, identityis more ìnstrumental' in the sense of having behavioral consequences. If westated earlier that it is difficult to locate the behavioral consequences ofreligion as art, it is much easier, on the other hand, to locate the behavioralconsequences of religion as identity . Social identity has social consequences inbehavior, and these consequences are not hard to discover . When we cancorrelate voting patterns with religious affiliation, we are clearly dealing withthe consequences of religious identity in social life . The political implicationsof religious identity are not hard to find nowadays in many parts of the world,and much current suffering can be tied to various consequences of religiousidentity claims (Beit-Hallahmi, 1973) .

Religion in its identity function supports the existence of human community,but the existence of multiple human identities and multiple human communities


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may be dysfunctional in the long run as it creates social divisions . Groupidentity, which exists to create social divisions, is a problem and an obstacle forboth art and religion ; indeed, for all of humanity . Particularistic identitieshave created both artistic and religious counter-identities, which aim at oneuniversal human selfhood . The dream of a universal human identity exists inreligion and in politics . Universal religions seek to unify all of humanity, whileuniversalistic ideals, such as Marxism, seek to unify humanity on a secularbasis . These dreams represent a natural yearning for overcoming humandivisions, but the roots of group identity are deep and go back to earlyexperiences in the human family, where every group identity begins . Identityon the individual level is a necessary support system for the ego, as the egocannot survive without both ego-identity (Erikson, 1950) and group identity,and as the ego cannot survive without structures around it, both ego-identityand social group identity serve as vital support structures .

CONCLUSIONThe term art has been used here to circumscribe the individual level ofinvolvement in religion, whereas the term identity has been used to refer to thesocial level of involvement, and its consequences . The discussion of religion asart follows the classical historical emphasis on individual religious experience,which has dominated the psychology of religion since William James . Thediscussion of religion as identity follows the tradition of the social psychologyof religion . The art and identity model is able to explain on the one hand thelack of visible consequences of religion on an individual level, and on the otherhand the clearly visible consequences of religion on a social level .

Religion offers us a case of unique connection between art and identity .Religion is a form of art which is claimed to be representing reality, rather thanreality transformed by imagination, and which is utilized to define andactualize an identity .

Viewing religion as representing social realities is a conception tied to thenames of both Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim (both, incidentally, descendedfrom distinguished rabbinical families) . Durkheim has expressed this viewmost directly when stating that religion cannot be false, in a social sense,because it represents society and social relations . Againt the psychologicaltruth of religion, recognized by Freud, we may posit the social truth of religion,recognized by Durkheim . Carrying these two views one step further, withinmy framework here, I may say that Freud posits religion as art, whileDurkheim posits it as social identity .

The psychoanalytic explanation for the function of both art and religionemphasizes gratification through fantasy . We go to church for the same reasonthat we go to the movies, because the fantasies presented at both places aregratifying . Going to church is in addition an expression of an identity, and

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identity may be just as important as fantasy for some individuals in determiningreligious behavior . One may venture a parallel between the intrinsic-extrinsicdichotomy, proposed by Allport and Ross (1967), and between the art andidentity factors . The intrinsically religious individual responds to religion asart. The extrinsically religious responds to religion as identity . This analysis is,of course, historical . It is possible that in other times and other places thepsychological context of religion was different . Today, in the age of seculariz-ation, religion has to compete very hard for its audience, against other, morepopular forms of art and entertainment, and its effect as an identity system arealso diminishing .

We may want to go further in our usage of the two concepts, and we maywant to use now a typology : a religion of art and a religion of identity . Based onthe well known distinctions between religious activity in different socialgroups, (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975), we may want to suggest the twokinds of involvement presented below .

RELIGION OF ART

RELIGION OF IDENTITYIntense experience

Social activityIntrinsic

ExtrinsicSect

Church

The discussion of religion and identity brings us to a possibly more basicpsychological tendency and a more basic source of religious feelings, and thatis the process of, and the need for, attachment to human objects . Here lies themost basic urge of all human urges, which gives its energy to most humanactivities and human institutions . The basic psychological process of attach-ment operates in art, where there is attachment to imaginary objects, intern-alized and then externalized . It clearly operates in the case of social identity,where the underlying process is that of attachment to real objects .

We arrive at a new psychological definition of religion : religion is a form ofart, about which a claim is made that it represents reality, and which alsoexpresses both individual and group identity. It is the identity element whichis responsible for the fact that this particular form of art is claimed to be true . Itis claimed to be true because it is essential for the maintenance of a certainidentity, like other kinds of ideology . Thus religion is both an art and anidentity-maintenance serving as a basis for social divisions and social grouping .

REFERENCESAllport, G. W. (1950) . The individual and His Religion . New York: Macmillan .Allport, G. W . and Ross, J . M . (1967) . Personal religious orientation and prejudice .

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 432-443 .Argyle, M. and Beit-Hallahmi, B . (1975) . The Social Psychology of Religion . London

and Boston : Routledge & Kegan Paul .Beit-Hallahmi, B . (1973) . Religion and nationalism in the Arab-Israeli conflict . Il


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Politico, 38, 232-243 .Beit-Hallahmi, B . (1974) . Psychology of religion 1880-1930 : the rise and fall of a

psychological movement . Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 10, 84-90 .Beit-Hallahmi, B . (1984) . Psychology and religion . In M.H. Bornstein (ed .), Psychology

and Its Allied Disciplines . Hillsdale, New Jersey : Lawrence Erlbaum Associates .Berger, P. (1973) . Identity as a problem in the sociology of knowledge . In G. W .

Remmling (ed .), Towards the Sociology ofKnowledge . London: Routledge & KeganPaul .

Berlyne, D. E . (1960) . Conflict, Arousal and Curiosity . New York: McGraw-Hill .Black, M . (1962) . Models and Metaphors : Studies in Language and Philosophy . Ithaca :

Cornell University Press .Blake, W . (1905) . Poems of William Blake . London: Routledge .Brenner, C . (1966) . The mechanism of repression . In R. M. Loewenstein, L. M .

Newman M . Schur and A . J . Solnit (eds), Psychoanalysis-a General Psychology .New York: International Universities Press .

Erikson, E. H . (1950) . Childhood and Society . New York: Norton .Firth, R. (1981) . Spiritual aroma : religion and politics . American Anthropologist, 83,

582-601 .Freud, S . (1927) . The Future of an Illusion . New York: Norton, 1961 .Harrison, J. (1948) . Themis . London: Cambridge University Press .James, W . (1902) . The Varieties of Religious Experience . New York: Longmans .Kardiner, A . (1939) . The Individual and His Society . New York: Columbia University

Press .Kardiner, A . (1945) . The Psychological Frontiers of Society . New York: Columbia

University Press .Kolakowski, L . (1982) . Religion . New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press .Kreitler, H. and Kreitler, S . (1972) . Psychology ofthe Arts . Chapel Hill, North Carolina :

University of North Carolina Press .Kris, E . (1952) . Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art. New York: International Universities

Press .Malinowski, B . (1925) . Magic, Science and Religion . In J. Needham (ed .), Science,

Religion, and Reality. London: Macmillan .Mol, H . J . (1976) . Identity and the Sacred . Oxford: Blackwell .Mol, H. J . (1978) . Introduction . In H . J . Mol (ed .), Identity and Religion . London :

Sage .Pruyser, P. W. (1976) . Lessons from art theory for the psychology of religion .Journal

for the Scientific Study of Religion, 15, 1-14 .Seguy, J . (1977) . Rationnel et emotionnel dans la pratique liturgique Catholique : un

modele theorique . La Maison Dieu, 129, 73-92 .Taylor, R. (1981) . Beyond Art . Sussex: The Harvester Press .Winnicott, D . W. (1971) . Playing and Reality . London: Tavistock .

BENJAMIN BEIT-HALLAHMI is associate professor of Psychology at the

University of Haifa. He has edited Research in Religious Behavior (1973),authored Psychoanalysis and Religion : A Bibliography (1978), co-authored TheSocial Psychology of Religion (1975), The Kibbutz Bibliography (1981), and

Twenty Years Later : Kibbutz Children Grown Up (1982) . He is currentlyworking on a study of contemporary salvation movements in Israel .

Department of Psychology, University of Haifa,Haifa 31999, Israel

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Religion as art and identity