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1999 14: 3Public Policy and AdministrationStephen Cope and Jo Goodship

Government?Regulating Collaborative Government: Towards Joined-Up

  

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Regulating Collaborative Government:Towards Joined-Up Government?Stephen Cope and Jo GoodshipUniversity ofPortsmouth

AbstractThis article examines the role of regulatory agencies in the development ofjoined-up government. It argues that they have the potential to both control andinfluence those agencies they regulate, and consequently constitute potentiallysignificant catalysts for joined-up government. However, there are dangers thatrivalry between regulatory agencies (and their different sponsors) and non-collaborative regulatory regimes (including game-playing and regulatorycapture) may frustrate such moves towards joined-up government. It also arguesthat joined-up government requires joined-up regulation, otherwise so-called"wicked problems" that spread across the joins of government are likely toremain unsolved, or at best partially solved. Moves towards joined-upgovernment, including joined-up regulation, are likely to be hindered by the wayin which the state is functionally organised and the entrenched interests ofpoliti-cians, bureaucrats and professionals that have sustained such an organisationaland functional carve-up of the state. Consequently progress towards joined-upgovernment, if the past is anything to go by, is likely to be slow and possiblymore aspirational than real.

IntroductionThis article examines the regulation of public services in light of movesannounced by the present Labour Government to promote joined-up government(Cabinet Office, 1999). It stems from a research project that compares andcontrasts the regulatory regimes of key public services - namely, furthereducation, health care, housing, policing, probation, social security and socialservices. This research project examines public-service regulation, whichembraces government-sponsored control, influence and monitoring, that isgenerally performed by relatively detached regulatory agencies (eg audit andinspection bodies), of a mix of public and private sector agencies deliveringpublic services. The research project deployed a range of research methods,

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involving both primary and secondary research and qualitative and quantitativeresearch in the form of a questionnaire-survey of regulated agencies deliveringpublic services, semi-structured interviews of key actors involved in theregulation of public services, analyses of source-documentation, and a literaturesurvey (Cope and Goodship, 1999).

The push towards joined-up government is a significant component of theLabour Government's government-reform programme with one of its three aimsto ensure that 'policy making is more joined up and strategic' (Cabinet Office,1999, p.6). Jack Cunningham, the Minister for the Cabinet Officer, stated(Cabinet Office, 1999, p.5):

To improve the way we provide services, we need all parts of government to worktogether better. We need joined-up government. We need integrated government.However, the aim to join-up government may be more aspirational than

realistic given the less-than-impressive record of previous attempts to promotesimilar forms of collaborative government. Perri 6 observed (1997, pp.9-10):

After a century of growth, governments in all western countries have become caughtbetween the public's resistance to paying more tax and their continuing demand forgovernments to provide high quality welfare, infrastructures and social order. Withrising demands for education, health and long-term care, governments are desperatelyseeking ways of achieving more for less. A wave of reforms in the 1980s and early1990s sought to address these challenges.... However, they had one overriding failure- they left government less, rather than more, able to solve the important, "wicked"problems that most concern electors: how to cut crime, to create jobs, to improveeducational performance and health. To the surprise of the reformers, in importantrespects government ended up delivering less, while citizens found themselves payingmore.... The core problem for government is that it has inherited from the nineteenthcentury a model of organisation that is structured around functions and services ratherthan solving problems. Budgets are divided into separate silos for health, education,law and order and so on. The vertical links between departments and agencies in anyone field and professional groups such as the police, teachers, doctors and nurses arestrong. The horizontal links are weak or non-existent.

This lengthy quote illustrates a critical and perennial problem of governingmodern societies - namely, as Rhodes argued, 'governing without government'(1996; see also Weller et al, 1997). Governance reflects a "'differentiated polity"... characterized by functional and institutional specialization and the fragmen-tation of policies and politics' (Rhodes, 1997, p.7). As a result the centre(wherever that may be located) is increasingly unable to steer policy made withinan increasingly fragmented but interdependent political system, because interde-pendence 'confounds centralization' (Rhodes, 1997, p.3). In other words, there istoo much vertical integration and too little horizontal integration withingovernment, leading to frequent calls to enhance the governing capacity of thecentre whether it be in the form of corporate or strategic management, or, joined-up or holistic government. The precise details may differ but the general thrust ofsuch reforms invariably remain the same.

The rise of public-service regulation raises important questions about thisreform-push for more coordinated and collaborative government. While public-

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service regulation is often justified to enhance central control of policy-making,empirical research (including our research) suggests that the plethora ofregulatory agencies may not ameliorate, and moreover may exacerbate, theproblems of governing a 'differentiated polity'. This article charts the rise ofpublic-service regulation before examining how the existence of regulatoryagencies further fragments the 'differentiated polity'. It argues that joined-upgovernment requires joined-up regulation, otherwise so-called "wickedproblems" that spread across the joins of government are likely to remainunsolved, or at best partially solved (Clarke and Stewart, 1997; Rittel andWebber, 1973). Our research compares regulatory regimes between several keypolicy sectors and examines the extent such regimes impact upon moves towardscollaborative government. In particular, this article looks at the extent to whichregulatory agencies facilitate (or not) collaboration within government, and theextent to which they facilitate (or not) collaboration across government.

The rise of public-service regulationThe regulation of public services is increasingly significant, yet remainsrelatively under-researched (for notable exceptions, see Hood and James, 1996;Hood et al, 1998; Hood and Scott, 1996; Hood et al, 1999; Hughes et al, 1997).Generally regulation is seen as 'what government does to business' (Hood et al,1998, p.61). Within the study of public administration, regulation is often seen as"what government does to privatised utilities", reflecting the emergence ofregulatory bodies, such as the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) andOffice of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) established as part of the previousConservative Government's privatisation programme. For example, Bishopdefined regulation as 'government action to control activities in which it is notdirectly involved' (1995, p.46). However, this view is far too restricted, and failsto recognise that 'government itself is also subject to regulation' (Hood et al,1998, p.61). There is thus "regulation inside government": though 'hard to definewith precision', it is 'the way public organizations are subject to influence fromother public agencies operating at arm' s-length from the direct line of commandand endowed with some sort of authority over their charges' (Hood et al, 1998,p.61).

This definition of "regulation inside government" is a useful starting-point inunderstanding public-service regulation. However, it requires some significantqualification given that many public services are not provided solely by publicsector bodies: increasingly a mix of public and private sector agencies areinvolved in public service provision. Consequently public-service regulationinvolves both "regulation inside government" and "regulation outsidegovernment", with regulatory agencies (firmly located within the public sector)shaping the activities of those agencies delivering public services (located withinboth the public and private sector, such as central government departments,executive agencies, quangos, local authorities, private contractors and voluntarybodies). Hood and his colleagues focus solely on regulation of public sectoragencies, whereas we focus on regulation of public services; our concern is more

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than "regulation inside government" but "regulation inside governance".Following Rhodes, governance 'refers to self-organising, inter-organisationalnetworks' and 'is broader than government, covering non-state actors' (1995,p.11). Governance is both multi-level, embracing actors from sub-national,national and supranational levels of government, and multi-sectoral, comprisingactors drawn from the public and private sector. It is concerned with themanagement of relatively discrete policy networks to deliver public services(Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). A policy network consists of a set of interdependentactors sharing a common interest and operating within a functionally-definedpolicy sector. Benson defined a policy sector as 'a cluster or complex of organi-zations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished fromother clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies'(1982, p.148). Policy sectors, such as education and policing, constitute policynetworks, either policy communities or issue networks (Rhodes and Marsh,1990), in that they consist of '(more or less) stable patterns of social relationsbetween interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/orpolicy programmes' (Kickert et al, 1997, p.6). The existence of policy networksis a reflection of a 'differentiated polity', comprising 'the complex, multiformmaze of institutions ... which resist central direction' (Rhodes, 1997, p.3).Consequently public-service regulation needs to be framed within this context of"governance not government". It is a mechanism by which government seeks tomanage governance. Though public-service regulation is not new, it has becomean increasingly significant form of management within governance. Generallythe rise of public-service regulation corresponds to the rise of new publicmanagement.

New public management has been used by government to restructure policynetworks, many of which have been traditionally resistant to reform. Its rise canbe seen, in part, as an attack on the entrenched and relatively autonomouspositions of professionals and bureaucrats within government. Professionals tendto be mission-oriented with little regard to the costs of providing public services,and bureaucrats tend to be rule-bound with little regard to achieving policy goals(Pollitt, 1993). New public management is 'the attempt to refashion publicservices in such ways that they resemble the private sector' (Hughes et al, 1997,p.299). It is about bringing "macho-managers" into government to take onprofessionals and shake up bureaucrats so as to get things done (that is, thingsthat government wants done) and keep within budgets (that is, budgets thatgovernment wants kept). Essentially new public management rests on the twindoctrines of removing differences between the public and private sectors, and ofshifting 'methods of doing business in public organizations' away fromcomplying with procedural rules towards 'getting results' (Hood, 1994, p.129).

New public management involves simultaneous moves to centralise anddecentralise the management of public services. First, it centralises the making ofpolicy strategy (especially policy goals and policy budgets) increasingly in thehands of the core executive at the heart of government, embracing a closely-knitnetwork of senior ministers and civil servants (such as those in the Prime

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Minister's Office, Cabinet Office and Treasury). New public managementseparates 'steering from rowing', leaving the centre to steer while other agenciesrow (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p.34). Second, new public managementdecentralises the delivery of policy to a plethora of rowing agencies (includingexecutive agencies, local authorities, quangos, private contractors and voluntarybodies), that exercise managerial and operational discretion within the limits ofpolicy strategy set by the steering centre (Pollitt et al, 1998). These deliveryagencies thus possess "'freedom within boundaries"' (Hoggett, 1991, p.251).

New public management thus involves 'the separation of purchasing publicservices or, as it is often called, their provision from production' (Foster andPlowden, 1996, p.46), whereby policy strategy is increasingly centralised andpolicy delivery is increasingly decentralised. By providing centralised leadership,it is argued, government can decentralise policy delivery to empower consumersof public services, as a 'remote agency is less likely to give customers the publicservices they want' (Foster and Plowden, 1996, p.52). According to Savas, therole of government 'is to steer, not to row the boat' because 'government is notvery good at rowing' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p.25). Central steeringagencies (such as central government departments) increasingly, both directlyand indirectly, regulate local rowing agencies (such as executive agencies, localauthorities and quangos) by setting policy goals for rowing agencies to achieve,fixing budgets within which rowing agencies must operate, awarding contracts(or quasi-contracts) to competing rowing agencies, appointing the "right" peopleto head up rowing agencies to do the "right thing", and establishing regulatoryagencies (such as the Audit Commission) to monitor the performance of rowingagencies (Clarke and Newman, 1997). New public management seeks to enhancethe capacity of steering agencies to manage rowing agencies within theirjurisdiction. It is all about managerial surveillance - the ability of steeringagencies to monitor and direct rowing agencies more effectively, and withinrowing agencies the ability of managers to control workers more effectively. Theregulation of public services is thus central within new public management. Therise of new public management thus represents a very significant push towardsthe rise of the regulatory state.

Collaboration within government: from control to capture?Modelling public-service regulationAs part of our research we compared the regulatory regimes of key policysectors, and to assist such policy-comparative research we surveyed a range ofmodels of regulation and developed a model of regulatory regimes (Cope andGoodship, 1999). The power-dependence model was utilised to map out the aimsand resources between key actors within a regulatory regime (Rhodes, 1981) -for example, the sponsor (such as a central government department), theregulator (such as the Audit Commission and central government inspectorates)and the regulated (such as schools, police forces, probation services and so on).The key assumption behind this model is interdependence - regulators depend onthe regulated (for information, expertise, implementation and so on) and the

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regulated depend on the regulators (for funding, approval, political support andso on). Furthermore, there is mutual dependence between sponsors andregulators, and between sponsors and the regulated. Consequently, actorsexchange resources (for example legal, financial, professional and politicalresources) in an attempt to achieve their aims. From existing research it isevident that there is different degrees of interdependence within regulatoryregimes of policy sectors. For example, in comparing the regulation of theeducation, police and health-care services, Hughes, Mears and Winch found(1997, p.309):

[The] review of the regulatory mechanisms for ensuring accountability in the publicservices reveals the variety of organisational forms charged with this task. Theparticular mechanisms reveal considerable, though not unexpected, diversity given thevery different historical trajectories of these services, their differing political profilesand the extent to which they have been regulated at a local or national level andwhether regulation has relied on formal or informal mechanisms. There are certainlydifferences in the degree to which the mode of assessment remains within profes-sional hands. The extent to which outsiders are involved in assessment is likely todetermine the level of resistance to the regulatory regime.

Similarly Hood, James, Jones, Scott and Travers noted (1998, p.62):... the behaviour of regulators inside government seems to be related to how closethey are to those they oversee in professional/social backgrounds. In general, we findthe more distant regulators are from their clients in backgrounds, the more formallythey behave (in the sense of non-participatory standard-setting, rule-bound regulatorybehaviour and heavy reliance on formal reporting and sanctioning, rather than partici-pating, discretionary regulation with co-operative methods for gathering informationand modifying behaviour).

The different patterns of interdependence between actors within policy sectors isa key explanatory factor in understanding the different forms of regulatoryregimes of public services.

We constructed a continuum of regulatory-regime models upon which policysectors generally can be placed - see Appendix A. At one end of the continuumthere is the regulatory-control model (either a sponsor-dominant or regulator-dominant variant) where the sponsors and/or regulators control the regulated. Atthe other end there is the regulatory-capture model (regulated-dominant) wherethe regulated control the sponsors and/or regulated. Between these two endsthere are a range of regulatory-bargain models where the sponsors, regulatorsand regulated influence each other as a result of their interdependence. Thedegree of interdependence between the sponsors, regulators and regulated effectsthe extent of collaboration within policy sectors. Key explanatory factors are theprofessional and political power of the regulated, the legal and political power ofthe regulators, and the political salience of policy sectors (and issues within) forthe sponsors of regulation. For example, those highly professional groups (egdoctors, police officers) are generally more resistant to external regulatorycontrol than less professionalised groups (eg housing officers, probationofficers); regulators with significant statutory powers (eg Further EducationFunding Council (FEFC), Audit Commission) generally exercise more control

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than those with weaker powers (eg Social Services Inspectorate (SSI),ombudsmen); and those policy sectors subject to much political and mediaattention (eg education, health care) are generally subjected to increasingregulation to ensure government-preferred policy outcomes are realised. As aresult, moves towards collaboration within policy sectors are highly dependentupon the nature of their regulatory regimes.

Regulating public services locallyMuch of the research on public-service regulation has been directed at chartingthe growth of such regulation. Hood, James, Jones, Scott and Travers observed(1998, p.62):

The size of regulation inside government cannot be measured to three places ofdecimals, but it is big business. UK government invests more resources (in staff andpublic spending) in regulating itself than it does in regulating the much discussedprivatized utilities.... [We] identified no fewer than 134 separate bodies regulating theUK public sector at national government level in 1995. They directly employedalmost 14,000 staff, and cost, £766M to run - just over 30 pence in every, £100 spentby UK government....

Their research focused on "regulation inside government", whereas our researchfocused slightly more widely on "regulation inside governance". Furthermore,their research generally focused on the regulators, whereas our research focusedon the regulated whom have been relatively neglected in the literature on public-service regulation. We both surveyed and interviewed key actors, mainly chiefexecutives (or equivalents), of those regulated agencies providing furthereducation, health care, housing, policing, probation, social security and socialservices within a large city - 58 completed surveys were returned (representing a59 per cent response-rate), and 30 interviews were conducted. Both survey andinterview findings, and their implications for joined-up government, will bediscussed.

Nearly all survey respondents (95 per cent) felt that regulation of publicservices had increased under the previous Conservative Government; and nearlytwo-thirds of survey respondents felt that regulation has increased under thepresent Labour Government - this latter figure is likely to increase as new initia-tives (eg Best Value, Commission for Health Improvement (CHIMP), NationalInstitute of Clinical Excellence (NICE)) take hold and also given the LabourGovernment's zealous pursuit to fulfil its key election pledges (such as those forschool class-sizes and hospital waiting-lists). The chief executive of a localauthority believed that 'we are getting virtually suffocated and throttled by theregulation' (MISC1). A senior police officer of Lancashire Constabulary noted(Smith, 1999, p. 1):

There is a saying in my part of the country that you do not fatten a pig by weighing it.And we have been weighed a few times.... In short we are being inspected to death.

It is clear that the significant growth of public-service regulation has been felt bythose being regulated. Well over 80 per cent of survey respondents believed thatregulatory compliance costs for agencies delivering public services have

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increased. The chief executive of a local authority believed that complying withregulation 'is horrendously bureaucratic and far too costly' (POL3). Thoughdifficult to calculate, Hood, James, Jones, Scott and Travers estimated that'compliance costs even in the narrow sense make the total cost of internalregulation in UK government at least double the ,766M directly spent onregulatory bureaucracies' (1998, p.64). Such compliance costs are borne by theregulated not the regulators.

Over 90 per cent of survey respondents stated that regulation made thoseagencies delivering public services more accountable to central government, 67per cent of survey respondents commented that regulation enhanced centralgovernment control of public services provided locally, and only 38 per cent ofsurvey respondents believed regulators to be sufficiently independent from their(mainly central government sponsors to regulate effectively. The Chair of a NHSHospitals Trust argued public services 'are regulated for the government to getits own way' (NHS1). Similarly the Chair of a Probation Board commented that'the government wants to see its policies in operation throughout the country andto try to do that in every aspect of the policy from whatever is the centraldepartment ... is a fairly clumsy way of trying to do it and is not sensitive to localconditions' (PROB 1). A senior local authority officer argued that the aim ofregulating public services is 'to make sure that what Parliament or thegovernment intend is actually happening on the ground' (MISC2).

Public-service regulation is thus a control mechanism by which centralgovernment seeks to govern the activities of those agencies providing publicservices. Regulatory agencies, such as the Audit Commission, National AuditOffice and central government inspectorates, are a significant link betweencentral steering agencies and local rowing agencies. In this sense they representimportant catalysts for collaborative government: regulatory agencies enhancethe steering capacity of the centre to govern an increasingly fragmentedgovernance. They monitor, influence and in some cases control the performanceof agencies delivering public services. For example, the Audit Commission havedeveloped an extensive, albeit much criticised, array of performance indicators;the HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) issues certificates of efficiency,necessary to attract central government-funding, to local police forces andadvises the Home Secretary on policing matters; the FEFC,as a funder-cum-regulator, funds further education colleges; the Office for School Standards inEducation (OFSTED) constructs highly contentious school league-tables; theAudit Commission and National Audit Office audit the spending of publicmonies to ensure financial probity; and, both audit and inspectorate bodiesspread so-called "best practice" to agencies providing public services. Thissubstantial regulatory activity performed by regulatory agencies assists steeringagencies in ensuring that policy delivery complies with centrally-set policystrategy, thus furthering a sense ofjoined-up government.

However, in another sense regulatory agencies also undermine a sense ofjoined-up government in three significant ways. First, the establishment ofregulatory agencies further fragments governance. Their relations with both their

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sponsors and regulated agencies are sometimes fractious, making collaborativegovernment less likely. For example, OFSTED, under Chris Woodhead, hassometimes strained relations with the Department for Education andEmployment and often very strained relations with schools (and especiallyteachers) which it regulates (Hughes et al, 1997, pp.302-304).

Second, the mere existence of public-service regulation suggests non-collab-orative government and a lack of trust between steering and rowing agencies.The chief executive of a local authority argued (MISC1):

... being in the civil service you can see it really. You start off with virtue; we have aresponsibility to ensure that people get decent standards of service or they areprotected in some way from criminal or incompetent behaviour. You solve the virtuebut then you do get the switch-over to say "and I'm the only person who can betrusted to ensure this". But unfortunately I have to allow people out there actually dothese things and deliver these wonderful policies and services and standards and soon, but I don't actually trust them because I'm so much cleverer and better than theyand that leads to over-regulation....

Regulation can be seen as a manifestation of mistrust by the centre of thoseagencies providing public services locally (Power, 1997, pp.134-138). As aresult, such regulation, though joining-up government, is not based on mutualcollaboration but more on enforcement imposed from the centre.

Third, there is much evidence that regulators are captured (or partly captured)by those agencies being regulated. For example, the Association of Chief PoliceOfficers (ACPO) has to a significant extent captured the Audit Commission.Savage, Cope and Charman found (1997, pp.69-70):

... as the Audit Commission's involvement with the police service developed, ACPObecame more integral to its investigations. Not only was ACPO increasinglyconsulted over the selection of topics for Audit Commission investigation, it was alsogiven the opportunity to comment on draft reports to the extent that ACPO couldclaim a significant degree of "ownership" of the final reports (including recommenda-tions) published by the Audit Commission.

Similarly a Chief Constable noted that 'they [Audit Commission] borrow yourwatch then tell you the time' (POL2). On relations between the police serviceand HMIC, Reiner commented that 'the HMI is seen not so much as a control,but as a useful senior colleague, and as a means of transmitting police views toofficialdom' (1991, p.277). This cosy relationship can be mainly explained bythe fact that inspectors of the HMIC are drawn from the senior ranks of thepolice service. Indeed most central government inspectors are appointed from theranks of the public services that they inspect, thus reflecting a significant degreeof professional capture. The regulatory regime of the police service fits neitherwith the regulatory-control nor with the regulatory-capture model, but insteadfits with the regulatory-bargain model though skewed more in favour of thepolice service. Consequently regulation (both inspection and audit) become 'anew form of image management' (Power, 1994, p.48), a ritualistic game inwhich a closely-knit group of actors perform well-scripted and well-rehearsedroles as part of the 'growing industry of comfort production' (Power, 1997,p.147) - 'the fact of audit is becoming more important than the how of audit'

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(Power, 1994, p.48). Regulation thus gives the impression that something isbeing done, thereby providing reassurance to those concerned. An AssistantChief Constable remarked that, though an inspection is 'not a stage-managedcommentary', 'any organisation would be stupid ... to show their backside toanyone who is looking at it' (POLl).

Our research suggests that those public services that are most professionallyorganised (such as policing and health care) are less likely to be controlled byregulators and are more likely to be captured by the regulated. In the case ofhealth care, there is no central government inspectorate; the medical profession isgenerally left to regulate itself, though the Labour Government is committed toestablishing NICE with the crucial support of the medical profession. Lessprofessionalised public services (such as further education and probation) aremore likely to be controlled by regulators. In the case of further education,Holloway argued that the Audit Commission 'has undoubtedly had considerableinfluence' partly because of 'the weak professional identity of staff' (1998,pp.53-54). There are asymmetrical patterns of interdependence betweensponsors, regulators and the regulated across policy sectors, reflecting differentdistributions of legal, financial, professional and political resources betweenthese key actors within different policy sectors. Regulatory regimes, in whichregulators have close professional ties with regulated agencies (eg policing), inwhich regulators are highly dependent upon regulated agencies for expertise (eghealth care), in which regulators are highly reliant on regulated agencies forimplementation of their recommendations (eg social services) and in whichregulators have little political and media support (eg housing), are more likely todisplay forms of regulatory capture than regulatory control. Though noregulatory regime is purely based on regulatory control or regulatory capturebecause of interdependence necessitating a regulatory bargain, some regimes (egpolicing) display more signs of capture than others (eg social security). However,the nature of such regulatory regimes changes over time as the aims andresources of key regulatory actors change. For example, the health-care policysector will experience greater government-sponsored regulation with theestablishment of CHIMP and NICE, reflecting increased government, media andpublic concern. The prospects of joined-up government within policy sectors willbe highly dependent upon the nature of their regulatory regimes: those regimeswhere the regulators have been captured or part-captured will be more resistantto reform leading towards joined-up government as they are more likely topromote and defend sectional interests.

Collaboration across government: towards joined-up regulation?The Labour Government is explicitly committed to the idea of joined-upgovernment (Cabinet Office, 1999). The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, argued(1998):

Even the basic policies, targeted at unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poorhousing, high crime, bad health and family breakdown, will not deliver their full effectunless they are properly linked together. Joined-up problems need joined-up solutions.

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The Government has launched a series of initiatives as a way of enhancingjoined-up government, eg Comprehensive Spending Review, Social ExclusionUnit, Performance and Innovation Unit, Women' s Unit, Public SectorBenchmarking Project, Best Value, Home Office' s Crime ReductionProgramme. More specifically, it encouraged the recent establishment of thePublic Audit Forum, comprising all audit bodies, to promote greater cooperationbetween audit bodies. It is committed to joined-up audit where 'more than oneauditor is involved in the audit of joined-up activities' (Public Audit Forum). Italso seeks to promote greater cooperation with other regulators (such asinspectors) in the form of 'exchanging information, subject to statutoryconstraints, joint inspection arrangements, co-ordination of work programmesand the timing of visits to public sector bodies, and exchanging staff to facilitatecloser understanding of the role and remits of each body' (Public Audit Forum).The Government has set up a Best Value Inspectorate Forum to look in part 'atwhether inspectorates take sufficient account of joint working between thebodies they inspect; ... [and] at the scope for coordinating their programmes andsharing information' (Cabinet Office, 1999, p.43).

Even before these recent initiatives there is much evidence that regulatoryagencies cooperate with each other. For example, the Audit Commission increas-ingly works with other regulatory bodies (such as the National Audit Office andcentral government inspectorates) in its value-for-money investigations, beggingthe question of "where does audit end and inspection begin?" as the boundariesbetween them 'grow messier' (Hood et al, 1998, p.67). Since 1996 it has workedclosely with the SSI, though at the start both 'went through some of the stagesorganisations often experience in setting up partnerships, vying for territory andwanting to each retain our own ways of working whilst working together'(Nottage, 1999, p.3). It took them two years to agree upon a methodology forsuch joint working. The SSI also works closely with other central governmentinspectorates, such as the HMIC and HM Inspectorate of Probation (HMIP).However, the SSI has no statutory powers, unlike most other inspectorates, andconsequently relies heavily on cooperation of those it inspects to exerciseinfluence; such cooperation has been more forthcoming amongst social servicesthan health authorities in its review of their collaboration to support mentally illpeople in the community (Nottage, 1999, p.3).

However, regulatory agencies, with their different remits, agendas and styles,often compete with each other, resulting in frequent "turf-wars". For example,both the Audit Commission and HMIP investigated the probation service at thesame time. The Audit Commission and Housing Corporation are having 'a top-level political battle' over Best Value in housing associations (HAH2). Therehave been difficulties between the Audit Commission and OFSTED with schoolinspections because 'OFSTED's judgemental approach to inspection is verydifferent from the Audit Commission's evidence-based method of working'(Travers, 1998, p.14). Regulatory agencies, particularly inspectorate bodies, arefunctionally organised, and as presently constituted will run into problems ofcollaborating in assessing the performance of policies that cut across

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functionally-organised agencies delivering public services - collaborativegovernment requires collaborative regulation to assess the collaborate perfor-mance of those collaborating agencies. Hood, James, Jones, Scott and Traversargued that 'there is a lack of systematic exposure of regulators in government toproductive competition and rivalry, rather than ad hoc turf battles or collabo-rative deals where responsibilities overlap', noting that such competition appears'to be regarded as a principle to be applied only to producers of public servicesand not to their regulators' (1998, p.67).

The Government in its drive towards joined-up government is hoping thatdifferent regulatory bodies will cooperate and has shied away from establishingsuper-regulatory bodies to "police" joined-up government. Travers wrote that'the government assumes that somehow they will all get along', and added thatthis 'assumption is simply wrong' (1998, p.14). Furthermore, central governmentmay be somewhat fearful of any such super-regulatory body because of itspotential clout, and existing regulators may be somewhat reluctant to mergetogether given their functional specialisms. Arguably joined-up governmentrequires joined-up regulation, otherwise solutions to "wicked problems" that cutacross government agencies and policy sectors cannot be effectively assessed.The Government stated that policy should be designed 'around shared goals andcarefully defined results, not around organisational structures or existingfunctions' (Cabinet Office, 1999, p.16). However, there are considerableobstacles in achieving joined-up government (Audit Commission, 1998;Wilkinson and Appelbee, 1999). Moves towards joined-up government,including joined-up regulation, are likely to be hindered by the way in which thestate is functionally organised and the entrenched interests of politicians, bureau-crats and professionals that have sustained such an organisational and functionalcarve-up of the state. Consequently progress towards joined-up government, ifthe past is anything to go by, is likely to be slow and possibly more aspirationalthan real, though a lot will depend on the political will of central government.

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Appendix A: Continuum of Regulatory Regime Models

Regulatory Control Model Regulatory Bargain Model Regulatory Capture Model

Variant A: Sponsor-dominant ModelSPONSOR

REGULATORI

IREGULTVariant B: Regulator-dominant ModelSPONSOR

REGULATOR

REGULATED

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