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Regionalism and International Politics of the South Pacific

Article  in  Pacific Affairs · November 1982

DOI: 10.2307/2756789

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Regionalism and InternationalPolitics of the South Pacific*

Gregory E. Fry

rlHE SoUTH PecIFIc region has been generally regarded as aI quiet backwater isolated from the mainstream of international

. relations. This view has been reinforced by the fact that, until re-cently, the twenty island-territories in this area came under the directcontrol of France, Britain, the United States, Australia and New Zea-land. From the perspective of western interests, therefore, the regionrequired little further attention. This situation has begun to change,however, as a result of two bursts of decolonizing activity which tookplace between 1962 and 1970, and 1974 and 1980. There are nownine independent Pacific Island states in a position to make their ownforeign policy decisions, and forces previously denied access to the re-gion are free to try to influence those decisions. The consequent in-

------------ ÞementoÊ*everal-?aei€e Rincountrieqìnc.Iudirg-tHovietUnion, China and Japan, has forced those with established interestsin the area-such as the United States, France and Australia-to de-vise policies to rr¡aintain their predominánt influence. Taken to-gether, these developments constitute the emergence of a new systemofinternational relations for the region. This article is concerned withexploring the degree to which developments in South Pacific region-álism, initiated by the new Pacific states and supported by severalwestern countries, affect the nature of the international relationswithin this new system, and with what implications for the variousinterests involved.

THE DtMENsroNs oF SourH PAcrFIc INTTERNATToNAL RELATToNSThe new.international system in the South PaciÊc comprises three

distinct sets of relations-those among the Pacific Island states them-selves, those between metropolitan powers with established interestsand the island states, and those between the new North Pacific inter-

* Thë author wishes to thank Alân Rix,Japan Secretariat, Canberra, Austratia, for his help-ful suggestions.

PACIF;f ,4Fi:lrìììì3Volume s-<y' ii:. 3I E ,¿ '^, ì

455

Pacifu Afairsests and the island states. The size, power and objectives of the threegroups of states involved in these relations vary dramatically.

There are nine fully independent Pacific Island states: WestemSamoa, Nauru, Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Is-lands, Tuvalu (formerly the Ellice Islânds), Kiribati (Gilbert Islands),and Vanuatu (New Hebrides). There are also two countries whichhave attained "self-government in association with New Zealatd'," astatus which accords them a degree of independence in the determi-nation of their external affairs. They are Niue and the Cook Islands.Although decolonization began as earþ as 1962, with the granting ofindependence to Western Samoa, half of these countries attained in-dependence only in the last five years.r Vanuatu was the most recent,emerging from Anglo-French tutelage in July 1980 amid violent at-tempts ât "rebellion" and secession on the islands of Santo andTanna. This process of decolonization is continuing. Current politicaldevelopments in the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-lands-comprising Belau (formerly Palau), the Fede¡ated States ofMicronesia, the Northern Marianas and the Marshall Islands-should create three more island states with a sufficient degree of inde-pendence to participate in regional relations.

Nearly all of these island countries fall into the "micro-state" cat-egory. The whole island region, with an area of 30 million sq. kms.,has a population of only five million,'most of whom live in PapuaNew Guinea. Apart from Fiji, with a population of around 600'000tall of the other states have less than 200,000 inhabitants each. It hasbeen a generally accepted Prâctice to divide the region into threebroad cultural areas: Polynesia in the centre and east, Melanesia tothe west, and Micronesia to the northwest.'? This suggests more culltural homogeneity than actually exists. There is in fact considerablecultural diversity within each of these sub-regions, making differencesbetween the neighbouring states of Tonga and Samoa as significantas those between, for example, France and Germany.

--f Thld""oloni"",ion of all Pacific territories up until l9?o is surv€yed in J.W. Davidson,The D¿coton;zation oJ Ouania-A $Lnq 1945-70 (Weltington: New Zeala¡d Institute of Inte¡-national Affairc, 19?l). The constitutional chang€ in British te¡ritori€s thròugh to 1976 is exam-ined in Barrie MacDonald, "Imperial RerÌinants: Decolonization and Political Change in theB tish Pacific Islands," F.P. King, ed., Occania and Bqond (llestPort, Connecticut: Gre€nwoodPress, 1976). The events leading tà Papua New Guinea's independence in 1975 are d¡scùssed inDonwooliord, Paþua NaD Gu¡nc¿: Initiation ¿n¿ Ind¿þrn1¿ff¿ (St Lucia: Univ€nity ofQueenslandP¡ess, 1976).

2 For an examination of the cult¡¡ral features and origins of the peoPles within these sub-regions se€ Willia¡n Howells,Th¿ Paî;i¿ Ist¿n¿eß (lÃndon: Weidenfeld and Nicolson' 1973); ando.¡,. Otiver, Thc Pacìfu Islands (Honolutuì Univenity Press of Hawaii, 1975, ¡evised ed.).

456

International Politics of the South PacìfuThe inescapable reality confronting the Pacific micro-states is

their continuing economic dependence on larger states.3 All, exceptNauru, are dependent on metropolitan countries for development as-sistance. Although there have been attempts at diversifying aid, eachcountry relies predominantly on one "sponsor." In nearly every case,that "sponsor" is the ex-colonial administrator of the island country.aSome of these states are in fact dependent on external sources for asignificant share of their recurrent budget. Papua New Guinea, forexample, receives around half of its budget revenue as a direct grantfrom Australia.5 Trade and investment patterns also reflect the estab-lished links between island country and former administering power,as well as the proximity of the larger industrialized economies of Aus-tralia and New Zealand.G There is, then, a regional economic depen-dence on a handful of metropolitan countries-Australia, New Zea-land, France, Britain, and the United States-with the EuropeanCommunity (through the inclusion of Pacific nations in Lome ar-rangements) and Japan becoming more important as sources of as-sistance and as markets.

In their foreigrr policies, each of the new South Pacific states hasconcentrated its limited resources on regional linls and has madecommitment to regional cooperation a priority concern.t The ex-pression of this commitment has not been confined to statements ofintent. The PaciÊc leaders have, since the mid-1960s, taken joint ac--- ffr"ì-"p*a"r,.y

"ituatio¡ for MeLanesian countries is discussed in H.C. Brook6etd, Colo-nia6n, D¿a'loþn¿nt and Indcþcndcncc: Thc Case of the Metantsian Isknd¡ in th¿ South pacifu (Czr -bridge: Cambridge Univenity Press, 1972); for a discussion of the Solomon Isla.nds ìn particu-lar, see Ralph Pettman, "The Solomon Islands: A Developing N€o-Colony," Auxtrat;an Outtook,XXXI (August 1977), pp. 268-78. For aspects of Papua New cuinea's d€pendency, s€e A,Amaßhi, K-Good and R. Mortimer, eds., D¿o¿oþn¿nt and D¿þ¿ndcnty: Tha potiticat Econon| o!Paþua N¿w Guiî¿a (Melboum€, Oxford, Wellington and New york:'Oxford U"iu"."ity eioi,1979)., a The flow ofomcial developm€nt assistance by source and recipient can be found in SouthPacific Commission, South Pae;þ Econoniæ 1978: Statit;cal gunnary (Noumea, October l9B0),Table 13.

s The AusÛaÌian grant-in-aid to Papua New Guinea for the 1980-81 period is esrimared arA$232 miÌlion. See Australian Development Alsistance BiJ'.e¿v, Dâo¿toþn¿nt Co-oþ¿ntion: B;frr-êlal

-Ptoerun 1980-81 (c.znherfa: Atstraliân covemment Publishing Service, 1981), pp.3-5.

6 See Australian Department ofOveneas Trade, SuùzrLssion to th; S¿natc Standini iornnittzc onForcien AÍ'¿ùs and D¿f L'¿-Inquùy;nto Aultftlian C,ann;tn nt ;n th¿ Sa1lth PaciIE (Mãrch 197?), inAustralian Senate, Standing Committee on For€ign AFaiß and D€fense (Reference: Ausrraliaand the South Pacific), Omcial HansaÌd Transcript of Evidence, 1977.

7 For statements of commitment to regionalism by Pacific Island leadels see, for example,Ratu lMù4 R¿þo on Fotcign Aîairs fot tha pãiod l9th Octob¿r 1970-31st De¿¿nbd 1973, partia-mentary Paper no, 19 of 1974, Parliaûent of Fiji, p. I; Michael Somare. Th¿ En¿tging Roh ofPaþt N¿u Cuin¿a;n WorU Af¿hs,Tweüy-ñfth Roy Milne Memorial Lecture (Metboume, Aus-tralian Institute oflntemational Affairs, 1974), pp. 11-12; and A.M. Kjki, paput Ncw Gu;nca-An Ass¿ssnrnt R¿þott on Forcign Pol;q @ thc Minist¿r Íot D¿I¿n¿., Forc;gn R¿krioß and na¿¿ to th¿Iloure of Asscnbþt, 6 December 1974.

457

Pacifu Afairstion to gain control of the South Pacific Commission-the existing re-gional organization established and managed by the colonial powers.They have also created a network of their own regional institutionsand conferences. Further, through these regional structures, theyhave pursued cooperation in a wide range of functional areas' Associ-ated with these developments has been the promotion of a South Pa-cific identity symbolized by the often-used expression, "The PacificWay." The new island states have notjust been concerned, then, withdevelopments in their own countries. They hold a regional view andpursue their interests in this arena' They share the attitude that it is

ihey, rather than outside powers, that should determine future devel-opments in the island region of Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia'

The emergence of these independent states scattered over a largearea of ocean has inevitably stimulated interest and involvementfrom outside powers with no former colonial links to the area' Newovertures, first evident in the mid-1970s, have come mainly from theSoviet Union, China and Japan, and have been expressed in theestablishment of diplomatic ties, trade links, visits and offers ofeconomic assistance. Together, these North Pacific states form thesecond group of actors involved in the new system ofinternational re-lations. The Soviet Union and Japan appear to be motivated primar-ily by the desire to facilitate the continued operation of their largefishing fleets in the area. This has to be considered in the context ofthe mãve by the newly independent Paciflc states to declare 200-mileeconomic zones. IJnder such arrangements, most of the independentisland states, being archipelagic countries, have sovereignty over avery large area of ocean-so large in fact that, taken collectively, theyclaim control over most of the South Pacific Ocean. The declarationof these zones, the political change within the countries of the region,and the increasing attractiveness of the South Pacific as a fishingground (as the U.S. and Australia, for example, have tightened con-irol of their fishing zones) have made it advisable for distant-waterfishing nations-such as Japan and the Soviet Union-to developcloser relations with the new states in the arêa. This has rendered thePacific states more imPortant than their smal size would normallydictate, and makes developments in the South Pacific region of primeconcern to the governments of most countries bordering the Pacific.

The Soviet Union has been particularly concerned to establish abase for its fishing fleet in the region, and in this regard approachedTonga in 1976 with an offer of aid to assist with airport extensions in

458

Intemational Politics of the South pacìfuexchange for port facilities.s In the same year, the Soviet Union estab-lished diplomatic links with Fiji and Western Samoa.e Japan has ex-pressed its interest in the region by becoming involved in joint fishingventures with some Pacific states and by giving assistance to theirfishing industries through the provision of ships and training.'o Thefactors underlying Chinese involvement are less clear, though its deci-sion to establish diplomatic missions in Fiji and Western Samoa in1976-the same year as the Soviet initiatives--loes lend support tothe view that China has been motivated primarily by the desire tocompete ideologically with the Soviet Union. This is also indicatedby the public warnings that. China has made concerning Russian ac-tivities in the area.rr Equally, it could be argued that a prime motivefor China is to counter Taiwan's influence in the region. Three of thePacific Island states-Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu-havé recognizedTaiwan, and Taiwanese fishing trawlers are active in South pacificwaters.

The third group of states involved in regional relations are thosemetropolitan powers with established interests and influence in thearea. Because they continue to exert control over territories in theSouth Pacific, the United States and France have the most direct in-volvement. To them the region is of immense strategic value, whichneither country wishes to see diluted. The wide isoláted expanses ofFrench Polynesia provide an ideal setting for French nuclear testing,whilst the Rothschild mining operation in New Caledonia is the sec-ond major producer of nickel in the world. For the Americans, thestrategically-placed Micronesian territories and Guam continue toprovide sites for military and communications bases. It can be arguedthat the French desire to remain in the region is also motivated bynationalistic concerns, by an interest in undersea resources, and by adetermin¿tion to be part of any future arrangements for a pacific--i

-'Aur,oti"r, Depanment of Forei$ Atrairs, 'rhc South paeijc: SÚbn;srion to th¿ S¿nat¿

Statdíag Connittæ on For¿ig,l AÍaiß and D¿I¿nc¿, March 1977, p. 2t.e For a view of the Soviet Union's new intere¡ts in the South paciÊc, see the anicle by Alex-ander Malyashkìn (a joumalist of tbe Novosri press Agency), .USSR, The pzciñc,'i pacilurrbn¿r Month\, J^nvary 1978, pp, t5-16.

¡oJapan's economic ¡nvolvemenr in the South paciñc is explored in a series of anicles on"Jap-an: Her.Role in the South Sê¡s," P¿',Þ Àtands Àtonthþ,luie 1926, pp. 33_47, and ¡n a spe_cial feature,'Japan and the Pacíñc,,, in Po¡af' Istands Monthll, Septemb;; 1978. ÞÞ.3?_6g. Mr,Yoshio Okaw¿¡a of the Japanese Emba.ssy in Canbena sets out i¡is country.s áåJelopment as_sistance activities in the South Pacific and the official ¡easons for this new intercst in ,,.¡apan,sPlea: Give Us Access to Your Waleß.,,P¿.rjt IsÌ¿nds Montht , Apnl 1978, pp. l0-l L

-L See, for exampfe, "Russian Threat i; pacifrc C,t¿inLeâ:' irh,, Àao,üg UuoU, t Vrunn1977.

459

Pacìfu AfaitsCommunity- Both the United States and France have recently in-jected massive amounts of money into their territories, a strategy*ttl"tr ¡ at least Partly based on the pragmatic view that such terri-tories will not be able to afford to sever ties with their metropolitanpower, even should they wish to do so.''

Britain, having withdrawn from its last colony in 1980, only re-tains a token interest in the reglon.r3 Australia and New Zealand', onthe other hand, despite having withdrawn from their colonies, havebecome much more heavily involved since the mid-1970s' Theireconomic and diplomatic initiatives, in fact, can be seen as a directresponse to Soviet moves in 1976,¡a for their concerns are primarilystråtegic: the island region south ofthe equator is viewed as an Aus-t.alasiu.r sphere of influence in which outside interference should becountered. Through the ANZUS security Pact, Australia, New Zea-land and the United States have, since the mid-1970s, developed ajoint outlook on their strategic interests in this area'" H"r", then, are all the ingredients of a complex and potentiallyvolatile system of regional politics: a group of newly-independent Pa-cific states committed to the Promotion of regional cooperation andthe fostering ofan indigenous regional identity; continuing Americanand French commitment to their Pacifrc territories; new interest inthe region on the part ofthe Soviet Union, China and Japan; and at-tempts by Australia, New Zealand and the United States- as anANZUS strategy-to keep the newly-independent states under theirinfluence. As each of these groups is trying to influence develoPmentsin the region, political divisions, tensions and conflicts are inevitable'Moreover, beãause the independent PaciÊc states are committed topractical ventures in regional cooperation' regional politici not onlyis defined in terms of "island countries versus metropolitan coun-tries," but also involves conflict among the island states themselvesover the nature, pace and control of regional ventures'

-tfr"*I--¿ Americ¿n aid constituted 60 per cent of total aid from all sources to allPacific lshnd countries in 1978. Aid-flo$/s from ih€ U.S. to its territories amounted to A$228million, whilst French aid to its tenitorica amountcd to A$309 million See South Pâcifrc Com-roilrJio;, South Pa¿;j¡ Ecønon;.s 1978: Stat; iôal Swn'¡r? (Noùm€a, October t980), Tâble 13'

'3 B;tain neuJ.thcles gives a considerable amount of economic assistance to the rcgion âs

¡an of irs oblimtion to former coloni€s (A$47 million in 1978).' tt ln tg76 Ãust-lia quadruPled its official development ansistance to the independent Pa-

cific Isia¡ã states other than Papua New Guinea Thii amounted to AS60 ¡nillion for 1976-7?

io 1979-80. lt doubled this amåunt to ASl2o million fo¡ the triennium 1980-81 to 1982-83'Ãit.oii" i. th" t.tgot donor to the independent South Pacific For details of Austrâlia's aidprogra-rne to the iegion see Australian DeveloPment Assistance Burcaú,.Dta¿loþn¿nl Co'oþãa'iaä A;utnot C.op"oËl" 1980-81 (C^rùeîl h'itralian Govemment Publishing Service, 1981),pp. 33-50.

460

Intemational Politics of the South pacifuTHE DEVÈLoPMENT oF SoUTH PACIFIC REGIoNALISM

Prior to 1965, all decisions concerning regional developments inthe South Pacific were made in the distant metropolitan Ëapitals ofthe colonial powers. Pacific Islanders did not play any real part inthis process. From the mid-1960s, however, the pacific ieaders took aseries of actions aimed at changing the regional structures which en_sured this colonial power supremacy. The first action was to demandchange in the power-balance within the existing regional organiza-tion, the South Pacific Commission (SpC). The SpC naa been estab-lished in 1947 by the nations having territorial interests in the re_gion-Britain, France, the Netherlanãs, the United States, Australiaand New Zealand.. The stated purpose of this organization was topromote the economic and social development of the inhabitants ofthe island territories.rs Nineteen temitories were eventually includedwithin its scope. The assurance that absolute control of thá organiza-tion would be in the hands ofthe metropolitan powers had been builtinto the provisions of the founding Agreement. Although the in_volvement of Pacific Islanders was to be encouraged throulh partici_pation in a triennial South Pacific Conference, ih. Corrf"-r".r"" *".only given _advisory powers. Control of the organization,s activitiesrested firmly with the twelve Commissioners -who represented themetropolitan governments. tu

- .Although they reflected prevailing thought in 1947, the provisionswhich errsured colonial-power predominance were anachrãnistic bythe 1960s when islanders began to feel the impact ofpolitical changewithin their countries. They objected .t.o.rgly to ihese structuralguarantees of colonial-power supremacy and, in reacting to them, theisland leaders found a rallying point. Their attack on ;etropolitan_power dominance took the form of a series of demands for a moreprominent role for the South Pacific Conference, the body within theSPC organization in which islanders were represented. Ináigenous in-terests became identified with the Conference, whilst the interests ofthe colonial powers became identified with the Commission.

Although there had been earlier isolated instances of islanders,dissatisfaction with their role within the SpC, it was not until the1962 Conference, held at Pago Pago, that such feelings were widelyshared and articulated.rT The mood of the meeting ì-nfluenced the

,."'j.^ryT*.: Establishing the South pacific Commission, Canberra, 6 Februâry 1947,,,Au'truIian Tfta, S¿ri¿s (1948), no. 15, pr€amble.t6 lòid., þút¡n.

. ']_qge-.R.Á., H9Ir, :'Regionatism in the South Seas,', unpubtished ph.D. thesis, Duke Univer-sity (1976), pp. 179-86.

461

Pacifu Afairsrepresentatives ofthe colonial powers at the 1964 session ofthe Com-mission, which decided that the Conference would henceforth t¡e ableto make recommendations concerning the work programme Dele-gates to'the 1965 Conference, held in Lae, were disappointed, how-iver, in how their newly-won power worked in practice This dis"illusionment was the immediate cause of the outsPoken attack uPonthe Commission.tu Ratu Mara of Fiji was the principal protagonist,but he was supported by nearly all island delegates. He was later todescribe their joint action as a "rebellion," arguing that the "con-frontation" with the colonial powers was necessary, because "thepåwers seemed incapable of realizing that the winds of change had atiast reached the South Pacific and that we peoPles of the territorieswere no longer going to tolerate the domination of the Commissionby the Metrãpolitan powers. We were sick of having little to say andno authority."re For both island participants and European observers,the Lae Conference rePresented a watershed in regional affairs'

In subsequent meetings of the Conference between 1967 and1974, the Pucifi" d"legut"t continued to press for more power'to De-spite the reluctance of some metropolitan powers-particularlyFìarrce-to concede change, these efforts culminated in the adoptionof a Memorandum of Understanding in 1974.'?' Under the Memoran-dum, the Conference became the governing body of the SPC Theoperation ofthe SPC under the new rules did not, however, satisfy allislander complaints. Islander! were to remain suspicious of any at-tempts by the metropolitan Powers to influence the oPeration of theSPC, and for many of them the SPC would always be seen as an or-ganization created by the colonial powers, and therefore not to be re-garded in the same way as "home-grown" institutions.

The second action aimed at asserting indigenous control of re-giorial organization was the establishment of the Pacific Island Pro'

1ó This attack on the Commission is reported in Roben Lângdon, "South Seas Council MayG¡ow Out of Lae Tallß," Paeífv Islands Monthþ, Autüsr 1965, P. 2I.

re Ratu Si¡ K.K.T. Mara, Rcgíonal Ca'opcnl¡on ;n th¿ South PaeiÍu, Address delivered at theUniversity of Papua New Guinea, May 1974, P 7.

'?o Thé demands made and concessions granted in this Period can be found in the followingoublications of the South Pacific Commission: Sets;on oÍ th¿ South Pacifb Conniss;on: Working P¿''hdt.1s61 73: South Pac;tu Confø¿nc¿: Wolkinl Phþ¿ts, t967 -73; Solü¡h PúiIt Reporr' 1967-t969/70:'Ann:t'"t R¿þo,; ø! h. SoutÁ Paàjv Connissian,19?0/7 t-t973/14; R¿þo of ú. South PaciÍ\¡ Canldmc(ønd Procuä;ngiof thc S'ssion oJ the Sauth Paaifu Connission, t961-t973. A morè livelv account of thepolitical intirpiay is contained in the riports of South Pacific Conference¡ in Paàfu Isknd:Monrhly.z'îhe text of ttre Memorandum is contained in South Pacific Commission, Rsþo of ¡h¿

Fou ¿¿flth Sourh Pacijr Confd¿nce (Noúîe ,1974), Annex C' PP. 42-4.

462

Intemational Politics of the South pacfuducers' Association (PIPA).,, Significantly, it was established in1965-the same year as the "rebellion,, occurred at the Lae Confer_ence. This was not mere coincidence, for the two developmentsstemmed from a common motive, and were initiated by thã samegroup of island leaders. The creation of pIpA was particularly impor_tant, because it involved moving outside the established orguiiru_tional framework which was identified with colonial-power interests.The establishment of PIPA was initiated by Ratu Mara_then Mem_ber for Natural Resources in the Fiji government-who saw the needfor closer cooperation among island territories supplying bananas tothe New Zealand market.'?3 Fiji was joined by Wãstern Samoa, theCook Islands, Niue, Tonga, and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. ThusPIPA really amounted to a Polynesian venture, reflecting the moreadvanced stage of decolonization in that part of the regiãn and thefact that the main banana producers also happened to bã polynesian.The scope of PIPA's interests widened to include other primary prod_ucts and possible cooperation on all stages of production þhipping,marketing, research).

PIPA was not created merely to work on practical problems of de-velopment, though this was the stated objective. Most of the activitiesundertaken by PIPA could have been approached through the SpC,yet a decision was taken to establish a new organization. The creationof PIPA can therefore be regarded as being-at least .in part_an ef_fort to take control of regional programmes. It was an exercise in self_determination. The importance of the all-island aspect of pIpA wasstressed by Tupua Tamasese Lealofi IV, then prime Minister ofWestern Samoa. In his closing speech to the i9?l pIpA Conference,he said, "This is the strength of our small body . . . this is an associa_tion of islanders, created by islanders, and successful only from the ef-forts of such."2a For Albert Henry, Premier of the Cook islands, pIpAwas important as a symbol of Polynesian assertation in particular:"for 200 years, the white man hãs been exploiting the resources ofthePacific, but now Polynesians are working together for polynesians.,,25

22 Between 1965 and 1968, this organization was called the pacific Islands producers, Sec¡e-rariat. PIPA'S constitution did not become operarive unril 1971. See pIpA, Coßtitut¡on Estøb_lishing r,hc Pacifu Isla .s P¡oduc¿rs' A¡sociatian (Suva, t97l).^ '?3 The d€tails of PIPA'S origins and €arly'histoÇ areãescribed by H.p. Elder, the ExecuriveSeclgtSrl.of the orgarrìzation, in Pacilu htanú Èoduc¿ts' A¡socíation (S"ru, frA.r.i, rSZg.

'* Paciñc Islands Producen' Associarion, Si¡¿ S¿$ ion: R¿cotd oÍ ho¿¿¿dings (Nuku'aloía, Aprill97r), p.24.'?5 "Paci6c Leaders Make Nuku,alofa a cet-Togeth€Ì to Remember,,, palij¡ ktand, MonthtJ,May 197 I , p. 22.

463

Pacifu AfairsPIPA was terminated in i9?3, but only because there was by then an-other indigenous organization with broader functions, that could sub-sume its activities.

The creation ofthe South Pacific Forum in 1971 was the third in-digenoirs action undertaken to gain control of regional decision-mak-in!. Established by the newly-independent Pacific states to provideun ur.nu for discussing matters of concern, the Forum resulted fromfeelings of frustration over the limits placed on the scope of discussionin the South Pacific Commission. The founding Agreement hâd lim-ited the SPC's scoPe to economic and social development. Politicalmatters had been purposely excluded, and this restriction began toannoy island delegates to South Pacific Conferences during the1960s.'?6 Ratu Mara of Fiji, Tamasese of Western Samoa, and AlbertHenry ofthe Cciok Islands therefore moved to set uP their own organ-ization. Although the other independent Pacific states becameinvolved, it was these three thât took the initiative. They aSked Aus-tralia and New Zealand to join them, but excluded the other metro-politan powers. The eleven official forum meetings held between 1971

ànd 1980 were attended in nearly all cases by heads of govemment;the several informal meetings held in recent years have also attractedhighlevel delegations. The discussions have ranged over a wide vari-ety ofsubjects, but most are develoPment-oriented. Subjects receivingcontinuing attCntion include French nuclear-testing, decolonization;shipping, civil aviation, telecommunications, trade promotion, bulkp"i"trurì.g, and the control of fishing resources." - -- h 1972, the Forum established the South Pacific Bureau for Eco-nomic Cooperation (SPEC) as its research arm.28 Australia and NewZealand wére each to contribute one-third ofthe budget, the remain-der being conributed jointly by the island country members' As asubject has become of interest to the Forum and required further in-vesiigation, it has been referred to SPEC, which either undertakes re-search itself or coordinates studies carried out by consultants pro-vided by international agencies or donor countries. In its first years ofoperation, SPEC's most important tasks were coordinating the nego-tåtion of the terms of association of Western Samoa, Fiji and Tongawith the European Community; promoting regional trade; and exam-

-*

a¡¡ poi't i" "-nhasized

in Ratu Mara, The south Patift Fonn,Address delivered ar lheUniversiiy òf the South Pacific, Suva. 25 August 1972' p. 5.

2? Forum meetings are held in private session. A communiqué, recording the mâin toPics ofdiscussion and decisions taken, is the only account of proceedings that is made public'

'?s Th€ functions, purPoses and structu¡e of this organization are set où1 in Ag¿¿n¿nt Estaù'tishine th¿ South Pa¿¡jr Butêau Íot Econoni¿ Cooþclation (SùYa\.

464

Int¿mational Politics of the South paeifuining the feasibility of a regional shipping line. It subsequently beganto oversee research and progtammes concerned with such matters astelecommunications and fisheries development.2e

The broadening of the Forum's field of interest has been reflectedin a corresponding expansion of the Forum/SPEC institutional net-work. This has taken two forms. One has been to create ministerialcouncils, with advisory boards composed of oficials, to make recom-mendations to the Forum in certain areas ofcooperation, such as civilaviation, trade and shipping. The other has been to establish semi-autonomous regional organizations to manage specific areas of co-operative activity in which a higher level of integration is being at-tempted. The Pacific Forum Line, the Telecommunications TrainingCentre, and The Forum Fisheries Agency are examples of this type.

Thus, the region now has two organizational networks-one cen-tred on the SPC and the other on the South Pacific Forum-bothmanaged by the Pacific Island states. As has become evident, thereare important distinctions to be made between them. The SpC coversa wider region through its inclusion of dependent territories; it alsohas greater metropolitaû involvement through the participation ofFrance, the United States and the United Kingdom, in addition toAustralia and New Zealand. The Forum, on the other hand, restrictsits membership to the independent Pacific countries, plus Australiaand New Zealand. Another important distinction is that the SpC hasretained its "no politics" rule, whereas any subject may be raised inthe Forum. Thus, it is only in the Forum that joint positions can beailopted regarding important political issues affecting the region-such as decolonization and nuclear testing-and that joint ap-proaches can be made to countries and. organizations outside the re-gion. Also, the regional ventures requiring a considerable com-mitment of national resources and the surrender of nationalsovereignty have all been pursued through the Forum network. Forthis reason, clashes in national interest that have emerged havetended to occur within the Forum rather than the SpC.

Although schemes involving a high degree of regional integrationhave often been contemplated-and sometimes attempted-there is ageneral preference for proposals involving a lesser degree of in-tegration. For example, a free-trade-atea option was passed over infavour of ad hoc regional trade promotion and the negotiation of- t" S.*d -i ai"""*ions with SPEC sraffmembeß, ar SPEC H€adquane¡s, Suva, October-November 1975. See SPEC, Dir¿ctols' Annuat neþort, tg¡g/t+-tg¡S/AO, br a ãetaiteå tisting ofSPEC activiti€s.

465

Pacifu Afairspreferential access to the Australian, New Zealand, and EEC mar-Lets. After experiencing difficulties with a regional carrier, the Pacificstates have chosen to encourage cooPeration among national airlines'The regional development bank proposal' which had been Siven seri-

ous coÃideration over many years' was finally dropped in favour of ajoint approach to gain access to Asian Development Bank funds'Wn"."åt earþ proposals for a regional shipping line included thecreation of a córpóration which would acquire its own vessels, theproposal which ultimately won acceptance advocated a "pooling"concept. Also, the regional rationalization of industrial developmenthas nåt been attempted, though there is provision for SPEC to exam-ine this concept if the Forum becomes committed to the idea' Onceagain, a lower-level form of integration has been adopted'3o

The South Pacific states are not attemPting political integrationin the sense of transferring power to a supra-national authority orcreating a confederation' South Paciûc regionalism, therefore, resem-bles the regional arrangements typical of most of the developing'world. It is,-however, different from many such regional efforts withrespect to the degree of economic integration being attempted' Its rel-atively low level of economic integration, for example, contrasts withthe rather high degree of coordination achieved by regional customsunions and free trade areas Prevalent in Central and South America'In this respect, it is closer to an ASEAN or OAU type of operation'

At the same time, there are several aspects of the South Pacificwhich make its experience with regionalism quite different from thatof Africa and Southeast Asia. First, Ttre

^lee- is composed almost en-

tirely of micro-states, whose preoccupations, needs and caPabilitieswith regard to economic development and international relations arevery different from those of larger developing countries' Second, theSoúth Pacific is a region of islands. There are, therefore, no bordersbetween states, thus eliminating the possibility of border disputeswhich have plagued other regions; the regional organizations do notha,re a peaie-kieping or mediating function as, for example, theOAU has in Africa. Third, regional cooPeration was already beingpromoted in the South Pacific by the colonial powers before theÞacific leaders became committed to the concept during the 1960s'

Although the power structures have changed, the regional organiza-tion esáblishád by the colonial powers in 1947 is still in operation,

-- f¡" *0".¡.t". "f the Pacific Islarìd states in Pursuing cooPeration .in- the-se and other

-"as i" "*a-ì"e¿ i" a"tail in the author's forthcoming monograph on Souh Paàþ Raghnalisn'

to l" f"tìßi"J ly rft" eùstralian National University DeveloPment Studies Cent¡e' Canbe¡ra

466

Intemational Politics of the South pacifuand activities promoted through the South pacific Commission haveinfluenced the emergence and shape of the indigenous commitmentto cooperation. This factor was absent in Africas'ãnd Southeast Asia.

The region that is most òomparable to the South pacific is theCaribbean. Both regions are composed of developing island micro_states; they have similar economic problems; and i; both, the colonialpowers had promoted regionalism before an indigenous commitmenthad emerged. There are, however, two significãnt distinctions be_tween the regions which limit their comparability. First, the Carib_bean is attempting to achieve a higher level of economic integrationthan the South Pacific, indicated, for example, by the establishmentof a-free-trade area and. a regional development bank. Second, whilstthe South Pacific regional organizations include colonial and ex_colo_nial powers as members, the Caribbean organizations consist only ofcountries within the region; metropolitan cóuntries are excluded.!2

..The limited form of integration that the pacific states are pur_suihg reflects the constraints imposed by the economic and poliiicalrealities confronting them. Such realities include the fact that theireconomic problems are not as similar as is often thought, that thereare more attractive means of approaching such problems, and thatthe difficulties involved in regional -arrugã-..,t Åft"r, otr ét the ben_eÊts to be gained from integration. It is nãt overly surprising that, forthe most part, regionalism has failed to rise much abãve tlie level oftoken economic integration. It would, however, be a mistake to inferfrom this that regionalism is an empty concept or,,all talk, no ac_tion," as some observers and participants have described it. The di_mensions of regional activity continue to expand; new organizationsare being created and new programmes initiated; and the"number ofregional conferences increases each year.3e paóific Island countriescoming to independence want tojoin the regional organizations, andmember-states which have been critical oi the eco=nomic achieve_ments of regional cooperation or ofregional management continue toparticipate in the organizations. There is, then, a=persisting and ex_panding commitment to the concept of regionalisÁ, despitð the fail_ures and the lowleveì achievements of thè past. This ongoing com_

_j -ill"¡*" 1",:.ntinenral regionat¡sm. rn terms ofsub-conrinen(at regionatism, ihe influ-ence¡l the cotonrat legacy was. ofcoune, very significant."'tor a compa son of Caribbean and South pacific regionalism, see Herbert Corkran,Min;-Nations and Mac,o'cooþ¿Ìatktç^ Th¿ caibb¿an and the south pzciJi' gvir'r'g,.ì, ñ""r., a-".ican Inrernationâ1. lg7ô.s3 There are o-onj fifty gou..rr-.nr-level r€gional conferences and seminars held annu_ally. Most of these are held'uider the auspices ofihe SpC and SPEC

+t\ J

Pacifu Afairs

mitment can be partly explained by economic motives, but I wouldargue that the driving force is provided by political factors

There are a number of political advantages which can derivefrom participation in regional activity. Such advantages do¡ot flowfrom ihe inìegrative process itself, nor are they indicated by thestated objectives of the regional organizations. They are, then, deriva-tive political functions. First of all are the diplomatic channels andbargãining advantages that participation in regional forums can Pro-vidJ for siates constrained in their international dealinç by theirvery small size. Of equal importance are the political benefits thatpariicipation in regional activity provide to the Pacific leaders'.Iitr.""ift their presence at regional forums, they have an opportunityto d.rrio.r.t.ut" their international statesmanship and thereby buildtheir stature in domestic politics. This is particularly important forleaders of micro-states who are not generally represented in larger in-ternational forums-or, having such rePresentation, are seldomheard because of their relative insignificance.

It can be argued that the most important force sustaining a com-mitment to regionalism is a developing "regional nationalism " Theterm "Pan-PaãiÊc nationalism" can be used to describe a set of atti-tudes concerned with the rejection of past and continuing political,cultural and economic domination by countries outside the reþion,and with the assertion of indigenous Pacific values and control' It is

evident that such attitudes have formed a raliying point for the Pa-cific leaders and have motivated many of their regional activities'New regional organizations were not just created for the practicalresults they might achieve; they were also seen as symbols of an in'digenous assertion of control over regional decision-making and ac-tivity. The various elements in Pan-Pacific nationalism-anti-colo-nialism, opposition to "neo-colonialism," and the promotion of aregional cult.rral identity-are all concerned with confronting an im-piiging outside world.3a The commitment to regionalism gains its*uil i-p.t,rt from the unity derived from the shared experience ofcolonialism and of continuing economic and cultural dependency,rather than from any "home-grown" regional identity' For the Pa-cific states, then, the primary value of regionalism lies in its role as anassertive mechanism' Their commitment to the concept can be seen

as part of the independence process.

-Af Jã"rr*rio. of these attitudes, see R. G. crccombe,,Th¿ Pa¿ifu Wq-An Endgins Iùn'ti, (Suva: Loru Pasi6ka, l9?Q.

468

Int¿mational Politics of the South pacifuIMPLICATIoNS FoR INTER-ISLAND RELATIoNS

Developments in South Pacific regionalism have had importantimplications for the nature of relations between the new island states.Such relations are, in fact, principally determined at the regionallevel rather than on a country-to-country basis. Regional forums pro-vide a personalized regular means of inter-island contact, obviatingthe necessity to exchange diplomatic missions. In view of the rela-tiveiy small population of the Pacific states and the considerablenumber of regional conferences held, such gatherings involve, overtime, a very significant proportion of those in government and profes-sional circles. Many political leaders and government offcials attendseveral regional meetings a year. There has developed, therefore, ahigh degree of familiarity and rapport among the leadership group ofthese states, reinforced by the fact that there have been very fewchanges in political leadership within island governments. In fact,with the exception of Western Samoa, no Pacific Island country expe-rienced a leadership change until 1976.

Inter-island relations have become increasingly complex, as morestates are involved in the regional forums and as cooperation issought on a wider range of subjects. As a result, underlying divisionsand conflicting interests within the South Pacific community haveemerged. These divisions have been associated with three general is-sues: the implementation of regional programmes and ventures; atti-tudes to Pacific Rim involvement in regional agencies and regionalaffairs generally; and regional leadership. Tensions associated withthe implementation of regional programmes and the management ofcooperative ventures stem from the fact that participation usually in-volves some initial economic cost or loss of prestige associated withhaving a national project of the same type. The siting of a regionalventure becomes a political issue because it means employment, thebenefits of immediate access, and prestige for the host state-and in-convenience for other participating stâtes. Decisions about the direc-tion and nature of regional programmes are, in like manner, politicalbecause countries have different requirements based on their eco-nomic and geographic situation.

When the South Pacific states began to promote and manage re-gional projects involving a significant degree of integration and com-mitment of resources, questions of cost and benefit soon created ten-sions between Fiji, on the one hand, and all other Pacific-stateparticipants on the other. This was partly due to the fact that, untilthen, most of the regional institutions had been established in Fiji-

469

Pacifu Afairsincluding the Universit;r of the South Pacific, SPEC, the SPC Com-munity Education Centre, the Telecommunications Training Centre,and Air Pacific. Fiji had the advantage of both being in a central lo-cation in the region and being well serviced by international trans-port. An added attraction was that the various United Nationsãgencies had set up their regional offices in Suva. This situationcreated the appearance ofa regionalism centred on Fiji, and was thecause of resentment among other island states. The latter also re-sented the dominant role Fiji had played within the major regionalventures; for example, they felt that the way the University of theSouth Pacific and Air Pacific were run favoured Fijian interests' Con-flicts within these organizations generally became defined in terms ofFiji versus the rest of the membership.35

This resentment of Fiji's role contributed to the move towards na-tional, rather than regional endeavours. This was particularly evidentin relation to civil aviation where Pacific countries have moved to setup their own airlines. Fiji's reaction to the criticism of its role has alsohad important implications for regionalism. At first, it tried to meetsuch criticism by publicly claiming that it did not desire a regionalleadership role. By 1975, however, it had become evident that RatuMara was tired of the constant criticism of Fiji's position. In a state-ment to the press in November, he expressed considerable dis-illusionment with regionally-run organizations, such as Air Pacificand the University of the South Pacific.36 He drew attention to thedifficulties of jointly managing regional programmes or institutions.In particular, he objected to the fâct that under such arrangements,the "pace of development is determined by the slowest member'" Hecited as an example the conflict over whether the university shouldhave chairs in accounting and engineering. While Fiji supported thismove because it suited its requirements, some other countries op-posed it because it was not relevant to their needs. Ratu Mara advo-cated moving away from joint management of regional institutionsand putting the host country in charge of running them-thus ensur-ing that "development would be determined by the fastest." WhenMàra made this statement, he had in mind the proposed RegionalTelecommunications Training Project. It was, in fact, subsequentlyestablished as a Fiji-run regional organization with places availablefor others from the region.

-*

Thß i. oo,,,ir,"d in detail in Fry, Soziá Pøcfu Rcgionalisn (forthcoming).36 See Fiji Ministry ol lnformation, The Prine Minitn's Po¡t-Cøbia¿¡ Pt¿ss Confd¿n'¿' 13 No-

vember 1975, Nervs Release no 625, Suva, 13 November 1975

470

Int¿rnational Polities of the South PacìfuThis was the first time that Ratu Mara had publicly criticised the

concept ofjointly-run regional organizations. His statement markedthe cuìmination of Fiji's growing frustration over trying to take thelead in regional organizations and its growing resentment of the criti-cism that had been levelled at it in recent years by other island states.The statement also reflected a feeling that Fiji,s national interest hadsuffered through the necessary compromises and sacrifices of the co-operative process. Some recent developments appear to have lessenedthe antagonism felt towards Fiji, including the siting of new regionalorganizations in Honiara and Apia, and the decentralization of theUniversity of the South PaciÊc. Nevertheless, the tensions related toFiji's position in the regional movement have probably had some last-ing effects. Nearly all Pacific countries have moved to more national-istic positions-particularly significant in Füi,s case because, until re-cently, it has been regionalism's most active supporter, and RatuMara the region's most prominent activist.

Further tensions in Inter-island relations derive from metropol:itan involvement in regional affairs. In their joint activity aimeã attaking control of the SPC and establishing their own regional struc-tures, the Pacific leaders achieved a high degree ofcohesion, for theyall agree on the need for redefining the nature of metropoìitan in-volvement in regional affairs, such that Pacific Island interests areparamount. But in 1978, the Pacific Island states began to differ òverthe degree to which, and how, such metropolitan involvement shouldbe redefined, both in relation to regional structures and the regiongenerally. The conflict has been primarily concerned with Americanand French involvement, though it also indirectly involves Australiaand New Zealand. Several issues have been at stake, the most impor-tant of which has been the question of U.S. involvement in the re-gional fisheries agency-an issue which came to a head at the Sep-tember i978 South Pacific Forum held in Niue.3?

- .U.S. membership was supported by a Western SamoanJed group,whilst a group led by Papua New Guinea and Fiji took the view thãtits membership should be opposed on the grounds that the UnitedStates does not recognise coastal state soverèignty over the migratoryskipjack tuna, the main resource that the agency would be con---iã-, ro,u. proceedings were closed ro the pubtic. The rifr that occurred amont the is-land states was, however, reported byjou¡nalists cov€¡ing rhe me€ting. See, for examplè, BruceJones, "US Tuna Fishing a Divisive Issue for Forum Members," Canber¡a Tin¿s, I I Octob€¡l97B; and "Islanden Wary of US Bait," S7dn7 Moming Herald,24 October 1978. These reporrswe¡e substantiated and expanded in the autho¡'s discussions with delegates to the 1978 SourhPacific Conference which met shonly after the Niue Forum.

47t

Paciic Afairstrolling. Fiji's position was made clear in the month following the Fo-.,r* *i"tt, itt an address to the United Nations General Assembly, itsambassador, Mr. Vunibobo, stated:

We have now reached a situation where the formation of such an agency is

threatened . . . . The main reason for this sorry stat€ of affairs haS been dueto the wishes of a dominant power foreign to the region, to join the Agencyon its own terms.... We viéw this .. as yet another attempt to dominateour region and to dictate to us the terms and conditions in which we shouldrun our affairs.u"

An additional objection, held particularly by Papua New Guinea,was that the U.S., as one of the main distant-water fishing nations,should not be a member of an agency controlling the activities ofsuch nations on behalf of the South Pacific states, The issue was notresolved at the Forum. By the end of the meeting, the Papua NewGuinea/Fiji grouP was threatening to set uP its own fisheries agency'As u co-pioài.", it was decided to proceed with the establishment ofa.r ugett"y composed only of the Forum countries, leaving the ques-

tion of Pacific Rim membership-other than that of Australia andNew Zealand-to further negotiation.

At the same meeting, the island countries lined up in the same op-posing groups on the issue of admitting American Samoa to.member-.frip i"-ttt" Forum. Papua New Guinea and Fiji in particular re-garded such a move as a threat to indigenous control of the Forum,Éecause Ame.ican Samoa, as a dependent territory, could not makefinal decisions and thus would still be referring mâtters to the UnitedStates. The Westem Samoa/Cook Islands group took a more tolerantview of possible IJ.S. involvement by proxy. Underlying these differ-ences were divergent attitudes concerning the degree to which outsideinvolvement in regional developments should be checked, and in-digenous interests asserted.

The third source of tension has been the question of regional lead-eiship. In the early 19?0s, this took the form of resentment of what*u, ,""., as Fijian assumPtion of regional leadership, a view basedonly partially on the perceived domination by Fiji of various regionalventures. The perception was reinforced by Ratu Mara's growingreputation as the "front man" of the regional movement' Moreover,during the time when it was the only Pacific Island member of theUniteã Nations (1970-75), Fiji considered itself as the spokesman for

-i" nJão."d in " 'New Colonialism' over Fishing: Fiji Accus€s theuS," Canòena Tincs,lrOctober 1978.

472

International Politics of the South Pacìfuthe regionee-and, to a certain extent, it was regarded as such by theoutside world. Other Pacific countries tended to see this as an unwar-ranted assumption of a regional leadership position.

When Papua New Guinea gained independence in 1975 and be-gan to involve itself in South Pacific regional affair3, there were ex-pectations that it would dominate the micro-states of the area. Ob-servers also predicted a conflict between Fiji and the ,'giant,,newcomer concerning the status of regional leader.æ As it happened,neither situation eventuated. The Somare Government consciouslypursued a low-proûle approach in its dealings with South Pacificneighbours. Fiji and Papua New Guinea, far from becoming rivals,developed close relationsar-ties which were dependent to a signifi-cant extent on the friendship of Michael Somare and Ratu Mara.This special relationship between Papua New Guinea and Fiji, lead-ing them to ally on some important issues, began to be resented byother Pacific states during 1978. It is evident that their dominance inregional affairs annoyed Tupuola Efi, the new Prime Minister ofWestern Samoa, in particular. In fact, his challenge to the PapuaNew Guinea/Fiji group at the 1978 Forum can be seen, in part, as anassertion of Western Samoa's right to a leadership position. This chal-lenge not only concerned the fisheries issue and American Samoanmembership, but also involved the question of who should succeedMahe Tupouniua as director of SPEC, the research arm of the Fo-rum. Here, Tupuola put up a Samoan candidate at the last minute tochallenge Papua New Guinea. Mara, a supporter of the Papua NewGuinea nomination, was angered by Tupuola's action and reportedlydescribed it as not in keeping with "The Pacific Way." The issue wasso divisive that the incumbent director was asked to continue in of-fice

-;4""11o".pt", Ratu Mara "statement ro the Twenty-fifth Regular Session of the UNGeneral Assembly, 1970," R¿þo on Fol¿ign Afaiß Iøt tù¿ þeiod l0th Octob¿t 1970-3tst D¿e'nb¿r1973, Parliamentary Paper no. 19 of 1974, Pa¡liament ofFiji, Appendix 111 (a), p. 22.€ See, for example, U. Sundhaussen, "That PNG shouid tryìo play a signiñcant role inboth the South-East Asian and South-Wesr Pacifrc regions," James Griftn,ed, A Foreign polþjol dn In¿eþ¿n¿nt Paþua Ncu Guin¿a (Sydneyt Angus & Rob€rtson, 1974), p. 104; PJ. Boyce andR.A. Herr, "Microstate Diplomacy in rh€ South Paciñc,,, Autalìan Ol,/¿oÈ, *XVnI (April1974), p. 34; S. Inder in Mondøt Confeftnct Int¿n);eu ø;th Ratu Man, Ausûali¿¡n BroadcastìngCommission, tra¡sc¡ipt, 5 June 1972, p. 22; and Ralph Premdas, ,,ToÌvard a Papua NewGuinea Foreign Policy: Constraint and Choice," F,P, King, ed., Oæãnia and Bqond, i. lS4,arThis began in 1974 after Raru Marâ visited Papua ñew Guinea. At the end oithis visit,tbe two leaders issued a joint communiqué in which they denied any aspirations for ¡€gionallead€Ìship, See Ratu Mara and Michael Sornarc, Ja;nt Connun;qu¿ (Port Moresby, 2? Mayt914),

473

Pacifu AfairsThe predicted leadership rivalry between Papua New Guinea and

Fiji did not emerge until 1980, after a change of government inPapua New Guinea. Somare's replacement by Chan has brought anend to the special relationship between the two countries. This wasnot only due to the breakdown of the close relations between theleaders, but also stemmed from the policies pursued by the Chan gov-ernment-measures reflecting Chan's determination to achieve amuch higher profile for Papua New Guinea in the region. First, hesent troops to assist the Lini government in Vanuatu (formerly theNew Hebrides) in its efforts to Put down a rebellion on Santo.n2 Sec-ond, he suggested the formation of a regional police force for futureactions in the region. Third, at the South Pacific Conference held inPort Moresby in October 1980, his government Proposed the forma-don of an "OAU-style" political alliance among the Pacific Islandstates.43 Such initiatives have signalled Papua New Guinea's usurpa-tion of Fiji's traditional leadership role in the region. Ratu Mara's re-cent support for a United States-backed Pacific Development organi-zalion can be seen partly as an attempt to regain the regionalinitiative.aa

While it is too early to sPeak of the existence of blocs within re-gional politics, there are two groupings which tend to form in relationto major regional issues. One group consists roughly ofthe Pacific Is-land states west of Fiji; the other, of those east of Fiji. Fiji itself hastended to be a pivotal state, shifting between the two groups Thegroup ofstates in the west ofthe region are mainly Melanesian, andthose to the east are Polynesian. Although cultural differences do notform the main basis of divergence between the two grouPs, the labels"Melanesian" and "Polynesian" are nevertheless of increasing pofitical relevance.

The Melanesian group-comprising Papua New Guinea, Van-uatu, the Solomon Islands and, until recently, Fiji-is the morestrongly opposed to metroPolitan involvement in the region. It is thisgroup which, as we have seen, opposed U.S. membership in the Fo-

--ãno, Cf,.nt ",.ptunation

of this decision, lee itàt¿z.¿nt to th¿ Nation^! Parlian¿nt on M;lit¿ryAssist¿a¿¿ Io Vanuatu, Paprz New Guinea Office oflnformation, 1980.

a3 See Address @ thc Eowurabh W Noet Leü, Minirta for Fot¿ign Afa;ß ana þde' Paln-NeyGuin¿ø, aíd, Adû¿I; b, the Eonouraùh Mini't¿r fot Prìnary Industry, Mt Rq Eaara, Twentieth SouthPaciâc Conference, Pon Moresby, 18-24 October, 1980.

aaThis organization has emerged from the Paci6c Islands Developm€nt Confeience held iûHonolutu, Mïch 1980. See the" East-West Cente¡ Paci6c Islands Development Program,Pnccedings of thc Pacifu hrandr Conf¿r¿nce: De¿etoþn¿nt oJ th¿ Pa¿iït' Iiua¡ Honolulu, March 2È29,1980.

474

Intemational Politics of the South Paeifurum Fisheries Agency and American Samoan membership in the Fo-rum. It is this group also that has led the campaign against Frenchinvolvement in the region. Papua New Guinea, the unofficial leaderof these states, is now pressing for a political alliance, which wouldexclude all metropolitan countries. In the past, these countries haveattempted to weaken, if not terminate the SPC-actions tantamountto attacks on the continued involvement of France, Britain and theUnited States in regional organizations.as The leaders of the Melane-sian states tend to be more outspoken and more "radical" than theirPolynesian counterparts.

The identity fostered by this shared attitude to outside in-volvement in the region is reinforced by a number ofother factors di-viding the South Pacific along Melanesian,/Polynesian lines. Becauseof their more recent constitutional development, the Melanesianstates were latecomers to a regional movement initiated and man-aged by Polynesians. When they did become members of the regionalorganizations, some of the Melanesian leaders were very critical ofthe lack of progress made in regional cooperation.a6.Implied in suchcomments was criticism of Polynesian effons. In general terms, theMelanesians have resented what they see as the superior attitude ofPolynesians within the regional forums. The Polynesians, they feel,have treated them as inferior, unsophisticated-and even primitive.a?

A further distinction between the two groups of countries iscreated by their differing economic interests. Their continental landforms endow the Melanesian states with a much greater land area, awider range of resources and a larger population than do the volcanic"high" islands and coral atolls of their Polynesian neighbours. Theytherefore have greater potential for economic development, and theireconomic problems are of a different nature and dimension. This di-vergence is accentuated by the fact that the very lucrative fishing re-source, the skipjack tuna, is found mainly in Melanesian and Micro-nesian waters-a situation which has already begun to deepen thedivision between east and west. Countries endowed with this resource

-'u

B^"d -, th" .,r.hor's obse ations and discussions at the t975 (Nauru), l97B (Nouûea)and I9i9 flabìti) South Pacific Confercnces.6 See, for example, Michael Somare, Thê En¿lginS Roh of Paþua N¿u Cún¿a in World Afaù5and Speech by the Chief Minister, lloa. S. ,4.1analani to South P¿¿il1î Fotun llcld in Tonga, l-3 J\ly1975. Solomon Mamaloni's criticisms were confirmed in an interview wiù rbe aurhor, Honiara,26 September 1975.

a7 See, for examplc, the comments of Dr. Taureka, Papua New Guinea,s Ministe¡ forHealth, in the discussion following Dr. Sundhaussen's paper, in James c àffin, ed, A Forcign Pat-¡et lor an Ind¿þ¿nd¿nt Paþut Ncw Guinca, p. Lt0.

475

Pacifu Afairshave begun to consider the establishment of a sub-regional agency tomanage it, and to exclude the Polynesian states from membership.(At this stage, the countries involved have produced a draft conven-tion which has yet to be ratified by governments.)48

Melanesian identity is also facilitated by the use of the Pidgin lan-guage in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.Among delegates of these countries attending regional conferences,Pidgin is often the preferred language for social situations. As is thecase with any ìanguage, an in-group and out-group are formed when-ever it is used. Whilst Melanesians are culturally diverse, they never-theless share certain characteristics which set them apart from thePolynesian, Asian and European cultures that surround them. Partic-ularly significant in this respect is the relative similarity in physicalappearance among Melanesians when compared to these othergroups, for it tends to encourage stereotyping and perceptions ofshared identity, even where little objective basis for such allegianceexists.

Although ethnographers generally identify Fiji as part of Mela-nesia, it was seen as Polynesian by Papua New Guinea and the Solo-mon Islands when they first entered regional politics in the 1974-75period.n' This perception was based partly on their view of RatuMara. However, when the Papua New Guinea/Fiji group challengedthe Polynesian grouping at the 1978 Forum on the issue ofoutside in-volvement in the region, Fiji's image changed: Polynesian leaders be-gan to see Fiji as part of a Melanesian grouping. Developments since1980, however, have moved Fiji out ofthe Melanesian camp; becauseof its changed public attitude toward outside involvement and theloss of the Somare/Mara special relationship, it is now considered tobe "Polynesian."5o For the immediate future, at least, the division be-tween the r /estern and eastern parts ofthe region will likely be accen-tuated by continuing competitive rivalry between Fiji and PapuaNew Guinea.

IMPACT ON ISLAND.METROPOLITAN RELATIONS

The regional activity promoted by the new Pacific states can beseen largely as an attemPt to shaPe and control the influence of met-

--* S"" n*."liu.' Oepartment of Foreign Affain, Backgound¿î (Canberra, 15 April 1981).

ae Based on jnte¡views conducted by the author during a field tr¡p through the region, Sep-t€mbe¡ to December 1975.

50 Based on observations and discussions at the Twentieth South Pacifrc Conference, PortMorerby. 18-24 Oclober 1980.

476

Intemational Politics of the South Pacìfuropolitan countries on the island region. There are several aspects tothis assertive strategy: flrst, changing the power-balance within theregional institutions to assure the supremacy of the Pacific Islandstates; second, pursuing collective self-reliance; third, imposing directcontrols on Pacific Rim involvement; and finally, confronting outsideinterests with one voice, either directly or in international forums.Relations between the Pacific Island states and those metropolitancountries with long-standing interests in the i.egion-the UnitedStates, France, Britain, Australia and New Zealand-have been rede-fined, at least in formal terms, at the regional level. Structuralchanges in the SPC and the establishment of new regional organiza-tions have ensured Pacific Island control of the regional forums. Butwhether this amounts to a substântial change in the fundamental na:ture of relations between the island countries and established metro-politan interests is questionable. Metropolitan countries continue toprovide 97 per cent of the SPC's budget, whilst Australia and NewZealand, contribute two-thirds of the annual budget of SPEC. Spe-cific regional ventures associated with these institutional networks-such as the Forum Fisheries Agency and the Pacific Forum Line-arealso heavily dependent on financial assistance from these countries.Thus, the reality is a regionalism managed by the island states but fi-nanced substantially by countries outside the island region-a situa-tion which parallels developments at the national level.

In such a context, the promotion ofcollective self-reliance has notproved an effective strategy. Attempts to launch substantial regionalventures to displace metropolitan involvement have inevitably led toeven greater involvement in the form of financial assistance. The nec-essary capital to support large regional ventures is simply not avail-able locally. The continued operation of the regional shipping line,for example, is dependent on the injection of Australian and NewZealand, capitali and yet, paradoxically, the line was establishedpartly to reduce dependence on metropolitan lines.st The third aspectof the regional strategy-the attempt to impose direct controls overoutside involvement in the region-runs into a similar problem. The

51 For discussion of an "economic nationalism" motive in relation to earlier regional ship-ping proposals (1971 to 1973), s€eJ.R. Baker, "Government Regulation of Ocean Liner Ship-ping Services in the Paciâc Islands," paper delivered at the Seventh Waigani Seminar, PonMoresby, April-May 1973; and for claims concerning a "regional independence" motive inshipping proposals in the 1971-75 period, s€e F. Hong Ti'' and R.G. Irwin, "A Survey of theDev€lopment of Inter-Cove¡nment Proposals for a Multi-National R€gional Shipping Line inthe South Pacific, "Discussion paper for the Papua Neìv Guinea Harbours Board South PaciñcPorts Conference, Port Moresby, 17-19 March 1975.

477

Pacifu Afairsprime example here is the Forum Fisheries Agency, an island body es-tablished to regulate the activities of the North Pacific fishing na-tions--notably the Soviet Union, the United States, Japan, Koreaand Taiwan. Although the island states may devise a joint approachto the distant-water fishing nations, they will stiìl be dependent onother metropolitan countries-Australia, in particular-fior assistancein policing their fishing zones. Even to survey the movement of the.migratory skipjack tuna through the region, they have had to rely onfinancial assistance from the United States, Japan and other PacificRim countries.

The island states have used regional forums to speak with aunited voice on issues concerning unwanted external involvement inthe area-for example, French nuclear testing, the proposed dump-ing of nuclear wastes near Micronesia by Japan, and French controlof New Caledonia and French Polynesia." The island campaignagainst French involvement gained new impetus in 1978, when thefour South Pacific members of the United Nations-Papua NewGuinea, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and Western Samoa-made a jointattack on continuing colonialism in the region during the Thirty-third Session of the Generai Assembly.'3 Papua New Guinea's For-eign Minister, Ebia Olewale, raised the issue at the 1979 South Pa-cific Forum, where he was supported by other island countries. Onthe insistence ofAustralia and New Zealand, however, the call for de-colonization ofthe French Pacific territories was watered down in thefinal communiqué. In press interviews and at an independence rallywhilst in Tahiti for the October 1979 South Pacific Conference, Ole-wale continued the campaigr and attacked Australia and New Zea-iand for not giving their support."

From the point of view of French interests, this campaign is po-.tentially very damaging, although so far it has had little more than"nuisance. value." The major exception was Papua New Guinea's de-cision to send troops to Vanuatu to help the Lini government sup-press the Santo rebellion.ss The rebels, partly led by French settlers,,had the tacit support of the French government; and Papua NewlõJoppã"i,¡on,o French nuclear terting, see press communiqu6 for each South PacificForum betw€en 1971 and 1976. On oppositio¡r to continuing colonial involvement, see the Fo-rum cornmuniqué for 1979.

ss See "Pacific Nations Speak to UN with Oûe Voice," Pa¿iII¿ Islands Monthþ, Febn:,ary1979, pp. 9-10.

sa Observations by the author at th€ Nineteenth South Pacific Conference, Papeete, Octo-ber 1979.

55 For ajournalistic account ofthe Santo rcbellion, See Richard Shears, Th¿ Corotul lqar-Thc Criis on Esþintu Sart¿ (Sydney: Cassell Australia, 1980).

478

Intemational Politics of the South PacifuGuinea's successful operation in Santo can thus be seen as a defeat forFrench interests. So far, the French have responded to the islandcampaign by attempting to entrench themselves more firmly in theregion. In the run-up to the French presidential elections in 1981, theSecretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories, M. Di-joud, gave assurances to Frenchmen in New Caledonia that Francewas in the Pacific to stay and that the French army was ready to pro-tect their interests.56

There are several indications that the Forum-based campaignmay have more success in the future. First, Papua New Guinea istrying to coordinate island interests in a "political alliance" in orderto make the South Pacific case more effectively in the United Nationsand other international organizations. Second, as the campaign de-velops, Australia and New Zealand will feel increasingly obliged toside with the islands on this issue, and thus contribute to the isolationof France in the Pacific. Third, independence groups are likely to re-ieive more support from the region now that Vanuatu is independ-ent. The circumstances surrounding Vanuatu's emergence as a statehave rendered its governing Vanuaaku Pati very anti-French, andsympathetic to the independence groups in neighbouring New Cale-donia. Already these groups have an office in the Vanuaaku Patiheadquarters in Vila.

Whilst the French have reacted to regional attacks by becomingmore entrenched, other metropolitan powers are willing to concedeon issues of obvious importance to island leaders. This is particularlythe case for Japan, the United States, Australia and New Zealand.The Japanese government, for example, could not afford to ignorethe opposition of island governments to its plan to dump nuclearwastes near Micronesia. Its concern was clearly indicated by the largeturn-out ofJapanese observers at the 1980 South Pacific Conferencein Port Moresby, where the issue was. debated. The Conference,which is not supposed to discuss political issues, issued a resolution"noting the grave concern" of island governments over the dumpingof radioactive wastes in the Pacific.5? Though the Japanese govern-ment was not named in the resolution as a result of a British amend-ment, Japan has apparently postponed its plans to dump waste in thearea, pending further talks with island governments.5s-l4JlJ*."t;"n Department of Fo¡eign Atrairs, Bøckgoun¿ù (Canberra, 25 March 19sl),Pp. 2-3

57 See South PaciÊc Commission, Rêþott oÍ ¡h¿ TÐenti¿th Sou¡h Pae;lv ConÍd¿nca, Port Moresby,18-24 October 1980 (l{oumea), pp. 21-2, Resolution 31.

53 See Patfu Islanù Monthu, lr4iay tg8t, p. 5.

479

Pacifu AfairsAlthough the new Pacific states regard cooperative action as a

means of controlling metropolitan involvement in their region, wehave noted severe limitations on the degree to which they can suc-ceed. Such limitations are the result, mainly, of the states' small sizeand lack of resources, and by inter-state differences within the regionwhich undermine attempts at cooperation. On the other hand, thesestates are not completely powerless. Regional action has had an influ-ence where metropolitan governments have felt they could not affordto offend island governments, or where one grouP of metroPolitanpowers have supported island-initiated action against one or moreother metropolitan powers.

The metropolitan countries most committed to supPorting re-gional cooperaiion in the South Pacific are the ANZUS countries-Australia, New Zealand and the United States. They consider itimportant that cooperative efforts of the Pacific Island states be en-couraged-and that they continue to be financed by the West. Theysee support for regionalism as an effective means, in addition to bilat-eral aid, of maintaining a favourable strategic posture in the face ofSoviet and Chinese approaches to the new states ofthe region.5e Thiswas revealed, for example, in an address to the July 1976 South Pa-cific Forum by Senator Cotton, Australia's representative at themeeting. Referring to the "increased external awareness" of the re-gion, and in particular to Soviet and Chinese interest, he stated:

[T]his we feel enhances the need for more intensive cooperation on a re-giónal basis in the South Pacific and emphasizes the importanceofthe exist-ing regional organisations such as the South Paciûc Forum, SPEC and theSPC. Àustralia will continue its efforts to suPPort and strengthen these or-ganisations and to make them as responsive as possible to the needs of thecountries of the region.6o

In the following month, at the ANZUS Council meeting, NewZealand joined Australia in an attemPt to persuade the United Statesto take a more active role in the island region south ofthe equator inorder to counter Soviet influence.Gt This subject reportedly dominated the Council's discussions. The U.S. Deputy Secretary of State,

-'"

a¡"Ì*rj o"¡^¿ R¿þo a Yâaùaok tg77/78 aryùes th,'r regionatism is in fact "the Pri-mary vehicle fãr Australia's foreign policy in the South Pacific." See D.Wzrner, ed , Pacifu Dc-¡rcì npoø kaúook 197?/78: Inærþotaling Ih¿ SS Mìlitary Balazca (Churchpoint, New SouthWales: P.Y. l,ogistics and Holdings, 1978), PP. l4l-2.

æ See "A Thundercloud But No Storm Over theFonn," Pacifu Islaadr Monthlt,Septembel1976, p. 13. I-- Ëi ö." "us urs"d to 'watch Pacific," c¿nó¿ ña Tin¿s, 4 Au.cL¡st 197û aåd'Red sails in rheSouth Seas?" S,/d'¡r, ¡loming Huald, 7 August 1976.

480

Intemational Politics of the South PacifuMr. Robinson, later admitted that as a result of the meeting he was"more sensitive" to the need for increased economic assistance to theSouth Pacific states.62 In reference to the Soviet moves in the region,he is reported to have said that "the seriousness of the threat is one ofpotential, and hopefully it can be contained in a cooperative way."63The deliberations at this and the subsequent ANZUS Council meet-ing in July 1977 indicated that the ANZUS partners saw a relation-ship between regional security, economic development and regionalcooperation. 6a The implication is that regional cooperation will helpcreate a climate in which Soviet offers seem less attractive, both byproviding economic assistance and by promoting the idea that thosewithin the region should determine what goes on there. For such asituation to be favourable to the ANZUS countries, however, it isessential that they be considered by the.Pacific states ¿rs part of theregion, and not part of the "outside." The attempt by the Australiangovernment to identify itself with the island region has been evidentin the way in which its leaders have spoken of the Russians and Chi-nese. For example, at the 1976 Forum, Senator Cotton identifiedthem as external to the region and having ulterior motives-the im-plication, of course, being that Australia is part ofthe region and hasno ulterior motives for its involvement.6s

A third advantage of their participating in regional developmentsis that, in view of their crucial role of providing finances, Australiaand New Zealand are in a position to influence events in subtle ways.Fourthly, through regional cooperation, certain direct controls can beput on outside involvement in the region. In this regard, the decisionto establish control of marine resources through the creation of a re-gional fisheries agency is particularly important: as fishing is one ofthe U.S.S.R.'s main avenues of involvement in the area, it could serveto curtail Soviet activiiies. Needless to say, this fits in well withANZUS strategy. At the July 1977 ANZUS Council meeting, theMinisters "looked forward to cooperation with South PaciÊc nationsin new areas such as the management and development of marine re-

-*

g¡on rool"y, "what Russians? It's Economics That Matter," ,4 utraliaa F;nanctat RcauvL,5 August 1976.

63 Russell Skelton, "ANZUS to Step Up Aid: Council Acts on Soviet Paci6c Move," l¿¿,49¿, 5 August 1976.

6a See ,{ustralian Department of Foreign AFain, Twenty-Fifth ANZUS Council MeetingCommuniqué, News Release no. Dl6,4 August 1976, p. 2; and "ANZUS Council Commu-niqué, News Release no. D16, 4 August 1976, p. 2; and "ANZUS Council Communiqué," lø-tralian Forcign Afairs Rccord (August 1977), p. 412.

65 See "A Thunde¡cloud But No Sto¡m Over tíeîon:m," Pacifu Islands Manthlt, September19?6, p. 13.

481

Pacifu Afairssources."66 It appears that the Unit;d States has been convinced ofthe need to assist the economic development of the South Pacificcountries, and of the importance of a strong regionalism in order tocounteract possible Soviet actions. But it is clear as well that the U.S.sees responsibility for this as lying primarily with Australia and NewZea\and.6' As several island countries in the region are opposed to asubstantial American involvement, it is, in any case, more practicalfor the U.S. to "subcontract" to its two allies the responsibility formaintaining its interests in this area.

The fact that the regional efforts of the Pacific states are financedby western and, particularly, ANZUS interests is likely to contributeto the western orientation of the island countries and therefore makeit more difficult for othei interests to influence developments in theregion. Nevertheless, it can be argued thât the ANZUS view exagger-ates the importance of regionalism in this respect. Whether or notmetropolitan countries will be able to Pursue their objectives in theregion will depend primarily on their access and influence at the na-tional level.

For Japan, the primary objective is to obtain a share of the richfishing resources of the region. To achieve this, Japan has not onlysought access for its distant-water fishing fleet by negotiating fishingagreements with various island countries; it has also established joint-venture fishing industries with island governments and has providedassistance in the form of ships and training. These moves are rapidlymaking Japan very influential, because the development of a fishingindustry is considered a priority concern by most island governments.As Japanese and island interests converge, Japan is being seen as partof the region, rather than "from the outside." Whilst the Japanesegovernment remains aware of regional developments in hsheries con-trol, its access and influence will continue to be determined mainly atthe national level.

The Soviet Union has virtually no influence in the region. Onceagain, this is primarily due to what is occurring at the national level.Although it has diplomatic relations with several island counuies, no

s See "ANZUS Council Communiqué," Au:tr¿lian For¿iea Afair',Rerorl (August 1977),p.4t2.

67 Fo¡ the United States omcial vrew of its ¡ole in the South PaciÊc region, see En¿/éi,18Pacifu Island Connunit2, Hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Paciñc AFain ofthecommittee on.Foreign Relations, United States Senate, July 31, 1978 (Washington, 1978);and Witliam Bodde, Jr., "PoÌitical Coope¡ation: Th€ United Stat€s, ANZUS and O¿eania,"Baîkenun¿ (Washi¡,gton: Unit€d Stater Internatiorìal Communication Agency, 24 April 1979),PP.4-5.

482

Intemational Politics of the South PacifuSouth Pacific state will allow the Soviet Union to establish an em-bassy. This restricts its involvement to the movement of research ves-sels and its fishing fleet through the region. China, on the other hand,has been able to establish embassies in Western Samoa, Papua NewGuinea and Fiji, though it has not been recognised by three ofthe is-land states. China has generally been seen as less threatening than theSoviet Union; Somare, when Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea,and Malietoa, the Head of State of Western Samoa, have both ac-cepted invitations to visit Peking. In each case, then, access and influ-ence are determined by the national leaders; regional controls andlack of access to regional organizations do not necessarily impedecountries in the pursuit of their objectives.

CoNcLUsroNSThe fundamental political changes that have taken place in the

South Pacific since 1962 have inevitably led to a redefinition of theinternational relations of the region. Before decolonization, suchrelations were fully determined in five metropolitan capitals. Theintroduction of two new sets of actors wanting to influence develop-ments in the region-the independent island states and the newÇ-interested North Pacific powers-has made the situation much morecomplex. The decision by the island states to make the promotion ofregional cooperation a priority concern in their foreign policy has hada significant impact on the way in which the new inter-state relationshave been defined. Developments in regionalism have had their mostcrucial effect on relations among the island states themselves. It is atthe regional level that the main issues and conflicts arise in their in-teractions, and it is here that the relative influence of each state is de-termined. Regionâl developments have been less important in deûn-ing island-metropolitan relations, though both the island states andANZUS seek a more significant role for regionalism in this respect.

An important motive underlying indigenous support for regional-ism is the desire to control developments in the region, to assert Pa-cific as against western values, and to lessen the dependence on Pa-cific Rim countries. Central to the islanders' concept ofregionalism isthe notion of self-determination. Yet, while they have succeeded incontrolling some unwanted outside involvement, their efforts gener-ally run up against the inescapable reality that they do not have theresources or the size either to pursue collective self-reliance or to carryon collective bargaining. They are also hampered by internal divi-sions. The result is that they have to depend on western interests to

483

Pacifu Afairsfinance their regional schemes and, as the regional network expands,such dependence actually increases. Thus, one decided èffect of re-gionalism on island-metropolitan relations has been to make the re-gional efforts of the Pacific states dependent on western and, particu-larly, ANZUS support. At the same time, while ANZIJS intends thatregionalism be a primary vehicle for the Promotion of its interests inthe area, it can only be of secondary importance. Decisions taken âtthe national level are the crucial ones and, for the moment, are allow-ing a substantial Japanese commercial presence and some Chinese in-volvement, whilst almost completely barring access to the SovietUnion.

Future developments in regional cooperationwill depend to a signifi-cant degree on the way in which Papua New Guinea-the largestcountry in the area-handles its regional initiatives. If it continues toovershadow Fiji, the existing tensions between these two countries,and the division between the east and the west of the region gener-ally, could be aggravated. A decision to go ahead with a sub-regionalfisheries agency in the west of the region could have further divisiveeffects. Fragmentation would not be welcomed by ANZUS powers,and it is likely that they, as the main financiers of regionalism, wouldtry to exert some restraining influence on such developments. IfPapua New Guinea's initiative for a political alliance is taken up bythe other island states, it could have important implications for theestablished metropolitan interests. But, even though such an alliancewould exclude all metropolitan countries, regional programmes andventures would still require ûnancing from the outside; and it is likelythat Australia and New Zealand would continue to be seen as themost attractive source of such funding. The economic, cultural andeducational links with Australia and New Zealand' are likely to re-main among the major deterniinants of the way in which inter-staterelations are defined in the South Pacific region.

Australian Nationøl Uniuersitl, May I98l

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