Regulatory Impact Assessment of EU Seveso II Directive€¦ · case of siting new Establishments and modifications to present ones Seveso Establishments and residential areas are

Regulatory Impact Assessmentof EU Seveso II Directive

(96/82/EC)

This project is funded by European Union

Authors

Sayman, Rıfat Ünal (MSc) (lead author) Regional Environmental Center (REC) Turkey

Baş, Dursun Regional Environmental Center (REC) Turkey

Öztürk, Ahmet Eren (MSc) Regional Environmental Center (REC) Turkey Cordova-Novion, Cesar (PhD) Jacobs, Cordova & Associates

REC RIA Committee Members

Sezer Eralp, Sibel (PhD)

Okumuş, Kerem (MSc)

Sayman, Rıfat Ünal (MSc) Güder, Nafiz

MoEU RIA Working Group

Contributors

Malkoç, Nihat

Tomas, Kadir (PhD)

Regional Environmental Center (REC) Turkey

Ertürer, Gönül

Girgin, Serkan (PhD)

Köse, Pınar

Bağan, Mustafa

Steering Committee for RIA

Regional Environmental Center (REC) Turkey

Turkish Ministry of Environment and Urbanization

Turkish Prime Ministry Turkish Ministry of Development

Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Delegation of European Union to Turkey

This Regulatory Impact Assessment Report was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the “Capacity Building in

the Field of Environment” project funded by EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) whose beneficiary is Turkish

Ministry of Environment and Urbanization.

Disclaimer

The content of this report does not reflect the official opinion of the European Union and Turkish Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in the report lies entirely with the Regional Environmental Center (REC) Turkey.

Baykara, Cengiz (PhD)

Dağ, Kemal

Demirural, Müfide

Yetgin, Funda

Göktaş, Ahmet

Aklan, Ayşe Pınar

Ercan, Özlem

Ekmekçi, İrfan

Zırhlı, Özlem

This project is funded by European Union

Capacity Building in the Field of Environment

Regulatory Impact Assessment of EU Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC)

Regional Environmental Center (REC)

Turkey, 2012

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: i

Executive Summary

The Assignment

To be a member of EU, Turkey needs to implement the directive of the European Parliament and of

the Council of 9 December 1996 on the Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous

Substances (aka the ‘Seveso II Directive’).

The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization requested REC Turkey to prepare a Regulatory Impact

Analysis to assist the implementation and enforcement of the Seveso II Directive.

The Problem

Modern industrial production processes requires the use of chemical substances. Chemical substances

are crucial components of the production of consumer goods, as well as agriculture, manufacturing,

construction, and service industries.

Turkish Chemical Manufacturers produced 126 million tons of chemicals in 20101. Failures in the

storage, use, production and disposal of these substances may lead to explosions, fires or releases that

can cause serious damage.

The immense negative impacts of major industrial accidents to environment, society and economy

have been documented worldwide over the past couple of decades. Unfortunately, there have been

numerous detrimental accidents over the years (see Annex - 7. 1). The release of a toxic cloud of

chemicals at Seveso (Italy, 1976) and the toxic leak at Bhopal (India, 1984) are among the worst in

history.

Box 1 - Seveso and Bhopal Disasters

Seveso Disaster Bhopal Disaster

The accident at a chemical plant in

Seveso, Italy (1976) resulted in the

release of a cloud of chemicals

containing dioxin, exposing 37,000

people, contaminating 1800-hectare

area and slaughtering about 75,000

animals.

Toxic leak at Bhopal, India (1984)

resulted in a death toll ranging from

4,000 to 20,000 people. The disaster

caused serious health problems to

both human and animal populations

for a long term.

Following the Seveso accident in 1976, the EU prompted the adoption of legislation aimed at the

prevention and control of such accidents. The Directive has been periodically amended based on

lessons learned from major industrial accidents (see section 1.3).

1 Turkish Chemical Manufacturers Association, 2010

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: ii

Turkey also challenged with major accidents. Recent examples in Turkey illustrate the serious

consequences. The 1999 earthquake resulted in many deaths and loss of property due to the explosions

in the TUPRAS refinery and Yalova AKSA facilities in İzmit. Other recent major accidents occurred

in establishments like the Tuzla Shipyards, the Akçagaz LPG filling plant, and the most recently

Kayalar Kimya ve Sanayi A.Ş.2 (See Annex - 7).

Turkey transposed Seveso II Directive with the By-Law on Control of Major Industrial Accidents both

as a requirement of EU accession process and as a prevention of future major accidents. Turkey

published the By-Law in August 18, 2010, which will enter into force in January 2014. The Directive,

with the implementation of the By-Law, will bring benefits to Turkey.

The Directive also requires important legal, technical and institutional reforms that will have

economic, social and environmental costs. It will also require budgetary and financial expenditures of

the public authorities and relevant stakeholders. These costs, their finance and distribution among

stakeholders will be the major challenge for Turkey.

Additionally, the Government will face several problems and challenges for the successful

implementation:

Implementation of the Directive requires involvement of different administrative bodies which

has limited human resources and technical capacity,

There is a limited understanding and no consensus among stakeholders on the definition and

practice of risk assessment in the context of the Directive,

Turkey does not have land use planning practices to prevent and control major accidents, in

case of siting new Establishments and modifications to present ones

Seveso Establishments and residential areas are overlapping,

Some of the Seveso Establishments do not have proper distance between each other, which

may lead to domino effect.

RIA Methodology

Regulatory Impact Analysis is an evidence-based process used for taking policy and regulatory

decisions. It involves asking key questions in a structured way in order to understand underlying

problems and identify options. Regulatory Impact Analysis analyzes and compares the various impacts

of these options systematically. This supports transparent policy debate and enables important

information to be communicated among government and stakeholders. It is crucial to ensure that key

decisions are made based on an assessment of the costs and benefits of each option.

For this RIA study, REC Turkey customized the current EU Impact Assessment methodology.3

Data Gathering and Impact Assessment Processes

This impact assessment is based on an extensive consultation of stakeholder’s and collection of data,

information and views. To strengthen the RIA study with unbiased evidence, REC Turkey undertook

the following activities:

2 Initial cost estimation for the Kayalar Kimya Sanayi A. Ş. accident is around 200 million American dollars:

http://www.sabah.com.tr/Ekonomi/2012/08/09/bir-kivilcim-kimyamizi-bozdu 3 http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/index_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/index_en.htm

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: iii

- Organization of a broad Consultation Process including meetings in Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir,

Adana, and Kocaeli with the support of Turkish Union of Chamber and Commodity Exchanges

Chamber of Commerce (TOBB). During this process, REC Turkey met with over 30 central and

local public institutions, 8 municipalities, and 84 operators.

- Preparation of a Preliminary RIA to validate policy options

- Consultation with the regulatory agencies, industry and trade organizations

- Literature and best practice research at the international level

- Benchmark studies

- Participation to the Seveso Training in Ankara, facilitated by the European Commission’s Joint

Research Centre

- Outputs of the Study tour to The Netherlands (with MoEU Officials)

- Undertaking a survey on the problems and solutions

- Development of cost-benefit models based on several scenarios with different projection tools

REC Turkey benefited from close collaboration of MoEU, TOBB, and Jacobs, Cordova and

Associates.

Baseline

Total number of establishments, which have been registered and identified as “Seveso Establishment”

in the MoEU Seveso Notification System, is 518 as of December 2011. Some of the significant figures

on these Establishments are as following:

- Half of the Establishments have been classified as Upper-Tier (251 - 48.5%) and the remaining

have been classified as Lower-Tier (267 - 51.5%);

- Petrochemicals, Chemical Installations and Manufacturing industrial sectors cover 75.5% of

Seveso Establishments;

- Seveso Establishments are distributed nation-wide (see Figure 1);

- Majority of Establishments (50.2%) are concentrated in the six provinces namely Ankara,

İstanbul, İzmir, Kırıkkale, Kocaeli, and Tekirdağ (see Figure 2);

- Many Seveso Establishments are overlapped with residential areas;

- Some of the Seveso Establishments are Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs);

- REC Turkey estimates the total number of establishments registered and identified as Seveso

Establishment will increase in the earlier years of the implementation of the Directive due to the

compliance rate.

The number of the “Seveso Accidents” is unknown due to the lack of systematic and detailed reporting

of accidents. Moreover, though it is fact that major accidents made irreversible effects to Turkey’s

economy, human health and the environment, the total cost of these accidents has not been estimated.

Regarding the administrative structure, there are three central public administrations closely related

with the Seveso Directive: Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (MoEU), Ministry of Labor and

Social Security (MoLSS), and Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (DEMP). Moreover,

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: iv

local authorities and Organized Industrial Zone (OIZ) administrations will have also responsibilities in

terms of implementation of the Directive.

Figure 1 - Geographical Distribution of Seveso Establishments in Turkey

Source: REC Turkey, Data source: MoEU Seveso Notification Database, December 2011

Figure 2 – Distribution of Seveso Establishments in North-West of Turkey

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: v

Source: REC Turkey, 2012, Data source: MoEU data

Note: Each dot represents one Seveso Establishment. Dots are randomly distributed within the geographical boundries of the

districts they are registered in.

Turkey’s industrial risk management practices focus on safety measures and risk reduction in the

Establishment itself (on-site). Operators follow current legislations and standards on risk assessment

practices. However, the Directive’s requirements related with risk analysis for the prevention and

limitation of major accidents are new subjects for both CAs and Operators.

The Directive also requires limitation of impacts to public health and environment exposed to the

industrial accidents in the vicinity of the Establishments (off-site) where Turkey lacks experience.

Currently, Turkey does not have a well-developed Land Use Planning regulation and practices for

limit the consequences of the major accidents and off-site protection . Moreover, majority of

Establishments do not perform consultation processes to inform and involve public to decision-making

process.

Objectives

The overall policy objective of the RIA is to ensure a successful implementation of the Seveso II

Directive in Turkey in an optimal way in terms of economic, environmental and social aspects.

The three specific objectives of the RIA are:

- To assist reduction of the major accidents, prevention and limitation of the consequences of

accidents on public health and the environment,

- To ensure the implementation of the Directive with specific policies that reduce the economic,

environmental and social costs for all stakeholders (governmental bodies, municipalities, operators

and general public)

- To achieve full compliance with the Directive, including administrative structure, risk assessment

framework, land use approach and sanctioning policy

These specific objectives leads to seven operational targets defined as follows:

- To calculate the expected cost of implementing the Directive in Turkey,

- To identify the most suitable regulatory framework for Turkey,

- To identify most effective methods to encourage full compliance,

- To set up a suitable administrative structure for proper coordination of multidiscipline problems,

- To develop a proper risk assessment framework,

- To develop the most appropriate land use planning approach,

- To identify enforcement and sanctioning instruments to increase the compliance level.

Policy Areas

In order to implement the main provisions of the Seveso II Directive, the Turkish authorities need to

make several decisions. In addition to measuring/assessing the baseline (corresponding to the “non-

action option”), the RIA study analyzes nine policy options around the following key policy areas of

the Directive:

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: vi

- Administrative Structure: This policy area analyses different regulatory structures for

Competent Authorities to implement and enforce the Directive and discusses the roles and

responsibilities of relevant public authorities.

- Risk Assessment Framework: This policy area assesses different regulatory frameworks,

where the CAs defines and requires or not, the use of the predetermined risk assessment

standards and instruments by operators.

- Land Use Planning Approaches: This policy area studies different approaches to risk

assessment of land use planning and their implication on safety zones and new developments

around the Establishments.

- Sanction Strategies: This policy area analyzes alternatives for setting up sanctioning

mechanisms that CAs use to ensure that the operators comply with the obligations of the

Directive.

Summary of the Impacts Assessed

The implementation of the Seveso II Directive will provide major environmental, social and economic

benefits:

- The implementation of the Directive will reduce the number of major accidents and mitigate

their consequences. These will lead to:

o Reduction of accidental release of dangerous substances to air, soil and water;

o Less harm to public health (less casualties, injuries and long term negative impacts on

public health)

o Less harm to properties in the vicinity of Establishments (settlements, commercial,

public and social sites, etc.)

o Decrease of the damage in-site the Establishments.

- Without full transposition of directives, the negotiations of the environmental chapter will not

be closed. Moreover, successful implementation of the Directive will support the Turkish

Government in the negotiation process.

- Without full transposition of directives, the negotiations of the environmental chapter will not

be closed. Therefore, directive specific implementation plan will be a positive milestone

towards EU membership.

- Full implementation of the Directive will reduce the risk of infraction fines and some

reputational damages after accession.

- The improvement of safety culture (occupational safety, process safety, off-site safety etc.).

REC Turkey estimates that the total compliance cost of implementing the Directive for government,

business and other stakeholders is around 62 million Euro between 2012 and 2021 (see Table 1).

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: vii

Table 1 - Total Administrative Costs (PV – Euros)

The following points needs to be pointed out. First, these impacts have been assessed for a period

starting from 2012 and ending in 2021. Second, because the Directive provides some flexibility in

terms of application and Turkey is not a member of the EU yet, the impacts could be incremental.

Third, the economic impact of implementing the Directive will mostly depend on the number of the

Seveso Establishments. Overall, the implementation of the Directive will cause three types of costs:

Administrative compliance cost; REC Turkey developed a model that estimates a total cost of 62

million Euro for 10 years between 2012 and 2021 (PV).

- These costs will not be shared equally. Operators will cover 63 % and public authorities 27%

of the total cost.

- The Directive will have different impacts according to the obligations of each category of

establishments. For Upper-Tier establishment it will be 47.2 million Euro for 10 years

between 2012 and 2021 (PV). In the case of the Lower-Tier establishment it will be 14.8

million Euro for 10 years between 2012 and 2021 (PV).

- In terms of sectors, the most affected one will be the petrochemical (48%) followed by the

chemical industry (21%) (see Figure 3)

- The Directive has a very important first year administrative cost, representing 1/3 of the total

costs for the assessed period. This is due to the preparation of the first set of safety

documentation and reports. The following years, the operators will mostly need to update and

validate this documentation.

- The model estimates that the inspection and assessment costs will also be significant,

representing 1/3 of the total cost and 70% of the total cost for the government.

Row Labels 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 TOTAL

Operators 17.022.120 1.786.476 1.717.766 2.845.398 3.289.231 3.652.003 2.529.548 1.411.878 2.811.649 2.248.759 39.314.829

Capacity Building 1.990.000 0 0 0 1.701.060 0 0 0 1.454.074 0 5.145.134

Other Costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Safety Report 3.960.000 190.385 183.062 176.021 169.251 976.449 156.482 150.464 144.677 139.112 6.245.903

MAPP 3.567.000 171.490 164.895 158.553 152.454 879.544 140.953 135.531 130.319 125.306 5.626.045

SMS 2.475.000 118.990 114.414 110.013 105.782 610.281 97.801 94.040 90.423 86.945 3.903.690

IEP 3.736.000 142.788 137.297 1.325.716 126.938 122.056 1.178.557 112.848 108.507 1.047.732 8.038.440

Public Information Costs 770.500 740.865 712.371 684.972 658.627 633.295 608.937 585.517 562.997 541.343 6.499.423

Inspection & Assessment Costs 523.620 421.957 405.728 390.123 375.118 430.377 346.818 333.479 320.653 308.320 3.856.194

Public Authorities 4.781.955 2.039.750 1.961.298 2.358.454 2.010.534 2.266.468 2.096.657 1.612.044 1.718.613 1.863.920 22.709.693

Capacity Building 230.700 0 0 0 197.203 0 0 0 168.570 0 596.474

EEP 1.868.000 71.394 68.648 538.598 63.469 61.028 478.812 56.424 54.254 425.662 3.686.290

Other Costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


Inspection & Assessment Costs 2.393.755 1.689.990 1.624.991 1.562.491 1.502.395 1.967.492 1.389.049 1.335.624 1.284.254 1.234.859 15.984.901

Grand Total 21.804.075 3.826.226 3.679.064 5.203.852 5.299.765 5.918.471 4.626.205 3.023.922 4.530.261 4.112.680 62.024.522

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Figure 3 – Distribution of Administrative Costs to Seveso Sectors (Euros)

Substantive costs are considered as a typical ‘business cost’ of working with dangerous processes and

products and not directly related to the Seveso II Directive. The Land use costs were not estimated

because of a lack of information on the safety zoning required by the Directive. RIA study values that

both of these elements will increase the total cost significantly.

Overall, assessment of qualitative aspects indicates that Turkey will have net benefit from the

implementation of the Directive.

After analysis of the different public sector, operators, environmental and social impacts of the nine

options, REC proposes the following preferred policy options and general recommendations.

Preferred options

Policy Area 1: The Administrative Structure

Option 1.3. Three Competent Authorities (CAs) with a Coordination Body

Definition Key impacts

Turkey should designate Ministry of

Environment and Urbanization, Ministry of

Labor and Social Security and the Disaster and

Emergency Management Presidency (DEMP) as

CAs.

In addition to CAs, Turkey should establish a

coordination body to increase the collaboration

between these three CAs and to provide

technical assistance to public authorities and

other stakeholders.

- Less conflicts between Competent Authorities.

- It creates less administrative burden to

operators in comparison to other options

(approx. 7000 days and 500.000 Euro

Annually).

- A more coherent implementation and

consistent application of the provisions of the

Directive.

- It requires a more standardized system and may

increase the transparency.

- EU experience shows that there is a need for a

coordination between CAs.

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Policy Area 2: Risk Assessment Framework

Option 2.2. Public Driven Framework


CAs design a uniform risk assessment

framework and control its implementation by

operators. In particular, CAs define the

standards, techniques, tools, and software for

each specified industry under the scope of the

Directive. The CAs should establish the

framework together with technical experts from

operators, and other stakeholders (NGOs,

universities, etc.).

The CAs should start implementing the

Directive with a ‘Command and Control’, with

the only provision giving large operators the

possibility to prove to the CAs that their in-

house Framework is appropriate and compatible

with the information needs of the Directive.

However, the RIA study recommends this

option for the initial stages of the

implementation of the Directive. In the long run,

operators should use adequate Risk Assessment

Instruments without the assistance of the

Government. It should be noted that the

Directive foresees a ‘performance based’

approach.

- Ensures a minimum level of quality in the risk

assessment practices of the Operators.

- It improves the availability and comparability

of information on major risks. Assures

common understanding between operators and

CAs on key issues.

- May prevent unfair competitive practices

among the Operators.

- Will assist SMEs to comply with the Directive

and decrease the costs for them.

- Decrease the total costs CAs despite the

increasing investment cost. Uniform system

enables harmonization, easy control and

inspection. Inspectors and other staff can

perform their task more easily and quickly.

- The CAs should exempt the existing operators

to use the uniform framework in the case they

are able to prove that their in-house systems

comply with the Directive. Thus, the Directive

should not bring additional costs to those

Operators.

Policy Area 3: Land Use Planning Approach

Option 3.2. Risk-Based Approach for land use planning


Risk-based approaches define the risk as

combination of the consequences derived from a

range of possible accidents and the likelihood of

these accidents. Safety zones are thus defined

according to estimated risks.

This approach considers the protection of

people with high probability of death/injury and

disregards the protection of people with lower

probability of death/injury.

One of the underlying logic is to minimize the

safety distances during the planning and zoning

because the value and scarcity of the land.

- Relatively small safety zones generate lower

cost for operators. The majority of

Establishments (50.2%) are concentrated in six

provinces. The land is expensive in these

provinces.

- Whereas the consequence-based approach

establishes risk zones, which covers 1.031 km2,

and 1.211.932 people, risk-based approach

reduces these figures to 177 km2 and 208.142

people (see Annex - 3).

- Less land purchase, resettlement or

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: x

compensation.

- Less constraints on the new developments


- Less social resistance.

- EU experience shows this option prevails in

many Member States (MS).

Policy Area 4: Sanctioning Strategies

Option 4.2. Proportional Sanctioning Strategy


In this option, if the Seveso establishment does

not follow the specific obligations, the CAs

consider a sanctioning strategy/mechanism that

is proportional to the infringement.

This approach will lead in most cases to a

payment of a certain fine and CAs will give

sufficient time to Establishments to comply the

requirements of the Directive. The amount of

the fine is based on the severity of the

infringement and/or plus an amount for

prevention. In some cases only verbal warnings

can be considered.

- Less economic losses to operators

- Less economic losses to national economy

- Proportional to infringement is more fair

- Minimize the complaints and criticism over the

CAs effectiveness and fairness

- Less pressure on CAs Experts and Inspectors

- Easier to implement

General Recommendations

Recommendations Reasons & Key Impacts

- Capacity Building activities should be

carried out to increase the technical

capacities of the CAs, Operators and other

stakeholders as well to increase the

awareness of the public

- Capacity Building activities will assist CAs to

prepare guidelines, standards, etc.

- The compliance rate with the Directive may

increase

- The consistency will be increased

- It will assist CAs to identify the scope/tier

status of Establishments.

- Public awareness and participation will

increase

- Compliance Costs for SMEs are relatively

higher, therefore, SMEs have to be

supported by the CAs.

- This will decrease the “Regressive Impacts” of

the Directive to the SMEs.

- Seveso requirements should be included to

the insurance system

- Consideration of major accident related issues

into insurance systems enhance the compliance

of the Establishments.

- A National Seveso map open to public

should be generated based on GIS data

- It will increase the awareness of public

- CAs and Local Authorities may utilize map for

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their planning activities

- The CAs should promote research activities

on major accidents and mitigation methods.

Especially, the reasons and the impacts

(costs) of the accidents should be assessed

in a more detailed way including the

environmental and social dimensions.

- The CAs should establish a database for

major accidents

- By analyzing the industrial accidents involving

chemicals in a consistent way, Establishments

and CAs can learn lessons and prevent further

accidents.

- Invest in research on the development of on

major accidents, early warning systems and on

interoperability of information and monitoring

systems

- It will assist Turkey to report Major Accidents

to EC.

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary........................................................................................................................... i

The Assignment ............................................................................................................................. i

The Problem .................................................................................................................................. i

RIA Methodology .......................................................................................................................... ii

Data Gathering and Impact Assessment Processes ..................................................................... ii

Baseline ....................................................................................................................................... iii

Objectives ......................................................................................................................................v

Policy Areas ...................................................................................................................................v

Summary of the Impacts Assessed .............................................................................................. vi

Preferred options ...................................................................................................................... viii

Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... xii

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................1

1. Policy background, procedural issues and consultation of interested parties .........................2

1.1 Policy background ...............................................................................................................2

1.2 The Scope of the Directive...................................................................................................2

1.3 The EU Experience ..............................................................................................................3

1.4 Consultation and data gathering ...........................................................................................4

2. Problem definition .....................................................................................................................7

2.1. Baseline...............................................................................................................................9

2.2. Overall Benefits of Implementing the Seveso II Directive in Turkey .................................. 19

2.3. Overall Unavoidable Costs of Implementing the Seveso II Directive in Turkey .................. 23

3. Objectives of the RIA ................................................................................................................ 27

4. Policy Areas, Options and Scenarios ......................................................................................... 28

4.1. Policy Areas ...................................................................................................................... 28

4.2. Options .............................................................................................................................. 28

5. Impact Assessment .................................................................................................................. 29

5.0. Policy Area 0: Non-Action ................................................................................................ 29

5.1. Policy Area 1: The Administrative Structure ...................................................................... 30

5.2 Policy Area 2: Risk Assessment Framework ...................................................................... 36

5.3 Policy Area 3: Land Use Planning approaches ................................................................... 44

5.4. Policy Area 4: Sanctioning Strategies ................................................................................ 52

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6. Conclusion & Preferred Options ................................................................................................ 58

6.1. Main Costs & Benefits ....................................................................................................... 58

6.2. Preferred Option(s) ............................................................................................................ 58

6.3. Distribution of Costs Based on the Preferred Option(s) ...................................................... 62

7. Annexes .................................................................................................................................... 63

Annex - 1. Policy Options of Policy Area 1 ................................................................................. 64

Annex - 2. Model for Calculating the Unavoidable Costs of implementing Seveso II Directive .... 67

Annex - 2. 1. Administrative Costs .......................................................................................... 67

Annex - 2. 2. Substantive Compliance Costs ............................................................................ 71

Annex - 2. 3. Land use costs .................................................................................................... 71

Annex - 3. Detailed Cost Calculations for the Estimation of the Costs of Land Use Planning ....... 73

Annex - 3. 1. Assumptions ...................................................................................................... 73

Annex - 3. 2. STEP 1: Consequence-Based Approach .............................................................. 74

Annex - 3. 3. STEP 2: Risk-Based Approach ........................................................................... 74

Annex - 3. 4. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 74

Annex - 4. Obligations of Operators ............................................................................................ 75

Annex - 4. 1. Safety Reports .................................................................................................... 75

Annex - 4. 2. Safety Management System................................................................................ 77

Annex - 4. 3. Major Accident Prevention Policy ...................................................................... 78

Annex - 4. 4. Internal Emergency Plan .................................................................................... 79

Annex - 4. 5. Substantive Modifications .................................................................................. 80

Annex - 4. 6. Public Access to Information and Consultation ................................................... 80

Annex - 4. 7. Notification ........................................................................................................ 81

Annex - 5. Obligations of Public Institutions ............................................................................... 82

Annex - 5. 1. System Surveillance ........................................................................................... 84

Annex - 5. 2. Enforcement and Inspection ............................................................................... 85

Annex - 5. 3. Land Use Planning ............................................................................................. 86

Annex - 5. 4. Domino Effect.................................................................................................... 86

Annex - 5. 5. External Emergency plan.................................................................................... 88

Annex - 5. 6. Public Access to Information and Consultation ................................................... 88

Annex - 5. 7. Accident Investigation ........................................................................................ 88

Annex - 5. 8. Sanctioning ........................................................................................................ 89

Annex - 5. 9. Reporting to EU ................................................................................................. 89

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Annex - 6. Background Information about Seveso I, II and III ..................................................... 91

Annex - 7. Industrial Accident Records in Turkey ....................................................................... 94

Annex - 7. 1. Overview of Some Notable Accidents ................................................................ 98

Annex - 8. SPIRS Database and Seveso Establishments in EU ................................................... 102

Annex - 8. 1. SPIRS Categories ............................................................................................. 105

Annex - 9. Seveso Establishments and Seveso Information System............................................ 106

Annex - 9. 1. MoEU Notification System .............................................................................. 106

Annex - 9. 2. EU and Turkey ................................................................................................. 110

Annex - 9. 3. Final estimation of number current “Seveso Establishments” ............................ 111

Annex - 9. 4. Preliminary estimation of “Seveso Establishments” .......................................... 112

Annex - 10. Seveso Related Infringements in EU Member States ................................................ 117

Annex - 11. Member State Administrative Structures for the Implementation of Seveso II ........... 118

Annex - 12. Guidance documents prepared by CAs and Industry across the EU ........................... 123

Annex - 13. Risk Assessment Benchmark ................................................................................... 124

Annex - 14. Land Use Planning Benchmark ................................................................................ 129

Annex - 15. Sanctioning Benchmark ........................................................................................... 132

Annex - 16. Detailed Cost Calculations for Coordination Body as an Administrative Costs ......... 134

Annex - 17. Detailed Cost Calculations for CAs when software program used in Risk Modeling . 135

Annex - 18. Other Policy Options................................................................................................ 136

Annex - 18. 1. Make insurance mandatory for Seveso Establishments...................................... 136

Annex - 18. 2. Reducing the costs of preparing External Emergency Plans .............................. 136

Annex - 18. 3. Resolving existing undesirable situation – conflict in the land use ..................... 137

Increase prevention measures for Establishments ........................................................................ 137

Relocation of Establishments ...................................................................................................... 137

Annex - 19. Non-compliance with environmental regulations ...................................................... 138

Annex - 20. Consultation Process ................................................................................................ 140

Annex - 20. 1. Central Consultation Process - Ankara .............................................................. 140

Annex - 20. 2. Local Consultation Process, December 2011- January 2012 .............................. 154

Annex - 20. 3. Consultation Process on Land use Planning ...................................................... 155

Annex - 20. 4. Questionnaire ................................................................................................... 156

8. References .............................................................................................................................. 160

9. List of Acronyms and Concepts ............................................................................................... 163

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: xv

Table of Tables

Table 1 - Total Administrative Costs (PV – Euros) ........................................................................... vii

Table 2 - Numbers of bodies involved in the national and local workshops during the Seveso II RIA

Consultation Process ...........................................................................................................................5

Table 3 - Current Legislations and Standards on Risk Assessment ..................................................... 16

Table 4 - Safety Distance (Geri Çekme Mesafesi) and Environmental Green Distance in OIZ Code of

Practice ............................................................................................................................................. 19

Table 5 - Total Administrative Costs (PV – Euros) ............................................................................ 24

Table 6 - The Impacts of the Consequence-Based Approach on Society ............................................ 49

Table 7 - The Impacts of the Risk-Based Approach on Society .......................................................... 51

Table 8 – Total Administrative Costs (PV – Euros) ........................................................................... 67

Table 9 - Cost Assumptions for Upper-Tier Establishments ............................................................... 68

Table 10 - Cost Assumptions for Lower-Tier Establishments ............................................................ 69

Table 11 - Total annualized administrative costs per establishment (k EUR) ...................................... 70

Table 12 – Inspection & Assessment Workload for Upper-Tier Seveso Establishments ..................... 70

Table 13 - Inspection & Assessment Workload for Lower-Tier Seveso Establishments ..................... 70

Table 14 - Assumptions Used for Calculation of Land Use Costs ...................................................... 73

Table 15 - Overlap and Population Density Assumptions Used for Calculation of Land Use Costs .... 74

Table 16 - Conclusion Table for Land Use Planning Approaches ...................................................... 74

Table 17 - Background Information about Seveso I, II and III ........................................................... 93

Table 18 - Employment Injury and Occupational Diseases ................................................................ 94

Table 19 - The Provincial Distribution of Industrial Accidents Between 1997-2007 in Turkey, (MoEF,

2007) ................................................................................................................................................ 95

Table 20 - List of selected industrial accidents that occurred in Turkey.............................................. 96

Table 21 - Overview of Some Notable Accidents .............................................................................. 98

Table 22 - Generalization of industrial activities in SPIRS into new aggregated categories .............. 105

Table 23 - Upper and Lower-Tier Establishments with Industrial Activities..................................... 109

Table 24 - Final estimation of current Seveso Establishments .......................................................... 112

Table 25 - Previously used industrial sector categorization in pre-RIA ............................................ 113

Table 26 - Industrial distribution of Establishments more relevant to Seveso Directive .................... 113

Table 27 - Risk Assessment Definitions .......................................................................................... 124

Table 28 - Generic Components of Risk Assessment ....................................................................... 128

Table 29 - Factors of probabilistic and deterministic variables influencing Member States .............. 130

Table 30 - Risk Assessment Approaches and Land Use Planning in Europe..................................... 131

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: xvi

Table 31 - Cost of Software Programs used in Risk Modeling ......................................................... 135

Table 32 - Fines for non-compliance with health and safety regulations in 2011, MoLSS ................ 139

Table 33 - Opinions of the Central Public Institutions in regard to the Institutional Set-Up .............. 142

Table 34 - Opinions of the Central Public Institutions in regard to the Land Use .............................. 144

Table 35 - Opinions of Central Public Organizations concerning Financial Supports ....................... 146

Table 36 - The Roles and Needs of Various Public Organizations in the Scope of Seveso II Directive

....................................................................................................................................................... 148

Table 37 - Local level workshops and workshop dates .................................................................... 154

Table 38 - Target Industry Sectors .................................................................................................. 156

Table 39 - Target Provinces ............................................................................................................ 156

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: xvii

Table of Figures

Figure 1 - Geographical Distribution of Seveso Establishments in Turkey ......................................... iv

Figure 2 – Distribution of Seveso establishments in North-West of Turkey........................................ iv

Figure 3 – Distribution of Administrative Costs to Seveso Sectors (Euros) ...................................... viii

Figure 4 – Increase in the number of Seveso Establishments in the EU: 2001-2010 .............................2

Figure 5 - Number of accidents per year for the period 1994-2004.......................................................4

Figure 6 - Major Accidents in last three Reporting Periods ..................................................................4

Figure 7 - Number of the Seveso establishments .................................................................................9

Figure 8 - Number of the Seveso in selected MS and Turkey ...............................................................9

Figure 9 - Seveso Establishments with industrial activities in Turkey ................................................ 11

Figure 10 - Geographical Distribution of Seveso Establishments in Turkey (December 2011) ........... 11

Figure 11 - Distribution of Seveso establishments in North-West of Turkey (December 2011) .......... 12

Figure 12 - Relationship between the location of Seveso Establishments and Major Accidents in

Turkey .............................................................................................................................................. 14

Figure 13 - The Provincial Distribution of Industrial Accidents Occurring Between 1997-2007 in

Turkey .............................................................................................................................................. 14

Figure 14 – Distribution of Administrative Costs to Seveso Sectors (Euros) ...................................... 24

Figure 15 - Three CAs with a Coordination Body .............................................................................. 34

Figure 16 – UK Example for Zoning IZ: Inner Zone MZ: Middle Zone OZ: Outer Zone ................... 45

Figure 17 - Summary of Impacts ....................................................................................................... 59

Figure 18 – Distribution of Administrative Costs to Seveso Sectors (Euros) ...................................... 71

Figure 19 - Average Safety Distances for Consequence-Based Approach .......................................... 74

Figure 20 - Average Safety Distances for Risk-Based Approach........................................................ 74

Figure 21 - EU Seveso Establishments on the basis of Category/Sector ........................................... 102

Figure 22 - Distribution of the Seveso establishments in Europe in 2010 according to SPIRS .......... 103

Figure 23 - Seveso establishments in the European regions, by NUTS 2 .......................................... 103

Figure 24 - Chemical installations covered under Seveso II by NUTS 2 regions .............................. 103

Figure 25 - Transport and storage group of Seveso establishments by NUTS 2 regions .................... 103

Figure 26 - Seveso establishments with manufacturing activity by NUTS 2 regions ......................... 103

Figure 27 - Seveso establishments belonging to the petrochemical industries by NUTS 2 regions .... 103

Figure 28 - Seveso establishments with metal processing activity by NUTS 2 regions ..................... 104

Figure 29 - Seveso establishments with power generation, supply and distribution by NUTS 2 regions

....................................................................................................................................................... 104

Figure 30 - Seveso establishments with water, sewage and waste management by NUTS 2 regions . 104

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: xviii

Figure 31 - Seveso establishments with agricultural activity by NUTS 2 regions ............................. 104

Figure 32 - Seveso establishments in the mining sector by NUTS 2 regions ..................................... 104

Figure 33 - Distribution of Seveso establishments by country .......................................................... 104

Figure 34 - MoEU Notification System ........................................................................................... 107

Figure 35 - Number of the Seveso establishments in the MoEU Notification System (December, 2011)

....................................................................................................................................................... 107

Figure 36 - Industrial Activities Distribution of All Seveso Establishments .................................... 109

Figure 37 - Industrial Activities Distribution of Lower-Tier Seveso Establishments ........................ 110

Figure 38 - Industrial Activities Distribution of Upper-Tier Seveso Establishments ......................... 110

Figure 39 Seveso establishments in the Turkey regions, by NUTS 1 ................................................ 110

Figure 40 - Seveso Establishment of EU Countries and Turkey ....................................................... 111

Figure 41 - Industrial Categories of Seveso Establishment in EU and Turkey .................................. 111

Figure 42 - Preliminary estimation of “Seveso Establishments” ....................................................... 112

Figure 43 - Fines for non-compliance with environmental regulations in 2011,MoEU ..................... 138

Figure 44 - Fines for non-compliance with environmental regulations between 2006- 2011,MoEU (in

thousand TL) .................................................................................................................................. 138

Figure 45 - Number of Participants During the consultation process ................................................ 154

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: xix

Table of Boxes

Box 1 - Seveso and Bhopal Disasters .................................................................................................. i

Box 2 - Seveso and Bhopal Disasters ..................................................................................................7

Box 3 - Projection of Number of Seveso Establishment in Turkey ..................................................... 10

Box 4 - Factors affect the assessment of the severity or duration of impacts of an accident ................ 21

Box 5 - Health and Safety Benefits.................................................................................................... 22

Box 6 – Scope and Main Obligations of Operators ............................................................................ 75

Box 7 - Proportionate and Demonstration approach ........................................................................... 77

Box 8 - Issues shall be addressed by the Safety Management System ................................................ 78

Box 9 - Relation of the SMS and MAPP ........................................................................................... 79

Box 10 - Annex IV of the Directive-Minimum information for IEP ................................................... 79

Box 11 - Content of the Seveso II Inspection programme .................................................................. 85

Box 12 - Seveso II Directive, Article 8 Domino Effects..................................................................... 87

Box 13 - External Emergency plans shall contain the information set out in Annex IV of the Directive

......................................................................................................................................................... 88

Box 14 - Public Access to Information and Consultation ................................................................... 80

Box 15 - Content of the Implementation Report ................................................................................ 90

Box 16 - Data in MoEU Notification System................................................................................... 106

Box 17 - Industrial activities in MoEU and their correspondence in SPIRS Categories .................... 108

Box 18 - Guidance documents prepared by Industry ........................................................................ 123

Box 19 - Guidance documents prepared by CAs .............................................................................. 123

Box 20 - Main elements in any risk analysis process ....................................................................... 125

Box 21 - Types of risk assessment................................................................................................... 127

Box 22 - Best practice in risk assessment ........................................................................................ 127

Box 23 - Concept for risk assessment in land use planning .............................................................. 129

Box 24 - Main element in Sanctioning practices .............................................................................. 132

Box 25 Content of the Survey ......................................................................................................... 157

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REC Turkey – 2012 Page: xx

Table of Pictures

Picture 1 - International Level .............................................................................................................6

Picture 2 - National Level ...................................................................................................................6

Picture 3 – Local Level .......................................................................................................................6

Picture 4 - Kayalar Kimya Sanayi A.Ş. Accident, 7th August 2012.......................................................8

Picture 5 – Batman TÜPRAŞ Refinery, with 1.5km radius safety distance......................................... 17

Picture 6 - Buncefield Smoke Plume ................................................................................................. 20

REC Turkey – 2012 Page: 1

Introduction

This Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) report was prepared by REC Turkey for the Turkish Ministry

of Environment and Urbanization (MoEU). The report aims to assist the Government and senior

officials of the MoEU to assess the impacts of the implementation4 of the Seveso II Directive

(2003/105/EC). The report also proposes a series of preferred options that could be rational choices to

maximize the benefits as well as reducing the compliance and enforcement costs for businesses,

government, national and local and other stakeholders. Thus, the RIA offers options for implementing

the Directive.

The report uses the European Commission (EC) impact assessment methodology5. The first section

sets the policy background and the general organization of the study including the extensive

consultation undertaken. Section 2 focuses on the problems related to major accidents in Turkey and

the challenges Turkey will face implementing the Seveso II Directive. Section 3 discusses the goals

for the Government to implement the Directive and in particular, some objective targets it needs to

achieve. The main part of the study concerns Sections 4 & 5 where an analysis of each of the selected

policy options that can reduce the compliance and enforcement costs – organized by areas of

intervention – are discussed. Based on the assessment, Section 6 discusses the preferred options that

the Turkish Government may adopt.

As will be further discussed this RIA is based on extensive consultation with stakeholders organized to

identify main reasons behind the implementation challenges and to examine the cause-result

relationship between the main reasons. The RIA study also presents the results of ad-hoc economic

calculation models that were used to estimate future implementation impacts.

The views expressed in this report are those of REC Turkey and its associated consultants and are not

necessarily the views of the Committee organized by the MoEU.

4 By ‘implementation’, this RIA understands substantive compliance ascertained by the EU Commission. 5 http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/index_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/index_en.htm

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1. Policy background, procedural issues and consultation of interested parties

1.1 Policy background

Turkey aims to become a full member of the EU. To achieve this, the Government has developed a

program for integrating the Acquis Communautaires into its legal and administrative frameworks. In

particular, Turkey needs to transpose and implement the Council Directive 96/82/EC on the control of

major-accident hazards – the so-called Seveso II Directive.

The main purpose of the Directive is to prevent major accidents involving dangerous substances. The

Directive introduces additional responsibilities on Operators as well as public authorities and enhances

enforcement methods over them to achieve this purpose. Consequently, the Directive aims to limit the

negative impacts of major accidents on environment and human health.

Turkey transposed the Seveso II Directive in August 2010 with the By-Law on Control of Major

Industrial Accidents,6which will enter into force in January 2014. Since Turkey has already transposed

the Directive, the main attention will be on the implementation and enforcement of the By-Law.

Moreover, in the meantime, the EU has introduced the Seveso III Directive. Turkey will need to up-

date the By-Law (i) according to the new requirements of the Seveso III and (ii) in relation with

lessons learned from the implementation of itself.

1.2 The Scope of the Directive

The Directive covers establishments7 where dangerous substances that may result in major accidents

are present. In order to identify establishments within the scope, the Directive considers the actual,

anticipated, and generated (during loss of control of an industrial chemical process) presence of

dangerous substances. The Directive contains two lists, namely Named Substances and Generic

Categories of Substances and Preparations. Both lists contain lower threshold of quantities and upper

threshold of quantities.8 The Establishments are classified under two categories named Upper-Tier and

Lower-Tier depending on the quantities of dangerous substances present.

Figure 4 – Increase in the number of Seveso Establishments in the EU:

2001-2010

Source: REC Turkey, Data source: Seveso Plants Information Retrieval System

(SPIRS) Database, 2010

6 The By-Law has been published in the Official Gazette No. 27676 7 By establishment, the Directive recognizes any industrial or commercial facilities, plants, warehouses, sites,etc. 8 Articles 6, 7, and 9 and Annex 1 of the Directive

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Approximately ten thousand Seveso Establishments in the EU and more than five hundred in Turkey

are within the scope of the Directive. The number has increased with the enlargement of EU (see

Section 2.1.1. and Annex - 8).

Seveso Establishments include many industrial and commercial sectors ranging from refineries to pulp

and paper mills, from paint manufacturing to chemical installations. Some few other Establishments

are also covered by the scope of the Directive, such as leisure and sport facilities, medical and research

centers if they possess substances defined in the Annex I of the Directive. The scope is determined by

the quantity of the specified dangerous substances and it is unconstrained by the size, location,

industry or the ownership of the Establishments.

1.3 The EU Experience

The Seveso Directive is one of the oldest active legal measures of the EU environmental policy. As a

response to the major industrial accidents in Flixborough in the United Kingdom, in 1974 and dioxin

release in Seveso in Italy, in 1976, the European Commission introduced the Directive 82/501/EEC

also known as Seveso Directive (see Annex - 1).

Since the release, the Directive has been periodically amended based on lessons learned from major

accidents. In 1996, the EU integrated further improvements to the Directive, which is known as the

Seveso II. The new Directive introduced additional requirements on protection of environment, set up

new management systems, introduced land use planning and strengthened the public access to

information (see Annex - 1).

In 2003, Seveso II amended9 in response to serious major accidents

10. This amendment has expanded

the scope of the Directive, which aims at:

prevention of major accidents involving dangerous substances

limitation of the consequences of accidents on man and the environment

high level of protection for man and the environment throughout the Community

In December 2010, EC has proposed to review the Seveso II Directive in order to address some of the

observed implementation problems and deficiencies, and to strengthen the enforcement elements of

this legislation and harmonization with other related directives. The proposal, Seveso III, will repeal

and replace the current Directive by 1 June 201511

(see Annex - 1).

Besides the legal framework, the number of the Seveso Establishments increased in time due to new

member states and the developments in the scope. There were 9,937 Seveso Establishments in the

reporting countries, according to SPIRS databases as of September 2010. Among these

Establishments, 4,575 (46%) of them are Upper-Tier and 5,323 (54%) are Lower-Tier. Germany has

the largest number of Establishments followed by France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The detailed

figures about the number of Establishments are provided in Annex - 8.

9 Directive 96/82/EC, OJ L 10, 14.1.1997, p.13; amended by Directive 2003/105/EC, OJ L 345, 31.12.2003,p.97 10The cyanide spill in the river Tisza in Baia Mare, Romania, in May 2000; the explosion at a fireworks

warehouse in Enschede, Netherlands, in May 2000; and the explosion at a fertilizer plant in Toulouse, France, in

September 2001 influenced the whole policy area and resulted in the Directive 2003/105/EC. 11

Impact assessment study into possible options for adapting Annex 1 of the Seveso II Directive into the GHS. Final Report , February 2010.

FINAL


As a general trend, implementation of the Directive has had an influence in the decrease of major

accidents in Europe (see Figure 5 and Figure 6).

Figure 5 - Number of accidents per year for the

period 1994-200412

Figure 6 - Major Accidents in the last three

Reporting Periods13

In February 2008, the EC launched a study on the effectiveness of the Directive, namely F-Seveso

Report14

. This report included the views of affected industry in eight Member States and concluded

that the Directive had improved safety and had introduced little impact on competitiveness. It also

provides extensive information regarding the EU experience on implementing the Directive and

identifies some difficulties those Member States faced during that process. The challenges resulted on

complaints and infringement cases which European Commission brought to the European Court of

Justice (see Annex - 10).

Overall, EU experience indicated that the proper implementation of the Directive is difficult:

there is still a lack of consistency among Member States’ enforcement standards and practices

there is a non-uniform process about risk assessment across Europe resulted from diverse

provisions, approaches, methods, tools and criteria.

1.4 Consultation and data gathering

To strengthen the RIA with unbiased evidence, REC Turkey carried out extensive consultation process

with stakeholders. The process included collection of data, information and views by the support and

participation of the Task Force of the MoEU representatives and the Turkish Union of Chamber and

Commodity Exchanges (TOBB).

Consultation process has provided insights for the study, in terms of better assessing the different

institutional setups for implementing the Directive. Consultation and data gathering process informed

main stakeholders about the Directive, and helped to identify the possible problems and resistance

areas. In addition, it shaped the policy areas and options of the RIA study.

12 Major Accident Reporting System ( MARS) Analysis of Major Accidents reported to the MARS Database

during the period 1994-2004. J. Sales, F. Mushtag, M. D. Christou. JRC, 2007 13Report on the Application in the Member States of Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards

involving dangerous substances for the period 2006-2008 14

EU-VRi 2008. Study of the Effectiveness of the Seveso II Directive http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/seveso_report.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/seveso_report.pdf

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In consultation and data gathering process, over thirty bilateral meetings with national and

international experts, interviews with operators of Seveso Establishments and municipalities, and

emergency services were carried out. In addition, central and local level workshops were held. The

consultation process, which took place between December 2010 and January 2012, was organized

around:

A survey about the problems and solutions for Turkish businesses to implement Seveso II

Directive with 52 operators;

Two national consultation workshops in Ankara;

Four local consultation workshops organized in Adana, Kocaeli, Istanbul and Izmir;

Preparation of a Preliminary RIA to validate options;

Publication of material in REC Turkey website.

During this process, REC Turkey met with over 30 central and local public institutions, 8

municipalities, and 84 operators. Table 2 presents the number of public and private institutions and

stakeholders who participated to mentioned activities.

Detailed information and main results and positions expressed have been taken into account

throughout the RIA process are provided in Annex - 20.

Table 2 - Numbers of bodies involved in the national and local workshops

during the Seveso II RIA Consultation Process

In addition to above-mentioned issues, REC Turkey undertook extensive data gathering efforts. They

include:

Literature review and international best practice research;

Participation to Seveso Training in Ankara, facilitated by the European Commission’s Joint

Research Centre;

Contracting out a study “International Benchmarks and Costs Calculation of the

Implementation of Seveso II Directive” (May 2011);

Organization of a study tour of MoEU Officials to the Netherlands in July 2011;

Level Stakeholder Participation

Governmental Institutions 33

Private Sector 84

Sector Associations 3

Governmental Institutions 9

Municipalities 8

Chambers of Industry and Trade 4

Civil Society Organizations 4

Other (universities, consultation companies etc.) 8

National

Local

FINAL


Utilize the outputs of the trainings carried out on Seveso II Directive in scope of the IPA

project15

;

Telephone interview with municipalities on LUP;

Development of cost-benefit models based on several scenarios with different projection tools

by consulting local and international experts.

To conclude, many institutions from different sectors –especially from the private sector – were

involved in the consultation process. Their contribution and the high number of participation affected

the consistency and the level of assessment in a better manner. As a result, Seveso II Directive RIA

study benefited from the information gathered during the consultation process.

Picture 1 - International Level Picture 2 - National Level Picture 3 – Local Level

15 Capacity Building in the Field of Environment

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2. Problem definition

Modern industrial production processes requires the use of chemical substances. Chemical substances

are crucial components of the production of consumer goods as well as agriculture, manufacturing,

construction, and service industries.

The production of the Turkish chemical sector is generally aimed at the products demanded by the

manufacturing industry and directly consumable products, namely petrochemicals, thermoplastics,

fertilizers, organic and inorganic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, synthetic fibers and yarns, soap and

detergents, paints, etc. Turkey produced 126 million tons of chemicals in 201016

. Chemicals are both

inputs and outputs of the production process of chemical sector establishments. They store, use,

produce and dispose substantial quantities of chemical substances. Moreover, other industries utilize

chemicals as inputs of their production and they store, use and dispose those substances.

Failures in the storage, use, production and disposal of these substances may lead to explosions, fires

or releases that can cause serious damage to workers at the establishment, surrounding population,

property, and the environment. This damage is especially true for the utilization of chemicals

classified as dangerous. A major accident involving dangerous chemical substances results in

significant economic, social and environmental costs to society.

Major industrial accidents in several areas of the world had serious negative impacts on the

environment, society and economy. Among the numerous major industrial accidents in history, the

release of a toxic cloud of chemicals in Seveso (Italy, 1976) and the toxic leak in Bhopal (India, 1984)

can be considered the worst (see section 2.1.1).

Box 2 - Seveso and Bhopal Disasters

Seveso Disaster Bhopal Disaster

The accident at a chemical plant in

Seveso, Italy (1976) resulted in the

release of a cloud of chemicals

containing dioxin, exposing 37,000

people, contaminating 1800-hectare

area and slaughtering about 75,000

animals.

Toxic leak in Bhopal, India (1984)

resulted in a death toll ranging from

4,000 to 20,000 people. The disaster

caused serious health problems to

both human and animal populations

for a long term.

Following the Seveso accident in 1976, the EU prompted the adoption of a legislation aimed at the

prevention and control of such accidents. The Directive has been periodically amended based on

lessons learned from major industrial accidents (see section 1.3).

16 Turkish Chemical Manufacturers Association, 2010

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Turkey also challenged with major accidents. Recent examples in Turkey illustrate serious

consequences. The 1999 earthquake resulted in many deaths and losses of property due to the

explosions in the TUPRAS refinery and Yalova AKSA facilities in İzmit. Other recent major accidents

occurred in the Tuzla Shipyards, the Akçagaz LPG filling plant, and most recently, Kayalar Kimya ve

Sanayi A.Ş17

. Akçagaz accident is considered as one the most damaging in the recent industrial history

of the country (see Annex - 7).

Picture 4 - Kayalar Kimya Sanayi A.Ş. Accident, 7th

August 2012

Turkey transposed Seveso II Directive with the By-Law on Control of Major Industrial Accidents both

as a requirement of EU accession process and as a prevention of future major accidents. Turkey

published the By-Law in August 18, 2010, which will enter into force in January 2014. With the

implementation of the By-Law, the Directive will bring benefits to Turkey.

The Directive also requires important legal, technical and institutional reforms that will have

economic, social and environmental costs as well as require budgetary and financial expenditures for

the Turkish Government and for the relevant stakeholders. These costs, their finance and distribution

among stakeholders will be the major challenge for Turkey.

Additionally, the Government will face several problems and challenges regarding the successful

implementation of the Directive:

Implementation of the Directive requires involvement of different administrative bodies which

has limited human resources and technical capacity,

There is a limited understanding and no consensus among the stakeholders on the definition

and practice of risk assessment in context of the Directive,

Turkey lacks land use planning practices defined by the Directive, to prevent and control

major accidents,

Seveso Establishments and residential areas are overlapping,

17

Initial cost estimation for the Kayalar Kimya Sanayi A. Ş. accident is around 200 million American dollars:

http://www.sabah.com.tr/Ekonomi/2012/08/09/bir-kivilcim-kimyamizi-bozdu

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Seveso Establishments do not have proper distance between each other which can lead to

domino effect ,

Following parts of this section focuses on the baseline, the unavoidable costs and the challenges of

implementing the Directive in Turkey.

2.1. Baseline

REC Turkey performed baseline data collection and continued analyses as deskwork in order to test

identified policy options and to assess the impacts of the Directive on six interconnected issues below:

- Seveso Establishments (Number, Categories and Geographic Distribution of Seveso

Establishments)

- Major Accidents

- Administrative and Institutional set-up

- Risk Assessment Framework

- Land use Approaches

- Sanction Policy

2.1.1. Seveso Establishments

The number, category and locations of the Establishments are major variables in the assessment of the

baseline and options.

Number of Seveso Establishments

Total number of establishments, which have been registered and identified as “Seveso Establishment”

in the MoEU Seveso Notification System, is 518 as of December 2011. Almost half of these

Establishments are Upper-Tier (251 - 48.5%), and the other half Lower-Tier (267 - 51.5%). Turkey is

one of the major countries in terms of the number of Seveso Establishments (see Figure 8).

Figure 7 - Number of the Seveso

Establishments

Figure 8 - Number of the Seveso Establishments in

selected MS and Turkey

Source: REC Turkey, Data source: MoEU

Notification System (December, 2011)

Source: REC Turkey, adapted from SPIRS Database and

MoEU Notification System

However, the final number of establishments is not definitive given the serious non-compliance with

the registration and the obligations regarding the notification of substances:

Some of the Operators, who should be registered to the Notification System, are not registered.

Some of the Operators who are registered to Notification System have not uploaded their

dangerous substances information to the system yet.

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REC Turkey tried to estimate the number of Seveso Establishments by utilizing the current

information from the notification system and from a survey carried out during the consultation period.

According to this estimation, the total number of Seveso Establishments is above 800 (see Annex - 9.

3).

The RIA study covers a period of 10 years between 2012 and 2021. However, REC Turkey was

unable to predict the changes in the number of the Seveso Establishments in the given period. Thus,

the figures calculated for 2012 are used for the whole period (see Box 3).

Box 3 - Projection of Number of Seveso Establishment in Turkey

REC Turkey tried to utilize the SPIRS Database to project the number of Seveso Establishments.

SPIRS provides the number of Seveso Establishments across the EU. Member States began to report

establishment data to SPIRS voluntarily since 2001. Information on numbers of establishment collected from the

Member States and evaluated (see Figure 8).

In the EU, an increasing number of the Seveso Establishments registered to the SPIRS database is observed over

period of 2001 to 2009 (see Annex - 8). Nevertheless, some of the MS have experienced reduction in the number

of Establishments (e.g. France, Italy, and UK); in some of them, the number has increased (e.g. Netherlands,

Germany, and Spain). In 2010, the total number of Establishments slightly decreased in SPIRS18 with respect to

previous year. However, the SPIRS do not reveals any relevant trend and since Member States have varying

trends in numbers.

Overall, MS have increasing trend in number at the beginning of implementation of the Directive and after

implementation period there is a stable trend in numbers. Albeit the lack of figures, REC Turkey expects a

similar trend in the number of Seveso Establishments in Turkey.

Categories of Seveso Establishments

REC Turkey grouped Seveso Establishments in ten sectors19

. Petrochemicals, Chemical Installations

and Manufacturing industrial sectors cover the 75.5% of Seveso Establishments. Petrochemicals (e.g.

oil refineries, storage and distribution) sector includes; LPG production, bottling and bulk distribution,

LPG storage, LNG storage and distribution. This group has the largest representation (29.9 %). The

chemical installations group has the second largest representation (23.2 %) which includes mainly

producers of industrial chemicals such as ammonia, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, pesticides etc.

Manufacturing category consists of mostly establishments that produce food, beverages, textile,

plastic, rubber, paper, wood, glass, cement, electronics, explosives, fireworks, general engineering,

building and constructions. On the other hand, some categories of the activities are very rarely

represented. The detailed information on industrial categories of Seveso Establishments with detailed

numbers is given Annex - 4. (see Figure 9).

18 Industrial Installations in Europe Distributed in the SPIRS Database, Status and analysis in 2010 19 The MoEU system classifies establishments over 20 different industrial activities. REC Turkey reclassified

Seveso Establishments according to SPIRS industrial categories with the consultation of MoEU officials. The

SPIRS industrial activities list has 10 main industrial sectors and contains 48 categories (see Annex - 8. 1)

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Figure 9 - Seveso Establishments with industrial activities in Turkey

Source: REC Turkey, Data source: MoEU Notification System, December, 2011

Geographical Distribution of Seveso Establishments

There are two main aspects in terms of geographical distribution:

i. Seveso Establishments operate in almost all provinces. Only in eight provinces there is no

Seveso Establishment exists (see Figure 10).

Figure 10 - Geographical Distribution of Seveso Establishments in Turkey (December 2011)

Source: REC Turkey, Data source: MoEU Seveso Notification Database, December 2011

ii. Majority of Establishments (50.2%) are concentrated in the six provinces namely Ankara,

İstanbul, İzmir, Kırıkkale, Kocaeli, and Tekirdağ (see Figure 11). Kocaeli has the highest

number of Establishments followed by İstanbul, İzmir, Ankara, Tekirdağ and Kırıkkale.

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Figure 11 - Distribution of Seveso Establishments in North-West of Turkey (December 2011)

Source: REC Turkey, 2012, Data source: MoEU Seveso Notification Database, December 2011

Note: Each dot represents one Seveso Establishment. Dots are randomly distributed within the geographical boundries of the

districts they are registered.

While the first fact indicates that Turkey will need to develop capacity in almost all provinces, the

second one emphasizes the efforts should be more intense in the six provinces mentioned.

2.1.1. Major Accidents

The number of the major accidents, which can be considered as Seveso accidents, is unknown due to

the absence of systematic and detailed reporting of accidents. Moreover, overall impact assessment

studies of major accidents hazards on society and environment are missing. This constrains

benchmarking figures such as mitigation and recovery costs for industry and CAs.

Turkey has been challenged with major accidents. Recent major accidents in Turkey illustrate serious

consequences. The 1999 earthquake resulted in many deaths and losses of property due to the

explosions in the TUPRAS refinery and Yalova AKSA facilities in İzmit. Other recent major accidents

occurred in establishments like the Tuzla Shipyards, the Akçagaz LPG filling plant, and the most

recently Kayalar Kimya ve Sanayi A.Ş.20

Major accidents have had irreversible effects to Turkey’s

20

Initial cost estimation for the Kayalar Kimya Sanayi A. Ş. accident is around 200 million American dollars:

http://www.sabah.com.tr/Ekonomi/2012/08/09/bir-kivilcim-kimyamizi-bozdu

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economy, human health and the environment. In August 1999, 7.4 on the Richter scale an earthquake

in İzmit refinery TÜPRAŞ caused $ 300 million damage21

(See Annex - 7).

In 1999, earthquake at TÜPRAŞ refinery in Turkey resulted in collapse of a 312 feet high concrete chimney

on one of the Crude units, set off fires at 226,000 barrels/d refinery. Damage to the refinery included total

loss of six storage tanks, a further four storage tanks were deformed, and there was some 50 % damage to

other floating roof tanks. Damage to process units included the fire on the Crude Distillation unit, and

damage to a Reformer and several connecting pipelines.

The analysis of past accidents is a useful method for identifying common aspects regarding the causes

that triggered such accidents by collecting information. By analyzing the industrial accidents involving

chemicals in a consistent way, Establishments and CAs can learn lessons and prevent further

accidents22

.

For these purposes, currently available databases for industrial accident records in Turkey can be

classified as follows:

i) MoLSS - The Social Insurance Institution

ii) MoEU

iii) Technological Accident Information System(TAIS)

Those sources provide general information on accidents; however, knowledge on major industrial

accidents is still very limited in Turkey.23

Yet, when available data analyzed, LPG and petroleum

related products are the most common substances, and then general chemicals products come next as

being involved in the accidents.

Nonetheless, based on current data on industrial accidents between 1992-2011 taken from TAIS, and

data on the number of Establishments from the MoEU notification system; it can be concluded that,

there is a correlation between two figures; the provinces with high number of Seveso Establishments

have more major accident events (see Figure 12 and Figure 13).

21‘The 100 Largest Losses 1972-2009; Large Property Damage Losses in the Hydrocarbon-Chemical Industries’,

2009, Marsh Property Risk Consulting. 22MARS. Analysis of Major Accidents reported to the MARS Database during the period 1994-2004. J. Sales, F.

Mushtag, M. D. Christou.JRC, 2007. 23

Except for occupational accidents which are registered in a systematic manner and wide range of statistics is

available.

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Figure 12 - Relationship between the location of

Seveso Establishments and Major Accidents in

Turkey24

Figure 13 - The Provincial Distribution of

Industrial Accidents Occurring Between 1997-2007

in Turkey25

The Marmara Region is one of the leading areas of the Turkey in terms of both Seveso Establishments

and industrial accidents. The population density of the region – nearly 30% of Turkey’s population –

increases undesirable consequences of major industrial accidents. Moreover, the majority of Seveso

Establishments that could be dangerous for the public health, environment and economy are located in

active earthquake regions in Turkey.

There is no comprehensive study on costs of major accidents occurred in Turkey, except for individual

cases, which do not provide enough information to calculate overall costs of major accidents. During

the consultation process, one of the respondents reported the cost of accident as nearly $1.000.000 in

the questionnaire. Annex - 7 gives detailed accident statistics for Turkey.

In overall, lack of an accident database is a barrier for learning from the accident history in Turkey.26

2.1.2. Administrative & Legal Structure

Turkey transposed the Seveso II Directive in August 2010 with the By-Law on Control of Major

Industrial Accidents27

, which will entered into force in January 2014.

Regarding the current administrative and legal structure, Ministry of Environment and Urbanization

(MoEU), Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MoLSS), and Disaster and Emergency Management

Presidency (DEMP) are three central public administrations closely related with the Directive. The

By-Law assigns first two bodies as Competent Authority. Moreover, local authorities and Organized

Industrial Zone (OIZ) administrations have also several responsibilities in the implementation of the

Directive. Both central and local authorities need to build capacity to implement the By-Law.

Since 1996, there have been some structural and legislative works that aim at preventing and

minimizing damage by major industrial accidents to the public and environment. In particular,

24 The information about the accidents that occurred between 1992 and 2011 is taken from

www.teknolojikkazalar.org. 25 Ülkemizde meydana gelen endüstriyel kazaların il bazında dağılımı”, T.C. Çevre ve Orman Bakanlığı, 2007 26 The MoEU Seveso Notification system provides ‘Accident Notifying/Reporting Form’ document.Operators

can download this form and fill it voluntarily. 27 The By-Law has been published in the Official Gazette No. 27676

http://www.teknolojikkazalar.org/

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A 1996 Circular on “Local Emergency Plan for Major Industrial Accidents” No. 4906 based

on Seveso I (82/501/EEC) Directive. It aimed at the prevention of the major accidents in

Turkey. Unfortunately, many provinces did not adequately apply this Circular.

Through the EU LIFE project and since 2003, the MoEU has undertaken data collection and

review of current practices; strategy development; implementation plan preparation;

preparation of draft Regulation transposing the provisions of the Seveso II Directive;

preparation of the main guidelines; and establishment of an information system.

An EU funded Technical Assistance Project will start in 2012, in order to develop capacity to

implement the By-Law. The Project includes trainings, study visits, pilot studies and public

awareness campaigns for MoEU and MoLSS, municipalities, special provincial

administrations, as well to the operators and public.

Annex - 3 presents detailed information about administrative structure of and legal structure of MoEU,

MoLSS and other authorities.

2.1.3. Risk Assessment Framework

Operators follow current legislations and standards on risk assessment practices. However, the

Directive’s requirements on the issue are new subjects for both CAs and operators. Prior to the

transposition of the Directive, there was no legal framework following the fundamental principles of

risk assessment as defined in the context of the Directive.

Current risk assessment practices in Turkey cover both work place (occupational) safety and external

safety (major accidents). There are different authorities for the management of occupational and

external risks. In other words, occupational and external risks are treated separately in Turkey.

In Turkey, occupational safety concerns the whole range of incidents or accidents that can cause harm

to personnel. These include falling from a scaffold or ladder, tripping on a platform and being exposed

to chemical substances, accidentally released from containment. Typically occupational safety deals

with accidents with a relatively high frequency but with relatively low impact (not many people

involved, recovering from injuries is possible), whereas major accidents with external effects can

affect more people and with lethal effects.28

MoLSS is responsible for enforcing all labor legislation and regulation including occupational health

and safety. MoLSS has presented occupational risk assessment requirements pursuant to occupational

health and safety legislations. With recent legislative developments, risk assessment became

obligatory at workplaces. The Labor Inspectorate is the enforcement authority for occupational risks

issue. The MoLSS has distributed guideline on how to perform an occupational risk assessment for

Establishments.29

28 Heidebrink, I. Synthesis document on WP 2 “Continuity of risk management from work place accident to

major accident”, 2005, SHAPE-RISK report http://shaperisk.jrc.it 29These guidelines define five simple steps to perform the assessment: which information should be gathered,

how hazards are identified, evaluation of the risks resulting from identified hazards, planning the precautions and

additional measures that should be taken to prevent or mitigate risks resulting from hazards, preparing the

written document for risk assessment process.

http://shaperisk.jrc.it/

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In the external risks context, pursuant to amendments to Environmental Law (No 2872), the

Environmental Law obliges risk assessment of dangerous chemicals substances. In addition, MoEU

prepared By-Law on the Inventory and Control of Chemicals that includes provisions relating to the

assessment of the risks of chemicals on human health and environment, together with legal

arrangements on preparing an inventory of chemicals in Turkey. More importantly, Environmental

Impact Assessment (EIA) Regulation obliges risk assessment in proposed projects. Lastly, Circular on

Coastal Facilities Risk Assessment and Contingency Plans includes provisions on risk assessment

requirement.

External risks context includes disasters also. Until the major earthquake in 1999, Turkey's Disaster

Management System mainly focused on the post-disaster events and there were no incentives or

legislations to encourage risk analysis or risk reduction approaches. Recently, Disaster and Emergency

Management Presidency (DEMP) started to conduct; pre-incident works such as preparedness,

mitigation and risk management, during incident works such as response, post incident works such as

recovery and reconstruction.

Beside the legislative documents, there are some standards regarding risk assessment issues followed

by operators, such as ISO 14000 on Environmental Management System and TS 18000 standard on

Occupational Health and Safety Management System (see Table 3).

Table 3 - Current Legislations and Standards on Risk Assessment

Related Regulation Description

Turkish Health Safety Law No.6331 Article 9 ; Operator must carry out Risk assessment by

considering Occupational Health and Safety issues

Regulation on occupational health and safety

precautions in working with chemicals Article 6 :Operator is obliged to carry out risk assessment

The Environmental Law No. 2872. (Law No. 5491

amending) Article 13 of Environmental Law

Regulation on Environmental Impacts Assessment Annex- IV of EIA Regulation

Circular on Coastal Facilities Risk Assessment and

Contingency Plans Annex 1 of Circular

TS 18000 Standard addresses Occupational Health

and Safety Management System

According to standard, an Occupational Health and Safety

Management System should be established. Risk

assessment is one of the parts of this system.

The ISO 14000 addresses "Environmental

Management System".

Minimize harmful effects on the environment caused by its

activities; achieve continual improvement of its

environmental performance

ISO 9001 Quality Management Adopts risk assessment principles

OHSAS 18001 Process Safety Management Provides a methodology for conducting fire risk

assessments

To summarize, the By-Law on the Control of Major Industrial Accidents introduces a new risk

assessment framework in scope of the Directive. However, no particular procedure or structure of risk

assessment is prescribed in the By-Law. Moreover, there are no other binding or non-binding

documents providing guidance on the risk assessment procedure in the framework of the Directive.

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2.1.4. Land Use Planning Approach

Turkey’s industrial risk management practices focus on safety measures and risk reduction in the

Establishment itself (on-site). However, the Directive also requires limitation of impacts to public

health and environment exposed to the industrial accidents in the vicinity of the Establishments (off-

site), an issue in which Turkey lacks experience. Concurrently, Turkey does not have well developed

Land Use Planning regulation and practices for off-site protection.

Major accident hazards (fires, explosions, toxic releases) are a relatively new element in Land Use

Planning. Land Use Planning policies for Natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods are better

known and considered in decision-making.

Moreover, the By-law on Control of Major Industrial Accident Hazards does not anticipate LUP

requirement. For a full transposition of the Directive, it is required that land use aspects and its related

emergency preparedness aspects have to be incorporated in appropriate legislation as outlined in the

Directive and described in pertinent guidelines of the EU.

LUP policies which fail to consider major industrial accidents result in existence of settlements in the

vicinity of Establishments involving dangerous substances (Picture 5).

Picture 5 – Batman TÜPRAŞ Refinery, with 1.5km radius safety distance

Source: REC Turkey

Although the current Turkish legislation does not correspond LUP practices in the context of the

Directive, it has several related aspects in different regulations. These are;

By-Law on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA);

By-Law on Business License and Work Permits;

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Governing Regulation of Organized Industrial Zones (OIZ);

Turkish Standard 11939, Liquefied petroleum gases (LPG) refueling station for automotive-

Safety Rules; and

Authorities associated with LUP legislation are;

MoEU;

Ministry of Health;

Municipalities/Special Provincial Administrations;

Local Municipalities; and

Organized Industrial Zones (OIZs) Authorities.

According to the regulations above, safety distances, which are also called health protection zones,

should be determined and applied in the boundaries of residential, commercial and industrial

development parcels. A commission composed of five local experts specialized in environment,

health, law, planning, etc. is assigned to determine health protection. On the other hand, for the

establishments with the obligation of EIA Reports, health protection zone is determined within the

scope of EIA Report.

The width of these health protection zones differ from one local authority to another. Moreover, the

current planning obligations, including the EIAs, do not have sufficient provisions of dealing with

major accident hazards.

During the consultation period, REC Turkey carried out interviews in selected provinces to analyze

the implementation of the health protection zones practices. The selected authorities are Kocaeli,

Adana and Sakarya Metropolitan Municipalities. with different practices for health protection zones.

For the establishment in Kocaeli, the distance of the health protection zone differs with respect to the

EIA Report. In addition to the safety distance located inside of facility borders, there is a 20-25-m

safety margin for the highway protection line.

Whereas, for the establishments that are not obliged to prepare EIA reports, the distance of the health

protection zone differs between 10 –to 50 m, according to the availability of the land, and there is an

additional 25 m for the safety margin of highway protection line. Moreover, at the LPG stations, the

health protection zone varies between 5 m and 15 m.

In Sakarya, land use planning is conducted mostly at the industrial zones for new establishments. For

these facilities, the health protection zone distances ranges between 25 m - 50 m. In addition, the

safety margin for highway protection line is usually 20 m.

In the case of OIZs, the commission does not determine the health protection zone. An additional

health protection zone is determined according to the size of the establishment parcel by the

Governing Regulation of OIZ authorities. Moreover, development of residential and commercial areas

is not permitted in 50 m starting from boundaries of the OIZ (see Table 4).

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Table 4 - Safety Distance (Geri Çekme Mesafesi) and Environmental Green Distance in OIZ Code of

Practice

2.1.5. Sanction Policy

By-Law on Major Industrial Accident Control has a strict sanction policy requiring the shutdown of

the establishment or suspension of process units in the case of any deficiency. MoEU, MoLSS and

local authorities will be responsible for the implementation of sanctioning practices regarding major

accidents.

REC Turkey was unable to find any reported cases concerning prevention of major accidents. The

only available sanctioning data considers general non-compliance issues on environmental and

occupational health and safety. MoEU imposed a fine over 30 million TL and the shutdown of 120

firms in the first seven months of 2012. Similarly, MoLSS imposed nearly 30 million TL in 2011, for

non-compliance with health and safety regulations.

Sanctioning can be in the scope of both administrative law and criminal law. The instruments of

administrative law are primarily aimed at terminating and reversing (insofar as possible) the current

illegal situation, in other words, at resolving the nuisance or damage caused and implementing

appropriate provisions for the future. The instruments of criminal law are primarily aimed to penalize

the offender and remove any unfair (competitive) advantage that operators may have enjoyed.

2.2. Overall Benefits of Implementing the Seveso II Directive in Turkey

The implementation of the Seveso II Directive will provide considerable benefits to Turkey, although

most of them non-quantifiable. Implementation of the Directive will mean, in particular, a reduction in

the number of major accidents and a decrease of the impacts on human health and environment in case

an accident occurs.

Concerning the environment and social impacts, including the protection of the environment, human

health, effects on employment, explained in Section 5, the analysis shows that the positive impacts of

the different policy options vary slightly in terms of social and environmental impacts.

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In the overall, the implementation of the Directive significantly increases the current level of

environmental and human health protection (see section 5), and brings positive impacts on

employment.

2.2.1. Environmental Impacts

Major accidents involve events with the potential to cause severe, widespread, long-term or even

permanent damage to ecosystems, which contaminates land, water and air (see Picture 6). Thus,

Environmental Impacts of the implementation of the Directive reflect itself in environmental

protection. However, for the majority of issues, it is not possible to quantify the benefits in terms of

increased environmental protection level.

Picture 6 - Buncefield30

Smoke Plume

Source: The final report of the Major Incident Investigation Board

Directive requires more awareness about major accidents and a better understanding of major accident

hazards to environment. Thus, implementation of the requirements of the Seveso II Directive has led

to a recognizably higher level of environmental protection in comparison with non-Seveso

Establishments. Moreover, the Directive forces MS to organize a system of inspections to ensure:

Operator provided appropriate means (MAPP, SMS) to prevent major accidents and limit their

consequences;

Additional Safety Documents (IEP, safety report etc.) drawn by operator is accurate and

complete.

CAs also will put into Land Use Planning, which prohibits the siting of Establishments close to

environmentally sensitive areas, and Emergency Plans that mitigates consequences to environment.

All the above-mentioned environmental benefits are qualitative. Both in Turkey and the EU, there is

no comprehensive study on the environmental benefits of the Seveso Directive. However, the cost

estimations of accidents can be used to assess the benefits of the Directive. 31

30

The main threat to ecosystems as was the case in the 2005 accident at Buncefield, the United Kingdom, is the

wastewater from fire extinguishing activities, which may pollute surface water or groundwater if not captured

effectively. The environmental cost of the accident was 2 million pounds. 31

However, cost estimations for accidents generally do not include environmental costs. Moreover, estimations are not accurate in numbers. For instance, Flixborough accident initially estimated ten times less than the

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As a part of a consultation process for the RIA report, Turkish operators were asked to assess the

benefits of Directive. Operators admitted that the Directive introduces additional requirements and

safety procedures to prevent and limit the impacts of major accidents to the environment;

65% of Operators think that the Directive will assist and enable the reduction in number of the

major accidents and limit consequences to man and environment.

60% of the Operators will take additional safety measures after implementing the Directive to

reduce the risks for the environment and residential places close to establishment.

REC Turkey tried to quantify both environmental costs and benefits, however, could not reach

accurate data. The only available data are the costs of cleaning up or restoring damaged ecosystems

after industrial accidents, which can run into billions of Euros. Moreover, the complexity of the

environment and the individual characteristics of each accident is another barrier to assess the benefits

(see Box 4). Due to the irreversible nature of some of the associated impacts, the real losses to society

will be higher than direct financial costs.

Box 4 - Factors affect the assessment of the severity or duration of impacts of an accident

- the precise nature of the particular resource impacted, i.e. habitats will vary in their vulnerability

- the pollution; certain habitats are more readily rehabilitated/recreated

- the total area affected, and the area of particular resources

- the importance of the resource at a range of scales, i.e. local, national, international

- the particular substances involved, their toxicity and persistence in the environment

- the nature of the accident, i.e. fire, explosion, spillage

2.2.2. Social Impacts

Implementation and enforcement of the Directive in Turkey will bring several social impacts. The two

relevant types of effects to consider are:

- Impacts on Public Health

- Impacts on Business and Employment

In this respect, REC Turkey assessed whether the implementation of the Directive would result in an

increased level of protection in public health and positive impacts on employment.

Impacts on Public Health

The RIA estimates that the Directive will bring major social gains on public health. As mentioned in

Section 2.2.1. , the Directive introduces appropriate means for management of major accidents and

implements safety procedures to prevent and limit the impacts of major accidents. For instance, Land

Use Planning will prohibit the siting of Establishments close to residential areas. Moreover, it

constrains the expansion of residential areas near Seveso Establishments, which reduces exposure to

major accidents.

actual cost (Fewtrell et. al. 1998). This and similar examples show that pre-estimation of accident costs might

not be reliable due to some aspects such as on-site personnel and health costs. Another difficulty arises when

operators do not want to share the cost estimation data for it is believed to a cause loss of reputation.

Competition concerns as well often appear as another barrier.

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High level of protection contributes to positive change in unsafe conditions and increases the health

and safety culture at workplaces.

Another important impact of the Directive is the participation of the public in the decision-making

process (i.e. siting new Establishment) and their right to access to information. The Directive requires

also public accession to information about the hazardous chemicals used in the Establishments and

measures taken for the safety and mitigation. People are more prepared and ready for emergencies,

which leads to success in evacuation procedures in case of an accident.

In Turkey, there is no comprehensive study on the health and safety benefits for workers and public in

case of prevention of the accidents. REC Turkey used the calculations from the UK Health and Safety

Executive (HSE) RIA report to assess health and safety benefits for the workers (See Box 5).

However, due to lack of data on major accidents and its consequences, social impacts of the Directive

on Public Health issues are not calculated, although it is positive.

Box 5 - Health and Safety Benefits

The UK Regulatory Impact Assessment for proposed regulations to implement Directive 2003/105/EC amending

Council Directive 96/82/EC used the A Review of UK and Overseas Major Industrial Accidents since Flixborough 197432 to calculate Health and Safety Benefits.

The Review details the twenty UK accidents with the highest numbers of casualties. There were 30 fatalities and

877 major injuries in the twenty-four years following the Flixborough accident. Using this data, the cost in an

average year is £7.2 million in current prices.

The RIA calculates the Health and Safety Benefits for the total number of Establishments that either enter the

Control of Major Accident Hazards(COMAH) for the first time, or move to a higher classification, The range for

Establishments is 224 - 249.

This represents approximately 19.3%-21.5%

of the existing total of Establishments. Using this range the

amendments to the regulations cover a percentage of the total cost of injuries that equates to a monetary value of

£1.5 to £1.7 million per year, a net present value over the appraisal period of £12.9 to £14.4 million.

Action to mitigate risks will also benefit members of the public. The study does not have information on

incidents involving members of the public in sufficient detail to make estimates for the risk from smaller scale

events. The review states that no member of the public has been killed off-site because of a serious incident in

chemical/ petrochemical manufacture. The quantitative benefit of reduced risk to the public cannot be estimated

but could be substantial.

Impacts on Business and Employment

Overall, the Directive will have positive impacts in terms of job creation and business. The operators

will need experts in the areas of process safety, risk assessment, emergency planning and safety

management system. Moreover, the CAs and the local authorities will need to recruit additional

experts and inspectors to assess and inspect the safety measurements of the Establishments. Currently,

the Operators and CAs have experts working on environmental issues and occupational safety.

However, the Directive introduces additional safety documents, which requires additional workload.

Operators will benefit from the implementation of the Directive when the Directive enables the

prevention of costly major accidents.33

There is no comprehensive study on the costs of major

accidents occurred in Turkey, which makes it impossible to calculate business benefits.34

32

Fewtrell, P. and Hirst, I. “A review of high-cost chemical/petrochemical accidents since Flixborough (1974)”,

IChemE Loss Prevention Bulletin, 140, 1998.

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2.3. Overall Unavoidable Costs of Implementing the Seveso II Directive in Turkey

This section looks at costs to be covered by government, business, and other stakeholders without

considering the flexibility provided by the implementation of the Directive that might reduce those

costs (see Annex - 1 for detailed information on unavoidable costs).

The following points should be noted. First, these impacts are assessed for a period starting from 2012

and ending in 2021. Second, as the Directive provides some flexibility in terms of application and

Turkey is not member of the EU yet, the impacts could be incremental. Third, the economic impact of

implementing the Directive will mostly depend on the number of the Seveso Establishments. Overall,

the implementation of the Directive will cause three types of costs:

Administrative costs, comprising those linked to the notification, preparing safety documents

and reports, inspection, and training. These costs are borne by operators, and the CAs and

municipalities.

Substantive costs is ‘business cost’ of working with dangerous processes and products and

not directly related to the Seveso II Directive, comprising operational/ maintenance costs

related to physical compliance measures, safety equipment, etc.

Land use costs, comprising restrictions on use, purchase of land or moving the facilities

and/or residential buildings.

REC Turkey developed a cost model for Administrative costs35

, but it was not possible to estimate the

other two categories of costs, which are assumed much more significant than the administrative costs.

Total administrative cost of implementation is expected to be 62 million Euro for 10 years between

2012 and 2021 (PV). REC study assumes that the Operators bear 63% of the total cost and CAs bear

27% of the total cost.

2.3.1. Administrative Costs for operators and public authorities

For the administrative compliance cost, REC Turkey developed a model that estimates a total cost of

62 million Euros for 10 years between 2012 and 2021 (PV) (see Annex - 1).

33 A Review of UK and Overseas Major Industrial Accidents since Flixborough 1974 estimated that the total cost

of the 20 major chemical/ petrochemical accidents since Flixborough was between £300 to £400 million in

1996 prices. The costs of reconstruction and lost production costs are included and incidents include indirect

production costs (such as loss of business, or forced sale of raw material), off-site damage, personnel costs

associated with injury events, civil emergency response, legal costs and public relations costs excluded. 34 In consultation process, one of the respondent from questionnaire answered the cost of accident as about

nearly $1.000.000.

35 The RIA study used the following sources for administrative costs, they contain relevant information and data

regarding on costs of Implementing the Seveso II Directive:

UK (2005) Regulatory Impact Assessment (final) of Seveso II;

Nutek (2006) Näringslivets administrativa kostnader på miljöområdet;

EU-VRI (2008) Study of the Effectiveness of the Seveso II Directive, August 2008; and

EU Project on Baseline Measurement and Reduction of Administrative Costs (2009), (Administrative

Burden study), Framework Contract no. ENTR/06/61

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Table 5 - Total Administrative Costs (PV – Euros)

These costs will not be shared equally. Operators will cover 63% and public authorities 27%.

The Directive will have different impacts according to the obligations of each category of

Establishments. For Upper-Tier establishment it will be 47.2 million Euro for 10 years between 2012

and 2021 (PV). In the case of the Lower-Tier establishment is it will 14.8 million Euro for 10 years

between 2012 and 2021 (PV).

In terms of sectors, the most affected one will be the petrochemical (48%) and the chemical industry

(21%) (see Figure 14).


Source: REC Turkey, 2012

Interestingly the Directive has a very important first year administrative cost, representing 1/3 of the

total costs for the assessed period. This is due to the preparation of the first set of safety

Row Labels 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 TOTAL

Operators 17.022.120 1.786.476 1.717.766 2.845.398 3.289.231 3.652.003 2.529.548 1.411.878 2.811.649 2.248.759 39.314.829


Other Costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Safety Report 3.960.000 190.385 183.062 176.021 169.251 976.449 156.482 150.464 144.677 139.112 6.245.903

MAPP 3.567.000 171.490 164.895 158.553 152.454 879.544 140.953 135.531 130.319 125.306 5.626.045

SMS 2.475.000 118.990 114.414 110.013 105.782 610.281 97.801 94.040 90.423 86.945 3.903.690

IEP 3.736.000 142.788 137.297 1.325.716 126.938 122.056 1.178.557 112.848 108.507 1.047.732 8.038.440





EEP 1.868.000 71.394 68.648 538.598 63.469 61.028 478.812 56.424 54.254 425.662 3.686.290

Other Costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0



Grand Total 21.804.075 3.826.226 3.679.064 5.203.852 5.299.765 5.918.471 4.626.205 3.023.922 4.530.261 4.112.680 62.024.522

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documentation and reports. The following years, the operators will mostly need to update and validate

these documents.

As well, the model estimates that the inspection and assessment costs will also be significant,

representing 1/3 of the total cost and 70% of the total cost for the government.

2.3.2. Substantive Compliance Costs

Other than administrative costs, there are also compliance costs of substantive modifications and

technical measures in the case of any modification for function, efficiency and position (change in

scope, open/closure of installations, change in quantity of dangerous substances, etc.).

It was not possible to estimate these costs, which are assumed to be much more significant than the

administrative costs. However, it can be argued that in the case of substantive costs, which will

increase safety standards of Establishments, they should be considered as typical ‘business cost’ of

working with dangerous processes and products and not directly related to the Seveso II Directive. For

instance, if an establishment becomes a Seveso II site, they might need to undertake investments in

changes to their manufacturing process or to way they store chemical substances.

UK (2005) Regulatory Impact Assessment (final) of Seveso II study on the control suggests that the

costs for Upper-Tier Establishments are in the same order as the administrative costs. For Lower-Tier

Establishments there is a large variation in the results of the two surveys and they could vary within a

range of 5% of the administrative costs to be at the same order as the administrative costs.

In overall, the current RIA study accepts that, substantive costs are significant for total cost

calculations.

2.3.3. Land use costs

Land use costs were not estimated because of lack of information on safety zoning required by the

Directive. However, this RIA study considers several cost examples from EU. For instance, in France,

the estimated total cost for French PPRTs (land measures including several thousands of

expropriations and relinquishments) is about 2.3 billion € and it covers 420 Establishments. This data

lead to total costs estimation for all Upper-Tier Establishments in the EU 27 of EUR 25 billion. In

Austria, a safety distance of 300 m leads to about 250,000 m2 of restricted area. For 145 Austrian

Seveso Establishments, based on a land value of 95 EUR/m2, the total costs amount to EUR 3.4

billion (For Details, see Annex - 2. 3 and Annex - 3).

Concretely, the public authorities need first to develop Seveso compatible plans for each

establishment, and second, value the land and residential buildings overlapping with these plans.

However, this is compounded by the fact that the 2010 By-Law does not require such obligation.

Overall, there are many uncertainties in particular in terms of the specific implementation impacts of

the Directive.

2.3.4. Uncertainties in the estimates

Key uncertainties include:

The final number of establishment is not final given the non-compliance of the some of the

establishments with the registration and the notification of substances obligations

The compliance costs of operators vary significantly. For instance, some multinational firms

have dedicated systems and procedures developed for their EU operations that are relatively

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cheaper and more efficient than those required to be developed from scratch by small Turkish

operators.

Changes in protection level are very difficult to estimate.

In all countries, health and safety legislation have overlapping requirements. So, some

activities to comply with the Seveso II might have been taken as a result of other legislation or

would have been taken because of good business management culture and attitude.

Compliance costs vary among Establishments, particularly because of the pre-existing

condition of land use.

Operators might be able to adjust stocks of Seveso chemicals to avoid falling within the scope

of the Directive. Another compliance strategy available is to set up storages for Seveso

chemicals in another facility different from the processing one. This takes the processing

facility out of scope but transfers the risks to the transport phase.

In sum, given the considerable uncertainties still existing, the estimates presented in the Report should

be taken as pointers rather than final numbers. Some impact assessments will therefore be more

qualitative than quantitative.

These structural uncertainties also mean that benchmarking figures across Member States and

industries will be also constrained. For instance, this will be very visible for the differences in the

compliance costs related to the familiarization and analysis required for the preparation of safety

reports of the Establishments.

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3. Objectives of the RIA

The overall policy objective of the RIA is to ensure successful implementation of the Seveso II

Directive in Turkey in an optimal way in terms of economic, environmental and social aspects.

The three specific objectives of the RIA are:

- To assist reduction of the major accidents, prevention and limitation of the consequences of

accidents on public health and the environment,

- To ensure the implementation of the Directive with specific policies that reduce the economic,

environmental and social costs for all stakeholders (governmental bodies, municipalities, operators

and general public), and

- To achieve full compliance with the Directive, including administrative structure, risk assessment

framework, land use approach and sanctioning policy.

These specific objectives leads to seven operational targets defined as follows:

- To calculate the expected cost of implementing the Directive in Turkey,

- To identify the most suitable regulatory framework for Turkey,

- To identify most effective methods to encourage the full compliance,

- To set up a suitable administrative structure for proper coordination of multidiscipline problems,

- To develop a proper risk assessment framework,

- To develop most appropriate land use planning approach,

- To identify enforcement and sanctioning instruments to increase compliance level.

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4. Policy Areas, Options and Scenarios

4.1. Policy Areas

In order to implement the main provisions of the Seveso II Directive, the Turkish authorities need to

designate several decisions. REC Turkey identified ten key policy options (including ‘non-action’) to

address issues organized around four policy areas for the implementation of the Directive:

0. Non-Action

1. The Administrative Structure

2. Risk Assessment Framework

3. Land use planning approaches

4. Sanctioning Strategies

4.2. Options

REC Turkey identified and analyzed alternative options for each Policy Area. Options under policy

areas are mutually exclusive. However, options identified under different Policy Areas are not totally

exclusive. Policy Areas identified in this analysis are interconnected.

Policy Area 0: Non-Action

Option 0.1 Non-Action

Policy Area 1: The Administrative Structure

Option 1.1. Two CAs without a Coordination Body (Non-Action)

Option 1.2. One Competent Authority

Option 1.3. Three CAs with a Coordination Body



Option 2.2. Operators Choose their own Framework

Policy Area 3: Land use Planning Approaches

Option 3.1. Consequence-Based Approach to LUP

Option 3.2. Risk-Based Approach to LUP


Option 4.1. Strict Sanctioning Strategy


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5. Impact Assessment

5.0. Policy Area 0: Non-Action

5.0.0. Description of the Policy Area

This option, evaluated as the RIA baseline, consists of retaining all the provisions that already exist in

Turkish laws and legislative norms but does not take any further action nor introduce any new

legislation.

Impacts on Operators:

Section 2.3 shows evidence that the implementation of the Seveso Directive has negative economic

impact for operators.

The Directive obliges the Operators to introduce additional safety measurements, which cause extra

costs. The problem is also due to the high number of potential Seveso Establishments in Turkey,

which leads to even higher costs for the national economy. Therefore, not implementing the Directive

means saving cost for industrial sector but also having high-level risk for major accidents, with costs

in billions.

Public Sector Impacts:

Seveso II Directive brings many obligations (see Annex - 5) to governmental institutions; therefore,

additional expenditures . First, CAs, namely Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and Ministry

of Labor and Social Security, will need to allocate budget for inspections. These inspections initially

and continuously require qualified inspectors in the field, which also increase the costs for the CAs.

Secondly, local authorities should increase capacity in order to prepare proper External Emergency

Plans and Land Use Plans. In the baseline scenario, Turkey will not harmonize the Directive, hence

there will be no cost arising for the implementation of the Directive.

However, the Non-Action option means that Turkey would not transpose and implement the Seveso II

Directive and consequently the Turkish Government would jeopardize the membership negotiations

between Turkey and the EC, and might lead to refusal of Turkey’s membership to the EU.

Furthermore, in case of transposing the Directive but not implementing it, Turkey would incur

infraction fines and some reputational damages.

Environmental impacts:

Baseline scenario does not decrease the probability of major accidents. Therefore, it brings some risks

on environmental assets, such as air, water resources, and soil. The value of these assets cannot

directly be monetized, which makes it difficult to compare the benefits and costs of implementing the

Directive. However, it is clear that not implementing the Directive means neglecting environmental

concerns.

Social impacts:

In the baseline scenario, there will be no social benefits. Social impacts regard health, safety, security

of workers and public, employment levels, and rights of citizens. Non-action does not reduce health

risks of workers and population. Current protection level does not improve the public health and

public access to information remains limited.

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Conclusion about the Non Action option:

Overall, non-implementation of the Directive in the baseline scenario could lead to less operational

and investment costs, for both operators and CAs. On the other hand, environmental and social

impacts reveal that non-action does not improve environmental protection, health and safety of public

and not adds additional value for employment levels, rights of citizens.

5.1. Policy Area 1: The Administrative Structure

5.1.0 Description of the Policy Area

The first policy area studies the set-up of the administrative structure and collaboration of public

authorities responsible for the implementation of the Directive.

The Directive assigns several obligations to the public authorities (see Annex - 5). Member States

(MS) fulfill these obligations through Competent Authorities (CAs). A Competent Authority is the

organization legally delegated with authority to perform a designated function. Once an authority is

delegated to perform a certain act, only this CA is entitled to take accounts therefrom and no one else.

The Government may establish a new authority or assign current authorities as CA to fulfill the

requirements of the Directive. The MS can delegate all responsibilities to one authority or distribute

them to several authorities. In the latter case, there will be more than one competent authority partially

responsible for the successive implementation of the Directive.

Eventually, CAs will need to supervise the overall implementation of the Directive. The tasks fulfilled

by CAs include a variety of activities such as preparation of external emergency plans, inspections on

the Establishments, issuing permits, assessment and approval of Safety Reports. CAs are also expected

to provide guidance to Establishments about their responsibilities and inform other stakeholders (non-

governmental organizations, research/academic institutions).

Seveso II Directive is a complex legislation that requires a multi-disciplinary approach. The problems

that the Directive attempts to answer and respective solutions are traditionally under the responsibility

of different public authorities. For instance, on-site impacts of occupational accidents are generally

related with the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, whereas off-site environmental impacts of

major accidents are under the responsibility of Ministry of Environment and Urbanization.

Member States had established different administrative frameworks to implement the Directive. The

core issue of the administrative framework is the set-up of the CAs. Generally, the choice of the

Member States depends on their existing legislation related to the topic and the historical distribution

of responsibilities between different public authorities at both national and local level.36

Annex - 11

gives information on Public Authorities and their responsibilities in scope of Seveso II Directive in

Member States.

REC Turkey identifies three main models for administrative set-up, which this RIA assessed:

Option 1.1. Two CAs without a Coordination Body (Non-Action)


Option 1.3.Three CAs with a Coordination Body

36 Seveso Inspection Series – Volume 3 p-25

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5.1.1 Option 1.1.Two CAs without a Coordination Body

Description of the option:

In this option, the government designates the “Ministry of Environment and Urbanization” and the

“Ministry of Labor and Social Security” as Competent Authorities both partially responsible from the

successful implementation of the Directive. Both ministries will be responsible from their identified

tasks and there will be limited cooperation between the authorities. Moreover, the government assigns

tasks to the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (DEMP) and local authorities.

Distribution of the obligations within the public authorities according to this option can be seen in

Annex - 1.

Some Member States (MS) have followed the model explained in this option. For instance, Sweden

has three different competent authorities37

fulfilling different tasks of the Directive.


Since both CAs will undertake its own inspection, it is most probable that this option will be costly to

the operators in terms of administrative costs. EU experience reveals that Member States with a high

number of man-days per inspection and a high frequency of inspections lead to higher compliance

costs for operators compared to those of operators in Member States where the frequency of

inspections is lower.

Therefore, the competent authorities undertaking the inspections independently and obliging

Establishments to spend more time for each inspection will signify loss of time both for

Establishments and experts who will spend time helping the competent authorities’ inspectors and

experts.


Costs (initial and ongoing) incurred to the public authorities depends on the structure of CA, related

agencies, qualification of personnel, quality of inspections and safety documentation assessment.

In the case of lack of coordination in assessments and separate inspections, different views regarding

results of inspections and examinations (e.g. a CA decision regarding a major accident topic may not

be accepted by another CA), can cause conflicts between CAs. Moreover, it may lower the quality of

performance and results varying from region to region. Without sharing information and deciding

together on the key requirements of the Directive (i.e. risk assessment, land use planning, external

emergency plans), officials, inspectors, and other civil servants will have many difficulties while

performing their tasks. Therefore, it results in loss of efforts.

37 In Sweden, the following public authorities have been designated as CAs: Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB).

MSB is responsible for the supervision of the Seveso II Directive at a national level as far as consequences for

the environment and the public are concerned. The 21 county administrations carry out inspections and

enforcement at a regional level. Work Environment Authority (SWEA): SWEA is responsible for the supervision

on internal aspects of the Seveso II Directive at a national level. The SWEA’s ten inspection offices around the

country carry out inspections and enforcement at a regional level. SWEA’s responsibility on inspections is

broader, which means they carry out not only for Seveso II Directive but all kinds of working environment (e.g.

working hours) inspections. Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA): SEPA is the major authority for

environmental and health protection. The issuing of permits for upper tier establishments is handled under the Environmental Code (1998:808) for which SEPA has a high responsibility.

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In the case of misunderstanding and poor communication between the CAs, the effectiveness of

assessments and inspections reduces. This impaired overlook results in higher risk in major accidents

(e.g. in emergencies), thus has more negative impacts to environmental assets near the Establishments

Social impacts:

Due to the possible lack of coordination between competent authorities, the effectiveness of the

assessments and inspections can be reduced. This impaired overlook can cause a higher risk of major

accidents thus has more negative on public health and property.

5.1.2 Option 1.2. One Competent Authority


In this option, Turkey establishes a new public authority (either under the current CAs or as totally a

new authority) responsible from the implementation the Directive. This authority may or may not use

experts from the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security

and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency.

In EU, some of the Member States have followed this option. Finland has followed a similar

approach.38

Inspections and safety reports are the task of one National Authority Tukes (Finnish Safety

and Chemicals Authority) which covers the whole country. The only agency with high technical

competencies and acting as CA, Tukes enforces the national legislation and carries out the inspections.

Tukes consults other authorities (regional environmental and work safety authorities, rescue services)

when handling safety reports and invites them to attend inspections. Tukes works under the Ministry

of Economy and Employment. In Ireland, there is one Central Competent Authority, Health and Safety

Authority (HSA), responsible for the enforcement of the Directive and gives technical advice on land

use planning to local Authorities.

See Annex - 1 for distribution of the obligations within the public authorities for the option ‘One

Competent Authority’


The CA will organize more efficiently assessments and inspections, which will have lower

administrative (red tape) costs for Operators.


This option can further reduce the costs on government and permit productivity gains. For instance,

the authorities will spend less time for coordination. One central office carries out the work easily with

the simplification of processes and procedures and eliminates the differences between the assessment

of reports and inspections (harmonized working environment).

38 The main authorities are the Safety Technology Authority (Tukes) and the regional rescue authorities. Tukes

maintains and promotes technical safety and reliability in order to protect people, property and the environment.

Tukes’s responsibilities include licenses, periodic inspections, handling of safety reports, evaluation of safety

report of establishments and internal emergency plans. The regional rescue authorities are responsible for

making statements of internal emergency plans, arranging emergency drills together with the operator every third

year, and compiling external emergency plans.

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On the other hand, the creation of a new entity will create transition costs due to the reallocation of

human resources and other resources to the new entity (including motivational costs for the public

servants) and require a longer transition period.

In the consultation process, various stakeholders expressed that this option poses the risk of shrinkage

in the scope of the inspection, due to shortage of staff and conflict of legislations if one competent

authority carries inspections. The excess of unnecessary arrangements is another problem. Lastly,

bureaucratic problems, such as conflict of authority, could arise, which cause overall management

problems, slower and inefficient inspection and assessments.


No major environmental impact.

Social impacts:

No major social impact.

5.1.3 Option 1.3.Three CAs with a Coordination Body


In this option, Turkey will designate “Ministry of Environment and Urbanization”, “Ministry of Labor

and Social Security” and “Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency” as competent authorities.

Moreover, Turkey will establish a Coordination Body to increase the collaboration between these

authorities (see Figure 15). For instance, these three competent authorities will be responsible for the

inspection of Establishments in relation with their responsibilities. Annex - 1 other responsibilities of

the CAs and the coordination body in this option. The Coordination Body will be responsible for:

Training and research activities related with the Directive and training for the competent

authorities inspectors and experts,

Establishing an effective inspection and examining system of Seveso Establishments,

Getting the reports from the competent authorities and provide a final inspection report and

inform the Seveso Establishments about these inspection reports.

Informing the public about the major accident issues,

Establishing a major accident reporting system,

Contacting and collaborating with the local authorities such as fire-fighting management, civil

defense, police and related groups for implementing emergency management.

The Coordination Body links actors and policies. Experience in some Member States demonstrates the

usefulness of setting-up coordinated mechanisms for major accident management, involving different

central and local public authorities and private stakeholders. It improves the communication between

CAs and other public authorities (i.e. local authorities responsible for land use planning practices).

A Coordination body could provide a useful forum for elaborating recommendations on best practices

from representatives of various national departments. The Coordination Body can create such a

network covering the departments in charge of land planning, risk and hazard mapping, protection of

the environment, and emergency preparedness and response. Moreover, the Coordination Body will

inform competent authorities and other stakeholders, coordinate the inspection dates and inspectors

and perform training and research activities.

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Figure 15 - Three CAs with a Coordination Body

In consultation period, stakeholders suggested several organizations as coordination bodies, such as

the Labor and Social Security Training and Research Center (ÇASGEM) under the Ministry of Labor

and Social Security, and the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK).

Setting up a special unit about accidents under the umbrella of the Council was one of the

recommendations. Moreover, stakeholders suggested authorizing an organization or some

organizations that would provide support for SMEs.

There are some MS follow this option in EU. In the Netherlands39

, the Seveso II directive is enforced

by three agencies: the Competent Authority for environmental regulation (‘Bevoegd Gezag Wet

milieubeheer’), the ‘Labor Inspectorate’ (‘Arbeidsinspectie’) and the ‘Fire Brigade’ (‘Brandweer’).

The Dutch Seveso II enforcement agencies thus represent the policy areas ‘environment’,

‘occupational safety and health’ and ‘emergency planning’. Moreover, Netherlands has established a

coordination office, LAT Bureau, for the effective implementation of Seveso Directive.

Likewise, in the UK, the Competent Authority for the control of major accident hazards brings

together three separate government bodies: the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and Environment

Agency (EA) in England and Wales and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency in Scotland.

There are ‘Separate Memoranda of Understanding’ defining working arrangements in order to make

sure that all functions are executed and all aspects are being treated. Besides, there is a ‘Steering

Group’ that checks whether all working arrangements are actually followed up. A ‘Single

Implementation Project’ introduced working arrangements in 16 areas such as inspections, assessment

and domino effects.

To summarize, a range of central and local policies can be managed in a way that supports the accident

management cycle — prevention, preparedness, response, recovery. However, this requires linking the

actors involved in developing and implementing measures that can have significant impacts on major

accident prevention.


This option brings comparatively less costs for the Operators in comparison to option ‘Two Competent

Authorities without a Coordination Body’. The competent authorities carry out joint inspections and

39 There are three competent authorities in the Netherlands: Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment,

Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, and Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.

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examinations of other documents with the assistance of a coordination body, which enables effective

and efficient joint inspections. Thus, Operators spend less time for these inspections and assessing

documents, and save time and money: the option results in approximately 7000 days and 500.000 Euro

less administrative burden to Operators than other options annually. Moreover, these jointly planned

inspections by uniform rules provide fair trade conditions (See Annex - 2. 1 Administrative Costs ).


This option enables efficient coordination of the competent authorities. The Coordination Body assists

and arranges inspections and examinations practices, increases the effectiveness of inspections, and

ensures a consistent approach. Therefore, the activities will be more effective, well-planned and less

loss of time and efforts. In addition, this option provides a more integrated service, and access to

information is quicker and more efficient via the coordination body.

Moreover, Coordination Body takes over administrative workload so that the inspectors can

concentrate on inspections and enforcement.

As a result of working together with the help of a Coordination Body, the conflicts between the

competent authorities will be less. It will be easy for the competent authorities to make harmonized

standards.

On the other hand, Coordination Body founding process could be very long (bureaucratic burdens) and

costly which prevents further administrative works and there may be a conflict responsibilities of

authorities. Moreover, this option increases the workload of the staff and requires recruitment of new

staff that results in an extra financial burden for government (see Annex - 16).


Because of sufficient coordination and increased knowledge of competent authorities via coordination

body activities, the effectiveness of the assessments increases and inspections can be implemented

well which reduces the probability of major accidents, therefore reduces hazards to environment.

Social impacts:

More coherent implementation and consistent application of the provisions of the Directive will

reduce the probability of major accidents, therefore public health impacts. Moreover, additional staff

may be recruited for the coordination body, which increases employment.

5.1.4 Summary of the impacts of the Policy Area

In summary, Policy Option 1.3 appears to have more positive impacts for Turkey than the other

options.

Previous legislations regulating major accident focused on individual installations and the inspections

on the individual lines of defenses while the Directive focuses on the overall safety management

policy of the Establishment Thus, a coherent implementation and consistent application of the

provisions of the Directive throughout the country requires close cooperation among the CAs.

Option 1.1 seems to have impacts that are more negative. It foresees more administrative costs on the

Operators. In this respect, Single Competent Authority (option 1.2) presents lower costs. However, the

option Single Competent Authority has mainly two drawbacks. First, existing Ministries will most

likely oppose any merge or consolidation, which will raise the political cost to implement the option.

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Secondly, any merge or consolidation requires a transition time to accommodate the culture, staff,

assets, ICT, etc.

It can be concluded from different country cases that the coordination body (at least one of the CA

should behave as a coordination body) is needed considering all of the obligations of CAs and

administrative cooperation among representatives of related authorities is required. The coordination

body will provide training and research activities related with the Directive and training for inspectors

and experts, information to the public about the related issues and contact with the local authorities

easily under the roof of one body. Although the financial burden may be high for establishing a body,

in the long term, the benefits will dominate those costs.

All issues (public sector, Operators, social, environmental) concerning the implementation of the

Directive taken into account, Option 1.3: Three CAs with a Coordination Body is the most proper

option for Turkey.

5.2 Policy Area 2: Risk Assessment Framework


This policy area assesses different regulatory frameworks where the Government obligates or not the

use of certain risk assessment standards and instruments (e.g. software) by Operators.

According to the Directive, Operators have to prevent or reduce the risks arising from hazards at their

establishments to an acceptable level based on risk assessment40

. Operators will need specific method,

standards and instruments to identify, analyze, assess, and evaluate these risks. Moreover, Operators

shall convince the CA about the quality of their risk assessment.

Risk assessment is a very complicated task. It includes assessing the risks of major hazards through a

series of analysis and tests, by using a variety of standards and tools. The Framework for risk

assessments is particularly important for preparing Safety Reports, which Operators need to send

periodically to CAs.

Although the industry, the CAs and the local authorities have interest in the same risk assessment

process, their needs are slightly different from each other. Industry needs a method to identify, assess

and reduce the risk. The CAs need to be able to assess the safety level of the plant, particularly

through the safety report.41

The local authorities are also interested in emergency and land use planning

issues.

The Directive does not require specific use of particular risk assessment instruments and standards.

CA and Operators should choose proper and effective risk assessment standards and tools in order to

ensure a proper implementation of the Directive, since they are the responsible bodies in this regard.

40Risk Assessment: The overall process comprising a risk analysis (the systematic use of available information to

identify hazards and to estimate the risk) and risk evaluation (whether the desirable level of risk has been

achieved). 41 The case of Catalonia, Spain is interesting. Safety reports assessment is delegated to three external institutions

appointed by the Catalan government: TNO, INERIS as consultant agencies and IQS Sarrià Chemical

Institute in Spain.

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There is a diversity of risk assessment tools within the EU, and the related regulation framework for

risk assessment tools and standards vary across the Europe. In F-Seveso Report, respondents reported

that several methods and standards are used for the risk analysis. Bow-tie method, fault tree and event

tree analysis, risk matrices, HAZOP42

, Preliminary Hazard Analysis, and ARAMIS43

could be listed as

examples of risk assessment methods and tools. Moreover, there are many different procedures and

threshold values as standards defined by either competent authorities or business.44

Risk assessment requires specific expertise and specialized knowledge about the hazard and its risk

being analyzed.45

SMEs usually face difficulties to understand and implement the risk analysis

requirements to produce Safety Reports or Major Accident Prevention Policies (MAPP). This

increases the compliance costs for SMEs; hence, a regressive impact on SMEs (compliance imposes a

greater burden on SMEs) which increases the risk of non-compliance.

Since it is difficult for an operator to independently identify and train all external stakeholders

regarding the industrial process, guidance provided by CAs and businesses and/or industry

associations is essential for Establishments with less experience on safety issues.

There are many national guidance documents (general and specific) in most of the EU countries,

developed by competent authorities, or national/European industry associations. In general, guidance

documents are developed for technical aspects like risk analysis, legal requirements and best practices.

F-Seveso report summarizes the existing national guidance documents prepared by CAs and Industry

across the EU. They are listed in Annex - 12.

REC Turkey identified two particular regulatory frameworks for risk assessment instruments and

standards used by MS from which Turkey may choose one:

Option 2.1. Public Driven Unique Risk Framework

Option 2.2.Operators Choose their own Framework

5.2.1 Option 2.1.Public Driven Framework


In this option, CAs design the risk assessment framework and control its implementation by Operators.

In particular, CAs define the standards, techniques, tools, and software etc. for each specified

industrial sector under the scope of the Directive. CAs also need to ensure that those standards,

techniques, and tools are obligatory. For instance, CAs provide the standards for the thresholds to be

used for the quantification of the consequences and the approaches for the selection of the scenarios in

the risk assessment.

42 HAZOP: Hazard and Operability studies 43 Method developed in the ARAMIS Project, see http://aramis.jrc.it/index.html 44 The diversity of methods/tools for risk assessment within the European Union is due to national constraints

and the history of the regulatory system. This is one of the major difficulties for the homogeneous and

harmonized implementation of the Seveso II Directive in Europe. 45 Fabbri, L. 2007. EU Guidance on Seveso II Directive and its Possible Application in the Non-EU Countries

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As an example for unique risk analysis and risk assessment framework, CAs will make obligatory the general

approaches, criteria for quantification, and methods/tools/data for implementation of the Directive for each

industrial sector. The following could be defined:

- deterministic and probabilistic, qualitative and quantitative approaches

- scenarios, accident severity estimation, in particular with commonly agreed effect thresholds, estimation of probability, based on harmonized probability classes

- (harmonized) values for the end-points thresholds for toxic, flammable and explosive substances to

characterize the effects on humans and the environment,

- values for failure-frequencies of safety equipment,

- values of the probability of occurrence of some events

- values of risk acceptability criteria: severity and probability calculation of the consequences of hazardous

phenomena, like explosion, fire, releases of toxic substances

- The methods and models, with the corresponding tools

The CAs support the deployment of framework through guidelines, case studies, manuals, etc. It is

very important that the CAs customize the Framework through consultation in order to develop a

common understanding together with the participation of the industry and other stakeholders.

A unique Framework assures common understanding between operators and CAs on key issues such

as identifying hazards and defining failure cases, estimating the frequencies with which these failures

occur, modeling the consequences of failures, analyzing and assessing risks and incorporating risk

reduction measures. Indeed, any risk assessment method requires reliable scientific inputs to be

gathered. However, significant variation can occur between analysts, which can affect assessments.

A unique Framework is also very useful to enhance a seamless communication between the operators,

the industry, the CAs and the local authorities. A proper communication also tends to ensure a better

dialogue and less adversarial relationship between stakeholders. It also assists major accident risks

experts of a country to reach consensus.

To develop a unique Framework, the CAs can start from scratch or they can adopt/adapt an existing

Framework already existing in another MS. Actually, the Public sector-driven option could be

developed jointly with the industry or not.

Through the years, Member States have developed different risk assessment frameworks emphasizing

either the methods or the standards. For instance, the Netherlands developed a unified method in the

early 1980s and since then it has been evolved into software called Safeti-NL (Software for the

Assessment of Flammable, Explosive and Toxic Impacts).

Overall, the unique public-driven option to specify methods and standards follows a ‘command and

control’ approach where operators must comply (“command”) or be penalized (the “control”).46

However, establishing a unique framework must be carried out by activating a working group

involving technical experts from industry, CAs and other stakeholders (NGOs, universities, etc.)

involved in the development of the existing framework on risk assessment issue.

Impacts on Operators

This option will have different impacts according to the size of the operator.

46Traditional command and control regulations are characterized as the use of rules reinforced by legal

authorities. In traditional command and control regulatory systems, standards and targets are set by the state, and

it is assumed that it is the responsibility/liability of the regulator to ensure regulation and standards. In this option, strength derives from the use of law to designate what is acceptable.

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EU experience indicates that most of the large operators are able to prepare safety reports on their

own, whereas small ones often outsource the risk analysis, which has high costs.

For small operators a ‘command and control’ approach will generate positive outcomes. First, defined

standards, software and precise guidelines, prepared by CAs regarding the preferred systems and

methods would be beneficial, especially for the existing SMEs.47

Second, in terms of the learning curve, a unique Framework reduces the chances of developing and

implementing inadequate risk assessment practices for smaller operators. SMEs also tend to prefer

clear rules provided by authorities rather than interpret discretionary obligations. This is particularly

useful during the learning process required when establishing Seveso obligations. As the industry

matures, these risks and costs tend to diminish and errors in the interpretation of the obligations

become less frequent.

Last, a unique risk assessment will avoid additional compliance costs for the operators, and the

unavoidable costs would therefore be lower for individual operators where CAs provides the

methodology and its tools. However, since CAs design the unique risk assessment framework, this

option would mean a ‘one size fit all’ approach which works regardless of the context and size of the

operation, which in effect may penalize small operators.

For large operators, especially the existing ones, a unique and government-sponsored framework

would not be positive. First, large operators have risk assessment systems already in place; they have

defined standards, methods and related instruments (e.g. software). Some actually have been

developed in their parent’s company in MS compatible with Seveso II. In addition to setting up a new

system, adapting to a new system might be duplicative at best or produce contradictory results at

worst. In the EU, multinational companies complained that they could not use an international safety

report format due to different requirements in different counties.

Second, large operators will not gain much from the government subsidies and assistance in the

learning curve, as they are already familiar with Seveso safety requirements.

Third, a ‘command and control’ Framework would probably mean they cannot adjust to their

particular complex production systems.

For the whole industry, economists have criticized ‘command and control’ rules for inhibiting

innovation, and for the high overall costs, inflexibility, and diminishing returns. Operators will have

little incentive for investing in Research & Development on new risk assessment methods or

developing more safety investments that might be more cost effective and cost efficient. In the long

term, they might stick to compliance ‘by the book’ with a stipulated standard rather than the best level

of risk avoidance that is reasonable in the particular context. Second, ‘command and control’

approaches tend to generate low level of commitment from the Operators.

For the operators, a unique Framework improves the availability and comparability of information and

expertise on risks. The information about risk assessment methods and data (reliability, failure

frequencies, effectiveness of safety barriers, etc.) must be available to all stakeholders.

47 Businesses such as warehouses, distribution and storage depots, food processing, and metal re-surfacing

although they may not necessarily be regarded as small businesses. However, those sectors do not have large

safety staffs since most of their business is not considered high risk and they also do not traditionally have expertise in safety because the safety aspect enters into their business as such a small part.

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This option introduces some positive aspects for CAs. First, it assures that the risk assessment

framework is of good quality. Operators, regardless of their size and operation lifetime, have put the

mitigation measures into place.

Second, a unique system simplifies the control, monitoring and inspection systems. A ‘command and

control’ approach supports transparency of enforcement, since each risk assessment follows same

approaches, that is by using predefined standards and methods (and it is often impossible for

inspectors to understand all the different frameworks operators are using, especially in medium and

large Establishments).

Third, compared to a performance-based framework, it requires lower level of investments in

capacities and expertise of the CAs. At the end of the day, CAs can reduce administrative burdens

induced by inspection and auditing activities by using a unique system and standardization. Currently,

technical capacity of staff who are dealing with major accident risks assessment is not at the desired

level, current inspectors and other staff can perform their task more easily and quickly in the case of a

unique Framework. Moreover, they can share information that builds on this common framework.

Fourth, a unique Framework can be deployed more quickly through the industry. Operators can follow

this unique Framework on risk assessment practices in different sectors, which ensures the CAs that

the risk assessment requirement in the context of major industrial accidents is performed properly.

Fifth, a government-backed system gives a powerful message across the industry and society that the

government is acting decisively to control major accidents.

On the downside, this option means that CAs will require extra budget and resources (other than

inspections) for the development, the implementation of proposed system, and the delivery,

corresponding to activities like the preparation of the main guidelines for standards and methods; and

establishment of an information system, training of staff, etc. Unfortunately, there is a limited data on

the costs of unique Framework.

For instance, in the Netherlands, CAs purchase the SAFETI-NL software license and sell it to

operators with lower prices. The SAFETI-NL software license costs to operators about 1250 euros if

CAs sells it. On the other hand, it costs 5600 euros when operators buy it without government support

(see Annex - 16 for the general software programs used in risk modeling with their prices).

A unique framework will necessitate significant expertise in both scientific research and benchmark

analysis for proper determination of the standards and methods. Moreover, a unique framework should

not result in significant administrative drawbacks and not affect overall economic integrity of markets

and preserve and enhance the current protection level of the environment.

As stated above, it is important that the CAs customize the Framework through consultation in order

to develop a common understanding together with the participation of the industry, the national

competent authorities and other stakeholders. If the industry shares the cost of developing and

deploying the unique Risk Assessment Framework, the impact on the state budget will be lower.


A unique Framework will be easier and faster to deploy among SMEs. Unique framework ensures

higher level of protection and monitors better non-complying Operators, which in turns reduces major

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accidents.

Overall, in the short term, this option will reduce environmental risks compared to a performance-

based option.

Social impacts:

This option creates a social impact concerning the health of residents living near the Establishments.

The unique Framework will have positive effects, similar to those on the environment through better

inspection and lower level of non-compliance.

5.2.2 Option 2.2.Operators Choose Their Own Framework

In this option, CAs ensure that Operators put into place risk assessment systems to prevent major

hazards. This means that operators need to develop or buy adequate Risk Assessment Instruments

without the assistance of the Government and are free to choose their own framework.

It should be noted that the Directive follows a ‘performance based’ approach. It does not require the

use of a specific risk assessment method, instrument or standard. On the other hand, the Directive

obliges that CAs ensure that Operators use appropriate risk assessment instruments and standards.

As stated before, there are variety of risk assessment procedures and defined standards, which

Operators can use and customize to assess and evaluate their risks. In addition, there are different tools

(including software) those can be used by Operators.

For instance, the UK follows a performance-based approach. In this approach, Operators are obliged to

perform risk assessment practices, but free to choose its framework from qualitative through semi-

quantitative to quantitative risk assessment (QRA).That is the CAs do not prescribe a precise method

and structure of the risk assessment to be used by industry. The UK health and safety legislation is

setting goals to reach rather than being prescriptive.

In Sweden, CAs does not oblige operators to use unique framework for assessing risk. Swedish

Government considers that hazardous substances and their related risks are characteristic in different

establishment using different production processes.

In Greece, the related law does not explicitly require a method for risk assessment. CAs provides to

operators only non-mandatory guidelines48

recommend that the preparation of safety reports contain

aspects such as a method to conduct a QRA. The official manual also helps operators to select between

different risk assessment tools.49

Likely, in some regions of Spain mandating a specific methodology

(QRA) for risk analysis has been refrained.


For small-sized Establishments and most of the Lower-Tier Establishments, a performance-based

system might be costly and risky because of the longer learning process and possibility of

misunderstanding the obligations. For Upper-Tier small sized operators, as they have to develop a

48The guidelines provided by NCSR Demokritosis are on Hazard Identification, Accidents frequency calculation

Definition of potential consequences of accidents, Risk estimation. NCSR Demokritosis is a multidisciplinary

research center focusing on several fields of natural sciences and engineering and hosting important laboratory

facilities 49

The manual was prepared by Systems Reliability and Industrial Safety Laboratory of NCSR Demokritos with the University of Crete and the National Technical University of Athens.

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specific Framework, the administrative burden (i.e. cost of risk assessment either carried out by

external experts or existing employee) will bring proportionate costs.

Smaller Establishments tend to have more problems with new, unclear rules and more dependent on

information from the authorities.

Second, the efforts these operators will make to conform to proper risk assessment frameworks will be

fully borne as fix compliance.

Some small operators will not have enough funds to establish proper safety reports that should include

proper risk assessment procedure, and they may prefer to stay in the informal sector. This may

increase unfair competition on those operators that are complying.

On the other hand, especially for innovative operators, the fact to choose a ‘tailor made’ solutions

might avoid the unexpected costs of a unique Framework not totally fit to its production and products

specifications (Small positive).

For large operators, on the other hand, performance-based approaches tend to be welcome. First, the

approach rewards good companies. Operators having a good health and safety staff with a lot of

knowledge on major accidents will comply at lower costs.

Second, since, there is no defined procedure or instrument to use in this option, operators are free to

choose the standards and instruments they consider the most appropriate. In theory, they will make the

best cost-benefit choice when selecting their ‘tailor made’ solution. Actually many big operators have

already Seveso-compatible risk assessment Frameworks.

As well, Operators will compete to develop cost-efficient risk assessment practices. This means,

Turkey will benefit from R&D and innovation in the area of risk assessment.


For the public sector and in particular for the CAs, a performance-based approach can have some

benefits. First, because each operator will be responsible to develop (or buy) and train their staff about

the chosen risk assessment Framework, the CAs will not need to fund the development and

deployment of the risk-assessment standards, techniques, software etc.

However, CAs will face different enforcement costs. The lack of precise and comparable standards

will require more detailed analysis and studies.50

With many different risk assessment standards, and

techniques, the CAs will have great difficulties to have a consistent approach to interpreting Seveso

compliance by all the operators.51

Second, the CAs will require extra technical expertise on risk analysis procedures carried out in

different sectors Paint Industry Petro-chemistry Industry, Oil Refineries, Power Generation and

Distribution, Shipbuilding, shipbreaking, ship repair, water and sewage (collection, supply, treatment)

to inspect and evaluate different existing methodologies. This option also means that the CA will need

to spend more on ensuring that staffs are highly trained in all risk assessment tools or using

experienced third parties for evaluations.

50For example, another tool used in NL, AVRIM2 is an assessment and inspection tool developed for the Dutch

Labor Inspectorate. The tool is currently used for the assessment of on-site safety reports. 51

Policy makers and businesses (e.g. infrastructure developers, the insurance sector) may face difficulties since benefit from better comparability of hazard/risk information at country level will be less.

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Third, CAs will be in need of not only higher numbers of qualified inspectors but also more time for

the assessment of the documents.

Because of the impacts stated above, it is likely that CAs will struggle to ensure that risk assessment

procedures of the Directive have been implemented properly and quickly.52


Previous experience shows that many Operators of smaller Establishments may not comply specially

with performance-based requirements due to risk of misunderstanding the obligations. Given that most

of the present risks are considered as associated with Lower-Tier Establishments, it is highly likely

that this option will increase environmental risks in case of accident due to weak risk assessment.

Social impacts:

Similarly, to the environmental impacts, risks of selecting and adapting a specific ‘performance based’

Framework system and its related high costs will make SME operators low compliers (or even impede

them to register as a Seveso Establishments). This high non-compliance with resulting possible

accidents will have important negative impacts on public health and property.

Moreover, performance-based regulation will be open to challenge by other stakeholders like neighbor

associations, who feel that the standards and rules are not primarily geared towards reducing the

impacts of undesirable activities. Performance-based approaches are more difficult to compare and to

communicate than ‘command and control’ regulation.


In summary, Policy Option 2.1 appears to have more positive impacts for Turkey than the other

option.

First, ‘Command and Control’ regulation will at least ensure a minimum level of quality in the risk

assessment and standards. It improves the availability and comparability of information on major

risks.

Second, this option may prevent unfair competitive practices among the Operators. Reviews of

Directive implementation in MS generally indicate that not all Establishments have a capacity to

prepare a proper risk assessment.53

Consultation process reveals that this fact is also valid for Turkey.

Thus, without a public Driven framework, most of the Establishments, especially SMEs will not be

able to comply with the Directive. Moreover, in the case they comply, the practices of different

operators may have big variances.

Third, a uniform Framework assures common understanding between operators and CAs on key

issues. It can often be implemented quickly, sets out clearly defined limits. Using a unique system and

standardization makes the costs of inspection and control lower for CAs. As well, command and

control approaches are easier to communicate and enforce when compared to ‘performance-based’

regulation.

52 See F-Seveso Report for the related comments and views on Risk Assessment practices among the EU. 53

It is very difficult to find a good risk assessment system that covers all possible risks. Actually, the EC considers this as a major problem of the Directive.

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Establishment of a uniform Framework is expensive. However, Turkey could reduce this development

costs by adapting and customizing other countries’ systems.

In sum, the CAs should start implementing the Directive with a Command and Control, with the only

provision letting large operators the possibility to prove to the CAs that their in-house Framework is

appropriate and compatible with the information needs of the Directive. In effect, this option will

follow the typical implementation approach of some MS, which have started with a strict command

and control approach, moving gradually toward a more efficient performance based approach.

5.3 Policy Area 3: Land Use Planning54

approaches


This policy area studies different approaches of risk assessment on examining land use implications of

a Seveso establishment.

In most of the industrialized countries, to prevent and limit the consequences of major industrial

accidents, there are mainly two mitigation actions : safety measures and risk reduction and control in

industrial facilities (on-site), second, limitation of structural and human assets exposed to the industrial

accidents in the vicinity of establishment(off-site)55

. Land Use Planning belongs to second category of

measures. It is the appropriate separation of Establishments, planning infrastructures and residential

settlements in industrial areas, which has to be taken into account in planning policies.

Recently occurred major accidents proved the importance of LUP. The explosion56

at the AZF

fertilizer factory killed 29 and injured 2,500. Extensive structural damage occurred to nearby

neighborhoods with three billion dollars of damage. Proximity of industrial sites to the urban areas

made the consequences of the accident is catastrophic.

Therefore, public authorities should establish land use planning arrangements to ensure that hazardous

installations are appropriately sited with respect to protection of health, environment, and property in

the event of an accident involving dangerous substances. Local authorities, at an appropriate level, are

usually in the best position to make the specific planning decisions, taking into account local social

and economic factors (OECD, 2003).

The Directive provides a regulatory framework57

for land use planning near hazardous industrial

facilities. In general, the scope and objective of land use planning near hazardous installations is to

54

European Working Group for Land Use Planning (EWGLUP) defines ;

Land Use Planning: A range of activities from procedures to administrative or governmental provisions to

accomplish a steering of the allocation of land use with the objective of achieving a zoning for the land around a

Seveso establishments that complies with the requirements of Article 12.

Zoning: In the context of land use planning, it is a term that indicates the regulation of the uses of land by defining certain categories of homogenous (allowed) development within assigned areas, resulting in

“zones”. 55 INERIS, Risk Governance For Sustainable Terrıtorıes: The French Case and Some Challenges,2010 56 Explosion at the AZF fertilizer Toulouse, France in 2001 57

Kirchsteiger C., Risk Assessment and Management in the Context of the Seveso II Directive, Industrial Safety Series, Vol. 6, page 438

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ensure that the "likelihood" and the “impact” of the potential accidents are taken into consideration

when decisions should be made concerning the followings58

:

o Siting of new Establishments

o Extension (or modifications) of existing Establishments

o new developments in the vicinity of Establishments (residential areas, major transport routes,

locations frequented by the public, environmental sensitive areas)

Each of the above undertakings has different implementation mechanisms and constraints related to

the precaution level to prevent and minimize negative impact on human health and environment.

Depending on the magnitude and type of risk in these circumstances, the CAs establish and maintain

Appropriate Distances59

or additional technical measures. CAs may or may not extends construction

permits for residential, commercial and other structures in these zones and has an impact on the

operators’ plans to extend or modify their Establishments.

While land use planning decisions (with respect to both zoning and siting of hazardous installations-

see Figure 16) generally take into account social and economic factors, it is important that decision-

making processes should be transparent and that all decisions are consistent with the goal of achieving

a high level of safety. The decisions above on land use planning should be conducted in cooperation

with all concerned stakeholders, including local communities, local administrations, public safety

officers and other related public officers.

Figure 16 – UK Example for Zoning IZ: Inner Zone

MZ: Middle Zone OZ: Outer Zone

Although the directive provide regulatory framework for LUP, does not contain any detailed

suggestion on how this should be done. In recent years, different methods and tolerability thresholds

have been developed in EU, fulfilling the requirements regarding LUP. In general, two risk

assessments -with different consequences on the size of the required protected land around the

Establishments- are applied to risk-informed land use planning; a consequence based and a risk-based

approach (see Annex - 14 for details).

58By taking into account Turkey industrial development and urbanization history, the impacts of Seveso-induced

changes to land planning on existing establishments and new green-field investments will be different 59

Appropriate distance: Take into consideration the existence of a major hazard site and establish a zoning, which is a restricted use of land around the site proportional to the risk posed by the site.

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The approaches for applying and enforcing LUP for safety purposes vary from one country to another

as a result of differing cultures, population, and legal systems. Annex - 14 lists MS approaches to

LUP.

In summary, this policy area studies these different approaches60

of risk assessment in the context of

LUP that will be used to examine land use implications for Seveso establishment:

Option 3.1. Consequence-Based Approach

Option 3.2. Risk-Based Approach

5.3.1 Option 3.1. Consequence-Based Approach


This option assumes that the country’s approach to LUP is Consequence-Based. In Consequence-

Based approach, the consequences of the accidents are mostly taken into consideration by calculating

the distance in which the physical and/or human health impacts reach, for a given exposure period, a

threshold value (e.g. irreversible health/harm). Safety zones are thus defined according to LUP

restriction are applied.

The main objective of the approach is to define the worst case scenario(s) with qualitative information

obtained from hazard identification, historical data and an expert judgment. Both the CAs and the

operators need to agree on the worst-case scenarios in a Consequence-Based approach61

.

The assumption behind this method is that if sufficient protection measures exist to protect the

population from the worst accident, then sufficient protection is available to fight any less serious

accident. Therefore, this approach evaluates only the extent of the accidents’ consequences, and not

their likelihood62

.

In practical terms, CAs, which follows a Consequence-based approach (or deterministic approach) in

the LUP procedure, will have larger safety zones around the Establishments in comparison to Risk-

Based Approach for the same possible accident (Please note there may be accident scenarios, which

will have the same safety, zones around the Establishments with respect to both approach).

On the other hand, since the Consequence-Based approach uses qualitative information from hazard

identification and qualitative analysis based on expert judgment, it is more subjective and the results of

the assessment may differ based on expert judgment.

The Consequence-Based approach has been used in Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, Spain, Belgium,

and Austria (see Annex - 14).

In Germany and Sweden, a simplified form of the Consequence-Based approach is the use of generic

separation distances. These distances are usually derived from selected scenarios and developed on a

conservative basis. In their most simple form, they are derived from expert judgment, including the

consideration of historical data or experience from operating similar plants.

60 Other than those common approaches, there are hybrids methods that combine consequence-based and risk-

based approaches: tables of generic safety distances and semi-quantitative approaches. 61 Kirchsteiger C., Risk Assessment and Management in the Context of the Seveso II Directive, Industrial Safety

Series, Vol.6 62

EC, Land Use Planning Guidelines in the Context of Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive 96/82/EC as amended by Directive 105/2003/EC, page 21

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In Germany, a mandatory licensing procedure, based on a Consequence-Based approach, requires all

Seveso installations to have a practically zero risk. Hence, operators need to develop appropriate

mitigating measures (e.g. adequate design of redundancies in the safety barriers, hardware and

procedures, management of plant, training, etc.).

The Swedish approach adds other noxious characteristics to the worst-case scenario. These

characteristics include noise, odor and routine emissions. Therefore, Sweden prescribes even larger

protection zones63

.


As the Consequence-Based approach recommends relatively larger protection zones, this option will

have severe cost implication for existing Establishments, which have developed in a dense urban

context. Some establishments, in particular Lower-Tier ones are now surrounded by residential

buildings.

Existing Establishments must invest either by buying directly surround land (or asking the government

to do so) or by deploying new mitigation equipment (e.g. protection barriers, special equipment) and

special safety procedures (i.e. special training). Therefore, the option brings administrative costs

effects especially in the case of buying land. In addition, for existing Establishments, the preparation

and implementation of emergency responses, will take into account detailed mitigation actions, which

will be expensive because the practices for implementation will be carried out in a large extended.

Existing Establishments will have difficulties in expanding their current Establishments and

installations. This situation will be more acute in old industrial regions like Istanbul, Bursa, and

Kocaeli. All these will also be reflected in higher premium paid to insurance companies.

For new Establishments the costs will be lower in terms of Seveso-induced mitigation equipment,

safety procedures, administrative costs and insurance premium. Because, the operators will be able to

choose the site according to the risk assessment, they do not need extra and expensive mitigation

equipment and special safety procedures to reach sufficient protection land around their

establishments. Overall, this means a decrease in the budget on Seveso-induced mitigation equipment,

safety procedures, administrative costs and insurance premium.

On the other, the sites for new establishment will be further from workers residences and clients,

which mean higher transportation and logistics costs.

Importantly though, for both type of establishments (exisiting and new), the Option 3.1 may have

some lower costs. First, the Consequence-Based approach is simpler and requires less expertise than

the Risk-Based approach. Therefore, it is less time consuming and risk assessment process cost is

comparatively lower for operator. Second, since the precautions will be maximized according to the

risk zones the cost of interventions will be lower in case of incident.

For stakeholders living in the vicinity of an existing establishment, the option will require them to be

trained and better informed. The new land planning will also imply banning on specific constructions

and activities (such as schools, and hospitals) to reduce the vulnerability of the people and their

property. This option might also have an impact on the price of their houses and lands, including the

63

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hypothetical possibility for the government or operator to buy them. Until now, this possibility has not

occurred.

For new establishment in green-field sites, these impacts should be smaller and even more so if there

are no residential areas around the Establishments.


The main impact for the CAs is the expropriation of the property in the vicinity of the site if other

measures cannot reduce the risks. Hypothetically, the CAs might need to buy land and constrain

construction in older industrial zones. CAs should consider to alleviate the risks in the longer term,

where a specific area with existing Seveso Establishments may not be able to meet current

requirements for land use planning in the short-term measures, by phasing out older Establishments

and/or residential buildings near the site. Such measures involve the need for compensation to

property owners.

Consequence-Based approach identifies larger safety zones in comparison to risk-based approach that

obliges CAs to invest more in new equipment and safety procedures as well as administrative

methods. Local authorities will also need to invest in these concepts too.

In terms of new accident mitigation and emergency equipment and facilities, for existing

Establishments, for instance, located in the old industrial zone of Kocaeli, the CAs will need to buy

special emergency equipment, firefighting and accident control equipment and improve their existing

installations. The costs of the new equipment and procedures will be relatively smaller for new

industrial zones with new establishment.

In terms of safety procedures, CAs will need to develop new accident prevention and awareness

procedures, including for instance training the fire brigade. Larger zones will also mean the need to

invest in monitoring processes according to expert judgment and administrative aspects, including

inspections and enforcement.

Administratively, the option will also be more costly because determining the worst case scenarios

require agreement with the operator, CAs and local authorities will experience difficult and lengthier

discussions and negotiations, in particular when complex industrial processes are involved.

A larger protection zone also means that the CAs will need to involve a larger number of stakeholders,

which can mean complex negotiations and costlier raising awareness programs.

On the other hand, the Consequence-Based approach is easy to use by the relevant authorities and

requires less scientific data and expertise, hence less costly for CAs than the Risk-Based approach.


This report has not identified major environmental impact for existing Establishments. However, some

environmental impacts might occur for new Establishments.

For existing Establishments, both risk-based and consequence-based approaches take the negative

impacts on the environment based on consequences into consideration (including worst case) and

hence mitigate them.

For the new Establishments there might be differences. The Consequence-Based approach might have

lower environment impacts because the siting of the new establishment will take consideration the

consequences of accidents in the larger area.

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Social impacts:

This option will have different impacts on the health and rights of citizens settled near the

Establishments.

In terms of health and safety of the surrounding population, this option will have positive impacts, in

particular in case of an accident for new Establishments (see Table 6). Increased safety zones and

other precautions in these zones will have positive effects on individuals/populations, concerning the

life expectancy, mortality and morbidity. However, through impacts on the socio-economic

environment (working environment, income, education, occupation,) it results in some drawbacks i.e.

relocation of the establishment and/or population around the Seveso site and expropriation of the

residential and other property in the vicinity of the site. In some cases, compensation to property

owners -namely residents- will result in conflicts.

Table 6 - The Impacts of the Consequence-Based Approach on Society

Consequence-Based Approach Existing Establishments New Establishments

Health and Safety issues before an

accident

None

positive because they will be further

away of industrial sites which

decreases the risk and residential

areas.

Health and Safety issues after an

Accident

in the short term none

In the long term very positive

because some people will start to

move out of the vicinity of the

Establishments and land planning

will forbid new construction.

Very positive because no residents

will be allowed to live in the

protected zone

Constrains to choose where to live

and use of property

Negative: Limits to new

constructions and other land uses

None

Same as environmental impacts of this approach, the social impact coverage of social needs are at

maximum level. Notification and workshops will take place in implementation process, which results

in better communication for stakeholders who are not experts but stakeholders of any incident.

Therefore, risk of death and injury is considered low.

On the other hand, in case of insufficient or/and wrong expert judgment on worst-case scenarios for

risk assessment, the negative impact on social will be high.

Likewise, to minimize negative social impact of operating Establishments, citizens should be moved

to safer zones or new residential, and commercial and industrial areas should be constructed according

to land use plan. If land use plan is not restricted, there will be more bureaucracy with respect to

number of owners in case of any accident.

5.3.2 Option 3.2. Risk-Based Approach


This option assumes that the country’s approach to LUP is Risk-Based. The Risk-Based approach is

normally associated with risk based decision criteria and mostly related to the use of quantitative

terms64

.

64 JRC Report EC, Land Use Planning Guidelines in the Context of Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive, page 21

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Risk-based approaches define risk as combination of the consequences derived from a range of

possible accidents and the likelihood of these accidents. The results are represented as individual risk

and/or societal risk (expressed as individual risk contours and societal risk (F-N) curves65

. This

approach seeks to be realistic as possible by considering all potentially relevant events within the

procedure.

Risk-based approach is determining potential of loss by managing risk of a certain hazard. When

assessing Risk-Based approach, the value of the assets that are threatened, the probability of hazard,

probability of accident, the probable extent of the damage to the assets, costs of intervention and

compensation of the property owners should be considered. On the other hand, view of what is an

acceptable risk depends on the circumstances where that risk is being evaluated (see Annex - 13 Risk

Assessment Benchmark).

One of the underlying logic for the MS choosing this approach is to minimize the safety distances

during planning and zoning because of the value and scarcity of the land.

This approach is followed in the UK and in the Netherlands and has been applied in specific case

studies in Greece. LUP criteria are based on specific acceptability criteria with respect to the

calculated risk.

For instance, the Netherlands defines maximum acceptable individual risk with 10-6

/year. This means,

areas with a risk less than 10-6

/ year are not protected with any interventions. This approach gives

more flexibility for land use planning for dense urbanized countries.

In Netherlands, the risk criteria have been part of a general environmental policy document

communicated to the Dutch Parliament in 1985 and have been reviewed afterwards.


Overall, economically this option is favorable.

Small safety zones generate lower cost for operators due to:

Less land purchase.

Less resettlement or compensation.

However, in this approach precautions will be more because of smaller safety zone, thus, both initial

negative impact and also intervention and compensation costs is higher. Operator should invest more

in precautions than in consequence based one. Operator should carry out more notification and study

workshops to inform other stakeholders.

Moreover, the risk assessment calculations of this approach are more complex and require more

expertise. The number of scenarios per installation is higher.

65 Two specific risk figures are used: a figure concerning risk to single persons (individual risk) and one which

takes into account the group of people (societal risk) that can be affected by an accident.

(i) Individual risk, defined as the probability of fatality due to an accident in the installation for an individual

being at a specific point, and

(ii) Societal risk, defined for different groups of people, which is the probability of occurrence of any accident resulting in fatalities greater than or equal to a specific figure (Kirchsteiger C., 1998).

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The public pressure on competent authority will be higher. CAs will face difficulties to explain the

results of risk assessment approach to the local people.

Moreover, the competent authority will require more expertise to assess complex risk assessment

procedures for LUP.


No major environmental impact has been identified. However, in case of an accident, the likelihood of

environmental damage may be higher than the “worst case scenario” principle of Consequence-Based

approach.

Social impacts:

This option has a relatively positive social impact, as it requires less limitation on settlements and less

relocation of the Establishments.

However, in case of an accident, the likelihood of death and injury may be higher than “worst case

scenario” principle of Consequence-Based approach therefore repairing damage to the environment

expected to be higher. Table 7 shows Impact of Risk-Based approach on old and new Establishments.

Table 7 - The Impacts of the Risk-Based Approach on Society

Risk-Based Approach Existing Establishments New Establishments

Health and Safety issues before

the accident

In the short term none, because

number of people living near the

establishment will not increase

immediately

In the long-term negative

because the number of people

will increase near the industrial

Establishments

negative because the number of

people live around the

Establishments will increase in

time

Health and Safety issues after

the accident

In the short term none, because

people living near the

establishment will not increase

immediately

In the long-term very negative

because the number of people

will increase near the industrial

Establishments

Very negative because the

number of people will increase

near the industrial

Establishments

Constrains to choose where to

live and use of property

Very Positive because there will

be smaller limits to new

constructions and other land

uses than in the other option

Positive because there will be

smaller limits to new

constructions and other land

uses than in the other option, but

much fewer people under the

restrictions

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According to the assessment, the Risk-Based approach is more suitable for the country. Although

Turkey has a large surface area and relatively low population density, most of the existing Seveso

Establishments are located in areas with high population density such as İstanbul, Kocaeli and İzmir.

Whereas the consequence-based approach establishes risk zones which covers 1,031 km2 and

1,211,932 people, risk-based approach reduces these figures to 177 km2 and 208,142 people. (see

Annex - 3)

Risk-Based approach is superior in terms of its impacts on operators and social impacts.

In terms of impacts on CAs and local authorities, both approaches seem equivalent. Yet, it is true that

the Consequence Based one will mean more negotiation with more people and the need to expropriate

neighbors. Phasing-out and relocation of the existing Establishments bring huge financial burden for

CAs. This will be less common case in Risk-Based approach. Operators will take extra safety

precautions to decrease the major accident risks.

On the other hand, the major drawback of the Risk-Based approach, it requires important expertise and

data on major accidents; cost of risk assessment will be much higher since it is a complex procedure.

The Risk-Based approach also means that in case of an accident the effects – in particular political –

might be more negative.

There is no major difference in terms of environmental impacts.

However, in case of an accident Consequence-Based approach may have more positive economic,

public sector, environmental and social impact.

There is a slight -not direct- correlation between country’s safety culture and its population density

with risk assessment approach. EU experience shows that whereas the countries with higher

population densities, such as the Netherlands, usually select Risk-Based approach, countries with

lower population densities, such as Germany, Finland and Sweden, usually choose to use

Consequence-Based approach.

Overall, both policy options have positive and negative impacts. Option 3.1 is more suitable for the

country. However, Option 3.2 seems favorable for high dense industrial areas especially Istanbul and

Kocaeli.

5.4. Policy Area 4: Sanctioning Strategies


The last policy area of RIA study is the sanctioning strategies that CAs use to ensure that the operators

comply with the obligations of the Directive.

Implementation of the Directive will bring many obligations to Seveso operators. In the

implementation and enforcement period of the Directive, cases66

will arise such that operators may

avoid fulfilling these obligations because of the financial and administrative burden.

Some operators choose to operate outside the law (illegal and informal) or operators will not totally

comply with their obligations (irregular). Adequate sanctioning practices limit environmental damage,

66

Measures taken by the operator for the prevention and mitigation of major accidents are seriously deficient and /or non-submission of notification, reports or other information required within the specified period.

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ensure restoration to the original state prevents recurrence and cancels out any unfair advantage that

the offender may have enjoyed.67

Therefore, Member States must ensure that an appeal procedure is in place against a prohibition order.

The following options are available in sanctioning practices:

- Oral or written advice;

- Fine;

- Prosecution;

- Shut down a company.

In general, the provisions of the Seveso II directive concerning the prohibition of use serve a double

objective:

On one hand, Competent Authorities must be empowered to apply strict measures where the

health and safety of the population and/or the protection of the environment is at stake.

On the other hand, Competent Authorities can exercise pressure against Operators who are not

willing or who fail to fulfill their formal obligations under the Directive (disciplinary

measure).

Although the Directive puts a lot of importance on ensuring that MS provide their CAs with sufficient

inspection and enforcements powers and resources, it does not prescribe a specific sanctioning strategy

that can create the right incentives for operators to take adequate redress measures.

The sanctioning practices generally vary in the frequency and form of sanctioning, the types of

sanctioning instruments used and the extent to which inspectors consider certain company-specific

circumstances before imposing a formal sanction (see Annex - 15). In strict sanctioning practices,

inspectors may immediately impose sanctions when they identified an infringement. On the other

hand, less strict practices give companies second or even third chances. Namely, for the same event,

inspectors use ‘lighter’ instruments such as a written advice or more ‘severe’ instruments such as

prosecutions.

It is also important to underline that the sanctioning strategy varies according to the type and the size

of the establishment. Upper-Tier and Lower-Tier Establishments have different responsibilities with

regard to adaptation to the Directive. Therefore, deficiencies of the Establishments to adapt to the

Directive will be different. Besides, the negative effects of not following the Directive on public safety

and environment issues will be several. Fulfillment of responsibilities in a deficient way will be more

common in Upper-Tier Establishments, off-the-record activities may occur more often in-group of

lower-tier Establishments. 68

67 E. Versluis. Enforcement Matters: Enforcement and compliance of European directives in four Member States.

Doctoral Thesis. Utrecht University. 2003.

68

European experience shows that the biggest problems are related with the SMEs grouped as upper-tier

establishment in the context of enforcement.

FINAL


Currently in Turkey, according to By-Law on Major Industrial Accident Control, CAs shut down

establishment/installation, or prohibits the bringing into use thereof as an enforcement option.

Moreover, Competent Authorities may also proceed with the prohibition of use if the Operator:

has not submitted the Safety Report

has not submitted the Internal Emergency Plan.

There are no pre-warning or any proportional enforcement methods except those two.69

To sum up, REC Turkey identified two options for developing an effective sanctioning strategy in

Turkey among which the government may choose one:

Option 4.1. Strict Sanctioning Strategy

Option 4.2. Proportional sanctioning strategy

5.4.1 Option 4.1. Strict Sanctioning Strategy

Description of the Option:

With this option, the government implements a strict sanctioning strategy upon operators that do not

follow the obligations and requirements requiring partial or total closure of the establishment, in order

to create the incentives for rapid remedial. This sanction practice shows a more legalistic enforcement

style than where inspectors give companies a second or third chance to undo the infringement.

At the top of the sanctioning scale, the CAs decide either to suspend the whole establishment or an

installation. These sanctions will be implemented without any warnings. The operator can start again

their activities only after correcting the irregularities and these are accepted by the CAs.

To summarize, in order to reduce the economic loss for the operator, the industry and society, the CAs

will verify the corrective measures as fast as possible. Most EU member states do not use this strict

enforcement strategy. (see Annex - 15).


This option would lead to negative economic results not only for the ‘faulty’ establishment but also to

the national economy because their suppliers and their industrial and individual consumers will also be

affected. In case of long-term suspension, this option will also affect employment.

It is not possible to calculate the economic loss to the non-compliant operator or to the national

economy because of the difficulties in projecting the number of days that such operator’s

establishment would be closed. Although, there are examples for the closure of the establishment or

installation due to both environmental and labor law, limited data exist on their relation to major

accident requirements.

Therefore, it is also not possible to determine the total cost for the national economy, one answer from

the questionnaire indicates over 2 million EUR cost would come up to the scene due to the days that

establishment is closed for its specific case.

69

Moreover, there are no other obligations are in process for establishments that are qualified as Seveso establishments however not identified themselves in MoEU Notification System.

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Public sector impacts:

This option has overall negative impacts. On the positive side, in case of any accident, the CAs and

inspectors will not be blamed and their responsibility will be minimized.

Given that, the enforcer of the CAs has only two choices: suspend or not suspend. The choice of

sanction will be easier, although the pressure on the enforcer not to sanction might be higher.

On the other hand, this option may have negative consequences. First, the extreme consequences of a

closure will deter the enforcer to sanction regularities small or large.

Second, the extreme penalty for operators may create incentives to corrupt enforcers to avoid loss of

production, including small irregularities.

Third, in case of major accident and its high negative impact on human health and environment,

society and the media will blame the CAs for their corruption or lack of courage to sanction.

Fourth, in case of closure, the operator will apply to legal redress in order to get a Court decision

impeding it. This court redress will imply extra costs for the State’s budget if the taken action is

illegal after being in court.


There are no environmental impacts within this option before any accident.

However, in case of any accident, with strict punishments and penalties, the Establishments will tend

to obey all the necessary obligations and this will decrease the environmental risks for the

Establishments.

Social impacts:

Because of the strict punishments and penalties such as shut down of the Establishments, the workers

and suppliers of the Establishments will be economically in hard situation, which will affect their

social life. In case of shut down, the negative social and economic impact on workers and the suppliers

will be high.

5.4.2 Option 4.2. Proportional Sanctions


In this option, if the Seveso Establishment does not follow the specific obligations (i.e. drawing up

safety report, preparing the internal emergency plan, implementing the requirements of the safety

report and major accident risk assessment), the competent authorities consider a sanctioning strategy

that is proportional to the infringement.

This approach will lead in most cases to a payment of a certain fine and CAs will give sufficient time

to Establishments to comply the requirements of the Directive and inspection report. The amount of

the fine is based on the severity of the infringement and/or plus an amount for prevention. In some

cases only verbal warnings can be considered. The given period for compliance takes in account the

economic and technical aspects of the fulfilling the deficiencies.

In this period, the establishment will continue its activity and when the competent authority experts

and inspectors are back for inspection if the Establishment satisfies the necessary conditions written in

the inspection report they will continue their activity. But, if necessary conditions are not fulfilled after

the given period the competent authority can step up forward to more rigid enforcement methods and

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come to conclusion to close the necessary process units or even the whole establishment according to

the importance of the deficiencies.

UK, Finland, The Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium (Flemish) are good examples of countries using

this option among Member States.


This option will cause less economic impact on the establishment and countries economy.

Establishment can continue to process if the expert decides that the deficiency is not likely to cause a

major accident after the inspection. However, they should work on these deficiencies as indicated

necessary by the expert to avoid additional fines.

Public sector impacts:

This option has less negative impacts.

The enforcer of the CAs has four choices: recommendations, exhortations, orders, or in necessary

cases, closure. Therefore, this option will cause a certain amount of workload to competent authorities.

If there is any deficiency detected in the establishment, authorities gives duration to make operator to

fulfill the Directive’s requirements. Then, inspectors will go back to establishment to control if the

deficiency is resolved or not. If requirements are not fulfilled, there will be other control processes for

the inspector.

On the other hand, the burden of bureaucratic work for the competent authorities can increase because

the type and number of enforcement procedure will increase. The paper work and also the time spent

for the inspection reports can increase.


No major environmental impact has been identified in this option.

This option may lead to negative impact on environment if the process is not controlled properly for

technical deficiencies.

Social impacts:

No major social impact has been identified.

The social impact of this option can be negative for vicinity if the process is not controlled properly

for technical deficiencies.


Both approaches have a deterrent effect, and therefore, they lead operators to have preventative

measures. However, Proportional sanctioning is more suitable for Turkey.

In majority of the cases, the lack of safety documentation is a result of the administrative process

deficiency. For instance, existing Establishments are continuing their activities in the time being

without fulfilling the documentation requirements of the Directive. Thus, if the lack of safety

documentation requires suspending the activities of the Establishments, their activities should be

suspended now. Therefore, direct closure of the Establishments due to this administrative process

deficiency would lead to an inconvenient situation. In summary, proportional sanctioning has

following benefits:


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- Minimize the complaints and criticism over the CAs effectiveness and fairness

- Less pressure on CAs, Experts and Inspectors

- Easy to implement

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6. Conclusion & Preferred Options

6.1. Main Costs & Benefits

The implementation of Seveso II Directive will provide major environmental, social and economic

benefits:

- The implementation of the Directive will reduce the number of major accidents and mitigate

their consequences. These will lead to:

o Reduction of accidental release of dangerous substances to air, soil and water;

o Less harm to public health (less casualties, injuries and long term negative impacts on

public health)

o Less harm to properties in the vicinity of Establishments (settlements, commercial,

public and social sites, etc.)

o Decrease of the in-site damage of Establishments.

- Without proper transposition and implementation, EU will refuse the membership application

of Turkey. Moreover, successful implementation of the Directive will support the Turkish

Government in the membership negotiations with EU.

- Proper implementation of the Directive will reduce the risk of infraction fines and some

reputational damages after accession.

- The improvement of safety culture (occupational safety, process safety, off-site safety etc.).

However, the Directive will have negative economic impacts for government, businesses and

consumers. The Directive achieves its targets through systematic and scientific ways by promoting

safety management systems, use of risk assessment approaches, comprehensive and frequent reports,

land use planning, intense inspection and public information. These instruments require additional

costs for both private and public sectors.

The implementation of the Directive will cost Turkey around 62 million by 2021 (PV – EUR). This

figure only represents the administrative costs and does not include the costs arises from substantive

investments and land use planning policies. These costs will significantly increase the total cost to

Turkey.

Overall, the assessment of qualitative aspects indicates that Turkey will benefit more from the

implementation of the Directive.

6.2. Preferred Option(s)

Turkey has different options to implement the Directive. They will have an impact on the overall costs

and benefits and their distribution to the stakeholders. The study shows that the following options

should be preferred.

Based on the conclusions for each option described in Section Five, Figure 17 displays a condensed

summary comparing the final assessment from highly positive impact to highly negative impact

concerning operators, public sector, environmental and social aspects.

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Figure 17 - Summary of Impacts

Options / Impacts on Operators Public Sector Environment Society Preferred

Option

Policy Area 0: Non-Action

Option 0.0. Non-Action

Option 0.1. Regulation

Policy Area 1: Administrative Structure

Option 1.1. Two CAs without a

Coordination Body

Option 1.2. One Competent

Authority

Option 1.3. Three CAs with a

Coordination Body


Option 2.1. Public Driven

Framework

Option 2.2. Operators Choose

Their Own Framework

Policy Area 3: Land Use Planning Approaches

Option 3.1. Consequence-Based

Approach

Option 3.2. Risk Based

Approach


Option 4.1. Strict Sanctioning

Strategies

Option 4.2. Proportional

Sanctions

Overall, the study compares the impacts of an option with respect to non-action and other options under the same

policy area.

Impacts on

Operators

Focus on economic and administrative costs on Operators includes changes in

compliance costs, administrative burdens to businesses/SMEs and, impacts on the

potential for innovation and technological development, changes in investment,

etc. as well the macro and micro-economic impacts to the business in general.

Public

Sector Focus on administrative structure and implementation costs for public authorities.

Environment Focus on air, water and soil pollution, land-use change.

Society Focus on the impact of the option on health, safety, security of workers and

public, employment levels or job quality, rights of citizens.

FINAL


Summary of the Impacts Assessed

After analysis of the environmental, social and economic impacts of the 11 options, REC Turkey

proposes the following recommendations:

Preferred options

The Administrative Structure

Option 1.3. Three CAs with a Coordination Body


Turkey should designate Ministry of

Environment and Urbanization, Ministry of

Labor and Social Security and the Disaster and

Emergency Management Presidency (DEMP) as

CAs.

In addition to CAs, Turkey should establish a

coordination body to increase the collaboration

between these three CAs and to provide

technical assistance to public authorities and

other stakeholders.

- It creates less administrative burden to

operators in comparison to other options

(approx. 7000 days and 500,000 Euro

Annually).

- A more coherent implementation and

consistent application of the provisions of the

Directive.

- Less conflicts between Competent Authorities.

- It requires a more standardized system and may

increase the transparency.

- EU experience shows that there is a need for a

coordination between CAs

Risk Assessment Framework



CAs design a uniform risk assessment

framework and control its implementation by

operators. In particular, CAs define the

standards, techniques, tools, and software for

each specified industry under the scope of the

Directive. The CAs should establish the

framework together with technical experts from

operators, and other stakeholders (NGOs,

universities, etc.).

The CAs should start implementing the

Directive with a ‘Command and Control’, with

the only provision letting large operators the

possibility to prove to the CAs that their in-

house Framework is appropriate and compatible

with the information needs of the Directive.

However, the RIA study recommends this

- Ensures a minimum level of quality in the risk

assessment practices of the Operators.

- It improves the availability and comparability

of information on major risks. Assures

common understanding between operators and

CAs on key issues.

- May prevent unfair competitive practices

among the Operators.

- Will assist SMEs to comply with the Directive

and decrease the costs for them.

- Decrease the total costs CAs despite the

increasing investment cost. Uniform system

enables harmonization, easy control and

inspection. Inspectors and other staff can

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option for the initial stages of the

implementation of the Directive. In the long run,

operators should use adequate Risk Assessment

Instruments without the assistance of the

Government. It should be noted that the

Directive foresees a ‘performance based’

approach.

perform their task more easily and quickly.

- The CAs should exempt the existing operators

to use the uniform framework in the case they

are able to prove that their in-house systems

comply with the Directive. Thus, the Directive

should not bring additional costs to those

Operators.

Land Use Planning Approach

Option 3.2. Risk-Based Approach for land use planning


Risk-based approaches define the risk as

combination of the consequences derived from a

range of possible accidents and the likelihood of

these accidents. Safety zones are thus defined

according to estimated risks.

This approach considers the protection of

people with high probability of death/injury and

disregards the protection of people with lower

probability of death/injury.

One of the underlying logic is to minimize the

safety distances during the planning and zoning

because the value and scarcity of the land.

- Relatively small safety zones generate lower

cost for operators. The majority of

Establishments (50.2%) are concentrated in the

six provinces. The land is expensive in these

provinces.

- Less land purchase

- Less resettlement or compensation

- Less constraints on the new developments


- Less social resistance.

- EU experience shows this option is prevailing

in many Member States (MS).

Sanctioning Strategies



In this option, if the Seveso establishment does

not follow the specific obligations, the CAs

consider a sanctioning strategy/mechanism that

is proportional to the infringement.

This approach will lead in most cases to a

payment of a certain fine and CAs will give

sufficient time to Establishments to comply the

requirements of the Directive. The amount of

the fine is based on the severity of the

infringement and/or plus an amount for

prevention. In some cases only verbal warnings

can be considered.




- Minimize the complaints and criticism over the

CAs effectiveness and fairness

- Less pressure on CAs Experts and Inspectors

- Easier to implement

FINAL


General Recommendations

Recommendations Reasons & Key Impacts

- Capacity Building activities should be carried

out to increase the technical capacities of the

CAs, Operators and other stakeholders as well

to increase the awareness of public

- It will assist CAs to prepare guidelines,

standards, etc.

- The compliance rate with the Directive may

increase

- The consistency will be increased

- It will assist CAs to identify the scope/tier

status of Establishments.

- Public awareness and participation will

increase

- Compliance Costs for SMEs are relatively

higher, therefore, SMEs have to be supported

- This will decrease the “Regressive Impacts”

of the Directive to the SMEs.

- Seveso requirements should be included to the

insurance system

- Consideration of major accident related

issues into insurance systems enhance the

compliance of the Establishments.

- A National Seveso map open to public should

be generated based on GIS data

- It will increase the awareness of public

- CAs and Local Authorities may utilize map

for their planning activities

- The CAs should promote research activities on

major accidents and mitigation methods.

Especially, the reasons and the impacts (costs)

of the accidents should be assessed in the more

detailed way including environmental and

social dimensions.

- The CAs should establish a database for major

accidents

- By analyzing the industrial accidents

involving chemicals in a consistent way,

Establishments and CAs can learn lessons

and prevent further accidents.

- Invest in research on the development of on

major accidents, early warning systems and

on interoperability of information and

monitoring systems

- It will assist Turkey to report Major

Accidents to EC.

6.3. Distribution of Costs Based on the Preferred Option(s)

REC Turkey developed a cost model for Administrative costs, which is expected to be 62 million Euro

for 10 years between 2012 and 2021 (PV). REC study assumes that the Operators bear 63% of the

total cost and CAs bear 27% of the total cost.

Policy Areas 1, 3, and 4 have minor impacts on the distribution of cost among the stakeholders.

However, Policy Area 2 has distributive impact. While Policy Option 2.1. decreases the costs on

Operators, especially SMEs, and increases the costs of CAs, the Policy Option 2.2. results in vice-

versa.

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7. Annexes

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Annex - 1. Policy Options of Policy Area 1

Policy Option 1.1 Two CAs without a Coordination Body

Obligations of Public Institutions

Public Institutions

MoEU MoLSS DEMP Local

Auth.

General Obligations

To Set-up Notification System x

To identify the scope of the Establishments x

To prepare guidelines x x

To Set-up Standard x x

Inspections (Periodical and Spot Inspections)

Total inspection plan x x

Inspection frequency /1 p/y x x

Inspection report x x

Safety Management System x x

Assessment and Approval of Safety Reports and MAPPs

Assessment of Safety Reports x

Site Visit x

Approval of Safety Reports x

Land Use Planning

Identification of Safety Zones x

Siting New Establishments x x

Land Use Related Activities for existing Establishments x

Domino Effects

Identification of Domino Effect x

Developing External Emergency Plan (Offsite)

Preparation of External Emergency Plan x

Testing the plan x

Providing Information to Public

Providing Information to Public x x x x

Investigation of Accidents

Incident investigation x x

Publication of investigation results x x

Enforcement

Shut down/close establishment x x

Other actions x x

Reporting to the EC

Accident Reports x x

General Implementation Report x

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Policy Option 1.2 One Competent Authority


Public Institutions

MoEU MoLSS DEM

P

One

Competen

t

Authority

Local

Auth.

General Obligations



To prepare guidelines x

To Set-up Standard x

Inspections (Periodical and Spot Inspections)

Total inspection plan x

Inspection frequency /1 p/y x

Inspection report x

Safety management System x

Assessment and Approval of Safety Reports and

MAPPs

Assessment of Safety Reports x

Site Visit x

Approval of Safety Reports x

Land Use Planning

Identification of Safety Zones x c x

Siting New Establishments x c x

Land Use Related Activities for the current

Establishments

x c x

Domino Effects

Identification of Domino Effect x

Developing External Emergency Plan (Offsite)

Preparation of External Emergency Plan x c x

Testing the plan x c x


Providing Information to Public x


Incident investigation x

Publication of investigation results x

Enforcement

Shut down/close establishment x

Other actions x

Reporting to the EC

Accident Reports x

General Reports x

FINAL


Policy Option 1.3 Three CAs with a Coordination Body


Public Institutions

MoEU MoLSS DEMP Coordination

Body

Local

Auth.

General Obligations



To prepare guidelines x x x c

To Set-up Standard x x x c

Inspections (Periodical and Spot

Inspections)

Total inspection plan x x c

Inspection frequency /1 p/y x x c

Inspection report x x c

Safety management System x x c

Assessment and Approval of Safety

Reports and MAPPs

Assessment of Safety Reports x x c

Site Visit x x c

Approval of Safety Reports x x c

Land Use Planning

Identification of Safety Zones x c x

Siting New Establishments x c x

Land Use Related Activities for the current

Establishments x c x

Domino Effects

Identification of Domino Effect x x c x

Developing External Emergency Plan

(Offsite)

Preparation of External Emergency Plan x c x

Testing the plan x c x


Providing Information to Public x x x c x


Incident investigation x x c

Publication of investigation results x x c

Enforcement

Shut down/close establishment x x c

Other actions x x c

Reporting to the EC

Accident Reports x x c

General Reports x c

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Annex - 2. Model for Calculating the Unavoidable Costs of implementing Seveso II

Directive

Examining the provisions and implementation of the Seveso II Directive brings out 3 major cost

generator areas, associated with the following activities:

Administrative costs, comprising those linked to the notification, preparing safety documents

and reports, inspection, training. These costs are born by operators and the CAs and

municipalities.

Substantive costs is ‘business cost’ of working with dangerous processes and products and

not directly related to the Seveso II Directive, comprising operational/ maintenance costs

related to physical compliance measures, safety equipment etc.

Land use costs, comprising purchase of land or moving the facilities and/or residential

buildings

Annex - 2. 1. Administrative Costs

In order to assess the total administrative compliance costs REC Turkey developed a special model.

This resulted in the estimation that the total administrative cost will be 62 million Euros for 10 years

between 2012 and 2021 (PV) of which operators will cover 63 % and public authorities 27% (see

Table 8).

Table 8 – Total Administrative Costs (PV – Euros)

The construction of the model included the following steps. First REC Turkey selected the key

necessary administrative and substantive activities to comply and enforce the Directive, which are

listed in Table 8.

Second, REC inputted the best estimates of Seveso Establishments as indicated in the Baseline. The

numbers of the Establishments used in the calculations are 426 for lower tier and 401 for upper tier

Establishments. Third, based on consultation and other Member States’ experiences, a set of cost

assumptions was prepared and validated (see Table 9, Table 10 and Table 11).

Row Labels 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 TOTAL

Operators 17.022.120 1.786.476 1.717.766 2.845.398 3.289.231 3.652.003 2.529.548 1.411.878 2.811.649 2.248.759 39.314.829


Other Costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Safety Report 3.960.000 190.385 183.062 176.021 169.251 976.449 156.482 150.464 144.677 139.112 6.245.903

MAPP 3.567.000 171.490 164.895 158.553 152.454 879.544 140.953 135.531 130.319 125.306 5.626.045

SMS 2.475.000 118.990 114.414 110.013 105.782 610.281 97.801 94.040 90.423 86.945 3.903.690

IEP 3.736.000 142.788 137.297 1.325.716 126.938 122.056 1.178.557 112.848 108.507 1.047.732 8.038.440





EEP 1.868.000 71.394 68.648 538.598 63.469 61.028 478.812 56.424 54.254 425.662 3.686.290

Other Costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0



Grand Total 21.804.075 3.826.226 3.679.064 5.203.852 5.299.765 5.918.471 4.626.205 3.023.922 4.530.261 4.112.680 62.024.522

FINAL


Table 9 - Cost Assumptions for Upper-Tier Establishments

Assumptions

Price (Per Unit) - EUR

Trainin

gs

(ope)

Additi

onal

Costs

(ope)

Inform

ation

Costs

(ope)

Code Sector of Upper Tier SEVESO Etablishment

Number

of

Facilities

Multiplie

r

Trainings

for the

Experts

of the

Operator

s

Other

costs

First

Preparati

on

Review

First

Preparati

on

Review

First

Preparati

on

Review

First

Preparati

on

ReviewDrilling -

Test

Assessm

ent Costs

Inspectio

n Costs

Informati

on Costs

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

N/A N/A N/A N/A ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope

1

petrochemical (e.g oil refineries,storage and distribution)58 100 2.000 10.000 2.500 90 270 500

2 manufacturing 86 60 1.000 6.000 1.500 90 270 500

3 chemical installations (excludeing petrochemical) 60 100 1.000 10.000 2.500 90 270 500

4 Processing of metals 16 40 1.000 4.000 1.000 90 180 500

5 transporting and storage 24 40 1.000 4.000 1.000 90 180 500

6 Power generation, supply and distribution 12 100 1.000 10.000 2.500 90 180 500

7 Mining activities 7 40 1.000 4.000 1.000 90 180 500

8 Other activity (not included above) 2 40 1.000 4.000 1.000 90 180 500

9 water and sewage and waste management 2 60 1.000 6.000 1.500 90 180 500

10 agriculture 60 1.000 6.000 1.500 90 180 500

Assumptions


Trainin

gs

(gov)

Additi

onal

Costs

(gov)

Inform

ation

Costs

(gov)

Code Sector of Upper Tier SEVESO Etablishment

Number

of

Facilities

Multiplie

rTrainings

First

Preparati

on

Review

Drilling -

Test

(Office

Drilling

and Live

Play)

Assessm

ent Costs

Inspectio

n Costs

Other

Costs

Informati

on Costs

1 2 3 4 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

N/A N/A N/A N/A gov gov gov gov gov gov gov gov

1

petrochemical (e.g oil refineries,storage and distribution)58 100 100 360 1.625 250

2 manufacturing 86 60 100 360 1.625 250

3 chemical installations (excludeing petrochemical) 60 100 100 360 1.625 250

4 Processing of metals 16 40 100 360 845 250

5 transporting and storage 24 40 100 360 845 250

6 Power generation, supply and distribution 12 100 100 360 845 250

7 Mining activities 7 40 100 360 845 250

8 Other activity (not included above) 2 40 100 360 845 250

9 water and sewage and waste management 2 60 100 360 845 250

10 agriculture 60 100 360 845 250

Cost to the Public Authorities

EEP (gov)

Inspection &

Assessment

Costs (gov)

Costs to the operators

Safety Report

(ope)MAPP (ope) SMS (ope) IEP (ope)

Inspection &

Assessment

Costs (ope)

FINAL


Table 10 - Cost Assumptions for Lower-Tier Establishments

Assumptions


Trainin

gs

(ope)

Additi

onal

Costs

(ope)

Inform

ation

Costs

(ope)

CodeSector of Upper Tier SEVESO

Etablishment

Number

of

Facilities

Multiplie

r

Trainings

for the

Experts

of the

Operator

s

Other

costs

First

Preparati

on

Review

First

Preparati

on

Review

First

Preparati

on

Review

First

Preparati

on

ReviewDrilling -

Test

Assessm

ent Costs

Inspectio

n Costs

Informati

on Costs

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

N/A N/A N/A N/A ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope ope

1

petrochemical (e.g oil

refineries,storage and distribution)97 100 5.000 12.000 3.000 1.500 375 7.500 1.875 9.000 1.875 2.000 180 1.080 1.500

2 manufacturing 30 60 3.000 7.200 1.800 900 225 4.500 1.125 5.400 1.350 2.000 90 720 1.500

3

chemical installations (excludeing

petrochemical)60 100 3.000 12.000 3.000 1.500 375 7.500 1.875 9.000 1.125 2.000 90 720 1.500

4 Processing of metals 10 40 2.000 4.800 1.200 600 150 3.000 750 3.600 900 2.000 90 540 1.500

5 transporting and storage 36 40 2.000 4.800 1.200 600 150 3.000 750 3.600 900 2.000 90 540 1.500

6

Power generation, supply and

distribution12 100 5.000 12.000 3.000 1.500 375 7.500 1.875 9.000 1.875 2.000 180 1.080 1.500

7 Mining activities 5 40 2.000 4.800 1.200 600 150 3.000 750 3.600 900 2.000 90 540 1.500

8 Other activity (not included above) 40 2.000 4.800 1.200 600 150 3.000 750 3.600 900 2.000 90 540 1.500

9

water and sewage and waste

management1 60 3.000 7.200 1.800 900 225 4.500 1.125 5.400 1.350 2.000 90 720 1.500

10 agriculture 60 3.000 7.200 1.800 900 225 4.500 1.125 5.400 1.350 2.000 90 720 1.500

AVERAGE 3.000 7.680 1.920 960 240 4.800 1.200 5.760 1.253 2.000 108 720 1.500

Assumptions


Trainin

gs

(gov)

Additi

onal

Costs

(gov)

Inform

ation

Costs

(gov)

CodeSector of Upper Tier SEVESO

Etablishment

Number

of

Facilities

Multiplie

rTrainings

First

Preparati

on

Review

Drilling -

Test

(Office

Drilling

and Live

Play)

Assessm

ent Costs

Inspectio

n Costs

Other

Costs

Informati

on Costs

1 2 3 4 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

N/A N/A N/A N/A gov gov gov gov gov gov gov gov

1

petrochemical (e.g oil

refineries,storage and distribution)97 100 500 4.500 500 1.000 1.620 3.705 500

2 manufacturing 30 60 500 2.700 300 1.000 1.350 2.535 500

3

chemical installations (excludeing

petrochemical)60 100 500 4.500 300 1.000 1.080 2.535 500

4 Processing of metals 10 40 500 1.800 200 1.000 1.080 2.145 500

5 transporting and storage 36 40 500 1.800 200 1.000 1.080 2.145 500

6

Power generation, supply and

distribution12 100 500 4.500 500 1.000 1.080 2.145 500

7 Mining activities 5 40 500 1.800 200 1.000 1.080 2.145 500

8 Other activity (not included above) 40 500 1.800 200 1.000 1.080 2.145 500

9

water and sewage and waste

management1 60 500 2.700 300 1.000 810 2.145 500

10 agriculture 60 500 2.700 300 1.000 810 2.145 500

AVERAGE 500 2.880 300 1.000 1.107 2.379 500

Costs to the operators

Safety Report

(ope)MAPP (ope) SMS (ope) IEP (ope)

Inspection &

Assessment

Costs (ope)

Cost to the Public Authorities

EEP (gov)

Inspection &

Assessment

Costs (gov)

FINAL


Table 11 - Total annualized administrative costs per establishment (k EUR)

Some activities like assessment and inspection required further investigation. For these activities, REC

used the number of days dedicated by Operators and by CAs based on experts’ experience. For

example, in the transport and storage sector, the total time dedicated to inspections by operators and

CAs is respectively 6 days and 16.5 day (see Table 12). The time dedicated is calculated by summing

up the needed days of several inspectors from different CAs.

Table 12 – Inspection & Assessment Workload for Upper-Tier Seveso Establishments

Table 13 - Inspection & Assessment Workload for Lower-Tier Seveso Establishments

The model was run according to the two types of establishments (Lower-Tier and Upper-Tier) and

economic sectors.

The Directive will have different impacts according to the obligations of each category of

Establishments. For Upper-Tier establishment it will be 47.2 million Euro for 10 years between 2012

and 2021 (PV). In the case of the Lower-Tier establishment is it will 14.8 million Euro for 10 years

between 2012 and 2021 (PV).

Code Type of Upper Tier SEVESO Etablishment Assessment - ope Inspections - ope Assessment - gov Inspections - gov

1 petrochemical (e.g oil refineries, storage and distribution) 2 12 18 28,5

2 manufacturing 1 8 15 19,5

3 chemical installations (excluding petrochemical) 1 8 12 19,5

4 Processing of metals 1 6 12 16,5

5 transporting and storage 1 6 12 16,5

6 Power generation, supply and distribution 2 12 12 16,5

7 Mining activities 1 6 12 16,5

8 Other activity (not included above) 1 6 12 16,5

9 water and sewage and waste management 1 8 9 16,5

10 agriculture 1 8 9 16,5

Code Type of Upper Tier SEVESO Etablishment Assessment - ope Inspections - ope Assessment - gov Inspections - gov

1 petrochemical (e.g oil refineries, storage and distribution) 1 3 4 12,5

2 manufacturing 1 3 4 12,5

3 chemical installations (excluding petrochemical) 1 3 4 12,5

4 Processing of metals 1 2 4 6,5

5 transporting and storage 1 2 4 6,5

6 Power generation, supply and distribution 1 2 4 6,5

7 Mining activities 1 2 4 6,5

8 Other activity (not included above) 1 2 4 6,5

9 water and sewage and waste management 1 2 4 6,5

10 agriculture 1 2 4 6,5

Source Lower-Tier Upper-Tier

EU-VRI (2008) - <20

UK (2005) 13 60

Nutek (2006) 1.3 23

FEA (2009) 50 180

CETS(2008/9) - 70

Administrative burden study (2009), updated of SR and IEP 2 10

Lowest estimate 2 10

Average 5 30

Highest estimate 15 100

FINAL


In terms of sectors, the most affected one will be the petrochemical (%48) and the chemical industry

(%21) (see Figure 18 – Distribution of Administrative Costs to Seveso Sectors)


Source: REC Turkey, 2012

Annex - 2. 2. Substantive Compliance Costs

It was not possible to estimate the substantive costs, which are assumed more significant than the

administrative costs. However, it can be argued that in the case of substantive costs, it will increase

safety standards of Establishments, they should be considered as typical ‘business cost’ of working

with dangerous processes and products and not directly related to the Seveso II Directive. For

instance, if an establishment becomes a Seveso II site they might need to undertake investments in

changes to their manufacturing process or to way they store chemical substances.

UK (2005) Regulatory Impact Assessment (final) of Seveso II study suggests that the costs for Upper-

Tier Establishments are on the same order as the administrative costs. For Lower-Tier Establishments

there is a large variation in the results of the two surveys and they could vary within a range of 5% of

the administrative costs to be on the same order as the administrative costs.

The RIA does not appear to have included plant modifications, but both this survey and the other RIA

studies suggest that this is a significant cost element.

Annex - 2. 3. Land use costs

In the third category, the land use costs were not estimated because of lack of information on the

safety zoning required by the Directive. Concretely, the public authorities need first to develop Seveso

compatible plans for each establishment that defines safety zones and second, value the residential

buildings overlapping with these plans. This is compounded by the fact that the 2010 By-Law does not

require such obligation.

FINAL


There are many uncertainties in particular in terms of the specific implementation impacts of the

Directive. The land costs directly depend on the size of the safety zones for each establishment and

vary according to different land use planning approaches.

This RIA study considers several cost examples from EU. First example is from France, the estimated

total cost for French PPRTs (land measures including several thousands of expropriations and

relinquishments) is about 2.3 billion €.

The average cost for the development of a PPRT is about 30 k€. It takes one person half a year to

elaborate the plan. Adding physical modifications or even expropriation could lead to very substantial

costs even though relatively few Establishments would require major physical measures. The French

estimate for the total costs amounts to 2.3 billion EUR and that covers 420 Establishments. An upscale

to all Upper-Tier Establishments leads to total costs estimate for EU 27 at 25 billion EUR.

Second example is from Australia, The Austrian Ministry of Environment has considered this issue of

a simple safety distance for all sites in a review of the implementation of the Seveso II Directive in

Austria. A scenario assuming that an area around each establishment would be restricted in use leads

to a total cost of imposing a simple rule for safety distances. In the Austrian case, the costs of a 300 m

safety distance leading to about 250,000 m2 of restricted area. Based on the 145 Austrian Seveso II

sites and applying a land value of 95 EUR/m2, total costs amount to EUR 3.4 billion. Similar

scenarios can be made for EU 27 using the total number of Upper-Tier Establishments and an

appropriate land value.

These considerations demonstrate that applying the LUP requirement to existing Establishments could

results in very high costs - though one-off costs – they could amounts to at least several hundred

million Euros and likely even into billions of Euros.

In order to assess the total cost of land use planning to comply with the Seveso II Directive, REC

Turkey tried to develop a special model for different approaches. Although it gives general idea on

safety zones resulting from the different approaches, it does not provide specific costs data for

operators and CAs (see Annex - 3).

FINAL


Annex - 3. Detailed Cost Calculations for the Estimation of the Costs of Land Use Planning

This annex is based on the estimation of the total cost of land use planning to comply with the Seveso

II Directive, a special model was developed by REC. Turkey needs to develop appropriate safety

distances and better land use planning around Seveso Establishments to prevent major industrial

accidents and limit consequences. The land use planning model has three main approaches to calculate

the total cost of land use planning:

STEP 1: Consequence-Based Approach

STEP 2: Risk-Based Approach

STEP 3: Generic Table Approach

Total number of Seveso Establishments of Turkey is gathered from Seveso Notification System of

Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. Seveso Establishments are located in 174 districts of

Turkey.

For the land use planning models the population density of 126 districts are obtained from Turkish

Statistical Institute (TurkStat) 2007 data. Population density data of other 48 districts were not

available in TurkStat because they are not independent districts. Thus, the population densities of

those are compared with the districts they are separated from and assumed as the population density is

equal to former districts.

Annex - 3. 1. Assumptions

In 2010, Ministry of Environment and Urbanization organized a training “Introduction to Land Use

Planning for Seveso II Directive” with JRC, Major Accident Hazard Bureau. The presentation in that

training calculates the difference in safety distances for deterministic and probabilistic approaches.

According to these calculations, REC Turkey assumed three average safety distances for

- fatality

- irreversible and,

- net irreversible (see Table 14).

REC Turkey used JRC distances to determine areal difference for Risk-Based and Consequence-Based

safety zones. Safety measure costs per citizen in these safety zones are determined as €5 for possibility

of fatality and €1 for possibility of irreversible effects.

Table 14 - Assumptions Used for Calculation of Land Use Costs

Definition Consequence-based

impact analysis radius (m)

Risk-based impact

analysis radius (m)

Consequence-

based area (m2)

Risk-based

area (m2)

Areal

Difference

Cost per

citizen

(Eur)

Fatality 1.484 615 6.918.591 1.188.229 5.730.362 5

Irreversible 5.547 1.180 96.664.321 4.374.354 92.289.967 1

Irreversible Net 4.063 565 89.745.730 3.186.125 86.559.605 1

Moreover, for the Establishments located in dense industrial areas, safety zones are possible to

intersect with each other. In this context, land use planning will differ according to size of intersecting

area. Assumptions for possible safety zone overlap and population density is given at Table 15.

FINAL


Table 15 - Overlap and Population Density Assumptions Used for Calculation of Land Use Costs

Overlap (Adverse) Real Population Density (Industrial Zone) (Adverse) Real

Level 1 1 0 Level 1 0,25 0,75

Level 2 0,5 0,5 Level 2

Level 3 0,25 0,75 Level 3

Annex - 3. 2. STEP 1: Consequence-Based Approach

There are three major parameters determined for the calculation of the safety distances. Figure 19

shows general picture, the average fatality and irreversible effect safety distance of Consequence-

Based approach calculated as 1,484 m and 5,047 m, respectively.

Annex - 3. 3. STEP 2: Risk-Based Approach

JRC calculated an average fatality and irreversible effect safety distance of Risk-Based approach as

615 m and 1,180 m, respectively (see Figure 20).

Figure 19 - Average Safety Distances for

Consequence-Based Approach

Figure 20 - Average Safety Distances for Risk-

Based Approach

Source: JRC, MAHB “Introduction to Land Use

Planning for Seveso II Directive”, 2010

Source: JRC, MAHB “Introduction to Land Use

Planning for Seveso II Directive”, 2010

Annex - 3. 4. Conclusion

Table 16 - Conclusion Table for Land Use Planning Approaches

Definition Additional Risk Area

(km2)

Total Effected

Population

Risk-Based Fatality 177 208.142

Risk-Based Irreversible Net 612 718.680

Consequence-Based Fatality 1.031 1.211.932

Consequence-Based Irreversible Net 13.514 15.881.358

Difference Fatality 854 1.003.790

Difference Irreversible Net 12.903 15.162.678

FINAL


Annex - 4. Obligations of Operators

The Operator of Seveso Establishment, which comes under the scope of the Directive, must notify the

Competent Authority and establish a Safety Management System (SMS) to be detailed in a Major

Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP) document as a pre-requisite to operating a regulated

establishment.

Additionally, the Operator of each Upper-Tier establishment is required to prepare an internal

emergency plan for the establishment in consultation with local authorities and CAs. The Operator of

each Upper-Tier establishment must provide a written Safety Report, which must include a description

of the activities and processes involved, the hazardous substances present, the major accident risks and

the preventive measures in place to the CA.

Box 6 – Scope and Main Obligations of Operators

The following sections will briefly summarize the main requirements of the Directive.

I. Safety Reports

II. Safety Management System

III. Major Accident Prevention Policy

IV. Internal Emergency plan

V. Substantive Modifications

VI. Public Access to Information and Consultation

Annex - 4. 1. Safety Reports

O One of the principal obligations of the Directive is a "Safety Report". Safety Report70

requirement

applies only to Upper-Tier Establishments. Existing Upper-Tier Establishments must provide the

70 A flexible presentation permits the combination of the Safety report with other reports produced in response to

other legislation to form a single Safety report in order to avoid unnecessary duplication or repetition of

work.

FINAL


reports not later than within one year after the Directive applies and for the new Establishments a

reasonable period prior to the start of construction or operation. Member States can decide what period

is considered reasonable.

Directive requires review and update of Safety Report every five years by operators. Additionally,

Competent Authority can request review and update of the Safety Report where justified by

– new facts

– new technical knowledge about safety

– new knowledge about hazard assessment

– in case of modification of a site

According to the Directive, the Safety Report must contain minimum information about SMS and on

the organization of the establishment with a view to major accident prevention policy (MAPP). Safety

Reports must also show proper identification hazards, accidental risks analysis, prevention methods

and description of the installation. Moreover, it should present the environment of the establishment,

adequate safety and reliability principles in design, construction, operation and maintenance measures

of protection and intervention to limit the consequences of an accident.

Other than above, safety report must demonstrate that Internal Emergency Plans have been drawn up,

supplying information to enable the External Emergency Plan to be drawn up, and sufficient

information must be included to support CAs in land use planning.

FINAL


According to Safety Report Guidance, (Seveso II (1998) New Guidance on the Preparation of a Safety

Report to meet the Requirements of Directive 96/82/EC as amended by Directive 2003/105/EC) safety

report should follow Proportionate and Demonstration approach (see Box 7 for the details of those

approaches).

Box 7 - Proportionate and Demonstration approach71

Proportionate approach Demonstration approach

The level of detail should be proportionate to

the extent of potential risks and the complexity

of the installation/process/systems involved

-The safety report should be of a summarizing

character i.e. Information provided is limited to

its relevance in regard to major-accident

hazards,

-However, the information should be sufficient

to demonstrate that the requirements have been

met

-The description of measures should be limited

to the explanation of their specific objectives

and functions.

Demonstration can be recognized by the presence of

the following components:

1.Systematic analysis

-hazard identification and risk assessment72

process must be systematic and

- Identify all major accident hazards in the

establishment

-Assign frequencies and consequences to

accidents

-Rank and select reference scenarios

2.Detailed evidence

The safety report must provide ample evidence to

show the consistency between the scenario

selected and the safety measures taken

Annex - 4. 2. Safety Management System

Safety Management System is a term used to refer to a comprehensive management system designed

to manage safety elements, including the necessary organizational structures, policies and procedures

in the Establishments. Naturally, Establishments should address safety management system as part of

their overall management.

However, in the context of the Directive, Safety Management System (SMS) is described and

introduced for only for Upper-Tier Establishments.

The introduction of the obligation for operators of Upper-Tier Establishments to put into effect an

SMS has taken account of the development of new managerial and organizational methods in general

and, in particular, of the significant changes in industrial practice relating to risk management, which

have occurred over the past ten years. One of the main objectives pursued by this obligation is to

prevent or reduce accidents caused by management factors that have proven to be a significant

causative factor in over 90 per cent of the accidents in the EU since 1982.

71

Safety Report Guidance - Seveso II (1998) New Guidance on the Preparation of a Safety Report 72 See Annex 9 for Brief overview on Risk analysis practices for application in safety reports

FINAL


SMS provides a structured approach to achieve better safety performance within an establishment.

Primary objectives of an SMS are to regulate the activities of the establishment formally in order that

they are carried out safely to improve safety performance in a continuous manner, and to support a

strong safety culture. Effective SMS minimizes risks related to chemical accidents and addresses the

followings .

Box 8 - Issues shall be addressed by the Safety Management System

- organizational structure (including the roles, responsibilities, training, education, qualifications

and interrelationship of individuals involved in work affecting safety);

- Identification and evaluation of hazards;

- Facilities and operational control;

- Management of change;

- Planning for emergencies;

- Monitoring performance (concerning the ongoing assessment of compliance with the Safety

Policy and the safety management system, and mechanisms for taking corrective action in the

event of non-compliance);

- Audit and review (addressing the periodic, systematic assessment of the Safety Policy and

effectiveness and suitability of the safety management system); and

- Accident investigation and learning from experience.

Before intruding the Major Accident Prevention Policy in Annex 6.3, relation of the SMS and MAPP

is explained in order to better understand the both concepts in Box 9 - Relation of the SMS and MAPP.

Annex - 4. 3. Major Accident Prevention Policy

The obligation to establish and implement a MAPP applies to Operators of both lower and Upper-Tier

Establishments.

The MAPP must be established in writing and should include the Operator’s overall aims and

principles of action with respect to the prevention and control of major-accident hazards. It shall be

designed to guarantee a high level of protection for man and the environment by appropriate means,

structures and management systems.

There are some major differences in the practical ways that operators of Lower and Upper-Tier

Establishments build the contents of their MAPP known to the authorities.

Operators of Lower-Tier Establishments do not have obligation to a send the written document setting

out their MAPP to the Competent Authority. They shall make the MAPP available to the Competent

Authorities (at their request) Operators of Upper-Tier Establishments must demonstrate in their Safety

report that a MAPP has been put into effect. The Safety report must be sent to the Competent

Authority.

FINAL


Box 9 - Relation of the SMS and MAPP

Safety Management System (SMS) and Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP) are combined

documents. SMS is the detailed report on the whole safety system of the establishment including all

organization and personnel, identification of process units and hazards, operational control, emergency

plans, monitoring process and auditing.

MAPP is the document that gives the policy information of SMS. Document must be written and must

include sufficient particulars to demonstrate that the operator has established an appropriate SMS.

Directive sets out the principles to be taken into account when preparing a MAPP document.

Description of MAPP and SMS are given in Annex III of Directive that is described below.

For the purpose of implementing the operator's major-accident prevention policy and safety

management system account shall be taken of the following elements. The requirements laid down in

the document referred to in Article 7 should be proportionate to the major-accident hazards presented

by the establishment: “the major accident prevention policy should be established in writing and

should include the operator's overall aims and principles of action with respect to the control of major-

accident hazards”.

Annex - 4. 4. Internal Emergency Plan

Internal Emergency Plan (IEP) is for response measures to be taken inside of the Establishments to be

drawn up by the operator to control incidents, minimize effects, and implement protection measures.

Moreover, it enables local authorities and CAs to draw up External Emergency Plans (EEP).All

Upper-Tier Seveso Establishments must prepare an internal emergency plans. Moreover, the Directive

obliges for operators to test the IEP regularly.

IEPs have to be reviewed, revised and updated, where necessary. Important new elements require

operators to consult employees, local authority, CAs, emergency services, health authority for the area

where the establishment is sited.

Internal Emergency Plan should define how the organization would protect people and property. It

assigns emergency-related tasks to individuals in the organization, and outlines protective actions to be

taken (see Box 10).

Box 10 - Annex IV of the Directive-Minimum information for IEP

The plan must contain the following information:

Names or positions of persons authorized to set emergency procedures in motion and the person in

charge of and coordinating the internal mitigatory action;

Name or position of the person with responsibility for liaison with the local Authority responsible

for preparing the internal emergency plan;

For foreseeable conditions or events which could be significant in bringing about a major accident,

a description of the action which should be taken to control the conditions or events and to limit

their consequences, including a description of the safety equipment and the resources available;

Arrangements for limiting the risks to persons on-site including how warnings are to be given and

the actions persons are expected to take on receipt of a warning;

Arrangements for providing early warning of the incident to the local authority responsible for

setting the internal emergency plan in motion, the type of information which should be contained in

an initial warning and the arrangements for the provision of more detailed information as it

FINAL


becomes available;

Arrangements for training staff in the duties they will be expected to perform, and where necessary

coordinating this with the emergency services;

Arrangements for providing assistance with external mitigatory action

Annex - 4. 5. Substantive Modifications

Other than direct administrative obligations, there are some obligations for the substantive

modifications. Operator should take administrative and technical measures in case of any modification

for function, efficiency and position (change in scope, open/closure of installations, change in quantity

of dangerous substances etc.)

For instance, if a Lower-Tier establishment becomes an Upper-Tier establishment, the operator needs

to report the changes and carry out the new requirements.

Annex - 4. 6. Public Access to Information and Consultation

The public information requirement is one of the most important components of the Directive.

Directive requires,

information on safety measures and on the requisite behavior in the event of an accident has

to be supplied regularly, without their having to request it, to persons liable to be affected by

a major accident.

Operators as well as public authorities have certain obligations to inform the public. Operators and

local authorities are obliged to provide active and passive information (permanent availability of

information) to the public.

Moreover, the information shall be reviewed (at least every three years) and repeated (at least every

five years), always if there is a modification of a site.

The public information requirements have been extended by the amendments to the former Directive.

The Seveso II Directive offers more rights to the public in terms of access to information.

Public can request information from operators or competent authorities or ensure distribution of

leaflets or brochures informing the public about safety measures and the behavior in the case of an

accident.

Moreover, the safety report should be publicly available but the operator may ask that certain parts are

not disclosed for reasons of industrial, commercial or personal confidentiality, public security or

national defense. The approval of the authority is necessary for non-disclosure.

Annex V to the Directive contains a detailed list of the items of information to be provided (see Box

11).

Box 11 - Public Access to Information and Consultation

- Name of operator and address of the establishment

- Identification, by position held, of the person giving the information.

- Confirmation that the establishment is subject to the regulations and/or administrative provisions

implementing this Directive and that the notification referred to in Article 6 (3), or the safety report referred

to in Article 9 (1) has been submitted to the competent authority

- An explanation in simple terms of the activity or activities undertaken at the establishment

- The common names, or in the case of dangerous substances covered by Part 2 of Annex I, the generic

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names or the general danger classification of the substances and preparations involved at the establishment

which could give rise to a major accident, with an indication of their principal dangerous characteristics.

- General information relating to the nature of the major-accident hazards, including their potential effects on

the population and the environment

- Adequate information on how the population concerned will be warned and kept informed in the event of a

major accident

- Adequate information on the actions the population concerned should take, and on the behavior they should

adopt, in the event of a major accident.

- Confirmation that the operator is required to make adequate arrangements on site, in particular liaison with

the emergency services, to deal with major accidents and to minimize their effects

- A reference to the external emergency plan drawn up to cope with any offsite effects from an accident, this

should include advice to cooperate with any instructions or requests from the emergency services at the

time of an accident

- Details of where further relevant information can be obtained, subject to the requirements of confidentiality

laid down in national legislation

Annex - 4. 7. Notification

Notification is submitted by the Operator to CAs if only:

• Seveso II Annex I dangerous chemicals are present in the establishment (as a raw material,

product, by product, residue or intermediate, including those supposed to be generated in the

event of accident)

• Their quantities are in excess of Lower or / and Upper thresholds of the Annex I, Part I & II

The notification is a document which shall demonstrate why the particular establishment qualifies for

Seveso.

The main element is the list of dangerous substances and the possible maximum quantities (easy for

fixed tanks, difficult for warehouses, storage of drums, big-bags.

Substances: identified by name, CAS-number, physical form (high pressure, high temperature).

Quantities up to 2% of lower threshold can be ignored, if no major accident can be caused by that

substance.

Summation rule: similar substances have to be counted together by their percentage of the respective

threshold

Example of terminology used in Notification.

- Named substance + named substance (acetylene + hydrogen)

- Named substance + category (chlorine + toxic substances)

- Category + category (very toxic + toxic, explosive + flammable)

- Substances with 2 dangerous properties have to be counted twice (methanol + toxic, methanol

+ flammable)

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Annex - 5. Obligations of Public Institutions

Public authorities have important roles to play in major accident prevention, preparedness and

response. These roles include developing a regulatory framework, monitoring and enforcement,

providing information to the public, siting and land use planning; external (off-site) emergency

planning. The Annex -7 summarizes the obligations of the public authorities under the scope of the

Directive. Firstly, it describes the current administrative structure in details for Turkey then

investigates and gives brief information on several important roles that Seveso II Directive assigns to

Public Institutions, which are listed below:

I. System Surveillance

II. Enforcement and Inspection

III. Land Use Planning

IV. Domino Effect

V. External Emergency plan

VI. Public Access to Information and Consultation

VII. Accident Investigation

VIII. Sanctioning

IX. Reporting to EU

Background Information on Public Institutions and their obligations in Turkey on Major Accidents

Before describing the details of obligations of public institutions defined under the scope of the

Directive, this section briefly gives information on Public Administrations and their obligations in

Turkey on management of major accidents.

The MoEU and MoLSS are the CAs according to Law on Environment No: 2872 and the Law on

Labor No. 4857, respectively. In addition, local authorities also responsible bodies for the enforcement

of labor safety and environmental protection regulations. Provincial Administrative, Metropolitan

Municipalities, and Municipalities have responsibilities according to Law on Provincial

Administrations No. 5302, Law on Metropolitan Municipalities No: 5216 and Law on Municipalities

No: 5272, respectively.

Moreover, the Directive also covers a third policy area, the public safety and emergency management.

The Turkish regulation asserts a lack policy in crisis management and the public safety. As in the most

Member States, Turkey has a three layered administration structure in public safety. In the first place,

there is the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (DEMP). Second layer is the regional

disaster and crisis management of the regions of Governorships and thirdly, crisis management is

carried out by local governments (e.g. municipalities).

The Turkish Seveso By-Law also assigns competency to local governments and provincial directorates

for external emergency plans, land use plans, and domino effects. In certain situations, CAs inform

these local competent authorities about obligations of operator (e.g. whether safety report of

establishment is approved or not). The roles of CAs and other administrative bodies in the context of

the Directive explained below.

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Central Government

MoEU:

The MoEU is the main Public Authority that is responsible for the environmental policy at national

level. General Directorate of Environmental Management and General Directorate of EIA, Permit and

Audit are responsible bodies for implementation and enforcement of the Directive.

MoEU was responsible for establishing a notification and a formal registration system. MoEU

Department of Chemicals established electronic notification system and determined the registered

Seveso Establishments’ tier status. MoEU will also carry out Seveso inspections, but these inspections

will be carried out together with the MoLSS.

MoEU is responsible for,

establishing an effective inspection and enforcement/implementation system

ensuring the preparation of external emergency plans by the local authorities

establishing procedures for information available to the public

ensuring development of a system for the classification of establishment groups with a

potential for domino effect

establishing procedures for investigation of major accidents

establishing a reporting system and ensuring fulfillment of reporting

ensuring the preparation of major accident prevention policy by operators

ensuring the preparation of internal emergency plans by operators

ensuring that operators provide information to the competent authorities about major accidents

MoLSS:

In Turkey, MoLSS is responsible for occupational health and safety issues. MoLSS monitors the

implementation of the measures to ensure occupational health and safety issues in the workplaces.

Ministry of Labor and Social Security is responsible for analyzing accidents, analyzing domino

effects, assessment of safety reports and informing operators in this direction. Moreover, MoLSS

ensures that operators provide information to the competent authorities about major accidents and

establishes an effective inspection and enforcement/implementation system. MoLSS has to prepare

guidelines on how to prepare Safety Reports and Emergency Action Plans with MoEU.

In addition, MoLSS investigates both occupational and major accidents. It has three different

departments to work on occupational health and safety issues.

Labor Inspection Board,

General Directorate of Occupational Health and Safety,

Centre for Labor and Social Security Training and Research.

In scope of the By-Law, Labor Inspection Board is responsible for assessing and approving the safety

reports and inspection of the Establishments.

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DEMP:

The main roles and responsibilities of DEMP are to coordinate the response at disaster and emergency

situations and inform the higher authorities and to determine the location of Civil Defense Search and

Rescue Unit Directorates by means of coordination with non-governmental organizations and related

governmental institutions.

There are six different departments under DEMP Presidency mainly related with the Directive,

1.Department of Planning and Mitigation

2.Department of Response

3.Department of Recovery

4.Department of Civil Defense

5.Department of Earthquake

6.Department of Administrative Affairs

Some of the Major industrial accidents are also considered as disaster according to their extent on man

and environment. Thus, to prevent and control disasters like major industrial accidents, DEMP is

responsible for prevention, response and recovery and plan all the mitigation measures to prevent

negative impact on human health and environment.

Local Administrations (Provincial Administrative, Metropolitan Municipalities, and Municipalities)

Municipalities and Special Provincial Administrations:

Local Administrations such as Municipalities and Special Provincial Administrations are responsible

for the administrative management of the provinces in Turkey. These Local Administrations prepare

and assess the land use planning policy of the provinces. Local Administrations controls siting of new

Establishments and modification of existing sites and new developments (residential areas,

commercial areas, transport links, locations frequented by the public).

Furthermore, Local Administrations should conduct the information procedures to raise awareness of

the public near Seveso Establishments and are responsible for the preparation of external emergency

plans, testing the external emergency plans and assessing possible domino effects of the accidents.

Annex - 5. 1. System Surveillance

This section summarizes the system surveillance obligations other than direct ones to CAs to

implement and enforce the Seveso II Directive. This RIA study identifies the followings as system

surveillance obligations items.

- General administration

- Notification system (development and modification of IT system)

- Approval of documents (safety reports, MAPP, IEP)

- Training of staff

- IT system for accident reporting

- Preparing technical guidelines

- Setting up public information system

- Campaigns for raising public awareness in the vicinity of the establishment

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- Maintenance of emergency vehicles and equipment

CAs examine the safety report and communicate the conclusions to the Operator. Conclusions should

be provided in written form and contain the following details:

– date of review

– additional sources of information used in the review (e.g., inspection report)

– specific conclusions (positive or negative) with reference to specific details in the

report

– clear identification of deficiencies and inaccuracies that must be corrected

Annex - 5. 2. Enforcement and Inspection

Member States shall make sure the proper enforcement of the Directive through providing details of

the obligations of the competent authorities and inspection. MS shall ensure increased consistency in

enforcement and inspection, and existing enforcement authorities should be fully equipped and have

the expertise to handle the enforcement because of the deviating complexity of the Directive. The

Directive constitutes following articles related with enforcement issues:

Article 18 on Inspections

Article 17 on Prohibition of use

Article 18 is on Inspections that has the most important role for improving the quality and consistency

of implementation of Seveso II obligations. The Directive forces MS to organize a system of

inspections to ensure:

Operator provided appropriate means to prevent major accidents and limit their consequences;

Safety report drawn by operator is accurate and complete;

Information has been supplied to the public.

System of inspection shall constitute a program of inspections for all Establishments or at least one on-

site inspection made by the competent authority for Upper-Tier Establishments in every twelve

months. Box 6 gives a sample for the Content of the Seveso II Inspection programme.

Box 12 - Content of the Seveso II Inspection programme

- Inventory of the Establishments

- Time period

- Identification of specific sites

- Provision of coordination,

- Public access

- Geographic area covered

- Provision for review and update

- Programme for routine/non-routine

inspections

- Frequency of inspections

Competent authority prepares a report following each inspection.

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Another enforcement mean is Article 17 of the Directive on Prohibition of use. It enables CAs to

prohibit the use of any site or installation if serious deficiencies are found in the measures for the

prevention and mitigation of major accidents or operator has failed to submit the necessary documents

i.e. Notification, Safety report, Emergency plans. It is discussed in Annex - 5. 8

Annex - 5. 3. Land Use Planning

According to the Directive, in order to provide greater protection for residential areas, areas of

substantial public use and areas of particular natural interest or sensitivity, it is necessary to apply land

use and/or other relevant policies applied in the Member States. Land Use Planning takes account of

the need, in the long term, to keep a suitable distance between such areas and Establishments

presenting such hazards and, where existing Establishments are concerned, takes account of additional

technical measures so that the risk to persons is not increased.

In brief, Land Use Planning (LUP), in context of Article 12, aims preventing major accidents and

limiting their consequences by control on

- siting new Establishments,

- modification of existing sites and

- new developments (residential areas, commercial areas, transport links, locations

frequented by the public).

Therefore, Member States have to ensure that the objectives of preventing major accidents and

limiting the consequences of such accidents are taken into consideration in their LUP policies.

Article 12 states that;

The Commission is invited on 31 December 2006, in close cooperation with the Member

States, to draw up guidelines defining a technical database including risk data and risk

scenarios, to be used for assessing the compatibility between the Establishments covered by

this Directive and the areas described in paragraph 1. The definition of this database shall as

far as possible take account of the evaluations made by the competent authorities, the

information obtained from operators and all other relevant information such as the

socioeconomic benefits of development and the mitigating effects of emergency plans.

Member States shall ensure that all CAs and planning authorities responsible for decisions in

this area set up appropriate consultation procedures to facilitate implementation of the policies

established under paragraph 1. The procedures shall be designed to ensure that technical

advice on the risks arising from the establishment is available, either on a case-by-case or on a

generic basis, when decisions are taken.

Annex - 5. 4. Domino Effect

Article 8 of Seveso II Directive uses the term domino effects to denote the existence of

“Establishments or groups of Establishments where the likelihood and the possibility or

consequences of a major accident may be increased because of the location and the proximity

of such Establishments and their inventories of dangerous substances”.

The areas where the concentration of activities concerning the storage, process and transportation of

dangerous substances take place in dense areas have so called domino effects. These areas have highly

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negative impact on risk control, land use planning, emergency planning and response. It is clear that

the decision-making process requires the analysis of a large amount of accident scenarios.

In order to reduce the risk of domino effects, where Establishments are sited in areas that increase the

probability and possibility of major accidents or aggravate their consequences, there should be

provision for the exchange of appropriate information and cooperation with public.

According to Directive, one of the obligations of the CAs is to evaluate whether domino effects are

possible between the Seveso Establishments. Risk assessment of the Establishments must take into

account domino effect and CAs have to justify this assessment

In other words, CAs must identify Establishments or groups of Establishments where the danger of an

accident and its possible consequences may be increased because of the location and the proximity of

the Establishments, and the dangerous substances present and to ensure an exchange of information

and co-operation between the Establishments (see Box 13).

Box 13 - Seveso II Directive, Article 8 Domino Effects

Seveso II Directive Article 8 states that;

1. Member States shall ensure that the competent authority, using the information received from the

operators in compliance with Articles 6 and 9, identifies Establishments or groups of Establishments

where the likelihood and the possibility or consequences of a major accident may be increased because

of the location and the proximity of such Establishments, and their inventories of dangerous

substances.

2.Member States must ensure that in the case of the Establishments thus identified:

(a)suitable information is exchanged in an appropriate manner to enable these Establishments to take

account of the nature and extent of the overall hazard of a major accident in their major accident

prevention policies, safety management systems, safety reports and internal emergency plans;

(b) provision is made for cooperation in informing the public and in supplying information to the competent

authority for the preparation of external emergency plans.

Moreover, the potential domino effects and potential risk of neighboring Seveso Establishments must

be reported annually to the European Commission. This report should answer the following points

related to the Seveso II Directive:

General background information on the methodology for identifying in Article 8, Paragraph 1

on the domino effect, Establishments referred or groups of devices.

Clarification of number of Establishments, identification of likelihood and the possibility or

consequences of a major accident due to the location and the proximity of such Establishments

as referred to in Article 8, paragraph 1.

An average number of Establishments per group should be passed.

The number of Establishments possible to cause domino effect in the smallest and largest

group should be listed.

Strategy that is followed to ensure that sufficient information is given for Establishments

affected by a domino-effect experience.

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Annex - 5. 5. External Emergency plan

CAs and assigned authorities are responsible for drawing up an external emergency plan for the

measures to be taken outside the establishment. They utilize the information that operator supplies and

draw up external emergency plans. Assigned authorities also communicate the necessary information

to the public and to the services and authorities in the area following a major accident. The public and

employees of the establishment are to be consulted on external plans.

Authorities should ensure plans are reviewed, tested, and where necessary revised and updated no

longer than three years. This review considers changes taking place in the Establishments concerned or

within the emergency services concerned, new technical knowledge, and knowledge concerning the

response to major accidents. Annex IV of the Directive lists the information to be included in external

emergency plans (see Box 14).

Box 14 - External Emergency plans shall contain the information set out in Annex IV of the Directive

- Names or positions of persons authorized to set emergency procedures in motion and of persons authorized

to take charge of and coordinate offsite action.

- Arrangements for receiving early warning of incidents, and alert and callout procedures

- Arrangements for coordinating resources necessary to implement the external emergency plan

- Arrangements for providing assistance with on-site mitigatory action

- Arrangements for off-site mitigatory action

- Arrangements for providing the public with specific information relating to the accident and the behavior

which it should adopt

- Arrangements for the provision of information to the emergency services of other Member States in the

event of a major accident with possible transboundary consequences

Annex - 5. 6. Public Access to Information and Consultation

Public access to general information on safety measures supplied by operators and local authorities are

briefly discussed in Annex 4.6 under the obligations of the Operators. Other than public access to

general information, the public should be able to give its opinion on planning for new Establishments,

modifications to existing Establishments, and developments around existing Establishments.

Directive states that Member States shall ensure that the public is able to give its opinion in the

following cases:

planning for new establishments covered by Article 9,

modifications to existing establishments under Article 10, where such modifications are

subject to obligations provided for in this Directive as to planning,

developments around such existing establishments.

Moreover, where an Upper-Tier site could result in a major accident having transboundary effects, the

Member State must provide sufficient information to the potentially affected Member State so that it

can prepare an external emergency plan and consider the information in land use planning.

Annex - 5. 7. Accident Investigation

One of the obligations of CAs is to provide investigation reports on the major accidents. According to

Article 15 of the Directive, MS must provide description of the circumstances and inform EC on the

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results of their accident analysis. The Directive defines the criteria for major accidents such as

substances involved (5% Lower-Tier, Seveso III 1% Lower-Tier), injury to persons and damage to real

estate, immediate damage to the environment, damage to property, cross border damage.

Generally, labor and environmental inspectorates carry out accident investigations. The presence of

training material or other forms of guidance are vital for inspectors to set up and maintain reporting

systems.

In order to fulfill its information obligations towards the Member States, the EC has established a so-

called Major-Accident Reporting System (MARS) and the Community Documentation Centre on

Industrial Risks (CDCIR) at the Major-Accident Hazards Bureau established within its Joint Research

Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy. The Bureau gives support to Environment Directorate General (DG ENV)

of the European Commission.

Commission Decision 2009/10/EC establishes the report form pursuant to Council Directive 96/82/EC

to be used. The short report form was for immediate notification of an accident and provided basic

information; the full report form was sent later when the investigation had been completed and the

cause(s) of the accident had been established.

The data is recorded on the Major Accident Reporting System (MARS). The names and addresses of

the operators are removed before the data is made available to the public on the eMARS website73

.

The EC uses the data to inform its decisions on future changes to legislation regarding major accident

hazards. The data is also made publicly available so that it can be used to learn lessons from the past

and help to prevent accidents in the future.

Annex - 5. 8. Sanctioning

Article 17 of the directive requires the competent authorities of member states to prohibit the bringing

into use or the operations of Establishments, installations, storage facilities installations for which the

measures taken by the operator for the prevention and mitigation of major accidents are seriously

deficient. Member States may also prohibit operations if the operator has not submitted:

Notification;

The reports;

Any other information required by the Directive.

The circumstances justifying prohibition of use, generally is a matter for Member States judgment in

the light of their individual experiences and procedures. The text of the Directive states ‘shall

prohibit’ with respect to serious deficiencies, but ‘may prohibit’ for matters of notification, report,

etc. In the second case, the intent is to allow Member States to use a range of measures as appropriate

to encourage compliance, but to retain the possibility of prohibition for cases of blatant disregard for

the notification, etc. requirements of the Directive.74

Annex - 5. 9. Reporting to EU

According to Article 19.4 of the Seveso II Directive, Member States have to provide the Commission

with a report every 3 years period giving details of how the Directive has been implemented within the

73

https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu 74Council Directive 96/82/EC as amended by Council Directive 2003/105/EC – Agreed questions and answers

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Member State based on a questionnaire. Member States provide report in accordance with the

Reporting Standardization Directive75

. These reports are limited to information related to Upper-Tier

Establishments covered by Articles 6 and 9 of the Seveso II Directive.

The Member States draws up a report covering the period in accordance with the questionnaire

published on the website of the European Commission. The Commission publishes a summary of that

information supplied by MS in every three years. The Commission published the first report about the

implementation of the original Seveso Directive in 1988. The first report for the period 1997-1999 was

published on 31 January 2002. The reports covering the other periods 2000-2002, 2003-2005, and

2006-2008 published on the website of the European Commission76

.

The latest questionnaire77

for the period 2012-2014, has been adopted by the Commission and notified

to the Member States on 30 June 2011. The questionnaire includes two parts: Part 1-Questionnaire and

Part 2-List with Seveso Activities.

Part 1 includes the General information about CAs, number of Seveso Establishments, number of

Emergency Plans drawn up and tested, Safety Reports submitted, information on safety measures,

inspections of Establishments, how the objectives of Domino Effects and Land Use Planning ensured.

While Part 1 provides general information on activities78

and numbers of all Seveso Establishments,

operators use the SPIRS activity list in Part 2 of the document. In summary, annual reports for the

Commission constitute questions about issues below listed in Box 15.

Box 15 - Content of the Implementation Report

General information about CAs,

number of Seveso Establishments

Domino Effects

Information on Safety Measures

Inspection

Safety Reports(Article 9)

Emergency Plans

Land use Planning

Prohibition of Use

Ports and Marshaling Yards

(optional)

75Directive 91/692/EEC of 23 December 1991, OJ L377, 31.12.1991, p. 48 76 Report for the period 2006-2008 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/report_2006_2008_en.pdf, Report

for the period 2003-2005 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/report_2003_2005_en.pdf, Report for the

period 2000-2002 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/report_en.pdf 77 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/questionnaires/1_EN_ACT_part1_v4.pdf 78A reply to this question can be fully or partially replaced by referring to and attaching a SPIRS report for

31/12/2014 (Reporting obligation under Article 19 1a). Member States that use for this SPIRS report the NACE

codes for classification of type of industry may continue to use these codes to describe the activities instead of the SPIRS activity list.

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/report_2006_2008_en.pdf


http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/report_en.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/questionnaires/1_EN_ACT_part1_v4.pdf

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Annex - 6. Background Information about Seveso I, II and III

European Commission proposed the original Directive 82/501/EEC, which is also known as Seveso I

Directive, in response to following an accident at a chemical plant in Seveso, Italy, in July 1976. The

accident resulted in the release of a cloud of chemicals containing dioxin, which covered Seveso and

other communities in the area, exposing 37,000 people.

In 1996, after several amendments following two other major accidents, namely, Bhopal, India, in

1984, and Basel, Switzerland, in 1986, the Directive on the Control of Major Accident Hazards was

adopted and became known as the Seveso II Directive.

Directive 96/82/EC was adopted in anticipation of the Community's approval of the Convention on the

Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, within the framework of the United Nations Economic

Commission for Europe. This approval took place on 23 March 1998, with the Council Decision

concerning the conclusion of the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents

(Decision 98/685/EC). Directive 96/82/EC is the instrument transposing the Community's obligations

under the Convention into Community law. The Seveso II Directive entered into force on 3 February

1997. Member States had up to two years to transpose their national laws, regulations and

administrative provisions to comply with the Directive (transposition period).

Seveso II Directive has introduced important new statements compared to the former Directive. It was

the first to include substances considered dangerous for the environment, in particular aqua toxics.

Moreover, it launched new management systems, which may minimize the occurrence of the major

accidents and strengthened the information provided to the public and ensured the access to the

environmental information in easier way.

Besides, the scope has been both extended and simplified, that is, the list of the industrial installations

has been removed from the Annex I, and the list of the named substances has been reduced, but at the

same time the categories of the dangerous substances have been increased and the criteria of the

certain category have been specified more precisely.

The main differences between Seveso I and Seveso II could be summarized below:

- Seveso II relates to establishment not installations

- A category ‘Dangerous to the Environment’ has been introduced

- Lower-Tier Establishments must comply with requirements under Articles Seven and Ten

- Article Eight is a new requirement for Upper-Tier operators

- Requirements for safety reports are set out in more detail

- New requirements relating to the safety management systems, emergency plans and land

use planning

- strengthened the provisions on inspections and public information

From 3 February 1999, the obligations of the Directive have become mandatory the implementation

and enforcement of the Directive.79

In 2003, Directive 2003/105/EC that amends Council Directive 96/82/EC has been adopted. Following

industrial accidents (Baia Mare-Romania in 2000, Enschede-Netherlands in 2001, Toulouse-France in

2001) resulted in broadening the scope of Seveso II rather than a major revision of it. It has started to

79 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/index.htm

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi%21celexplus%21prod%21DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=Directive&an_doc=1996&nu_doc=82

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi%21celexplus%21prod%21DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=Decision&an_doc=1998&nu_doc=685

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi%21celexplus%21prod%21DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=Directive&an_doc=1996&nu_doc=82

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cover the processing and storage of minerals containing dangerous substances extracted in mining and

quarrying, and the tailings disposal facilities used in these activities.

On 20 January 2009, the new Regulation on classification, labeling and packaging of substances and

mixtures (CLP) entered into force. It aligns existing EU legislation with the United Nations Globally

Harmonized System of classification and labeling of chemicals (GHS). The CLP Regulation will

replace Directives 67/548/EEC (DSD) and 1999/45/EC (DPD) after a transitional period. Thus,

dangerous substances must be classified according to the CLP as well as the DSD from 1 December

2010, and from 1 June 2015, the CLP will repeal the DSD/DPD for both substances and mixtures

(currently called preparations).

The CLP regulation amends and repeals Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC (packaging and

labeling of dangerous substances and preparations, respectively, and amending Regulation (EC) No

1907/2006 entered into force on 20 January 2009)

GHS includes consumers, workers, and emergency responders, yet it is not legally binding itself,

although its introduction via the CLP makes it legally binding in the EU.

Brief history about Seveso I, II and III is given at Table 17.

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Table 17 - Background Information about Seveso I, II and III

Event Explanation Consequences Resulted in

Seveso, Italy 1976

Dioxin escape, spread over countryside, more environmental impacts

3,000 pets and farm animals died and later, 70,000 animals were slaughtered to prevent dioxins from entering the food chain

82/5001/EEC Seveso I

Bhopal, India 1984

Leak of Methyl Isocyanate

Estimates of its death toll range from 4,000 to 20,000. The disaster caused the region's human and animal populations severe health problems to the present.

87/216/EEC (1st amendment)

Some substances added and lowering the thresholds for others

Sandoz, Basle 1986

The storehouse, was completely destroyed by the fire

The Sandoz disaster in, Switzerland, released tons of toxic agrochemicals into the Rhine, death of half a million fish

88/610/EC (2nd amendment)

It increased the number of warehouses subject to the Directive

In 1988, fundamental review of Directive result in a proposal that would become 96/82/EC-Seveso II Directive

Baia Mare, Romania 2000

Cyanide spill Untreated cyanide waste has mixed with the Danube River.

2003/105/EC (3rdAmendment) -It extends the scope to mining quarrying; -a redefinition of ammonium-nitrate -new classes covering self-sustaining decomposition and reject material; -new thresholds for potassium nitrate fertilizers, -seven new carcinogens, and raised threshold limits for all carcinogens; -a new definition of automotive petrol to include diesel and kerosene,

Enschede, Netherlands,2001

Fireworks accident 21 people killed and 800 injured -lower qualifying thresholds for substances dangerous for the environment;

Toulouse, France 2001

explosion at a fertilizer plant

-An explosion at the AZF fertilizer factory killed 29 and injured 2,500 -Extensive Structural damage to neighborhoods

-a change to the aggregation rule to be applied to all substances classified as toxic, dangerous for the environment, flammable and oxidizing;

In 2008, F-Seveso Report

Report on implementation of the Directive and assessed the effectiveness of the Directive

Views from 8 Member State Proposal for amended Directive

(industry, CAs, NGOs)

The EC published a proposal for an amended Directive, 21.11.2010

Changes to the EU system of classification of dangerous substances (Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008

In 2010, EC published a proposal (COM(2010)781) for amended Directive

Seveso III –

To align Annex 1 of the Directive changes to the EU system classification of dangerous substances

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Annex - 7. Industrial Accident Records in Turkey

This section will give details of the recorded accidents data from Turkey. Data on occupational

accidents from The Social Insurance Institution and data on (major) industrial accidents from MoEU

will be investigated. In addition, Technological Accidents Information System (TAIS) database will be

analyzed.

In Turkey, although occupational accidents are registered in a systematic manner and wide range of

statistics are available thereof, information on industrial accidents is very limited. Lack of a regulation

on control of industrial accidents is the primary reason of this deficiency. Seveso II Directive requires

a reporting system for industrial accidents and it will be helpful to solve mentioned problem in that

sense.

Data from The Social Insurance Institution (SII) under MoLSS provide the reliable and complete

information only for occupational accidents (see Table 18). Employers are obliged to report the

accident to the SII within two days after it occurs. Labor Inspectors from MoLSS have to conduct an

investigation at the accident site. The Labor Inspectorate investigates only accidents that result in

death, loss of a body part or long-term hospitalization, which are classified as serious accidents.

Table 18 - Employment Injury and Occupational Diseases

Type of accident 2010

Male Female Total

Transportation accidents 2.331 202 2.533

Accidental poisoning 26 1 27

Falls of persons 8.187 805 8.992

Accident caused by machinery 7.137 464 7.601

Accident caused by explosion 624 13 637

Exposure to or contact with extreme temperatures 1.339 133 1.472

Struck by falling objects 11.638 318 11.956

Stepping on, striking against or struck by objects excluding falling objects 21.697 1.649 23.346

Exposure to or contact with electric current 423 8 431

Injuries due to challenging of the body 1.091 45 1.136

Contamination of the part of body with a foreign object 757 35 792

Biting and kicking by animals, by poisonous insect 39 1 40

Treatment accident and vaccination complications 3 1 4

Late appearance of a problem because of an earlier accident 6 0 6

Accident while welding 148 1 149

Murder and wound 192 4 196

Trauma due to battle operation 2 0 2

Exposure to or contact with harmful substances or radiations 123 15 138

Other types of accident, not elsewhere classified 3.248 197 3.445

Total 59.011 3.892 62.903

Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 2010

MoEU is another administrative body that collects information about accidents in the past, by post-

event site inspections or by using related regulatory instruments, such as Environmental Inspection

Regulation or Decree on Major Industrial Accidents.

FINAL


However, these efforts were mostly CAs specific and have not continued regularly. The only publicly

available data on major accidents from the governmental resources is an inventory document prepared

by the MoEU, which contains information on 26 accidents that occurred between 1997 and 200780

.

This specific document gives a general idea; however, there are still some missing industrial accidents

(see Table 19).

Table 19 - The Provincial Distribution of Industrial Accidents Between 1997-2007 in Turkey, (MoEF, 2007)

No Location Date Establishment Event

1 İstanbul 14.02.1997 Tuzla Tersaneleri Fire

2 Kırıkkale 03.07.1997 M.K.E. Explosion

3 Denizli 11.10.1997 Aciselsan Fire

4 Tekirdağ 21.10.1998 PEG Profilo Elektrikli Gereçler San A.Ş. Fire

5 Kocaeli 22.07.1999 D-130 Karayolu Release

6 Yalova 17.08.1999 Aksa Release

7 İzmit 17.08.1999 Tüpraş Explosion

8 Tekirdağ 21.12.1999 Likit Kimya San.ve Tic. Ltd.Şti. Explosion

9 Kocaeli 23.06.2000 Altinel Melamin San:A.Ş. Explosion

10 Kocaeli 04.08.2000 Total Oil Fire

11 İzmit 15.08.2000 Serfleks Yer Karoları San. Tic. Turz. A.Ş. Fire

12 Eskişehir 18.01.2001 Şeker Fab. Explosion

13 Kocaeli 08.02.2001 Aysan boya ve Kimya San. A.Ş. Explosion

14 İstanbul 16.02.2002 LPG Tesisi Explosion

15 İzmit Körfez 28.07.2002 Akçagaz LPG Dolum Tesisleri Explosion

16 İstanbul 22.05.2003 Büfe Explosion

17 Ankara 05.08.2003 LPG Tesisi Explosion

18 Kayseri 20.08.2003 Yatılı Okul Explosion

19 Mersin 25.07.2004 Ataş Fire

20 İstanbul 24.04.2006 Saf Kimya Fire

21 Bursa Nilüfer 29.05.2006 Soykim Kimyevi Maddeler Release

22 İstanbul Tuzla 31.07.2006 Dicle Kimya Fire

23 Gaziantep 21.09.2006 Alles Kimya Explosion

24 Ankara 04.01.2007 Tüpgaz dolum tesisi Explosion

25 Ankara 21.02.2007 İPRAGAZ Anonim Şirketi Explosion

26 Denizli 04.03.2007 Gamateks Fire

As stated above, information on major industrial accidents is very limited. Lack of a regulation on

regular reporting of major industrial accidents is the primary reason of the deficiency. In order to

record major accidents, MoEU Chemicals Department provided accident-reporting document as a

requirement of the Directive. It will also be available in electronic medium.81

Beside the governmental documents TAIS, which is an academic effort to collect and share

information on technological accidents that occurred in Turkey, is currently the most comprehensive

80 “Ülkemizde meydana gelen endüstriyel kazaların il bazında dağılımı”, T.C. Çevre ve Orman Bakanlığı, 2007 81 http://kimyasallar.cob.gov.tr/HalkiBilgilendirme/menubilgileri.aspx

FINAL


data source on industrial accidents.82

It contains over 500 industrial accidents that spans between 1967

and 2010, together with reference information such as newspaper articles and photographs. In order to

give a brief idea about industrial accident history of Turkey, summary information on selected

accidents from TAIS is given in Table 20. Selection is not based on solid criteria and is just for

informative purposes. Number of fatalities and injuries are not official. Accident type column lists the

major event in case of multiple events (e.g. explosion and fire, explosion and chemical release).

Data from TAIS provides the distribution of industrial accidents by employees’ age and sex, work

environment (enterprise size-number of employees, economic activity or sector, type of accident),

working conditions (days, hours of work and shift work) and outcomes (death or injury).

The lack of comprehensive industrial accident inventory system impedes making general statements

about number of accidents, number of fatalities, type of industry, physical effects (explosion, fire, and

release), damage to real estate, immediate damage to the environment, damage to property etc.

Table 20 - List of selected industrial accidents that occurred in Turkey

Date Location Installation Accident Description

12.07.1976 Balikesir Sugar Factory Explosion 1 fatalities, 6 injured

21.01.1977 Izmir Petroleum Refinery Explosion Property damage (interruption of

production)

14.02.1978 Kocaeli Petroleum Storage Plant Fire Property damage (complete

destruction)

14.04.1978 Izmir Sugar Factory Explosion 2 fatalities, 1 injured

07.05.1979 Izmir LPG Warehouse Explosion Property damage (off-site)

15.06.1979 Kirikkale Gunpowder Factory Explosion 3 fatalities

01.06.1980 Batman Petroleum Refinery Explosion 2 fatalities, 18 injured (interruption of production)

03.05.1982 Kirikkale Gunpowder Factory Explosion 3 injured

12.04.1985 Zonguldak Iron-Steel Factory Explosion 18 injured

16.07.1985 Karabuk Iron-Steel Factory Explosion 6 injured

30.01.1986 Zonguldak Iron-Steel Factory Explosion 15 injured

13.08.1986 Kirikkale Munitions Factory Explosion 7 fatalities, 24 injured (off-site

evacuation)

12.03.1987 K.Maras Thermal Power Plant Explosion Property damage (interruption of

production)

10.05.1988 Kocaeli Fermentation Plant Explosion 5 fatalities

05.03.1989 Istanbul Painting Factory Explosion 14 fatalities, 44 injured

26.07.1990 Izmir Factory Explosion 3 fatalities, 5 injured

24.12.1990 Istanbul Drug Factory Explosion 2 fatalities

04.02.1991 Ankara Hunting Cartridge Factory Explosion 2 fatalities, 1 injured

28.11.1992 Izmir Ship Disassembly Plant Explosion 6 fatalities

08.08.1992 Tekirdağ Textile Factory Explosion 32 fatalities, 84 injured

15.09.1993 Gaziantep Factory Explosion 8 fatalities,26 injured (complete destruction)

82www.teknolojikkazalar.org/

FINAL


31.08.1995 Ankara Gunpowder Factory Explosion 2 fatalities

13.02.1997 Istanbul Shipyard Explosion 2 fatalities, 24 injured

03.07.1997 Kırıkkale Munitions Factory Explosion Property damage (off-site

evacuation)

11.10.1997 Denizli Cellulose Factory Fire Property damage

21.10.1998 Tekirdağ Electric Appliances Factory Fire Property damage (off-site

evacuation)

17.08.1999 Kocaeli Petroleum Refinery Fire Property damage (off-site

evacuation)

17.08.1999 Yalova Acrylic Fiber Factory Release Damage to environment (offsite

evacuation) [Acrylonitrile]

27.09.1999 Istanbul Painting Factory Fire 6 fatalities, 20 injured

21.12.1999 Tekirdağ Chemical Warehouse Release 2 fatalities, 3 injured, damage to

environment [Hydrochloric acid]

17.01.2000 Istanbul Textile Factory Explosion Property damage

23.06.2000 Kocaeli Chemical Warehouse Explosion 4 injured

04.08.2000 Kocaeli Petroleum Storage Fire Property damage

15.08.2000 Kocaeli Floor Tile Factory Fire 1 injured

18.01.2001 Eskişehir Sugar Factory Release Damage to environment [Molasses]

08.02.2001 Kocaeli Paint Factory Fire Property damage

15.02.2002 Istanbul Textile Factory Explosion 7 injured, property damage (offsite)

16.02.2002 Istanbul Radiator Factory Explosion 11 injured, property damage

(offsite)

10.06.2002 Istanbul Rubber Factory Explosion 1 fatality, property damage (complete

destruction)

03.07.2002 Kocaeli Petroleum Refinery Explosion 5 injured

28.07.2002 Kocaeli LPG Storage Plant Explosion 2 injured, property damage (offsite)

(offsite evacuation)

11.08.2002 Muğla Thermal Power Plant Fire Property damage (offsite effect)

13.08.2002 Aydın Food Factory Explosion 1 fatality, 32 injured

16.12.2002 Kocaeli Iron-Steel Factory Explosion 1 fatality, 2 injured

30.12.2002 Van Food Factory Explosion 4 fatalities, 3 injured

30.03.2003 Adana Dough Additive Factory Explosion 9 fatalities, 11 injured

05.07.2003 Ankara LPG Station Explosion 110 injured

11.07.2003 Izmir LPG Warehouse Explosion 2 injured

30.07.2003 Istanbul Iron-Steel Factory Explosion 2 fatalities, 2 injured

04.08.2003 Kocaeli Petroleum Refinery Fire Property damage

12.09.2003 Kocaeli Painting Factory Explosion Property damage

30.10.2003 Balikesir Meet Processing Factory Release 39 injured [Ammonia]

03.11.2003 Hatay Chemical Factory Release 150 injured (off-site effect) [Phosphoric acid]

05.12.2003 Adapazari Textile Factory Fire Property damage

25.07.2004 Mersin Petroleum Refinery Fire Property damage

24.04.2006 Istanbul Chemical Factory Fire Property damage

29.05.2006 Bursa Chemical Warehouse Release 5 injured [Reaction products]

31.07.2006 Istanbul Chemical Factory Fire 1 injured

FINAL


21.09.2006 Gaziantep Chemical Factory Explosion 3 fatalities, 34 injured, damage to

environment

04.01.2007 Ankara LPG Storage Facility Explosion 1 fatality, 1 injured

27.01.2007 Istanbul Lube Oil Storage Explosion 4 fatalities

01.02.2007 Kocaeli Petroleum Refinery Explosion 2 fatalities, 7 injured

04.03.2007 Denizli Textile Factory Fire Property damage

12.02.2008 Istanbul Cosmetics Factory Fire 11 injured, property damage

15.03.2009 Izmir Petroleum Refinery Explosion 4 injured

21.05.2009 Sakarya Fireworks Factory Explosion 3 injured

29.09.2009 Sakarya Fireworks Factory Explosion 2 injured

20.11.2009 Kocaeli Petroleum Refinery Explosion 2 injured

24.11.2009 Antalya Chemical Factory Explosion 3 injured

Source: Preliminary Seveso RIA Report

Annex - 7. 1. Overview of Some Notable Accidents

The UNEP guidance document83

, A flexible Framework Addressing Chemical Accident Prevention

and Preparedness describes a number of well-known chemical accidents such as: Flixborough (UK

1974); Seveso (Italy 1976); Bhopal (India 1984); Mexico City (Mexico 1984);Basel (Switzerland

1986); Pasadena (US 1989); Baia Mare (Romania 2000); Enschede (Netherlands 2000);Toulouse

(France 2001); Texas City (US 2005); Jilin, Songhua River (China 2005); and Buncefield (UK 2005).

Table 21 - Overview of Some Notable Accidents Date/Place Description Casualties / Consequences

01.08.1974/ Flixborough, United

Kingdom

-Inadequate design coupled with poor management of change led to a release of ca. 30 tonnes of cyclohexane at a chemical facility, resulting in a vapour cloud explosion which destroyed the facility and caused damage up to several km away.

28 killed, 89 injured

10.07.1976/ Seveso, Italy

-Loss of control of an exothermic chemical reaction led to the loss of the contents of the reactor via the bursting disc and the pressure relief system at a small chemical manufacturer. A cloud of toxic and corrosive chemicals formed, containing phenols, sodium hydroxide, and ca. 2 kg of 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) “Seveso Dioxin.”

-Among the causes was the use of an inherently more dangerous reaction route to produce the trichlorophenol (TCP) than competing companies and dangerous operating practices which allowed the production shift to leave the reactor with insufficient cooling at the end of the Saturday morning shift.

- Large number of cases of Chloracne due to TCDD contamination

- ca. 410 cases of chemical

burns (probably caustic) Evacuation of over 5,700 people from the area immediately affected by the toxic plume

- Widespread

83 A Flexible Framework for Addressing Chemical Accident Prevention and Preparedness- A Guidance

Document (2010) http://www.unep.fr/scp/sp/saferprod/pdf/UN_Flexible_Framework_WEB_FINAL.pdf

http://www.unep.fr/scp/sp/saferprod/pdf/UN_Flexible_Framework_WEB_FINAL.pdf

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-Due to the lack of management responsibility and poor communication between the company management and local authorities after the accident, measures to prevent exposure of the population and to decontaminate the area were taken extremely slow.

contamination of the surrounding countryside Large number of livestock killed as a precautionary measure 11 July 1978

19.11.1984,Mexico City, Mexico

-A 200 mm pipe between a storage cylinder and sphere ruptured, releasing LPG. The release continued for some 5 to 10 minutes resulting in a large gas cloud which ignited, causing an explosion and many ground fires.

-These ground fires led to a series of BLEVEs in the LPG terminal. The cause of escalation was the ineffective gas detection system and, as a result, lack of emergency isolation.

-The high death toll occurred because of the proximity of the plant to residential areas. The total destruction of the facility occurred because there was a failure of the overall system of protection, including layout, emergency isolation, and water spray systems. The terminal’s fire water system was disabled in the initial blast. The plant had no gas detection system and, therefore, when the emergency isolation was initiated it was probably too late

650 killed

6,400 injured

03.11.1984/Bhopal, India

-A cloud of methyl isocyanate was released at a pesticide plant after water entered a storage tank, resulting in the deadliest chemical disaster in history. The addition of water to the tank caused a runaway chemical reaction, resulting in a rapid rise in pressure and temperature. This resulted in the formation of poisonous gases that escaped from the plant into the surrounding areas and drifted eight km over the city of Bhopal.

-The plant was located in a crowded working-class neighborhood, and there was no warning for people surrounding the facility as the plant emergency sirens had been switched off. The gas release resulted in the death of many people living in informal settlements near the installation who were blinded and suffocated by the chemicals.

-The storage of large amounts of toxic intermediate (an inherently unsafe process design), lack of effective safety measures and controls, poor site management, and close proximity of the local population have all been identified as major contributors to this accident and its devastating

>3,000 killed

170,000 injured

FINAL


consequences.

13.05.2000/Enschede,

Netherlands

- A stock of ca. 100 tonnes of explosives was detonated by a smaller fire. This led to a massive explosion and fireball which destroyed and damaged property in a wide area surrounding the site. Poor control of storage, as well as lack of control related to the siting of the installation, were major contributors to the accident.

21 killed

> 900 injured

21.09.2001/Toulouse, France

- An explosion in an ammonium nitrate and fertilizer factory destroyed the facility and caused widespread damage in the surrounding area. Problems with land-use planning contributed to the extent of the damage and the number of injuries.

31 killed

ca. 2,500 injured

23.03.2005/Texas City, Texas, United States

-A major explosion occurred in an isomerisation unit of the refinery. This was caused by the overfilling of the raffinate splitter with liquid, overheating of the liquid, and release of hydrocarbon through the blowdown drum and stack. The ignition of this vapour cloud led to extensive damage to the facility and the casualties, many of whom were in temporary buildings located in a neighbouring installation.

-Numerous failings in equipment, risk management, staff management, working culture at the site, maintenance and inspection, and general health and safety assessments were identified as problems in the investigations of the incident.

15 killed

170 injured

Substantial damage to property within a radius of

400 m Windows were damaged several km away

FINAL


11.11.2005/Buncefield, United

Kingdom

-The massive overfilling of a petroleum storage tank by pipeline at a fuel storage depot led to several explosions and a fire which engulfed 22 storage tanks.

-Inadequate control of the filling and tank gauging as well as an ineffective overfill protection system were the main causes of this incident. The close proximity of neighbouring office buildings and also residential property meant that there was substantial damage.

-There was no loss of life and relatively few injuries due to the fact that the incident took place early on a Sunday morning.

Disruption to the fuel distribution network,

particularly the distribution of aviation fuel to Heathrow

airport

FINAL


Annex - 8. SPIRS Database and Seveso Establishments in EU

European Commission established different systems to avoid or limit the consequences of major

accidents. One of these systems is Seveso Plants Information Retrieval System (SPIRS).

The SPIRS is a database system aimed to provide access to the European Commission on risk-related

information from major hazardous industrial establishments in Europe. The database contains data

reported by the 27 Member States and three of the EEA/EFTA countries (Iceland, Norway and

Switzerland) through the Committee of Competent Authorities (CCA) to the Seveso II Directive.

The SPIRS database was established in the 2001-2002 period when the EU was consisted only of 15

countries. In addition, several countries accepted to the European Union in 2004, reported their data on

a voluntary basis before or shortly after accession.

As of September 2010, there were 9937 Seveso Establishments in the reporting countries in the SPIRS

database of which 4575 (46 %) were Upper-Tier and 5323 (54 %) Lower-Tier. Among these countries,

Germany had the largest number of Establishments (2141, which corresponds to 21.55 %), followed

by France (1106; 11.13 %), Italy (1095 or 11.02 %) and the United Kingdom (1082; 10.89 %).

The majority of countries (19 out of 29) have a higher number of Lower-Tier Establishments while,

two countries have the same number of upper and Lower-Tier Establishments. Distribution of

Establishments based on the industrial activities in the EU is shown in Figure 21. The Figures 20 to 31

taken from SPIRS publications gives the more details on the Seveso Establishments in the EU.

Figure 21 - EU Seveso Establishments on the basis of Category/Sector

Source: REC Turkey, Data source: SPIRS

FINAL


Figure 22 - Distribution of the Seveso Establishments

in Europe in 2010 according to SPIRS

Figure 23 - Seveso Establishments in the

European regions, by NUTS 2

Figure 24 - Chemical installations covered under

Seveso II by NUTS 2 regions

Figure 25 - Transport and storage group of Seveso

Establishments by NUTS 2 regions

Figure 26 - Seveso Establishments with

manufacturing activity by NUTS 2 regions

Figure 27 - Seveso Establishments belonging to

the petrochemical industries by NUTS 2 regions

FINAL


Figure 28 - Seveso Establishments with metal

processing activity by NUTS 2 regions

Figure 29 - Seveso Establishments with power

generation, supply and distribution by NUTS 2

regions

Figure 30 - Seveso Establishments with water,

sewage and waste management by NUTS 2 regions

Figure 31 - Seveso Establishments with

agricultural activity by NUTS 2 regions

Figure 32 - Seveso Establishments in the mining

sector by NUTS 2 regions

Figure 33 - Distribution of Seveso Establishments

by country

FINAL


Annex - 8. 1. SPIRS Categories

In order to analyze the different classification systems of industrial activities used in the reporting

countries all types of activities have been reconfigured to be consistent with the SPIRS new list. In

addition, industrial activities in the SPIRS have been grouped into 10 categories84

in order to make

them easier to see in a GIS environment (see Table 22).

Table 22 - Generalization of industrial activities in SPIRS into new aggregated categories

84 “Other activity” includes the SPIRS new list categories of leisure and sport activities; medical, research and

education, and other activities not included in the list. This category can also contain the establishments that did

not clearly identify or left blank their industrial activity.

FINAL


Annex - 9. Seveso Establishments and Seveso Information System

Annex - 9. 1. MoEU Notification System

This section briefly gives information on the MoEU Notification System and illustrates number of

Seveso Establishments in Turkey, with graphs and figures.

According to the Directive, each Member State (MS) must supply the name of the operator of each

Seveso establishment and its full address to the European Commission (EC). In addition to the address

field, MS should also provide the geographic location of Establishments.

In order to fulfill the Seveso II requirements, Turkey established a notification system. Operators must

enter the relevant data to system.

The system includes the information given in Box 16.

Box 16 - Data in MoEU Notification System

- name or trade name of the operator,

- name of the establishment/installation

- complete address of establishment

- activity or activities of the

establishment

- industry type

- environmental information surrounding the

establishment,

- information whether establishment is on coastline

- information whether establishment is in industrial

zone

- information whether establishment is in municipal

adjacent area

Notification System and data includes tier status of Establishments, industrial sector type, province,

area of business, environmental information surrounding the establishment, and information whether

establishment is in industrial zone or on coastline. However, Seveso Notification System does not

provide direct information on the size of Establishments (i.e. whether SMEs or not) and either public

or privately owned.

MoEU established the Seveso Notification System. Notification procedure consists of two phases:

registration of establishment to “Environmental Information System” and

notification to Seveso Notification System (see Figure 34).

According to information taken from the system in December 2011, the total number of Seveso

Establishments in Turkey is 518. Among these, the number of Lower-Tier Establishments is 267

(51.5%) and the number of Upper-Tier Establishments is 251(48.5%).

FINAL


Figure 34 - MoEU Notification System Figure 35 - Number of the Seveso Establishments

in the MoEU Notification System (December,

2011)

The MoEU notification system classifies Establishments over 20 different industrial activities. To get

clearer picture of industrial activities of Seveso Establishments, REC Turkey reclassified

Establishments in the system according to SPIRS new aggregated categories with the consultation of

MoEU officials (see Box 17).

FINAL


Box 17 - Industrial activities in MoEU and their correspondence in SPIRS Categories

Table 23 summarizes the all information of Seveso Establishments and Figure 36 illustrates the Seveso

establishment’s distribution according to industrial activities categories. This categorization gives a

general idea about distribution of industrial activities belong the Establishments in Turkey. The results

indicate that Petrochemical, Chemical installations and Manufacturing industrial activities are in

majority and covers the 75.2% of all Seveso Establishments. Petrochemical (e.g. oil refineries, storage

and distribution) sector includes LPG production, bottling and bulk distribution, LPG storage, LNG

storage and distribution. This group has the largest representation (29.9 %) in the MoEU notification

system.

Industrial activities in the MoEU Notification System Industrial activities in the SPIRS

1. Paint Industry

2. Fertilizer Industry

3. General Chemicals Manufacture

4. Pharmaceuticals and Pesticides

5. Plastics and rubber manufacture

6. Electronics and electrical engineering

7. General Engineering , Manufacturing and Assembly

8. Food and Drinks

9. Manufacturing of Paper

10. Wood treatment and furniture

11. Cosmetics

12. Machine industry (automotive, shipping, etc.)

13. Ceramics ,Glass, Cement

14. Textiles, clothing and footwear

15. Shipbuilding, shipbreaking, ship repair

16. Power Generation and Distribution Power generation, supply and distribution

17. Metal refining and processing Processing of metals

18. Petrochemistry Industry, Oil Refineries and processing of oils

19. Wholesale and retail storage and distribution (incl. LPG bottling & bulk distribution

20. Other Other activity

21. Water and sewage (collection, supply, treatment) Water and sewage and waste management

22. Mining activities Mining activities

Transporting and storage

-Handling and transportation centers

-Fuel storage

-Wholesale and retail storage and distribution

(excluding LPG)

Chemical installations (excluding petrochemical)

Manufacturing

23. Wholesale and retail storage and distribution (excluding LPG bottling & bulk distribution)

Petrochemical (e.g. oil refineries, storage and distribution)

FINAL


Table 23 - Upper and Lower-Tier Establishments with Industrial Activities

Figure 36 shows the details of the distribution of Establishments based on the industrial activities.

Figure 36 - Industrial Activities Distribution of All Seveso Establishments

Figure 37 and Figure 38 illustrates the distribution of lower and Upper-Tier Seveso Establishments

with their industrial activities.

Industrial Activities Lower Tier Upper Tier Grand Total

Petrochemical (e.g. oil refineries, storage and distribution 58 97 155

Chemical installations (excluding petrochemical) 60 60 120

Manufacturing 86 30 116

Transporting and storage 24 36 60

Processing of metals 16 10 26

Power generation, supply and distribution 12 12 24

Mining activities 7 5 12

Water and sewage and waste management 2 1 3

Other activity 2 0 2

Grand Total 267 251 518

FINAL


Figure 37 - Industrial Activities Distribution

of Lower-Tier Seveso Establishments

Figure 38 - Industrial Activities Distribution of

Upper-Tier Seveso Establishments

Figure 39 illustrates Seveso Establishments, by NUTS 1 regions in the Turkey.

Figure 39 Seveso Establishments in the Turkey regions, by NUTS 1

Annex - 9. 2. EU and Turkey

In this section, Seveso Establishments in Turkey and in EU are compared. The number of Seveso

Establishments in Turkey comes after Germany, France, Italy, UK, and Spain. In Turkey, the

industrial categorization of the Establishments shows nearly same pattern in EU. Turkey has same

percentage rates in distribution of the Establishments’ industrial activities with EU. The main

differences result from Transporting and Storage sector.

FINAL


Figure 40 - Seveso Establishment of EU Countries and Turkey

Source: REC Turkey, Data Source: SPIRS Database (2010) and MoEU Notification System (2011)

Figure 41 - Industrial Categories of Seveso Establishment in EU and Turkey

Source: REC Turkey, Data Source: SPIRS Database (2010) and MoEU Notification System (2011)

Annex - 9. 3. Final estimation of number current “Seveso Establishments”

According to data form MoEU Notification System, there are registered Establishments to notification

system, but not notified their chemical. Moreover, there still exist Establishments that are not

registered to notification system based on survey data.

REC Turkey predicts expected current number of Seveso Establishments in notification system will

increase to 827, this estimation carried out by utilizing the current information from notification

system and survey. Therefore, with the notification of these Establishments, the total number is

expected to increase.

FINAL


As December 2011, there are 3364 Establishments, which are registered to the system. Out of all the

Establishments that registered, 2315 of them notified (69% of all registered ones) and 1049 (31%) of

them registered but not notified.

Distribution of those registered and notified Establishments (2315) follows like that 11% are Upper-

Tier, 12 % Lower-Tier and the rest (77%) is out of scope of the Directive.

By using percentage distribution of registered and notified Establishments’ number data, REC Turkey

distributed the registered but not notifying Establishments. Moreover, based on survey data, there still

exist Establishments that are not registered to notification system. REC Turkey assumed that 10% of

potential Seveso Establishments do not registered. These additional Establishments are distributed

according to current numbers percentage and sectorial percentage.

After calculating the numbers of registered but not notifying and not registered potential Seveso

Establishments, REC Final estimation for the Seveso Establishments in Turkey is realized (see Table

24).

Table 24 - Final estimation of current Seveso Establishments

Annex - 9. 4. Preliminary estimation of “Seveso Establishments”

In pre-RIA studies, preliminary estimation carried for the determination of the potential Seveso

Establishments II Directive. It is given in figure below (see Figure 42).

Figure 42 - Preliminary estimation of “Seveso Establishments”

Sector Notification Registered, Not Notified Not Registered Total

Count of Establishment - Lower Tier Number Total Percentage Seveso Total Percentage Seveso Total

petrochemical (e.g oil refineries,storage and distribution) 58 1049 3% 26 84 10% 8 92

manufacturing 86 1049 4% 39 125 10% 13 138

chemical installations(excludeing petrochemical) 60 1049 3% 27 87 10% 9 96

Processing of metals 16 1049 1% 7 23 10% 2 25

transporting and storage 24 1049 1% 11 35 10% 4 39

Power generation, supply and distribution 12 1049 1% 5 17 10% 2 19

Mining activities 7 1049 0% 3 10 10% 1 11

Other activity (not included above) 2 1049 0% 1 3 10% 0 3

water and sewage and waste management 2 1049 0% 1 3 10% 0 3

agriculture 1049 0% 0 0 10% 0 0

Grand Total 267 120 387 39 426

Sector Notification Registered, Not Notified Not Registered Total

Count of Establishment -Upper Tier Number Total Percentage Seveso Total Percentage Seveso Total

petrochemical (e.g oil refineries,storage and distribution) 97 1049 4% 44 141 10% 14 155

manufacturing 30 1049 1% 14 44 10% 4 48

chemical installations(excludeing petrochemical) 60 1049 3% 27 87 10% 9 96

Processing of metals 10 1049 0% 5 15 10% 2 17

transporting and storage 36 1049 2% 16 52 10% 5 57

Power generation, supply and distribution 12 1049 1% 5 17 10% 2 19

Mining activities 5 1049 0% 2 7 10% 1 8

Other activity (not included above) 1049 0% 0 0 10% 0 0

water and sewage and waste management 1 1049 0% 0 1 10% 0 1

agriculture 1049 0% 0 0 10% 0 0

Grand Total 251 113 364 37 401

FINAL


The previously used industrial sector categorization is given in Table 25 and distribution of

Establishments relevant to Seveso Directive is given Table 26.

Table 25 - Previously used industrial sector categorization in pre-RIA

No Industrial Sector (F-Seveso) Industrial Sector (TOBB)

1 Wholesale and retail storage and distribution

(including LPG)

7191: Depolama ve dolum işleri

71910002: LPG ve diğer gazların dolumu, depolanması

2 General chemical manufacture 3511: Ana kimya sanayi

3 Pesticides, pharmaceuticals, other fine

chemicals

3512: Kimyasal gübre, tarımsal ilaçlar sanayi

3522: İlaçlar

4 Metal refining and processing (foundries,

electrochemical refining, plating, etc.)

37: Metal sanayi

5 Power supply and distribution (electric, gas,

etc.)

41: Elektrik, gaz üretimi ve dağıtımı

6 Petrochemical, refining, processing 3530: Petrol ürünleri sanayi

354: Çeşitli petrol ve kömür türevleri sanayi

7 General engineering, manufacturing and

assembly

8 Plastics and rubber manufacture 355: Lastik ürünleri sanayi

3560: Plastik mamulleri sanayi

351301: Sentetik kauçuk

351305: Plastik

9 Water and sewage (collection, supply,

treatment)

42: Suyun sağlanması, temizlenmesi ve dağıtımı

10 Food and drink

Table 26 - Industrial distribution of Establishments more relevant to Seveso

Directive

Province 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 TOTAL

Adana 27 11 12 58 4 20 185 3 320

Adıyaman 8 3 6 17

FINAL



Directive


Afyon 14 4 4 1 4 27 54

Ağrı 1 2 1 4

Aksaray 8 1 2 5 16 32

Amasya 8 2 2 6 20 38

Ankara 155 15 29 188 11 59 371 3 831

Antalya 68 4 25 9 3 7 99 1 216

Ardahan 0

Artvin 1 3 2 6

Aydın 48 1 1 6 2 2 30 90

Balıkesir 58 12 8 28 6 30 142

Bartın 1 3 13 17

Batman 3 10 6 19

Bayburt 1 4 5

Bilecik 1 3 13 3 1 12 2 35

Bingöl 3 1 3 7

Bitlis 1 3 4

Bolu 7 1 4 8 4 21 45

Burdur 5 1 13 19

Bursa 35 8 5 69 7 16 440 4 584

Çanakkale 9 2 2 2 4 2 12 33

Çankırı 3 2 1 7 13

Çorum 19 1 2 17 4 11 54

Denizli 14 4 37 7 9 73 4 148

Diyarbakır 7 1 2 25 35

Düzce 3 5 12 1 1 27 49

Edirne 7 6 13

Elazığ 20 4 8 1 27 60

Erzincan 3 1 1 8 13

Erzurum 29 3 4 13 49

Eskişehir 17 5 1 35 2 4 64 128

Gaziantep 46 6 4 24 1 23 268 1 373

Giresun 5 2 1 1 5 14

Gümüşhane 1 1 3 5

Hakkari 14 2 16

Hatay 40 7 6 52 16 52 1 174

Iğdır 1 1

Isparta 12 1 2 2 22 39

İstanbul 351 43 79 664 7 79 2,396 2 3,621

FINAL



Directive


İzmir 168 45 38 166 13 71 421 9 931

Kahramanmaraş 14 1 34 3 4 26 2 84

Karabük 3 1 39 2 4 49

Karaman 7 1 2 1 18 29

Kars 3 1 3 7

Kastamonu 4 1 3 7 15

Kayseri 45 8 1 40 4 10 109 217

Kilis 1 2 2 5

Kırıkkale 8 2 8 7 18 4 47

Kırklareli 3 3 4 7 9 3 9 38

Kırşehir 3 2 3 1 7 16

Kocaeli 53 39 22 188 14 62 281 6 665

Konya 110 9 18 200 1 23 253 1 615

Kütahya 14 9 1 6 9 27 66

Malatya 17 2 2 1 3 22 47

Manisa 63 5 10 22 2 11 94 1 208

Mardin 8 3 2 1 1 9 17 41

Mersin 72 12 12 21 5 15 93 2 232

Muğla 26 1 2 4 10 43

Muş 1 3 4

Nevşehir 13 3 11 27

Niğde 7 2 2 5 1 1 8 1 27

Ordu 12 1 1 2 11 27

Osmaniye 5 2 14 8 18 47

Rize 16 1 4 7 28

Sakarya 8 5 2 27 2 8 62 114

Samsun 34 4 9 33 2 8 92 182

Şanlıurfa 2 3 8 1 4 10 28

Siirt 3 1 1 5

Sinop 4 2 7 13

Şırnak 2 4 2 3 2 13

Sivas 19 1 2 13 2 27 64

Tekirdağ 27 9 8 33 18 10 77 12 194

Tokat 18 2 2 3 3 16 44

Trabzon 24 9 1 47 81

Tunceli 1 1

Uşak 3 2 3 1 7 23 1 40

Van 14 1 1 1 6 7 30

FINAL



Directive


Yalova 7 3 1 18 29

Yozgat 8 3 3 3 4 19 40

Zonguldak 8 2 31 1 2 29 1 74

TOTAL 1,908 308 346 2,188 143 593 6,241 63 11,790

FINAL


Annex - 10. Seveso Related Infringements in EU Member States85

There have been a number of cases decided in the European Court of Justice concerning Directive

96/82/EC. Some of them are listed below.

Three cases concerned the failure by Member States to failure to ensure adequate transposition of the

Directive :

o C-226/05 5.10.06. This was a judgment against Austria for failure to ensure adequate

transposition of the Directive within the prescribed period.

o C-383/00 14.05.02. This was a judgment against Germany for failure to ensure adequate


o C-423/00 17.01.02. This was a judgment against Belgium for failure to ensure adequate


o C-394/00 17.01.02. This was a judgment against Ireland for failure to ensure adequate


Three cases concerned the failure by Member States to draw an emergency plan:

o C-401/08 02.04.09. This was a judgment against Austria for failure to ensure adequate

emergency planning.

o C-342/08 12.03.09. This was a judgment against Belgium for failure to ensure that an

external emergency plan is drawn up for all the Establishments covered by Article 9.

o C-289/08 12.03.09. This was a judgment against Luxembourg for failure to ensure that an

external emergency plan is drawn up for all the Establishments covered by Article 9.

One case concerned the failure by Member State to ensure adequate transposition of Directive

2003/105/EC:

o C-375/06 24.05.07. This was a judgment against Portugal for failure to ensure adequate


85http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=264103:cs&lang=en&list=492415:cs,490719:cs,490693:cs,441110:cs,264103:cs,263955:cs,264117:cs,264109:cs,250826:cs,250823:cs,&pos=5&page=1&nbl=10&pgs=10&hwords=96/82%7E&checktexte=checkbox&visu=



http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=492415:cs&lang=en&list=492415:cs,490719:cs,490693:cs,441110:cs,264103:cs,263955:cs,264117:cs,264109:cs,250826:cs,250823:cs,&pos=1&page=1&nbl=10&pgs=10&hwords=96/82%7E


http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008J0289:EN:HTML

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=449793:cs&lang=en&list=451838:cs,449793:cs,287373:cs,413912:cs,284028:cs,&pos=2&page=1&nbl=5&pgs=10&hwords=2003/105%7E&checktexte=checkbox&visu=

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso

FINAL


Annex - 11. Member State Administrative Structures for the Implementation of Seveso II

LATVIA Responsible Body

Land Use Planning Local governments (municipalities) are responsible for Land Use

planning. The Environment State Bureau (ESB) is responsible

for making recommendations to municipalities

Inspections of Establishments The State Environment Service forms and heads an Inspection

commission, inviting representatives from the State Fire-

fighting and Rescue Service, the State Labor Inspectorate, the

relevant regional environmental board and local authorities

Assessment of the Safety Report The Environment State Bureau (ESB)

Developing an external (offsite)

emergency plan

The State Fire-fighting and Rescue Services (SFFRS)

Providing Information to the

Public

The operator and the State Fire-fighting and Rescue Service

Accident Reporting to the

European Commission

The State Environment Service (SES)

Lithuania Responsible Body

Land Use Planning The State Territorial Planning and Construction Inspectorate and its

structural inspectorates under the County Administrations

Inspections of Establishments The State Labor Inspectorate is the main body responsible for

inspections of Seveso Establishments. Other institutions

(Environmental Protection Inspectorate, Fire and Rescue

Department, the State Energy Inspectorate and the Health

Emergency Situations Centre also conduct inspections and

there is a move to conduct joint inspections with the identified

institutions

Assessment of the Safety Report The Fire and Rescue department, The Environmental Protection

Agency, the State Labor Inspectorate and the State Energy

Inspectorate are jointly responsible


emergency plan

Municipalities and County Administrators


Public

The Operator


European Commission

-

Italy Responsible Body

Land Use Planning Regional Authorities

Inspections of Establishments The Regional Technical Committee (which includes the

Environmental Minister, Regional

Technical expert for pollution prevention and Municipal Authorities

and the Fire Brigade Director)

Assessment of the Safety Report The Regional Technical Committee (which includes the

Environmental Minister, Regional Technical expert for

pollution prevention and Municipal Authorities and the Fire

FINAL


Brigade Director)


emergency plan

the Prefecture


Public

The Mayor


European Commission

The Regional Technical Committee (which includes the

Environmental Minister, Regional Technical expert for

pollution prevention and Municipal Authorities and the Fire

Brigade Director)

Lithuania Responsible Body

Land Use Planning Administration of the Environment (ADE)/Labor Inspectorate and

Mines (ITM)

Inspections of Establishments ADE/ITM

Assessment of the Safety Report ADE/ITM


emergency plan

ADE/ITM


Public

ADE/ITM


European Commission

ADE/ITM

Malta Responsible Body

Land Use Planning Planning Authority

Inspections of Establishments The Occupational health and Safety Authority, the Malta

Environmental and Planning Authority and the Civil

Protection Department are jointly responsible

Assessment of the Safety Report The Occupational health and Safety Authority, the Malta

Environmental and Planning Authority and the Civil

Protection Department are jointly responsible


emergency plan

The Civil protection Department


Public

The operator


European Commission

-

Netherland Responsible Body

Land Use Planning The Environmental Licensing Authority

Inspections of Establishments The Labor Inspectorate, The Environmental Licensing Authority

and the Board of Regional Fire Services are jointly responsible

for inspections.

Assessment of the Safety Report The Environmental Licensing Authority

Developing an external (offsite) Local municipalities are responsible for developing external

FINAL


emergency plan emergency plans in line with mandates issued by the Ministry

of Interior


Public

The Environmental Licensing Authority is responsible for

informing the public of the results of assessments of safety

reports. The Mayor is responsible for providing information to

the public related to emergency responses


European Commission

?

Poland Responsible Body

Land Use Planning commune authority (gmina

Inspections of Establishments the National Fire Brigade (Komenda Wojewodzka Strazy Pozarnej)

at voivodship level

Assessment of the Safety Report the joint responsibility of the Fire Brigade (Komenda Wojewodzka

Strazy Pozarnej - PSP) at voivodship level and Voivodship

Environment Protection Inspection (WIOS


emergency plan

The Fire Brigade (Komenda Wojewodzka Strazy Pozarnej – PSP)


Public

The Fire Brigade (Komenda Wojewodzka Strazy Pozarnej – PSP)


European Commission

The Minister of Environment

Czech Republic Responsible Body

Land Use Planning Regional Authorities in cooperation with Construction Authorities)

Inspections of Establishments Regional authorities

Assessment of the Safety Report The Ministry of the Environment


emergency plan

The Ministry of the Environment

Providing Information the

Public

Regional authorities in cooperation with the relevant District

authority)


European Commission

Regional Authorities are responsible for handling accident reports

from operators and responsible for notifying the Ministry of

Environment and the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of

Environment is responsible for informing the European

Commission

Finland Responsible Body

Land Use Planning The Safety Technology Authority (TUKES) in cooperation with

City Planners

Inspections of Establishments The Safety Technology Authority (TUKES)

Assessment of the Safety Report The Safety Technology Authority (TUKES)


emergency plan

The regional rescue authorities


Public

The Operator

FINAL



European Commission

The Safety Technology Authority (TUKES)

Germany Responsible Body

Land Use Planning The regional (“Länder”) authorities

Inspections of Establishments The regional (“Länder”) authority together with the district

authorities and the technical staff

Assessment of the Safety Report The regional (“Länder”) authorities


emergency plan

The regional (“Länder”) authorities


Public

The Operator


European Commission

Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and

Nuclear Safety

France Responsible Body

Land Use Planning Local authorities(Mayor, municipal council) under guidance from

the Prefet

Inspections of Establishments DREAL - Direction Regionale de l’Environnement de

l’Aménagement et du Logement

Assessment of the Safety Report DREAL – DirectionRegionale de l’Environnement de

l’Aménagement et du Logement


emergency plan

the department Prefet under guidance from DREAL


Public

The Operator and Prefet


European Commission

DREAL is responsible for collecting the data qhich is then managed

by the Environment Ministry (BARPI who notify the EC.

Hungary Responsible Body

Land Use Planning The National Directorate General for Disaster Management,

Ministry of the Interior together with the Hungarian Trade

Licensing Office (MKEH

Inspections of Establishments The National Directorate General for Disaster Management,

Ministry of the Interior together with the Hungarian Trad


Assessment of the Safety

Report

The National Directorate General for Disaster Management,



Developing an external

(offsite) emergency plan


Ministry of the Interior is responsible for drawing up external

emergency plans. The Mayor tests external emergency plans in

cooperation with the emergency services


Public

The Mayor


European Commission




Ireland Responsible Body

FINAL


Land Use Planning Planning Authorities

Inspections of Establishments The Health and Safety Authority

Assessment of the Safety Report The Health and Safety Authority


emergency plan


Public

The Operator


European Commission

The Health and Safety Authority

FINAL


Annex - 12. Guidance documents prepared by CAs and Industry across the EU

Box 18 - Guidance documents prepared by Industry Box 19 - Guidance documents prepared by CAs

France: UIC (Chemical Industries Association), FEEM

(European federation of Explosive Makers), work groups

like “Risk assessment - Safety report”, EIGA (European

Industrial Gases Association), AFGC, INERIS, GESIP.

UK: Tank Storage Association (TSA), Energy Institute (EI),

CIRIA, Chemical Industries Association (CIA), Chemical

Business Association (CBA), CONCAWE, : British

Coatings Federation, Responsible Care, LPG guidance on

major accident prevention policies, British Aerosol

Manufacturers' Association (BAMA)

Spain: COASHIQ (Autonomous Commission for Safety and

Hygiene at Work in the Chemical and Related Industries),

FEIQUE (Chemical Industries Association),

Italy: UNI (Italian national standardization Institute)

Existing national guidance documents known by Industry

cover various types of fields: methodology of safety report,

emergency plans, land use planning aspects, SMS,

inspections, etc.

Apart from those,

Cefic: The European Chemical Industry, European Process

Safety Centre (EPSC), the Institution of Chemical Engineers

(IChemE) also contributes to developing performance

indicators and management models for process safety, giving

guidance on their application and sharing best practice.

In 2011, Cefic published Guidance on Process Safety

Performance Indicators to facilitate the development of

broadly applicable process safety metrics. They provide

advice related to the role and responsibilities of public

authorities, industry, employees and their representatives, as

well as interested parties such as members of the public

potentially affected in the event of an accident.

France: National guidance for writing and reading a safety

report (MEDD, December 2006), Guidance for the

preparation of a PPRT (INERIS, October2007)

Germany: guidance provided by the "Disruptive Incident"

Commission (SFK), Technical Committee on Systems Safety

and (TAA), The Federal Ministry for the Environment,

Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety of Germany

(BMU)

Hungary: some books and documents for the

implementation of Seveso and preparing Safety Report are in

preparation by the National Directorate General for Disaster

Management and by Hungarian Trade Licensing Office.

Italy: attachments I, II and III of the decree DPR 175/88 and

further modifications; Document issued by national authority

(The Italian Environment Protection and Technical Services

Agency, APAT) containing SMS requirements and

inspections guidelines

Netherlands: NL guidance (CPR-20 / PGS-6), BRZO 1999,

RRZO 1999

Spain: decrees (RD 1196/2003, RD 393/2007), guidance

documents for the safety report preparation, emergency plan,

technical guidelines of the General Direction of Civil

Protection,; also there are Guides provided by local

authorities (for instance, in Catalonia)

Swedish: Guidance from Swedish Rescue Services Agency

UK: HSE and EA guidance on COMAH (Control of Major

Accident Hazards) compliance, preparation and review of

safety reports, emergency plans, land use planning aspects.

HSE guidance document L111 Chemical Information sheet

nos. 2, 3, 7 Human Factors briefing notes 4, 9, 12 Chemical

sheet no. 6 Guidance for operators from the competent

authority on review of safety reports, also environmental

aspects. DETR guidance on interpretation of major accidents

to the environment. INDG leadership for major hazard

industries HSG244 LOPA in the COMAH context HSE

Research report no 457 Location and design of occupied

buildings at major hazard establishments HSL/2006/117 risk

control for major hazard incidents HSG 190 HSG 19

Approved Code of Practice of the COMAH Regulations

(L111) and associate guidance on Preparing Safety reports &

Emergency Plans (HSG 190 & HSG 191

FINAL


Annex - 13. Risk Assessment Benchmark

This annex provides an overview of some of the key issues associated with risk assessment. It begins

by giving key definitions and what is meant by risk, hazard, risk analysis, and risk assessment. Then; it

gives an overview of the risk assessment process and requirements to comply with the Seveso

Regulations.

Explanation of key terms

The Directive defines formal definitions hazard and risk that are related with risk assessment. It is

useful to draw a distinction between these terms.

-‘hazard’ shall mean the intrinsic property of a dangerous substance or physical situation, with

a potential for creating damage to human health and/or the environment;

-‘risk’ shall mean the likelihood of a specific effect occurring within a specified period or in

specified circumstances;

In other words, risk is a complex function of the hazards connected with a certain technological or

environmental system, the "likelihood" that a hazard results in an undesired event, and the

vulnerability of the environment into which the undesired event may develop its consequences.

The other important definitions (see also Table 27):

Risk analysis: The process of hazard analysis, and the estimation of associated levels of risk to

people, property, the environment or a combination of these.

Risk assessment: The process of risk analysis and evaluation of the significance of the results.

Table 27 - Risk Assessment Definitions

Source Definitions

DG Joint Research Centre (2006) Land

Use Planning Guidelines in the Context

of Article 12 of the SEVESO II Directive

96/82/EC as amended by Directive

105/2003/EC

Risk Assessment is briefly defined as:

- The overall process comprising a risk analysis (the

systematic use of available information to identify

hazards and to estimate the risk) and risk evaluation

(procedure whether the acceptable level of risk has

been achieved)

Kirchsteiger C., Christou M., Papadakis,

G. (eds.) (1998) Risk Assessment & Risk

Management in the Context of the

Seveso II Directive, Elsevier, The

Netherlands

Risk Assessment :

- Identification of industrial hazards, analysis of

sudden and uncontrolled releases of dangerous

substances from industrial plants and determination

of mitigation measures for serious consequences of

industrial accidents to people and the environment.

FINAL


Box 20 - Main elements in any risk analysis process

The main elements in any risk analysis process are as follows:

1. Hazard identification

2. Accident scenario selection;

3. Scenarios’ likelihood assessment;

4. Scenarios’ consequence assessment;

5. Risk ranking;

6. Reliability and availability of safety systems

Source: Joint Research Centre (2005), Guidance on the Preparation of a Safety Report

Following section on risk assessment is adapted from two main sources:

- Joint Research Centre (2005), Guidance on the Preparation of a Safety Report and

- Guidance on the Environmental Risk Assessment Aspects of COMAH Safety Reports

After adapting the information from these documents, the risk assessment concept was analyzed and then

summarized by addressing five basic questions:

Risk

Assessment

Risk Analysis

1. What Can Go Wrong?

Identification of the sources of potential accidents and the ways they

could happen (hazard identification-accident scenario selection);

2. How Often?

An estimate of the probability of their occurrence (scenarios’

likelihood assessment-frequency assessment);

3. What Are The Consequences?

An estimate of the potential consequences of the accidents (-accident

scenarios’ consequence assessment);

4. What are The Risks?

Determination of risk levels derived from the above analyses, and

assessment of their significance; and (Risk ranking);

Risk

Evaluation

5. So What?

Risk management action (Reliability and availability of safety

systems)

Presentation of resulting risk and comparison with established

tolerability criteria (Identification of mitigation measures,

acceptance of result, modification or abandoning )

With regard to the 1st question -What Can Go Wrong- hazard identification process carried out for

which a range of tools exists for systematic assessments, which are selected depending on the

complexity of the individual case. Furthermore, the level of detail required depends on the intended

FINAL


use of the safety report. Essential parts of the hazard identification are indications on the identification

methods used, the scope of the analysis and related constraints. The identification of hazards is

followed by designation of reference accidence scenarios, which form the basis for determining

whether the safety measures in place or foreseen are appropriate.

After the identification of hazards and designation of reference accidence scenarios, second and third

questions come respectively, How Often (scenarios’ likelihood) and What are the Consequences

(scenarios’ consequences) questions followed. In this step, hazards taken forward for further

consideration are known to have the possibility.

For the questions, How Often? and What are the consequences?, the scenarios’ likelihood and

consequence assessment, which is essential steps in the risk analysis process, quite different

approaches can be followed. These assessments make use of methodologies that are generally

subdivided into different categories, in particular:

- Qualitative - (semi)quantitative and

- Deterministic- probabilistic (see Box 21 - Types of risk assessment)

The next question is the what are the risks. In this step, determination of risk levels derived from the

above analyses, and assessment of their significance so called Risk Ranking is carried out. Then

presentation of resulting risks and comparison with established tolerability (acceptability) criteria

comes next.

The last question is So What? It includes risk evaluation action by considering reliability and

availability of safety systems and decision on whether mitigation measures are enough to decrease the

risk to accepted risk level or modification or abandoning is needed. A range of risk reduction methods

may be envisaged in this context, for example, improved operator training, introduction of additional

physical safety measures, or process modifications. it is necessary to decide what risk reduction

measures may be introduced and whether or not they are practicable, bearing in mind the associated

costs and benefits.

FINAL


Box 21 - Types of risk assessment

In broad terms, there is a hierarchy of risk assessment approaches of increasing complexity, ranging from simple

qualitative analyses through semi-quantitative analyses to fully quantified risk assessment. The depth and type of

analyses required by the COMAH regulations will vary from installation to installation but is likely to be

proportionate to:

(a) the scale and nature of the major accident hazards presented by the installations and activities on it;

(b) the risks posed to neighboring populations and the environment - in other words, the extent of

possible damage; and

(c) the complexity of the major accident hazard process and activities, and difficulty in deciding and

justifying the adequacy of the risk-control measures adopted.

Qualitative risk assessment is the comprehensive identification and description of hazards from a specified activity, to people or the environment. The range of possible events may be represented by broad categories,

with classification of the likelihood and consequences, to facilitate their comparison and the identification of

priorities.

Semi-quantitative risk assessment is the systematic identification and analysis of hazards from a specified

activity, and their representation by means of both qualitative and quantitative descriptions of the frequency and

extent of the consequences, to people or the environment. The importance of the results is judged by comparing

them with specific examples, standards or results from elsewhere.

Quantitative risk assessment is the application of methodology to produce a numerical representation of the

frequency and extent of a specified level of exposure or harm, to specified people or the environment, from a

specified activity. This will facilitate comparison of the results with specified criteria.

Source: Guidance on the Environmental Risk Assessment Aspects of COMAH Safety Reports

Summary

In the overall, the risk assessment86

should demonstrate the following aspects:

that the operator understands the risks involved in the operation of the installation;

that risks from arising from the installation are at an acceptable level;

adequate measures are being taken to prevent occurrence and limit consequences;

(see Box 22 and Table 28, which summarize the risk assessment procedure.)

86 Whichever method is used, the result is a set of “scenarios”. These are descriptions of potential accidents,

starting with causes, describing the intermediate events, finishing with consequences, and describing the

safety barriers that prevent the accident from occurring. 87 Taken from Mannan/Lees “Loss Prevention in the Process Industry”, 2005

Box 22 - Best practice in risk assessment87

In principle all risk assessment methods without regard to individual applications have the same relevant elements; these are:

o Definition of scope, objectives and risk criteria

o Description of the object or area of concern

o Identification of hazards

o Identification of vulnerable targets

o Assumption of source terms or hazardous incidents

o Development of escalation scenarios

o Estimation of consequences

o Estimation of likelihood

o Presentation of resulting risk and comparison with established tolerability criteria

o Identification of mitigation measures

o Acceptance of result, modification or abandoning

FINAL


Table 28 - Generic Components of Risk Assessment

Assessment Components Definition Indicators

Hazard identification and

estimation

Recognizing potential for adverse

effects and assessing the strength of cause-effect relationships

Properties such as flammability etc.

- Persistence

- Irreversibility

- Ubiquity

- Delayed effects

- Potency for harm

- Dose-response relationships

Exposure/vulnerability

assessment

Modeling diffusion, exposure and

effects on risk targets

exposure pathways

normalized behavior of target

vulnerability of target

Risk estimation

Quantitative: probability

Distribution of adverse effects

Qualitative: combination of hazard,

exposure, and qualitative factors

(scenario construction)

expected risk value(s) (individual,

collective)

% confidence interval

risk description

risk modeling as function

of variations in context variables and

parameters

FINAL


Annex - 14. Land Use Planning Benchmark

Currently, the practices and methodologies are so varied for land use planning policies throughout the

Member States. Understanding the variations, identifying the basic level of safety applied, while at the

same time making the land use planning approaches more transparent and understandable seems to be

crucial for the implementation of Article 12 (see Box 23).

Social, cultural and geographical aspects are important for land use planning approach of Member

States. Consistency in the selection of technical data used in risk assessments and identification of

accident scenarios, which will lead to greater understanding and convergence of what "suitable

distance" is in the context of Article 12.

Box 23 - Concept for risk assessment in land use planning88

The adoption of a concept for risk analysis in land use planning comprises two basic decisions about:

- the general category of approaches (deterministic vs. probabilistic);

- the risk assessment method adopted within the category,

being the distinction between “approach” and “method” used in the context of this document:

- “approach”: the adopted definition of “risk” and to the way risk is evaluated and compared with

a measuring scale;

- “method”: the models of hazard identification and assessment compatible with the approach.

As defined in several comparative studies and EU surveys, the options for hazard/risk assessment

approaches are divided in two categories with a sub-category each. The main difference between the

two categories refers to the consideration of the frequencies of accident events as a factor to be

accounted within the following evaluations:

a) “risk-oriented”/quantitative approach

b) “risk-oriented”/semi-quantitative approach (limiting pre-conditions are defined)

c) “consequence-oriented”/effects based approach, with implicit consideration of frequencies

d) “consequence-oriented”/general distances approach (use of tables of fixed distances).

The risk assessment methods of land use planning comprises according to general category of

approaches (deterministic vs. probabilistic) and methods meaning models of hazard identification of

and assessment compatible with the approach. The risk assessment approach divided into two

categories. The main difference between the two categories refers to the consideration of the

frequencies/probabilities of accident events as a factor to be accounted.

Factors that affect methodological differences of the land use planning approaches for different

national contexts are given at Table 29 below:

88 Implementing Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive: Overview of roadmaps for land use planning in selected Member

States” JRC Scientific and Technical Reports, 2008

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Table 29 - Factors of probabilistic and deterministic variables influencing Member States

Country/Regional

Variables Probabilistic Variables Deterministic Variables

Geographical/Dem

ographical Territorial morphology; Population density

Territorial specificities (particular agricultural production, water sources,

etc.); Environmental specificities (rare

flora/fauna)

Economical

Number of Seveso II Establishments;

National/regional economic capacity (i.e.

risk reduction, additional measures

availability)

Relevance of the chemical industry within

national economic system and history.

Legal Additional national legal provisions Legal System (common law vs. civil law)

Societal

Local communities composition (percentage

of elderly, young families, working force,

etc.)

Local communities’ risk perception

(deriving from accident history, cultural

specificities, etc.);Environmental

protection culture.

Source: “Implementing Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive: Overview of roadmaps for land use planning in selected

Member States” JRC Scientific and Technical Reports, 2008

Either in deterministic or probabilistic approach, there are common stages should be carried out for

LUP that are;

Hazard/risk assessment

Selection of reference scenarios (i.e. selection based of history, substances, worse or most case

scenarios);

The definition of tolerability thresholds;

Differentiation of zone planning; and

Types of technical prevention measures

Risk assessment approaches and land use planning in Europe are given at Table 30.

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Table 30 - Risk Assessment Approaches and Land Use Planning in Europe

Country Risk Assessment Approaches Developed Land Use

Planning

Consequence Based Risk Based

Generic Safety

Distance

Tables

Belgium X (Wallon) X (Flemish) X

Finland X

France89 X X

Germany X X X

Italy* X X

Poland X

Romania X

Spain X

Sweden X X

The Netherlands X X

United Kingdom X X

*Semi-quantitative approach

To conclude, Risk assessment for LUP is linked with risk assessment carried out for the establishment.

Concerning the LUP activity, depending on the complexity of the case and on the available resources,

opting for a deterministic or probabilistic approach results in relevant different in terms of procedures

and necessary data, as a result the complexity of the assessment differs.

89 In France, before the accident in Toulouse 2001, the approach was Consequence-Based modify approach for

LUP, after the accident, France combined the risk and consequence-based approaches

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Annex - 15. Sanctioning Benchmark90

This section summarizes the main sanctioning practices (see Box 24) in selected member states. In EU,

the sanctioning style is generally persuasive; inspectors hardly sanction and often warn first or

consider company-specific circumstances.

Box 24 - Main element in Sanctioning practices

Sanctioning practices

Frequency of sanctioning

Frequency of warning before imposing a sanction

Types of sanctioning instruments used most often

The extent to which inspectors consider

– company size

– the severity of the infringement

– costs to undo the infringement

– the financial situation of a company

Actor that decides on sanctioning

Germany

In Germany, sanctioning practices depends on the severity of the infringement, the costs to undo an

infringement or the financial situation of a company. If an inspector finds an infringement that is not

very serious, there will be room for negotiations and the offender will receive a warning first. A more

serious infringement will be sanctioned sooner. A dangerous situation with possible immediate

consequences could lead to the closing of a plant. In none of the inspectors are also empowered to

impose administrative fines in cases of offences, up to 51.000 euro.

UK

In UK, Inspectors can impose the İnformal actions, when an infringement is very small the inspector

can tell the company what to do to comply correctly. A more serious infringement can lead to an

improvement notice. This notice will first be discussed with the operator to see whether differences of

agreement can be solved beforehand. The notice describes what has to be done, why and before when.

This period of time a company is allowed to repair an infringement is at least 21 days. If the

infringement is not ceased within the set time, the inspector can prosecute a company. Inspectors

impose a prohibition notice that forbids a certain activity immediately or after a set period of time can

sanction a serious infringement. Lastly, inspectors may prosecute the establishment and decisions

when and how to prosecute are laid down in the ‘Enforcement Policy Statement’ of the HSE. A failure

to comply with an improvement or prohibition notice can lead to a fine as high as 32.000 euro or six

90 E. Versluis. Enforcement Matters: Enforcement and compliance of European directives in four Member States.

Doctoral Thesis. Utrecht University. 2003.

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months in prison before the magistrate’s court. The most serious cases will be dealt with in crime

court. The fines here can even be as high as one and a half million euro or more.

Netherlands

As an example, in Netherlands, the three competent authorities inspect together, but they sanction

according to their own legislation. The environmental authorities sanction according to the

‘Environmental Management Act’. According to this act, environmental authorities can partly or

totally withdraw an environmental license in case of non-compliance by the regulated. As well,

environmental inspectors can sanction according to administrative law. The labor inspectorate can use

both criminal and administrative instruments. The main criminal instrument that can be used is the

warrant. Possible administrative instruments are agreements or warnings, demands to comply, the

opportunity to close down an establishment and, since 1999, the administrative fine.

Finland

In Finland, Establishments are first given deadlines to fulfill the requirements. The duration depends

on the type of requirement (how much it need resources in time and money). If the requirement is not

fulfilled at the given duration, the authority normally sends a letter reminding of the requirement. If

the deficiency continues, authority gives fine. If the situation at the establishment is so severe that an

accident is very probable, the authority can stop it immediately. In practice, there has not been this

kind of situations.

Sweden

In Sweden, main authority responsible of the implementation of environmental laws is Work

Environment Authority. According to their applications, individuals or organizations can be penalized

either by imprisonment (not more than a year) or by fines. Generally, the prison penalty is transformed

into fines that the operator has to pay.

Belgium

In the Flemish region of Belgium, the Environmental Inspectorate Division (EID) is in charge for the

enforcement. It is the EID’s authorization to enforce in a proactive and coordinated way, in

cooperation with other enforcement authorities.

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Annex - 16. Detailed Cost Calculations for Coordination Body as an Administrative Costs

According to consultation process, most of the stakeholders suggested the foundation of the technical

institute, which organizes inspections, trainings and coordinates other activities. This institute may

serve as a coordination body to increase the collaboration between these authorities either.

There are different examples of supportive organizations in EU provide assistance to

implementation/enforcement of the Seveso II Directive. Generally, Regional Authorities and central

health and safety authorities are act as coordination body, this bodies are either under CAs or

separately works.

Since there are uncertainties on costs implications of the coordination body, since it varies with

foundation of new body or just authorization of the existing department, the number of the staff, its

responsibilities (assessment of the safety documents, trainings, inspections, etc). These uncertainties

makes hard to provide concrete cost data for the foundation procedure of the body.

However, there are some information and estimation on ongoing costs.

The ongoing costs data in this section are based on examples from the EU and Turkey. The first

example is from Netherlands. Netherlands has established a coordination office for the effective

implementation of Seveso II Directive, which has a name LAT Bureau. The overall yearly budget of

the LAT Bureau is about 1.717.500 euro.ICT, website and inspections-trainings account for the

majority of the budget.

The other example is from Turkey, MoLSS Training and Research Centre-ÇASGEM. According to

2011 budget report for the MoLSS, the budget of the ÇASGEM is 2.546.740 TL.

In sum, there are uncertainties on the costs of the coordination body (new or adapt existing body), but

based on interviews with experts, it will require one to two million euro per year to manage such body.

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Annex - 17. Detailed Cost Calculations for CAs when software program used in Risk

Modeling

As an example, in the Netherlands, CAs purchase the SAFETI-NL software license, sell it to operators

with lower prices and make the use of it. The SAFETI-NL software license costs to operators about

1250 euro when CAs buy license and sell it operators. On the other hand, it costs 5600 euro when

operator buy it without government support. The training cost of this program is nearly 1000 euros per

body.

REC Turkey calculated the total cost for CAs, when they buy software license and sell it to

Establishments with lower prices. It will cost nearly 2.26 million euro for one time. The staff also

needs training for the use of selected software. Software training costs depend on the number of staff

in CAs get this training.

(See also Table 31 for the general software programs used in risk modeling with their prices per year)

Table 31 - Cost of Software Programs used in Risk Modeling

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Annex - 18. Other Policy Options

Annex - 18. 1. Make insurance mandatory for Seveso Establishments

The Seveso II Directive does not contain any requirements related with insurance. However, liability

insurance could accomplish dual advantages. Firstly, insurance should be treated as an instrument that

softens the economic impact of accident hazards. Whatever measures are taken, risk is always present.

Especially in the case of Establishments in close proximity to residential zones, insurance would be a

highly preferred option.

By insuring, operators transform unsure financial burdens from unforeseen events to well-defined and

limited costs within a known period, so that the insured parties can eliminate or reduce uncertainties.

Insurers desire to reduce their uncertainties as well so they must be able to assess future losses and

spread the risks as widely as possible. At this point, the second advantage can be achieved: economy

of scale to be gained for government inspections.

In order to reduce their uncertainties, insurers will be assessing risks in detail. The insurance and

reinsurance companies generally use risk maps as a tool for assessing risks, identifying risks and risk

zones and for assessing potential losses. In general, the insurance maps use information from public

sources. Some EU countries, e.g. Austria, have set up a private public partnership on flood risk zoning

and mapping with the participation of the insurance industry and public authorities.

Insurance is also a driver for excellence in safety management. Insurance inspectors inspect

compliance with a number of ATEX (Appareils destinés à être utilisés en ATmosphères EXplosives)

Directive91

related requirements. In addition, operators receive a reduction of insurance premiums if

they periodically produce inspection reports stating satisfaction of requirements. This might act as a

positive incentive for compliance.

On the other hand, liability insurance can be too costly or unaffordable for small-scale companies.

Furthermore, precise information on risks and vulnerability at local levels affect Insurance premiums.

This would most likely mean increased premiums in affected or risk areas.

Annex - 18. 2. Reducing the costs of preparing External Emergency Plans

The directive requires that the competent authorities or local authorities draw up external emergency

plans to be implemented in the event of a major accident, and review, test, revise these plans, and

ensure that the operators supply the competent authorities with the necessary information to enable the

Member States to draw up such plans.

As stipulated in the By-Law assigns local authorities as the responsible parties for the preparation and

implementation of the External Emergency Plans (EEPs). However, the currently insufficient technical

and financial resources of particularly small municipalities put the directive at risk in terms of

implementation.

91 Directive 94/9/EC on equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres

(ATEX)

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In this option, local authorities maintain their role of coordinating emergency response components

such as the Fire Brigade, and the central government body executes general planning and coordination

Disaster and Emergency Management Administration appears as the best alternative as it can also link

with other disaster affairs as well as triggering impacts on major industrial accidents.

Annex - 18. 3. Resolving existing undesirable situation – conflict in the land use

The directive requires that local authorities establish objectives and relevant policies, and consultation

procedures to facilitate the implementation of land use planning obligation.

Currently, planning regulations have provisions related to Land Use planning. Land Use Planning

involves, modifications to existing Establishments and new developments such as transport links,

locations frequented by the public and residential areas in the vicinity of existing Establishments.

Given the highly populated industrial regions in Turkey, the conflicting situation may be an issue on

several occasions:

-MoEU designates the domino sites and,

-such information is communicated with the public.

At this point, MoEU will responsible to decide between two options on specific cases:

- Increased safety management measures for Establishments

- Relocation of the Establishment

Both options impose financial burden on the operator and furthermore may raise competitiveness

issues.

Increase prevention measures for Establishments

This option assesses costs of increased prevention measures associated with off-site measures,

although there are only limited possibilities such as firewalls off-site or the change of the construction

of buildings according to the actual hazard; furthermore the emergency response measures may offer

some improvement (e. g. alarm systems with extended range). If the situation is extremely undesirable,

the decision may result in the relocation of the establishment.

This option raises issues of competitiveness and increased costs.

Relocation of Establishments

This option represents cases that may totally be undesirable given high risks on communities.

Relocation certainly decreases risks on human life and environment, which is not possible to monetize

but assess in terms of qualitative benefits.

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Annex - 19. Non-compliance with environmental regulations

Figure 43 shows fines for non-compliance with environmental regulations in 2011. Figure 44 gives

fines for non-compliance with for environmental regulations 2006 to 201192

.

Figure 43 - Fines for non-compliance with

environmental regulations in 2011,MoEU

(in thousand TL)

Figure 44 - Fines for non-compliance with

environmental regulations between 2006- 2011,MoEU

(in thousand TL)

Source: REC Turkey, Data source: MoEU Source: REC Turkey, Data source: MoEU

On the other hand, Table 32 indicates the total amount of fines that MoLSS assigns based on the Law

on Labor. Total amounts of environmental charges nearly 1 million TL, and MoLSS charges is nearly

30 million TL in 2011.

92

Source: http://www.cevredenetimi.cevreorman.gov.tr/istatistik.asp

http://www.cevredenetimi.cevreorman.gov.tr/istatistik.asp

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Table 32 - Fines for non-compliance with health and safety regulations in 2011, MoLSS

Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 2011

NumberFine Amount

(TL)Number

Fine Amount

(TL)Number

Fine Amount

(TL)

Adana 61 402.474,00 145 220.529,00 206 623.003,00

Ankara 182 1.779.738,00 335 466.675,00 517 2.246.413,00

Antalya 330 2.418.101,00 64 63.008,00 394 2.481.109,00

Aydın 153 1.273.090,00 121 171.323,00 274 1.444.413,00

Bursa 272 2.194.491,00 232 297.474,00 504 2.491.965,00

Diyarbakır 14 101.696,00 41 42.407,00 55 144.103,00

Edirne 46 350.260,00 138 299.110,00 184 649.370,00

Elazığ 5 39.740,00 23 39.317,00 28 79.057,00

Erzurum 11 79.375,00 9 17.049,00 20 96.424,00

Eskişehir 34 359.563,00 32 118.060,00 66 477.623,00

Gaziantep 30 199.605,00 138 412.466,00 168 612.071,00

İstanbul 848 6.762.741,00 237 408.027,00 1.085 7.170.768,00

İzmir 368 3.736.824,00 138 251.872,00 506 3.988.696,00

Kayseri 95 905.158,00 135 123.288,00 230 1.028.446,00

Kocaeli 310 1.483.199,00 44 72.990,00 354 1.556.189,00

Konya 103 848.124,00 25 26.288,00 128 874.412,00

Kütahya 36 295.430,00 31 56.074,00 67 351.504,00

Malatya 7 104.178,00 22 23.907,00 29 128.085,00

Samsun 64 2.850.121,00 142 219.164,00 206 3.069.285,00

Trabzon 21 124.029,00 70 78.926,00 91 202.955,00

Van 2 18.314,00 12 12.647,00 14 30.961,00

Zonguldak 22 166.596,00 56 74.007,00 78 240.603,00

Total 3.014 26.492.847,00 2.190 3.494.608,00 5.204 29.987.455,00

TotalRegional

Directorate

Administrative AspectsOccupational Health and

Safety

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Annex - 20. Consultation Process

The Consultation Process started with the consultation meetings held and finalized with central level

meeting in Ankara. The pilot regions in which the consultation process will be realized have been

identified with the cooperation of the experts from the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. The

geographical location and the concentration of the Establishments falling within the scope of Seveso II

Directive were dominating criteria in identifying these pilot regions. As a result of this study Kocaeli,

Adana, Izmir and Istanbul provinces were selected as the pilot region and the process was continued to

within these provinces.

Annex - 20. 1. Central Consultation Process - Ankara

The central consultation process held within Ankara completed with a meeting held with the public

institutions. Experts and high-level managers from the related departments of the public institutions

have participated within the meeting held on 13 December 2010 and 4 January 2012.

In the first national workshop, plenary session during which presentations were delivered in regard to

the concept and methods of Regulatory Impact Analysis, the Seveso II Directive and the transposition

of the Directive. A group work was conducted in the following sessions during which the participants

were divided into nine groups and discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the subjects

previously given to them. The discussion points were identified in cooperation with the Department of

Industrial Accidents of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization.

The subjects discussed during the first group work are as follows:

Institutional Set-Up

Ensuring the realization of the inspections by a sole organization

Establishing a body that aims to provide technical assistance

Identifying the coordination body for the External Emergency Plans

Land Use and High Risk Regions

Resettlement of the Establishments that pose a high risk to secure high risk regions

Taking extensive precautions within the Establishments that pose a high risk

Defining the risk zones that will direct the selection of the location on which the new

Establishments will be settled

Financial Support

Providing government support to SMEs

Providing tax deduction for the SMEs

Providing government support for high risk zones

Upon group discussion, each group selected their speaker and the speakers presented the main

discussion points of their group to the other participants. This has enabled a general discussion session

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among the participants. The main conclusions derived from the discussion sessions are presented in

Consultation Process Report of the RIA Report.

In the second national workshop, Policy Areas and Policy Options and general content of Seveso II

RIA report were discussed with the participation of MoEU, MoLSS, and Ministry for EU Affairs and

Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency. The outputs of second Consultation

Meeting were used for Seveso II RIA report.

The subjects discussed during the first group work are as follows:


Option 1.1. Two CA without Coordination Body


Option 1.3. Three CA with a Coordination Body

Policy Area 2: Regulation of Risk Instruments and Standards

Option 2.1. Public Driven

Option 2.2. Operators chose their own framework

Option 2.3. No Regulation

Policy Area 3: Risk Assessment Approach

Option 3.1.Risk-Based

Option 3.2. Consequence Based

Policy Area 4: Enforcement approaches

Option 4.1. Strict Enforcement

Option 4.2.Proportional Enforcement

First National Consultation Meeting I, 13 December 2010

Institutional Set-Up

The Directive requires the identification of the authorized administrations/administration. The

regulation, which transposes the Directive, defines two authorized administrations being Ministry of

Environment and Urbanization and Ministry of Labor and Social Security and it delegates

responsibility and authority to both of these organizations. The options developed within the first

phase in order to decrease the difficulties and challenges for the implementation of the Directive

focuses on realization of the inspections by a sole organization, assigning a body to provide technical

assistance and defining a regional coordination.

Stakeholders suggested that conducting inspections by a single organization would be cost-effective

and fast, lessen bureaucratic and administrative burden, and solve possible coordination problems. On

the other hand, additional costs such as training, infrastructure, personnel and legislation due to the

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disadvantages of technical inadequacy when it is conducted by one organization, and lack of an

organization that might meet all inspection needs currently.

It is possible to provide service expected from technical assistance organization through available

organizational structures. For instance, Labor and Social Security Training and Research Center

(ÇASGEM) under Ministry of Labor and Social Security is an organization recommended in this

respect.

In terms of accessing technical support opportunities, the importance of including non-governmental

organization in this process by raising their awareness was emphasized.

Another organization recommended in this context is Scientific and Technological Research Council

of Turkey (TÜBİTAK). Setting up a special unit about accidents under the umbrella of the council is

one of the recommendations.

It is a common idea to authorize an organization or organizations that will provide support for SMEs.

Another recommendation raised in the workshop is to enhance the efficiency of local administrations

about inspections. It was suggested that local administrations would undertake inspections in line with

the criteria and policies defined by central public organizations (Ministry of Environment and

Urbanization and Ministry of Labor and Social Security). Local administrations already inspect the

workplaces for granting “business license”. Municipalities, administrative capacity of which is

adequate (metropolitan municipalities or municipalities population of which is larger than 500.000),

and Special Provincial Administrations were suggested as the local administration units which can

undertake this responsibility.

Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency Law No: 5902 gives the task of

ensuring coordination to Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency. However, the

discrepancies in relevant law and regulations should be eliminated and authorized coordination

organizations should be defined to make the planning from a certain structure.

Commissions for coordination purposes at provincial level might be functional in various issues

however; “intervention commissions” are specified in relevant regulation.

Table 33 - Opinions of the Central Public Institutions in regard to the Institutional Set-Up

Advantages Disadvantages

Realization of the

inspections by a

sole organization

A more speedy and efficient inspection

Less bureaucracy

Prevention of conflict of authority

Easier to implement

Less time consumption occurring due to the

difficulties in coordination

Decrease in the cost

The Ministry of Labor and Social Security

risk of shrinkage in regard to the scope of

the inspection (due to shortage of staff

and conflict of legislations)

insufficient efficiency and effectiveness

excess of unnecessary arrangements

additional cost

insufficient background knowledge and

training

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shall conduct it alone in case the

commission is constituted of the

representatives from the related institutions

Increases harmonized working

no problem of financing

decrease of the current burdens

provision of efficient and effective staff

eliminates the differences of the assessment

of the reports

lack of an established mechanism in place

bureaucratic problems

Establishing a

research guidance

body that provide

technical

assistance

obtaining a more accurate and healthy data

from the Establishments

the institutions will have an opportunity to

prepare better safety and emergency plans

beneficial for the prevention of major

industrial accidents

a more integrated service

access to information is quicker and more

efficient

promotes specialization (on the basis of

sectors)

creates employment opportunities

delivery of free of charge service by the

government

Decreases the costs of licenses

Establishments

decrease of costs

there are institutions currently in place

(Ministry of Labor and Social Security

Training and Research Centre-ÇASGEM,

Scientific and Technological Research

Council of Turkey Turkish-TUBİTAK,

Non-Governmental Organizations)

a special body may be established

the universities or independent academies

could assume the role

financial burden

recruitment of additional staff

it will not be possible to utilize the

knowledge and experience within the

other institutions

the possibility of confronting bureaucratic

burdens in the establishment phase

possible hurdles that could be confronted

during the efficient functioning of this

body

conflict of authority and responsibilities

lack of capacity

extends the process

the required training is insufficient. In

addition to this a standard should be set

this body should be subject to a technical

inspection

Identifying the

coordination body

for the External

Emergency Plans

enables efficient coordination

the possibility of rapid intervention due to

the difference of the working areas of the

Increases the work load of the staff

requires recruitment of new staff

results in a financial burden

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existing institutions

enables sharing the practical experiences

prevents conflict of powers

enables to predict the possible impacts and

effects

less time consuming

Could be the Disaster and Emergency

Management Presidency of the Prime

Ministry

Intervention commissions may be

established within the provinces

A coordination unit of the Disaster and

Emergency Management Presidency of the

Prime Ministry

Provincial Directorate of Disaster and

Emergency Management

Land Use

The issue emphasized here is the relatively high risks, which the settlement areas, transportation

networks, and other social structures close to High Level Establishment and “Domino Zones” where

those organizations are together, will be subject to. In the event that a High Level Establishment is

close to a settlement area, the impact of a major accident is quite serious.

Table 34 - Opinions of the Central Public Institutions in regard to the Land Use


Resettlement of

the

Establishments

that pose a high

risk to secure

regions

Safer in terms of environment and human

health

less risk of accidents

Abolishes the domino effect

Decreases external costs

Decreases the traffic jam thus enabling

easy access to the region in the event of an

accident

The management of the risky

Establishments within a single zone will

be is easier

Social demographic burdens

Cost of resettlement of Establishments,

possible accidents that may occur

during resettlement

Disconnection of contact with sub

sectors

Increases cost

Leads to conflict and disagreement

between the producer and the

management

Legal process will start

Emerges an obligation to find a suitable

location

May negatively influence the

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competition

Conflict between the public and the

owner of the establishment

May pose the same similar risks even

resettled

Taking extensive

precautions

within the

Establishments

that pose a high

risk

Increases quality of life

Decreases the impacts of the accidents to

human health

Decreases the number of accidents

Decreases costs

Decreases social drawbacks

Increases safety management

High applicability

Has a positive influence in terms of

environment and human health

Eliminates the vicious cycle that will

occur during resettlement

Contributes in solving safety related

problems and issues

Decreases the risks of the disasters

(technological)

Eliminates the domino effect

Increases the cost of safety measures

Affects the psychology of the people

living in the region

Decreases the prices of the real estate in

the region

Will have negative influences in the

environment and human health

Additional work force

Periodical maintenance and renewal

(processes and the equipment)

Defining the risk

zones that will

direct the

selection of the

location on which

the new

Establishments

will be settled

Risk management will become easier

Enables to take precautions

Preparation and implementation of

emergency plans

Decreases the environmental impacts of

the accident

Decreases the negative impacts on the

living beings

Decreases the costs in the long run

Enables effective planning

Will have a positive influence on

identifying the policies

Increases the number of safe residential

Conflict of opinions in identifying the

risk zones

Decrease in the alternatives of locations

for the Establishments

Unforeseen relationships may emerge

May increase the costs for the

Establishments

Developing sanctioning power

Incompliance with the current industrial

zones

Lack of infrastructure

Decreases the investments since it

prevents industrial development

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areas

Ensures planned housing and development

Enables to create and implement the risk

maps

Destruction on the natural sites

Financial Support

In accordance with the Cabinet Decree No: 15199 of Undersecretary of Treasury, environmental

investments are subject to VAT exemption and customs exemption, and given interest support.

KOSGEB might also offer such a support to SMEs.

There might be loan supports which will be returned. Investments within the scope of safety measures

might be accepted as environmental investments, and enterprises might apply to Undersecretary of

Treasury.

Possible organizational structures for governmental support to SMEs:

Undersecretary of Treasury, Directorate General of Incentives

KOSGEB (Republic of Turkey Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization)

Turkish Export Promotion Center (İGEME)

Development Agencies

European Turkish Business Centers

Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade

In addition, use of the European Union Pre-accession Aid Funds IPA) should be recommended.

Undersecretary of Treasury also provides insurance premium support. This might be considered

together with VAT exemption.

KOSGEB offers various opportunities for SMEs via loan support and technical support programs.

With respect to the measures towards prevention of accidents, it is recommended to provide low

interest loan support. Technical assistance opportunities such as project and report preparation might

be considered under the umbrella of Technical Assistance Programs.

Table 35 - Opinions of Central Public Organizations concerning Financial Supports


Providing

government

support to SMEs

Easy harmonization of SMEs with

environmental legislation

More reliable Establishments

Supporting the environmental investments of

SMEs

Ensuring the survival of SMEs

It might lead to financial and

administrative laziness

It might decrease competitiveness

Increasing bureaucracy in SMEs

Use of support for its purpose

Budgetary burdens (governmental

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There might be training and technical

assistance

Supporting effect for future

It facilitates the business of SMEs

Raising the awareness relating to training

among SMEs

Taking appropriate measures in SMEs

It protects competitiveness in foreign markets

Seveso category of the SME applying for

support is determined

expenses)

Providing tax

deduction for the

SMEs

Supports for environmental sanctions

Awareness relating to environmental

sanctions

Applicable method


SMEs might develop themselves

Financial support for SMEs

It protects competitiveness in foreign markets

Easy harmonization of SMEs with environmental legislation

It facilitates finding financing

Decrease of tax income

Unfair competition

Unfairness in tax applications

Providing

government

support for high

risk zones


SMEs might develop themselves

A safer environment for environment and

human health

It is appropriate to provide governmental

support to these Establishments as there will

be responsibility

It might encourage the Establishments move

to less risky areas

It enables taking more safety measures in the

event that Establishments do not resettle

It enables taking measures in necessary areas

by decreasing the hazard level

Negative effect for organizations

which are not in risky area

Difficulties and cost of management

and inspection of governmental

support

Unfair competition

Financial burden

Budget burden (governmental

expenses)

It might encourage investment in

highly risky areas. It might be better

to change it in way to support the

investments in less risky areas.

As the establishment will take into

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account this while calculating the

cost, there is no need for a separate

governmental support.

The results of the working groups composed of participants during national consultation process (roles

and needs of various organizations in the scope of Seveso II) are given below in


Organization Role of the Organization During the

Implementation of Seveso II Directive

Needs of the Organization During the

Implementation of Seveso II

Directive

Ministry of Labor

and Social Security –

Training and

Research Centre

They might play a direct role in

inspection, training, raising awareness,

risk assessment, reporting, technical

assistance, financing and policy

development.

A pool of trainers might be used

To develop training modules needed by

public organizations and institutions

within the scope of the directive, and to

deliver trainings

To contribute to the preparation of

implementation guidelines for relevant

enterprises, to explain the liabilities in

the guidelines to organizations and to

run a counseling process

Training of the personnel in

question,

Necessary protocols need to be

prepared in order to delegate the

coordinator organization for training,

As there are many stakeholders, a

council might be set up and it might

be responsible solely

Training of the personnel about

relevant directive

TURKSTAT

Generating databases relating to

relevant organizations, collection of

data and ensuring sustainability

General Directorate

of Land Registry

and Cadastre +

Ministry of Public

Works and

Settlement

Land use (selection of location and

resettlement after accidents)

Giving necessary information to

Establishments having hazardous

substances

Completion the nationwide cadastre

work, designing a location defining

system, and transition to Land

Registry and Cadastre Information

System are necessary.

Provincial

Directorate of

Disaster and

Management of the crisis after accident,

implementation and finalization

Conflict of authorizations should be

prevented

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Directive

Emergency

General Directorate

of Mineral Research

& Exploration

Scientific and technical support

concerning appropriate management of

mineral waste

Ministry of Interior,

General Directorate

of Provincial

Administration

Determining the location of the

Establishments within the scope of the

Directive, providing licenses, making

emergency plans and inspection, in

order to minimize the hazard during

accident, efficient use of law

enforcement, fire brigade, ambulance

and civil defense services, and in the

implementation Ministry of Interior,

Special Provincial Administrations and

Municipalities are highly responsible.

Informing the relevant organizations

about the Regulation and other

arrangements

General Directorate

of Local

Administrations

Ministry of Interior might conduct

inspections via inspectors upon request.

Social Security

Organization

There is no role stemming from the

Directive. It is ready to take necessary

responsibility.

Increasing inspections and

decreasing unregistered employment

Prime Ministry,

Disaster and

Emergency

Management

Presidency

Presidency of Planning and Hazard

Mitigation, Risk and Strategy Working

Group: it has a role to ensure

coordination and to make projects

relating to defining risks, estimation,

and early warning.

Making the analysis of needs for the

in house training relating to

technological disasters,

Strengthening the search and rescue

teams of provincial directorates

about this kind of accidents,

Setting up warning-alarm systems,

As technologic accidents are not

included in provincial emergency

plans, making an arrangement about

it and preparing a training,

Integration of external emergency

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Directive

plans to be prepared for Seveso

Establishments with provincial

emergency plans.

Ministry of

Environment and

Urbanization –

General Directorate

of Environmental

Impact Assessment

and Planning

Defining the locations, monitoring and

inspection, informing the public

Safety Information Forms should be

integrated in relevant parts in EIA

reports in place of presenting as

attachments.

During the sanctioning on Seveso

Establishments, EIA reports should

be detailed and there should be

special study about it.

Ministry of Labor

and Social Security -

Inspection Board

Investigating and approval of safety

reports, informing related

organizations,

Inspections,

Investigating accidents,

Sanctioning.

Setting up a separate Seveso

inspection team,

Delivering training to inspectors

about investigating the safety

reports,

Designing an inspection model and

giving a training,

Defining of Establishments in the

scope, programming the inspections

and setting up an archive system,

Designing a reporting system,

Defining accident inspection criteria,

Making arrangements about

legislation (communiqués etc.)

Harmonization of the current

legislation (Labor Law etc.)

Acquisition of materials and

equipment.

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Directive

Ministry of Labor

and Social Security –

İŞGÜM

Assessment of Safety Reports,

inspection of major accidents,

investigation of accidents.

Preparation of guidelines for Safety

Report.

There might be a training need in the

event that it has a role relating to

supporting preparation of Safety

Report,

Strengthening the human resources

infrastructure of Inspection Board,

increasing the number of technical

inspectors

KOSGEB

Financing, training and raising

awareness for SMEs

Necessary infrastructure is available;

budget of the KOSGEB might be

increased in order to support SMEs.

Training of environmental and

energy experts employed in the

organization in this subject

Ministry of Food,

Agriculture and

Livestock – KKGM

Capacity development

Efficient and appropriate share

between Ministry of Food,

Agriculture and Livestock and

Ministry of Environment and

Urbanization

Ministry of

Transportation

Resettlement of public and immediate

removal from the area in emergency

action plans.

Creating a connection with ADR and

defining it.

Ministry of

Transportation

General Directorate

of DLH

Construction

Making necessary arrangements to

prevent conflict of authority

Turkish standards

Institute

Defining product and establishment

standards, if necessary

Improvement of laboratory

infrastructure about examination and

experiment.

Ministry of Health

Health Protection Strip

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Directive

Ankara

Metropolitan

Municipality

Permits for setting up and operation of

an establishment,

Intervention of fire brigade during

accident

Undersecretary of

Customs, General

Directorate of

Customs

There might be contribution relating to

completion of customs procedures

when emergency intervention

equipment and materials are imported

or taken as a grant.

State Planning

Organization

Providing investment support for risk

mitigation projects

Making contributions to define the

strategies to prevent accidents

Prioritization might be used for

facilitating the transfer of

investments,

General Directorate

of Public Security

Control and organization of traffic

during accident

It will give information to General

Directorate of Public Security about

the importance and dimension of the

accident and the measures needs to

be taken. If there is a communication

unit, the measures taken will be

useful.

Ministry of Industry

and Trade

To determine the business actors that

will be within the scope,

Approval of the location,

Raising awareness among business

actors,

Disaster management

Environmental protection

Broadening the scope of the

compulsory insurance relating to

environmental pollution

Data provision might lead cost

Secretariat General

for European Union

Affairs

Ensuring coordination among

organizations and monitoring and

evaluation of IPA Project

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Directive

Undersecretary of

Treasury

Support might be provided in terms of

data provision. Insurance agents may

report the companies which

produce/sell/transport explosive

materials to Undersecretary of

Treasury.

Insurance agents might monitor and

follow the risk control mechanisms and

prevention measures during insurance

period.

Turkish Petroleum

Corporation

It will undertake necessary work

relating to safety management and

environmental protection during

production and drilling activities, and

take required responsibility about

making emergency plans and risk

assessments.

What needs to be done within the

scope of this Regulation will be

studied and the needs will be

determined according to results.

Energy Market

Regulatory

Authority

Update in the content of EIA Report

and a standard defined for the

implementation of the Seveso II

Directive will meet the needs.

Also update of the content of the

inspection and investigation

conducted during the delivery of

GSM licenses.

Second National Consultation Meeting II, January 4 2012


The general opinions on this policy area indicated that current CAs structure is capable for the

implementation of the Directive. However, participants stated that if the legislative and institutional

adjustments are made, it is also possible to have three competent authorities. Moreover, participants

point out that a coordination body is needed either under the existing body or new. All participants

also agree on lack capacity in the local level.

Policy Area 2: Regulation of Risk Instruments and Standards

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At the meeting, officials from MoLSS said that there are risk assessment applications used in labor

health and safety issues; however, they must be adapted for the Seveso II Directive. Some of the

participants agreed on performance based risk assessment option but they also point out that standards

and rules should be identified by state.

Policy Area 3: Land Use Approach

There are different opinions on the Land Use Approach. Participants agreed on consequence-based

approach provide better safety for both public and environment. However, risk based approach also

favored when current situation of Establishments in Turkey. Participants also approved that land use

approach must be differentiate with respect to new and old Establishments.


The current approaches to the sanctioning policies are found to be suitable for the sanctioning policies.

Annex - 20. 2. Local Consultation Process, December 2011- January 2012

The local consultation process was held in Adana, Istanbul, Izmir and Kocaeli provinces. The

representatives of the related industrial organizations and public institutions within the selected

provinces were invited to participate in the workshop for the Regulatory Impact Analysis of the

Seveso II Directive to deliver their opinions and views. Meetings were held with the key public

institutions and organizations, which were unable to attend the workshop.

Table 37 - Local level workshops and workshop

dates

Figure 45 - Number of Participants During the

consultation process

In the workshops held in the selected four provinces, mainly information was given to those industrial

institutions constituting the main interest group if the Directive and feedbacks are obtained. The

common agenda to be followed within the above-mentioned workshops are determined in cooperation

with the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. The issues that discussed in the workshop were as

follows:

Feedback and reporting

Safety Management Systems

Inspections

Use of land

Sanctions

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Consultation Process in Kocaeli

One-day workshop was organized in Kocaeli with the co-operation of Chamber of Industry in Kocaeli,

East Marmara ABİGEM and TOBB. The workshop aimed to inform the business actors as well as the

local authorities in the region, about Seveso II RIA Studies, as well as liability of business after the

Directive has come into force.

Consultation Process in Adana

One-day workshop was organized in Adana with the co-operation of Chamber of Trade in Adana,

ABİGEM Adana and TOBB. The workshop aimed to inform the business actors as well as the local

authorities in the region, about Seveso II RIA Studies, as well as liability of business after the

Directive has come into force. Provincial Directorate of Environment and Forestry, Fire Brigade

Department, Provincial Directorate of Disaster and Emergency Management are presented in the

meeting.

After the workshop, a meeting was held with the Manager of Hacı Sabancı Organized Industrial Area.

Also, Health and Safety Executive of the Area has been interviewed in terms of safety issues and

enforcement within the Area.

Consultation Process in İzmir

A half-day workshop was organized in İzmir, with the co-operation of Aegean Region Chamber of

Industry and TOBB. The workshop aimed to inform the business actors as well as the local authorities

in the region, about Seveso II RIA Studies, as well as liability of business after the Directive has come

into force. The head of Provincial Directorate of Disaster and Emergency Management has also put

contribution to the workshop.

Consultation Process in İstanbul

A half-day workshop was organized in İstanbul, with the co-operation of Chamber of Industry in

İstanbul and TOBB. The workshop aimed to inform the business actors as well as the local authorities

in the region, about Seveso II RIA Studies, as well as liability of business after the Directive has come

into force. Apart from the business representatives, officials from related governmental bodies also

attended the workshop.

Annex - 20. 3. Consultation Process on Land use Planning

In addition to central and local consultation processes, a specific consultation process has been carried

out on Land Use Planning issue. In order to have an aligned process with the overall consultation,

Kocaeli, Adana, İzmir, Ankara and Sakarya Metropolitan Municipalities have been interviewed. REC

Turkey RIA experts have conducted interviews via telephone, and the target audience were the experts

from local authorities as well as from Organized Industrial Zone (OIZ).

The interviewees have been questioned about the implications of land use planning within either their

municipal areas or the organized industrial zone. The results have shown that in different cities or

zones, the applications of regulations differ. It shows that there is nearly no consistency among these

applications, since health protection zones and highway protection lines are various. Therefore, it can

be concluded that there is a lack of consistency as there is no comprehensive regulation followed by all

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authorities. This lack of consistency hinders equal opportunities for competition among

Establishments as well as remains confusion among the competent authorities.

Annex - 20. 4. Questionnaire

In the process of Seveso II Directive RIA study, the questionnaire forms were sent to the operators to

determine strengths and weaknesses, together with an overall assessment of the implementation of the

requirements imposed on operators of Seveso Establishments.

In 2010, the REC e-mailed a questionnaire to 80 Establishments located within the pilot provinces

namely Izmir, Adana and Kocaeli and Yalova. The participants are then requested to deliver their

views and opinions in writing. The survey aims to get information on current practices and future

implementation plans of the Directive requirements. 52 of the 80 Establishments answered the

questions (see Table 38 and Table 39).

Table 38 - Target Industry Sectors Table 39 - Target Provinces

Industrial Sector of Establishment

Number of Establishment

Chemical Installations (Excluding petrochemicals)

27

Petrochemicals 10

Manufacturing 7

Processing of Metals 4

Water and sewage and waste management

4

Location of Establishments

Number of Establishments

Kocaeli 27

İzmir 20

Adana 3

Sakarya 1

Yalova 1

Method of the study

The questionnaire contains 36 principal questions. Some questions were in two or more parts. An

opportunity to provide additional information appeared with many questions.

It is aimed to select the representative sample of Establishments and industrial sectors to analyze the

implementation of the requirements imposed on operators of Seveso Establishments. The survey

therefore focused on provinces covering more than 27% of the total number of Seveso Establishments,

and on the contributors of 25% of accidents reported in TAIS during the period 1993-2010. 90% of the

Establishments are within the organized industrial zones.

An analysis was performed in terms of distribution amongst the representative provinces, contributors

to the number of accidents reported and industrial sectors. By end of April 2008, operators submitted

52 completed questionnaires.

It is estimated that the number of Seveso Establishments covered by the survey is more than 10% of

the total number of Seveso Establishments in Turkey.

It is estimated that the number of Seveso Establishments covered by the survey is more than 10% of

the total population of Turkey.

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General Structure of the Survey

The survey enabled an analysis to be made of the situation as regards the following issues in Box 25.

Box 25 Content of the Survey

I. General Information

II. Notification III. Quality management systems

IV. MAPP

V. Safety report

VI. Emergency action plans VII. SMS

VIII. Training

IX. External emergency plans

X. Information to public

XI. Inspections XII. Red tape

XIII. Land use

XIV. Domino effect

XV. TMS XVI. Burdens of Directive

XVII. Stakeholders

XVIII. Accidents and emergency response history

General Results of the survey

The survey has shown that implementation of the requirements of the Seveso II Directive will lead to a

higher level of safety, since the requirements of the Directive contributes to extra control on the major

accident risks and enables developing measures to control risks.

Respondents accept that Directive brings substantial requirements and they have to take additional

measures, but these will not affect the product prices or will not require huge investments on safety

measures. However, operators claim that they need technical assistance to implement the Directive

properly. Operators agree that it will require 2 years on average to implement the provisions of the

directive.

According to the answers, the notification of the establishment is still going on, there are some

operators who did not register to the system and who registered but not notified the chemicals.

Operators’ answers indicate that notification procedure is so time consuming.

Most of the respondents are aware of Seveso II Directive; however, they do not know what the

Directive brings in depth. In addition, the general organizational structure of the Establishments for the

prevention and limitation of major accident is mainly concentrated on mitigation of the accidents i.e.

the emergency responses. The great majority of the respondents indicate that they implement the

quality management systems (ISO 9001, OHSAS 18001, ISO 14001) and carry out risk analysis as a

requirement of these systems.

The respondents’ answers show that 65% of them do not have MAPP. This indicates a level of

knowledge for the general implementation of the Directive.

As Directive requires, the Upper-Tier Establishments have to draw up safety reports, according to

answers only 63% of operators have safety reports. These safety reports have some deficiencies in the

context of the Directive such that 40% of them do not include the identification of major accident

hazards and 20% of them do not have risk assessment practices. Most of the Establishments (94%)

have internal emergency plans. Nearly half of the operators tend to receive consultancy for the

preparation of the documents. There are also questions on the cost of these services but answers do not

provide general idea (estimation) on the costs.

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The respondents agreed that the approach of their safety management system is well-suited to prevent

major accidents and mitigate their consequences. Respondents (83%) concluded that their SMS are

sufficient for provisions in the Seveso II Directive.

There is also clear evidence that trainings are being carried out in the scope of Safety-Quality-

Environment in a year in Establishments. 46% of respondents carry out 1 to 3 training in a year, 23%

of the respondents carry out trainings over 11 in a year.

Majority of the respondents (75%) stated that they are not involved in any implementation of external

emergency plans procedure.

Answers were mostly negative concerning information of the public provisions. Majority of the

Respondents (80%) say that they do not inform public and do not have any mechanism for it. Only

15% of the respondents inform the public by own or via municipalities.

The other important component of the Directive is Land Use. Operators stated the distances to the

residential areas at the time their establishment was established and the current distances. Respondents

answers indicates that there is a nearly 50% reduction in the distances to residential areas since their

foundation. Although the majority (94%) of the respondent say that there is no structure in their safety

zones, safety distances are short in distance, which increases the exposure negative consequences of

the accidents for residential areas.

On the other hand, operators accepted responsibility in case of being in the vicinity of the residential

area, they will tend to increase their investments on the safety measures, but operators are against the

relocation of their Establishments which costs heavily. Operators also say that they will establish

insurance policy for the dangerous substances in case of high risk for the surrounding population.

Domino effect is also problematic issue. According to answers, average distance to possible neighbor

establishment, which can results in domino effect, is less than 250 m. Most of the respondents gave the

same answers that they gave for Land Use Planning. According to answers there is nearly no practice

or cooperation considering domino effects.

To determine the administrative and business costs, survey included questions on costs of

implementing the Directive. However, most of the respondents did not have answers the questions on

cost items. Operators accept that Directive compliance costs is a significant factor but state that safety

costs are financially beneficial in the end, because they reduce the chances of facing the huge costs of

major accidents.

To summarize, all target groups think that the implementation of the requirements of the Seveso II

Directive has led to a recognizably higher level of safety in comparison with non-Seveso

Establishments.

The requirements of the directive contribute to creating awareness of the hazards and develop

measures to control risks. Responses to questionnaire showed that operators are aware of the directive

in certain areas and they have a good practice especially in Internal Emergency Plans.

However, in general perspective, operators need technical assistance to implement the Directive. SMS

and MAPP requirements have serious deficiencies and most of the operators do not have proper risk

assessment practices. Land use planning and domino effect issues are also missing.

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http://www.bmu.de/files/chemikalien/downloads/application/pdf/peking_lahl.pdf

- Walker, G. Simmons, P. Irwin, A. and Wynne, B. Risk communication, public participation and the Seveso

II directive, UK, Journal of Hazardous Materials 65, March 1999, www.sciencedirect.com

- Wettig, J. Porter, S. and Kirchsteiger, Christian. Major industrial accidents regulation in the European

Union, European Commission, Belgium and Italy, Journal of loss prevention, 1999. www.sciencedirect.com

- Special issue of Safety Science on the International workshop on promotion of technical harmonization on

risk-based decision-making (Safety Science 40, 2002, www.sciencedirect.com) with the following papers:

- Ale, B.J.M. Risk assessment practices in Netherlands, RIVM, Netherlands, Safety Science 40, 2002,

www.sciencedirect.com

- Kirchsteiger, C. Workshop summary evaluation and how to proceed. International workshop on promotion

of technical harmonization on risk-based decision-making, European Commission, Italy, Safety Science 40,

2002, www.sciencedirect.com

- Rouhiainena, V. Gunnerhedb, Mats. Development of international risk analysis standards, Finland and

Sweden, Safety Science 40, 2002, www.sciencedirect.com

- Ruppert, K. The application of the term “Risk” from the viewpoint of the German chemical industry,

Degussa AG, Düsseldorf, Germany, Safety Science 40, 2002. www.sciencedirect.com

FINAL


9. List of Acronyms and Concepts

CPL Classification, Packaging and Labeling

DEMP Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency

DG ENV Directorate General for the Environment

DPD Dangerous Preparations Directive

EAS Environmental Approximation Strategy

EEA European Environment Agency

EC European Community

EEC European Economic Community

EEP External Emergency Plan

ElA Environmental Impact Assessment

EIONET European Environment Information and Observation Network

EIPPCB European Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Bureau

ELV Emission Limit Value

EMAS Eco-management and Audit Scheme

EU European Union

GHS Globally Harmonized System

IED Industrial Emissions Directive (2010/75/EU)

FINAL


IPPC Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control

IPA Instrument for Pre-Accession

IPPC Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control

ISO International Organization for Standardization

LCP Large Combustion Plants

LT Lower-Tier

LUP Land Use Planning

MAHB Major Accident Hazards Bureau

MAPP Major Accident Prevention Policy

MARS Major Accident Reporting System

MoIA Ministry of Internal Affairs

MoLSS Ministry of Labor and Social Security

MS Member State

NPV Net Present Value

NGOs Non-governmental organizations

OG Official Gazette

OIZ Organized Industrial Zones

PV Present Value

REACH Registration, Evaluation Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals

FINAL


RIA Regulatory Impact Assessment

Seveso II Refers to: Directive 96/82/EC as amended by Directive 2003/lOS/EC

SMS Safety Management System

SIA Sectoral Impact Assessment

SPIRS Seveso plants information retrieval system

SR Safety Report

UN United Nations

UT Upper-Tier

WHO World Health Organization

CAPACITY BUILDINGin the FIELD of ENVIRONMENT

Regulatory Impact Assessmentof EU Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC)